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Why Educators Should Bring an End to Pedagogy

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Abstract: As Australia is moving towards a national curriculum there are also activities to nationalise teacher education. This involves various departments of state and federal governments, third-party bodies funded by government such as the Curriculum Corporation and Teaching Australia, and non-government organisations such as the Business Council of Australia. These agencies are producing models and principles which aim on establishing standards of best practice for how they want teachers to teach. Within all of this activity the term 'pedagogy' is often employed to represent aspects of these best practices. Examples include 'productive pedagogies', 'new pedagogies', 'pedagogical content knowledge' and 'pedagogical strategies'. However these are all means only without any end purposes which identify them as being valuable for education. In this paper I will argue that in order to have educative value teachers themselves must exercise a degree of professional autonomy to bring their own end purposes to their choice of pedagogy.

Different conceptions of pedagogy can be identified but basically it usually refers to the 'science' or 'theory' of teaching and some sources indicate that it can also refer to the 'art' of teaching. However reference to a 'science' or 'theory' can make the term attractive to employ in an attempt to lift the kudos of the profession because 'pedagogy' rather than 'teaching' has a more 'intellectual' aspect to it – especially if it can also be claimed to be research-led and evidence-based. In ancient Greece the pedagogue (literally meaning to 'lead the child') was a slave employed to look after the schooling of children. From Latin sources pedagogy can be understood to be equated with *education*. This latter term has rich moral and political aspects and includes purposeful considerations given to what sort of society we should be working towards, the type of persons we should become and how we should live well – especially with one another. However, it is contended here that in Australia this relation to *education* has been overlooked altogether. Consequently we have an atrophied understanding of pedagogy which is represented only as a *means* or process of instructing and is totally neglectful of the *end* purposes which are intrinsic to education.

This paper is divided into three sections. The first shall review how pedagogy is being employed as a form of management for effectiveness rather than as an aspect of education. As a result it is being reduced to atheoretical activities which only offer means without any ends or purposes which indicate that they have something valuable for

education. The second section shall examine the nature of ends and the relation between ends and means. The third and final section will endeavour to argue why and how teachers should bring educative end purposes to their own pedagogies by engaging with the aims of education in a professionally autonomous manner. A mainly Deweyan perspective is adopted throughout the paper to explore these issues and to argue the need for teachers to become more involved with the philosophical aims of education in order to give their pedagogies educative value.

Pedagogy as a Means Without an End

‘Pedagogy’, like the term ‘professional’ is undergoing a contestation regarding its meaning. Invariably government funded agencies reduce the term to represent only the means of teaching and learning and neglect to offer any aims or purposes which are able to identify their pedagogy as being of *educational* value beyond simply being effective for training. For example the Curriculum Corporation (2005) defines pedagogy as “understanding teaching and learning”, Victoria’s Department of Education and Training (2005) as “how people learn”, Education Queensland (2004) as a “framework under which teachers can choose and develop strategies” (but are not at liberty to critique the framework or choose another), Robertson *et al.* (2008) through an ARC linkage project involving the University of Tasmania and the Tasmanian Department of Education define it as the “**activities** that impart knowledge” [their emphasis], and Teaching Australia (2008), who omit the term ‘education’ from teacher education and reduce teacher preparation specifically to ‘training’ are currently conducting a project to establish a National Centre for Pedagogy which will centralise “knowledge about effective [rather than educative] teaching and learning”. What these organisations offer are only what Beck (2008, p. 135) describes as “‘cradle-to-the-grave’ framework[s] within which teachers are increasingly constrained to pursue their ‘professional development’ and career progression.” These frameworks typically consist of methods, strategies and models involving learning styles, multiple intelligences, scaffolding and reflection. All of these have very little theoretical support and which Dewey (1907, p. 158), if he were still alive today, might well have described as being examples of “trivial devices and patent panaceas” because they can only offer means and are unable to engage with *educational* issues. What is clearly missing is what he referred to as ends-in-view.

Dewey (1916, p. 176-7, 179) claimed that “nothing has brought pedagogical theory into greater disrepute than the belief that it is identified with handing out to teachers recipes and models to be followed in teaching” because such a procedure encourages teachers to “dispense with [the] exercise of his own judgment”. Teachers are not to be reduced to human *doings* but are to be understood as *beings*, those who actively think as well as act. Yet how often in recent times do we witness new methods, strategies and models being recommended to be copied and applied (not thought about or critiqued through professional forums), often in the guise of best practice? Dewey was very clear that in order for teachers to be able to *educate*, they need to exercise their critical capacity of judgment making and this capability must necessarily be embedded in understandings of the purpose(s) of education.

