

2010

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Originally published in the Proceedings of the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, 30th November 2010

This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online.

<http://ro.ecu.edu.au/act/5>

The Emergent Challenges for Policing Terrorism: Lessons from Mumbai

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Abstract

On November 26, 2008 ten armed terrorists from Lashka-e-Toiba utilised military assault style tactics to attack a number of establishments including restaurants and hotels in the city of Mumbai, India. This new attack paradigm indicated a significant shift in tactics from the placement of improvised explosive devices or deployment of suicide bombers, and contains valuable lessons for contemporary law enforcement particularly with regard to intelligence, response, and media management. There are few agencies currently geared to deal with the sheer scope of an event involving trained terrorists well versed with small team tactics, heavily armed and equipped conducting operations in any major city. This attack paradigm clearly presents unique challenges to police who will be tasked to respond to these types of incidents, particularly given the training and weaponry that will be deployed against them.

Keywords

Mumbai, India, Terrorism, Pakistan, Police, Assault Rifles, Planning, Technology, Media, Social Networking, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Active Shooter.

INTRODUCTION

On November 26, 2008 ten armed terrorists from the group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) utilised military assault style tactics to attack a number of establishments, including restaurants and hotels in the city of Mumbai, India. The name of the group translates to Army of the Righteous, and it was formed in the Kunar province of Afghanistan in 1989 with a mandate to Islamise Indian administered Kashmir, and the wider region (Duraphe, 2009). This incident resulted in the deaths of at least 172 people, and struck at the economic and social hub of India, thereby generating significant media interest (Rabasa et al., 2009).

This attack paradigm indicated a significant shift in tactics from the placement of improvised explosive devices or deployment of suicide bombers, and contains valuable lessons for contemporary law enforcement (N.Y.P.D. Intelligence Division, 2008). Globally there are few policing agencies currently geared to deal with an event of this nature occurring in a major metropolitan city. According to Rabasa et al. (2009, p.1) this incident was significant due to the sheer scale and complexity of the elements involved. This methodology clearly presents unique challenges to police who will be the first to respond to these types of incidents, particularly given the training and weaponry that will be deployed against them. This paper will not review the attack itself in detail, as both government and private reports referenced have provided an excellent overview of the incident. This paper will focus on the emergent challenges for policing organisations resulting from this incident.

EVOLUTION OF TERRORIST ATTACK PARADIGMS

Terrorist tactics have continually evolved from the 1970's when groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine took hostages and made demands, generating media coverage for their cause. Information and communications technology at the time required terrorist groups to undertake protracted operations in order to ensure that their media and publicity objectives were met. Terrorists were dependent upon conventional media entities for the achievement of such, a vulnerability that no longer exists in the contemporary networked world.

The events at the Munich Olympics in 1972 during which the terrorist group Black September took hostages, resulted in a significant loss of life during an attempted rescue. This terrorist operation resulted in the creation of specialised police and military hostage rescue units, culminating in the Iranian Embassy Siege in London famously resolved 5 May, 1980 when the British 22nd Special Air Service Regiment stormed the embassy and rescued the hostages.

This paradigm whereby hostages are taken and the media utilised to articulate terrorist demands to a global audience continued to determine the police response to terrorism. This was challenged with the emergence of the suicide

bomber, as police were no longer afforded the opportunity to isolate the individual or group and negotiate a resolution. Police are now confronted with individuals and groups who place devices either on their person or in situ, then detonate them without making any demands. Islamist proponents like Abu Mus'ab al-Suri who advocate using this approach posit that the greater the loss of life and atrocity committed, the greater the subsequent media coverage (Lia, 2007). It could be argued that the transition from siege situations also corresponds with the increasing media capability invested in the individual, who is now empowered by the evolving communications technology.

