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# THE USE OF GOVERNANCE TO IDENTIFY CYBER THREATS THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA

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## Abstract

*Identifying which website, Facebook page or Linked-in connection could lead to an engagement with a terrorist group is beyond the capabilities of ordinary people. Differentiation of one website from another in terms of cyber threat is a complex problem in terms of separating those that encourage and sponsor radicalization and those that do not. These claims usually exist without evidence, and almost always without the opportunity to know where social justice and human-rights support ends, and reaction, dissidence and subversion begins. By overlaying the new modes of governance (NMG) framework against sites and connections that may be subject to ongoing and persistent threats, sites can be divided into two areas. The first aligns closely with governance, whilst the second looks decidedly more threatening. This paper gives an outline for future developments in recognizing simple markers for differentiating hard core extremism from genuine community engagement. The notion that participatory governance need not imply democracy is an important element in future determinations between radically driven cyber threats and moderate media interactions.*

**Keywords:** Governance, participation, multi-scalar, radicalization, new modes of governance (NMG).

## INTRODUCTION

Within a research field that is constantly and repeatedly seeking to redefine the meaning of terrorism and security, it is surprising that there is no commensurate effort aimed at redefining governance. What is perhaps even more perplexing is why disciplines such as psychology, philosophy and politics continually adjust to novel understandings about politically-motivated violence yet make no real attempt to consider a new framework by which edicts, mandates and general order are established. Yet new modes of governance, largely based on non-hierarchical structures and highly de-regulated arrangements, appear to be evolving at the root level of our governing principles. Novel forms of communication and interaction, derived from e-governance, social networking, digital media and digital communications are now deemed to have permanent status within society. They all operate under very different governance to the rules of traditional law and order. Their regulating foundations are non-hierarchical, highly participatory, and adapt to different size and scale regardless of established governing bodies or formal authority. This paper looks at the two areas of terrorism and governance and considers the way in which the latter can be used to interpret and make sense of the former. With particular reference to forms of governance in Indonesia, and with a broad focus on its Islamic communities, this paper looks to encourage pragmatic perspectives about how governance operates.

Two types of governance operate concurrently. Traditional governance follows vertically structured chains of command, and follows a set of rules and conventions that have been developed over time using the authority of governments and regulatory bodies. Online communities, social networks and chat forums are far more closely linked to new modes of governance than the traditional hierarchy of government and/or religious authority. They derive their conventions through interaction and informational exchanges and dialogues. At face value, there is more than a passing connection between new online existences and the highly participatory non-hierarchical characteristics of new modes of governance (NMG). At a time when fake online personas and counterfeit web-content is indistinguishable as fact or fiction, the ability to depict preference for, and adoption of, this new type of governance may be useful in differentiating between the more nefarious elements of cyber threat from the mainstream interaction of moderate online citizens.

## CONFUSION IN GOVERNANCE


Governance is a misconstrued term. The term is used by governments to suggest 'good' government and to inherently embed the notion that vertically structured lines of authority represent the best method of establishing rule and order. In contrast, social networks and web2.0 sites have greatly influenced the way in which individuals and organisations choose to behave. The governance of the internet shows far less connection with vertical authority and is remarkably devoid of connection with any particular government authority, with the possible exception of censored and filtered environments such as mainland China (Taubman 2001). Instead, 'netizens' have made a bee-line for shared information and interaction across extremely robust forums and connections, yet without the established rules and hierarchies of other more face to face environments (Budd & Harris, 2009). In reaction to this phenomenon security researchers refer to the 'global dialectic' by cautioning about the world wide conditions under which awakening, awareness, activism and radicalism are stimulated within small local circles that quickly generate widespread involvement, dissent and protest (RAND, 2000). Web 2.0 environments are extremely attractive to those engaged in cyber menace because in addition to the obvious ubiquity and speed of delivery, any interaction enjoys numerous options in ensuring the capability to circumvent government censorship (Denning 2000). Clearly the governance of traditional hierarchy and state-based authority has little effect against the tidal-wave of cyber threats.