Due to the lack of educative end-purposes accompanying the various ‘best practices’ or pedagogies it needs to be recognised that pedagogy, as a *means* only, is not educative. Indeed as a ‘science’ or ‘theory’ of principles for *effective* instruction, pedagogy can be equally useful for organisations who wish to oppress, indoctrinate or brain-wash learners. This is because the principles of best practice are limited to being only managerially effective at imparting information and developing skills and so they are clearly not necessarily educative. This replacement of education by pedagogy has been recognised by Hinchliffe (2001) who claims that we might have to “accept that we have been misusing the term [education] and start to get into the habit of calling the bulk of what goes on in our schools and colleges, pedagogy rather than education”. He suggests that we might have to choose between education *or* pedagogy.

Blake *et al.* (1998) argue that since the late 1960s and early 70s the foundations of education which had very clear theoretical guiding principles for education have been replaced with forms of atheoretical reflective practices which simply focus upon the methods of best practices and pedagogies. They argue that the demise of the foundations has not been replaced by any other discipline of study but by:

the personal (but largely atheoretical) reflection of the “reflective practitioner” [which] is supposed to do whatever job here needs doing, with the help of a few *Introductions to Management* nostrums and Learning Method techniques. In a neat marrying of the themes of performativity and the rejection of grand narratives or foundational theories, governments in many parts of the world have intervened in the curriculum of what used to be called teacher education in order to replace the study of education for prospective teachers with training in “effective skills” and classroom competencies. (Blake *et al.*, 1998, p. 3)

Certainly Teaching Australia, the Curriculum Corporation and the Business Council of Australia all fit this description of intervening in the curriculum of theoretically rigorous university-based teacher *education* programs in order to have these replaced with *training* in pedagogy which only focus upon effectiveness. However, many universities too are succumbing to this trend.

Pedagogy, as a form of effective management of learning, readily becomes a *means* only because it is presumed to offer a link between the intentionality of curriculum designers and the actual learning outcomes which are developed in learners. Sometimes this presumed link receives support from empirical data which supposedly demonstrates that certain teaching procedures *cause* learning to occur more efficiently and effectively. In this climate of performativity government agencies often attempt to justify their frameworks of best pedagogical practices through references to such ‘evidence’ which is also frequently described as being ‘scientific’. This appears to be so attractive that Slavin (2007) reports that in the *No Child Left Behind* Policy references are made to ‘scientifically based evidence’ 110 times. However the evidence referenced for supporting best pedagogical practices are not scientific but are only empirical and Fenstermacher (1978; 1986) warns against the tempting but fatal leap often made from correlations obtained from empirical data to claims for causal relations. While such claims lend themselves to formulating recommendations for teaching practice he observes that what is dominant in the literature is a focus upon successful teaching rather

than good teaching (*i.e.* educating with moral purpose as well as sound epistemology), for which there appears a dearth of research regarding this latter type.

The practises which are promoted through the pedagogies of various agencies lack ends or justifications as to *why* such technical and instrumental approaches should be regarded as ‘good’ and as appropriate for schooling and for education particularly, other than for making learning more effective. The obsession for making performance as effective as possible has marginalised opportunity to engage with the big picture of schooling – what its purposes or ‘ends’ should be. Consequently discussions around pedagogy suffer from this constraint and only address effective means of teaching and learning, never about the ends of pedagogies such as what we are educating for? It is also argued by Pring (2004, p. 15) that “it is one of the absurdities of much research into the ‘effective school’” that the big picture issues which are part of an educational justification are ignored.

