"We Are Next!": Listening to Jewish Voices in a Multicultural Country

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Abstract

"Just because you're paranoid, doesn't mean they are not out to get you." (unattributed, multiply-claimed)

"What does it matter what the crankpots believe? It matters to the extent that others come to believe them." (Daniel Patrick Moynihan)

If the notion of being at home in one's country is safe and reassuring, the homeland and the heartland of what we judge important, then the thought that a country needs its own homeland security is destined to create a sense of unease. Australia's homeland security unit was set up in May 2003 (Riley), just weeks after the allied Coalition of the Willing had celebrated George W Bush's declaration aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, of 'Victory in Iraq' (BBC). It might have been expected, in this victorious glow, that the country would feel confident enough to return to a state of security. Apparently however - if paradoxically - it is only necessary to set up a department of Homeland Security when a country feels insecure. In a country of insecurity - and the dimensions of that insecurity were to be researched and teased out over the months and years to come - there are likely to be some people who feel more or less secure. What might the reasons be for people to feel fearful in their own country?

The discourse of terrorism has created and revealed significant divisions in Australian society, apparently unequalled since the Vietnam draft (if the size of the public protests before the 2003 Iraq War, and the polarisation of opinion since, is a gauge). At a time when the 'imagination nation' (Anderson) becomes more conflicted and less accessible as a result of such division and fear, a number of publications have concentrated upon the impacts of this changed national environment on Australia's Muslim communities. Some commentators have identified threats to the conception of Australia as a welcoming country which embraces a multi-cultural vision of itself (Poynting and Noble; Manning 'Arabic and Muslim people in Sydney's daily newspapers'). Clearly, in all this insecurity, the discourse of terrorism has directly impacted upon Australian perceptions of Australian others - and Australian constructions of Australian others - as well as upon perceptions of those others beyond the country's borders.

While attention has been paid elsewhere (Aly and Green 'Moderate Islam') to the binary perspectives of audience members who fear Bush's global policies, and audience members who fear the actions and motives of the non-Western other (typically the 'Islamic fundamentalist'); further narratives of country, belonging and security are also circulating. These stories may have less purchase in popular discourse simply because there is no 'news hook' upon which to hang them - or paradoxically as we discuss below, the news is 'old news' and is thus not considered newsworthy or dramatic enough. However, when researchers become aware of such discourses it becomes important to ask why some stories are hidden from view. Specifically, this paper pays attention to the fact that a national survey of levels of fear, comparing broader community Australians with Australian Muslims, found unexpectedly that the group which recorded the highest fear levels of all was the small number of people identifying themselves as Australian Jews. While the finding was from a sample of only 7 respondents, and while a cell size such as this is in line with acceptable statistical expectations for a sample of 573 (see below), another 63 people identifying as Jewish voluntarily contacted the research team when they heard about the survey, with the aim of expressing their views. A further eighteen people, expressing extreme anti-Semitic sentiments, also voluntarily contacted the team. As indicated above, the Chief Investigator who was the contact point for responses to the survey, 81 constructed Jewishness and Jewish identity as a relevant prompt for their comment.

In terms of the original project, 750 people were interviewed over the telephone and agreed to complete a survey assessing their levels of fear. The survey is reported elsewhere (Aly and Balnaves 'They want us to be afraid'; Aly, Balnaves and Chalon). Of these 750 respondents, Australian Muslims were disproportionately sampled with 177 respondents identifying themselves in this way (although only 105 interviewees actually gave their faith as Islamic indicating that a significant proportion might have been secular, or non-practicing, Australian Muslims). This community was over-represented in order to obtain a statistically robust sample for analysing discourses of terrorism and the other. Thus the respondents who did not identify as Islamic represented 573 interviewees, and the 7 Jewish respondents constituted over 1% of these, which - given a proportion of secular and non-religious Jews - may tie in with the 0.4% of 2006 Census respondents giving their religion as Jewish (ABS). These small Jewish Census numbers have to be read with caution. It is not unusual for respondents to censuses who are fearful of possibly unpredictable futures to not disclose their religious or cultural affiliation. Nonetheless, this is clearly not a statistically-significant sample. It was to avoid such small numbers that the survey had been set up to over-sample Muslim respondents in terms of their proportional representation in the Australian population.

The proportion of respondents to the fear survey identifying with major religious groupings was:

Religion (Question 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both - 118</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While it was not self-evident prior to undertaking this research that Australian Muslims would necessarily present as more fearful than broader community Australians, this is in fact what happened. The results from Australian Jews and the overwhelmingly Jewish-focused public responses to the survey, however, were totally unexpected by the researchers - none of whom is Jewish.

