1999

Man makes man: a study of uplifting and upbuilding in the novels of Joseph Furphy

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Man Makes Man:  
A Study of *Uplifting* and *Upbuilding*  
in the Novels of Joseph Furphy.

by

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A Thesis submitted for the Award of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in English Studies.

at the Faculty of Community Services,  
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Perth, Western Australia.

Date of Submission: 28th of May, 1999.
Abstract.

In a letter to Kate Baker, circa November 1910, Furphy wrote, 'but ain't it anomalous that the erratic G.H [Grant Hervey], the saintly Dr. Strong, and the perverse T.C. [Tom Collins] should be working strenuously toward the same goal, namely, the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:259. My italics). This thesis is an investigation of the ideas of uplifting and upbuilding, and their relevance to Tom Collins and his concerns. The reason for Furphy waiting so long to lay bare his designs can only be speculated. Rather than accepting the general critical stance that Collins is unreliable, and that Furphy meticulously sets out to expose his flaws, this thesis argues that this is not the case. Since he distanced himself publicly from his own novels, refusing to have authorship credited to his name, Furphy wanted his readers to respond to Collins not as his literary creation, but as a fully developed and self-reliant identity capable of setting an example of what it means to uplift and upbuild a national community.

The ideas of uplifting and upbuilding are simple enough to comprehend. Yet a proper appreciation of their scope in the novels requires a careful consideration of the historical context which links Collins to many issues of the 1880s. The chief issue is the textual construction of an Australian identity vis-à-vis an Anglo-Australian identity, and the influence literature has on the common mind. Because of his involvement with uplifting, upbuilding and self-reliance, there is a complexity to Tom Collins that is the result of his being the implied author, controlling the selection of characters and their narratives, as well as his own self-image, in the novels. The thesis argues that Collins' representation of "Collins", and other characters in the Riverina, is designed to represent the "right" qualities for an Australian character or type, which is consistent with uplifting and upbuilding. For these reasons, the novels are considered as Collins' strategic response to the contemporary representations of life in terms of their value to the search for meaning, and to ways of seeing and responding to the good of an Australian life.
Indeed, the character of Tom Collins is very much concerned with personal and communal well-being in an environment of colonial loyalties, rivalry and division, and a landscape often categorized as exotically cruel or dangerous. Because this is so, Collins is concerned with the value of education, with the value of notable Western thinkers and artists, and with the shifting of ignorance for better judgment. He is also concerned with the benefits of democracy and the democratic temper over aristocracy and its emphasis on class and station. Collins is quite a modern thinker, deeply concerned with actions and consequences in art and life. He is a modern thinker because he believes, as Paine, Emerson and Whitman do, that the idea of natural rights is the cornerstone of moral progress for civilization, but only if men and women accept and practise the civil rights that necessarily come with the pursuit of liberty, fraternity, equality and happiness.
Declaration.

I certify that this thesis does not, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

(i) incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education;

(ii) contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text; or

(iii) contain any defamatory material.

Signed:

Date: 28-05-1999
Acknowledgements.

I wish to extend my deepest gratitude to my supervisors, Professor Andrew Taylor and Dr. Jill Durey, for their continued support and critical appraisal of this work. Their skills and knowledge are, without a doubt, of great value to the academic community and the community at large.

I also feel the need to extend the self-same gratitude to Dr. Alan Tapper. Although he was not my supervisor, he has left a permanent mark on my thought, namely that wisdom is the goal of any inquiry.

I would equally like to thank the staff at the library on the Mt. Lawley campus for their excellent services, as well as their many diplomatic reminders regarding overdue books.

I think many will agree that living with a postgraduate student engaged in research is not an easy one, and no amount of words will ever express the love I feel for my wife, Jo-Anne. Her patience is a godsend.

On this personal note, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my recently deceased dog, Zeus, for his companionship and frequent demand for walks. Without you, my friend, the hurdles would have been greater than they were.

And finally, I offer this work to the spirit and wisdom of Joseph Furphy: half bushman, half bookworm, full genius.
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Introduction: remarks on unreliable narration and the direction of the thesis.

Since this thesis investigates what Furphy meant by the nationalist ideas of *uplifting* and *upbuilding*, one of the key aims is to tease out the complexity of Furphy's creation, Tom Collins. During my research, I became increasingly dissatisfied with the traditional view that Tom Collins is simply an unreliable narrator, and that Furphy intervenes in the novels quite regularly in order to foreground the blindness of his narrator to the actual state of affairs in the "world" around him. Simply put, Furphy shows his readers that Tom Collins is an inept chronicler of life by providing the clues which Collins does not notice during his observations, despite the fact that these clues occur right before his eyes. Collins is an observer, but he is not observant, and by aligning ourselves with Furphy we are privy to Collins' inadequacies and mistakes, making the necessary connections Collins fails to make.

There are two important points underpinning this view, namely Furphy's 1903 review of the novel and Wayne Booth's idea of the unreliable narrator. In the last paragraph of the review, Furphy states that '[u]nderneath this obvious dislocation of anything resembling continuous narrative run several undercurrents of plot, manifest to the reader, though ostensibly unnoticed by the author' (1969:130). According to Booth's (1983:158-159) view, an unreliable narrator is a main character whose observations and opinions of the world run contrary to the observations and opinions expressed by the implied author, who represents the core values of the text. The idea of the implied author, for Booth (1983:73-75), is the result of a need to distance the *real* author from his or her text, and therefore avoid the issue of having to determine whether or not the core values of the text are, for proper appreciation, sincere or insincere with the *real* author's life.

Because of this idea of the unreliable narrator, critical opinion has generally taken the last paragraph of the 1903 review to be Furphy's way of making his readers aware that there are things they should notice which Collins does not. In this sense, critics have
implicitly identified Collins with Booth's idea of the unreliable narrator, while Furphy is identified with both the real and implied author. There are, however, problems with this view. Firstly, as I will discuss in my thesis, Furphy, in light of A.G. Stephens and William Cathels' perplexity with *Such is Life*, wrote the review in order to alert future readers to be observant rather than expect a traditional narrative structure in which they could relax and enjoy the ride. Also, it is important to bear in mind that Stephens had asked Furphy to write a synopsis of *Such is Life*, which would be published in *The Bulletin*, but he instead wrote a review. I do not think that Furphy could not distinguish the meaning of these two words, and it is for this reason that I believe the review to be a carefully designed piece of insight into his creation, Tom Collins, and the core values he represents.

Secondly, despite being the author, Furphy wrote his review as a reviewer of *Such is Life*, making no mention of his being either the real or implied author. Furphy did not write that there were several undercurrents of plot ostensibly unnoticed by the narrator. In other words, Furphy is determined to manufacture a distance between himself and his creation. He is careful to attribute authorship to Tom Collins, and he makes this clear several times in the review. Indeed, the situation is such that it seems more than likely that Furphy intended readers to accept Collins as the real author. The 1903 review strongly supports this situation, as does the textual fact that *Such is Life* is penned by Collins from his supposedly real life observations in a contemporary brand of pocket diaries, namely Letts. Although I do look at the issue of distance between Furphy and Collins towards the close of chapter two, my main concern is to examine Collins' status as the implied author of the novels, rather than the intended real author.

Thirdly, if Furphy is taken to be the implied author, then how do these critics explain Collins' many discussions of his own authorship in the novels? To say that the implied authorial voice belongs to Furphy while the narratorial voice belongs to Collins is to make a rather odd distinction between the "I" of the implied author and the "I" of the narrator, especially since the texts give us no necessary indication of such a distinction within their first-person structure. Booth states that 'Flaubert is right in saying that
Shakespeare does not barge clumsily into his works' (1983:75), and readers need to apply the same observation to Furphy. In short, Furphy wanted readers to see Collins as the implied author.

As I will show in my thesis, Furphy refused to have authorship attributed to him, even though A.G. Stephens had made this request. With the exception of the short story, 'O'Flaherty's Troubles', Furphy's name did not appear on any of his work until 1916, four years after his death, when Kate Baker edited a book of his poetry, which was published by the Lothian Book Publishing Company and had been subtitled "Tom Collins, author of Such is Life" (Croft, 1991:265). But this subtitle is much more indicative of Baker's desire to have Furphy publicly recognised as an author rather than fulfil what Furphy would have actually wanted himself. By placing Furphy's name on the cover of each novel, as publishers have done with modern versions, Collins' significance is over-looked.

The fact that Furphy readily attributed authorship to Tom Collins is rather interesting in light of the last paragraph of the 1903 review. To say that there are 'several undercurrents of plot, manifest to the reader, though ostensibly unnoticed by the author', does not necessarily mean that the author, namely Tom Collins, fails to notice the undercurrents of plot in his own narrative strategies. This is simply absurd. What this suggests is that the author either pretends not to notice these undercurrents or has no intention of foregrounding them to his readers in the traditionally expected sense. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines 'ostensible' as something that is '[d]eclared, avowed, professed; put forth as actual or genuine; often [opposed] to "actual", "real", and so [equals] merely professed, pretended' (1933:1390). This definition first came into use circa 1771, becoming only recently obsolete, and is more than likely the one used by Furphy in his 1903 review. In short, Furphy uses the adverbial form of "ostensible" to modify the verb "unnoticed" in order to indicate that Collins' not noticing the undercurrents of plot is merely professed or pretended.

Collins is not an unreliable narrator in Booth's sense of the term; nor is he a reliable narrator in the traditional sense of overtly showing what needs to be shown in terms of plot or character development. Equally, Collins is not a reliable author in the traditional sense of overtly guiding the reader through the twists and
turns of his narratives. Either of these two views runs contrary to the stress placed on observant reading. Though he reads the novels in the traditional way, Croft's idea of 'Tom's...cunning concealment' (1991:36) offers an excellent insight into Collins' self-professed tactics as the implied author and narrator. According to Collins, '[i]n the race of life, my son, you must run cunning, reserving your sprint for the tactical moment' (SiL, 215. My italics).

This leads me to clarify another important point. Where do we locate Tom Collins as a narrator? Do we locate him inside the narrative world of the Riverina and its characters or outside with the implied author? Although there are many literary examples where the "[n]arrator" or "I" of the work...is seldom if ever identical with the implied image of the artist' (Booth, 1983:73), Furphy's novels, like Defoe's Moll Flanders or Sterne's Tristram Shandy, do not conform to this state of affairs. When Collins narrates, we are confronted with a complexity in the novels where it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to dissociate the implied author who is outside the narrative world of the Riverina and comments on that world from the Tom Collins who is within the narrative world of the Riverina. In short, the term "narrator", although fruitful to some extent, seems to me to be an insufficient categorisation which does nothing more than confuse an already complicated issue.

In order to establish what I consider to be greater clarity, I have chosen to use the term "hero" in this thesis, and to discuss Collins in light of his status as implied author and hero. Because it automatically invokes the idea of the role model, the term "hero" is quite consistent with Collins' preoccupation with the moral consequences of roleplay and with the overall issue of identity in the novels. To all intents and purposes, I intend to show, in this thesis, that Collins, as implied author, articulates an heroic image of himself within the narrative world of the Riverina, and that this image of himself, as the hero, naturally suits the many issues which occur as a result of the thematic preoccupation with uplifting and upbuilding.

Before the issue of the unreliable narrator and the implied author could be addressed properly. I felt that it was necessary to place the novels firmly in context. The reason for this has to do with

4.
establishing the core values of the novels, namely uplifting and upbuilding, which underpin Collins' status as implied author, and his representation of himself as the hero. For this reason, chapter one focuses on the socio-historical context of the 1890s, and looks at a select number of reasons for the colonial division and rivalry which plagued the federation movement. A section is devoted to exploring some of Furphy's views of the world and sets out to establish him as an enlightened thinker, a *philosophe*, rather than a socialist. Furthermore, Chapter one examines the characterisation of the bullockies and looks at the story of the Penguin and the Man-O'-War Hawk as a parable of the opportunism which was widespread in colonial Australia. Furphy's other main character, Jefferson Rigby, is also discussed, and the view that Rigby's socialism is the epitome of Furphy's own views is challenged. Finally, chapter one ends with a discussion of Collins' view on uplifting and upbuilding through democracy and rights, comparing this view with that of Thomas Paine.

In addition to the implied author and hero discussion mentioned above, chapter two establishes Furphy's views on art in light of the socio-historical context discussed in chapter one. Chapter two sets out to show that Furphy's views on art are intimately related to the value and function of art in society. In this sense, a major concern underpinning Collins' view of authorship is the need to tackle the ignorance, rivalry and division so pervasive in colonial Australia, and to stress the importance of education and right judgment *through* literature in lieu of the popular debate concerning democracy, national identity and federation *in* literature. This is no different from A.G. Stephens' notion of seeing Australia 'through clear Australian eyes, not through bias-bleared English spectacles' ([1901] 1973:ix. My italics). The chapter also explores Collins' preoccupation with roleplay within this context. In short, Furphy's creation, Tom Collins, is preoccupied artistically with social architecture, as stated in the opening paragraphs of *Such is Life*, and it is within this context that the relevance of the ethical theory of the controlling alternatives is developed.

Chapter three connects the preceding topics of discussion to the idea of guardianship. Furphy's idea that life's purpose can be discovered through calm courage, clear intellect and high moral
standards is explored in light of Tom Collins as implied author and hero. The chapter connects Furphy's tripartite idea with Plato's idea of the Guardians and the three elements needed for justice in society, arguing that any image of the national type, for Furphy, had to embody these qualities. Furphy's idea of the national type is developed as a Half Bushman and Half Bookworm, and the chapter puts forth the notion that Tom Collins, as implied author, articulates his own heroic image within that context. The chapter also discusses Plato's idea that women can be Guardians if they have the aptitude for calm courage, clear intellect and high moral standards, and explores Collins' preoccupation with the "Australienne" in this light. Finally, chapter three looks at the function of the many marriages in the three novels, finishing with the Falkland-Pritchard marriage in light of Fred Falkland-Pritchard's capacity for tall stories about himself as an heroic Australian, and Lillian Falkland-Pritchard as the epitome of the Australienne. The chapter ends with a discussion of the romance plot and its philosophical issue of induction.
1. Man and Nation: towards an understanding of the ideas of uplifting and upbuilding.

...every avenue to distinction is not closed... We're knocking at the gates of Futurity for the Australian pioneer of poetry-fiction-philosophy-what not?

-Such is Life, 1903/1991:224-

1.1. Furphy's 1880s: a search for meaning in the public domain.

In a recent essay, John Barnes states that 'Such is Life was written by an autodidact working in isolation in a late nineteenth-century country town, and in my view that profoundly affects both its form and substance. I should like to see future studies of Furphy's book look more closely at Such is Life as a cultural creation' (1993:48). It is a view shared by Wieland (1985) who argues that Such is Life is both a product of and an experience in the past. Or, as MacKenzie explains, 'Such is Life can be said to be cultural business arising' (1993:534). But what is this cultural business that supports a reading of Such is Life as a cultural creation? Barnes (1993) and Wieland (1985), like Gilding (1967:201) almost thirty years earlier, do not raise any specific points, preferring instead to emphasize the necessity of a socio-historical approach to curb potential misreadings of the novel. MacKenzie is more specific, arguing that 'identity in Australia is fundamentally controversial as a result of an old/new double bind, and is even a matter of imposture' (1993:534). In comparing Furphy with Marcus Clarke on the issue of imposture in Australian cultural business, MacKenzie argues that 'Furphy foregrounds the idea of imposture to a degree that surpasses even Clarke' (1993:534).

The question of imposture in Australian cultural business, or culture building, is a tricky one. It seems to suggest that, more than anywhere else, Australian culture is the product of an illegal theft. MacKenzie seems to reinforce this idea when he states that 'an
Australian cultural nationalist not only shares identity with a European bookworm, but also competes with him for this identity, imitates and impersonates him and so to an extent robs him of it' (1993:535. My italics). It is in this way that MacKenzie describes Tom Collins as 'a phantom identity' and 'a trickster' (1993:540). In my opinion, such a view of Furphy's novel, as well as Australian culture building generally, tends to dismiss the complex reasons for the cultural process that works with the old/new double bind. Furthermore, the notion of imposture also seems to suggest that Australian cultural identity is an elegant forgery vis-à-vis the genuine European article.

Nevertheless, MacKenzie is correct in observing that *Such is Life* is concerned with cultural business. Readers ought to bear in mind Barnes' advice for the direction of Furphy studies, for the social and political horizon of the 1890s provides signposts for a greater understanding and appreciation of the structure and themes of the novels. The fact that Collins is so obviously concerned with 'a fair picture of Life' (*StL*, 2) should be sufficient to direct the reader's attention to the historical period about which it is written. Equally, the fact that Collins is concerned with a *fair* picture, rather than a *true* picture, should also indicate that cultural business is never a clear or easily resolved issue, and yet must, to some extent, have clarity and resolution.

A *fair* picture of life makes cultural business an ethical and moral issue so that life is selectively represented in order to inform human judgment about necessary courses of action in light of the good. Contrary to this, a *true* picture of life seeks to represent life as it is. *True* pictures do not, properly speaking, concern themselves with the good. In this sense, Furphy's novels and Collins' narratives do not just set out to mimic life in all its looseness and adversity, but to provide a solution to 'that engaging problem' (*StL*, 2) of human affairs in nineteenth-century colonial Australia.

In light of this focus on cultural business, Indyk points out that '[i]nstead of a sense of national identity, there is the constant assertion of national differences. The characters are English first or Irish, Scottish, Cornish, Chinese, Dutch, German, French, or Aboriginal -with each group having its own distinguishing dialect' (1986:305). According to Indyk's observations, '[e]ven where two
bullockies belong to the same group, it will nevertheless make a great deal of difference if one of them comes from Victoria, the other from NSW' (1986:305). Thus, '[i]n a novel which was acclaimed as an Australian classic in the years following [f]ederation, there isn't a character who thinks of himself or herself as Australian' (Indyk, 1986:305). Indeed, the social, historical and political "world" of 1880s Australia is marked by an intercolonial rivalry which threatened to keep the colonies separated due to ethnic loyalties. According to Manning Clark,

[as early as 1842, when the agitation to divide the old New South Wales into two or three separate colonies first got under way, the far-sighted presented the case for some central government on the grounds of convenience; but their counsel fell on the deaf ears of men bent on the tri-section of New South Wales, or those even deafer ears in South Australia that confounded all central government or federation proposals with domination by New South Wales (1995a:201).

In the words of the historian, David Day, 'it was a time for jealousies and protecting one's individual interests' (1996:195). As Gibb explains,

[f]or colonists, identifying with their colony was always a substitute for identifying with their continent. Rivalry between Sydney and Melbourne, and between New South Wales and Victoria, was endemic. Tasmanians were suspicious of and resented their 'mainland'. South Australians were proud of their freedom from the convict 'taint'. The Western Australians and Northern Queenslanders felt that they were 'a thousand miles away'. Governments promoted rivalry in numbers of ways, for example by tariffs and extending railways into other colonies. The difficulties of getting united action on defence and immigration questions were reasons why politicians became active
Historically, socially and politically, this scenario forms the basic structure of chapter one in *Such is Life*, and it is interesting to note that one of the first social issues with which readers are confronted, besides the squattocratic monopoly on grass, is the rivalry among the colonies, especially Victoria and New South Wales. Evidence of this rivalry is implied by the terms 'Port Phillip' and 'the mother colony' (*Sil, 3*). Or in Mosey's retort to Cooper, the New South Welshman: '[r]oll up Port Phillipers! the Sydney man's goin' to strike a match!' (*Sil, 5*). Or Cooper's remark to Mosey on 'Port Phillip ignorance' (*Sil, 26*). Rivalry is also foregrounded by Collins in his pointing out that '[t]he Victorian carrier, formidable by his lack of professional etiquette and his extreme thrift, is neither admired nor caressed by the somewhat select practitioners of Riverina' (*Sil, 7*). And one can equally find this rivalry in the volley of terms like 'Cabbage Garden', 'a 'Sucker' or 'a Port Philliper' for Victoria and the Victorian, and 'Cornstalk' for the New South Welshman (*Sil, 35*).

Indeed, it is within this last context that 'the Separation' of 1851 is invoked, when Victoria ceased to be called 'the District of Port Phillip' and ceased to be a 'Colony of New South Wales' (*Sil, 35*). According to Serle, '[m]any New South Welshman, clutching at pretensions of historical dignity, found it difficult to look calmly on upstart breakaway Victoria whose astonishing progress had rested on the chance presence of gold deposits' (1969: 13). There are, of course, other examples in chapter one of the division among colonial Australians. But these tend to unveil this colonial rivalry in an indirect manner through economic opportunism among the men in Riverina. For example, one can see this rivalry and opportunism in the clues to Dixon and Bum's attempted theft of Collins' horse, Cleopatra, especially with Collins' sudden acquisition of a new saddle on his horse which he had left unsaddled overnight (*Sil, 39, 41*). This incident stands directly opposed to the egalitarianism usually associated with Furphy's rendition of the bullockies and Riverina society. According to Furphy, this episode is '[n]ot only true to nature, but true to *fact*, for '[t]he plot wouldn't be obscure to straight-ahead reader -particularly bushman' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:92).
Devlin-Glass, Eaden, Hoffmann and G. W. Turner, the Furphy scholars who worked on *The Annotated Such is Life*, (1991:322) explain that parts of the novel allude to the battle for economic control of Riverina between Victoria and New South Wales: a battle that was very topical in 1883, the year in which the novels are set. Gibb states that '[c]ompetition between rival economic interests for the Riverina had brought bitterness between New South Wales and Victoria. Victoria's protection policies and practices and her stock tax infuriated free trade New South Wales' (1982:78-79). Serle (1969:15) also points out that the Riverina became the economic battleground for Victoria and New South Wales because each thought that the control of trade in the Riverina meant greater status and prosperity for their own colony.

From the 1860s to the 1890s, when economic ventures became more uniform for the Australian colonies, both Victoria and New South Wales each set out to claim Riverina economically, imposing eccentric standards that can be seen as an expression of this rivalry. For example, Victorians constructed 'a Victorian-gauge' railway, 'both colonies adopted a policy of differential freight rates', and 'New South Wales began running early newspaper-trains to the Riverina at considerable financial loss to combat the insidious influence of the Melbourne papers' (Serle, 1969:15). Evans *et al* state '[t]hat the parochialism which characterized life in nineteenth-century Australia was not simply the product of a narrowness of vision or a preference for the local and the limited' (1997:92). Indeed, '[g]iven the separate development of each of the colonies, and their primary identification with a power base in London rather than with other colonial capitals, the process to achieve any form of union would be necessarily slow' (Evans *et al*, 1997:93).

Gibb explains that '[c]olonial governments competed with one another for loans on the London money market and for immigrants in Britain generally' (1982:78). As Serle indicates, '[t]he colonial economies were largely insulated from each other; the nationalising of the Australian economy in the eighties and nineties greatly smoothed the path to federation as the hindrances of colonial barriers to day-to-day business became increasingly irritating' (1969:12). According to Cantrell, '[t]hough the economic and industrial upheavals of the time made progress slow, they also
underlined some of the disadvantages of the present state of disunity' (1977:84).

In view of this disunity and rivalry, we should consider what Collins is doing in the Riverina. If, as Croft believes, 'the time of composition of Tom's memoirs is...some time after the shearer's strike of 1891' (1991:91), then why focus specifically on the years 1883 to 1884? I place emphasis on specifically because one cannot, after almost a century of criticism, appeal to Collins' claim that he opened a Lett's Pocket Diary 'at random', and it just happened 'to be the edition of 1883' (Sil, 2). As readers now know, Collins repeatedly and overtly refutes his claim to sketching random selections of life. The answer, I believe, lies in a letter to Kate Baker, circa November 1910, when Furphy wrote, '[b]ut ain't it anomalous that the erratic G.H [Grant Hervey], the saintly Dr. Strong, and the perverse T.C. [Tom Collins] should be working strenuously toward the same goal, namely, the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:259. My italics).

The English novelist, Anthony Trollope, visiting the colonies in the early 1870s, noted that '[a]n Englishman cannot be month in Australia without finding himself driven to speculate -almost driven to come to some conclusion- as to the future destinies of the colonies', since 'they are loyal to England with an expressive and almost violent loyalty of which we hear and see little at home' ([1873] 1968:52). Trollope explains that '[a]n Australian of the present day does not like to be told of the future independence of Australia', and that he had 'met no instance where the proposition on [his] part was met with an unqualified assent' ([1873] 1968:52). This is despite his steady belief that 'the independence of Australia will come in due time' (Trollope, [1873] 1968:52). But, '[b]efore that day shall arrive the bone and sinews of the colonies must be of colonial produce' and '[t]he leading men must not only have lived but have been born in Australia, so as to have grown up into life without the still existing feeling that England is their veritable "home"' (Trollope, [1873] 1968:52-53).

According to Trollope's observations, '[t]he Australian colonies are very jealous of each other, and in their present moods are by no means ready to unite' ([1873] 1968:53). Indeed, 'the divisions already made, and any new divisions which may be made, are not
incompatible with national unity', but they 'certainly need not be accompanied by the all but hostile feeling, by the unloving and unbrotherly condition, which is inseparable from custom-houses between the one and the other [New South Wales and Victoria]' (Trollope, [1873] 1968:337-338). In a chapter devoted wholly to life in the Riverina, Trollope states that 'she is terribly hindered' because 'every article carried across the Murray is subject to the interference of the custom-house', and '[t]he Riverina and Victoria, instead of being to each other as are Lancashire and Yorkshire, or as are New York and New Jersey, are in reference to their custom-house laws as are France and Germany' ([1873] 1968:334).

It is interesting to note that Furphy, during the rewrite of *Such is Life*, shifted the scene from the settled areas around the Murray to the vast space of Riverina, as pointed out by Croft (1989:10). Why did Furphy make such a dramatic change? In part, this question has already been answered. If Riverina is the place where New South Wales and Victoria express their rivalry to the fullest, then it also stresses the need for a unity of vision in Australian society. Perhaps this is what Collins means when he states that, '[i]t is not in our cities or townships, it is not in our agricultural or mining areas, that the Australian attains *full consciousness* of his own nationality; it is in places *like this* [Riverina], and as clearly here as at the centre of the continent' (SiL, 65. My italics). In view of the political and social climate I have just sketched, it is my contention that the shift to the Riverina marks a thematically mature investigation into the uplifting and upbuilding of a "nation", foregrounding the 'wasteful competition' (Serle, 1969:15) so prominent in colonial Australia.

Given that Victoria and New South Wales both engaged in a "thirty-year war" over the economic control of Riverina, and that this issue was very topical in 1883, what other historical events underpin Collins' uplifting and upbuilding in the 1883-84 diary narrative? Collins states that 'the subject of grass' was 'a vital question in '83, as you may remember' (SiL, 4). As Croft explains, '[t]hings are worse than usual in September of 1883, because of a prolonged dry spell during winter -the spring rains have not yet arrived and the signs of over-grazing are evident' (1991:129). According to Croft, '[i]t is interesting to see that Tom assumes the reader would be aware as any bullocky of the condition of grass in the Riverina in 1883. It is as
If the issue of land and its alienation is assumed to be the common denominator of all social reality in Australia' (1991:129). While I agree with Croft's notion that land is an important denominator in Australian social reality, as the battle for Riverina indicates, I do not think that a reader's familiarity with the grass issue automatically concludes a link between landscape and alienation.

It might be better to consider the grass question in light of the prevailing rivalries between New South Wales and Victoria, and to say that the rivalry between squatter and bullocky is just one more example of the division in colonial Australia. Speaking from personal experience, perhaps Furphy wanted to point out that the effects of a prolonged dry spell for the people of Riverina is not made any easier by the discord between Sydney and Melbourne. Indeed, the subject of grass is immediately punctuated by a remark on the 'division of labour' as 'the secret of success': a practice which Dixon considers to be the 'secret of England's greatness' (StL, 4), rather than Australia's. Willoughby's rejoinder to Dixon that '[t]he true secret of England's greatness lies in her dependencies' (StL, 4) hints that the success of a division of labour depends on unity, something which is lacking in Australia. It is interesting to note that the aforementioned colonial rivalry in chapter one is woven into this 'committee on the subject of grass' (StL,4). All in all, the opening dialogue of chapter one gives much information to 'the observant reader' on the 'fair picture of Life' (StL, 2). Since Collins asks observant readers to remember the importance of the grass question in 1883, it is also possible that he wants readers to remember that the grass question was but one issue of a much more divided political climate.

One such important issue can be seen as a first move towards economic and political unity. Clark (1995a:178), Gibb (1982:79) and Serle (1969:1) note that on the 14th of June 1883, many New South Welsh and Victorian members of the public joined notables at Albury to toast the railway link between their respective colonies. According to Serle, '[e]lectric light dispelled the wintry gloom, flowers covered the pillars and tables, and on high an allegorical painting showed Victoria and New South Wales clasping hands in unity, while behind them an engine was crossing a bridge' (1969:1). More important than this festive coming together was Victoria's 'confidence that the inevitable result of the rail union would be the union of the colonies
themselves' (Clark, 1995a:178). Indeed, the Premier of Victoria, James Service, publicly announced that

[w]e have been long separated, and rivalries and jealousies and ignorance of each other have sprung up in consequence; but now we are looped together with bands of iron...Gentlemen, we want federation and we want it now...I decline to subscribe to the doctrine that I am to die before the grand federation of the Australian colonies. There is no earthly reason why it should not be achieved...I tell my honourable friend, the Premier of New South Wales, that at a very early opportunity...we intend to test this question. The Government of Victoria have determined to send a message to New South Wales asking them what are the obstacles that stand in the way? (in Serle, 1969:1-2).

On the 23rd of June 1883, the *Bulletin* wrote that

[t]here's been a big drink on at Albury. It was a Federal affair. Away down here in the country, where thousands have watched for twenty years or more the outcome of a bitter rivalry between people of kindred blood, and in reality, common interests, -down here on a spot for ever rendered historic by the enterprise of bold prisoners, though afterwards 'utilized' by political charlatanism as a starting point of intercolonial rancour -down here at Albury, where the Murray flows between the shores of New South Wales and Victoria, there's been a big drink! The influence of trade has done what so-called statesmanship failed to effect. The railway systems of the two colonies are united! And over the union there's been a great shivoo (in Ward and Robertson, eds, 1980:208).

The *Bulletin*’s sceptical tone mirrors the scepticism prevalent in New South Wales at the time. As Serle explains, 'at the 1880-1
Intercolonial Conference, the Victorians brushed aside Parkes's proposal for a Federal Council', thus 'there was some reason why many in Sydney reacted with surprise and suspicion to the Victorian initiative of 1883' (1969:15). Indeed, '1884 was to be a bad year for the cause' (Serle, 1969:17). Furthermore, Serle (1969:49-50) explains it was not until 1888-9 that some reconciliation on the issue of federation occurred when New South Wales and Victoria were both delighted by the South Australian decision to join the Federal Council. All in all, 'the extent of opposition to federation, the lack of desire to co-operate with other colonies, the strength of New South Wales provincialism and the weakness there of a sense of Australian identity remain baffling' (Serle, 1969:55). As Gibb points out, '[p]ride in colony always remained a difficulty and New South Wales was the most vacillating of the major colonies on federation' (1982:79). This colonial pride was so strong that '[i]n 1887 Parkes enthusiastically commended to the New South Wales Legislative Assembly the provocative proposal to rename New South Wales as Australia' (Gibb, 1982:79).

Serle indicates that '[i]n view of the lack of national feeling, Service's campaign of 1883 was obviously premature and ill-prepared' (1969:12). If Furphy wanted to draw the observant reader's attention to this ill-prepared and premature push for unity, then his many remarks on ignorance shifting, in his novels and letters, certainly cuts to the heart of the matter. Shifting ignorance has the capacity to resolve colonial jealousies and rivalries. Of further interest to Furphy's observant reader is the following. Gibb (1982:79) and Serle (1969:12) both note 1883 was the first year that the two most prominent Victorians, the Premier James Service and the Victorian chief justice George Higinbotham, had set foot in New South Wales with the specific intention of "uplifting and upbuilding Australia". Given the deep-seated and extensive rivalry between the two colonies, as well as the 1880s New South Welsh view that 'Victorians were "people to be mistrusted"' (Sir Robert Garran cited in Serle, 1969:13), it is rather interesting that Collins, the native-born Victorian, works for 'the New South Wales Civil Service' (Croft, 1991:91, 1986:155-157).