Suicide bombers or the placement of explosive devices by terrorists have targeted civilians in Bali, Madrid and London. However, the direct attack method used in Mumbai may indicate yet another possible evolution in terrorist tactics. It is clear that terrorist groups possess analytical capability and can adapt to tactics employed by law enforcement. This is evidenced by the attempts to get chemical explosives onboard aircraft in component form, rather than as an assembled unit in response to tightened aircraft security restrictions. Mumbai demonstrated the continuing threat that exists when tactics from the battlefield are employed even more effectively against urban targets, not located in the conflict zone. This brings them into direct conflict with patrolling police officers who are not as well equipped and trained for this role, as the soldiers these tactics were designed to defeat.

ATTACK ON MUMBAI

The former city of Bombay, now known as Mumbai is the capital of the Indian state of Maharashtra. It is one of the most densely populated urban cities in the world with a population of approximately 20 million. It is a city of contrasts from the eminently wealthy to the slums, founded on reclaimed land and still home to a commercial fishing fleet, which is how those who attacked were able to navigate so close to the India coast unnoticed by security forces. It was this accessibility from the sea in such close proximity to vast numbers of foreigners and India's wealthy and famous that sealed its' selection by the terrorists (Rabasa et al., 2009). Mumbai had been attacked before in July 2006, when terrorists bombed a train and killed 209 people. The scope of the most recent attack reveals the potential synthesis of terrorist attack profiles and presents significant challenges for all law enforcement agencies. Mumbai is the commercial and entertainment epicentre of India, home to the world's third largest stock exchange and the Bollywood entertainment industry producing film and television programs (Rabasa et al., 2009). It was into this vibrant mix of people and culture that ten armed terrorists entered on the night of 26 November, 2008 and commenced multiple attacks against defenceless civilians, whom they deliberately and methodically murdered.

This assault style strategy was described by the New York City Police (2008, p.4) as, "a major shift in traditional terrorist tactics". This approach resulted in police being confronted with multiple active shooter locations. The term 'active shooter' is used in police and law enforcement agencies to describe a particular situation, whereby rapid response to the incident and close containment of the offender are paramount. This required a shift in training and deployment from the traditional incident cordon and contain approach, due to the propensity for the offender to continue killing and seriously injuring those targeted until physically contained or prevented from doing so by responding officers.

To address multiple active shooter locations, including large hotels containing thousands of people, required a large scale well coordinated police response. The ability to deal with an incident like Mumbai would test the resources of most contemporary policing organisations, and would require significant increases in planning, resourcing and training to meet effectively. This requires intimate knowledge of potential targets that lie within the jurisdiction of the relevant agency. Such a database needs to expand beyond the traditional critical infrastructure, like mass transit points and power stations and water supplies. Policing agencies now need to compile data pertaining to hotels and similar in order to ensure they are can regain the initiative at an incident. According to Rabasa et al. (2009, p.3) the terrorists demonstrated intricate knowledge of the layout of the hotels and buildings. They utilised including areas not normally accessed by the public, giving rise to the inference that the operation was meticulously planned. This contrasts with the view posited by McElroy (2008) who cites an unnamed British official as highly critical of the command and control and planning undertaken prior to the deployment of the India National Security Guards, hostage rescue team. This negated their effectiveness as the terrorists were able to use service access facilities and the Indian Commandos went in virtually blind.

The police in Mumbai were confronted with multiple incidents and were initially unable to ascertain the overall picture. The attacks occurred over a 60 hour period and were reported widely on by the world's media organisations. In a report published by the RAND corporation Rabasa et al. (2009, p.3) acknowledge that the careful planning undertaken prior to the Mumbai attacks. This was due to the complexity of the operation undertaken by the terrorists, which challenged the resources of the responding police to contain them and protect the public. The challenge now exists for policing organisations to ensure that operational practices continue to evolve to meet these types of threats,

in order to anticipate and be prepared. Ganguly (2008) supports this and further advocates that changes are needed to improve intelligence collection and the policing of large urban cities.