Green and Balnaves invited Bloustien, a cultural anthropologist, to join them in interrogating these issues around Jewish-ness in Australia. The authors started by exploring several related questions in this preliminary paper: firstly, whether these findings might be representative of a generalisable outcome and, if so, the factors which might explain it. Secondly, why these findings had been so unexpected to the researchers in a study of Australian community perceptions of fear: what clues might have been overlooked and why? Thirdly, how could we start to unravel the complex emotion of fear and understand what it means for different citizens and communities in contemporary Australia?

As indicated above, the majority of the 92 calls from Perth and interstate, enquiring about the survey while it was being conducted and when it had a high news profile, were from Jewish (63) and overtly anti-Semitic (18) members of the community. The latter were from those who insisted that it was the Jewish population of Australia that was responsible for the terror started on 9/11, thus tapping into one of the many conspiracy theories that circulate in the electronic and digital media:

In addition to causing massive loss of life, the attacks spawned a host of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that implicated the Jews and Israel in the bloodshed. As it turns out, these canards were not fleeting expressions of paranoid fantasy that dissipated once they were debunked. On the contrary, nearly five years later, the various 'Jews-did-it' scenarios emanating from the wreckage of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have proven stubbornly resilient. 'If anything, they're flourishing,' says Chip Berger, senior analyst at Political Research Associates, a liberal think tank based in Somerville, Mass. (Greenberg)

The callers to the University would not have had to look very far to find what they took to be 'documentary proof' offered for Jewish perfidy. Anti-Semitic websites offer 'evidence' for a range of theories, including that there was an international Jewish conspiracy, with identified United States Senators as part of the conspiracy. Barkun argues that these anti-Semitic explanations represent a "closed system of ideas that is structured so that it is impossible to disprove" (Barkun; Pipes 'Conspiracy', 'Hidden hand').

The 81 Jewish-related calls from the community noted above do not count as a statistically representative probability sample of any defined sampling frame.
However, they highlight the fact that Jewish communities are a section of the Australian population who, historically, have had an interest in shifts in public opinion that lead to social isolation. The first enquiry to Mark Balnaves following national publicity about the survey was from an elderly Australian Jewish Perth resident. He had heard about the survey from friends and was concerned that public opinion in Australia was turning against those who were perceived as different. His comment was "We are next!"

Although the kinds of fears expressed by members of Australia's Muslim communities have been discussed elsewhere (Exploding media myths), part of thegenesis of this anxiety is that fear is located in the inability of some communities to see their experiences and perceptions reflected in mainstream media coverage. According to Noelle-Neumann ('Spiral of silence', 'Turbulences'), people who think they represent a minority view tend to keep quiet in public debates, whereas those who think they represent a majority opinion feel free to express their views known. As new public debates are mass mediated (and are rarely conducted in sole interpersonal contexts in modern societies), most people have no way of finding out what the majority's thoughts are other than relying on news coverage and public opinion polls. People make judgements about whether they are in the majority or a minority concerning a specific issue and if they think they are in the minority, and the issue is important to them, they will often keep silent for fear of social isolation. Public opinion polls, interestingly, cannot for the most part pick up the spiral of silence because people are responding to their perceptions of what the majority think, or against the questions the pollster has put (Altheide; Fletcher; Foyle).

With the departure of the Howard Government 'fear' is not simply 'old news'. The elderly Jewish caller, afraid that his community was in trouble, may not be part of a 'representative sample' but he certainly represents himself. The fear survey was designed to elicit a fairly quick overview against a summative scale of people's sense of fearfulness within the community. In truth, the results should -- in a country like Australia -- show almost no-one perceiving themselves as fearful of living in our society.

Why might Jewish people particularly feel so fearful in their own country? In a rush to respond to changing perceptions of Australian Muslims in the aftermath of the Tampa incident (August 2001) and the 9/11 attacks on the US, studies such as Dunn and Mahtani's ('Media representations of ethnic minorities') indicated that more than 80% of Ausralians believed beliefs about the nature of the Arab are false. The (very small sample of) Australian Jewish respondents registered highly on the fear scale ties in with the discomforts indicated by Dunn and Mahtani's study, and a possibly generalised concern with the sense of a nation polarising around factors of ethnicity, culture and religion (rather than taking these for granted as everyday differences). In this respect it might be said that Australian Jews were equally concerned, along with Australian Muslims, but this is not necessarily so, and was certainly not what was indicated in the public responses to Mark Balnaves. The disproportionate response to the survey findings indicated that Australian Jews were fearful because there were one or two extreme groups of Australian Muslims. Even though the media and commentary predominantly focused on Muslim identities, it seemed to be the case that people identifying with Judaism felt equally -- or, possibly, even more -- isolated than Muslims did.