It seems that Furphy wanted readers to see Tom Collins as a key figure in the public domain of meaning, federation and
nationalism, for the clues to his narratorial identity are equally clues to the social and political climate in which he exists. Perhaps it is for this reason that Collins' narrative begins almost three months after Service's proposal at Albury. According to Ward, the 'internal and external conditions [of the 1880s and 1890s] enabled Australians to pause, to look inward on themselves, to take stock as it were, and to indulge in what their predecessors in the land might have called a "dreaming"' (1966:208). In my view, Collins' uplifting and upbuilding is also an attempt to address and solve the problems 'of an old/ new double bind' and, in this sense, 'can be said to be cultural business arising' (MacKenzie, 1993:534). In short, colonial rivalry is as anachronistic to Australia's future as the colonial romance to which Collins is so vehemently opposed. Although problematic, Vance Palmer speaks some truth when he states that '[t]he notion of a national dream-time is not at all a myth. The forward-looking spirits of those days really did find a stimulus in their isolation; vague, creative impulses germinated in their minds' (1963:14).

Perhaps what Palmer should have said is that the national dream-time is not just a myth, for the creative idealism of intellectuals and artists is an ostensive phenomenon. As Ward explains, '[m]en sought, partly by looking for those things which distinguished them from their British fathers and congenerers, to know themselves and their country better, and at the same time they saw utopian visions of a national future in which Australia, unsullied by the wars and wrongs of the old world, would be a light to less happy lands' (1966:208). This seems to be also Turner's view, who states that 'the Lawson-Furphy brand of nationalism in fiction includes not only a set of definitions of Australian cultural identity, but also a major strategy for measuring that identity against the English, and valorising those aspects of our national character which depart from English values and loyalties' (1993:114). While this is true, there are also problems in neatly conflating Furphy with Lawson and speaking about a "Lawson-Furphy" brand of nationalism.

As Ozolins explains, 'a glance backwards reveals that in the second half of the 19th century, Australia experienced a period of considerable cultural and linguistic diversity, with a huge influx of population during the gold rushes of the1850s from Europe, Asia and the Americas' (1993:3). If, as Ozolins argues, language is 'one of the
clearest and most evident manifestations of cultural diversity' (1993:2), then Furphy and Lawson are miles apart in their respective renditions of the 1890s in narrative. In his 1903 review of *Such is Life*, Furphy states that Collins is, '[b]eyond all other Australian writers,...a master of idiom', for 'the education of each speaker is denoted by his phraseology; the dialect of each European bespeaks his native locality; and, above all, the language of the most unbookish bushman never degenerates into "caster"' (1969:129). Not only does Furphy demonstrate 'a brilliant use of the strategy of code-switching', but his 'employment of language variance represents a stage of "becoming" which exists between [a sense of diversity and a sense of unity]' (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, 1989:73).

One should not be deceived into thinking that the germination of nationalist ideas or the pursuit of meaning for "Australia" was homogeneous. Neither Furphy nor Lawson shared the same vision for Australia, as I will show in appropriate parts of the thesis. As Stewart states, '[t]he "1890s debate" is not a simple dialogue directed by unchanging assumptions and goals, or fixed questions and answers. It is usually perceived today as a dynamic of interactions amongst contending discourses' (1996:10). For example, commenting on Australia's cultural obsession with Youth, Stewart points out that

> In the 1890s Australia could be represented as a beautiful and athletic young woman, her torch lighting the future; or a young bushman or axeman, an allegorical emblem of industry or pioneering; or a baby blowing bubbles, naive, lovable, immature; or a little boy, often from Manly. The metaphor might be simultaneously a metonymy: the young person is an Australian; Australians *are* "young and free", as *Advance Australia Fair* decreed. You might easily feel that Australians were not actually, and certainly not typically, old; and that a young country had "more" future, and more opportunity with a longer life to come, than an "old" country (1996:1-2).

According to Stewart, '[t]he Young Country provided an
important, perhaps dominant code, which was almost universally employed; but it was not the only code. Its power in the 1890s created a context for the inevitable articulation of disappointment, one for use of an alternative “Australian” code of stoicism, iconoclasm and scepticism. You do not feel young and free in a depression, a drought, or a strike; some writers felt, in the 1890s and later, robbed' (1996:6). The meaning and vitality of Youth can be rather problematic, not only for one's expectations of the local milieu, but also for one's position among the nations and empires of the world. Docker's notion that '[t]he very confidence and élan of the Nineties' literary and intellectual communities presented them with dilemmas in terms of the inherited British-Australian cultural relationship' (1991:238) is fitting.

According to Evans et al, '[t]he position of British-Australians, who composed the vast bulk of the colonial population, was also somewhat ambiguous, for not only were they the citizens of a potent new nation, but also the subjects of a far mightier Empire' (1997:24). As Evans et al explain, '[t]o many, Britain was still "home" rather than the suburban villa, worker's cottage or selector's hut they now inhabited on the opposite side of the world. For an expatriate people, the British connection remained a guarantee of their essential kinship, even though the British themselves tended to regard colonials more as embarrassing country cousins than as warmly recognized brothers and sisters' (1997:24). Rather than a 'great age of literary and cultural nationalism', the 1890s 'was a varied and exciting scene, full of drama and conflict and contradiction' where 'its actors had to contend with more than just each other' (Docker, 1991:238).

It is, therefore, difficult to swallow Ward's notion that '[w]hen the dreaming was over the values and attitudes of the nomad tribe [or pastoral workers] had been largely adopted by the whole nation' (1966:208). Such values and attitudes may have been adopted by some of the nation, but even here the degree to which such an adoption occurred depends greatly on being able to smooth over a variety of contending discourses. As McCauley explains, 'Ward is not concerned with what Australians are really like, but with the myth or stereotype, the idealized self-portrait representing a particular set of demands and approvals' (1962:124). Ward may be right in stating
that, after the influential decades of the 1880s and 1890s, 'the “noble bushman” was already firmly enshrined in both the popular and the literary imagination' (1966:212). But this does not answer the question as to which image dominated the nationalist outlook. Given the poor public response to Such is Life, one may say that it is not Furphy's "Tom Collins", but what of Lawson's "Joe Wilson" or Paterson's "Clancy of the Overflow"?

Palmer's 'forward looking-spirits' may have had 'a deep sense of responsibility to the country they were making their own' (1963:14), but the cultural obsession with Youth does not necessarily mean that such an obsession created a unity of meaning, vision or purpose. Nor does it guarantee a safe haven from Western Europe's 'fatal nest' to which O'Dowd alluded (in Cantrell, ed, 1977:86). The 'new settler' may have wanted 'as few links as possible with the Europe he had left behind' (Palmer, 1963:15), but the new world is not so new as to be wholly independent, for ideas and evils migrate with people. Come an Australian dusk, Collins may state that 'the sun went on its way to make a futile attempt at purifying the microbe-laden atmosphere of Europe' (Sil, 11). But the thematic preoccupations of chapter one with the duffing of grass, opportunism and the intercolonial rivalries seem to suggest that Australia's atmosphere is currently as equally "microbe-laden" as Europe's.

In the search for "new" meaning in the new world, individual or group optimisms can easily turn into pessimism. And it is this conflict, this tension between optimism and pessimism that marks 1880s and 1890s nationalism primarily as a search for meaning, or a desire to build meaning vis-à-vis the dynamic conflicts of contending discourses. Barnes' notion that 'future studies of Furphy's book [should] look more closely at Such is Life as a cultural creation' (1993:48) is important. Such is Life is not, as Green would argue, 'a formless slab' (1930:127). Furthermore, one should equally consider both Rigby's Romance and The Buln-Buln and the Brolga in the same light. Again, readers should ask themselves the question "what is Collins doing in the Riverina?" In conjunction with this question, I think it is also important to consider why Furphy has Collins present a diary narrative to the public.

Both of these questions are important in terms of the search for human meaning, and the "Australia" of the late nineteenth 20.
century is an excellent example of the need for this search. According to McLaren, '[t]he characters of Such is Life are trapped in lives of search and pursuit. The search varies from Tom Collins' pursuit of meaning to the teamster's constant quest for grass' (1989:58). Or, as Henricksen notes, Furphy's 'fiction becomes not art for didacticism's or nationalism's sake, but art which tries to find a solution, if not an answer, to the riddles of human existence' (1985:10). And, in this sense, 'Furphy's fiction...meditates and speculates on the role of man in the cosmos, on God, on the cosmic order of things, and on man's response to the cosmic reality' (Henricksen, 1985:157. My italics).

It may be true, as Henricksen notes, that '[t]he closer Furphy approaches his monastic truth, the more pluralistic does his universe become, and the more unschematizable does truth become' (1985:166). However, one should not take this view, as Armbruster does, to the extreme and conclude that Such is Life is 'a veritable hotch-potch of meaning' (1991:85). In light of the novels' historical background, as well as Furphy's own reference to Collins' concern with the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, I disagree with Armbruster's view that Furphy's 'self-referential mode of writing' and 'deliberate self-contradiction and ambiguity avoids any mimetic commitment' (1991:121. My italics). Nor do I agree with Armbruster's notion that this artistic approach 'reduces the need for definite meaning' (1991:121).

Although the self-referentiality and pluralism in Such is Life 'greatly enhances the text's affirmative potential', it is fallacious to assume that '[t]he reader may construct an almost infinite number of meanings' (Armbruster, 1991:121). As Wieland states, 'thematicallY, Furphy is concerned with life lived and life speculated about, he is not, as many twentieth-century writers are, affronted by the possibility of a meaningless reality, even as he recognizes its relativity and complexity' (1985: 24). If we are to approach Furphy's novels as cultural creations, as art and meaning in the public domain, then we must acknowledge that this artistic self-referentiality and pluralism in his narratives are meant to serve as evidence for the mimetic commitment to "life".

Within this mimetic commitment, there is the more important thematic concern with the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, which is not just mentioned in the letter to Kate Baker, but also
alluded to in Furphy's 1903 review of Such is Life. Croft may state that '[t]he complexity of the first and the final versions of Such is Life (and its offsprings) arose from a mind which attempted to bring together a series of vinegar and oil opposites, at one time giving more oil, at others more vinegar' (1991:10). But one should not just look for '[t]he key to Furphy's mind and art' in 'the division between the male and female worlds of his family' (Croft, 1991:11). Although it is difficult to ascertain just exactly what Furphy knew and considered important in the 1880s and 1890s socio-cultural climate, one can safely assume that the key to the pluralism in the novels is found in the division of society, politics and culture.

For this reason I must disagree with Partington, who states that the 'contemporary political system, like political history, had only marginal interest for Furphy....[The] political parties and political issues being contested in Australia during the 1880s do not directly feature in the Furphy novels' (1993:170). Perhaps Partington's statement builds on Barnes' (1990:145) observation that, although Furphy had an interest in State Socialism, he belonged to no particular political group nor partook in any political activities while working and writing in Shepparton. But Partington takes this a step further by concluding that Furphy's lack of political involvement is a direct result of a lack of interest in the 1890s socio-political scene. This is a hasty generalisation, for Furphy, in a letter to Cathels dated the 14th of July, 1901, spoke of 'the cares of Art and the deceitfulness of Politics' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:69). As Gilding states, 'Furphy's novels are themselves perceptive comments on political notions, and his realism and romanticism add up to a personal search and vision which signify a great deal more than nothing' (1967:202).

Wallace-Crabbe (1962: 144-145), Kiernan (1971a:19, 1971b:148, 1964), and Barnes (1968:vi) all state that the emphasis of Such is Life lies not in a distinctive core or philosophy, for the novel is more concerned with Collins' response to life than with a theoretical orientation to life. As Collins states, '[n]o one except the anchorite lives to himself; and he is merely a person who evades his responsibilities' (SiL, 71). In this sense, Collins is extremely interested in 'Happenology' (RR, 30) and in 'the marvellous tactics of Destiny' (RR, 235. My italics). But, although Wallace-Crabbe,
Kiernan, and Barnes each points out valid readings of the novel, it is my contention that the novel has a philosophical 'core', namely the ideas of uplifting and upbuilding. Also, Collins' response to life incorporates a theoretical orientation to life because of the search for meaning through art, as I will discuss in the next chapter. Of further importance to the novels' philosophical core is Gilding's notion that 'the novels are a “way of seeing”' (1967:201). This point is also made by Barnes, who states that the novels 'offer a way of seeing which illuminates the experience of living' (1979:27).

For these reasons, I disagree with Barnes' earlier notion that, '[because] Furphy's “philosophy” seems rather nebulous, and because there is no core to Such is Life, no human situation which contains in itself the central theme, the novel fails to give a sense of life developing' (1971:131. My italics). Central to the development of the novel's narrative is the issue of identity. Thematically, both the socio-historical concerns of the narrative and Collins' identity exist in a symbiotic relationship. One cannot but note that Collins' identity develops in conjunction with his response to life, his search for meaning and his way of seeing. When investigating the persona of Tom Collins, one should note that his articulating an identity is meant to be a culturally ostensive phenomenon. On a personal and national level, one can say that identity, like '[e]ach undertaking, great or small, of our lives has one controlling alternative, and no more' (StL, 68). Although I will investigate the notion of identity as a controlling alternative in chapter two, it can be said for now that the theory of the controlling alternative is part of Furphy's attempt to address the division and rivalry in colonial Australia.

As Gilding notes, 'behind the philosophy of the controlling alternative lies an awareness of the complexity of human experience' (1967:97). Although D'Alton and Bittman do not in any way discuss Such is Life, their sociological explanation of an individual's position in the world is indirectly a rather revealing explanation of Furphy's thematic aim and the novel's "core":

|e|ach individual in society must order his world so that it has meaning for him or else there is no reason for action at all. A choice must be made. Even a choice not to act is still a choice, as it is a denial (a chosen
denial) of the alternatives of action which are open and it is an active denial of the alternatives to the extent that the alternatives of action are repudiated. Consequently most people...have a theory about the world. In a sense, everyone's knowledge of the world is a 'theory' in that 'knowledge of the world' refers to that world order which different individuals identify. There may be as many world orders as there are individuals but nevertheless each person, simply to act in the world, must have some way of ordering, of understanding, that world so that courses of action can be decided upon and so that courses of action can be carried out (1972:98-99).

1.2. A Philosophe: some historical and epistemological orientations of Joseph Furphy.

Barnes (1990:170-2) postulates that Furphy, circa 1890, may have encouraged the Mechanics Institute at Shepparton to purchase both the *Encyclopedia Britannica* and the *Chambers' Encyclopedia*, which he constantly used as his reference during the writing of *Such is Life*. While it is only an hypothesis, Barnes' comment sits well with a man whose primary concern appeared to be the eradication of ignorance. In a letter to Stephens, Furphy states that 'I find myself continually blocked by my own infernal ignorance, so that I have worn a pad from my sanctum to the Ency.Brit., at the Mechanics' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:68). One might say that Furphy's love for the Mechanics Institute at Shepparton is indicative of his love for knowledge, since the Mechanics Institute could be neatly described as the bricks-and-mortar symbol for those seeking enlightenment. To Cathels, Furphy declared that he had 'to shift a bit of [his] fearful burden of congenital ignorance by reading any new scientific book that finds its way into our local Mech.Inst.,' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:119).

And, to Cecil Winter, Furphy wrote that, '[d]uring the spell I had in Melb., 12 years ago, a few weeks at a time, I wore a cattle-track from the West End Hotel to the Public Library....Now, artisans are, as a rule, more bookish and better informed than clerks,
shopmen &c., and yet of the 16 or 18 hands at the Foundry, only 3 besides myself are members of the Mechanics Institute -though subscription is only 2/6 a quarter' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:168). One can do no worse than to see Furphy, as well as Collins, as a Philosophe. But what does it mean to be a Philosophe? Zeitlin explains that 'the Philosophe investigated all aspects of social life; they studied and analysed political, religious, social, and moral institutions, subjected them to merciless criticism from the standpoint of reason, and demanded to change the unreasonable ones' (1968:3).

According to Zeitlin, '[m]ore often than not, traditional institutions were found to be irrational', thus proving the point that these 'institutions were contrary to man's nature and thus inhibitive of his growth and development' (1968:3). Kramnick states that 'unassisted human reason, not faith or tradition, was the principal guide to human conduct...Everything, including political and religious authority, must be subject to a critique of reason if it were to commend itself to the respect of humanity' (1995:xi). In light of 1890s division and rivalry, this need for reason is very applicable to Furphy, for Franklin, when she spoke of Furphy's relationship to knowledge, wrote that '[h]e took nothing on authority' (1944:9). As Collins proudly states, 'a revolt undreamt of by your forefathers is in progress now -a revolt of enlightenment against ignorance; of justice and reason against the domination of the manifestly unworthy' (Sil, 90).

In *The Life and Opinions of Tom Collins*, Croft states that

[t]o me, Joseph Furphy himself is just not there in the record we have of him, nor is he clearly present in what has survived of what he has written. The man is like his fictions, layers of oil and vinegar, each separate from the other. Perhaps that was a product of the time: Protestant Christians with the vestiges of Calvin and Puritanism in them, living in a world of scientific determinism modelled on the laws of thermodynamics and the laws of natural selection. One could believe in Christ, but only as a prophet of the major intellectual movement of the late 25.
nineteenth-century socialism. The individual was not important in this system, hence Furphy's deep attraction to classical Stoicism. An individual was important only as an agent of change directed by inescapable historical processes. Thus Furphy's view of human affairs is summed up in the famous metaphor of the railway tracks: the way is laid out before us, accept it and do not whine; but there are choices to be made at certain points...and that is where individual courage and volition come in. The historical process is bigger than any individual, but each individual has an opportunity to influence the unfolding of that process. We should submit; but we should also strive (1991:19-20).

Indeed, Croft, in his conclusions to this major study, repeats this view by stating that '[Furphy] believed in individual choice, individual responsibility, and the redemptive power of human love; but he also believed in a divine love and purpose which shaped in mysterious ways the progress of human affairs' (1991:275). If what Croft says is true, then what do we make of Furphy's artistic conviction that 'Man, in this vocation [of creative art], is a god, a creator, and cannot create but in his own image' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:137). I think Croft makes too much of the tension in the novels as a direct manifestation of Furphy's own "oil and vinegar" mind. In my view, there is a consistent view in the novels which can be attributed to Furphy, and that view is the view of the Philosophe. However, Croft is correct in pointing out the importance of historical processes to the novels, but I must disagree with his notion that the individual's importance stems from his or her being just a subordinate agency to that historical process.

Such a view personifies the historical process to the status of God and belittles the emphasis on the theory of the controlling alternatives. As Collins states, '[w]hether there's a Divinity that afterwards shapes [the chosen alternative] is a question which each inquirer may decide for himself (SiL, 70). What is important is the fact that '[a] Divine Idea points the way, clearly apparent to any vision not warped by interest or prejudice, nor darkened by
ignorance; but the work is man's alone, and its period rests with man' (SL, 95). Furphy and his hero stand true to the Philosophe's primary concerns. The uplifting and upbuilding of Australia is equally an uplifting and upbuilding of the human being and his or her experience in the world. As I hope to show in the next section, readers should see Furphy's orientations to socialism within the context of the Philosophe.

The "order of things" does not refer to some mysterious or divine force in the universal scheme of things, but to that historical power or force which directly emanates from individuals acting in the world. The order of things is a human order and, within the context of Furphy's views on art, should be equally seen as the public domain of meaning. Furphy seems to be saying that progress or tension in the unfolding historical processes is a direct product of human interaction and human expression in the history of ideas. If this is the case, as I think it is, then Furphy's constant emphasis on ignorance-shifting, in both the novels and the letters, is an appeal to informed action rather than an ignorant exercising of one's agency in the controlling alternatives. As Collins explains, '[t]he major alternative is the Shakespearian "tide in the affairs of men," often recognized, though not formulated' (SL, 69). According to Collins, 'how often do we accept a major-alternative, whilst innocently oblivious to its gravity!' (SL, 69). But, as Collins' warns, 'isn't history a mere record of blundering option, followed by iron servitude to the irremediable suffering thereby entailed?' (SL, 73)

In Furphy, the individual and his or her agency is the historical process, and one can see that the rivalry between the colonies is a direct manifestation of a series of blundering options rather than strategic moves and countermoves. Although the novels are thematically rooted in nineteenth-century Australian history, Furphy's views are surprisingly modern. Discussing the relationship between 'the philosophy of history' and 'man as a historical being', Levy states that 'the process of human history' is 'the record and adventure of an ontologically finite being striving to realise his no less finite potential upon a cosmic stage whose limits, though always incompletely unknown, constitute the absolute frontiers of possible human achievement and thus of what we commonly mean by history' (1993:66). According to Levy, 'man must be conceived as something
more than a self-constituting being’ (1993:74). But, although the human being is bound by “the limits of history”, one ‘should not underestimate the degree of free, self-constituting activity which is possible in this space’, just as one should not ‘ignore the limits to which it is subject’ (1993:75).

With this in mind, one should see that there is a profoundly humanist dimension in the symbiosis between the historical process, the controlling alternatives and the order of things, for the order of things is a human order. Barnes (1990:243) validates this notion by noting that the order of things is also a synonymous term for reality. As Collins argues, ‘each alternative brings into immediate play a flash of Free-will, pure and simple, which instantly gives place -as far as a particular section of life is concerned- to the dominion of what we call Destiny’ (SiL, 69. My italics). And, according to Collins, free-will and destiny ‘should never be confounded’ (SiL, 69). In the oscillating ideas and tensions of human history, destiny and free-will, or consequences and choices, creatively give form to the complex dialectic called “life” or reality. This ties in directly with the emphasis on the response to life, the way of seeing, and the search for meaning discussed in the previous section, for these things can seen to constitute the content of “life” or reality.

In the human order of things, a controlling alternative is best seen as the creative choice through which one makes a response to life in the search for meaning. Once made, the choice engages a way of seeing and a series of options generally labelled as destiny. Or, as Collins puts it, ‘Destiny puts in her spoke, bringing such vicissitudes as are inevitable on the initial option’ (SiL, 70). In my view, the way in which Furphy sees this symbiosis between human beings and history works on all levels of human affairs from art to politics. One can see the human order of controlling alternatives operating on a small scale in the many episodes throughout the novels, hence Collins' claim that he is commissioned ‘to use [his] own judgment, and take [his] own risks, like any other unit of humanity’ (SiL, 1). Equally, one can see the aggregation of these episodes, or these units of humanity, as the evidence for the ignorant actions that lead to irrelevant and irrational consequences in the 1890s order of things.

This is a particularly revealing way of seeing Furphy's own orientations to 1880s and 1890s rivalry. Readers could say that the
theory of the controlling alternatives is Furphy's response to life, depicting the human being as a unit of measure in history and the search for meaning. In the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, one should not just submit to history or tradition. Rather, one should critique that which is irrelevant and irrational and strive to make history, for history is the direct result of measurable human affairs. Again, as Collins argues,

[whether there’s a Divinity that afterwards shapes [the chosen alternative] is a question which each inquirer may decide for himself. Say, however, that this postulated Divinity consists of the Universal mind, and that the Universal Mind comprises the aggregate Human Intelligence, co-operating with some Moral centre beyond. And that the spontaneous sway of this Influence is toward harmony -toward the smoothing of obstacles, the healing of wounds (StL, 70. My italics).]

Or, as Furphy explained to Cecil Winter in a letter dated the 23rd of September, 1903:

Now, a man doesn’t need to be a psalm-singing sneak to admit that beyond the material elements of life, beyond the minerals, plants and animals, beyond the changing seasons, and so forth, there lies a purpose. We don’t know definitely what this purpose may be; but I don’t think it is fulfilled by plethoric banking accounts. Same time, I believe it is fulfilled by the production of men and women of high moral standard, calm courage, and clear intellect (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124. My italics).

Let us now turn to the issue of historical narrative, veracity and identity. In her discussion of the importance of “history” to nineteenth-century Victorian thought, Crosby states that “[h]istory is a regime of truth to which knowledge in general is subject, which governs philosophy and philosophical novels; historical novels and history “proper”; melodrama and social studies; theology, aesthetics,
and autobiographical fiction' (1991:10-11). In terms of this 'regime of truth', Crosby further explains that

"man," in the nineteenth century...is distinguished by his historicity, and can be understood fully only in the context of historical realities which are the preconditions of the present, the necessary foundation of both social and individual life. The priority accorded to the past, then, and to the forces of history, means that history is divided; "history" is both the general ground of human life and also an empirical science of events, the study and representation of the past....History must be purged of fiction, must be objective and scientific in order to be truthful, for science, as the knowledge of positive realities, is the modern discourse of truth. The opposition of "history" to "fiction" is that of truth to falsehood, the exclusion of the latter guaranteeing the scientifcicy of the former....However, the objects of history ensure that the discipline of history can never successfully foreclose fiction, for fiction is the place not of falsehood, but of questions about the conditions of representation, the processes of signification, the constitution of the subject...."Fiction," then, always returns to haunt history, although the discipline has been largely successful in repressing the problems with which fiction engages. Fiction is thus imagined as other than -indeed, the opposite of- history (1991:45-46).

Reading Furphy's novels, one finds that the discipline of "history" is equally important to nineteenth-century Australian thought. Furphy is not, as Brady erroneously argues, 'ignorant of, or at least indifferent to, history' (1981:65). Nor is he boasting that 'Australia somehow stands outside the course of history' (Brady, 1981:65). In Furphy's novels, the importance of history is primarily asserted through the pursuit of Australianness in opposition to an established sense of Britishness. Indeed, the difference between
Australian history and British history is simply that British history does not begin with an exact point of origin in historically-recorded time. In this sense, what is written as the facts of British history, and the facts of the British national consciousness or character, stretches far back into an antiquity of myth and legend.

Although this is not in accordance with the scientific veracity of history, there is a “dreaming” from which the British can establish a positive sense of personal and national identity without having to fear the needle of fact. From Antiquity to Empire, one could say that British history can rationally accommodate historical fact, historical fiction and fiction per se. Through these distinctions, British history can comfortably pursue its celebration of national “truth” and character on many factual and fictional levels. As White points out, "[t]he concept of national types fitted snugly into the nineteenth-century intellectual landscape, a central feature of liberal, national and racial ideology. It was the product of an obsession for categorisation which dominated the science of the day" (1981:64).

"Australia", on the other hand, was more or less born into the modern science of history, and the facts surrounding her birth cannot be effaced. Historically, she is a convict colony, which is a rather unsavoury fact for contemporary views of the national type. As Turner states, "[i]n the relationship between the structures of social order and the "normal" in Australian society, we can sense the traumatic condition of subjection into which the first [white] inhabitants of Australia were thrust" (1993:76). According to Turner, "[i]t seems inevitable that this would have a profound effect on the myths and meanings articulated within the culture then and since" (1993:76). This is an important point to remember when reading Furphy, for the Victorian emphasis on the truth-function of history, in conjunction with a popular interest in eugenics, means that an “Australian” nation-state and the unique Australian type are forever marked by the history of convictism.

Boehm states that "from whatever perspective they viewed the new world, the one constant concern of writers on all levels, official, experiential and fictional, bond and free, was with convictism" (1973:ix). For example, according to Palmer, "[o]ne of the chief things the Bulletin had set out to destroy was the tradition of the convict system that still, in its view, cast an ugly shadow over the life of the
country' (1963:95). This leads me to ask the following question. If Furphy created a hero who was concerned with the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, and colonial "Australia" was in the grips of an ongoing but messy debate concerning both federation and national identity, then what does one do with "Australia's" convict history? Hughes (1987:158-159) points out that, until the 1960s, Australia's convict history was the cultural stain on the national consciousness, and much of convict history was mythologized to avoid having to deal with skeletons in the closet.

In *Such is Life*, reference to Australia's convict origins is expressed stylistically like a footnote. This sits nicely with Collins' stress on observant reading in light of Hughes' point about convict skeletons in the closet. After his authorial introduction, Collins begins his narrative with the statement that '[t]his record transports you (saving reverence of our "birth stain") something more than a hundred miles northward... ' (*SL*, 52). He then proceeds to describe the scene at the Willandra Billabong, and makes no more mention of transportation or the birth stain. Yet, if we ask ourselves what the function of a footnote is, then we would at least answer that its purpose is to direct readers to research and think more about a particular topic or issue. Having said this, the value of this "footnote" in *Such is Life* can be explained by Furphy's advice to Cecil Winter, '[a]ttend well to details, without making them prominent' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:146). In short, the "footnote" in the narrative was, according to Furphy's artistic style, sufficient enough to engage 'the observant reader' (*SL*, 2). As G. W. Turner notes, '[s]ometimes it is the esoteric nature of a scrap of knowledge that is valued most in Furphy's writing' (1986:179). What was it that Furphy, as well as Collins, sought to communicate?

In my view, the message readers receive from this "footnote" has much to do with the uneasiness of the convict legacy to nineteenth-century Australian society. Although the "footnote" is short, an investigation of its semantic allusions reveals a rich source of meaning. Semantically, "birth stain" suggests a "birthmark", or something which one has for 'life', supposedly making one's origins and one's status in the world ideologically and biologically black and white. This accommodates the nineteenth-century interest in eugenics, perhaps justifying the binary view of England's 'good stock'
versus Australia’s ‘bad stock’. Eugenics has some very interesting implications for the concept of a national type. White argues that ‘[t]he idea that it was possible to isolate national “types” was the most important intellectual pillar supporting the complex structure of ideas about national character which developed in the nineteenth century. The national type was given not only physical and racial characteristics, but also a moral, social and psychological identity’ (1981:64). As Willoughby states, ‘high breeding and training are conditions of superiority in the human as well as in the equine and canine races; pedigree being, of course, the primary desideratum’ (Sil, 26).

Of interest to this view, expressed by White, Hughes states that ‘until well into the 1820s, the word “Australian” was a term of abuse, or at best of condescension; it carried an air of seediness on the rim of the Pacific’ (1987:325). This air of condescension towards the term “Australian” did not entirely end with the 1820s, for it is still apparent in the contradictory views of the national type in the 1890s. This can be further qualified by the fact that “stain” suggests something that can be cleaned up with hard work, or “elbow-grease”, but never removed entirely. Or “birth stain” suggests that it is something which can be aesthetically covered up to hide unpleasantries, despite the fact that it can always be seen if one looks in the right places. Perhaps the greatest problem for nineteenth-century “Australians” was the fact that their emerging national type was quite capable of both veiling and unveiling their origins. Readers should note that both “birth stain” and “transports” generate a metonymic allusion to the convict system and indicate, through Collins’ offhand remarks, the social and cultural uneasiness to the system’s shadows.

Although Shaw is correct in stating that ‘[e]conomically [transportation] had greatly helped Australian development’ because ‘it had provided a labour force, which if less efficient than free workers was far better than no workers at all’, I disagree with his notion that ‘[s]ocially it did no great harm’ (1966:358). Hughes points out that ‘[t]he basic class division of early colonial Australia - guards versus prisoners- lived on as a metaphor of future disputes’

1 It is also interesting to note that these “transports” and “birth stain” should directly follow chapter one, where readers have become intimately acquainted with some of “the Lower Orders” (Sil, 34) of the Riverina. One wonders how many Furphian heroes are ticket-of-leave men.
In short, the convict system can be seen as an important background to the search for meaning, a way of seeing and the response to life in Australian history. Indeed, not only was there rivalry between the newly-formed states to the penal colony of New South Wales throughout the nineteenth century, but there was also the animosity of the Australian born to a British judicial and cultural system, which had transported and wanted to continue transporting felons to his or her home. As Palmer notes,

The freed community could begin to build up a self-sufficient Australia if it had the will....But memories of the convict era remained....At the time of [Sir Charles] Dilke's visit [in 1866] the shadow of the penal system still clouded the eastern colonies. A jealous watch was kept on immigrants, and a fine of £100 could be inflicted upon captains of ships bringing convicts into Melbourne. Cases of crime or lawlessness on the mainland were invariably attributed to Tasmanian “bolters”... (1963:15).

Furphy, who was born in 1843, must have had, at the age of eight, some understanding of the ideological rivalry that surrounded the stigma of the convict system and the breaking away of new colonies, especially since, in 1851, he was no longer a native-born of New South Wales, but one of “Victoria”. It is quite probable that these experiences shaped the novels and his views of the colonial rivalry surrounding the Federal movement. When the Furphys arrived in the colony of New South Wales, landing at 'Port Phillip on 1 March 1841', the 'Argyle', the barque on which they had arrived, 'was one of the first ships to come under the bounty system in what was to be a bumper year for immigrants' (Barnes, 1990:6). This bumper year brought '7000 assisted immigrants' (Barnes, 1990:6) into the Port Phillip district. But what Barnes does not mention is the fact that Samuel and Judith Furphy essentially arrived in a convict colony. According to Brian Pilbeam (1973:4), Samuel and Judith Furphy were employed by a squatter named Anderson before they had even left the ship, and both were the only free employees amongst the ticket-of-leave men on his station, which lay twenty miles outside of 34.
Melbourne. Barnes (1990:8) also notes this fact.