RESPONDING TO AN ACTIVE SHOOTER

Prior to the Columbine High School shooting in the United States in 1999, law enforcement would adhere to the principle of isolate, cordon, contain and negotiate. The term 'active shooter' was coined following this event and is now used to describe a law enforcement approach whereby initial responding officers seek to directly engage the shooter, thereby denying them time to kill or harm further unarmed civilians (Pastor, 2010, p.136). The active shooter approach whilst extremely high risk to the officers involved was not designed to meet the threat posed by an attacking terrorist group. The emergent threat from Mumbai is that responding police may be confronted with multiple trained active shooters who are better armed and operating with the sole aim of inflicting maximum casualties on the civilian population.

Criminal activities including the Bank of America shootout in Los Angeles in 1997 where Los Angeles Police (LAPD) officers were confronted by heavily armed offenders following a bank robbery illustrate the scope of the challenge. The responding officers were only armed with 9mm handguns and 12 gauge shotguns against criminals with fully automatic .308 calibre (7.62mm) assault rifles and full body armour, which defeated most of the police rounds fired. This situation resulted in changes to LAPD policy and AR-15 rifles are now carried by most patrol vehicles to ensure that officers have the capability to protect themselves and the public should a similar event occur.

The fear and uncertainty created during the hunt for the Washington sniper in 2002 and media frenzy during the event showcased the pressure that law enforcement agencies operate under during major incidents. The loss of ten lives and the fear generated in the community as citizens were murdered going about their normal daily business created uncertainty and distrust. Whilst neither of these events were perpetrated in the name of a terrorist group they still reveal the challenges facing law enforcement from criminals most of whom will seek to escape where possible.

Unless the responding officers are trained and equipped appropriately it is highly likely that they will be unable to protect themselves or the community. Reliance upon a police tactical team even in those jurisdictions where police are armed can only be effective if that capability can respond to multiple threats within a very short time. The LAPD experience illustrated the difficulties facing patrol officers armed with handguns when confronting criminals who are armed with high powered assault rifles. The ability for LAPD patrol officers to effectively contain such a threat is now provided by the semi automatic rifles carried in each patrol vehicle. This enables those officers initially responding to establish a cordon, and in circumstances of imminent jeopardy to take action and limit the loss of civilian lives.

Terrorist groups operating like those in Mumbai go beyond the threat posed by heavily armed criminals and can overwhelm traditional police responses. Rabasa et al. (2009, p.6) cite testimony from the surviving terrorist to illustrate that his mission was to kill as many people as possible. This approach means that until actually stopped by police the terrorist will continue killing. This threat is now realised even by those jurisdictions where the police are not traditionally armed, and instead are reliant upon a small cadre of highly trained officers to provide specialist firearms response akin to the UK model.

However, the threat posed by the Mumbai experience has caused the UK to review policy and upgrade the capability and amount of ammunition carried by armed officers, in order to allow them to effectively confront the threat. Former UK Security Minister Lord West is quoted by the Gardner (2010) as saying:

These people like the Mumbai terrorists, are a bit like soldiers, they do fire and support, move forward, all they want to do is kill as many as possible, with slightly heavier weapons than our police have and therefore you have to give heavy weapons to the police and train them how to do it.

Lord West succinctly describes the challenge facing police who will be the first to respond to such an incident. Rabasa et al. (2009, pp., 4-5) identify the assault rifles carried by the terrorists in Mumbai as AK-56 a Chinese variant of the ubiquitous Russian Ak-47. This was used in combination with improvised explosive devices and hand grenades to create a situation whereby police commanders were unable to discern the overall picture of what they were facing, thereby negating their ability to plan and deploy appropriately. According to Ganguly (2008) the Indian government were unprepared to deal with an incident like Mumbai and took nine hours to deploy the National Security Guards to the scene in order to engage the terrorists.

