Title

Post-Takeover Effects on Thai Bidding Firms: are Takeovers in the Bidder's Interests?

Document Type

Journal Article

Publisher

World Scientific Publishing

Faculty

Business and Law

School

Accounting, Finance and Economics

RAS ID

4315

Comments

This article was originally published as: Allen, D. E., & Soongswang, A. (2006). Post-Takeover Effects on Thai Bidding Firms: are Takeovers in the Bidder's Interests?. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, 9(4), 509-531.

Abstract

This paper analyses takeover effects on the Thai stock market in terms of their impact on the bidding firms' shareholders. We apply a comprehensive analysis ofshareholder wealth effects using multiple methods. Our results conform with prior studies: see Jensen and Ruback (1983), Agrawal and Jaffe (1999), Bruner (2002) and Campa and Hernando (2004). Thai takeovers result in significant negative abnormal returns over the sixteen months after the takeover. The abnormal return, variously defined, vary from -4% to -6%, and -0.20% (monthly) for the bidding firm's shareholders. Thai takeovers do not appear to add to bidding firms' shareholder wealth.

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