What they thought of this situation is not documented, but it is quite probable that, once settled, they would come to share the views of the majority of free settlers. According to J. M. Ward, 'the rapid increase of free immigrants in the thirties coincided with the heaviest period of convict arrivals' and '[b]y the end of the decade free immigrants were much more than balancing the growing number of convict arrivals' (1966:37). Because '[t]he free population observed and resented the horrors of convict life', they 'helped to bring the system under severe scrutiny in both colony and homeland' (J. M. Ward, 1966:37). A great stigma of convictry was the belief 'that convicts depressed wages and produced social and moral standards that were detrimental to nearly all working people' (J. M. Ward, 1966:42). As Collins states, '[t]he folklore of Riverina is rich in variations of a mythus, pointing to the David-and-Goliath combat between a quiet wage-slave and the domineering squatter, in the brave days of old' (Sil, 204). Indeed, ....The squatter of half-a-century ago dominated his immigrant servants by moral force-no difficult matter, with a 'gentleman' on one side and a squad of hereditary grovellers on the other. He dominated his convict servants by physical force—an equally easy task. But now the old squatter has gone to the mansions above; the immigrant and old hand to the kitchen below; and between the self-valuation of the latter-day squatter and that of his contemporary wage slave, there is very little to choose....Either the anachronistic tradition must make suicidal concessions, or the better class people must drown all plebeian Australian males in infancy, and fill the vacancy with Asiatics (Sil, 205-206).

The labour question in Such is Life is not just a question governed by socialist views on class and exploitation, but also a question richly shaped by the convict presence that represented a threat to the livelihood of free settlers who had initially nothing 35.
more to offer than their labour. Hughes states that, by 1838, 'native-born Australians had come to hate the stigma of convictry -and the competition from assigned convict labour. In 1840, all transportations to New South Wales ceased' (1987:162). But, one needs to remember that 'Transportation to Van Demon's Land was not abolished until 1853' and that the last transport ship brought 'a group of Irish Fenians' to Western Australia in 1868 (Hughes, 1987:162). Nor should one think that this was the end of transportation, for '[t]hey were to come, not as convicts, but as "exiles" bound not to return to Britain until the expiration of their sentences' (J. M. Ward, 1966:39).

Here we see one of the variations of the mythus to which Collins alluded, for '[s]ome of the pastoralists, avid for cheap labour, welcomed the suggestion' (J. M. Ward, 1966: 39). Three years after Samuel and Judith Furphy, these exiles arrived '[l]n 1844', when 'the transport vessel Royal George had landed twenty-one convicts at Port Phillip Bay, the first felons to arrive in the future state of Victoria since the abortive attempts at a convict settlement there back in 1803' (Hughes, 1987:553). With these alterations to transportation in place, 'the lines of class conflict over the arrival of Exiles were drawn. It was city versus country, worker versus squatter' (Hughes, 1987:554). However, the plan was later modified so that '[i]nstead of sending exiles to the colonies', Britain 'would send men on tickets-of-leave at the expiration of half their sentences' (J. M. Ward, 1966:41). Or, as Shaw explains, 'the convict would have to undergo "separate" imprisonment and then labour on the public works in England; only after that would he be sent to Australia, where there was a great demand for his labour' (1966:320).

Even though, as Hughes (1987:346) explains, New South Wales was not a jail, for Norfolk Island filled that role, it was nevertheless a colony of free settlers with a large proportion of convicts. Indeed, Hughes (1987:367) points out that by 1840, forty-five per cent of the population were convicts: a number which decreased to twelve per cent in 1842 when the remaining percentage obtained their ticket-of-leave. According to J. M. Ward, though '[t]icket-of-leave men were not road-gang convicts or assigned servants,...they were obviously convicts in the eyes of the colonists and the law' (1966:41). One can imagine that an ever-increasing influx of free settlers into a colony,
which had only recently ceased receiving transported felons, could not but lead to an ideological conflict between the notions of free and bond. J. M. Ward states that 'hostility to transportation was not the preserve of any single class or district....Most emancipists opposed the system, believing that so long as it existed, the shameful distinction between bond and free would continue' (1966:42). Indeed, 'anti-transportation views, by the late 1840s, were a commonplace of every pulpit sermon and most political meetings' (Hughes, 1987:559).

And yet, 'for all the protests, the meetings and the airing of grievances at the enforced Stain, there was never any question of secession' (Hughes, 1987:560). Loyalty to the Empire remained strong for a variety of reasons. Hughes argues that this view was due to the notion that 'the stereotype of convict evil was fixed beyond the power of any individual's experience to alter it. Get rid of convictry, keep the imperial attachment -such was the local reformer's tune' (1987:559). Perhaps loyalty to the Empire was seen by some reformers as a safeguard to stop the fatal shore from turning into the fatal nest. As Evans et al explain, Anglo-Australian loyalism should also be seen within the context of Western notions of good citizenship:

[1]n the Australian colonies, as elsewhere in the Western world at this time, respectability and right-living were seen to be consistent with such personal virtues as thrift, industriousness, purity and Christian sanctity. Idleness, on the other hand, led directly to temptation, and temptation to profligacy, over-indulgence and the abandonment of all sensual restraints. By various moral arbiters, especially from the middle class, it was viewed as a titanic struggle to convince citizens -and especially working class men- to forgo instant sensory gratification for the more delayed and less tangible pleasures which hard work, saving money, monogamy and family devotion promised to bring. The struggle in Australia was seen to be more vital and difficult than in Britain, largely because of the former's convict origins. Morally shameful beginnings and the heritage of a 'convict taint' made 37.
the need for respectable behaviour all the more pressing in Australia (1997:83-84).

Within the context of good citizenship and the convict taint, Manning Clark has made some interesting observations on the historical tension between labour and capital in 1883:

[It]hroughout the whole civilized world the labouring millions were in revolt against the organized army of capitalists. Labour was becoming militant and aggressive; capital was stolid and defiant. In Australia the struggle was complicated by a legacy from the past. In Sydney and Melbourne an 'irruption of barbarians' was threatening the very foundations of society. The old convict strain had inoculated the working classes with the virus of destruction. The question was whether civilisation could find the right varnish with which to coat the underlying barbarism....In Victoria by 1883 40 per cent of the population were city­dwellers. The problem was to find in this ancient, barren land the roots that would clutch, branches that would grow out of the stony rubbish and prevent Australian society from degenerating into barbarism (1995b:416).

It is interesting to note that the flavour of Clark's narrative brings new light to the city-bush dichotomy. One could argue that the rivalry between a militant labouring class and a defiant capitalist class, as well as the emphasis on good citizenship, finds its immediate expression in the city-bush debate. The bush can be both the moral saviour and the militant agitator. This is not because the bush is janus-faced, but because the bush comes to serve the political ends of a way of seeing and a response to life in the search for meaning. But, while the emphasis on good citizenship is meant to efface convictism and barbarism, it equally lends support to jingoism, thereby reinforcing the rivalrous barbarism loyalists hoped to overcome. As Collins states, 'eighteen-and-a-half centuries of purblind groping for the Kingdom of God finds an idealized Messiah
shrined in the modern Pantheon, and yourselves "a chosen generation," leprous with the sin of usury; "a royal priesthood," paralysed with the cant of hireling clergy; "a holy nation," rotten with the luxury of wealth, or embittered by the sting of poverty; "a peculiar people," deformed to Lucifer's own pleasure by the curse of caste..." (Sil, 89).

This is important, for an appreciation of Furphy's art must include an understanding of the history of colonial rivalry in order to understand his emphasis on ignorance shifting to overcome these divisions. Collins states that '[i]n our democracy, the sum of cultivated intelligence, and corresponding sensitiveness to affront, is dangerously high, and becoming higher' (Sil, 205). It appears Furphy wants to stress that an uplifting and upbuilding of Australia must be an informed and enlightened programme, rather than just a set of traditionally learned guidelines to good conduct, a fervent parochialism or jingoism and a series of suspicious accusations about the intentions of colonial neighbours. In an essay supporting the concept of "world federation", Furphy argues that

[ours is pre-eminently the age of goodwill; it is the age of goodwill because it is the age of enlightenment; it is the age of enlightenment because throughout the civilized world a thousand pens, such as petrified prejudice and vested interests can never hire, are writing in varied style and phrase the unchallengeable charter of human brotherhood, and the whole world, being kin, responds gallantly to the touch of nature (1890:54. My italics).

Under the influence of the Meerschaum pipe, that 'storage-battery, or accumulator, of such truths as ministers of the Gospel cannot afford to preach' (Sil, 85), Collins claims that '[t]he world's brightest intellects are answering one by one to the roll-call of the New Order, and falling into line on the side championed by every prophet, from Moses to the "agitator" that died o' Wednesday' (Sil, 90). Furthermore, Collins is convinced that 'the soul-slaying loyalty to error draws near its close; for the whole armoury of the Father of Lies can furnish no shield to turn aside the point of the tireless and
terrible PEN -that Ithuriel spear which, in these latter days, scornfully touches the mail-clad demon of Privilege, and discloses a swelling frog' (*Sil*, 90). And, in this sense, 'contemperaneous literature...is our surest register of advance or retrogression; and, with few exceptions indeed, the prevailing and conspicuous element in all publications of more than a century ago is a tacit acceptance of *irresponsible lordship* and *abject inferiority* as Divine ordinances' (*Sil*, 90. My italics).

In what can best be described as the "self-evident truths" of an enlightenment thinker, Furphy argues home the point that 'an enlightened age repudiates the blunders and concessions of an ignorant age; it is a self-appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober' (1890:54-55). Or, as Collins claims, 'John Knox's wildest travesty of eternal justice never rivalled in flagrancy the moving principle of a civilisation which exists merely to build on extrinsic bases an impracticable barrier between class and class: on one side, the redemption of life, education, refinement, leisure, comfort; on the other side, want, toll, anxiety, and an open path to the Gehenna of ignorance, baseness and brutality' (*Sil*, 88. My italics). According to Collins, 'your conception of heavenly justice is found in the concession of equal spiritual birthright, based on the broad charter of common humanity, and forfeitable only by individual worthlessness or deliberate refusal' (*Sil*, 88). Driving the point home, Collins asks a choice question to his readers: 'why is your idea of earthly justice so widely different -since the principle of justice must be absolute and immutable' (*Sil*, 88).

In the human order of things, 'the mustard seed has become a great tree, but the unclean fowls lodge in its branches' (*Sil*, 89). But, rather than taking the axe literally to the tree, Furphy took the pen. One could say that the pen is only mightier than the sword because the former is the symbol of he or she who thinks. According to Collins, '[e]rudition, even in the humblest sphere of life, is the sweetest solace, the unfailing refuge, of the restless mind; but if the bearer thereof be not able to do something well enough to make a living by it, his education is simply outclassed, overborne, and crushed by his own superior ignorance' (*Sil*, 34). In short, 'it is such men's ignorance -their technical ignorance- that is their curse. Education of any kind never was, and never can be, a curse to its
possessor; it is a curse only to the person whose interest lies in exploiting its possessor' (Sil, 34).

It will be of further interest to the reader to note that the latter half of the nineteenth century marked an intense debate on the status of education in Australia. Clark points out that

[the need was great. In the cities the men with education were conscious...that here in Australia everything was 'anti-podean'. In Europe there was enlightenment; here there was semi-barbarism. In Europe and North America there were expensive schemes for the education of all children; here the wealthy alone could enjoy the highest branches of knowledge. In Europe and North America many countries had already introduced free education for all; here narrow-minded class legislation and sectarian animosity thwarted all such attempts.

Bedevilled by sectarian suspicion and bitterness, and despairing of Protestants and Catholics ever reaching agreement on a general system of education, the colonies of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland had introduced a dual system of national schools and denominational schools (1995b:366).

Ignorance, as Furphy sees it, is inseparable from a complex and deeply-ingrained social and cultural rivalry, and so long as it remains inseparable, education and federation will suffer. This is particularly important to 'the Lower Orders' (Sil, 34) because they make up the largest portion of the Australian population and appear to be the most susceptible to ignorance. In the letter to Cecil Winter, dated the 23rd of September, 1903, Furphy declares that '[t]here is much in your suggestion respecting the causes of pessimism in the Out-back man (who is the real Australian); but, as you say, Ignorance is at the root of it. Does anyone suppose that unbroken prosperity is good for a man or a nation? No one, I think; and the inability to apply the rule to one's self personally is one manifestation of Ignorance' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124. My italics).
Indeed, Collins argues that ‘there is a time to be born, and a time to die; a time to mourn and a time to dance. Alternate sunshine and rain is the law of Nature; alternate smiles and tears is the law of human life; and this rhythmic reaction is as necessary to healthy moral being as the tide to the sea, or the wind to the atmosphere’ (BBB, 23). In short, one must accept and work with life’s lessons, rather than suspiciously reject or hastily build barriers to that which “appears” to be a threat. As Ralph Waldo Emerson argued in ‘Nature’, ‘space, time, society, labor, climate, food, locomotion, the animals, the mechanical forces, give us sincerest lessons, day by day, whose meaning is unlimited. They educate both the Understanding and the Reason’ ([1836] 1985:55). It is interesting to examine the connection between Furphy’s novels and some of the ideas espoused by Emerson. In their respective biographies, both Franklin (1944:6) and Barnes (1990:56) note that amongst the many books on the shelf in the Furphy household at Corop was a copy of Emerson’s essays.

Barnes (1990:243) also notes that Furphy’s use of the phrase “the order of things” may have been a borrowing from Emerson’s essay ‘Nature’. This is rather interesting, for Emerson’s essay maps out the basic intellectual concerns which underpin Furphy’s novels and their theme of uplifting and upbuilding Australia. Furthermore, a comparative reading of Furphy’s novels and Emerson’s essays reveals not only a similarity of theme, but also a similarity in style, especially with Collins’ meditations. Perhaps Furphy saw himself as an Australian version of Emerson, seeking to communicate to his bush-born readers the universal values of reason and understanding. Although he does not discuss the connection between Furphy and Emerson, Barnes points out that

[the bushman is at the centre of Furphy’s world; it is as a bushman that he writes for a local audience, quite free of the notion of colonial inferiority....Not that Furphy wished to cut himself off from the English culture. Quite the reverse. He tries to link his own writing to the English tradition by constant allusion. The Bible and Shakespeare are never far from conscious recall, offering phrases which embody rich insights into the permanent in human life (1979:36).] 42.
Green (1961:613) and Hope (1971:112) have both noted that Furphy's active accumulation of knowledge resembles that of the magpie, insinuating that Such is Life is an undisciplined nest of items collected through desire and greed. While I do not disagree with the analogy of the magpie, I should like to affirm that the published version of the novel is highly disciplined, for this scholarly eclecticism is primary to Collins' presentation of his identity as an enlightened and educated thinker. One should not forget that Collins himself comes from 'the Lower Orders' (Sil, 34) and that he is concerned with 'the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:259). Indeed, one only needs to think of the 'ten masterpieces of poetry' (RR, 53) with which Collins tries to educate other Furphian heroes to see that the notion of enlightenment is one crucial factor of the novels' thematic momentum.

Richters states that '[i]t is, incidentally, not the least of Furphy's achievements to suggest an immemorial tradition pervading an order of things of such very recent historical origin' (1979:259). But this immemorial tradition serves a purpose. As Partington (1993:147, 208) explains, Furphy saw the need to align the great cultural traditions of Britain and Europe with the Australian experience because such an alignment would have a liberating effect on the individual and social groups. G. W. Turner points out that '[s]ometimes a European expression is acclimatized by expressing an Australia experience, sometimes Australian idiom expresses moral or philosophical truths from a European tradition or simply expresses well a subtle or complex idea. There is a constant bringing together of the two traditions. Both are respected' (1986:173). Or, as Henricksen explains, '[p]olitical philosophies, ideas, arguments, propagandist techniques, set mythological or historical or Biblical exempla, single allegorical images: all were transplanted in the amalgam of Australian idiom and English literature, and directed to healing Australian ills' (1985:127).

In this sense, one should see Such is Life as a book that 'is meant to educate its readers in various ways' (Pons, 1979:119). But I would extend this qualification equally to Rigby's Romance and The Buln-Buln and the Brolga, for all three novels are 'an educational game of the first order rather than a fireworks display testifying to
the author's cleverness' (Pons, 1979:120). If, as Pons rightly states, 'education means the development of one's intellectual capacities, one's ability to interpret correctly the various events to which one is a witness' (1979:120), then the educational quality of the novels is rather pertinent in light of the pervasive but unnecessary ignorance and rivalry in nineteenth-century Australia. As Collins states, 'human ignorance is, after all, more variable in character than in extent. Each sphere of life, each occupation, is burdened with its own special brand of this unhappy heritage. To remove one small section of inborn ignorance is a life-work for any man' (Sil, 32).

This applies equally well to Furphy, who wrote to Stephens that 'another ray of light has tended to dissipate that midnight darkness of ignorance with which Nature somewhat unjustly started me on the pilgrimage of life' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:118). And, to Miles Franklin, Furphy stated that '[i]n the matter of Education, I am confronted, whichever way I turn, by my own fearful and wonderful Ignorance' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds 1995:174). This is an interesting use of two opposed adjectives, for ignorance is fearful when it breeds rivalry and division. Perhaps Furphy was much influenced in his views by Emerson's notion that 'fear always springs from ignorance' ((1837)1985:97). But ignorance can also be wonderful in the sense that it can encourage one to accept one's shortcomings and to search for knowledge. As Collins states, '[t]hose who are personally acquainted with me will readily believe that the most difficult self-disciplinary lesson of my life has been obtaining a practical mastery of that fine Rabbinical precept, "Learn to say, I do not know"' (BBB, 121). One is reminded of Socrates and his investigations into the knowledge and ignorance of his fellow Athenians.

It would seem that, for Furphy, nation-building is a universal concern, and cannot be conducted under the pretext of exclusivity. Nor can nation be built in an era of rivalry over education. Furphy wanted to point out that one cannot uplift nor upbuild a nation by remaining ignorant of, and closed to, other cultural traditions and other expressions of universal concerns. Equally, one cannot upbuild or uplift a nation in an air of suspicion and rivalry. In fact, Furphy stands opposed to the popular discourse of an Australian type that has evolved from a narrow stance to a rivalrous history. According to
Palmer, the type was 'a laconic but sociable fellow with his own idiom and his own way of looking at things. He had humour of a dry sardonic kind, a sensitive spirit with a tough covering, initiative and capacity that were qualified by "near enough" standards of achievement' (1963:169). Ward also points out these qualities in the Australian type, with the added observations that '[h]e swears hard and consistently gambles heavily and often, and drinks deeply on occasion' (1966:2). Furthermore, Ward notes that the Australian type is strongly anti-authoritarian, 'a "knocker" of eminent people', strongly egalitarian, for he will 'stick to his mates through thick and thin' and 'a great improviser' (1966:2).

As Harris explains, '[l]ife was a matter of rough and ready adaptation to the environment. Self-reliance of this kind, allied to a dislike of the boss-cocky, is recorded as far back as the first generation of currency lads and lasses' (1962:54). While I am of the opinion that Furphy did not disagree with some of these qualities of the national type, the extent to which they became the norm struck a dissonant chord in him, especially given his passion for learning. What Furphy stood most opposed to in the popular discourse of the Australian type, most notably the prose sketches of Lawson, was the fact that the Australian type's 'mental horizons were comparatively narrow', for this overturns, as I have tried to show, the notion that 'his sympathies were broad' (Palmer, 1963:169). Indeed, Furphy desires to overturn the notion that the Australian type 'is a "hard case", sceptical about the value of religion and of intellectual and cultural pursuits generally' (Ward, 1966:2).

Ward states that 'all these characteristics were widely attributed to the bushmen of the last century', particularly 'the outback employees, the semi-nomadic drovers, shepherds, shearsers, bullock-drivers, stockmen, boundary-riders, station-hands and others of the pastoral industry' (1966:2). It is rather interesting to note that, within the opposition of ignorance and knowledge, Furphy wrote a novel focussing on many of the aforementioned occupations and created a hero who has worked extensively in the bush without succumbing to the narrow outlook of the Australian type. It is also interesting to note that the people who filled these occupations were avid readers of the *Bulletin*: a popular newspaper that perpetuated and thrived on rivalry, contradiction, suspicion and fear. Furphy may
have written for the *Bulletin*, but his eclectic and scholarly style ensured that he was not published often. Furphy's writings were not as saleable as Lawson's or Paterson's writings. This is evident by the sheer length of time it took to publish *Such is Life*.

Indeed, if we consider the *Bulletin* as the major shaper of a national identity and all things Australian, then it might be said that its readership was getting an education equivalent to that of modern tabloid press. In a letter to Kate Baker, Furphy wrote, 'that idolatrous red-covered journal hasn't yet printed our remarks of Tennyson. I have a paragraph in its columns now and then, but only something trifling....Also I will send a duplicate of a yarn which that immoral rag fired into its basket with contumely. But "they are an ignorant lot"' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:100. My italics). Perhaps Furphy's attitude is adequately surmized by Collins, who states that

> the censorious reader may have already noticed [my] habit of airing some scrap of unhackneyed information, apparently, though not actually, with a view to effect. Immoral as the practice is, and pert as it may seem to the unbookish critic, I hold it to be far less reprehensible than the converse impropriety of writing for full-grown people in the painfully simple manner so often affected in literature intended for the "masses" (*BBB*, 88).

One could say that the *Bulletin*, although Furphy's only literary outlet, eventually fell prey to the same scorn that was normally reserved for the romance novelist. Again, it is important to note that the *Bulletin*, like the colonial romance, had a wide readership, which makes it very influential in terms of a popular way of seeing and responding to life in Australia. Furphy wanted to educate, as well as entertain this mass readership. He wanted to address the ignorance that divided Australian society and plagued the fledgling national movement. Nowhere is this more prevalent than in the 1903 review Furphy wrote for his own novel, where he points out that

> [t]he corresponding penalty of this National
consciousness is a certain narrowness of outlook, a spontaneous impression that the sun rises over the Barrier Reef and sets behind the Leeuwin. When darkened by Stolidity, such focalized regard is sometimes amusing, sometimes regrettable -which, however, doesn’t signify much, as it seldom reaches the dignity of print. Shrivelling into provincialism, it becomes contemptible; and, festering into the imperical-cum-provincial sentiment, it becomes obscene.

But when illuminated by intelligence, the same insular survey crystallizes into far-sighted patriotism. When further reinforced by acute observation, and cast into literary form, it invests with interest the minutest details of National life (1969:128-129).

Turner states that '[i]f...our nationalist myths are not unmediated reflections of history but transformations of it, then they must work to construct a very specific way of seeing the nation....This way of seeing the nation is dependent upon a relatively narrow range of myths -primarily those attached to the radical nationalists icons of bushman and the digger' (Turner, 1993:107). Furphy understood this too, and found the myth much too narrow. Thus, within the context of the Federal push, jingoism, the convict taint and colonial rivalries, Furphy’s consistent but eclectic use of the European cultural canon and his focus on ignorance shifting suggests his pledge to an Australian programme of enlightenment, through an Australian programme of education. Furphy was dissatisfied with the ignorance that became so much a part of an anti-intellectual stance in the national type. Indeed, if we consider how other Furphian heroes reflect the Australian type more accurately than Collins, then we can see that Furphy desires to encourage a healthy intellectualism in this “type”.

To return to Crosby’s discussion on the tension between fact and fiction in the discipline of history, it can be said that the colonial sense of Australian history has utilized this tension to the fullest in order to mythologise a grand, national life rather quickly. If history cannot be effaced, then the next alternative is to examine
history's status as fiction, smoothing over the obstacles and healing the wounds of colonial Australia. To stress Crosby's previous points, such an examination does not mean a preoccupation with history as a falsehood, but with 'the conditions of representation, the processes of signification [and] the constitution of the subject' (1991:45). This accords with Furphy's views on art. But, since ignorance seems to be, for Furphy, at the root of the problem, it must also be said that the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, or the art of nation, besides being concerned with representation, signification and the constitution of identity, must also consider the dangers of ignorance, sophistry and rivalry that can result from a particular way of seeing and a particular response to life.

Consider the following enthusiastic excerpts from a speech entitled 'The Mind of a Nationalist' by R. Thomson:

...[l]et the critic sneer at 1788. It shall yet be a date that the wide world shall honour. What though our land was born in sorrow and shame; yet out of the cradles of poverty and sin, empires have emerged and the regenerators of mankind have arisen.

When we think of the teachings of history we can well believe that in the time to come - it may be before this generation has passed away- 1788 will be a date that will be classed in the world's history with the founding of Rome, the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers, or the storming of the Bastille. There will be but one greater day in our own Australia's annals, and that will be the anniversary of the Declaration of her Independence. For that great date... it is the duty of our countrymen to make preparation. It will be a fateful event, and epochs of that character are slow in coming and are not the progeny of chance. Work, earnest work, must smooth the way, and the more the labourers and the more earnest their labour, the sooner and the better will the triumph be achieved. Too many of my countrymen give no thought to the morrow. It suffices them that they eat, drink, and be merry. But empires are not built by muscles and
bodies alone. Brains must also be exerted. There must be they who will plan and work for other ends than those which are demanded to obtain the wherewithal to eat and drink (in Clark, 1955:792).

Furphy seems to share the flavour of Thomson’s concerns. If, historically speaking, convictism is one of the most prominent factors in the shaping of a national type, and the once negative qualities of the convict type are appropriated by the rural and urban masses as a celebration of a society and culture, then it can be said that the emerging national type ignorantly celebrates the very thing that has perpetuated rivalry and consistently divided the people. Indeed, Ward argues that the qualities of the Australian type were not just shaped by ‘the material conditions of outback life’, but also by the fact that ‘the first and most influential bush-workers were convicts or ex-convicts, the conditions of whose lives were such that they brought with them to the bush the same, or very similar, attitudes’ (1966:2). This is reminiscent of Hughes’ aforementioned notion that ‘[t]he basic class division of early colonial Australia - guards versus prisoners- lived on as a metaphor of future disputes’ (1987:158).

Perhaps this link between the convict stereotype and the anti-intellectualism of the newly-emerging national type is just one of the reasons why ‘the coming Australian is a problem’ (SlL, 144) for the scholarly Furphy. Indeed, it may have even been one of the primary reasons for his pessimism in the last two years of his life, for he wrote to his mother that ‘all my interminable reading has the effect only of impressing me with the vast extent of my own present ignorance. Yes, there is another effect, namely, a realisation of the similar ignorance of all our leading men of letters. There is hardly a book worth reading’ (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:253). The letter was written ten years after federation on the 1st of April, 1910. But even in this letter there is present an undeniable and deep-seated optimism, for Furphy wrote

[and] yet, running beneath all the “personal equation”, prejudice, and general trashiness of our best literature there is a blind, half-futile aspiration toward

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something better; and this aspiration is not without its effect (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:253).

At the time when the Furphys arrived, colonial society had begun to feel the birthpangs of federation, and one can only imagine the impact it had on the free settlers, emancipated convicts and their native-born children who, like Furphy, represented an "Australian" socio-cultural future. As a writer who sought to write about an Australia for Australians, it is obvious that Furphy sought to bring Australia to its full potential as a nation amongst nations. But the manner in which he undertook this strategy was to emphasize the importance of a commitment to education, for education would, in turn, emphasize the importance of that which is other to the self. In short, education takes the people out of the microcosm of ignorance into the macrocosm of knowledge and understanding.

Perhaps the events of 1883 in the Riverina brought Furphy to an understanding that the success of Australia as a nation amongst nations depended on a common 'smoothing of obstacles' and a common 'healing of wounds' (*Sil, 70*) in the human order of things. But the turn of events in nineteenth-century colonial Australia perhaps suggested to Furphy that the removal of obstacles and the healing of wounds can only occur by epistemologically eradicating the sophistry that perpetuates the problem of colonial rivalry and the stigma of convictism. As Collins states,

> [h]istory marks a point of time when first the Humanity of God touched the divine aspiration in man, fulfilling, under the skies of Palestine, the dim, yet infallible instinct of every race from eastern Mongol to western Aztec. "The Soul, naturally Christian," responds to this touch, even though blindly and erratically, and so from generation to generation the multitudes stand waiting to welcome the Gospel of Humanity with psalms and hosannas, as of old; while from generation to generation phylactered exclusiveness takes counsel against the revolution which is to make all things new. And shall this opposition -the opposition by slander, conspiracy, 50.
bribery, and force- prevail till the fatal line is once more passed, and you await the Titus sword to drown your land in blood, and the Hadrian-plough to furrow your Temple-site? (SiL, 90).

This cannot be if, as Collins believes, one takes part in the 'revolt of enlightenment against ignorance' (SiL, 90).

1.3. The Penguin and the Man-O'-War Hawk: a parable on opportunism.

In a letter to his mother, Judith Furphy, dated the 10th of April, 1910, Furphy wrote,

Though I have learned something of the history of the human race, I am only on the fringe of knowledge. Beyond Rome lies in rotation Palestine, Greece, Babylon, Assyria, with Egypt, India & China, all to be inquired into. But the Siege of Troy and the episode of Jepthah (about the same date) are matters of yesterday. Beyond History lies Tradition, then Legend; and beyond this stands the Cave Man, clamoring for recognition....But the main interest of Science lies far beyond the earliest of those early times, and extends onward through the Future to a time when our descendants will be as superior to ourselves as we are to those evil-smelling ancestors of ours. And to this end Socialism expects every man to do his duty (Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:253-254).

Given our knowledge of Furphy's interest in history and his support for education, Green is correct to state that Furphy had a keen 'desire to understand the nature and history of the evolution of man' (1961:613). But how does this relate to Furphy's socialist concerns? What does Furphy mean when he states that "to this end Socialism expects every man to do his duty"? There is no denying that Furphy keenly expressed his concerns for the social. But was Furphy a committed socialist? In a letter to Cathels, discussing the
'Darwinist' and 'Antinomian' climate of Victorian industry, Furphy voices his opinion that he has little 'hope' for 'the consummation of the social economic ideal' in 'Victoria' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:20). But, in the self-same letter, Furphy also writes,

[y]ou'll think by all this that I've been reading myself stupid in the literature of Socialism. Not so, my last exercise has been Fielding and Smollett, both of whom I had partly read long ago....By the way what a rotten world it was before Paine preached and Burns sang and Byron scoffed and Carlyle snarled. I find great comfort in the ferment of society in these our days, but Gude save us! What a lot of suffering it takes to earn a little progress (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:20).2

The letter was dated January, 1894. But, in a letter to Miles Franklin, written on the 31st of July, 1904, Furphy explains that 'being a State Socialist, I am not under the Divine malison, and am consequently able to see things as they are -chiefly the great fact that my own private interests are not worthy to count for -/2 against the public welfare' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:174). This is interesting, for one could argue that, by the time Furphy had written the aforementioned letter to his mother on the 10th of April, 1910, he had converted fully to socialism. But I do not think so. While it is an undeniable fact that Furphy had social concerns, I think it is necessary to approach this within the context of the philosophe’s concern for rational human progress. As Furphy had stated to Cathels, 'I am about the busiest man in Shep., for when the Adamic penalty of each day has been duly paid, my labour of love -ignorance shifting- just begins' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:23). It is this labour of love which probably led him to adopt some socialist ideas. But, unlike Barnes (1990:145), Croft (1991:86; 1996:215) or Ewers (1943), I would not classify Furphy as a socialist. Perhaps Henricksen's notion that Furphy articulated a 'reasoned socialism' (1985:175) comes closest to the truth.

Furphy is a philosophe and his socialist ideas, just as his

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2 I will discuss Paine's relevance to Furphy more fully in the last section.

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nationalist ideas, should be seen within this context. Thus, it is the object of this section to show some of the reasons why I think this is the case. In the words of that other philosophe, Tom Collins,

if the censorious reader has detected here and there in these pages a tendency toward the Higher Criticism, or a leaning to State Socialism, or any passage that seemed to indicate a familiarity with cuneiform inscriptions, or with the history and habits of Pre-Adamite Man, he may be assured that, at the time of writing such passage, I had been smoking the mighty pipe -or rather, the mighty pipe had been smoking me - and the unlawful erudition had effervesced per motion of my scholastic ally (StL, 272).

Firstly, Furphy's own interests in individual and social circumstances are too complex and variform to be simply pinned down to one political view of the world. Indeed, Furphy wrote in his essay on world federation that 'there are stupendous industries awaiting development; there are untrodden labyrinths of science lying beyond the vestibule where we stand to-day; there are artistic and literary possibilities to which present attainments are the mere alphabet; there are ten thousand beneficient outlets for the inborn combativeness and effervescent energy and limitless aspiration of enfranchized humanity' (1890:55). Although socialist ideas can be identified in this essay by choice words such as proletariat or class, I do not agree with Barnes' notion that, 'although the term is never used, "Socialism"...is clearly the philosophy which is being espoused' (1990:157). Though Barnes is correct in noting that Furphy's 'personal philosophy...was a mixture of Protestantism, Stoicism and Socialism' (1990:148), one ought to subordinate this mixture of ideas to the enlightenment programme of shifting the ignorance that jeopardises human progress and the 'gospel of equal rights' (1890:55).

What, then, do we make of Furphy's socialist ideas in his narratives? Though Croft classifies Furphy as a socialist, he points out that 'what we get is not a comprehensive picture of life in the

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I will discuss the importance of rights in more detail in the next section.