Social networks look irresistibly tempting to those who advocate global forms of governance. Proponents of global governance are advocates of a hybrid existence in terms of governance. They recognise the fallibilities with state-based and regional/local regulation and authority in online terms. However, they still cling to the traditional vertical hierarchies of face to face governance even though they hold no sway in any virtual sense. The natural allure of trans-border interaction within a global community appears, at first glance, attractive to globalists interested in governance. However social networking is not such a perfect fit as one might presume. Global governance refers to global problem-solving arrangements in far more concrete terms than the sorts of free-flowing discussions that take place in social networks. The very same detachment from individual nation states and discrete governments is also a freedom from other hierarchies as well. In fact, social networks often promote lawless freedoms without any dissimilarity between government, NGO, private sector or civil society. Global governance is frequently trundled out in a predetermined fashion to its global village constituents. Although dynamic participants in social networks laud their associations and freedoms of speech they are also collectively harsh and swift to criticize any actor (state, individual or global) who suggests that one particular set of rules has already been determined and that global society need simply comply. Advocates of a disaggregated sovereignty should remember that social networks rise up to problems more vehemently than they do to solutions (Weimann, 2007: 211).

A step further along the evolutionary governance chain supports the notion that e-Governance and IT governance might also feel comfortable in the midst of a citizenry of social network advocates. IT governance takes a parallel direction to global governance, insomuch as it actively contributes to the same initial sanguine beliefs about the efficacy and viability of governance within social networks. However IT governance is afflicted by a similar disadvantage to global governance because it relies upon the competence of information delivery in combination with a robust interdependence with knowledge management. Its reliance upon competent bureaucracy precipitates a corresponding reduction in pliability, creativity and ingenuity. Yet the sort of real world governance that governments support also serve to stifle the naturally unfettered vision and enterprise which characterises so much about the appeal of online interaction. There is a flawed underlying supposition that e-Governance will somehow overcome these problems automatically. Vincent and Harris (2009) explain the drawback of widespread technology acquisition that just because a modern communications-technology becomes more readily procurable, "it does not necessarily follow that people will be prepared to change their established practices...to interact with government" (ibid :38). At least part of that inventive freedom pertains to a liberation from traditional forms of governance.

One of the galvanising arguments with the debate about the governance of social networks is whether there is any significant authority which we can depend on. The dominant issues comprise trust, negotiation, diplomacy, and citizenship. This is often measured by considering perceived levels of diffusion (Budd and Harris, 2009), however despite the ubiquity of social networks, the conditions do not as yet exist under which an acceptable level of trust and mediation act as genuine enablers of governance. Social networks occupy a position at the broadest end of the diffusion space. That means that whilst social networks offer a rich source of widespread opinion, they are also subject to criticism from governance practitioners who place a much heavier weighting on issues of clarity and trust. Figure 1. illustrates the notion of a diffused acceptance of e-governance in society.

Figure 1. Dimensional Diffusion for Online Governance, Trust, and Authority



Adapted from Okot-Uma (2000)

## PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE

The term hard governance ‘sounds’ more robust than soft governance. Proponents of governance often seek to demonstrate the success of key governance features and therefore opt for more concrete rules-based forms of governance because they have quantifiable metrics that can be presented as measures of success. Hierarchical structures can demonstrate project governance in the form of deadlines, milestones, and deliverables. In the real world of commercially difficult (and value-laden) enterprise, hard governance is far less effective than its softer cousin. Global governance, e-government and IT governance derive their success from the proposition that a rule has been adhered to, or a date has been met. These successes are meaningful in corporate terms, and often underpin the ability to achieve large-scale profits for companies, businesses, individuals and collaborative ventures. They may even assist in achieving a range of social goals like decreasing road deaths, paying licenses and taxation returns. However when used to bring about solutions, mitigations and the avoidance of complex issues, softer forms of governance are better suited.

