Detection of compromised smart meters in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure
Health, Engineering and Science
School of Computer and Security Science
Smart meters are key components of the smart grid infrastructure, connecting households to utility providers. With Internet connectivity to such devices, the smart grid Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is exposed to attacks by the adversary class. Any compromise of a smart meter may jeopardize the security of not just the household in question, but also the entire neighborhood network and possibly the utility provider's core network. One attack category that may pose a serious threat to the AMI is a meter compromise attack, wherein a smart meter is controlled by the adversary, with the intent of committing energy fraud. In this paper, we present a detection model based on a cumulative analysis of smart meter readings of clustered smart meters. The clustering of smart meters is done based on the physical deployment points of individual smart meters within a neighbourhood area network. Results obtained through simulation of the proposed scheme are promising.