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Riverina in the 1880s. Instead, there is an absence, a silence, which
must worry those readers who turn to the text as an example of
socialist propaganda in the 1890s' (1991:17). According to Croft,
'shat Furphy should attempt to write an epic of socialism without
ever showing unionists and in particular the shearsers, the historical
agents of socialism, is explicable only in terms of the confusion of
Furphy's mind when he came to deal with life in the Riverina in the
1880s' (1991:18). But in a recent essay, Croft states that 'Such is Life,
Rigby's Romance and The Buln-Bulin and the Brolga certainly put the
case for socialism and egalitarianism but an analysis of the ideas in
the novels, and their method of presentation through a conservative
narrator [Tom Collins] and a flawed spokesman for state socialism
[Jefferson Rigby] compromise those ideas, and confuse the readership

If one considers that Rigby's Romance is the most consistent
expression of State Socialism of the three novels, one really ought to
reevaluate just what Furphy intended in regards to socialism. The
socialist issue is only marginally present in Such is Life and virtually
non-existent in The Buln-Bulin and The Brolga. Toward the close of
the latter narrative, however, Collins has this to say to his readers:

[Barefooted] Bob was a bushman by nature, as well as
by compulsion. His individuality was clear-cut as a
cameo. Faithful and single-hearted, he was sternly
honest in his criminality, and pious in his
acknowledged wrong-doing. For instance, his sympathy
with bushrangers and horse-stealers was as
magnanimous as your own tenderness for usurers,
profit-mongers, nobleman, etc. In a word, he walked
conscientiously in a light that was extremely dim.
Every unselfish man is loyal to something extraneous;
at that date Bob was loyal to capitalism and M'Gregor;
a few years later, he was still more loyal to the
Queensland strike leaders and Socialism-in-our-time
(BBB, 140-141).

Is Collins not hinting at Barefooted Bob's opportunism? Is
Furphy suggesting that the desire, or human spirit for opportunism
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is as prevalent as ignorance? If so, then could we not argue that the rivalry and contradictions of the 1890s are due to the prevalence of ignorance and opportunism? If egalitarianism and socialism in the novels are not what they seem, then perhaps one to ought consider Furphy's narratives as suggesting something other than the run-of-the-mill themes through which we see the 1890s and its literature. Of particular interest to my view is Jack the Shellback's account of the "Penguin and the man-o'-war Hawk".

The account is an interesting one because of its central theme of hunger. Indeed, this theme of hunger is introduced through the voracious appetite of Collins' kangaroo-dog, Pup. Readers of the three novels are well informed of Pup's entertaining antics in his quest for food. According to Collins, "[o]ne peculiarity of the kangaroo-dog is...that he can smell food through half-inch boilerplate; and he rivals Trenck or Monte Cristo in making way through any obstacle which may stand between him and the object of his desires" (SIL, 274). This is important, for it is through Pup that Furphy alludes to the themes of desire and opportunism, and it is because of Pup's hunger that Jack the Shellback gives his account of the man-o'-war hawk. Collins may state that "[t]he kangaroo-dog is the hungriest subject in the animal kingdom" (SIL, 274), but, according to Jack the Shellback, 'he ain't in it with the man-o'-war hawk' (SIL, 274). Furphy is surely alluding to an even hungrier subject in the animal kingdom than either the kangaroo-dog or the man-o'-war hawk, and that is Man.

Because of Jack the Shellback's profanity, Collins paraphrases the account:

[t]he man-o'-war hawk, it appears, utters a thrilling squeal of hunger the moment his beak emerges from the shell; and his hunger dogs him - kangaroo-dogs him, you might say- through life. At adult age, he consists chiefly of wings; but, in addition to these, he has a pair of eager, sleepless eyes, endowed with a power of something like 200 diameters; and he has also a perenially empty stomach - the sort of vacuum, by the way, which Nature particularly abhors. He can eat nothing but fish; and, since he suffers under the
disadvantage of being unable to dive, wade, or swim, someone else must catch the fish for him. The penguin does this, and does it with a listless ease which would excite the envy of the man-o'-war hawk if the unceasing anguish of hunger allowed the latter any respite for thought (Sil, 275).

In contrast, the penguin 'presents a pointed antithesis to the man-o'-war hawk' (Sil, 275). The penguin's 'life is unadventurous; some might call it monotonous' (Sil, 275). Indeed, the penguin is never required 'to act either on reason or impulse', for he 'has few wants, and no ambition. Dreaming the happy hours away - that is his idea' (Sil, 275). The small bird 'knows barely enough to be aware that with much wisdom cometh much sorrow' (Sil, 275). And, once a day, he experiences a crisp, triumphant appetite, which differs from hunger as melody differs from discord and he 'selects a fish as for size, flavour, and general applicability [that] will best administer to his bodily requirements, and gratify his epicurean taste' (Sil, 275). In short, while the penguin's desires are well-fed, the man-o'-war hawk must use strategy in order to live by the principle that 'the most important of all economies is the economy of time' (Sil, 276).

From a socialist perspective, one could say that the man-o'-war hawk represents the maxim that "time is money" and the social Darwinist notion of the survival of the stronger. Indeed, one could conclude, as Croft (1991:205) and Henricksen (1985:135) do, that the account is a parable of nineteenth-century laissez-faire capitalism, and that the man-o'war hawk represents the exploiter and the penguin the exploited. But readers should note that the manner in which Collins paraphrases the account has much to do with attributing human qualities to both the penguin and the man-o'-war hawk. Effectively, this makes the two birds the measure of how one desires to exist in the world. Indeed, according to Collins, '[a]fter listening with much interest to the description here loosely paraphrased, I fell asleep with the half-formed longing to be a penguin, and the liveliest gratitude that I was not a man-o'-war hawk' (Sil, 277. My italics).

In short, the man-o'-war hawk must suffer in his labours for his fleeting moment of happiness, while the penguin appears to have
the perfect life. As Croft notes, 'this is a curious inversion of the usual socialist picture of the economic problem' (1991:206). But I disagree with Croft's notion that the parable 'is no answer to the great problems of social inequality in the late nineteenth century' (1991:206). Sharkey is correct in noting that the parable is 'a subtle analogy for the reader's interpretation of the plot' (1984:23). But I think that the parable foregrounds more than just 'the relationship between narrator and audience' (1984:23). Is Furphy suggesting that, while human beings desire to be like the penguin, perhaps even obtaining a degree of bliss in the pursuit of happiness, they are more than likely to act and interact in the manner of the man-o'-war hawk? Is the desire to live like the penguin more a case of opportunism than an honest expression of socialism, mateship or working class solidarity? Indeed, Ward points out a rather humorous but 'well known story' where 'a socialist orator promised his audience that there would be strawberries and cream for all after the revolution' (1966:181).

Though earlier than Manning Clark, was Furphy already pointing to the fact that the labour movement 'was corrupt, opportunist' and 'riddled with bourgeois prejudices', showing 'no intention of working for the regeneration of mankind' (1980:14). If this is the case, as I think it is, then Partington is quite right in concluding that 'Jack the Shellback's parable of the man-o'-war hawk and the penguin suggests there are basic differences between individuals or groups which may persist through all social arrangements' (1993:176). As she points out,

the theme of class-conflict by no means constitutes the whole of Such is Life. Indeed, it is difficult to recognise the naive antithesis of wicked squatter and worthy plebeian as even a defensible reading. There seems little reason to suspect that selectors, bullockies, or stationhands, although they have little enough to show for their efforts, are any less 'land-hungry' than the squatters (1993:172).

To put it simply, '[m]en and women in the Riverina lie and steal in similar ways to the rest of humanity' (Partington, 1993:123).
One only needs to remember Dixon and Bum's attempt to steal Collins' horse, Cleopatra, or the impounding of Warrigal Alf's bullocks while he is sick to note the widespread opportunism in the Riverina. From this, one could say that the account is a parable of the opportunism that turns the individual longing for happiness into the individual pursuit of happiness, with little regard for society or ideology. This is interesting in light of a neat little remark made by Collins and our previous investigation of the importance of ignorance to the narrative. If people long to be like the penguin, and the penguin lives 'in total ignorance of the man-o'-war hawk' (SiL, 276), then people long to be ignorant of the internal and external factors that affect and determine their positions in the world. Although, as Collins states to Warrigal Alf, 'one must love something' and 'one must hate something' (SiL, 135), one must also be aware of why one loves or why one hates and what effect one's hatred or love has on one's response to life.

To live in the penguin's blissful ignorance does not necessarily mean that one's happiness is of benefit to self or society. Indeed, Sam Brackenbridge's conversion to socialism and his belief that 'us Socialists is no more responsible for the comin' revolution than the mere petrel is for the storm it prognosticates' (RR, 255) is one example of the penguin's blissful ignorance as well as the man-o'-hawk's opportunism. Socialism is not a 'mere matter of evolution' (RR, 255), but a purposeful strategy executed by people in the human order of things. And it is a strategy with major and minor alternatives. In this sense, one could consider the parable of the penguin and the man-o'-war hawk as a further illustration of the theory of the controlling alternatives and the need for education. This applies equally to Furphy's earlier views towards ignorance-shifting and human progress. It also allows Furphy to use the parable to indicate further the damaging attitudes and orientations of colonial Australians toward the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia. Thus, while the account of the penguin and the man-o'-war hawk can be read as a parable of economic conditions, its designs are better seen as a study of desire and interaction in human nature.

One must remember that neither the penguin nor the man-o'-war hawk is unduly disadvantaged by the economics of their
relationship in the order of things. Both live in a state of opportunism relative to their desire or epicurean taste. In light of this, I would like to turn to a letter that Keats wrote to his brother and sister, George and Georgiana, for it brings some interesting points to the discussion at hand. In this letter, dated the 19th of March, 1819, Keats wrote that

"In wild nature the Hawk would lose his Breakfast of Robins and the Robin his of Worms. The Lion must starve as well as the swallow - The greater part of Men make their way with the same instinctiveness, the same unwandering eye from their purposes, the same animal eagerness as the Hawk - The Hawk wants a Mate, so does the Man - look at them both, they set about it and procure one in the same manner - They want both a nest and they both set about one in the same manner - they get their food in the same manner - The noble animal Man for his amusement smokes his pipe - the Hawk balances about the Clouds - that is the only difference of their leisures. This it is that makes the Amusement of Life - to a speculative Mind. I go among the Fields and catch a glimpse of a stoat or a fieldmouse peeping out of the withered grass - the creature hath a purpose and its eyes are bright with it - I go amongst the buildings of a city and I see a Man hurrying along - to what? The Creature has a purpose and his eyes are bright with it (in Rollins, ed, 1958: 79-80. My italics).

Thematically, the flavour of Jack the Shellback's account is very similar to Keats' letter. Considering that Keats' letter had been originally published in 1848, it is quite possible that Furphy had read the letter. Indeed, Keats' letter foregrounds not just the issue of hunger, but also the issue of purpose in the account of the hawk and the penguin. This is important, for we are already familiar with Furphy's belief that 'beyond the changing seasons...there lies a purpose' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124). But, while Keats' letter speaks generally about the presence of purpose in hawk and

59.
man, I find it interesting that Furphy's parable should focus on a particular type of hawk associated with images of the 'high seas' (*Sil*, 274), with "treasure", "heroism" and "opportunism" in the human order of things. This has some rather interesting ramifications for Keats' analogy on purpose, the ramifications of which he seems to be aware. Indeed, Keats wrote that '[t]here is an electric fire in human nature, tending to purify; so that, among these human creatures, there is continually some birth of new heroism; the pity is, that we must wonder at it, as we should at finding a pearl in rubbish' (in Houghton, ed, [1848] 1927:158).

Referring to the Australian type, Palmer states that 'there was a streak of idealism in his nature that expressed itself in his sentiment about mateship and in the political movements that made for equality' (1963:170). Indeed, according to Ward, '[t]he later bushman exhibited, perhaps even more clearly than his fore-runners, that "manly independence" whose obverse side was a levelling, egalitarian collectivism, and whose sum was comprised in the concept of mateship' (1966:180). This may be true for some 1890s writers and their depiction of the type, but not Furphy. While Furphy considered the bushmen to be indicative of the real Australian type, one should not forget their opportunist nature, their willing participation in some form of colonial rivalry and their tendency for overhasty and ignorant actions.

As Clark (1980:12-17) has pointed out, egalitarianism, or the belief that brotherhood, equality and mateship were universally extended to all is a fallacy, for such a view was much more prominently a front for anti-loyalist sentiments. Clark argues that '[m]ateship was the product of a way of life: a mate was a bulwark against loneliness, a help in time of sickness and accident' (1980:16). This is what Furphy's narratives indicate, for there are numerous examples of this kind of "mateship" which in no way espouse true equality, brotherhood or egalitarianism, as Ward or Palmer describe. For example, one could consider Collins' tending to Warrigal Alf's sickness and his retrieval of Alf's impounded bullocks within Clark's description of mateship. Likewise, one could also see Clark's description of mateship operating in chapter one of *Such is Life*, when the bullockies help Cooper to tow his wagon out of the bog, despite the fact that there is a deep colonial rivalry between the men.
According to Kiernan, Collins' 'digressions may present us with the ideals of Australian democratic socialism but, when we glance at the characters and situations in the novel, society is seen as far from ideal. . . . Society is seen as absurd in its pretensions, and corrupt behind its facade of respectability' (1971b:143). I think Collins' digressions are designed to direct our attention to this fact.

Douglas places much of Such is Life firmly in the picaresque tradition, arguing that '[t]heft and deception are the stock-in-trade of the picaresque tradition' and that '[t]he picaro....sets out to rise in the world by skills picked up from bandits, toughs, card-sharpers, pimps, burglars, pickpockets and confidence men' (1978:19). While such a variety of characters do not grace Furphy's pages, it is rather interesting that the bullocky, like the picaro, 'has cruelties inflicted on him, and returns them with interest', for '[h]e practices the trades of the world to which he belongs' and 'engages in a battle of wits to see who will emerge the deceiver and who the deceived' (1978:19).

Indeed, '[t]he picaresque "hero" shows no consciousness of wrong-doings except in so far as he reveals some of his misdemeanours by accident rather than design' (Douglas, 1978:21). One could do no worse than to remember the manner in which Dixon tries to pass off his bad back to Collins after he and Bum tried to thieve Collins' horse during the night. For this reason, I must disagree with Brady, who claims that Furphy's 'bullock-drivers...are the equivalent of O'Reilly's Aborigines, noble savages unspoiled by the corruptions of civilization' (1981:52).

This directly affects the manner in which socialism, mateship or egalitarianism are practised in the world of Furphy's three novels. The picaresque tradition also ostensibly directs readers to consider further the actual status quo of "life" in the 1890s. Of equal importance to this and to the picaro's plying the skills of his trade is occupation. According to Croft, '[i]f we look at the range of occupations of the characters in Furphy's work, it is apparent that most of them are of [the class of journeymen, skilled workers and minor entrepreneurs], or of higher class allegiances' (1996:211). And, for Croft, Furphy's bullockies are 'minor entrepreneurs in the sense that present day "truckies" are minor capitalists' (1996:211). Barnes states that '[t]he Riverina carriers were an unusual group: capitalists of a sort, their capital being invested in their carrying plant and
teams, they were individualists with strong group loyalties' (1990:125). This is important, for one could do no worse than to see the bullockies as *subcontractors* who, even to this day, are a problem for the success of socialist or unionist movements.

As Docker points out, '[t]he men work largely for themselves, although always in danger of commercial failure, and [a] return to a working-class wage existence' (1991:113). Furphy wished to show that the bullockies were one group of minor entrepreneurs who desired to live like penguins but acted as man-o'-war hawks to achieve their aims. Thus, I agree with Docker that '[i]t is, not surprisingly, individualism we see them attracted to, not co-operative socialism' (1991:113). In terms of their occupation, one could argue that it is the environment in which they ply their trade that makes them so. But I am of the view that while this is not false, it is neither entirely true, for the parable of the penguin and the man-o'-war hawk indicates that hunger, or desire, plays a great role in the major or minor alternatives of one's purpose.

In short, Furphy's observations on the 1890s environment equally take into account that rather complex and persistent "thing" called human nature. In this sense, does environment dictate "human nature", or does human nature dictate "environment"? Given the theory of the controlling alternatives, it is my contention that Furphy thought the latter to be the case without totally discrediting the former. Again, one must remember that, according to Collins, 'the coming Australian is a problem' (*SiL*, 144). This is equally so in light of our previous discussion on convictism and the pervasiveness of the convict stereotype in many of the power struggles of nineteenth-century Australia. After reading Furphy's novels, readers should come to some understanding that the celebrated ideals of 1890s egalitarianism or mateship are, in the words of Keats, pearls in rubbish. Yet, according to Collins, 'if we decline a brotherhood of mutual blessing and honour, we alternatively accept one of mutual injury and ignominy' (*SiL*, 95).

Or, as Furphy wrote in his essay supporting world federation, '[i]ntelligent co-operation and mutual goodwill are the only necessary conditions to organisation; loyalty is the sole condition to stability; and loyalty is the central instinct of humanity -good night, indeed, to civilisation if it were not so!' (1890:55). This may be taken to be 62.
socialist, but it could just as easily be understood to mean enlightenment humanism, for one could see Furphy as having the *philosophe's* rational passion for the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia and Australians. To recall Furphy's belief in purpose, he wrote that 'we don't know definitely what this purpose may be; but I don't think it is fulfilled by plethoric banking accounts. Same time, I believe it is fulfilled by the production of men and women of high moral standard, calm courage, and clear intellect' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124).

Neither the opportunism of the man-o'-war hawk nor the blissful ignorance of the penguin will clarify the purpose of men and women in the human order of things. As Dorothy Green notes, Furphy does not 'deny that one's neighbour has needs', but he does much 'to refine the perception of what those needs are and to admit that there are a genuine scale of priorities' (1980:33-34). Or, as Indyk states, '[i]t is not the fact of diversity but the failure to acknowledge reciprocity and equality that prevents the development of a binding sense of community' (1986:307). But it is not socialism alone that can bind the community, for one needs a much broader education than just the socialist message. Perhaps one could say that the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia is worth 'a great deal more to one who has been nourishing a youth sublime with the curious facts of Science and the thousand-and-one items of general information necessary to any person who...above all other strife contends especially to know himself; and that physically, as well as morally' (StL, 280. My italics).

It is well documented in Barnes' biography (1990:123) and Barnes and Hoffmann's collection of Furphy's letters (1995:1) that Furphy had camped with Charlie Sullivan one night in the Riverina, and that the pair had discussed the content of many literary and philosophical works. One of these was Plato's *Republic*. According to Sullivan, Furphy was 'the most learned bushman' he had 'ever met, a real bushman', leading him to conclude that 'Furphy was of us, but not one of us'. With regard to that famous maxim of the Delphian oracle, Furphy seems to share Plato's notion that 'the just man is wise and good and the unjust man bad and ignorant' (bk.1.350e). Because of this, 'just men are more intelligent and more truly effective in action, and...unjust men are incapable of any joint action.
at all' (Rep. bk.1.352b). I think Furphy supported Plato's idea that society 'must look for the Guardians who will stick most firmly to the principle that they must always do what they think best for the community' (Rep. bk.3.413c). Also, Furphy appears to believe that 'it is...in education that our Guardians must build their main defences' (Rep. bk.4.424d), for it is 'the direction given by education that is likely to determine all that follows' (Rep. bk.4.425b-c).

Socrates' argument 'is not a trivial one', for he states that 'our whole way of life...is at issue' (Rep. bk.1.352d). Furphy places similar emphasis on the art of living, for one of the main themes in his novels, as in *Republic*, is that of justice and injustice in light of ignorance, education and conduct in life. Key ideas from Plato's text echo profoundly throughout Furphy's novels. As Partington points out, '[t]he force and passion of Furphy's affection for literature and history make it difficult to think of him as a naively exclusive admirer of wisdom derived directly from everyday experience in the working world' (1993:64-65). Although she discusses Furphy's affinities with Plato's concern for epistemology, Partington does not discuss Plato's continually stressing the need for knowledge and education in political science and justice, since, in Plato's view, Athenian democracy was prone to the manipulation and opportunism of the sophists. This is important, for Furphy's novels also expand on this philosophical theme in light of the colonial rivalries of the Federal movement, as I have attempted to show. Indeed, Thrasymachus' notion that 'justice or right is simply what is in the interest of the stronger party' (Rep. bk.1.338c) is a particularly apt description of the oscillating moods in 1890s Australia.

What, then, of Jefferson Rigby? Firstly, there is much that can be said about Rigby and his sermon, and no critic, to my knowledge, has taken a detailed approach in the spirit of the observant reader to this rather interesting character. To some greater or lesser degree, critics such as Croft (1996:215) or Barnes (1990:205-206) are content to say that Rigby is a manifestation of Furphy's socialist views *vis-à-vis* Collins' declaring that he is a 'Conservative' (RR, 12). As Furphy had stated to Cathels in 1898,

![Image](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

lit may be worth while to remark that the uncritical public, as represented by Jim Gourley, *et hoc genus*

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(adj.) omnes, look on that pedant [Rigby] as the pillar which supports the book. Sam Brackenbridge's admiration for the man is a common complaint. 80 per cent of masculine readers will long to be like Rigby; and that feeling will disarm criticism. I deliberately intended Rigby as a man of offensively large information, one who knows more than any person is justified in knowing' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:44-45).

However, approximately four years later in a letter to Cecil Winter, Furphy states that he 'noticed an unconscious plan in the story. Every other character is a foil to the Commodore [Rigby] - Dixon, in his good-natured but brutal worldliness - Thompson, in his dense but generous Individualism - Furlong, in his docile devotion to revelation as popularly accepted - and so on through the company' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:147-148). This "unconscious plan" changed Furphy's designs for the novel. As Partington points out, 'at the end of Rigby's lengthy discourses we are little the wiser as to just what policies "State Socialism" would entail if [Rigby] had his way. Rigby's social and political program, in a curiously similar way to the religious sermons he ridicules, never comes alive' (1993:161). To some extent, readers should approach the novel as 'menippean satire' (G.W. Turner, 1971:lx-x; Docker, 1991:119-120).

Alluding to the work of Northrop Frye, G.W. Turner explains that "Menippean satire" deals less with people as such than with mental attitudes, and is especially likely to present the philosophus glortosus, the learned crank or obsessed philosopher' (1971:x). From a Bakhtinian perspective, Docker states, 'Rigby's Romance incorporates the Menippean... mode of parody where the parody is not necessarily a rejection of the parodied object, but rather represents an argument between different positions, different philosophies' (1991:120). In short, 'ideas are more important than manners and psychological analysis in Furphy's world, and the people in his stories, though so "real"... are primarily mouthpieces for ideas and points of view, especially particular ideas about Providence and free will and human responsibility' (G.W. Turner, 1971:xi). But, one wonders if this is because of the stylistic rules of the menippean genre or because
Furphy's novels investigate the heady pluralism of 1890s culture and ideology?

In light of Furphy's comment on the "unconscious plan" of *Rigby's Romance*, one wonders if Docker is correct in stating that 'the parody of Rigby as an ideologue doesn't mean his particular socialist ideas are not to be taken seriously' (1991:120). To turn to the issue of Collins' conservatism, readers ought to note the explanation he gives for its use *vis-à-vis* state socialism. According to Collins, 'I adapt myself to the times and the seasons, whilst he [Rigby, or the state socialist] thinks the conformity ought to be on the other side' (*RR*, 12). In other words, Collins' conservatism indicates that, '[i]n occupation, I change involuntarily, like the chameleon, according to my surroundings' (*RR*, 15). Interestingly enough, the explanation Collins gives for state socialism is surely much more suited to a traditional and popular understanding of conservatism, and I think readers are meant to query this inversion of meaning. More importantly, Collins' explanation of the conservative and the state socialist, in the spirit of the penguin and the man-o'-war hawk parable, also unveils how much two diametrically opposed identities depend on desire and strategy.

According to Docker, '[t]here is a particular rivalry between Collins and Rigby, a rivalry that is both personal and ideological' (1991:110). Whatever support Furphy had originally intended for Rigby and state socialism in *Rigby's Romance*, the final version serialized in the socialist newspaper, *The Barrier Truth*, is far from a welcome celebration of this 1890s ideological movement. With this in mind, Collins' function in the narrative should be reevaluated. He is not just a hero who is 'unable to find any coherent pattern in the events that he describes' nor a hero who 'cannot learn' (G.W. Turner, 1971:x). Nor does Docker's view that Collins 'is pessimistic about human nature' (1991:111) seem plausible, simply because he points out that, rather than the pursuit of knowledge, '[a]ny sensible bloke, if he were restricted to one course, would select damper and bacon, as being both wholesome and filling' (*RR*, 164). Collins is quite rightly pointing to the fact that 'if you could take statistics of the whole human race I fancy you would find a very large number who never trouble themselves over any other consideration' (*RR*, 164). In light of the penguin and the man-o'-war hawk parable, the issue
of desire and strategy permeates and shapes many ideologies concerned with human purpose and progress.

Given his explanation of conservatism, Collins' status in *Rigby's Romance* is an important one, for he is not just 'a figure of fun' (Croft, 1996:215). As Collins had stated in *Such is Life*, '[i]n the race of life, my son, you must run cunning, reserving your sprint for the tactical moment' (215. My italics). Or, as Collins points out in the proem to *Rigby's Romance*, '[y]ou must take me as a hard-working and ordinary actor on this great stage of fools; but one who, nevertheless, finds a wholesome recreation in observing the parts played by his fellow-hypocrites. (The Greek *hupokrits*, I find, signifies, indifferently, "actor" and "hypocrite".)' (xviii). In this sense, Collins acts as chameleon-like foil for Rigby's sermon, strategically directing the reader to observe the flaws in the socialist order of things. What hypocrisies, therefore, can we observe and are meant to observe in Jefferson Rigby? Although there are many observations which are interesting and pertinent to the points I have made, I will select a sample of evidence which strongly supports my case.

Firstly, it is fair to say that not all of Rigby's polemic is hypocritical. Nor is Rigby's sermon without its pertinent points, despite the fact that Rigby is, I believe, drawn as a sophist. One of the main propositions of state socialism, the notion that 'Jack is as good as his master' (*RR*, 215), is important to Furphy's way of seeing because such a proposition shows some concern for the uplifting and upbuilding of Australian society, culture and nation *vis-à-vis* British empiricism. But Rigby's sermon is not without its problems. Consider the following dialogue between Collins and Rigby:

"Persuade Jack to the contrary, and his master will clothe you in a belltopper, and make you the third ruler in the kingdom," replied the Sheriff [Rigby]. "Individualism has helped the lower dog to the great discovery you mention; therefore, we have at last reached the time -the first time in history, mark you- when a man's foes are they of his own household. And 'household', in the English of James I, doesn't mean 'family'; it means 'holders of the house'- formerly chattel-slaves, now wage-slaves. The house is divided

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against itself, and the breach is widening perceptibly year by year- day by day, for that matter. But for any possible disorder of the body politic there is, in the very nature of things, an accessible, appropriate, and infallible remedy. In this case ours is State Socialism. What is yours?"

"But is Socialism a remedy?" I asked querulously. "If you divide everything today, how long will it be before you require another division, and another, and so on?"

"Let some advocate of Individualism answer that question, since it concerns him alone," replied the Major. "For this ebb and flow in private fortune, this rhythmic accumulation, confiscation and re-distribution of property confront us as the most conspicuous feature in the working of our present system, and one of the most disastrous and demoralising. This perpetual division and re-division of wealth is the distinctive outcome, and the just and certain curse of Individualism...(RR, 215).

This is despite the fact that Rigby had 'led Binney to believe that Socialism meant the abrupt confiscation of farms, and the degradation of farmers to the ticket-of-leave level' (RR, 231). Indeed, Collins' question to Rigby concerning Socialism and social divisions is an excellent example of *reductio ad absurdum*, for Rigby's answer is both lame and ignorant of the many reasons for rivalry and division in colonial Australia. Furthermore, Rigby is ignorant of the fact that, economically speaking, socialism is as responsible for the growing economic division in society as the man-o'-war-hawk tactics of industrialism and capitalism. Again, Sam Brackenbridge's belief that 'us Socialists is no more responsible for the comin' revolution than the mere petrel is for the storm it prognosticates' (RR, 255) is an ignorant conclusion. Socialism, like capitalism or industrialism, is built on the notion that 'one must love something' and 'one must hate something' (SiL, 135). In other words, one lives and responds to life and the human order of things in much the same manner as the man-o'-war hawk and the penguin in *their* order of things.

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Of further interest to Rigby’s proposition that ‘Jack is as good as his master’ (RR, 215) is Plato’s notion that such a way of seeing creates rivalry and division between rich and poor, promoting an ignorant but popular concept of liberty that leads to tyranny. According to Plato, ‘[t]he extreme of popular liberty is reached [in democracy] when slaves...have the same liberty as their owners—not to mention the complete equality and liberty in the relations between the sexes’ (Rep. bk.8.563b). From this, Plato argues that ‘the minds of the citizens become so sensitive that the least vestige of restraint is resented as intolerable, till finally,...in their determination to have no master they disregard all laws, written or unwritten’ (Rep. bk.8.563d). In other words, ‘from an extreme of liberty one is likely to get, in the individual and in society, a reaction to an extreme of subjection’ (Rep. bk.8.564a). But this is the least of Plato’s problems, for this extreme of popular liberty in a democratic society does not necessarily mean that a society cannot function as a democracy, even though Plato does not consider it to be an ideal form of government. What concerns Plato is his expectation for ‘tyranny to result from democracy’ because of this tension between ‘the most savage subjection’ and ‘an excess of liberty’ (Rep. bk.8.564a).

In books eight and nine of Republic, Plato spends some time formulating a theory of political psychology. This is most important, for Plato wants to show Adelmantus, as well as his readers, that certain types of societies and their political systems are the direct result of a certain type of human character. Given the climate of extreme and popular liberty, Plato expects a tyrannical character to grow naturally within the larger democratic character of politics and society. Employing the analogy of bees, Plato directs his argument to a certain type of character: ‘a class of thriftless idlers, whom [he compares] to drones, their energetic leaders to drones with stings, the more inert mass of followers to drones without stings’ (Rep. bk.8.564b). This is important for understanding the potency of Collins’ attack on Rigby’s proposition that ‘Jack is as good as his master’, as well as the notion that socialism is an ‘infallible remedy’ (RR, 215) for the ills of industrialism and capitalism. Speaking of the drones, Plato states that, in a democratic society,

[e]veryone’s on the make, but the steadiest characters

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will generally be most successful in making money. And the drones find them a plentiful and most convenient source to extract honey from. And so this group, on which the drones batten, are called the rich (Rep. bk.8.564e).

Or, as Furphy, writing under the *nom de plume* of Warrigal Jack, stated in the article, 'The Mythical Sundowner',

while human nature sports into so many varieties and degrees of laziness, the sundowner proper will never fail; men may come and men may go, but he goes on for ever. Pastoral interests may wax and wane: stations may be incorporated, divided, sold, or foreclosed; managers may die, resign, be sacked, or received into partnership; the Mantchoorian boundary man may supersede the Indo-Germanic, but while there exists a circuit of stations as a basis of operations the phoenix-like sundowner shall flourish in immortal youth ([1889] 1981: 396).

While the sundowner may not have a sting, he is nevertheless an opportunistic drone, for he forms part of what Rigby calls the 'helpless minority' (RR, 186). The problem, however, is not so much this stingless drone, but the 'single popular leader', the drone with the sting, 'whom [the stingless drones] nurse to greatness' (Rep. bk.8.565c). According to Plato, '[i]t is he who leads the class war against the owners of property' (Rep. bk.8.566a). And, as Collins so poignantly asks Rigby, 'If you divide everything today, how long will it be before you require another division, and another, and so on?' (RR, 215). Or, as Plato states, 'when [the owners of property] see the people trying to wrong them, not with intent, but out of ignorance and because they've been misled by the slanders spread by their leaders, why then they've no choice but to turn oligarchs in earnest, not because they want to, but again because the drones' stings have poisoned them' (Rep. bk.8.565b-c). Thus, a popular but reactionary concept of liberty and equality leads to further rivalry and division in an already reactionary society. As Plato sombrely states,
[t]he mob will do anything [the popular leader] tells them, and the temptation to shed a brother's blood is too strong. He [the popular leader] brings the usual unjust charges against him [his brother], takes him to court and murders him, thus destroying a human life, and getting an unholy taste of blood of his fellows. Exiles, executions, hints of cancellation of debts and redistribution of land follow, till their instigator [the popular leader] is inevitably and finally bound either to be destroyed by his enemies, or to change from man to wolf and make himself tyrant (Rep. bk.8.565e-566a).