According to Page (2008) the state of the equipment issued to the police in Mumbai helped to explain why ten terrorists managed to exert influence over a city of nearly 18 million people for more than sixty hours. Page (2008) supports this assertion quoting Maxwell Pereira a former Delhi joint police commissioner who commented on the state of police resources, “These casualties could have been prevented if they’d been properly equipped”.

MEDIA MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES

Policing organisations utilise the media to convey messages to the public and detail response to incidents of public interest. As such the public image of these agencies can be adversely affected, when media entities take a particular denunciatory frame regarding police activities. This approach can reduce public confidence and limit the flow of information coming into the police. In order to address this most police agencies now have media units staffed by former journalists and experienced advisors. This has resulted in a very open approach, whereby police actively engage the media and this strategy is effective with regard to most traditional crime types. However, such an approach is inherently problematic when this template is applied to terrorist incidents like Mumbai. Live feeds and reports from incident scenes where police commanders answer operational questions that refer to timeframes, future intentions, and deployment or response strategies now have the potential to provide terrorists with advanced warning and allow them to alter their tactics in response.

This was identified by McElroy (2008) who asserts that an Indian cabinet minister publically announced the timeframe for deployment of commandos to the incident scene, information that was of significant value to the terrorists. This will require police organisations to develop new media strategies and train their staff and management accordingly. Such an approach will need to be undertaken in close partnership with government, to ensure that the political response is cognisant of the challenges involved.

Relationships with the conventional media have historically presented policing agencies with challenges and opportunities during major incidents. However, in addition to the challenges posed by the events themselves, law enforcement is now confronted with terrorists who are accessing real time intelligence data regarding the police response and deployment via the media. The 24/7 news cycle generates intense competition between media entities and can adversely affect responsible reporting. The excessive competition between Indian media agencies is seen by Acharya, et al. (2008, p.42) to have resulted in behaviour that was focused on the business of news rather than the responsible delivery of information to the community. This focus on the measures undertaken by the Indian authorities provided a wealth of information to the terrorists and also informed them about those they held hostage.

Most media entities now stream live video and photographs from incident scenes via the Internet enabling anyone with a connection to remotely access the data stream. This facilitates real time analysis from a location removed from the incident site resulting in the provision of actionable intelligence to the terrorists themselves. It can be inferred from the situation in Mumbai and ongoing communications between team members, and their base in Pakistan that intelligence was being fed back to the team whilst they were still carrying out attacks, thereby enabling them to negate the effectiveness of responding police (N.Y.P.D. Intelligence Division, 2008, p.5).

Mumbai clearly illustrated that contemporary policing agencies need to be aware of the operational space that they now operate within. This space makes use of ubiquitous communications technology, allowing those involved to change their tactics in response to police deployment. Advances in social networking technology are creating an environment where video from an incident can be uploaded in real time. Social media and networks like You Tube, Facebook and Twitter allow the uploading of photos and video with the potential for anyone to access. This can readily identify police tactics like those in Mumbai when commandos began fast-roping onto the roof of the hotels. Whilst the terrorists could not physically see what the commandos were doing, the media coverage provided their controllers with a live feed of the incident. This allowed the terrorists to identify the likely approach routes of the commandos based upon their physical entry points the building and respond accordingly. The intercepted phone calls between the terrorists in Mumbai and their controllers in Pakistan clearly detailed the assessment of the tactics being used against them and directed a response. One intercept released by the Indian Government (2008, p.54) detailed instructions passed to the terrorists:

Keep in mind that the hostages are of use only as long as you do not come under fire because of their safety. If you are still threatened, then don’t saddle yourself with the burden of the hostages, immediately kill them.

