Governance of firms during reorganization following the Bankruptcy Act of Thailand: An agency consistency model
Business and Law
Accounting, Finance and Economics, Finance, Economics, Markets & Accounting Research
This paper reviews previous research to develop 3 key propositions which will improve the governance of companies during bankruptcy reorganization. The model is based in Agency Theory and suggests avenues for improving the performance of restructured companies by effective monitoring and incentive alignment of the managers of the restructuring process. The Thai Bankruptcy Act specifies two critical positions to be involved in the reorganization process, the Planner and Plan Administrator. These may be individual, Companies or committees, but the Act is silent on their composition. The propositions provide guidance to the ideal composition of these positions to enhance the chances of successful reorganization. Specifically, they suggest that the court approved Planner and Plan Administrator would benefit by the inclusion of a majority of independent directors and the provision of incentive based remuneration packages to managers including a significant equity component. Further, given the absence of market signals during the restructure process, where the firm is effectively protected from takeover and market price discipline, the court should ensure the adequate representation of equity holders on the overseeing Planner and Plan Administrator committees.