Furphy is actually much more concerned with studying and understanding human nature, in relation to a particular belief or ism, than advocating a reactionary way of seeing and responding to life. If one were to classify theoretically Furphy's concern for the social, I think it is more appropriate to say that Furphy advocated humanitarianism and education rather than the politically and economically reactionary views of the socialists. For Jack to be as good as his master, Jack must be shifted out of his ignorance, since an educated individual is understood to know what is best for himself, his political system, and his society. In light of Plato's views, consider the following revealing comment by Collins, who states that 'without vassal loyalty, or abject vassal fear, the monopolist's sleep can never be secure. Domination, to be unassailable, must have overwhelming force in reserve -moral force, as in the feudal system, or physical force, as in our police system. The labour leader, of accredited integrity and capability, though (so to speak) ducally weedy, has moral force in reserve; and we all know how he controls the many-headed' (Sil., 205. My italics).

Or, as Plato explains in his analogy of the sophist and his "science" of sophistry:

Suppose a man was in charge of a large and powerful animal, and made a study of its moods and wants; why it was especially savage or gentle, what the different noises it made meant, and what tone of voice to use to soothe or annoy it. All this he might learn by
long experience and familiarity, and then call it a science, and reduce it to a system and set up to teach it. But he would not really know which of the creature's tastes and desires was admirable or shameful, good or bad, right or wrong; he would simply use the terms on the basis of its reactions, calling what pleased it good, what annoyed it bad. He would have no rational account to give of them, but would call the inevitable demands of the animal's nature right and admirable, remaining quite blind to the real nature of and difference between inevitability and goodness, and quite unable to tell anyone else what it was (Rep. bk.6.493a-c).

Although there are problems with Plato's analogy in light of empiricism, the notion that the sophist can skilfully gain political control by pandering to public passions or pleasures is nevertheless made. As Thompson observantly states, '[g]reat Socialist Rigby is,...but it's more the power of controversy than the force of argument. An ounce of fact is worth a mile of theory, they say' (RR, 217-218). Or, indeed, as Rigby himself confesses to Collins, '[d]on't mistake me for an organiser. I'm merely an agitator, a voice in the wilderness, preaching preparation for a Palingenesis. The program is hidden in the order of events, and will be evolved in its own good time. To be fettered by a programme now would be fatal' (RR, 231). Claiming a stylistic affinity to John the Baptist, Rigby attempts to push home a universal truth about socialism, hoping to pander to the passions and pleasures of a popular desire for 'the Kingdom of God' (RR, 231). But, according to Rigby, '[i]f we assuaged our zeal by bearing in mind that Socialism is relative, not absolute -that it must come by evolution, not by miracle- we should be much further ahead than we are' (RR, 231).

And yet, to confuse matters more, Rigby claims that he is merely 'a watchman, imperfectly qualified, I admit, though Divinely commissioned' (RR, 231. My italics). One wonders whether or not Rigby, the sophist, desires to have his portion of strawberries and cream after the revolution. Readers can be certain of one thing, and that is Sam Brackenbridge's naively devotional observation that 72.
Rigby is 'an artist' (RR, 91) and that he is 'quick on the trigger' (RR, 92). In short, Rigby is no less an opportunist than many of the other Furphian heroes. Indeed, Rigby's curriculum vitae is impressively broad. According to Collins, Rigby is currently a '[s]econd-rate photographer and descriptive writer' but '[h]e has been a first-rate engine-driver, also a mechanical expert, a third-rate journalist, and a fourth-rate builder' (RR, 12). Furthermore, Rigby has been 'ranked high up to ninth and tenth rate in something like a score of other and more menial occupations; but speaking with actuarial precision, he's a land surveyor' (RR, 12-13).

Readers also find out that Rigby had had 'an excellent little industry in connection with a carpenter in Sandhurst' buying 'empty weatherboard houses at Sandhurst' and selling 'them, re-erected, on the Spring Creek' goldfields (RR, 122-123). And, although his old employer, Milligan Brothers, 'declined to employ' Rigby because he is 'an agitator', Rigby nevertheless refuses to take the matter further because 'Leslie Milligan is the most astute man of [his] acquaintance' (RR, 234). Indeed, Rigby admirably states that Leslie Milligan 'can see ten years further ahead than the average Conservative does -in other words, he can see a decade ahead of the present moment. I mustn't build too much on his hostility' (RR, 234). While Leslie Milligan can see opportunities for future avenues of business, Rigby cannot. It would seem that Rigby's socialism is not just a sophistic pandering to public passions and pleasures, but also an opportunistic preaching of a fashionable gospel. As Devlin-Glass points out, '[c]learly Furphy means us to take Rigby at face value...by insisting that he is an ideologue, an agitator, rather than an organiser of the Christian Socialist Utopia' (1974:75).

There is another interesting example of Rigby's sermon to which I would like to refer. This example not only further qualifies Rigby's status as a sophist with a sting in a divided community, but also gives readers a better insight into Rigby's character. In this example, Rigby pits law against the human spirit. According to Rigby, '[h]appiness is not an ingredient of life, subject to the augmentation or diminution by prescription. It is the outcome, or rather the fruition, of an inherent susceptibility, which latter is governed in tone, though not affected in extent, by the conditions which form individual character' (RR, 184. My italics). While Rigby is
correct in noting that 'man can no more exist without drawing his
dole of so-called happiness than without breathing' (RR, 184-185),
the manner in which Rigby proposes to implement that happiness
leaves much to be desired. Indeed, Rigby's concept of happiness
appears to be heavily dependent on his notion of goodness: 'goodness
is anything that intuitively or of set purpose makes for the
establishment of a human relationship which will develop each
man's best, and starve each man's worst' (RR, 186. My italics).

What Rigby ignores, purposefully or not, is the fact that one
man's best may be his worst according to the views of another. For
example, we are well acquainted with the opportunism of many of
Furphy's heroes. If this opportunism is considered to be the best a
particular individual has to offer, then starving that best, because it
is seen as a worst in the eyes of the socialists, will do nothing to
bring that individual into harmony with the concept of society or
community. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether or not an
ideology or form of government can purposefully starve the worst in a
community in order to bring out the best. But this is exactly what
Rigby proposes to do in the name of socialism. Indeed, Rigby begins
to introduce his proposition that law shapes human spirit by an
appeal to Providence. According to Rigby, '[a]part from the stings of
conscience, and the retribution of the world to come, God punishes
by the agency of our Criminal Law' (RR, 193).

Rigby's sophistry, and perhaps his ignorance, is caught out by
a young kangaroo-hunter:

"Sposen there's a man in a place called Sussex, in
England, an' this man shakes a bushel o' wheat for
his Missus to boil for the kids to keep them from
starving -does God give that man seven years' laggin',
and then set him adrift, with his ankles wore to the
bone with the irons, and his shoulders like a soojee
bag with floggin? Well, that was my gran'father -an' as
decent a man as ever your gran'father knewed how to
be. Is that God's style o' punishin' people with the
Criminal Law? Don't talk rubbage (RR, 193).

The story is a familiar one and, as we already know, quite
capable of stirring deeply felt passions in colonial Australia. Rigby's answer is again a rather lame attempt to dodge the issue: 'I admit that, where offences against property were concerned, the law was exceedingly severe in the days of our forefathers; indeed, it is, perhaps, too severe still in some instances, but.' (RR, 193). Rigby is cut short by Dixon, who sharply states 'but God backs it up. Stick to your argument' (RR, 193). Rigby does not get a chance to talk himself clean, and the discussion is placed on hold. At a later time, Rigby manages to steer the argument back to his initial proposition. According to Rigby, if you 'give us laws Socialistic in principle, with a system of mutual polity', then 'all things are possible to man as a law-abiding animal' (RR, 201). This is the crux of Rigby's argument, underpinning both the concepts of happiness and goodness, for Rigby believes that 'you can make men anything you please by Act of Parliament...provided that such Act is sanctioned by a preponderant moiety of the national intelligence' (RR, 201).

But is it an act based on wisdom or an educated shifting of ignorance? Or is such an act merely a pandering to the popular passions and pleasures of the democratic majority? There is some truth to Rigby's proposition, for one can turn men from British colonials into Australian nationals by an act of parliament. But it remains to be seen whether or not one can make men good, happy or virtuous by an act of parliament. I do not think, for example, that anyone would support the proposition that one can make men intelligent by an act of parliament. While laws have their place and purpose in the human order of things, they do not occupy the status given to them by Rigby. In short, 'human nature is not as 'plastic as the clay from which it is derived', nor is 'our collective moral nature, in its response to the contract of laws, usages, and culture,...subject to rules of scientific exactness' (RR, 208).

Speaking of 'Furphy's criticism of socialist ideals', Gilding argues that Furphy maintained 'that idealism of Rigby's kind is largely incompatible with real life', since 'Rigby's redoubtable political code is a little less than human' (1967:30). Indeed Gilding notes that 'he is so absorbed in his argument that he has become impervious to sentiment or tenderness' (1967:30-31). Or, as Croft states, 'it is equally hard to ignore Rigby's personal emotional desiccation and his inability to love at the intimate level' (1996:216).
Indeed, Collins states that ‘[w]hen the Ego has ceased to be a hobby-ridden man, and culminated into a man-escorted hobby, there is no hope of restoration’ (RR, 262). It would seem, on a personal level, that Rigby's preoccupation with law and the plasticity of human nature is an attempt to lead a painless and comfortably utopian existence.

Most readers are aware of the argument that occurred between Rigby and his sweetheart, Kate Vanderdecken. Collins informs us that Rigby thought the argument to be ‘entirely her own fault’, for ‘[s]he was petulant and quarrelsome, frivolous and heartless’ (RR, 17). According to Rigby, ‘the best thing that had ever happened to him was this quarrel, inasmuch as it had swept away all tawdry romance from his life, and laid bare its grand realities’ (RR, 17).

Given our understanding of Rigby's character so far, one wonders to what extent the argument between him and Kate was due to his dogmatic character. Collins states that '[i]n describing this quarrel he was bitterly precise; yet I experienced disappointment, even injury, in failing to detect any blame attachable to the other party, whilst my dad's judicial mind could find no cause of misunderstanding whatsoever' (RR, 17-18). The following piece from Rigby's sermon may offer a clue, for Rigby believes that 'Christianity must be translated into secular law, and such law must be sternly enforced' (RR, 202. My italics). Although speculative, one wonders if Furphy wanted his readers to comprehend Rigby's character through Plato's concept of the tyrannical character. According to Plato, the tyrannical character has

[in] his early days...a smile and a kind word for everyone; he says he's no tyrant, makes large promises, public and private, frees debtors, distributes land to the people and to his own followers, and puts on a generally mild and kindly air....But I think we shall find that when he has disposed of his foreign enemies by treaty or distraction, and has no more to fear from them, he will in the first place continue to stir up war in order that the people may continue to need a leader (Rep. bk.8.566d-e).
Even though the public domain of the 1880s and 1890s is important to the novels, Furphy wants his readers to see that it is Rigby's spirit that shapes and articulates "Rigby", not the omnipotent power of the law or environment, as argued by the socialists. As Collins explains, 'in love as well as in other things, there was nothing but roguery to be found in villainous man, I had only to remember the Senator [Rigby], and keep on believing....I used him as an object lesson in fidelity' (RR, 1946:19). Collins' lesson in fidelity is the notion that one must educate, or uplift and upbuild the individual human character and spirit in conjunction with the uplifting and upbuilding of the nation. By '[learning] to say, I do not know' (BBB, 121), one can set a course to learn and to know, hence the continual stress on ignorance-shifting in the novels. In light of Pons' notion, readers should see Furphy's writing as 'an educational game of the first order rather than a fireworks display testifying to the author's cleverness' (1979:120).

Indeed, when Collins states that 'the Order of Things, rightly understood, is not susceptible of any coercion whatsoever' (SiL, 215), it is my contention that it is the human order to which he refers, for Rigby's sermon on the Murray foregrounds the ideological and emotional resistances of many of the Furphian heroes throughout the three novels. Collins' notion that '[i]n the race of life, my son, you must run cunning, reserving your sprint for the tactical moment' (SiL, 215) could be a popular maxim. In short, one may coerce a percentage of the human order to do something, but one can never coerce every human being. There will always be resistance. As Collins points out, 'to everything there is a time and a season -a time for work, and a time for repose- hence you find the industrious man's inveterately leg-weary set of frames in hopeless competition with the judiciously lazy man's string of daisies. The contrast is sickening' (SiL, 215). Because of this, I shall disagree with Sutherland, who notes that 'one of Furphy's firmest convictions was that environment exerts a far more powerful influence upon the growth of human character than does heredity' (1951:169).

Finally, towards the close of Rigby's Romance, Collins states that '[t]o sane minds, the Universal Plan is the enigma of the ages; detached, objective, and wholly intangible -any attempt at solution thus being a capricious speculation, shaped by the proclivities or by
the experience of its projector, and varying even with his mood' (RR, 261). What does this say about Jefferson Rigby? If Rigby is meant to be the manifestation of Furphy's own ideology, then why should Collins have the last word? Is Collins suggesting that State Socialism, whether espoused by Rigby or another, is a "universal plan" shaped by the experience and mood of the orator rather than being the universal plan? In the search for meaning, this is interesting, for Furphy does not offer anything resembling a Universal Plan. Rather, he offers a series of common sense, philosophical solutions to the mismatched affairs in the human order of things. Accordingly, 'truth [may be] relative [and not] absolute' (BBB, 8), but such relativity does not necessarily mean that the human order of things needs to be divided.

In a letter to William Cathels circa May or June, 1893, Furphy, discussing the Melbourne depression, writes:

And what price your Individualism now? The present spectacle for gods and men which Vic. presents is the natural and necessary outcome. And if you argue that 'we should have done the same thing ourselves if we had the chance', I reply that we should have been sternly repressed. And if you argue that 'you can't make men virtuous by act of parliament', I reply, Just wait till I publish what I have written on that point during the last week....

Personally, I hope and trust that one whom I have learned to value as I have you, is not a victim of the hideous depression brought on by the unbridled greed of vile men in high places. My own pity for the unfortunate is swallowed up in anger at the so-called Christians who could not see prosperity in the country without looting it. Christian as I am, myself, I say, Damn them (In Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:15).

Was Furphy hinting at his agreement with Cathels and so thematically exploring the tension between virtue, law and human spirit in Rigby's Romance? Again, in a letter to Cathels dated the 12th of January, 1894, Furphy continues:
The fact is that our fathers were a bad class of people. Their ethics were Darwinism, and their religion Antinomian, the survival of the thriftiest, and somebody else, anybody else, to be sacrificed.

They were fine enterprising men, but they have Somersetted the country, and I wish we were out of it. Too much premium on the wisdom of the Serpent and too much penalty on the harmlessness of the dove....We're on the wrong track. Our forefathers made a slippery hitch in their apotheosis of Individualism and we have to suffer for it. The only hope of my own petty little soul is to spoke the ole chariot along the right track (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:20).

Or, as Collins states, 'in this pandemonium of Individualism, the weak, the diffident, the scrupulous, and the afflicted, are thrust aside or trampled down' (Sil, 89). But, Furphy does not rebuke the "fine enterprising" spirit of his father's generation. Instead, he considers their opportunist spirit to be the direct result of an ignorant glorification of individualism: a glorification that has ruined the country. To recall the economic battle over Riverina and the colonial rivalry between Victoria and New South Wales discussed earlier, I am of the view that Furphy is not strictly anti-capitalist, nor is he strictly pro-socialist. It would be better to say that the flavour of the letter points to the detrimental aspects of a rivalry due to a specific way of seeing or ideology: a rivalry based on desire, social Darwinist principles and an Antinomian indifference to the moral considerations of others. But there is also another important context which perpetuates rivalry, and that is division within the 'tripartite' (RR, 262) nature of the self, as exemplified by Rigby. In this sense, "to spoke the ole chariot along the right track" could be Furphy's alluding to Plato's key concept of justice and the just man:

Justice...is a principle of this kind; its real concern is not with external actions, but with a man's inward self, his true concern and interest. The just man will not allow the three elements (Reason, Thumos, Desire) which make up his inward self to tresspass on each

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other's functions or interfere with each other, but, by keeping all three in tune, like the notes of a scale... will in the truest sense set his house to rights, attain self-mastery and order, and live on good terms with himself. When he has bound these elements into a disciplined and harmonious whole, and so become fully one instead of many, he will be ready for action of any kind, whether it concerns his personal or financial welfare, whether it is political or private; and he will reckon and call any of these actions just and honourable if it contributes to and helps to maintain this disposition of mind, and will call the knowledge which controls such action wisdom. Similarly, he will call unjust any action destructive of this disposition, and the opinions which control such action ignorance *(Rep. bk.4.443c-e).*

Furphy's message is clear. In the uplifting and upbuilding of a nation, individuals must not only strive to shift ignorance, rivalry and division, but must also strive to know themselves, thereby uplifting and upbuilding their own character. If there is a purpose in the human order of things, then Furphy believed that this purpose 'is fulfilled by the production of men and women of high moral standard, calm courage, and clear intellect' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995: 124). I will investigate this more fully in chapter three, where I shall discuss this issue in light of Furphy's rendition of the male and female "Australian" type.

**1.4. The Gospel According to Collins: uplifting and upbuilding through the idea of rights.**

G.W. Turner (1986:174-175) and K.A. McKenzie (1966:273-276) have both noted that *Such is Life* is rich in its allusions to both the Old and New Testaments. Indeed, a study of 'the annotations' (Devlin-Glass et al, 1991) will confirm many of the biblical allusions to which Collins and other Furphian heroes refer. Discussing the frequent use of specific sources, K.A. McKenzie states that Furphy's fondness for the *Book of Job, Ecclesiastes*, and *Isaiah* may have been
due... to attitudes which he found congenial' (1966:273). According to G.W. Turner, 'the biblical reference is acclimatised, given new and unexpected life in its new setting' (1986:174). More importantly, 'the biblical is no longer remote from life nor life remote from the Bible' (G.W. Turner, 1986:175). Although I agree with Turner's point, it is not without its problems. The Bible does play an important role in the intellectual scheme of the novels, but the novels show that its place in colonial society and culture is far from what it ought to be. Furphy believed that its most cherished principles on human relations were often ignored by the Church and her laity, particularly with the 'Gospel of Thrift' (SiL, 89). Also, in an 1894 article for the Bulletin, Collins points out that 'the Bible is not the secret of Riverina's greatness' (1981:398).

Collins' conclusion is based on the prevailing ignorance of scripture, for 'there is no doubt that the healthy recoil from priestcraft is carrying us too far', and that 'the Bible-hater is no less irrational than the Bible-faddist' ([1894] 1981:398). According to Collins, 'the O.T. is the most interesting, instructive, and authentic section of ancient history within the range of literature, and an inexhaustible mine of fearless philosophy and sublime forecast' ([1894] 1981:398). Furthermore, 'the N.T., rightly read, will be the textbook of ideal Socialism when its professional perverter is more extinct and less regretted than the Tasmanian blackfellow. In the interests of moral progress, the Bible must be read; and in the interests of honest interpretation, the parson must go' ([1894] 1981:398). This issue of honest interpretation finds fuller voice in the novels, for Collins' concern with uplifting and upbuilding underpins his directing readers to the Bible for the sake of moral progress.

But he also refers to the Bible in order to foreground the division and rivalry between the Church and currency. Towards the close of Such is Life, Collins finds the opportunity to comment that 'an open-mouthed, fresh-faced rouseabout... was just undergoing that colonising process so much dreaded by mothers and deplored by the clergy' (SiL, 293). The mainstay of this division and rivalry is the clash of customs, particularly the Anglo-Australian views of piety and good citizenship vis-à-vis the growing popularity of larrikinism, considered to be evidence of the ever-pervasive convict taint or 'birth stain' (SiL, 52). On this note, I agree with Clive Hamer that the
majority of characters in the novels 'are not idealized members of the working class', nor are they 'shining examples of virtue trampled down by the oppressing class' (1964:146). For example, the bullockies are discerningly labelled by Collins as either 'outlaws' (Sil, 51) or 'Ishmaelites' (Sil, 42). Within the context of the latter, the bullocky ought to be seen as 'a wild ass of a man,/ with his hand against everyone/ and everyone's hand against him:/ and he shall live at odds with all his kin' (Genesis, 16.12).

Croft explains that 'Such is Life is a parodic epic in which Furphy tries to make sense of society and belief, by comparing the stern Calvinism of his forebears with the new and exciting notions of a Christian Socialism' (1986:160). But, in order to implement an ideological perspective like Christian 'Socialism', one must first redeem "Australians" from the historically determined notion that they 'are all under sin' (Romans, 3:9). According to Hughes, 'the [birth] Stain would not go away: the late nineteenth century was a flourishing time for biological determinism, for notions of purity of race and stock, and few respectable native-born Australians had the confidence not to quail when real Englishmen spoke of their convict heritage' (1987:xii). As Bum had remarked, 'People seem to think Gawd made these here colonies for a rubbish heap' (Sil, 25). It is a sentiment echoed by Cooper, who had stated much earlier that 'this is about the last place God made' (Sil, 5).

To all intents and purposes, the novels indicate that the rivalry and division between Church and currency are both unnecessary extremes which, because of prejudice, interfere with the idea of rights and moral progress. Attacking the Church for its customary division between 'earthly justice' and 'heavenly justice', Collins and the pipe state the following:

Yet while the Church teaches you to pray, "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven," she tacitly countenances widening disparity in condition, and openly sanctions that fearful abuse which dooms the poor man's unborn children to the mundane perdition of poverty's thousand penalties. Is God's will so done in heaven? While the Church teaches you to pray, "Thy kingdom come," she strikes with mercenary venom at
the first principle of that kingdom, namely, elementary equality in citizen privilege. Better silence than falsehood; better no religion at all -if such lack be possible- than one which concedes equal rights beyond the grave, and denies them here (Sil, 88-89).

Furthermore,

[t]he Church quibbles well, and palters well, and, in her own pusillanimous way, means well, by her silky loyalty to the law and the profits, and by her steady hostility to some unresisting personification known as the Common Enemy. But because of that pernicious loyalty, she has reason to complain that the working man is too rational to imbibe her teachings on the blessedness of slavery and starvation. Meanwhile, as no magnanimous sinner can live down to pseudo-Christian standard, unprogressive Agnosticism takes the place of demoralised belief, and the Kingdom of God fades into a myth' (Sil, 89).

In this sense, 'Burns and Paine flashed their own strong, healthy personalities on the community, marking an epoch; and from that day to this, the Apology of Humanity acquires ever-increasing momentum, and ever-widening scope' (Sil, 91). According to Paine, '[t]hough I mean not to touch upon any sectarian principle of religion, yet it may be worth observing, that the genealogy of Christ is traced to Adam. Why then not trace the rights of man to the creation of man?' ([1791] 1995:117). Indeed, '[t]he duty of man is not a wilderness of turnpike gates, through which he is to pass by tickets from one to the other. It is plain and simple, and consists but of two points. His duty to God, which every man must feel; and with respect to his neighbour, to do as he would be done by' (Paine, [1791] 1995:118-119. My italics). Paine's essay asserts the practicality of the Christian idea through the distinction between '[n]atural rights', defined as 'the rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of others', and '[c]ivil rights', which 'are those which appertain to man
in right of his being a member of society' ([1791] 1995:119). Indeed, Paine argues that 'every civil right has for its foundation, some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and protection' ([1791] 1995:119).

According to Collins, 'if social-economic conditions fail to keep abreast with the impetuous, uncontrollable advance of popular intelligence, the time must come when...the latter shall assail the former; and the scene of this unpleasantness...is called in the Hebrew tongue, Armageddon' (Sil, 91). Paine's most consistent point of attack is the idea of aristocracy, or that rights are for the few, not the many. It is interesting to bear this in mind when reading Furphy's 'The Teaching of Christ'. This article, published in 1894 in the Bulletin, has Collins replying to an earlier correspondent who had assumed 'that He [Christ] was an aristocrat...and that He denounced only the bourgeoisie, and that He was not a democrat' (1981:399). In the spirit of Paine, Collins states that, '[owing to enlightenment, aristocrat] is not a name to conjure with - in fact, it is impossible to touch it without a pair of tongs and a respirator, or contemplate it without an ounce of civet to sweeten the imagination; and the time is not far distant when it will be carried out on a spade and buried in quicklime, at midnight, in some secluded place' ([1894] 1981:399).

Discussing 'Christ's favourite title, Son of Man', Collins states that '[He] struck at the very root of caste when He established a new aristocracy of usefulness, in which he that was greatest should be servant of all' ([1894] 1981:399-400). Or, as Collins points out in Such is Life, '[h]eaven knows I am no more inclined to decry social culture than moral principle; but I acknowledge no aristocracy except one of service and self-sacrifice, in which he that is chief shall be servant, and he that is greatest of all, servant of all' (33. My italics). In the article, Collins also asserts that '[t]he Sermon on the Mount is permeated by the most perfect democracy ever breathed on earth, whilst the last awful denunciation of Jerusalem impartially embraces aristocrat and bourgeois, and no other' ([1894] 1981:400. My italics). This view is repeated in Such is Life, where Collins states that the 'Sermon on the Mount....is no fanciful conception of an intangible order of things, but a practical, workable code of daily
life...delivered...by One who knew exactly the potentialities and aspirations of man' (Sil, 89-90). In short, the New Testament is seen as the template for a democratically enlightened Christianity and its emphasis on rights, rather than a Christian Socialism with its view of Christ as the redistributer of wealth.

In a letter to Stephens, Furphy wrote,

I am an Optimist and a Christian.....Optimistic, in the sense that I can see in the future a type of humanity further above present attainment than the latter is above lowest conceivable savagery. Christian, inasmuch I believe Jesus (or His inventor) to have given us a Square, which obviates any necessity for working out a mathematical problem when we wish to gauge the Absolute Morality (or Ultimate Expediency) - in a word, the Squareness- of this or that action (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:95).

And, in "The Teaching of Christ", Collins states that '[t]he founder of a religion which aimed at making things new by the obliteration of meretricious distinctions could not count aristocrat, bourgeois or pauper, common or unclean. All were potential material for the perfect democracy He purposed' (1894) 1981:400). As Furphy stated in his essay on world-federation, '[t]he best hope of religion rests not in the distorted Christianity which fences monopoly and points the plundered tailor to a heaven won by mental suicide and moral self-abasement, but in the restored gospel of equal rights to the fullness of God's earth and equal liability to the consecrated penalty of work' (1890:55. My italics). On the basis of these points, I disagree with Dorothy Green's notion that '[t]he proper function of Christianity may not be, as Furphy thought, to provide a blue-print for socio-economic organisation, but to act as a beacon to light men back to "caritas", to loving-kindness, when they have wandered too far away from it' (1980:33). Furphy was as much concerned with "caritas" as he was with the necessary socio-economic milieu for its success.

Nor do I agree with Brady's reading of the biblical dimension in Such is Life. She argues that
there is something profoundly sour as well as comic, in fact, about Furphy's sense of life, something more despairing than a Christian vision could be, since the Christian has a sense of God at work, even here and now, in the midst of injustice and confusion. Despite the optimistic words he allows Tom about the future of Australia, Furphy offers no way to that future (1981:61).

Yet Brady had stated earlier that Furphy 'gives priority...to orthopraxis, right action, rather than to orthodoxy, right belief' (1981:47). Is not orthopraxis dependent on orthodoxy, and vice versa? The two may be distinct ideas but they are not mutually exclusive. If, for her, '[t]he great weakness of Such is Life...lies in its inability to deal with the material of life as it presents itself to experience' (1981:67), then this weakness occurs because she has misinterpreted the novel's philosophical preoccupation with seeing and responding to the material of human life. Whether or not God works in the world, Furphy rightly shows that man must work to uplift and upbuild man, regardless of man's aptitude for injustice or confusion. Contrary to Brady's view, Furphy shows us that we must put our 'trust in what is human, "all too human"' (1981:67). As Hamer argues, '[n]ot always is virtue rewarded and wrong punished; the rain falls alike on the just and the unjust. Furphy scoffs at people of blind faith who look for divine help but ignore natural cause and effect; and he scorns the related attitudes of complacency and self-righteousness' (1964:143).

Hamer points out that '[i]t is more difficult to establish Furphy's Christian viewpoint from Such is Life alone. There is a compelling unity about the whole of Furphy's writings: he wanted to present the three novels to the reading public for the price of one' (1964:146). To this I would also add Furphy's articles and letters, since he was quite consistent in his views. Among other issues, Furphy used Collins throughout the three novels to investigate the religious attitude towards, what Morgan calls, 'the foundation myth of Australia' (1979:57). According to Morgan, this foundation myth stipulated that Australia was 'a new, clean, unpolluted land, where a

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new beginning could be made and the old mistakes not repeated; a whole nation, one people, unified, not divided by ancient quarrels; self-sufficient, independent and free, and protected from the rest of the world by its vast surrounding seas' (1979:57). One is reminded of Bernard O'Dowd's poem 'Australia' (in Cantrell, ed, 1977:86) as an excellent example of this perspective. However, Furphy takes it a step further by pointing out that new beginnings must require new attitudes if old mistakes are not to be repeated, for damaging customs can build a fatal nest.

While Brady (1981:76) is content to attribute a link between Patrick White's writings on Australia and the biblical dimension of the Old Testament, she cannot see this link in Furphy's work despite the obvious intertextual evidence. She does not see that Furphy's heroes, like White's 'characters[,] are...strangers and pilgrims in their society' and that 'they are faithful to the life of the spirit' (1981:76). Nor does she see that Collins is as much a part of 'the crucible in which prophets are shaped' (1981:76) as any of White's heroes. Richters may consider Collins to be a 'clownish anti-Christ' or 'a malign rather than divine fool' (1979:261). But I think this is much too severe a judgment based on his notion that 'it is man's "fallen" nature that Furphy...is ultimately concerned with' (1979:257), and that the chief of the "fallen" is Collins. It is true that Furphy is concerned with man's "fallen" nature, but so is Collins. As Collins states to Stewart, 'if Adam fell in the days of innocency, what should poor Tom Collins do in the days of villainy?' (SiL, 168).

This leads us to consider another important aspect of Furphy's novels, especially if one considers the value of Tom Collins, as I will do in the next chapter, and that is the opposing values of the social and the individual. In a letter to Miles Franklin, dated 20th of August, 1904, Furphy states, '[w]ould you believe it -I tried Religion (Church of Christ); but had to give it best; not because it was too exacting, but the other way about. I didn't want a church that prohibited actual vice -for I'm not vicious- but I wanted one that would expel me with contumely for having two coats while another bloak had none' (Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:172). It would appear that Furphy privileges the social over the individual, but we must remember that it is a particular version of individualism to which Furphy is opposed, namely one that extends rights to the few.
and not the many, or one which treats others as means to an end. Nevertheless, Furphy's novels do exhibit a strong social orientation, placing much emphasis on the concepts of society and community.

Furphy would agree with Plato's notion that '[s]ociety originates...because the individual is not self-sufficient, but has many needs which he can't supply himself' (Rep. bk 2.369b). In this sense, 'when we have got hold of enough people to satisfy our many varied needs, we have assembled quite a large number of partners and helpers together to live in one place; and we give the resultant settlement the name of a community or state' (Rep. bk 2.369c). Similarly, one wonders if Furphy was aware of Aristotle's assertion 'that every state is a sort of partnership, and that every partnership is formed in order to attain some good' (Pol. bk 1.1), or that 'the state is natural, and man is by nature an animal designed for living in states' (Pol. bk 1.2). Bearing in mind the ideas of uplifting and upbuilding, Furphy would agree that human beings are social animals, and that there is a need for a way of seeing and responding to life which does not interfere with natural rights, with civil rights, nor with the common pursuit of goodness and happiness, or that which is called well-being.

Perhaps this is what Furphy hinted at when he wrote 'yet do I cling...to Plato's beautiful thought that no soul misses truth willingly' (Sil., 87). Or why Collins, in the closing chapter of Rigby's Romance, meditates on the concept of happiness:

But, after all, what is happiness? "Felicity" is its closest synonym, and you will observe that both words have the alternative import of Compatibility or Accordance -as when we speak of "a happy combination", "a felicitous phrase", and so forth. Such a coincidence in double-meaning is not without significance, since it betokens an instructive subconsciousness that Happiness must not be incongruous, or out of place, in respect of the Universal Harmony. Doubtless, our field of thought is invaded by a prophetic forecast, a twilight revelation of completer life, not directly formulated, though finding cryptic register in everyday speech. Then -taking

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Happiness in the double-intent of the word- who shall presume to interpret its manifestation, or limit its scope? Passing over the vanishing happiness of the moment, the ephemeral happiness of the day, and the scarcely less transitory happiness of the lifetime, may not the Ultimate Happiness of the Moral Universe be in some way consistent with the cross-purposes of human life?....And if there be a Universal Purpose, beyond individual welfare, and apart from the wayside interests of existence -if each lifetime be but one pace of Humanity in a decreed journey toward some Ultimate Good- then, measuring the consummation by its incalculable cost, that Good may be taken as the Inconceivable Best

Ay, but -mortal men, Hal, mortal men. And women still more inveterately mortal. Mortality is here emphasized, not in trite confession of its precarious tenure, but because of its abject servility to terrestrial conditions (260-261).