Dewey (1938a, p. 67) reminds us through Plato that slaves such as pedagogues were employed to “execute the purposes of another”. So we see from this that teachers cannot be professionals, in the sense of autonomous *educators* by becoming pedagogical slaves either to the will/purpose/policies of others or to their assumed evidence-based principles and rules for conduct. This is clearly identified by Bailey who concludes that “what an autonomous teacher could not do, and retain autonomy, would be to consider the teacher’s role simply as that of agent for someone else’s decision-making, especially where such another was not a professional educator” (quoted by Beck, 2008, p. 128). Consequently Beck reminds us that as professional educators teachers should be accountable to ends such as those found in educational theory and not just those which are driven by bureaucratic efficiencies. The ends embedded in intellectual rigor can provide the pedagogy of teachers with *educative* value. Dewey argued that teachers should not be pedagogical slaves who passively conform to the will of authoritarian elites. He recognised that education must be practiced democratically if a society is to become authentically democratic.

Pedagogy has become so highly technicist and limited in its scope that it is causing teaching to be reduced to the compliant application of best principles as if these were universally the ‘best’ for all contexts. The argument is being made here that as educators, teachers must bring end purposes to their pedagogy in order to provide it with educative value. Not all teaching approaches are educative. Therefore teachers ought to be enabled to discriminate between the sorts of pedagogy which are educative and which are not by focusing upon the big-picture issues of their end purposes. This is not a proposal that we should return to foundationalism (Carr, 2006) in order to rescue the study of education from an over emphasis on effective skill acquisition for the sole purpose of improving standards of performance. What is being argued for here is that our pedagogies should be accompanied with clearly articulated and justified ends-in-view or purposes and that these end purposes must be participated in and contributed to by individual teachers themselves. In order to appreciate this importance that teachers have in exercising their professional autonomy to critically determine the ends of their pedagogy, the following section will now examine the nature of ends and their inextricable relation to means.

The Nature of Ends

In the spirit of Neil Postman's *The End of Education* (1995) the argument is being made here that pedagogy has come to an end for education since in its various forms it generally fails to clearly articulate its end purposes for education. In his book Postman claims there are two problems faced by schooling. The first is an engineering problem which engages with the *means* of how learners learn and the second is a metaphysical problem which provides the big picture justifications for particular approaches and addresses significant issues such as what sorts of persons ought learners to become. He argues that:

It is important to keep in mind that the engineering of learning is very often puffed up, assigned an importance it does not deserve... there is no one who can say that this or that is the best way to know things, to feel things, to see things, to remember things, to apply things, to connect things and that no other will do as well. In fact, to make such a claim is to trivialize learning, to reduce it to a mechanical skill. (Postman, 1995, p. 3)

Through a focus on pedagogy as a means only, learning can certainly be trivialised. Our language has become dominated with managerial terms such as best practices, effective and efficient methods and performance, without any justification as to what educative ends these means should be used for attaining. Consequently Postman (1995, p. 26) comments that "There was a time when educators became famous for providing reasons for learning; now they become famous for inventing a method". He laments that the second challenge he identified for schooling – the metaphysical challenge – is either neglected or avoided altogether. This particular challenge offers educators an opportunity to articulate and justify a *why* for the *how* of their pedagogy and for schooling generally. He warns that if this challenge is overlooked or neglected, then "there is no surer way to bring an end to schooling [*i.e.* education] than for it to have no end" (Postman, 1995, p. 4).

These two different meanings for 'end' (*i.e.* termination/completion and overall end purpose) were also understood by Dewey but he actively sought to demonstrate how they both are related. He stated that:

Likewise, the ideas of a goal for a runner in a race or of a target for an archer are obstructive not helpful unless they are translations of the final mark as an existence into *means whereby* – procedural means. The runner employs the *thought* of the goal as means of regulating his pace, etc., at different stages of his running; the archer uses the *thought* of the target, in connections with observations of the direction and force of wind, etc., as a guide or direction in *taking* aim. The difference between the two senses of *end*, namely, end-in-view and end as objective termination and completion, is striking proof of the fact that in inquiry the termination is not just realistically apprehended and enunciated but is stated as a way of procedure. (Dewey, 1938b, p. 169)

Dewey here argues that this end-in-view or end purpose is an anticipation of an existential consequence and directly influences our way of being and the manner and *means* by which we perform our actions. That is, as ends they also become embedded aspects of our means. Ends and means should not be presented in a dichotomous fashion nor should ends be considered as somehow “lying beyond activity” (Dewey, 1922, p. 154). Therefore what Dewey is signalling here is that the means of a teacher’s practice is inextricably related to her end purposes or theory – whether these latter aspects have been clearly articulated or not. Attempting to separate theory from practice through notions of pedagogy as a means only is also recognised by Deborah Britzman as being highly problematic for the professionalism of teachers. She argues that there are tensions between “knowing and being, thought and action, theory and practice” which should be appreciated as being “lived as individual dilemmas” for the thinking teacher as professional. Without this integration of thought with action, she concludes that teaching becomes limited “to a mechanical problem of transmission” (Britzman, 2003, pp. 29 & 53). Famously known for his opposition to dichotomous thinking, Dewey strongly opposed the notion that pedagogy should be considered as only a practical activity, as a means without concurrently also having overarching end purposes which include a vision of the sort of society that is being worked towards.