This view is also supported by Rabasa et al. (2009, p.7) who posits that the terrorists received tactical advice based upon what their handlers were able to discern and analyse from the live media feeds at the scene. During a protracted incident like Mumbai police commanders will need to gain an effective picture of the overall incident. According to

Acharya, Mendal, & Mehta, (2008, p.6) the planning of the Mumbai attack was designed to create confusion and negate any effective response by Indian authorities. Following the Mumbai attacks the NYPD deployed members to the scene to liaise with Indian investigators and provide intelligence that the NYPD could use to plan its response to a similar incident in New York City. According to information obtained by the NYPD Intelligence Division (2008, p.42) the terrorists involved made excellent use of information and communications technology:

They carried blackberries, compact disks with high-resolution satellite images such as Google Earth maps, and had multiple cell phones with interchangeable SIM cards that would be hard to track. Once on the scene they removed cell phones from hostages and used them to stay in contact with one another.

This use of multiple cell phones and Internet access technology would require significant resources to intercept, translate and analyse. It would however, present a unique opportunity to intercept communications and discern future intention.

INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS

In order for a terrorist or extremist group to mount a similar attack to that staged in Mumbai they would need access to the requisite weaponry and the ability to operate undetected by intelligence agencies (Binnie & LeMiere, 2008). It could be argued that such a group would also need to operate below the law enforcement radar, unless such an attack was to be funded by crime. Changes in society are necessitating new paradigms for the collection and analysis of intelligence needed to support national security operations, and guide public policy (Sullivan, 2008). Predictive analysis or warning intelligence is needed to allow policing agencies to take action prior to a terrorist incident. However, the production of this class of intelligence is inherently difficult. It requires engagement with policy makers in order for the assessment and discussion of differing hypotheses regarding emergent challenges, prior to determining policy responses. This engagement will facilitate a broader strategic approach, rather than the prevailing policy of demands for immediate intelligence (Sullivan, 2008).

Traditional intelligence practices from the Cold War are not well suited to meeting the challenges posed by the dynamic nature of contemporary terrorism. This new environment contains a manifold of non-state actors, cultures and political objectives fed by an extremist ideology, that is spread via new communications technologies (United States Government, 2006). Accordingly, it could be argued that no organisation is better suited to enhancing domestic intelligence capabilities than local policing agencies. Intricate knowledge of local communities, offenders, crime types and patterns of behaviour make local police highly attuned to the environment they patrol. However, such agencies are limited in their ability to isolate and dedicate resources solely for counter-terrorism due to fiscal and resource constraints, thus limiting their ability to focus purely on intelligence (Riley, Treverton, Wilson, & Davis, 2005).

Evans (2005) posits that whilst intelligence should be the primary strategic consideration for addressing terrorism, it can only be effective if delivered in such a manner as to meet the needs of its customers. In order for intelligence to be advantageous, the organisation producing it must have the capacity to discern the challenges that the future may hold. Such intelligence, when provided to policy makers, has the capacity to improve their decision making process, resulting in the initiation of action that is more likely to succeed. It is this ability to take action as a result of an intelligence product relevant to the particular situation, that is the ultimate outcome for the intelligence community (United States Government, 2008).

In order to remain effective in the future the producers of analytical intelligence products, including the police, will need to understand and anticipate the needs of those who use them. This will necessitate a shift from the production of a traditional list of intelligence requirements to a more mission orientated focus designed to assist decision makers in achieving objectives (United States Government, 2008). Quiggin (2007, p.50) defines this as, "The final all-source intelligence product of actionable knowledge provided to government to anticipate or reduce uncertainty in its pursuit or protection of international political, economic and security objectives".

The primary task of the contemporary intelligence agency is the provision of quality analytical product to decision makers. However, its production is reliant upon the human cognitive element, which is often overlooked as attention and subsequent funding is drawn to the impressive technical hardware that intelligence agencies can deploy (Wastell, Clark, & Duncan, 2006). Technical collection systems like satellites, which can demonstrate a clear capability and are supported by excellent marketing, will normally always be funded as a priority. However, Treverton (cited in Quiggin, 2007, p.92) argues that more resources should be provided to analysis in order to increase the processing capability as funding for such is deficient in most policing agencies. This results in a failure to recruit, train and

mentor high quality analysts, which Zegart (2007) posits was the case for FBI intelligence analysts prior to 9/11, but has now improved due to the FBI integrating intelligence into its core mission.