As one can see, Furphy uses the socio-historical climate of political divisions and rivalry to underpin his concerns with moral progress, and this is particularly the case with the cultural idea of a national type during the federation movement. If we recall the rivalry between colonial governments, particularly the New South Welsh and Victorian squabbles over the Riverina, it appears Furphy thought that society, whether in the form of Church or government, should not be of such a nature as to interfere with or curb the needs of the individual within a particular geographic experience. Indeed, as Furphy's novels insinuate, disorder in society is not just a disorder within politics, but also a disorder amongst individuals and their need for a particular custom vis-à-vis the convict taint. Besides an emphasis on public welfare in Furphy's novels, there is an equally strong focus on individualism and what an individual ought to do within the context of cultural production, particularly through the character of Tom Collins. For this reason, I think Furphy's views of nineteenth-century Australia share an affinity with Emerson's views of America:
Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of everyone of its members. *Society is a joint stock company*, in which the members agree, for the better securing of his bread for each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture of the eater. The virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion. It [society] loves not realities and creators, but names and customs ([1841] 1985:178. My italics).

Both Furphy and Emerson believed that the concept of society in the new world ought to be a joint stock company or a partnership of creators and realities, not just names and customs adopted from another time and place. According to Emerson, '[a]ll men have my blood and I all men's. Not for that will I adopt their petulance and folly, even to the extent of being ashamed of it' ([1841] 1985:192). In short, the emphasis is not on the abandoning of old world knowledge and values, but a retranslation of their cultural and social relevance by the new world experience for the new world experience. As Lillian Falkland-Pritchard states to Collins,

"Strange, isn't it -to think that a word, impalpable to touch and invisible to sight, should be more enduring and reliable than any material monument? The history of nations -their migrations, settlements, conquests- can be traced by the philologist far back into ages which afford little or no clue to the antiquarian. Yet in spite of the paramount significance of local designations -or, perhaps because of it- the map of this young land is already defaced by ugly and incongruous names, *transplanted* from the other side of the world" (BBB, 71. My italics).4

It is interesting to note that Collins does not disagree with her, and I think this is Furphy's way of satirizing the Anglo-Australian

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4 I will discuss the value of Lillian Falkland-Pritchard more fully in chapter three, where I discuss Collins' interests in the "female" version of the national type.
attempt to uplift and upbuild Australia through the hasty adoption of British names and customs, which try to efface the negativity of the fatal shore. For example, the fact that New South Wales was called 'the mother colony' (Sil, 3) suggests that the penal system is not only bequeathed to the much newer 'child' colonies, such as Victoria, but also suffers under an 'adolescent' rebellion in which the child strategically throws off the system of the parent in order to come of age. One could say that the name change, in 1851, from the "Port Phillip District" in New South Wales to the colony of Victoria is the first move in effacing the convict taint. It is equally, and more importantly, a socio-cultural homage to the head of the Empire and, in this sense, an appeal for redemption.

Responding in an 1883 editorial to the threat of a proposed French convict colony in the Pacific island of New Hebrides, the Victorian Premier, James Service, stated that '[a]s far as France is concerned, Australia is simply a geographical expression. But we want to make it more than that; we want to make ourselves a nation, a united people...who are able to command respect' (in Serle, 1969:32). Furthermore, Service argued that '[e]very one of us must feel our hearts beat strong and more strong when we think of ourselves not merely as Victorians, or New South Welshmen...but as Australians' (in Serle, 1969:32). And yet, in that same year at the Australasian Convention, Service declared that '[w]e cling to the idea of the Unity of the Empire. We do not wish to see anything of estrangement between Young Australia and Great Britain. We want our sons and daughters to grow up to love the Old Country' (in Serle, 1969:32). Serle describes Service as 'a fervent imperialist' and states that '[j]ingo enthusiasm swept Victoria remarkably early', for 'nowhere else in the colonies was there more consciousness of growing threats to the Empire or stronger demands for a no-nonsense imperial policy' (1969:32).

Although Furphy did not consider a clean-break from the old country to be possible or necessary, it is my contention that, rather than support jingoism, Furphy would have wanted his readers to follow Emerson's advice for the new world citizen:

[b]e it known unto you that henceforward I obey no law less than the eternal law. I will have no covenants

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but proximities. I shall endeavour to nourish my parents, to support my family, to be the chaste husband of one wife, but these relations I must fill after a new and unprecedented way. I appeal from your customs. I must be myself. I cannot break myself any longer for you, or you. If you can love me for what I am, we shall be the happier. If you cannot, I will still seek to deserve that you should. I will not hide my tastes or aversions. I will so trust that what is deep is holy, that I will do strongly before the sun and moon whatever inly rejoices me and the heart appoints. If you are noble, I will love you; if you are not, I will not hurt you and myself by hypocritical attentions. If you are true, but not in the same truth with me, cleave to your companions; I will seek my own. I do this not selfishly but humbly and truly. It is alike your interest, and mine, and all men’s, however long we have dwelt in lies, to live in truth’ (Emerson, [1841] 1985:192-193).

In Furphy’s views on the truth of cultural production and the idea of a national type, self-reliance is as important as ignorance shifting. As Emerson postulates, ’is not a man better than a town? Ask nothing of men, and, in the endless mutation, thou only firm column must presently appear the upholder of all that surrounds thee’ ([1841] 1985:202). Ask nothing of men and the uplifting and upbuilding of a nation shall come to nought. Furphy stressed, in his own way, Emerson’s notion that ’nothing can bring you peace but yourself. Nothing can bring you peace but the triumph of principles’ ([1841] 1985:203). According to Collins, ’collective humanity holds the key to that kingdom of God on earth’, for ’the kingdom of God is within us; our all-embracing duty is to give it form and effect, a local habitation and a name’ (Sil., 95. My italics). One should see Collins’ statement as a principle, advising the new world “child” to be true to him or herself and his or her experiences vis-à-vis the customs and values of the old world. It is a call to self-reliance, to uplift and upbuild the new individual and the new nation through the ideas of natural and civil rights, as well as the shifting of ignorance. Once

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this road is taken, it is then possible to establish the rightful identity of community, society and nation. As Henricksen explains,

\[1\] in Furphy's fiction, nationalism is never a simple and absolute good. There is always this striking ambiguity. Furphy was always eager to espouse pragmatic solutions to Australia's problems and nascent evils, usually as suggested in the *Bulletin*. On the other hand, he never apotheosized nationalism. He always saw it as ultimately marred by a flawed humanity, always imperfect, and never utopian. The more characteristic nationalism of the Nineties was a mixture of over-reacting pragmatism and romantic, numinous overtones. With Furphy's nationalism, as with his Christianity, Furphy promptly accepted the pragmatic road to assumed social improvement, but cast a skeptical glance at the numinous (1985:66).

Generally, Henricksen is correct, although his thinking that Furphy was sceptical of the "romantic", does pose a problem: a problem to which I will devote more attention in the next chapter. Nevertheless, if one were to identify a universal theme in Furphy's novels, then it would be quite apt to say that his work evolves around the search for meaning, or the avid pursuit and production of unifiable cultural experiences, for a group of people must seek common ground in order to make their experiences, however diverse, a public property that promotes social, cultural and individual well-being. In this sense, I must disagree with Brady, who concludes her analysis of Furphy with the notion that

\[t\]he great weakness of *Such is Life*, then, lies in its inability to deal with all the material of life as it presents itself to experience. This failure manifests itself in the stiffness and emotional wariness of the characters and also in the discontinuity and general sense of inconsequence of the story line which reflects on the one hand, as we have suggested, a certain humility, but on the other a kind of cowardice, a

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desire not to push questions but rather go around them (1981:67).

As we shall see in the next chapter, where I will deal with Furphy's views on art in more detail, nothing is further from the truth.
2. Man and Art: the ethics of representing Australia for Australia.

Of course, you're not responsible for India; but, by Heaven, you're responsible for Australia!
-Rigby's Romance, 1946:91-

2.1. The Normative Theory of Art: creativity, culture and value.

Having discussed some of the important issues of the socio-historical background to the novels, it is now time to turn our attention to Furphy's views on art. Previously I discussed the view that Furphy's novels are an education. This view has broader implications than a mere recognition of the sheer number of literary and non-literary allusions in Furphy's work. Chiefly, this view that Furphy's novels are an education should be seen within the context of art and knowledge, or art as a way of understanding. According to the philosopher Gordon Graham, '[t]he theory that art is valuable because of what we learn from it is sometimes called "cognitivism", a label derived from the Latin for knowing' (1997:43).

Graham calls this cognitive approach to art the '[n]ormative theory of art', for it 'is not concerned with the essential nature of "art" but with explaining the different ways in which it can be of value and the relative importance we should attach to each [artistic work]' (1997:127). Thus, '[i]nstead of seeking a definition of art in terms of necessary and sufficient properties, or seeking to determine its social function, we see what values music, or painting, or poetry can embody, and how valuable this form of embodiment is' (Graham, 1997:173). In Graham's view, this is especially important because 'the fact is that generation after generation and a wide variety of cultures all have attributed a special value to certain works and activities, and this suggests that some of the things we call art have an abiding value' (1997:176). How this value enriches knowledge and understanding, so becoming a norm, depends on what 'imaginative
creations' can bring 'to everyday experience as a way of ordering and illuminating [that everyday experience]' (Graham, 1997:62).

Appropriately, this has some very interesting implications for art. Discussing art's ability to allow human beings to reflect upon, as well as structure their 'world of political experience,' Graham states that

[a]rt can have the same sort of relation to moral and social experience. One way of putting this point is to say that we should think of artistic creations not as stereotypes but as archetypes. The images of the greatest artists do not provide us with distillations or summations of the variety in experience (stereotypes) but imaginary models against which we measure that variety (archetypes). And in certain contexts these archetypes may be said to constitute the only reality that there is. Things such as 'a lover', or 'a gentleman', or 'the perfect marriage', or 'a consuming passion', or 'innocence', do not await our discovery in the way that black swans or seams of gold do. They are patterns which structure our approach to the social and moral world in which our lives have to be lived and determine our attitude to the behaviour of ourselves and others. Works of art that come to have a common currency contribute to the formation of these patterns, and in the case of the greatest works -some of Shakespeare's plays for instance- they have been definitive. Art thus contributes to social and moral experience, and for this reason may be said to provide us with the possibility not only of understanding but also of self-understanding (1997:128-129).

When using the term "archetypes" in this context, we are not dealing with Jung's idea of 'the collective unconscious' and its 'contents' of 'primordial types' or 'universal images that have existed since the remotest times' ([1959] 1980:5). Instead, we need to turn to Locke. Without delving into the finer details of Locke's distinctions, we can contrast Graham's idea of stereotypes with Locke's 'simple
ideas', which 'all agree to the reality of things' even though some may not be 'the images or representations of what does [actually] exist' (Essay, 2.10.2). Similarly, Graham's archetypes correspond to Locke's "complex ideas" or 'mixed modes and relations' of simple ideas, based on degrees of sensation and reflection, which possess 'no other reality but what they have in the minds of men' (2.10.4).

Black swans or gold are simple ideas or stereotypes, while ideas such as innocence, love or heroism are complex ideas or archetypes. Within the context of reference, if and when certain complex ideas or archetypes, existing since antiquity, recur in isolated cultures without any form of cross-cultural fertilization, it is then that one can possibly begin to define these ideas in Jung's sense of the word. However, we need only concern ourselves with the notion that works of art are yardsticks for understanding reality, and that they employ, explore or construct a currency of complex ideas or archetypes, which have no referential existence other than the individual or common mind. For this reason, some artistic endeavours have been judged to be important works of art because their value is such that they increase the wealth of an already existing body of knowledge, as well as broadening human understanding of its own nature and condition in the world.

Simply put, a work of art is deemed important, or even great, because it is worth studying its treatment of specific values, or even its creation of "new" values. It is a view shared and practised by Furphy, for his novels allude to a diverse body of art in order to illuminate not only specific episodes in his own art, but also specific incidents in the reality of the Australian experience. Although the relationship between art and value is not a simple one, since any question of value in art is demarcated by ethical considerations, we can at least argue that the relationship between art and value in Furphy is based on the importance of uplifting and upbuilding a nation ethically. One could say that Furphy's main strategy in his art 'is to hold, as 'twere the mirror up to nature, to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure' (Hamlet, III.2.21-24).

In this sense, the manner in which Furphy practises this view in terms of his own art, as well as "Australian" art generally, is the reason for inquiry in this section. While I will have more to say
about this in the following chapters, it is important to note now that national identity, like the concept of nation, is an archetype, an imaginary model and unit of measure that constitutes a reality where there formally was none. But it should not be overlooked that an archetype also employs specific things within an already understood reality in order to validate ostensively its right to belong amongst that which is already known. Without this quality, nationalist narratives will have little impact on the public domain and leave no lasting impression in that public domain. Furphy appears to take this as a matter-of-fact. However, what Furphy does strongly suggest is this. If one is endeavouring to uplift and upbuild a nation artistically, then one needs to pay attention to what one treats as a value, particularly with the national type.

As Ernest Gellner explains, 'it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round. Admittedly, nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them radically' (1983:55). Or, as Turner points out, 'it is wise not to underestimate the power of images, of the way in which the meaning of everyday life is constructed through representation' (1994:51). In this sense, Australian national identity and nationhood can be seen as the claim to be recognized, to be known and understood as a common currency, as one identity vis-à-vis many others, and as a set of values among many other sets of values, particularly the British Empire. Consider the following telling comments by A.G. Stephens in his introduction to *The Bulletin Story Book*:

...the stories and sketches which follow are usually the literary dreams of men of action, or the literary realisation of things seen by wanderers. Usually they are objective, episodic, detached- branches torn from the Tree of Life, trimmed and dressed with whatever skill the writers possess (which often is not inconsiderable). In most of them still throbs the keen vitality of the parent stem: many are absolute transcripts of the Fact, copied as faithfully as the resources of language will permit. Hence many of
them, remaining level with Nature, remain on the lower plane of Art- which at its highest is not imitative, but creative,- making anew the whole world in terms of its subject. What is desiderated is that these isolated impressions should be fused in consciousness, and re-visualized, re-presented with their universal reference made clear....In other words, the branch should be shown growing upon the Tree, not severed from it: the Part should imply the Whole, and in a sense contain it, defying mathematics. Every story of a man or woman should be a microcosm of humanity; every vision of Nature should hold an imagination of the Universe ([1901] 1973:vii).

It can be said that Stephens is pushing for the need between art and understanding in relation to the short sketches that the storybook has to offer. More than just making 'an interesting book', Stephens' aim is to show that a characteristically Australian narrative is starting to emerge, even though '[t]he literary work which is Australian in spirit, as well as in scene or incident, is only beginning to be written' ([1901] 1973:vii). Stephens' comment that '[t]he formal establishment of the Commonwealth has not yet crystallized the floating elements of national life' is rather applicable to Furphy's Riverina, for readers see that 'Australia is still a suburb of Cosmopolis, where men from many lands perpetuate in a new environment the ideas and habits acquired far away' ([1901] 1973:vii-viii). Despite the difference in years, Stephens' discussion of the early twentieth century and Furphy's representation of 1883-1884 shows that any progress in the nationalist cause was slow, eclectic and perhaps disappointing.

It is important to bear in mind what Stephens has to say, for Stephens is a much more sophisticated thinker than most others of the nationalist cause. The narratives of nation and nationality, which he considered to be "Australian", had to be much more mature than that which the 1890s had to offer. According to Stephens, 'our most talented story-writers are still only clever students of the art of writing' ([1901] 1973:vii). In this sense, 'only here and there [do] we receive hints and portents of the Future', for 'Australian nationality
to-day is like an alchemist's crucible just before the gold-birth, with red fumes rising, and strange odours, and a dazzling gleam caught by moments through the bubble and seethe' ([1901] 1973:vii). The crux of Stephens' argument is to see 'our country...through clear Australian eyes, not through bias-bleared English spectacles' ([1901] 1973:ix. My italics).

One must understand Australia through art, and the manner in which to do this is to remove the English spectacles, to create rather than to imitate a way of seeing, and to respond to 'the local sense of local beauty' ([1901] 1973:vii). More importantly, Stephens warns that '[i]t will be the fault of the writers, not of the land, if Australian literature does not by-and-by become memorable' ([1901] 1973:ix). Nevertheless, Stephens does concede that '[t]hese counsels of perfection' may be 'easier to teach than to practise' ([1901] 1973:vi), but he also points out that 'every year is teaching us wisdom' ([1901] 1973:viii). I find Stephens' comments rather illuminating when it comes to Furphy, for both men are of much the same mind set. Given that both men spent the best part of five years in a working relationship as author and editor of Such is Life, it is possible that each influenced the mind of the other. Stephens' ideas thematically reverberate throughout Furphy's views on art and life.

But I am also of the view that Furphy took these ideas to greater heights in an effort to show his readers the philosophical relationship between art and life within the context of "narrative" understanding. Perhaps this fundamental difference between the two men was one of the reasons why Stephens missed the complexity of Furphy's work, making the claim that '[n]o one but the proof-readers will ever read Such is Life right through' (in Barnes, 1990:255; Franklin, 1944:125). As Furphy stated to Cecil Winter, 'A.G.S [is not] a perfect critic, according to my mind (though he may be nothing the worse for that). Too much reliance on models, and criteria, and the "unities", and so forth. But he is far from Bayldon, Myers and others. No critic, for instance, has ever done justice to Lawson's best work' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:168).

Besides the formative influence of The Bulletin's house style, one wonders whether or not these ideas are partly expressive of a basic manifesto formulated by the short-lived "Society of Irresponsibles": a society which Stephens had formed with himself as 100.
President' (Barnes, 1990:308) and a society to which Furphy belonged. As Furphy stated in a letter to his mother, Judith:

...a society is being organized to place all Australian writers and artists on terms of personal acquaintance, without further introduction -the object being to further the interests of Australian literature and art (as distinguished from Anglo-Australian). The society was organized by my editor, A. G. Stephens, and...he chooses to enlist all such purely Australian talent as may be available. It is called the Australian Society of Irresponsibles -signifying that no member is bound by any rules- and the secret sign and symbol is an inverted pewter- implying that the day of carousal is past, and the day of work has begun (In Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:102-103).

Despite Croft's notion that 'the content of Furphy's text may be nationalist', but his 'language is not' (1991:17), Furphy's affiliation with the society shows that he is as concerned with the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia as his hero, Tom Collins. If Croft means to say, as I think he does, that Furphy's nationalism is not, as Green argues, an 'aggressive Australianism' (1961:633), then I do not disagree with him. One of the problems with Croft's (1991:14) notion is his basic premise that there is a difference between Furphy's text and Collins' "text". While this is not untrue, it does not necessarily follow that nationalism is not an issue in both texts. Collins may be 'an Australian nationalist' (Croft, 1991:171), but it would also be fair to say Collins is not aggressively nationalist.

I think this is important, for aggressive nationalism or aggressive Australianism, in light of our previous discussion on the theme of ignorance shifting, has a tendency to justify a narrow-minded attitude towards the concepts of nation and national identity. Rather than a radical closing-off, I think Furphy's text and Collins' "text" firmly push the overall view that the many concerns surrounding Australian national identity should be seen as universal concerns. As Miles Franklin explains, 'Joseph Furphy built in harmony with the contours and atmosphere of his own continent.
and used as well much treasure from the universal storehouse of knowledge' (1944:4). In the words of Stephens, 'the branch should be shown growing on the Tree, not severed from it ([1901] 1973:vi). For this reason, I disagree with Croft's statement that 'deep within [Furphy] was the desire to be judged against the civilized standard of the "home" culture, and not to create a form of art which would make its own terms and therefore be found wanting' (1991:17). Croft is closer to the truth in one of his earlier essays, when he states that '[a]t the level of deeper interpretation, we might say that Furphy's desire was no so much for the restitution of a broken primal union,...but a creation of something new from independent parts' (1989:19).

To return to the Society of Irresponsibles, there is the claim that no member is bound by any rules, showing that, within the common expectations of what art should be, the Society was quite ready to break with conventional ways of seeing. Most contemporary readers are more or less acquainted with Stephens' ([1901] 1973:viii) view that early Australian literature is like early Australian art; both are very much the products of English conventions and English ways of seeing. It is, therefore, interesting to note that Furphy's novels not only represent the emergence of an Australian art, but also themselves thematically deal with the move towards an unique Australian style a little more than a year before Tom Roberts returned to Australia, in 1885, from the Royal Academy and began his school of plenair painting (Whitelaw, 1985:54). Indeed, the plen air quality of Collins' artistic style, depicting a 'random selection' of 1883-84 "life" in Riverina, seems to imply that Collins is the forerunner of an Australian aesthetic unveiled by the Impressionism of the 1890s Heidelberg school. Although there is no clear date as to when Collins sat down with his Lett's diaries to write his "extracts", it is not inconceivable to assume that he, like the Heidelberg artists, sets out to capture 'Nature in her Impressionist mood' (StL, 65), thereby attempting to give the public the evidence of uniqueness, beauty and value that made the Australian experience worth understanding as both a local and universal series of concerns.

Furphy's novels challenge the common notion that art is escapist or, as Plato argues in a later dialogue than Republic, that 'artistic representation' can properly be classified as 'diversion'
because no work of art 'has a serious purpose; all are performed for pure amusement' (*Statesman*, 288c). If art is pure amusement and no one takes it seriously, then a work of art which deals seriously with the issues and experiences of nationalism is pure amusement and cannot be taken seriously. This is, of course, false, for the problem with the notion that art is escapist or pure amusement is that if it is not escapist nor pure amusement, it cannot be art. While this may be an acceptable judgment based on one's taste, it is not a judgment based on the facts about works of art which attempt to facilitate an understanding about the different kinds of experiences in the world. As I will discuss shortly, what Furphy called "romance" may be escapist or purely amusing as well as art, but it does not follow that what is neither "romance", escapist nor purely amusing cannot be called art. If that were the case, then Furphy's novels would have to be seen as artistic failures because his thematic preoccupations are far from escapist or purely amusing.

As the philosopher John Dewey states,

> [i]t is mere ignorance that leads then to the supposition that [the] connection of art and esthetic perception with experience signifies a lowering of their significance and dignity. Experience in the degree that it is experience is heightened vitality. Instead of signifying being shut up within one's own private feelings and sensations, it signifies active and alert commerce with the world.; at its height it signifies complete interpenetration of self and the world of objects and events. Instead of signifying surrender to caprice and disorder, it affords our sole demonstration of a stability that is not stagnation but is rhythmic and developing. Because experience is the fulfilment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of things, it is art in germ ([1934] 1958:19).

Dewey's observation is a good one, for rather than solely identifying a work of art as that which satisfies our personal whims or amusements, art is a legitimate way of understanding, in an ordered manner, the rhythms of the world. Art is active and alert
commerce with the world, and can afford to be taken properly as a yardstick for understanding the responses to life in the search for meaning. As Dewey explains, 'Experience is the result, the sign, and the reward of that interaction of organism and environment which, when it is carried to the full, is a transformation of interaction into participation and communication' ([1934] 1958:22). In short, works of art are one important component in social participation and communication. And if we want to contemplate something about our world, our experiences, or if we engage ourselves in the search for meaning in our responses to life, then works of art can be important mediators of understanding.

Furphy's novels, in terms of art and understanding or normative aesthetics, anticipate 'a number of things that twentieth-century novelists were to explore' (Eagleson and Kramer, 1976:79). Indeed,

[the novels examine] the relationship between fiction and actuality, between actual and literary experience, and between life and knowledge. Furphy wrestles with the problem as to how realistic dialogue, and the sense of life as it is lived, can be incorporated into a novel which nevertheless has a full contour and shape. He is up against the most difficult of all problems for the novelist: how to preserve the sensations of real life while at the same time giving real life the shape of fiction. It offers an actual dialectical representation of Riverina life in the 1880s in the context of a formal shape with elements of eighteenth-century picaresque fiction, and even the romantic novel which, through his references to Henry Kingsley, he pretends to despise (Eagleson and Kramer, 1976:79).

Leaving aside the issue of the romance for the moment, it should be noted that the theoretical issues of "identity", "nation", "new world" and "old world", within the context of artistic representation, are also of primary concern to Furphy's novels. While Croft also points out that Furphy is 'very much a twentieth-century writer whose work is still relevant late in the century for which he
has such high hopes' (1991:276), I have some reservations about the reasons that he gives. As I have argued earlier, I do not think that it is 'his cast of mind', nor would I exclusively attribute Furphy's "modern" style to 'his involuted uncertainties about art, identity, and purpose' (1991:276). What Croft seems to read in Furphy is the seed of some twentieth-century angst, which I think is rather inappropriate.

Instead, one must not only see Furphy's work as a cultural creation, but also seek to understand his work as a cultural creation concerned with illuminating the complex processes of uplifting and upbuilding, and this includes the uncertainties and the contradictions in the text. As Dewey states, '[s]ince the artist cares in a peculiar way for the phase of experience in which union is achieved, he does not shun moments of resistance and tension. He rather cultivates them, not for their own sake but because of their potentialities, bringing to living consciousness an experience that is unified and total' ([1934] 1958:15). One could say that Furphy's programme was twofold. Firstly, he wanted his readers to observe and think about that which occurs in the novels as a work of art. Secondly, he wanted his readers to understand that these works of art were deeply concerned with life, both locally and universally.

In other words, art, identity and purpose are crucial factors in the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, and this applies to both Furphy's text and Collins' "text". According to Wilkes,

[1]In the the work of Lawson, Furphy and Patterson, a deliberate emphasis is placed on the features of the Australian landscape least resembling the English countryside -the harsher aspects may even be especially prized- and at the same time a vernacular idiom is asserted against the cultivated modes of the period before. This third stage [in Australian literary history] takes the pattern beyond adjustment to environment: it invokes also a movement from the artificial to the genuine and from a state of exile and dislocation to a state of national pride and self-reliance (1975:142. My italics).

105.
It must be said that Wilkes' comments are more or less applicable to Lawson, Furphy and Paterson in varying degrees, for it is a mistake to assume that these three writers form a neat little nationalist package. Indeed, while Lawson and Paterson respectively and unproblematically assert an Australian national identity, Furphy questions the validity of many contemporary assertions in light of what it means to uplift and upbuild. To put it another way, readers are constantly encouraged to think about what it means to move from the artificial to the genuine, rather than just accepting the existence of a particular type as being genuine. Thus, while Lawson and Paterson clearly render an Australian type in their art, Furphy and Collins put forth the much more credible view that 'the Coming Australian is a problem' (*Sil*, 144). According to Turner, '[t]he key issue in talking about the role and nature of the presence of nationalism in Australian narrative is thus not so much the range of meanings made available but the fact of the dominance of one set of terms, one body of myth or discourse, as the accepted mode of representation of the meaning of the nation' (1993:109).

Although Turner does not qualify Furphy's art with the capacity to isolate and question this dominant representation, preferring instead to place Furphy on an equal standing with Lawson, it is my contention that readers should see the tension between realism and romance, or fact and fiction, so frequently addressed by Collins, in light of uplifting and upbuilding the meaning and value of Australia. Once this is the case, it becomes equally possible to see that Furphy is not concerned simply with perpetuating the dominant representation of the Australian type, but challenging that representation with his own, namely the scholarly Tom Collins. To some degree, Furphy's investigation of the pros and cons of uplifting and upbuilding precedes some of the more modern theoretical concerns with nationalism, especially the art of nation and the view, as expressed by Benedict Anderson, that 'nationality', or 'nation-ness' and 'nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind' (1991:4).

White states that '[t]he question of Australian identity has usually been seen as a tug-of-war between Australianness and Britishness, between the impulse to be distinctively Australian and the lingering sense of a British heritage' (1981:47). Readers can see 106.
this recurring in Furphy's novels. But readers should also see that Furphy's novels, through Collins' preoccupations with artistic representation, foreground a tug-of-war between a number of values vying to be quintessentially Australian. What is important is not so much that there exists a difference of opinion, but the process where, as White explains, 'self-conscious nationalists began to exaggerate what was distinctive about Australia' (1981:47). In a letter to Cecil Winter, Furphy states, '[w]rite only of something which impresses you. Never draw wholly upon imagination; truth embellished is the idea. Attend well to details, without making them prominent. Let every sentence tell; let the yarn go, from post to finish. Last and greatest -Be lucid; avoid obscurity as the worst literary sin' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:146).

Much can be said about this piece of authorial advice to Winter¹, but in the current context what interests us is this idea of "truth embellished". Indeed, Furphy is not opposed to exaggeration in uplifting and upbuilding, but he is opposed to an author who takes "truth embellished" to mean an artistic misrepresentation of norms. As Collins warns, '[i]t will just show you how much the novelist has to answer for; following, as he does, the devices and desires of his own heart; telling the lies he ought not to have told, and leaving untold the lies that he ought to have told' (SIL, 272. My italics). This is especially so if the narrative is written 'for full-grown people in the painfully simple manner so often affected in literature intended for the "masses" (BBB, 88). Nevertheless, Furphy's notion of "truth embellished", when applied to uplifting and upbuilding, does appear to indicate a rather modern awareness of the nation as 'an imagined political community (Anderson, 1991:6).

According to Anderson, the nation 'is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (1991:6). More importantly though, the nation is imagined because '[c]ommunities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in

¹ One could say, for example, that Furphy's attention to details, without making them prominent, naively anticipates that his readers will be observant readers, and he thus runs the risk of obscurity. If this is the case, then this may explain why public response was poor and Furphy's faith in Such is Life dwindled. It also might explain why The Buln-Buln and The Bropga was written in a style that resembles the literature for the masses, while its themes are an extension of his previous novels.
which they are imagined' (Anderson, 1991:6. My italics). This point encapsulates much of what I have said about Furphy in relation to uplifting and upbuilding, as well as Wilkes’ notion concerning the move from an artificial Australian experience to a genuine Australian experience in light of artistic representation and value. Indeed, it also says much about the formative processes of an Australian nation, for the style in which one imagines the nation will depend on its history in light of popularized versions of official ideological discourses.

Because Australia was born in modern European history for a specific purpose, Australian nationalism must move fast to overturn the nation’s tainted history, thereby challenging these popularized versions of official ideological discourses, especially the applicability of “sin” at a national level. Hughes states that “[f]rom England, the identity of these people looked simple: They were seen in a bald, one-dimensional way as “the children of the convicts,” heirs of a depraved gene pool, from whom little good could be expected’ (1987:355). As White points out, ‘many Australians were not content simply to be proved worthy of the old stock: some were so bold as to suggest that the new type was in fact a decided improvement on the old’ (1981:73). In this sense, ‘the virtues of the convicts, their enterprise and self-reliance, were said to have been passed on to the Australian type, while their faults had been bred out’ (White, 1981:75). Nevertheless, Anglo-Australianism dominated the celebrations on the first day of federation, as noted by Evans et al (1997:11-14), foregrounding the more pervasive belief that what is British is best.

As Evans et al explain, ‘even in the 1950s there were still Australians, born and bred in Australia, who called the British Isles “home”’ (1997:185). Within this context, I find White’s concept of “generational renewal” rather appropriate. Discussing such qualities as the anti-authoritarianism and the anti-intellectualism of ‘The Coming Australian’, White states that ‘[w]hat is surprising is how often these characteristics were seen as being peculiarly Australian when they can more properly be ascribed to the age-old dismay with which one generation greets the ascendancy of the next’ (1981:77). According to White, ‘[t]he 1890s generation, predominantly native-born, felt more at home in the Australian environment and felt more need to promote an indigenous culture’ (1981:87). We can take this a 108.
step further and, keeping in mind the correlation between “nation” and “home”, side with Anderson’s notion that despite the ‘fear and hatred of the Other, and its affinities with racism, it is useful to remind ourselves that nations inspire love, often profoundly self-sacrificing love’ (1991:141). In this sense, there is another strong reason for the 1890s generation’s promoting an indigenous culture, namely to challenge the deeply-ingrained notion that ‘the word “Australian” was a term of abuse’ (Hughes, 1987:325).

Let us now consider Anderson’s definition of the nation a little further, since it offers a good understanding of that curious phenomenon called nationalism. Besides being imagined as a political community, the nation is also ‘imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (Anderson, 1991:6). According to Anderson, ‘[t]he nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them...has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind’ (1991:7). Furthermore, the nation ‘is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm’ (Anderson, 1991:7). But most importantly, the nation ‘is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson, 1991:7).

