Document Type

Journal Article

Publisher

Canadian Center of Science and Education

Faculty

Faculty of Business and Law

School

School of Business

RAS ID

18693

Comments

This article was originally published as: Long, H. , & Zhang, Z. (2014). Listing Requirements Lose IPO-Screening Functions: Evidence from the Emerging Growth Enterprise Market of China. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 6(3), 29-36. Original article available here

Abstract

Using two multivariate regression models based on prior studies, this paper aims to examine whether the listing requirements of the GEMC are able to help the exchange to screen high quality IPO firms. It suggests that the approved IPO companies have better performances than failed ones, but listing requirements of the GEMC are unable to screen high quality issuers to go public, because the majority of listed companies performed poorly rather than better after their IPOs. This result is against previous findings that regard an IPO market as a screening device.

DOI

10.5539/ijef.v6n3p29

Access Rights

free_to_read

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

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Finance Commons

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