In areas where discussions take place between people who have been marginalized, downtrodden, and exploited, the achievement of a corporate deadline becomes meaningless. Such is the case through much of South-east Asia. In nations such as Indonesia and the Philippines, the lack of participatory governance creates a ‘hotbed’ of dissent where multi-national corporations locate major ventures in order to take advantage of low cost operations (Lewis 2007, p206). Even worse, in the case of disparities so great that they involve people convinced of the need for strong violent actions, a corporate rule or hierarchical framework may in fact be a contributing factor in convincing an individual or group to commit an act of retaliation or retribution. The aim of participatory governance is not about a measurable financially-dependent outcome. Rather, the aim of participatory governance is to provide circumstances where the rules and structures (or perhaps the removal of them) can be influenced and shaped by a range of interactions. Although participatory governance is often tagged as ‘soft’ governance, the label is a misnomer. Participatory governance deserves a tag more closely

suggestive of 'complex' or 'multi-factorial' governance. It can draw together multiple points of contention that move it beyond the limitations of single issue rules and ordinance.

In social networking, the discussions range from the mundane to the sensational. Chat rooms abound with discussions about ordinary elements of life. Mixed in with conversations about ordinary matters are multifaceted discussions from a diverse range of outlooks, beliefs and values. Catastrophic events that affect global opinion (such as the war on terror) generate widespread popular discussion fields that are mostly polarized, and often reactionary to events and circumstances. Social networking allows civilian interaction that engages less in technological determinism and more in social determinism by influencing a range of factors from culture and politics through to economic partnerships and shared regulatory mechanisms. "What matters is not the technology itself, but the social or economic system in which it is embedded" (Winner 2004, p106). Again, from a South-east Asian perspective, the cultural and political authority of the region is easily identifiable through the way in which activists evade government censorship and embrace the participatory allure of social networking (Weimann 2007, P214).

Participatory governance is the backbone of interactive social networking. It is sometimes described as weak governance or soft governance, because it lacks the same hierarchical authority structures of its corporate and governmental cousins. In certain terms the 'soft' label is a deserved label. Why involve the many when decisions can be made with clarity and efficiency by a few? Why involve additional ideas that could open up unnecessary discussions fuel wider debate, and add unnecessary inertia to an already inefficient set of processes? These are the arguments of business, of corporations and in many instances of governments (regardless of democratic status or otherwise). The regulatory reactions of governments to the events of September 11 2001 were hard-edged, swift and authoritarian (Hoffman 2006). They pigeonholed activities by single-issue laws and 'fit for purpose' rules as matters of security and protection. Difficult times called for hard measures, including the calcification of governance (Lewis 2007, p222). In South-east Asian countries such as Indonesia, there is a greater need for participatory governance to balance the hierarchical authority of elite and semi-authoritarian rule. The real value of participatory governance, however, is not in the softness of its interactions, but rather it is the complexity and richness of the multi-faceted opinions which are drawn into play.

## **MEDIA, IMAGERY AND SOCIAL NETWORKS**

Mainstream media interaction is a strange bedfellow to social networking. On the one hand most media draws attention from a wide range of highly visual and remarkably graphic communication offerings whilst on the other hand social networking draws its greatest impact from an acceptance of the new way in which communal ties and opinions are composed, posted, and discussed. Since many of the contributing links to the overall composition of a social network are at best loose connections, a dominant issue could effectively attract a great many loose ties or only a handful of stronger ties. Connections might be long-standing or momentary, yet they all count towards the wider 'community' that is accepted under the banner of social networking.