Qualifying Anderson’s view, Willis explains that ‘[b]esides being a political figuration, nation is a cultural construction, a concept in which large communities believe’ (1993:19. My italics). As Anderson points out, one should treat nationalism ‘as if it belonged with “kinship” and “religion”, rather than with “liberalism” or “fascism”’ (1991:5). Indeed, one needs to see nationalism as a concept that is inseparable from the meaning of “home”. This is especially so if one is to realise that the true power of nationalism does not lie in an official policy, but in its ‘existence’, according to Ernest Renan, as ‘a daily plebiscite’ ([1896] 1979:81). Nowhere is this more affirmatively evident than in art, since art not only has the ability to give people a way of seeing and understanding nation, but it also has the capacity to foreground and further encourage, either positively or negatively, the creative response to the concept of nation.
on a large scale, especially in the communal search for meaning.

Although Homi Bhabha offers a post-structural and post-colonial reading of the 'western nation as an obscure and ubiquitous form of living the locality of culture', his notion that 'the complex strategies of cultural identification and discursive address', functioning 'in the name of “the people” or “the nation”' and making 'them the immanent subjects and objects of a range of social and literary narratives' (1990:292) is an equally appropriate observation for Furphy's novels. Putting post-structural and post-colonial readings of an already established culture aside, one can observe in these novels the symbiotic formation of national and cultural identity at both the outer margins of the Empire and the infant space and time of experiencing the local 'landscape as the inscape of national identity' (Bhabha, 1990:295). As Furphy states, '[t]he poet's eye must see everything that is to be seen; his ear must hear everything that is to be heard; and, finally, his pen must give to these things a local habitation and a name' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:137).

In this sense, the creative response to the concept of nation in the communal search for meaning takes '[t]he scraps, patches, and rags of daily life' and continually turns them 'into signs of a national culture' (Bhabha, 1990:297). These scraps, patches and rags are what Furphy, in his 1903 review, called 'the minutest details of National life' (1969:129). When the creative act makes the nation visible in narrative, 'the very act of the narrative performance interpellates a growing circle of national subjects' (Bhabha, 1990:297). However, as Furphy's novels so rightly foreground, there are also 'counter-narratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its totalizing boundaries', disturbing 'those ideological manoeuvres through which “imagined communities” are given essentialist identities' (Bhabha, 1990:300). Some of these counter-narratives are Furphy's novels themselves, for the complexity of Tom Collins is such that he strategically disturbs the national and cultural formation of a dominant Australian type in a large number of plebiscite narratives.

The reason for this disturbance has much to do with value, since the dominant Australian type, according to Furphy, appears to be very much capable of perpetuating the ignorance, rivalry and
division that had repeatedly sabotaged federation, as well as making national life shrivel 'into provincialism', becoming 'contemptible; and, festering into the imperial-cum-provincial sentiment' that makes nationalism 'obscene' (1969:128). To a certain extent, one could say that Furphy's writings on nationalism and his challenging of the dominant representation of the national type are marked by what Gellner calls '[n]ationalist sentiment', which 'is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of a principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment' (1983:1). Rather than Bhabha's notion that '(b)eing obliged to forget becomes the basis for remembering the nation, peopling it anew, [and] imagining the possibility of other contending and liberating forms of cultural identification' (1990:311), Furphy's novels suggest that nationalism is a process of strategic moves and countermoves in the plebiscite of identities, especially their artistic representations and their national identification.

To reiterate Graham's point concerning art and understanding, 'what is in view here is human experience in its widest sense -visual, aural, tactile, emotional, mental. Works of art can supply the imaginative apprehension of experience in all these respects, and their value derives from the fact that we may ourselves be deficient in this regard. This is the sense in which art is a source of understanding' (Graham, 1997:58). Or, as the philosopher A.L. Cothey explains, '[h]ow we act towards others is shaped by the understanding of people we gain from art. More generally, we see things through the eyes of art -and in a deeper sense than that we see them as works of art' (1990:187). Thus, the object of art as a route to knowledge, like anything that we designate as knowledge, 'is to make our understanding of experience explicit and thereby to contribute to making our actions meaningful. The opposite of this is a state of confusion and ignorance' (Cothey, 1990:188-189).

According to Cothey, there are '[s]ome artefacts [that] promote this [state of confusion and ignorance] by masquerading as art while in fact encouraging us to enjoy apprehending them for incidental reasons. In this sense false art -art that is positively bad- is a genuine possibility and a real danger' (1990:189). Although Cothey's argument is not free from problems, namely that troublesome distinction between good art and bad art, as well as true art vis-à-vis
false art, he nevertheless makes a very important point: there emerges from time to time works of art which jeopardise the attempt to arrive at a specific value in human understanding. In Furphy's view, this kind of art is the colonial romance. But what is it about the colonial romance that makes it such a threat that Furphy, as well as Collins, repeatedly attacks it?

We can begin to answer this question with a comment by Miles Franklin. In her biography of Furphy, she states that 'Artist Time has been distilling atmosphere from crude local colour so that the Australian novel has advanced beyond the stage when it became such simply by the substitution of native fauna, flora and place names for those of other lands' (1944:2). In short, Australian literature has moved beyond the simple formula of a British ethos with an Australian nomenclature. Franklin's comment says much about the state of Australian literature in both the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially the steady move against those Anglo-Australians who 'greeted with hosannas any clever or promising novel written in the expatriate spirit' (1944:2). It is fitting that Franklin should introduce Furphy in this way, for numerous letters to her by Furphy testify to his constant urging the vibrancy of the Australian experience.

For this reason, it can be said that, besides challenging the dominant representation of the Australian type, Furphy opposed 'the centripetal movement towards the hub of Empire' which made 'Australian writers yield to overseas predilections in choice of subject-matter and/ or in the interpretation of their own' (Franklin, 1944:2). In his 1903 review, Furphy makes this quite clear when he stated that

[t]he fictional literature of Australia -scanty at most, and uneven at best- has advanced by orderly gradation from Anglo-Australian, through Colonial, to National. The successional replacement of the immigrant, with his old-world ideals, by the impressionable representative of a new type has made such a transition inevitable. But the mass of our literature is British; and book-begotten sentiment dies hard, except amongst pioneers of opinion. Conventionality persists in viewing Australian characteristics and deviations as
more or less exotic; whilst to the fully-emancipated native-born, these stand as self-established units of comparison, as normal and legitimate phenomena (1969:128).

Anglo-Australian “romance” recreates Australia in light of old world units of comparison, as well as British or European perceptions of normal and legitimate phenomena. A particularly good example of an Anglo-Australian concept and value, which perhaps forms the basis for many romance narratives, devaluing much of the Australian experience, is Major Mitchell’s description of Victoria as ‘Australia Felix’, for it sets Victoria at odds with ‘the parched deserts of the interior country, where we had wandered so unprofitably, and so long’ (in Poynter, 1987:76. My italics). But, as Furphy points out, ‘tragedy, humour, pathos, [and] fancy, however indissolubly linked with human nature, must assume unhackneyed aspects in a continent which resembles Europe or North America only inasmuch as there is a river in both’ (1969:128. My italics). In short, the Victorian landscape is not the sum total of legitimate phenomena in the Australian experience just because it resembles old-world social and economic values and can easily accommodate a British or European way of life.

Armbruster (1991:30) and Henricksen (1985:18) each points out that the colonial romance follows a formula in which the hero, idealizing England and her values in Australia, generates a substantial fortune and, after having industriously reaped from the colonies what he could, returns to the comforts of “home”. As Collins states, “[a] novelist is always able to bring forth out of his imagination the very thing required by the exigencies of his story - just as he unmasks the villain at the critical moment, and, for the young hero’s benefit, gently shifts the amiable old potterer to a better land in the very nick of time. Such is not life” (Sil, 269). In terms of narrative formulas, one is also reminded of a comment by Willoughby to Collins. Finding ‘the colonies pretty rough’, Willoughby states that “[e]ven in your cities I observe a feverish excitement, and a damnable race for what the Scriptures aptly call “filthy lucre” (Sil, 35). Indeed, Willoughby, championing Mitchell’s “Australia Felix”, states that “[i]n the near future, each of these shabby home-stations
will be replaced by a noble mansion, with its spacious park; and these bare plains will reward the toil of an industrious and contented tenantry' (Sil, 35). Willoughby's statement captures perfectly the flavour of Anglo-Australian rhetoric on British aristocracy.

As Tiffin points out, 'Furphy's sense of Australian life is bound up in the detail of bush occupations so that he finds the vaguely conceived activity in the romance pattern...not just irrelevant or silly but actively offensive' (1986:31). Furphy believed that, if this formula continued to dominate Australian artistic pursuits, allowing romance to recreate English ways of seeing and understanding, then Australia would never be understood on its own terms, nor for its own values in the world of knowledge. All values would thus be solely British or European and Australia's identity would be marked by an Empire of men whose plans for the colonies are industry and exploitation or exotic titillation. In short, any attempt to claim that a particular work of art illuminates a value of Australia for Australia, as well as contributing to the sum of universal concerns and values, in whatever context, would be meaningless. In terms of offering a "truth embellished" narrative, Anglo-Australian depictions of the Australian experience misrepresent that experience or deny its value, its "normal and legitimate phenomena". Discussing the valuable horsemanship of 'Young Jack', a born and bred Australian at Runnymede station, Collins states that

[y]our novelist, availing himself of his prerogative [to uplift and upbuild Australia], fancifully assigns this office [of great horsemanship] to the well-educated, well-nurtured, and, above all, colonial-experiencer, fresh from the English rectory. But I am a mere annalist, and a blunt, stolid, unimaginative one at that; therefore not entirely lost to all sense of the fitness of things (Sil, 278).

One wonders if, to some extent, Furphy considered the Anglo-Australian romance to be a catalyst in the perpetuation of ignorance, division and rivalry in Australia, as well as an over hasty attempt to redeem Australia from its penal origins by good citizenship and 'the crimson thread of kinship' (Sil, 5). I must agree with Henricksen's 114.
observation that ‘Furphy’s response to Anglo-Australian fiction was to treat their writing *primarily* as a manifesto to be refuted, ignoring the exceptions and countering the generalities’ (1985:29). Indeed, ‘Furphy was earnestly interested in the “naked truth”, artistically reproduced. In colonial fiction, he did not find it’ (Henricksen, 1985:46). And, as Henricksen notes, ‘Furphy’s revolt against the school of Anglo-Australian writers derived from his interpretation of the social function of literature, *as reforming rather than entertaining*’ (1985:55. My italics). According to Partington, ‘[e]ven before location and *personae* are made known, [*Such is Life’s*] first paragraphs introduce the idea that fiction or romance and strict chronicle offer alternative and conflicting accounts of the suchness of things’ (1993:238). In short, Furphy’s attack on Anglo-Australian narrative is an ethical one, for he appears to take to task any writer whose work could have disastrous consequences for the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, or the values one can derive from art and understanding.

But, as Barnes notes, ‘[t]he “realism” at which Furphy aimed was qualified and *in part defined by the “romance” to which he opposed it*’ (1990:228. My italics). To some extent this is true, since readers often find Tom engaged in a perspective on “life” worthy of romantic pulp fiction, as is the case when Collins, having read Ouida, comes to Warrigal Alf’s assistance. But Collins states that ‘I object to being regarded as a mere romancist, or even as a dead-head spectator, or dilettante reporter, of the drama of life’ (*RR*, xvii). Collins declares that ‘I am no romancist. I repudiate shifts, and stand or fall by the naked truth’ (*Sil*, 113). One should not confuse “romance” and “romanticism” simply because they share the same adjective. I must disagree, therefore, with Knight’s notion that ‘Collins rejects romanticism in general’ (1969:243). When I speak of Collins’ “romantic” orientations, I mean the kind which are thematically similar to Emerson’s focus on nation-building, the creative power of art, the season in Nature and the new world experience as an environment of rights and self-reliance. Like Emerson, Furphy appears to believe rather strongly that ‘[e]ach age, it is found, must write its own books; or rather, each generation for the next succeeding. The books of an older period will not fit this’ ([1837] 1985:87-88).
In the introduction to 'Nature', Emerson addresses these basic principles of “man's” position in the new world vis-à-vis the old:

Our age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchres of the fathers. It writes biographies, histories, and criticism. The foregoing generations beheld God and nature face to face; we, through their eyes. Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe? Why should not we have a poetry and philosophy of insight and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us, and not the history of theirs? Embosomed for a season in nature, whose floods of life stream around and through us, and invite us, by the powers they supply, to action proportioned to nature, why should we grope among the dry bones of the past, or put the living generation into masquerade out of its faded wardrobe? The sun shines to-day also. There is more wool and flax in the fields. There are new lands, new men, new thoughts. Let us demand our own works and laws and worship ([1836] 1985:35).

When this happens, according to Emerson, there is 'creative reading as well as creative writing' ([1837] 1985:90). In short, '[w]hen the mind is braced by labor and invention, the page of whatever book we read becomes luminous with manifold allusion. Every sentence is doubly significant, and the sense of our author is as broad as the world' (Emerson, [1837] 1985:90). Romance, on the other hand, is parodied by Furphy and Collins to foreground not just the creative power of the narrative act, but to show how influentially misleading a narrative can be in terms of narrowly seeing and depicting the values of the new world. Perhaps romance does not have 'coincidence and cross purposes, sometimes too intricate' (Furphy, [1903] 1969:130). According to Lever, 'Furphy’s objection that they [romance novels] create an alluring imaginary world apart from class struggle still has some force’ (1996-97:154). Although Lever's observation is astute because of the preoccupation with rights and self-reliance, an absence of class struggle is not the only reason for Furphy's and Collins' objecting to the colonial romance. Collins' denial that he is
a romancer is based on the fundamental notion that the romancer, by the elaborate contrivances of plot, does not tell the tale of national life as it is and as it ought to be.

Romance, like colonial art, merely perpetuates an old-world way of seeing. In opposition to this, one can argue that the Heidelberg way of seeing is a romanticist way of seeing, and this newness of the impressionist "vision splendid" is crucial to understanding Furphy's and Collins' narrative strategies. Collins' affectations for realism commit him to the responsibility of reporting on life in Riverina. But, as he says, one must not take him as a dead-head spectator or dilettante reporter. Why is this so? In my view, the answer lies in Furphy's remark about uplifting and upbuilding. Collins, turning his 'mind loose for a roll in the dust of Memory, and a cavort round the paddock of Imagination' (BBB, 1948:3. My italics), elevates the realism of the narrative to the status of "vision splendid". In light of the ethics of uplifting and upbuilding, Memory and Imagination can be seen as two necessary faculties in the creation of a "truth embellished" narrative.

In this sense, I disagree with Barnes' notion that '[i]n his fiction, Furphy was not consciously innovative in relation to his contemporaries in England and America -and Australia, for that matter' (1990:228). Nor do I agree with Brady that 'Furphy is a man divided against himself, so inwardly unsure that he dare not take risks but must cling to what he knows' (1981:62). As Eagleson and Kramer note, 'Such is Life is a highly experimental novel for its period (1976:79). This is especially so with selfhood or subjectivity, nation and narration, and the recognition of the power of language in the construction of a reality. Like Whitman, to whom Collins refers in his narrative strategies, Furphy was first and foremost preoccupied with nation. When Furphy stated that his hero was involved in the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, one could say that this thematic involvement in uplifting and upbuilding was equally applicable to Furphy, as the letters to Miles Franklin testify. Thus, I find it rather strange that Barnes should state that Furphy 'was not...responding to what was new in the fiction of the 1880s and 1890s'(1990:228).

Nor do I think that Barnes is justified in stating that '[t]he act of writing was itself a release, a fulfilment, and a vindication for a
lonely man aware that the world regarded him as a failure' (1990:228). Furphy did not play with language or narrative on the basis that he considered it personally cathartic. Nor do I think that the act of writing was solely related to Furphy's economic failures. Furphy, *the currency lad*, considered himself to be personally involved in the social and cultural aspect of history, as well as being involved in the history of ideas. In short, I think Furphy saw himself holding 'an independent diploma as one of the architects of our Social System, with a commission to use my own judgment, and take my own risks, like any other unit of humanity' (*SIL*, 1). Like Emerson, Furphy may have 'read with some joy...the auspicious signs of the coming days, as they glimmer already through poetry and art, through philosophy and science, through church and state' ([1837] 1985:101).

In a comparative discussion of *Such is Life* and *Don Quixote*, Suárez-Lafuente states that '[b]oth texts record the inevitable breakage of a social construct and a given national type that had exhausted their historical possibilities' (1994:39). Indeed, 'Furphy and Cervantes take into consideration the possibilities of reality as it is perceived and the reaction of individual characters to the space they find themselves in; these individualities, Tom Collins and Don Quixote, effect a mapping of their world and link it to their own personal values and to a system of meaning that proves to be new because it is built upon new premises' (Suárez-Lafuente, 1994:39). However, I would like to modify this proposition slightly, for what the Australian experience shows is that new premises are more inclined to be re-evaluations rather than clean breaks from "old" premises about what reality "was", "is" and "will" or "should be". In short, the Australian experience diversifies our understanding that is derived from inductive knowledge².

Furthermore, Suárez-Lafuente states that

> [s]tarting from the fact that the concept of reality is always elusive, that there is no such thing as a reality...it can be stated that reality in itself is construing insofar as its prescribed immutability changes with every wink of the eye. Understood

²I will have more to say about induction in the next chapter.
otherwise, reality becomes a false construct. Furphy undermines the notion of reality in the very choice of a name for his hero, Tom Collins (1994:41-42).

Although I do not disagree with her notion that reality cannot be reduced to a singularly immutable concept, the problem with her concluding statement is that we are meant to see no difference between the Tom Collins of an oral folklore and the Tom Collins of the novel. This is a dangerous mistake, leading perhaps to a critical devaluation of Furphy’s statement that Collins is concerned with the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia in a manner that is far from mere comedy. While it is true that the use of “Tom Collins” allows us to understand reality as a plurality of meaning, it is not true that “Tom Collins” foregrounds a reality that changes with every wink of the eye. What the etymological implications of “Tom Collins” make clear is the intricate game of narration and representation in the response to life and the search for meaning. That Furphy chose “Tom Collins” as the vehicle for his ideas comes as no surprise in light of the novels’ preoccupations with the power of art to generate and direct meaning and understanding.

Indeed, it can be said that “Tom Collins”, as both a novelistic persona and an expression of 1890s popular culture, has left a powerful impression on later generations. If we are asked to isolate a common element between the Tom Collins of oral folklore and the Tom Collins of the novel, then we could say that both personas tell their stories with a design in mind. However, this is where important differences come into play. As noted by Barnes (1990:21), Croft (1991:85), Franklin (1944:42) and Wilkes (1990:86), the Tom Collins of the oral tradition is seen to tell his stories or idle rumours for the sole but frivolous purpose of character assassination, giving the actual teller of the story a loophole from having to claim responsibility for the damaging content of the “yarn”. But, a “Tom Collins” is only an idle rumour or tall story after the event. At the time of delivery, it is meant to function as truth and its purpose is to make one think about the content and truth of the message.

The Tom Collins of the novel, on the other hand, assassinates some characters in a manner that can be seen as strategic rather than frivolous, for the message of his narrative is a call to uplift and
upbuild vis-à-vis tearing down and destroying that which is seen to be unsuitable, as is the case with the romance novelist. Readers should be aware, therefore, of the shift in meaning and purpose of "Tom Collins" when considering the etymology of the name. It pays to bear in mind that, in the novel, the meaning of Tom Collins is dependent on the meaning of "currency lad". And, as such, the linguistic game that Furphy plays with "Tom Collins" is a game based on the ethics of representation insofar as representation is intimately related to the communication of values and the promotion of understanding. Discussing Collins' "authorship" in the 1903 review, Furphy stated that '[t]here is interest, if not relevancy, in every sentence' (1969:129). Or, as Douglas notes, '[Collins] voices a response to life, based on serious assumptions, possessing serious implications, which must be taken into account in any interpretation of the book' (1978:24).

In this sense, Suárez-Lafuente is correct to state that '[a]fter Don Quixote and Tom Collins have roamed La Mancha and the bush,... both spaces will offer, if not a new "reality", at least a new image, new possibilities for the individual and for a different approach to a geography that has to be considered with a new outlook, as different as has to be a new attitude towards history' (1994:43-44). As Bernard O'Dowd's poem 'Australia' (in Cantrell, ed, 1977:86) implies, there must be more to the future of Australia than just a perpetuation of Old World evils, for its manifest destiny cannot just be the dual status of antipodean prison and colonial settlement. And it must be capable of more than just copying or perpetuating old world ignorance and evils. Ideally speaking, it must have the same options and capabilities as 'America'. History in Furphy's novels not only involves the facts of a unique Australian experience, as demanded by the chronicle style, but also an evaluation of one's narrative strategies as found in the realm of fiction.

We might say that, although Furphy considered nationalism or the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia to be "truth embellished", he was also aware that 'the distinction between the fact and fiction of nation cannot be made with such certainty' (Willis, 1993:14). Recalling Anderson's (1991:6) notion that style is not concerned with the hard distinction between what is false and what is genuine in narratives about the nation, one should not approach Collins'
narrative with the intent of trying to distinguish what is false about
him and what is genuine. If one were to maintain such a distinction,
foregoing the clue that Collins is concerned with the uplifting and
upbuilding of Australia, then one risks misunderstanding the power
and wealth of the nationalist spirit made flesh. This, in turn, will
severely limit the reader’s appreciation of Collins’ creative response
to the concept of nation, as well as limit the reader’s understanding
of the value of narratives to promote further the “truth embellished”
nation.

Furphy’s point is this: the manner in which an author or artist
represents a pre-national community in art will shape the manner in
which the nation is understood, since art has the capacity to
illuminate, either positively or negatively, a particular human
condition or experience vis-à-vis universal concerns. Furphy’s
concerns are thematically similar to Plato’s concept of censorship in
Republic, for the latter states that

our first business is to supervise the production of
stories, and choose only those we think suitable, and
reject the rest. We shall persuade mothers and nurses
to tell our chosen stories to their children, and by
means of them to mould their minds and characters
which are more important than their bodies. The
greater part of the stories current today we shall have
to reject (bk.2.377b-e).

At this stage of the discussion, it can be said that what I have
investigated within the context of uplifting and upbuilding can be
subsumed under a single concept, namely aesthetic well-being. This
concept is a particularly good clarification of why uplifting and
upbuilding occur and why this process is intimately related to art,
making art a key object in the determination of value and
understanding. It cannot be stressed too often that Furphy’s designs
for his novels cannot be valued merely within the context of “a good
yarn”, for that overestimates the pleasure and escapist quality one
can get from the narratives. One of the most basic issues in Furphy’s
writing is a nationalist’s concern for the well-being of a federated
nation. In short, Furphy took to task the damaging aspect of

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ignorance, division and rivalry in the search for meaning and the response to Australian life.

If we recall that the nation is both a community and a daily plebiscite, then we can easily see why Furphy considered it important to promote or create artistically those values which contribute to communal and individual well-being. This is, of course, a very complicated matter, and, it is for this reason that Furphy used "Tom Collins" to exemplify the complex symbiosis between art and personal and national well-being. To recall Graham's notion that one 'should think of artistic creations not as stereotypes but as archetypes' (1997: 128-129), it is more than likely that Furphy would have wanted his readers to observe and perhaps emulate Collins' most basic qualities and values. In this sense, I disagree with Croft's notion that

Tom is an anti-hero. He expresses in himself, and in his role as narrator, those unresolved divisions which were deep within Joseph Furphy's personality. Unlike the hero of the epics - the nation builders, the saviours - Tom does not bring about unity or redemption; instead, he leaves us with paradoxes. Perhaps Furphy used him as a way of dealing with those aspects of Furphy's own character which he found ridiculous - his pedantic learning, his recidivistic conservatism, his love of abstract thought (1991:274).

If we were to attribute some basic qualities and values to Collins' character, then, bearing in mind the recent discussion on the etymology of "Tom Collins", as well as the consistent focus on ignorance-shifting, I consider the following three to be most important. First and foremost, readers should see "Tom Collins" as being expressive of the creative possibilities of language towards the formulation of an identity between "self" and "other", especially within the context of the personal and the national. This is what Furphy meant when he stressed that "[a]ll creative Art -as distinguished from imitative- is in the nature of a confession. Man, in this vocation, is a god, a creator, and cannot create but in his own image' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:137). Secondly, readers
should see Collins as a strategic agency in the determination of semantic value in accordance with the arbitrary nature of signs, the conventions of a sign-system, and the demands of a particular context. This is what I mean when I use the term “articulation”. Finally, readers should see Collins as a speaker not just within an established system of signs, but also as a speaker who can contend a sign’s meaning in light of its emotional and intellectual value, especially with the handing down of signs from an old world context to a new world experience. This is what I mean when I use the term “orientation”.

The purpose of outlining these three values now is to frame the direction of the next section. Having discussed why Collins is concerned with uplifting and upbuilding, I will now focus on how Collins can uplift and upbuild. Again, I do not wish to conclude that “Furphy’s text is simply a text about nationalism”, for such a conclusion does little justice to the rich complexity of Furphy’s art. Readers should not over-emphasize the nationalist dimension of the novels in the sense that Furphy is drawn as a radical nationalist or an advocate of ‘aggressive Australianism’ (Green, 1961:633). Nor should readers underestimate the nationalist dimension. Furphy is radical, but his radicalism ethically concerns itself more with the art of nation than an ideologically exclusive blind faith or a microcosmic depiction of all things Australian. One should see the nationalist aspect of the novels, or the notion that Collins is concerned with the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, as a key which can facilitate one’s understanding of how and why one artistically uplifts and upbuilds something. As Dewey points out,

[art] is proof that man uses the materials and energies of nature with intent to expand his own life, and that he does so in accord with the structure of his organism - brain, sense-organs, and muscular system. Art is the living and concrete proof that man is capable of restoring consciously, and thus on the plane of meaning, the union of sense, need, impulse and action characteristic of the live creature. The intervention of consciousness adds regulation, power of selection, and redisposition. Thus it varies the arts.
in ways without end. But its intervention also leads to
the idea of art as a conscious idea-the greatest
intellectual achievement in the history of humanity

2.2. Social Architecture and the Theory of the Controlling
Alternatives.

At the close of Such is Life, Collins gives the following warning
to his readers:

Now I had to enact the Cynic philosopher to Moriarty
and Butler, and the aristocratic man with a 'past' to
Mrs. Beaudesart; with the satisfaction of knowing that
each of these was acting a part to me. Such is life, my
fellow-mummers-just like a poor player, that bluffs
and feints his hour upon the stage, and then cheapens
down to mere nonentity. But let me not hear any small
witticism to the further effect that its story is a tale told
by a vulgarian, full of slang and blanky, signifying-nothing (Sil., 297. My italics).

As Macbeth declares, one's life, or one's identity is 'but a
walking shadow, a poor player/ That struts and frets his hour upon
the stage,/ And then is heard no more' (Macbeth, V. 5. 23-25). However, unlike Macbeth's declaration, one's life is not 'a tale/ Told
by an idiot, full of sound and fury,/ Signifying nothing' (Macbeth, V.
5. 25-27). This warning from Collins stands rather opposed to the
general critical consensus on the preoccupation with role-playing in
the novels. I disagree with Barnes' notion that '[t]he tone of this
paragraph] leaves one uncertain what weight it is meant to have'
(1981:xxii). Yet Barnes is correct in observing that the novel's final
paragraph 'carries some disturbing implications about life and its
possibilities' (1981:xxii). Although Croft rightly notes the 'very
Shakespearean end to the book' (1991:215), I do not agree with his
final assertion. According to Croft, the novel's ending is '[o]ne in
which the fool addresses the audience and asks them to dismiss the
shades (the actors) and return to their own lives. Lives which are

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stories too, and some of them like his [Collins'] vulgarian's tale "full

And yet Croft states that '[b]efore Tom disappears, however, he
will not let us make this conclusion, believe it though we may. This is
a diary. It is life. It is truth, and it is not told by a vulgarian'
(1991:215. My italics). This is despite Collins' clear warning to his
audience that his tale does not signify nothing. On the whole, I find
the critical responses to the novel's final paragraph, even though
they express very salient views about role playing, unnecessarily
confusing. Let us consider a sample. Henricksen argues that
'Furphy's fiction bristles with references to the stage, primarily to put
reality in doubt, and secondarily to make the reader aware that the
actors in Such is Life are just that, each playing a wide variety of
roles' (1985:167). While I share Henricksen's view that the strong
focus on role-playing suggests that each character plays, or acts, a
role, I disagree with his notion that the focus on role-playing puts
reality in doubt. I am more inclined to think that role-playing reifies
a version of reality, and that certain roles chosen by particular
individuals promote certain ways of seeing and responding to life.

As Barnes notes, '[t]hroughout the novel Collins takes on
different roles, and acting becomes a metaphor for life as Collins
(and Furphy) conceives of it' (1981:xxi). Indeed, '[t]he role a man
plays is how he chooses to let himself be seen by his fellows' (Barnes,
1981:xxi-xxii). But, though 'Collins is something of a chameleon,
taking on the appropriate colour according to occasion', Barnes
claims that Collins is 'always under the illusion that he is in
command of the circumstances' (1981:xxi-xxii). In Partington's view,
'[e]nough of Collins' moral shortcomings have been detailed already
to establish that, far from his being a reliable figure, he is at best an
incorrigible, although not consummately successful, role player,
protean, or chameleon-like in his attempted transformations'
(1993:122). And, according to Hartley, Collins plays 'a long sequence
of roles' in which he 'symbolically borrows, steals, loses, finds and
swaps an assortment of clothes, pipes, horses, saddles' (1986:167).
Indeed,

as narrator, [Collins] establishes himself as a mimic,
who, with minor comic distortions, acts out in turn
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the prose strategies of the lawyer, the offended socialist, the Aussie chronicler, the scientist, the fumbling country journalist, the philosopher, together with the romance and detective novelists and innumerable other literary styles, playing off the one against the other, and refusing, finally, to be identified with any of them (Hartley, 1986:167).

To a certain extent, the preceding critical views have some validity, for Collins does state that ‘[i]n occupation, I change involuntarily, like the chameleon, according to my surroundings’ (RR, 15). But one should also remember that Collins’ roles or identities are culturally created responses to life, in which he voluntarily plays off styles and images against each other in order to roll with the punches. Again, the plurality of roles played by Collins does not put reality in doubt; nor does it point to Collins’ moral shortcomings and unreliability. Collins is not, as Brady argues, ‘a parodic version of all of us who worship illusion’ (1981:57). In light of the “truth embellished” narrative, illusion may play a central role in the response to life and the search for meaning, but it does not follow that a degree of illusion means one worships illusion in toto. As Collins states, ‘a lifelong education, directing the inherent loyalty of human nature, invests anything in the shape of national or associational bunting with a sacredness difficult to express in words’ (SiL, 117). Indeed,

[1]loyalty to something is an ingredient in our moral constitution; and the more vague the object, the more rabid will be our devotion to the symbol. Any badge is good enough to adore, provided the worshipper has in some way identified the fetish with himself -anything from the standard of St. George to the “forky pennon” of Lord Marmion; from the Star-spangled Banner to the Three Legs of the Isle of Man.

Now, with insignia, as with everything else, it is deprivation only that gives a true sense of value (SiL, 117).
As Kiernan states, 'through Tom Collins we are presented with an image of the way in which a society “works”, the network of relationships that exist within it, and the way these appear to an individual within the net' (1971b:145). Or, as Wilkes explains, '[i]t will be characteristic of Such is Life as a whole to ponder the causes of things, to seek to fix responsibility, and to contemplate the administration of human affairs' (1985:3). In his biography of Furphy, Barnes notes that '[t]he “crawling Conservative” of the selection days had had plenty of time in the Riverina to think about the social system and how it operated' (1990:145). In a letter to A. G. Stephens, Furphy writes, '[f]or one thing, I was widely known as a crawling Conservative, till I met the Lord in the way to Damascus, and the usages of Riverina rasped the scales from my eyes' (Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:84-85). But Such is Life also presents readers with an image of how the individual makes him or herself meaningful. More to the point, it is my contention that Furphy thought about the creative operation of identity and its orientations from the personal to the social and the national.

In terms of a national image and nineteenth-century Australianism, deprivation of a type gives the community a true sense of the value of a type, and its absence makes the members of a community work towards its presence. MacKenzie's notion that Collins is 'a phantom identity' and 'a trickster' (1993:540) seems to me to be unsound. Nor do I agree with his main premise that Furphy is simply concerned 'with imposture' (MacKenzie, 1993:535). According to Kiernan, '[i]n judging Tom we become aware of the nature of interpersonal relationships: the way we react to others, how much we realize about them and the web of life in which we are enmeshed at any one time' (1971b:145). In light of my previous discussion on art and value, as well as chapter one's discussion of the Riverina in 1880s, we can see why Furphy depicted the Riverina as a geography of players. And, in the sense that 'identity in Australia is fundamentally controversial as a result of an old/ new double bind' (MacKenzie, 1993:534), the first of Collins' “roles” to which readers are introduced in this geography of players is the role of the social architect.
Unemployed at last!