When considering the reasons for the high levels of fear expressed by the Jewish respondents and the later voluntary callers who identified as Jewish, it is relevant to acknowledge the ongoing existence and impact of anti-Semitism. Indeed, clear evidence of such anti-Semitism was also offered in the form of the 18 anti-Semitic calls made to Mark Balnaves by people who saw Jews and Jewish influences as being behind the 9/11 atrocities. We can address the impacts of anti-Semitism under two main headings:

a) Self-perception: historical experience and contemporary experience;

b) Framing as outsiders and labelling by others: discourses of difference.

Self-Perception: Historical Experience

Many if not most of the Jewish population in Australia -- perhaps including the elderly caller whose comment is contained in the title of this paper -- would be living through the experience of the Holocaust and Second World War for the first time. The Holocaust, the Holocaust, the Holocaust! When the first of the former German community members came back from the concentration camps in 1945, the acrimony between Jewish and Nazi Germany, nor did it stop at the end of the Second World War. In fact, some of the worst state-sanctioned examples of Jewish persecution occurred in Europe after 1945 (Geller; Stephen Roth Institute). "Representative statistical sample" but he certainly represents himself, as the other callers represented themselves. The fear survey was designed to elicit a fairly quick overview against a summative scale of people's sense of fearfulness within the community. In truth, the results should -- in a country like Australia -- show almost no-one perceiving themselves as fearful of living in our society.

http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/rt//printerFrien...
Attacks do not have to be physical to have the effect of raising anxiety in a smaller community and creating a sense of exclusion from the broader community. On 6 April 2002, an open letter was published in The Guardian (Guardian, ‘More pressure for Mid-East peace’). It called for a international boycott of all cultural and religious events in the Israeli government, negotiations with the Palestinians, along the lines proposed by the Bush administration and plans including most recently that sponsored by the Saudis and the Arab League.” That call was echoed in Australia, with a number of high profile Australian academics also calling for boycotts. These resolutions are part of an ongoing series which Julius and Dershowitz describe as “an act of violence, though of a paradoxical kind – one of recoi and expulsion rather than assault.”

### Jewish Diasporic Identities

As with almost every cultural group apart from those living in their traditional lands, communities which identify as Jewish regard themselves as belonging to a (global) diaspora. That is, Australian (local) members of the Jewish diaspora consider they are “living away from the geographical region identified as the heartland of [their] cultural tradition” (Green 130). While Australia’s Jewish community may feel themselves to be more or less well integrated within their host nation, the notion of diaspora functions as a discourse to construct the diasporic nation in ways analogous to Anderson’s imagined community. Given (as we have suggested earlier) that people who perceive themselves as being ‘othered’ may band together to protect the identity which feels most threatened, it may not be surprising that some Australian Jews indicate an attenuated sense of security.

Friedman argues that “the processes that create the context in which identity is practiced constitute a global arena of potential identity formation” (117). Here he foregrounds the work of the individual subject in drawing upon a range of influences to construct personal histories which inform the practices of the self. Processes involving identity formation include such socially-constructed parameters as age, gender, class, ethnicity, cultural context, sexual orientation and religious affiliation. Dayan argues that the construction of a diasporic identity balances discourses generated within the global diasporic community with those produced elsewhere – including discourses emanating from the local (‘host’) country which may be more or less positive. Identity creation is an ongoing individual activity which produces the individual subject through the negotiation of the range of alternative discourses. Some aspects of available discursive identities will be appropriated while others will be confronted or rejected. Within these contexts, people can be seen to practice a range of identities.

Dayan highlights the work of what he terms “particularist media” in constituting a “micro public sphere” (103) which include physical and symbolic elements and understandings circulating among participants. These constructed understandings integrate the global identity in the context of a shared past. To such media can be added everyday practices – such as those of cooking and eating – and rite of passage rituals marking birth, coming of age, marriage and death. Relevant elements of material and social culture include newsletters, icons, photographs, travel, worship, meetings and gatherings and web-based interactions – often consumed in a local context. The aim of particularist media in a diasporic community, argues Dayan, “is not to create new identities but to prevent the death of existing ones” (110). In an environment where difference has been made problematic, engagement with such media and participation in such practices may increase the tension between the global and the local; and between the diaspora and the host nation of which they are a part and in which they live. This is not to presume the homogeneity of the Australian Jewish community. It is true that diversity exists within the community, but it is also the case that many of those who identify as members of the Jewish diaspora construct those who are ‘othered’ as engaging in specific practices through which the community may be identified. These practices include what Dayan refers to as the ‘rediscovery’ or ‘reinvention’ of tradition. They integrate the historic and local Jewish community over time and across space – differentiating that community from some dominant traditions of the local, Australian nation.

