The Treasury of the United States of America and the Asian Financial Crisis: A Decade in Review
Australasian Journal of American Studies
Business and Law
Throughout the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, and in the years immediately following, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was openly criticised by both Asian and international commentary for its adherence to subscribing restrictive monetary policy. Whilst the IMF took the brunt of often hostile criticism, this paper argues that the real target of hostility was the Treasury of the United States of America. The reasoning for this is simple. Throughout the crisis, the IMF behaved in a manner that reflected the interests of its largest contributor (the United States) rather than its clients (the Asian economies in debt crisis). New materials published in the middle of this decade (2003-2006) by leading United States policy-makers at the time of the Asian crisis provide new perspectives on the political nature of modern financial crises.
Not open access