In his 1902 essay *The Educational Situation* Dewey argued that the reformers of education in his day tended to be too much into theory while the conservatives controlled the realm of schooling where the actual practice was taking place. A century later we continue to see conservative forces dominate school practices through government departments and agencies such as the Curriculum Corporation and Teaching Australia, and importantly, they continue to avoid theory in the sense of providing any unity to means and ends. However, they currently appear to be aggressively seeking to control the theory related to the profession of teaching in addition to the practice (Beck, 2008; Flinders and Thornton, 2004) and in doing so replace it altogether with atheoretical activities. Under such dominant political control which has as its interest the conservation of the status quo, Dewey (2001, p. 397) recognised that all that was required of teachers is “to study the mechanics of successfully carrying into effect the prescribed matter of instruction” and they did not need to bother themselves with studying “its educative bearing” or indeed any of “the most fundamental educational problems”.

In his essay on pedagogy, Dewey argued that teaching should not be limited to the notion that it is simply an application of a repertoire of methods only, without some deep and complex theoretical understandings driving these activities. He stated that “the question of subject-matter and method is indeed of supreme importance because it is the question of how the machinery of the institution is to touch human life... the question of method is impossible to divorce from that of subject-matter” (Dewey, 1896, p. 287). The subject matter of most significance is argued here not to be discipline specific knowledge as recommended by Shulman (2004) who has introduced the now popular notion of *content pedagogical knowledge*, but rather it is that of education itself which cannot be separated from the particular methods, content or strategies we use in our teaching.

Dewey (1916, p. 177) clearly considered teaching to be primarily an art rather than a 'science' and described this art as "action intelligently directed by ends." William James before him also regarded teaching to be mostly an art and consequently warned teachers from choosing to be "docile" by plunging into the discipline of psychology to provide a scientific basis to their work. While written over a century ago this warning still has great value for both teachers and those who prepare them in programs of education who believe that the descriptive nature of psychology can somehow provide the foundations of the normative nature of educational practices. James declared:

I say moreover that you (teachers) make a great, a very great mistake, if you think that psychology, being the science of the mind's laws, is something from which you can deduce definite programmes and schemes and methods of instruction for immediate school-room use. (James, 1899, p. 15)

Here James differentiates between the abstract and analytical attitude of the psychologist compared with the moral obligation of the teacher as educator seeking the good and the best for the human child who is before her. He was quite clear that in order to educate, the teacher cannot rely upon a science or evidence base to determine what she ought to do for the good of her particular learners. Empirical observations cannot lend themselves to the formulation of universal rules of conduct – especially moral conduct. What is necessary is for the individual teacher to be able to pursue a notion of the good for each and every one of her students. This requires her to exercise some professional autonomy in determining what the purposes or aims of her pedagogy ought to be. Formulating one's own aims of education in order to bring educative value to one's pedagogy shall now be addressed in this final section.

Bringing an Educational End to Pedagogy through Aims

The general problem Dewey described above was the separation from practice and theory, doing from thinking, and so pedagogy without a thoughtful and intellectual educative purpose can be understood to have come to an end for education. What pedagogy needs of course are end purposes of an educative kind which distinguishes it from others which foster fundamentalism, indoctrination and unethical practices. In order to make one's pedagogy educative, educational end purposes must be brought to it. Such purposes not only provide the warrant, justification and *raison d'être* but they also articulate a vision of the ultimate value of the education which is being provided. This does not necessarily work against the bureaucratic concern for effectiveness as if a vision of ultimate value must necessarily be *ineffective* as Dewey (2001, p. 402) argued that any "efficiency in conduct" such as pedagogical activity, must have as a prerequisite "an enlightenment of vision". Efficiency can only be *given* value in an overall understanding of the purpose of education. This necessitates that such a vision is not just an 'ideal' because being idealistic it would exist in a realm other than that in which we ourselves have our practical existence. Consequently philosophers of education refer instead to 'aims' as these, unlike ideals, take account of the practicalities in which we are inescapably involved.