It is this human element, which technology cannot replicate that is so crucial to successfully discerning key information. The intelligence community has also identified significant challenges posed by the need to recruit, train and retain the best and brightest in the current employment market. Conditions and remuneration will need to be adjusted in line with the private sector to ensure they remain a competitive employer (United States Government, 2008). Once trained these analysts may be able to recognise key fragments of intelligence termed indicators. Discernable indicators or warnings may be produced at any time in the terrorist 'Event Horizon' as discussed by Sullivan & Wirtz (2008, p.18) who classify this as the time between the conception and execution of a terrorist operation. This will necessitate analysts being able to identify targets and modes of attack and information about those involved from just about any point along the 'Event Horizon' where the indicator is first recognised.

Whilst conventional military operations take time to build up and deploy assets thereby providing discernible indicators, the activities of terrorists are more subtle and harder to predict. Whilst not advocating that the future can be successfully predicated, Quiggin acknowledges that the role of intelligence is to scan the horizon, and provide warning about future challenges in such a manner as to allow decisions to be made and action taken. According to Robert Bowie a former deputy director of the CIA actionable intelligence is, "knowledge and analysis designed to assist action" (May, 1984, p.3). Whilst structural and bureaucratic change occurs across police and intelligence agencies, it is the ability of these agencies to successfully adapt at a sufficient rate to meet the shifting global challenges that is essential (Zegart, 2007). Cultural impediments can significantly hamper efforts to adapt. Individuals within the organisation can become institutionalised and insist on doing things a particular way because that's the way they have always been done, thereby ensuring that newer members adhere to this mantra (Zegart, 2007). This can be alleviated over time by targeted recruitment practices in order to ensure that the intelligence team is sufficiently diverse, and contains a range of highly skilled members who are not afraid to question the status quo and challenge unsubstantiated opinion (Quiggin, 2007).

Counter-terrorism analysts require an intricate understanding of the environment, which facilitates such activity, and may need to become experts regarding specific groups or geographic regions. Such levels of competency will take years to acquire, and cannot be taught in a short course (Best, 2003). Therefore the retention of such skills is essential if intelligence organisations are to be able to achieve their mission. Cooper (2005) identifies that analytical success cannot be achieved by the wishes of senior command or the issuance of instructions, it can only be achieved by the correct selection, training and mentoring of the individuals who are assigned to that role. Intelligence agencies need to be able to acknowledge their limitations and decline requests when necessary, or else run the risk of overloading their analytical workforce thereby reducing the quality of the product (Cooper, 2005).

Problems can emerge when analysts are not provided with access to data from other agencies. This can be caused by IT systems that cannot communicate or restrictions placed on the sharing of information by particular agency to protect sources. If it is not able to be accessed and aggregated into the final product, then critical decisions are being made with incomplete information (Cooper, 2005). The culture of competitive analysis in which intelligence is examined in isolation without input from other agencies has also impaired the ability of the wider intelligence community to address the current challenges (AFCEA Intelligence Committee, 2005).

Harris (2004) advocates team based analytical gaming and scenario based approaches to analysis. The ability for intelligence agencies to deploy small teams of specialists against a dynamic networked adversary could prove pivotal in the current threat environment. There is an identified need to encourage personal initiative and lateral thinking, thereby ensuring that the resultant analytical product is not tailored to reflect the cultural biases or beliefs inherent in the particular group or organisation (Harris, 2004). According to Sullivan & Wirtz (2008) the military model of intelligence preparation of the battlefield can be adapted for law enforcement use, resulting in a new approach termed intelligence preparation for operations (IPO). This approach consists of a four-step process including situational recognition, analysis, divining course of action and rehearsals. This model is also designed to bridge the divide between deliberate and emergency response planning as it provides multiple scenarios, thereby allowing commanders to work up a variety of responses and assess the suitability of each. Senior commanders or government officials need sufficient lead time to allow the decisions they make to be effectively implemented. This lead time is dependent upon the direction given to the intelligence unit to conduct strategic assessment, otherwise the decision making process will be directed to an extent by the unforeseen crisis (Quiggin, 2007).