There is widespread Indonesian mistrust in sophisticated media because of its historical Western origins and the thought of being overwhelmed by all things Hollywood. Whilst editorial authority is usually assigned to the pro-establishment, capitalist elite, many revolutionaries have assumed that their communications would always be moderated, misinterpreted, or seized upon for its 'entertainment' benefit rather than its informative and educational objectives (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982). The counterargument must acknowledge that people from southeast Asia have a fascination for new media (that goes beyond most Western interests) and are drawn to social networks like moths to a flame. One critical component in determining the shape and depth of each online community is the acceptance, or otherwise, of its participatory governance. Social networks exist within popular frameworks by incorporating a range of accompanying visual imagery. To simply discuss social networks as if they only participate within the context of text-based discussions is misleading. Social networks are limited by the way they offer a loosely egalitarian basis for participation. Social networks, when examined in combination with their accompanying imagery (photos, youtube videos etc), favor the technologically advanced participant.

## **DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE**

Democracy and governance have been lumped together as co-dependent requirements of an applied solution to radicalization. However this alignment is partially flawed. Islamic groups from both ends of the political violence spectrum have not supported democracy and in fact use the term as a pejorative in the context of the war on terror. US policy continually takes the path of polarizing certain elements of community interaction by insisting that good governance can only come from democracy, and therefore governance without democracy is not good. Governance can be expressed through participation without an expressed connection to democracy.

Western democratically aligned ‘netizens’ might assume that all participants in any given social network support democracy but this is over-simplifying democracy into the participatory side of its characteristics.

The intention of this paper is not to challenge the successful integration of democratic process across developing communities, but rather to ensure that democracy does not become an exclusionary term that prevents non-democratic communities and individuals from engaging in forms of participatory governance. Governance, like democracy, surfaces from under a range of highly contested circumstances. Social networks enjoy the patronage of individuals without asking their political, ideological or religious predispositions. The anonymity or partial masking of identities among social network participants is one of the key features of its structure in terms of governance. Social network participants are, for the most part, free to post comment and enter discussions, chats and arguments on an equal basis. The same could certainly not be said for face to face discussions on the same topics. E-participants can reveal as much or as little as they want. They need not reveal gender, race, or ideology.

In Indonesia there is enormously widespread support for Islam and in many cases that extends to the Islamic governance of Islam and its fundamental rules, beliefs and values. At the harder end of the Islamic governance spectrum there is considerable support for Sharia Law (Ramakrishna 2009). Yet from the same community there is also widespread engagement in the more moderate participatory conversations, postings and commentaries that comprise the social networks of south-east Asia. To imply that these interactions are democracy has at least two significantly deleterious effects. Firstly it influences the wider Islamic community of Indonesia towards a deeper rejection of what is often perceived as the decadent and evil trappings of western society. Secondly, it serves to polarize the wrong features of what are key discussions about difficult issues. In essence, the best participants are those who engage in online discussion or website postings regardless of their views about western democracy. For many individuals and groups who come from marginalized and downtrodden origins, it is an important distinction that they be included in the participatory elements of online discussions without the fear of being branded as participants in democracy.

The democracy issue is relevant because it is strongly linked to the governance debate about whether we can encourage communities to embrace governance without embracing (or believing they are embracing) democracy. In the case of Indonesia, there is a clear pattern of participation and engagement in social networks that indicates a willingness to discuss matters that are plainly contested and unmistakably difficult to resolve within a Muslim-dominated society. After episodes such as the Marriott hotel bombings in Jakarta, the Bali Bombings (I and II), and post events such as the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta (Ramakrishna 2009), social networks throughout Indonesia have revealed a large volume of post-incident discussion in general, of which sufficient numbers of social participants support the theory that social networks sustain participation in such dialogues (Robb 2007).

Western contributors often assume that democracy is a necessary element of any discussion about governance. Even though there is widespread acceptance of the merits of participation, feedback, interaction, and social inclusion, the requirement for elected representation does not share the same affirmation in south-east Asia (Loo 2007). Elected representation is held aloft as the crowning feature of democracy (ibid). However for those whose origins lie in the marginalized and uprooted regions of the world, the appeal, trust, and perceived legitimacy of democracy is less accepted. Whilst western cultures slam democracy and participatory governance together as part of the same ideal, non-western cultures maintain their support for various forms of governance without the connection with democracy (UNDP, 2005).