There are four characteristics of such aims which are able to bring educative value to pedagogies and these are as follows: individual teachers must be active participants in the formation of these aims; these aims should be continually open for democratic re-evaluation; they are philosophical in nature; and they must address the personhood of learners. Dewey (1916, p. 114) recognised that “education as such has no aims. Only persons, parents and teachers, etc., have aims”. This identifies the first of these four – that aims must be actively contributed towards by individual teachers within their own situations. Aims cannot be provided by education itself nor by centralised bureaucratic authorities. This is because ‘education’ itself is an abstract concept while teachers are concrete and relate to particular and real learners. In his discussion on aims in education Dewey described these as being situated by the lives of the individuals becoming educated and that they ought to be co-operatively participated in by both these learners and their teachers. Consequently he warned that “educators have to be on their guard against ends that are alleged to be general and ultimate” (Dewey, 1916, p. 116) because such aims are likely to be too abstract to offer significant value for individual learners in their own particular situations.

This first characteristic is difficult to manage from a bureaucratic management perspective which wishes to standardise activities in all schools for the express purpose of seeking efficiencies and accountabilities. However, Dewey contended that educative value can only be realized in the lives of existing individuals and their communities. Educative value cannot be imposed as if they were ultimate and universal for all contexts which for us would include remote Aboriginal community schools and inner city grammar schools. This requires individual teachers to operate as professionals with a degree of autonomy in order to operate by their own ends which focus upon education, not just effectiveness. Such autonomy is in contrast to becoming compliant and passive servants of the state as reflected in the ancient Greek notion of the pedagogue. Teachers ought therefore to be encouraged to have the courage to exercise independence and responsibility for being an educator. Dewey (1929, p. 38) argued that “until educators get the independence and courage to insist that educational aims are to be formed as well as executed within the educative process, they will not come to consciousness of their own function.”

Through this assertion here Dewey was careful to qualify that it is the *educative process* which should be independent and not that individual teachers can simply ‘do whatever they please’. As educators we have a role in the process but we do not operate as independent, atomistic units. This brings us to a second characteristic of educational aims which is that they should be continually open for democratic re-evaluation. Dewey was very focussed on re-constructing society through the social intelligence of its members and he regarded the educative development of this intelligence to depend on a democratic engagement with others. This democratic characteristic does not simply involve one’s complying with the vote of the majority but rather it is descriptive of the open and critical inquiry members are able to engage with while evaluating aims and purposes to examine their proposed *value*. Consequently the aims of individual teachers are to be articulated and made public so that they can be critically engaged with through dialogue with others, theories of others and the consequences of their own particular practices. This would ensure that the aims of individual teachers are embedded in a social process.

The third characteristic of educational aims is that they are philosophical in nature. Dewey (1916, p. 338) claimed that “philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education”. He described philosophy as being “concerned primarily with values – with the ends for the sake of which man acts” (Dewey, 1938c, p. 281). Being primarily concerned with *ends* does not exclude philosophy from offering important value to *means* such as pedagogy. Dewey (1938d, p. 350) regarded ends and means to be inextricably related, stating that “I hold that the end in the sense of consequences provides the only basis for moral ideas and action, and therefore provides the only justification that can be found for means employed.” If best practices consist in the expected pedagogy to be applied, then Dewey here claims that the only grounds for their justification must reference their relationship to morality.

For Western civilization both education and philosophy emerged together in ancient Greece. Philosophy specifically addressed what the good and moral life might be while education addressed how such a life could be actualised. Aims of education, being philosophical, should offer an articulation regarding the goodness or worthwhileness being offered to individual learners and to society. This latter aspect requires such aims to also be political in nature. Bureaucratic managerialism which exclusively focuses upon effective pedagogy as a *means* only, lacks what Plato referred to as the *hou heneka* meaning the “what for”. Plato promoted the importance of this ‘what for’ in order to challenge the sophistry in his day which was being employed largely by politicians to manipulate the public opinion of the masses (Gadamer, 1986). This understanding of ‘what for’ enables us in practical terms to distinguish between good and bad, and without it school communities are without the criteria to evaluate the particular best pedagogical practices that might be imposed upon them. They are being denied the vision of what sort of society they are contributing towards and what sort of persons they are becoming. These two aspects are interdependent.