Whilst the term intelligence can be applied to almost any context, Shulsky & Schmitt (2002) advocates its application to the national security arena pertaining to the activities that are of interest to national governments. Quiggin (2007) posits that intelligence is better described as a craft, rather than a scientific endeavour. Such

explanation places intelligence into a domain whereby skills are learnt under guidance from an experienced practitioner, until sufficiently developed to the level whereby the individual can defensibly state their position based upon credible analysis. The future will require intelligence analysts who are globally aware and capable of understanding the potential domestic effects of events occurring well beyond their geographical or jurisdictional borders. This is particularly pertinent for policing agencies as analysts who can project beyond the immediate operational sphere into the strategic realm are an extremely rare commodity. Continual rotation of staff is an ongoing issue in many government agencies, and prevents the development of knowledge and experience required to effectively counter emergent threats. This expertise can't be replicated by technology, which is just a tool to be used by the analyst to enhance their capabilities.

Quiggin (2007) adopts the position that unless a paradigm shift occurs the future for intelligence analysis is not a positive one. He bases this on a lack of parity between the analysts and technical collection resources in terms of funding as well as an adoption of the military approach, which is not always suited to domestic missions. This outlook is further compounded by the culture of secrecy, difficulty in accessing classified material (stove-piping), and finally a lack of ongoing training resulting from culture that is unwilling to change. This lack of training is highlighted numerous times by Quiggin (2007) and whilst a contributing factor to intelligence failures, it is seldom identified as a such in subsequent inquiries. Whilst it is acknowledged by Grabo (2004), Kam (2004) and Khalsa (2004) that there are challenges in identifying relevant data, all are of the view that it is achievable if a sound methodology is followed and historical lessons noted. However, all acknowledge the difficulties that the current terrorist threat presents. When attempting to evaluate and identify potential data the, "ability to perceive or attempt to perceive what others are thinking" (Grabo, 2004, p.47) is critically important.

Viewing the potential event from the terrorist perspective can allow the analyst to identify the critical points along the event horizon that could provide intelligence about a pending attack. The approach taken to collecting data needs to be able to highly flexible in order to meet the dynamic nature of the threat posed by extremists. Traditional strict hierarchal structures, working routines and methodologies may not keep pace with technology and therefore may prove ineffective (Clark, 2004, p.160). The difficulties faced when endeavouring to produce intelligence assessments in times of stable international relations are significant but as Quiggin (2007, p.95) identifies they are magnified when attempting to produce, "accurate assessments on multiple targets in a fast changing fluid and violent environment". However Zegart (2007) is of the opinion that the lack of another attack on U.S. soils since 9/11 is not attributable to an increase in the effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community.

CONCLUSION

The ability to acquire real time intelligence from the media during a terrorist incident by those involved poses significant challenges for police responding to and managing the incident. This will extend to the physical access allowed to the media who may have greater assets than the police at the incident scene and the information that is provided to the media. This combined with the sheer scope of the challenge of managing multiple crime scenes and confronting unknown offenders also requires training and preparation. It is this training in high stress situations that needs to go beyond that traditionally practiced, and introduce simultaneous and seamless interaction by those at the tactical and strategic levels who are able provided with actionable intelligence product. This will require a new paradigm of policing response to address including the appropriate resourcing of equipment and training. Rabasa et al. (2009, p.10) support this asserting that in order for responding police to be effective they need to have the equipment and training necessary to allow them to engage or contain the terrorists. Such deployments will need to be supported by a 24/7 intelligence capability.

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