## **THE “DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT”**

Despite not supporting western democracy, an understanding of participatory governance within south-east Asian communities still needs to focus on a better understanding of democratic values. Past discourse regarding democratic values have often oversimplified democracy as an all-conquering solution. However, online internet-savvy participants are more accurately informed about democracy than ever before. The “democratic deficit” is a phrase that enters discussions about governance on a regular basis. It refers to those ostensibly democratic associations (especially governments) that appear to be decreasing their achievements in upholding the principles of parliamentary democracy (Budd and Harris, 2009). Their conduct as representatives and their achievements in terms of parliamentary integrity are the topic of widespread social network discussion. Within the Indonesian social network environment, the democratic deficit is a topic that is discussed with a great deal of maturity (Ramakrishna 2009:87). There is a wider understanding of the deficit in the European Union, and a corresponding understanding of a relative ‘surplus’ in terms of democratic comparisons to organizations such as the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank, and the United Nations. Nation-states that have endured the



generosity and favor of global NGOs have a razor-sharp clarity about issues of governance and funds and assistance from NGOs. Democratically punctuated governance does not have a perfectly clean slate in terms of global aid and assistance and the mechanisms by which certain hierarchical elites maintain a globally perceived unfair advantage.

## **NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE**

This discussion has so far indicated general support for participatory governance. However participatory governance is a clumsy descriptor for the type of high-yield governance that is put forward in this paper. New Modes of Governance (NMG) refers to more than just examples of rules. The links between social media and governance are clearly evident when examined through a framework of decentralized inter-sectoral networks. New modes of governance are characterized by a complex version of governance than that of publicly discussed and privately enacted market-driven transparency (Sassen, 2003; Walters, 2004).

Understanding New Modes of Governance (NMG) requires changing the accepted wisdom about what governance is. In the first instance, NMG sees government as a single branch of governance, and not the other way around. Governance is a multi-layered authority that derives its legitimacy from a multifaceted set of exchanges rather than any one single focused point of power. (Walters,2004). Under this more complex arrangement NMG exhibits multi-scalar characteristics that appear as self-regulating cross-boundary systems. The NMG structures follow directional traits that are more aligned with ‘steering’ than ‘rowing’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). This form of policy ‘steering’ is typically non-hierarchical and shows as a diminished hierarchy. It has often been further defined as having the effect of ‘hollowing the state’ (Rhodes, 1996). These features (more than simple participation) are continually exhibited across social networks. (Jessop, 1997)

Scale, Shape and Boundaries

New Modes of Governance are notably multi-scalar. By comparison, the traditional hierarchies of nation-state governance operate within a set of specified ranges. Large scale enterprises usually interact with similarly sized entities, whilst individual operators gravitate towards interactions with other individuals. Those who embrace NMG are drawn to it because of its ability to ignore scale as an issue (Latham and Sassen, 2005). The more diverse the various actors are within the field of engagement, the greater the expectation that the value of the participation will be rich. In the context of social networks accessed by radicals, the compelling feature of new modes of governance is that any given discussion can adapt to interactions across global and local elements. No one single issue becomes overshadowed by global rhetoric. Instead, the focus remains interconnected with local issues of any magnitude. Under these conditions governance gains a meaningful foothold across social network users irrespective of organisational status, size or sphere of influence. (Kooiman, 1993)

Sassen (2003) advocates NMG because of its application in different notions of authority. New modes have an empowering quality that encourages natural leadership qualities. The participants of on-line chat conversations through popular social media come and go according to personal preference and personal satisfaction. No one actor dominates a discussion, and any and all actors can come and go as they wish. NMG does not recognize state-based boundaries and borders. In some cases that means there is an intersection between public and private organisations or individuals and large groups. At other levels it means there is interaction between individuals who are simply sharing the governance of commonly discussed values and issues. Unlike hierarchical structures that often force an unwilling response (especially in relation to rules that are born out of one particular value system), new modes fosters ongoing interaction between like and unlike minded actors. These interactions are of varying scale, authority, participation and outcome.