The fourth and final characteristic of educational aims being discussed here is that they have a focus upon the sort of persons that learners are becoming. The Latin origins of the term curriculum stem from ‘race course’ or running the race itself and remind us that in addition to the track or course-content being run or engaged with, the educative curriculum also addresses the runner herself, *i.e.* the personhood of the learner. Knowledge of content and methods of delivery are never enough to provide an *education*. Consideration must also include the effects that experiences have upon the learners. Dewey (2001, p. 402) argued for example that “we need to know just what reading and writing and numbers do for the present life of the child”. He called this ‘collateral learning’ which refers to the attitudes and habits that are being developed by learners. This aspect must acknowledge that persons are social beings and the sorts of persons we become determine the nature of our relations with others and the sort of society our communities become. This is reflected by Postman’s (1995, p. 18) question “what kind of public does it [public schooling and the pedagogies practiced therein] create?” Only an answer to this can provide the context for justifying pedagogies as to their educative value.

It would appear then that the aims of pedagogies must engage in the big picture issues of what it means to be an educated person and what an educated society might be if they are to be educative. In order to offer an alternative to learners other than for them to become docile consumers of popular culture and being politically oppressed or

manipulated, teachers need to have a clear view of what a worthwhile life might be like. They need to have an articulated and justified position regarding the sort of society they are working towards and even a meaning and purpose of life. Indeed to have a meaning of education necessarily implies a meaning of life (Allen, 1991). While this claim might initially appear to be a somewhat hyperbolic assertion, this is nevertheless argued to be essential if our pedagogies are to be recognised as being educative. Certainly there is no universally agreed answer to the quest for the meaning of life and so each of us must engage personally with the significant existential challenge of determining how one ought to live a purposeful and meaningful life.

Rather than focus exclusively on the economics of instructing for only effective learning or 'imparting knowledge', pedagogy - if it is to be considered as educative - ought to provide end purposes, often referred to as aims of education. Importantly these need to be formulated by individual educators themselves and not just government departments. This is in contradistinction to the focus given by government funded agencies which would prefer that their own aims be uncritically implemented by teachers rather than have teachers base their practices upon their own aims which have been formulated autonomously based upon an understanding of educational theory which lies beyond bureaucratic domination. This tension between whose aims are to have most influence certainly has implications for what it might mean for teaching to be a profession.

Not all pedagogies are educative. The contrast between pedagogy as a means only and having an end which informs the judgements that professional educators must make, can be recognised as providing an important characteristic of pedagogies if indeed they are to be considered as having value for education. To actualize such value for one's pedagogy one does not need to exclusively rely upon a Deweyan perspective. Carr (2003, p. 36) refers to the professional autonomy that all teachers should be able to exercise by their being embedded in the theoretical complexities of education. In addition to the general intellectual aspect of educational theory teachers must authentically engage in the uniqueness of their own contexts. This professional sensitivity for the situation in which one has a presence is recognised by Blake *et al.* (2000) who argue that teachers ought to see themselves primarily in relationships of care with others, where these others are treated as persons in their own right rather than as objects to be manipulated or are available for depositing information into. Guiding these professional relations is a moral vision which Charles Taylor (1991, p. 16) describes as having "a picture of what a better or higher mode of life would be, where 'better' and 'higher' are defined not in terms of what we happen to desire or need, but offer a standard of what we ought to desire". This is best served by an open and democratic environment in which we all are able to participate and critique in the formation of aims of education as the vision from which we operate. This in turn then determines our pedagogy.

To reverse this priority, that is, to place primary emphasis upon a standardized, universal pedagogy as a means for attaining effectiveness rather than upon the purposes of education, is likely to result in the sorts of teaching that are oppressive or *mis-*educative. Dewey has warned us that pedagogical theory is brought into disrepute if its means – as models and strategies – are over-emphasised. There cannot be any educative justification for such pedagogical strategies that focus solely upon effectiveness of learning as some authorities recommend through their notions of best practice. As

Postman (1995, p. 26) has observed, the main problem that an overemphasis on methods has, is “that it diverts attention from important matters” and what could be more important than what sort of persons we are educating the public to become?

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