### Framing as Outsiders and Labelling by Others: Discourses of Difference

Possibly one of the greatest reasons for Australian Jewish communities’ sense of unease and sense of being outsiders is the framing and labelling that occurs in popular discourses circulated in the media. As our accounts of assumed Jewish political ‘influence’ and wealth have the effect of creating a fictionalised homogenised (caricatured) Jewish identity at the expense of the real Australian citizen who also happens to be Jewish. While the possession of influence and wealth is undoubtedly true for many Australians from other ethnic and cultural backgrounds, the kind of libels to which Jewish Australians are subjected include the circulation of published virulent anti-Semitic literature (for example ‘The Protocols of the Elders of Zion’, a forgery that claims to describe a secret Jewish conspiracy for world domination which is still promoted and offered as evidence supporting anti-Semitism in many countries today: Jacobs and Weitzman).

The lack of knowledge by the wider Australian community of the diversity and nature of Jewish culture, and perceived misunderstandings about Israeli society, impact on how Jewish Australian citizens can feel ‘othered’ in their everyday social encounters. Most non-Jewish Australians do not realise the breadth of ethnic backgrounds represented under the term ‘Jewish’. For example, while Jewish communities frequently self-identify as coming from Ashkenazi (originally German speaking) or Sephardic (originally Spanish speaking) backgrounds, these definitions themselves fail to record the diversity of communities from Hungary, Poland, Russia, Eastern Europe, France, Italy, North Africa, Turkey, Asia Minor, the Netherlands, England, North and South America, Germany, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, India, the US, Israel and more recently arrived Ethiopian Jewry, as well as those people who through intermarriage and conversion originate from far East Asia. Within these mixed populations are communities which identify with particular religious traditions such as Hassidic, Orthodox, Progressive, Reform, Re-constructionist and also those who consider themselves secular but who still identify with Jewish culture and tradition. As demonstrated in the research with Australian Muslims (Aly and Green, ‘Less than equal’), the complexity of what lies behind the simplicity of labels is important as we consider why some groups are far more fearful than others in Australia.

### The Role of the Media in Framing the ‘Other’

In their report of the classic Project Revere study, DeFleur and Larsen (‘The flow of information’) show that as stimulus intensity – the repetition of a message – increases, the proportion of people who get the information will also increase but not in direct proportion to the increasing number of repetitions. Doubling the number of exposures does not translate to doubling the number of people in the know. Arguably, stimulus intensity also affects the half-life of information and knowledge – lessons learned painfully, and often, become deeply ingrained and it may be hard to move on from these; even given a change of country, a new start, or even a new generation.

We are aware that perceptions of risk are firmly linked to bio-social markers. Lupton and Tulloch (‘Risk is part of your life’) point to the growing body of sociological research that investigates ways in which people respond to risk and identified that factors such as “gender, age and sexual identity [were implicated] in structuring risk perceptions.” Noting that historical experiences can heighten a sense of risk for an Australian community in the present, in the absence of specific drivers for this, is significant since many cultural studies approaches to dealing with contemporary political issues may not fully acknowledge the creation of new understandings through the integration of news and information with existing historical and cultural knowledges shared within the diasporic community.

Cultivation theory (Shanahan and Morgan) can explain some aspects of the phenomenon of pervasive fear, as do Cohen’s theories about moral panics. What we tell ourselves about the causes, consequences and cures of fear constitutes a significant proportion of the media product currently consumed by Australian audiences. Popular culture examples of this discourse of fear include Channel 7’s ratings leader Border Security, ‘Australia’s frontline’ in the quest for a secure homeland. To a diasporic community it constructs itself as having a particular experience of isolation and exclusion – whether in Australia or abroad – continual media repetition of the fear motif would be an invitation to a spiral of concern.

In Western democracies like Australia the mass media have considerable freedom accorded them in the expectation that they will both diffuse political information and act as watchdogs on the conduct of the political bodies – governments, departments, institutions and the like. At the same time, formal attempts to build reassurance (‘Alert but not alarmed’) may backfire. Gilroy, for example, found that government messages of reassurance have often failed because the context in which they were put forward did not take into account the need to be received is poorly understood at a sub-cultural level. While most of the work on diffusion of information focuses either on ‘mass media’ environments or on ‘interpersonal’ contexts, few studies have explored the intersection of both and how adoption and diffusion relate to democratic processes (Bilalves et al; Goot; Manning, ‘Voting behaviour’). Clearly, however, the processes by which information is adopted and diffused have an important effect on how public opinion is formed within communities. In the Australian context, an understandable recent research focus on Australian Muslims should not obscure the reletence of pervasive fears which deeply concern Australian Jews. While it is precipitate to suggest ways to address this fear at present, acknowledging and regretting its existence is a small first step.

### References