## **STEERING NOT ROWING**

New modes of governance appear more naturally in social networks than in other environments. Rhodes (1996) points to two main features in ICT and digital environments. Socio-cybernetic systems and self-organising networks are two key features of new modes of governance that evolve because social networks have few of the hierarchical constraints of other organisational groupings. Both fit snugly into the ubiquitous boundaries of social networks. For Rhodes this is the true value of the NMG opportunity that he refers to as “governing without government (Rhodes 1996: 667).

In most face to face networks and organisations the differences, disparities and asymmetries of its contributing actors are more clearly defined through obvious signs and physical manifestations. Each actor knows something of the others and enters into discussions and information sharing based upon those specific understandings. NMG in social networks masks these distinctions. What follows then is a self-organising approach to

commentary and debate that drives discussions. No single actor dominates - so the nature of the “steered course” is a function of the combined comments and thoughts that emerge through the social network. “The issue of whether someone lives in a centre or on the periphery of a social system is determined less by his or her place of residence but rather by the intensity and the connections of his or her communications” (Paetau 2003, p30).

Steering rather than rowing is an important characteristic of NMG in social networks. For genuine influence to curb the curiosity of potential radicals that guidance (steering) must occur organically through participation that is free from politically biased hierarchical structure. A collective guidance emerges within social networks which is informal in origin, yet takes on a legitimacy that is substantially more robust than any of its individual contributing commentators. “Steering” assumes even greater legitimacy because its direction is constantly under review and, where necessary, correction. More formal forms of governance plot a course and then maintain that course. NMG is open to the active reconsideration of values and beliefs according to circumstance and happenstance.

Human rights groups, NGOs and radical Islamic groups all draw their members from a common pool of ordinary citizens (Weimann, 2006). New Modes of Governance might better be understood to work at the edges of difficult issues rather than from a direct attempt to denounce and destroy the central core of radical impulse through some sort of ‘divine’ democratic understanding. NMG works most effectively when it is applied to complex issues. Understanding why terrorist radicalization gains such strong traction amongst the marginalised and downtrodden is a complex problem. If those who share a predisposition towards nominally accepting a path of radical Islam can never understand the value of democratically evolved values then why not approach the same people in a manner of interaction that still covets governance without the unattractive elements of mainstream democracy. A discussion played out through a social network on an issue such as the killing of innocent bystanders during Jihad can have tremendous impact across a wide audience (or a select few), where that same discussion could otherwise never hope or expect to infiltrate the inner core of radical groups.

Social networks facilitate participation at the most useful level of inclusion amongst the most keenly sought actors involved in Islamic communities. To engage with the undecided, or the partially convinced is of tremendous value in the fight against terrorism. To maintain a range of meaningful discourses that are no longer dismissed outright from consideration is even more valuable. At the same time, NMG also enables terrorists to perform what Denning (1999) describes as ‘Perception Management’ by allowing radicals to portray themselves and their actions in whatever way they wish, outside the filters and sanitation of established media. The New Modes of Governance appeal to wider audiences has several advantages that suggest that governance has a broad attraction.

## **GOVERNANCE MARKERS IN SOCIAL NETWORKS**

Social networks attract comments and postings from any and all actors regardless of disposition to radical terrorism. For many critics of open source discussion there is a fear that people would be seduced by radicals who would stalk and prey on those who might be vulnerable to a consideration of Islamic radicalization. The use of governance, and in particular the application of new modes of governance, is therefore beneficial in determining which social networks, which websites, which chat rooms and which specific associations support the kinds of interactions that draw out the more complex aspects of terrorism and radicalization.

## **DEPLOYING NEW MODES TO ACT AS MARKERS**

Given the close fit between NMG and social networks, it is possible to make determinations about specific social networks to assist in deciding the interactivity of a given site, chat-room, or discussion thread. There are obvious websites that do not need such an evaluation in order to determine their standing. Some websites use clear language in describing their support for radical Islam by precluding open ended discussions about radical Islam, and by preventing the opportunity for such discussions (Weimann, 2006). These type of sites fall well outside the catchment of new modes of participation. Sites such as these either offer no options for the posting of comments or discussion threads, or otherwise moderate the comments so heavily that truly interactive and transparent participation cannot and does not take place. “Participation is an active process; individuals seek and select the [chat]rooms most compatible with their views and abandon the ones they disagree with”(Sageman, 2008, p117)

The main characteristics of new modes of governance form the basis of key ‘markers’ that indicate the manner in which participation plays out. These markers help to identify rogue participants by highlighting an actor whose intentions might be to derail a thread or unduly influence an online discussion (Brachman, 2009). In other



cases the same markers assist in revealing the radical nature of a website or social grouping. Social networks aligned to radical recruitment sites often feature predatory online chat tactics that attempt to drag a participant away from the openly transparent threads that initially entice participation and discussion towards more controlled environments where governance takes a back seat to political and ideological motives. In recent times an emerging threat to social networking has been the tactic of creating 'parasite' takeovers of sites and networks that originally began under entirely more innocent origins (Weimann, 2006). Other less subtle markers include the links to fundraising and the requests for financial support of a "global jihad". Some sites have links to hidden recruitment and fundraising sites with complementary links to social media including Facebook and other popular social environments (Hoffman, 2006).

Markers such as these are important tools in the fight to differentiate legitimate social networking from cyber-predation. Sageman (2008, p114), highlights the misunderstanding between websites that release information about jihad and the far more dangerous social network sites that go beyond information and into active recruitment of young believers through computer-mediated chatrooms and forums.

#### Markers for NMG and non-participatory deception

- Is the process of posting comments and/or chatting on-line seamless and transparent?
- Does each posting allow for anonymity?
- Can any one participant unduly exert influence or visible status?
- Does the social network allow and or encourage "steering" that is dynamic across a range of issues and contested discussions?
- Do certain chats and threads suddenly disappear off mainstream and into private "chat-realms"
- Is moderation unevenly harsh and swift towards comments without explanation or acknowledgement of concern?
- Do any of the comments or posts become dominating rants that appear to badger earnest discussion?
- Can the scale or size of any particular contributor become obvious so as to exert an influence over other contributors?
- Do global issues get a strong showing without connection or context to local and regional concerns?
- Does the discussion continually call for religious or political reasoning?

## **CONCLUSION**

New modes of governance provide a method by which social networks can more easily be distinguished. Whilst the term government is often used abstractly as a synonym for governance, it is the concept of governance rather than its application of rules that is directly connected to social networking and media. Islamism clearly rejects democracy. The broader community of Islam tolerates the notion that democracy exists but prefers an 'Islamically-palatable' type of governance that does not insist on elected representation. The indicator of choice is therefore one which is capable of interpreting which social networks incorporate NMG steering characteristics whilst embracing high participation irrespective of hierarchy, asymmetry, or singularly dominant influence (Bevir, 2009). New modes of governance provide the building blocks for two key initiatives regarding online radicalization. They offer a better understanding of which social networks, which chat rooms, and which discussion threads are closely aligned to acceptable modes of governance. Secondly they enhance the conditions under which radically motivated actors can better participate amongst non-radical discussions so that radicalism is evaluated against a wide body of opinion. This early research indicates the need for further evaluation of new modes of governance as an effective method of identifying cyber threats within social networks.

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