Scientifically, such a contingency can never have befallen of itself. According to one theory of the Universe, the momentum of Original Impress has been tending toward this far-off, divine event ever since a scrap of fire-mist flew from the solar centre to form our planet. Not this event alone, of course; but every occurrence, past and present, from the fall of captured Troy to the fall of a captured insect. According to another theory, *I hold an independent diploma as one of the architects of our Social System*, with a commission to use my own judgment, and take my own risks, *like any other unit of humanity*. This theory, *unlike the first*, entails frequent hitches and cross-purposes; and to some malign operation of these *I should owe* my present holiday (*Sil*, 1. My italics).

In the postscript of a letter to A.G. Stephens, Furphy states that '[i]f the first 3 pars. of S. is L. compel the reader to *think*, their purpose is duly served' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:85). While I will discuss the important distinction between free will and determinism in a moment, I would like to consider now the relevancy of this opening paragraph to role playing, for the close of *Such is Life* asks readers to reconsider philosophically not just what they have read, but also to reconsider the themes and philosophical tone of the novel's opening paragraph. In a rather obtuse manner, Furphy wants his readers to synthesize the novel's opening emphasis on fact with the novel's closing comments on fiction, since both the beginning and the end of *Such is Life* rightly foreground that identity has facts and fictions. In other words, identity is "truth embellished". In this sense, readers should see that within the "truth embellished" narratives of identity, there is a core role in the variety of roles. Collins is not, as Croft argues, 'a man with no centre of identity' (1996:218).

For Collins, this core role is the role of the social architect, allowing him to orient and articulate his responses to the drama of the Riverina just as an actor orients and articulates his or her role.
to respond to the specifics of a drama. And, in order to comprehend further the centrality of the social architect's "role", it is important to understand that Collins, a 'native' Australian born in 1849 (in Croft, 1991:86, 306), is one of the new "Currency lads". As Hughes (1987:354-355) and Ramson (1993:171) point out, Currency was a popular emancipist term used to describe the native born children, including those of convict parents, in whom the future of the Australian nation rested. One could say that the word and concept of "currency", as a sign handed down from one generation to the next, socially determines "the generational renewal", as White (1981:77, 87) suggested, whereby the 1880s and 1890s radical nationalists sought to define an Australian culture.

But one should not underestimate the fact that each radical nationalist saw him or herself as holding 'an independent diploma', commissioned 'to use [their] own judgment, and take [their] own risks, like any other unit of humanity' (SL, 1). In this sense, the "truth embellished" narratives of identity, orchestrating numerous facts and fictions within an identity, foreground the freedom of individual will and creativity in the drama of cultural definition or redefinition. As Croft observes, 'unemployment in those famous opening paragraphs of the novel is treated not as a personal or social disaster, but as a creative opportunity' (1996:214). But I do not agree with Croft's strange conclusion that '[f]or Tom Collins to be "unemployed at last" is to be away from a treadmill of lies and duplicities, to be free from responsibility, and to have enough time to write up the truth about work: that work has little to do with success, and has no bearing on our mana or our destiny' (1996:227).

Nor do I agree with a similar view held by Barnes, who argues that

[u]nlike Furphy, Collins has no family responsibilities and has no awareness of having made an irrevocable choice as far as his own life and happiness are concerned. He is not seen in the roles of son (except for a minor reminiscence), husband or father. His job is so minimal in its demands as to hardly impinge upon his consciousness. He is a free spirit as far as social and emotional ties are concerned, and despite
the strength of his religious and political convictions, he is not a participant in the conflicts that are portrayed in the novel (though his sympathies are with the bullockies) (1990:222).

Collins may not have family responsibilities, but he is not a flippant character. Although Collins may not get directly involved in the minor conflicts portrayed in the novel, he is involved in the much greater conflict concerning the ethics of artistic representation and misrepresentation of an Australian experience and value. Through Tom Collins, Furphy appears to lay great stress not only on the work involved in uplifting and upbuilding, but also on the intimate relations between the images of identity, or the roles played, and an individual's creative choices and consequences in the historical order of things, hence the theory of the controlling alternatives stressing informed choice _vis-à-vis_ ignorant rivalry and division. I think this is important, for the original typescript of the novel began much differently. Gilding (1971:viii, 1967:96) states that the opening paragraphs to the typescript of _Such is Life_ contained no mention of a man's holding an independent diploma, nor did it refer to social architecture. Furthermore, Gilding (1967:95-96) points out that the theory of the controlling alternatives is not present in the surviving pages of the typescript. Indeed, the original opening paragraph reads as follows:

Unemployed at last.

Either the tendency of events during the last few days, weeks, months, years, centuries, (for we can't mark an arbitrary point on the line anywhere,) has been working toward this end, or my indomitable old Adversary has suddenly called to mind Dr.Watt's friendly hint respecting the easy enlistment of idle hands (in Barnes, 1990:400; in Gilding, 1971:viii, 1967:96).

In this earlier version of the opening paragraph, there is less emphasis on human agency and a greater appeal to chance. Barnes suggests that during his rewrite of the typescript, Furphy 'reflected 130.
upon and drew out of the narrative the philosophical implications' (1990:243). According to Gilding, '[i]n the published version the possible categories in which one may think about life have been extended to include the possibility of independent choice and action' (1967:106). Croft may argue that the typescript 'was far more concerned with the notions of art, artifice, realism, and romance' (1991:61), but it can be said that the published version treats these same themes with more maturity, sophistication and purpose. In a letter to A.G. Stephens, Furphy wrote, '[a]s we agreed, contraction proper is impossible; the operation must be performed as if you would cut an ocean liner in two, then take a portion out of the centre, and deftly stick the ends together, making a tight, seaworthy brig' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:62).

Without concerning ourselves too much with the exact nature of the changes that Furphy made to his seaworthy brig, it is clear that *Such is Life* became a much more complicated but focused narrative philosophically. Along with the initial emphasis on art and life, Furphy introduced the theory of the controlling alternatives and the issue of social architecture, or uplifting and upbuilding. Perhaps the most lucid example of this in light of role play and the currency status, thereby emphasizing the powerful nature of the "truth embellished" identity, is the following excerpt:

I thereupon resolved myself into a committee of inquiry, and, applying the analytical system befitting these introspective investigations, discovered, in the first place, furtively underlying my philosophy, a latent ambition to be regarded as a final authority on things in general. Hitherto, this aspiration had fallen short, partly owing to the clinging sediment of my congenital ignorance, *but more especially because I lacked, and knew I lacked, what is known as a 'presence'.* Now, however, the high, drab belltopper and long alpaca coat, happily seconded by large, round glasses and a vast and scholarly pipe, seemed to get over the latter and greater difficulty....There was something in presenting an academic-cum-capitalistic
appearance even to the sordid sheep...and to the frivolous galahs....But outside all possible research or divination lay the occult reason why my bosom's lord sat so lightly on his throne (*Sil*, 278. My italics).

In light of the prevailing ignorance, rivalry and division within the novel's many episodes, it is rather interesting that, towards the close of *Such is Life*, Collins presents an articulated identity to his readers that embodies many of his hitherto argued values. Indeed, I think it is important to note that this passage is the first of its kind in the novel where Collins willingly gives a physical description of himself to his readers. Prior to his stressing the need for a "presence", Collins had mainly shared with his readers a volley of knowledge, allowing readers to construct creatively a physical identity to match the intellectual identity to which they had been exposed. One could say that, while Collins' roleplaying had previously been open-ended, suitting many an occasion in terms of resourcefulness, it now manifests a much more stable image. Rather than being out of character, readers can see the artistic spirit of Collins made flesh, and can see the orientation and articulation, the content of an identity taking on form. And so far as Furphy's authorial designs are concerned, the values of his hero, which I discussed towards the close of the last section, are rendered visible, qualifying the power of the image-maker in social architecture.

Although humorous, the main reason for Collins' description of himself in the above manner is to reify the qualities of authority. As Jack the Shellback states, 'you'll do a bit o' killin' at the station, in that rig-out' (*Sil*, 272). Upon approaching Runnymede station, Collins' appearance has the desired effect. Jack Frost, or Young Jack, the station's chief horse breaker, proclaims his surprise: 'Well, I be dash! Didn't know you from a crow! Reckoned some member o' Parliament, or bishop, or somebody, had bin swappin' horses with you. You are comin' out!' (*Sil*, 282). Likewise, Toby, the station's rouse about, is equally surprised: 'Gosh, I didn't know you till I seen you side-on, when you was shuttin' the Red Gate....I thought you was comin' to buy the station' (*Sil*, 283). And Moriarty, the station's storekeeper, 'respectfully rose to his feet': 'Well, I'll be dashed!...You
are coming out in blossom. Now you only want the upper half of your head shaved, and you could start a Loan and Discount bank, with a capital of half a million' (Sil, 284).

Within the context of etymology, Barnes states that 'socially [the] Tom Collins [of folklore] represented the lowest level' (1990:201). Indeed, the Collins of the novel is also from ‘the Lower Orders' (Sil, 34). But, as I have already argued, one ought not to confuse the two. The Tom Collins of the novel moves progressively upward, and his value, with regard to uplifting and upbuilding, becomes increasingly more apparent as his role-playing takes on physically identifiable proportions. I would agree with Croft's notion that readers ought to see 'Tom Collins as a gentleman' (1991:88), but not in the aristocratic sense of landed gentry or social status. I think Collins is a gentleman in the modern sense of the word, namely a compliment that one is decent, honourable or kind. This is firmly in keeping with Collins' references to social architecture, uplifting and upbuilding, ignorance-shifting and reason, the controlling alternatives and his role as 'a Government official of the ninth class' (Sil, 4) or a public servant. If one recalls Collins' self-professed 'academic-cum-capitalistic appearance' (Sil, 278), then it is possible to suggest that Collins' final and most appropriate image in the novel is in the mould of an Emersonian "American Scholar": resourceful, creative, native born, self-reliant, an authority on the new world experience and scholarly.

Henricksen may point out that 'Furphy's recurrent motif is 'that man himself is never an integrated whole, that he is a different person to every other that he meets' (1985:166-167). But I think this is a hasty mistake, for a man could not play different roles to every other that he meets if he did not have a sense of his own role playing capacity within an integrated, though "truth embellished", whole. In this sense, I disagree with Hartley's notion that 'Tom's own refusal to adopt a definitive narratological voice can thus be seen not as an abuse but a renunciation of authorial privilege or author-ity' (1986:168). While 'the name "Tom Collins" marks the place of what is indeed an absence', I do not think Hartley is justified in claiming that it is 'an absence which refuses to endorse or prescribe in advance a hierarchy of interpretative or moral response' (1986:169). Collins does not redistribute 'the hermeneutic power of attorney

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amongst his readership' (Hartley, 1986:169) to such a degree that it compromises his own capacity for authority in the image-making process.

Any theoretical approach toward the concept of absence in the novels must consider the concept as ethically meaning a lack of community and unity of purpose in the daily plebiscite of individuals, images and image-making vis-à-vis nation and federation. Readers should not evaluate the novels ahistorically. I think Collins, as well as Furphy, appeal somewhat to Emerson's notion that people must self-reliantly 'affront and reprimand the smooth mediocrity and squalid contentment of the times, and hurl in the face of custom and trade and office, the fact which is the upshot of all history, that there is a great responsible Thinker and Actor working wherever a man works; that a true man belongs to no other time or place, but is the centre of things' ([1841] 1985:185). As Emerson states, '[e]very true man is a cause, a country, and an age....Let a man then know his worth, and keep things under his feet' ([1841] 1985:185-186). One could say that Collins' drive towards authority in role-playing and image-making is a self-reliant determination to counteract the tremendous 'leakage of Energy in this world of ours' (RR, 49).

I think Emerson's concept of self-reliance sums up Furphy's emphasis on the ethical need for role-playing and social architecture rather nicely, for he states that

[1]If any man consider the present aspects of what is called by distinction society, he will see the need of these ethics. The sinew and heart of man seem to be drawn out, and we are become timorous, desponding whimperers. We are afraid of truth, afraid of fortune, afraid of death, and afraid of each other. Our age yields no great and perfect persons. We want men and women who shall renovate life and our social state, but we see that most natures are insolvent, cannot satisfy their own wants, have an ambition out of all proportion to their practical force and do lean and beg day and night continually. Our housekeeping is mendicant, our arts, our occupations, our marriages,
our religion we have not chosen, but society has chosen for us. We are parlor soldiers. We shun the rugged battle of fate, where strength is born ([1841] 1985:194).

This leads us to clarify what Furphy had in mind within the context of ethics. Although it is true that 'man's relationships to the universe and his fellow men are the real concern of Such is Life' should we agree with Kiernan that 'the novel offers us Tom Collins' comic response to life rather than Furphy's "philosophy"'? (1971b:147-148). More to the point, do Furphy's novels expose the reader to a specific guide for ethical action and, if so, what is it? Furthermore, does the ethical dimension in Furphy's novels enhance the interpretation of the novels, supplying a key to unlocking the complexities of their meaning and so enriching our understanding and appreciation of their thematic treatment of "life"? In his view that art can enrich human understanding, the philosopher Gordon Graham states that

\[t\]hough there are evident differences between art on the one hand and science or history on the other, the former, no less than the latter, can be seen to contribute significantly to human understanding. In appreciating how it does this, it is essential to see that works of art do not expound theories or consist in summaries of facts. They take the form of imaginative creations which can be brought to everyday experience as a way of ordering and illuminating it (1997:62).

While I do not disagree with Graham's view for a vast majority of art, it is rather interesting to note that, as well as being imaginative creations, Furphy's novels are one of the few exceptions where art does consist in a summary of facts and the expounding of a theory. I have in mind, of course, the theory of the controlling alternatives (Sil, 68-71). The theory has been problematic to criticism on Furphy for a variety of reasons, with the most notable

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problem being the credulity of its exponent, Tom Collins\(^3\). Indeed, G.A. Wilkes thinks that the theory of the controlling alternatives 'is clearly another of the theories in the mind of Collins that ridicules itself as the action unfolds' (1969:41). And yet, in a much earlier essay, Wilkes rightly points out that 'Such is Life is memorable' because it is 'an exploration of the abiding problems of destiny and free will, moral responsibility, and the operation of chance in the universal scheme -problems which have engaged writers...of all periods, and which are still in no imminent danger of solution' (1962:39).

According to Osland, 'Tom's theory of the controlling alternatives is less a solution...to the enigma of life than a demonstration of man's desire that there should be a solution -that life should be governed by laws, that man's actions should have some shape, that his suffering should be to some purpose' (1985:240). While it is not untrue that the theory may demonstrate man's desire for purpose within the context of human suffering, as many theories are apt to do, it seems strange to suggest that the theory is less a solution to the enigma of life. I think it is important to distinguish between the meaning of "life" within the contexts of both nature and society. Even if the natural processes of life were enigmatic or if life was just simply chaotic, it does not follow that the social "life" of human actions does not have shape nor demonstrate some capacity for purpose. The theory of the controlling alternatives has little to do with "life" in the natural order of things. It is not a scientific theory of natural laws or a metaphysical attempt to solve the enigma of life. Nor is it one of Collins' intellectual whims. Instead, the theory should be properly seen as providing an ethical solution to the mismatched actions of human affairs within the human order of things, namely society or community.

Influenced by the pipe, 'an ally of established efficiency in ethical emergencies' (SL, 85), Collins had stated that 'there is nothing Utopian...in the sunshiny Sermon on the Mount', for '[i]t is no fanciful conception of an intangible order of things, but a practical, workable code of daily life...delivered...by One who knew exactly the potentialities and aspirations of man' (SL, 89). Collins

\(^3\)The issue of Collins’ status as unreliable narrator will be discussed at greater length in the next section.
indicates that the uplifting and upbuilding of an individual and his or her natural rights is equally and automatically an uplifting and upbuilding of civil rights, as suggested by the Sermon. Although there is a divine note to Collins' conclusion because he refers to the "One", I think it is much better, ethically speaking, to take Collins' message wholly within the context of utilitarianism, for 'no better name has been found [for this "One"] than the Will of God' (Sil, 90). As Collins states, '[c]ollective humanity holds the key to that Kingdom of God on earth, which clear-sighted prophets of all ages have pictured in colours that never fade' (Sil, 95. My italics).

For this reason, '[t]he kingdom of God is within us; our all-embracing duty is to give it form and effect, a local habitation and a name' (Sil, 95. My italics). In this sense, '[e]ach undertaking, great or small, of our lives has one controlling alternative, and no more' (Sil, 69. My italics). and '[e]ach alternative brings into immediate play a flash of Free-will, pure and simple, which instantly gives place -as far as that particular section of life is concerned- to the dominion of what we call Destiny' (Sil, 69. My italics). Again, '[w]hether there's a Divinity that afterwards shapes them, is a question each inquirer may decide for himself' (Sil, 70. My italics). But, as Collins warns, 'if we decline a brotherhood of mutual blessing and honour, we alternatively accept one of mutual injury and ignominy' (Sil, 95).

Collins' warning is clearly a warning that emphasizes the importance of choice and consequences, hence the validity of the theory of the controlling alternatives as an ethic of utility to each undertaking in life, both in the personal sense and the communal sense of rights. It is in this way that readers ought to take the meaning of Collins' claim that '[a] Divine Idea points the way, clearly apparent to any vision not warped by interest or prejudice, nor darkened by ignorance: but the work is man's alone, and its period rests with man' (Sil, 95. My italics). As Collins states, '[i]nstead of remaining a self-sufficient lord of creation, whose house is thatched when his hat is on, you have become one of a Committee of ways and means -a committee of two, with power to add to your number' (Sil, 71). Furphy seems to suggest that a community with a balanced view of common and individual purpose is the surest way of nullifying 'history' as 'a mere record of blundering option, followed by iron
servitude to the irremediable suffering thereby entailed' (*SiL*, 71)*.  

In this sense, I find Brady's comments contradictory, for she argues that 'Tom's convoluted meditations on the question of predestination leave us with a sense of determinism tempered only by a vague hope that decent people making sensible choices can make some changes' (1981:51-52). While I do not disagree with this, Brady concludes with the notion that, '[d]espite the optimistic words he allows Tom about the future of Australia, Furphy offers no way to that future' (1981:61). It appears that any theory or scrap of knowledge articulated by Collins is unreliable because Collins is taken to be unreliable, even if it does offer promise for the future. When this is the case, Furphy's views are left to dangle precariously in an intellectual limbo simply because of the supposed unreliability of a hero and his theories. Perhaps much of Brady's misreadings of Furphy occur because she stresses the divinity of an ethic, ideologically clashing with Furphy's stress on the need for utility, hence her conclusion that 'Such is Life represents the failure of the secular Gospel' (1981:67).

This leads us to consider another prominent interpretation of the controlling alternatives. Croft states that 'the theory of the controlling alternatives is...the main [insight] we have into Tom's belief system' (1996:223). But, unlike Brady, Croft also states that the theory is part of Furphy's belief system, for 'Furphy could not break from the deterministic model of man and nature...of European thought at the time' (1989:13). However, Croft's explanation of the theory as a gateway to Collins' and Furphy's belief systems is not the problem, whereas his view on determinism is. According to Croft, 'Tom attempts to define by literary allusion,...parable, and allegory his notion that there is a teleological imperative, a determinism or destiny, within which are made the aggregate of human choices' (1996:223). Indeed, in his major study on Furphy, Croft's (1991) views on the theory and its determinist emphasis underpins his views in his last essay on Furphy's novels.

*Despite Furphy's utilitarian focus on ethics, it is interesting to note the Kantian flavour of this quotation and of Furphy's ethical view generally. Like Kant, Furphy appears to stress that one ought not to treat human beings as a means to one's own ends, but to treat human beings as ends in a system of ends. Perhaps Furphy's "Kantian" ethic was his chosen response to the flippant status quo of the federation debate. As Collins states, 'men thinking and acting in mass, do not...follow the line of least resistance' (*SiL*, 71). It seems that the line of least resistance was, for Furphy, a common-sense approach to unity or the unification of the colonies.*
Likewise, Hartley states that 'in the confrontation between chance and design, design emerges as a clear winner' (1986:156). Hartley does concede that the novel allows for 'a small air-pocket of free-will', but this free-will should be seen as 'a departure, or freedom, from the appearance of autonomy' because free-will calls 'into question [the] decentralization of voice' (1986:168). Again, Hartley reads Furphy post-structurally, claiming that hero and text generate 'an absence which refuses to endorse or prescribe in advance a hierarchy of interpretative or moral response' (1986:169). I do not think that this kind of reading is at all justified in light of the preceding discussion. Furthermore, neither Hartley nor Croft takes note of the stress on free will, or choice, in the first premise of the theory of the controlling alternatives: '[e]ach undertaking, great or small, of our lives has one controlling alternative, and no more' (Sil, 69. My italics). One cannot undertake something unless one is able to exercise one's will or choice.

Although Collins employs the analogy of the locomotive, which suggests that he is from the determinist school of thought, readers ought to see the analogy as an equally steady treatment of free-will or choice. According to Collins, '[t]he misty expanse of Futurity is radiated with divergent lines of rigid steel; and along one of these lines, with diminishing carbon and sighing exhaust, you travel at schedule speed' (Sil, 70). And, '[a]t each junction, you switch left or right, and you go still, up or down the way of your own choosing. But there is no stopping or turning back...except by voluntary catastrophe' (Sil, 70). Again, '[a]nother junction flashes into sight, and again your choice is made; negligently enough, perhaps, but still with a view to what you consider the greatest good, present or prospective' (Sil, 70). In an excellent discussion of nineteenth-century realism and the determinist case, Larkin (1977:176) discusses the trolley-bus school of thought and their stressing the mean between determinism and free-will through the analogy of the trolley-bus: a vehicle which not only depended on its environment but also had considerable room for movement. Although Furphy does not use the trolley-bus, he nevertheless emphasizes the same principle of moderation by showing that the rigidity of life's "tracks" is tempered by the "junctions" of choice.

Douglas observes that '[t]he two poles of Collins' vision of life
are a sense of the arbitrariness of destiny and a compulsive desire to find in the workings of fate a retributive pattern' (1964:80). But I think the theory shows Furphy emphasizing not the desire to find a retributive pattern in the workings of fate or destiny. On the contrary, I think the theory emphasizes the desire to find a retributive pattern in the workings of choice by stressing the existence of consequences, for a consideration of the consequences of one's choice is equally a consideration of that which determines one's choice. In short, exercising one's choice is essentially a process of selection, which I will discuss later when I address the concept of authorship and creativity in Furphy's novels. For now, it can be said that being able to foresee the consequences of a bad choice is evidence of one's 'flash of Free-will' (Sil, 69), since one could then freely exercise one's will to avoid those consequences, or 'what we call Destiny' (Sil, 69) by making another choice, and so opting for another set of consequences. As Partington notes, 'it proves possible to change track, although not to undo all the consequences of earlier wrong choices' (1993:97).

In this sense, the importance of ignorance-shifting is apparent once more, for Furphy appears to place a heavy emphasis on both the recognition of one's "flash of Free-will" and the consequences that it will entail. We must not forget that Collins does not owe his 'present holiday' to 'the momentum of Original Impress', but to his holding 'an independent diploma as one of the architects of our Social System, with a commission to use [his] own judgment, and take [his] own risks, like any other unit of humanity' (Sil, 1). Wilkes states that '[t]he novel from this standpoint may be seen as an exploration of Destiny and Free-will' (1985:24). But, should readers take seriously Croft's notion that Furphy cannot escape the 'deterministic paradigm' (1989:13) of nineteenth-century intellectualism? I think a question such as this touches the very heart of the problem, for artistic creativity and its themes cannot easily be explained by an exclusive appeal to determinism or free-will. Any conclusions based on such an exclusive appeal would suffer from false alternatives.

It is true that Furphy cannot entirely rise above the century in which he lived and wrote, but this is not a strong enough reason to conclude that Furphy is wholly determined by the period into which he was born. Despite 'the momentum of Original Impress' (Sil, 1),
the intellectual dimension of Furphy's novels step beyond the rigidly deterministic paradigm in a variety of ways. I think the most likely historical contender for the explanation of the theory of the controlling alternatives is not a nineteenth-century intellectualism but the stoicism of Antiquity, especially Aurelius' *Meditations* and Epictetus' *Enchiridion*. As Russell states, '[t]he main doctrines to which the [stoic] school remained constant throughout are concerned with cosmic determinism and human freedom' ([1946] 1991: 261). It is, of course, impossible for me to deal with either of these two thinkers in great detail, but I think a sensitive overview of their ideas on determinism and free-will shall do much to clarify Furphy's and Collins' theory.

In his introduction to Epictetus' *Enchiridion*, Mann (1990:323-324) explains that, in their concept of the ruling principle and the virtuous life, the four main consequences of the stoic doctrine are:

(i) rational man is part of the naturally rational universe, not separate from it;

(ii) rational man is subject to the same prescriptive laws that underpin the naturally rational universe;

(iii) man ought to live in accordance with nature, thus reason ought to dominate man's emotions and actions;

(iv) man's existence as the manifestation of a naturally rational universe meant that man is strictly determined by the universe.

This is the view that one finds in Aurelius' *Meditations*, who states that the 'Universal Nature's impulse was to create an orderly world. It follows, then, that everything now happening must follow a logical sequence; if it were not so, the prime purpose towards which the impulses of the World-Reason are directed would be an irrational one' (bk 7, 75). It is for this reason that man must aspire to 'the just

5 According to Barnes (1990:179-182), Furphy gave copies of Aurelius and Epictetus to Kate Baker after an incident in which Leonie, Furphy's wife, due to a "love" letter written by Kate Baker while she suffered from fever, suspected that Furphy and Kate were having an affair. Indeed, she made her suspicions known to many members of the Furphy family. Furphy obviously considered these texts seriously enough, perhaps hoping that Kate would find the stoic code to life equally invaluable in difficult situations.
thought, the unselfish act, the tongue that utters no falsehood, the temper that greets each passing event as something predestined, expected, and emanating from the One source and origin' (bk 4, 33). These two meditations are some of the many examples in which Aurelius describes the necessity of a rationally providential universe of natural laws, or an "order of things", whereby man may achieve 'freedom, self-respect, unselfishness, and obedience to the will of God' (bk 7, 67). According to Ruf, '[t]he stoics turned to rationally necessary, universal laws of nature in order to free individual persons from social oppression, but these same natural laws prescribe that everything which happens in the world to such individuals happens by rational necessity' (1987:56). In this sense, '[w]e are only free to accept what happens or to make ourselves miserable by cursing that over which we have no control' (Ruf, 1987:56).

Aurelius' concept of free-will is not very clear because he does not devote much time to it. What one finds instead is a concept of free-will subordinated to a clearly thought-out doctrine of determinism, for 'you cannot lay down rules until you have learnt to obey them' (bk 11, 29). Aurelius may state that he remains his 'own master, and none shall hinder me from doing what I choose', but his choice is already determined, for he 'is to live the life that nature enjoins for a reasonable member of a social community' (bk 5, 29). Quoting Epictetus, Aurelius may believe that '[t]he robber of your free-will...does not exist' (bk 11, 36), but his concept of free-will never strays beyond its ordained place in a rationally providential order of things. As Aurelius points out,

[all is well with a tool, instrument, or utensil when it serves the use for which it is made, though in this case its maker is not present. But with things formed by Nature, the power that fashions them is still within them, and remains in them. All the more, then, should you have it in reverence, and be assured that if only you live and act accordingly to its will, you have all things to your liking. That is the way in which the universe, too, has all things to its liking (bk 6, 40).

And yet, 'one thing alone troubles me: the fear that I may do
something which man's constitution disallows, or would wish to be
done in some other way, or forbids till a future day' (Aurelius, bk 7,
20). Despite the belief that man is the naturally rational
manifestation of a naturally rational providence in nature, which
ought to make living the virtuous life simple and clear, there is a
hint of doubt, perhaps explaining why the concept of free-will needs
to be subordinate to a belief in determinism. This would also explain
the rather curious statement that '[t]he art of living is more like
wrestling than dancing, in as much as it, too, demands a firm and
watchful stance against any unexpected onset' (Aurelius, bk 7, 61).
But, then, there is always the equally problematic and contradictory
meditation that '[a]ll of us are working together for the same
end....To one man fall this share of the task, to another that; indeed,
no small part is performed by that very malcontent who does all he
can to hinder and undo the course of events. The universe has need
even of such as he. It remains for you, then, to consider with whom
you will range yourself (bk 6, 42).

The problem with Aurelius' views on determinism and free-will,
common to most stoic doctrines, is best put forward by Russell, who
states that

There are obvious difficulties about this doctrine. If virtue is really the sole good, a beneficent Providence
must be solely concerned to cause virtue, yet the laws
of Nature have produced an abundance of sinners. If
virtue is the sole good, there can be no reason against
cruelty and injustice, since, as the Stoics are never
tired of pointing out, cruelty and injustice afford the
sufferer the best opportunities for the exercise of
virtue. If the world is completely deterministic, natural
laws will decide whether I shall be virtuous or not. If I
am wicked, Nature compels me to be wicked, and the
freedom which virtue is supposed to give is not

I think Furphy borrowed much from Aurelius, especially in
terms of a code of behaviour, the stress on community service and
the stress on the importance of reason, but I do not think that he
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places the same emphasis on a naturally rational order of things nor on its underlying providence. Again, in the words of Tom Collins, "[a] Divine Idea points the way, clearly apparent to any vision not warped by interest or prejudice, nor darkened by ignorance; but the work is man's alone, and its period rests with man" (SiL, 95). While Aurellius explores the spiritually intimate relationship between man, virtue and the rational universe, Furphy's "stoic" doctrine is rationally pragmatic, stressing the need for a utilitarian concept of virtue. As the novels show, I do not think Furphy believed that "[w]hat does not corrupt a man himself cannot corrupt his life, nor do him any damage either outwardly or inwardly" (Aurellius, bk 4, 8). I think Furphy rejected the traditional cosmology of determinism and providence, still common in the nineteenth century.

But he recognized also that one cannot wholly abandon the concept of determinism, particularly the idea that one is shaped by external factors. Perhaps Furphy's interest in the socialist ideas of his time is based on a reworking of those views, since nineteenth-century socialism had a tendency to over-emphasize determinism, as is the case with Jefferson Rigby. There is, however, another possibility, which leads me to consider Epictetus' *Encheiridion*. According to Mann, 'the Stoics' insistence on the law-governed nature of the universe committed them to determinism' and, '[a]s their critics were quick to point out, this seemed to clash with their belief that humans are free, responsible agents' (1990:324). Within this context, 'Epictetus' *Encheiridion*, or "Handbook",...besides giving a moving account of the Stoic view of life, attempts to resolve the contradiction between human freedom and determinism' (Mann, 1990:324). Although Epictetus' handbook is not without its problems, it does offer a much more consistent and pragmatic reconciliation between determinism and free-will: a reconciliation which I think underpins Furphy's utilitarian theory of the controlling alternatives.

According to Epictetus,

\[\text{s}ome \text{ things are up to us and some are not up to us. Our opinions are up to us, and our impulses, desires, aversions -in short, whatever is our own doing. Our bodies are not up to us, nor are our possessions, our} \]

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reputations, or our public offices, or, that is, whatever is not our own doing. The things that are up to us are by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded; the things that are not up to us are weak, enslaved, hindered, not our own....From the start, then, work on saying to each harsh appearance [phantasia], "You are an appearance, and not at all the thing that has the appearance." Then examine it and assess it by these yardsticks that you have, and first and foremost by whether it concerns the things that are up to us or the things that are not up to us. and if it is about one of the things that is not up to us, be ready to say, "You are nothing in relation to me" (1990:325).

Essentially, Epictetus stresses the importance of analysing and judging what appears before one's eyes, for one ought not to judge a book by its cover nor allow oneself to be swayed by the appearance of something. As Epictetus states, 'try not to be carried away by appearances, since if you once gain time and delay you will control yourself more easily' (1990:329). In other words, the emphasis is not so much on maintaining an air of indifference to all things because of their appearances, but to shift one's ignorance towards the thing's appearance in order to analyse the thing as rationally and objectively as possible, evaluating whether or not the thing concerns one's sense of self. It is, in my opinion, a common-sense approach to the ethics of responding to life and maintaining one's fortitude. As Epictetus states, 'if you think that things naturally enslaved are free or that things not your own are your own, you will be thwarted, miserable, and upset, and will blame both gods and men' (1990:325).

Although open to interpretation, it appears that what is "naturally enslaved" is determined and thus serves a purpose or exists in a manner that is beyond one's control. Any attempt to exercise control will lead to frustration and despair, suggesting that one has ignorantly and wastefully exercised one's will. It is in this sense that one should, '[a]t each thing that happens to you, remember to turn to yourself and ask what capacity you have for dealing with it' because 'if you become used to this, you will not be carried away by appearances' (Epictetus, 1990:327). To all intents
and purposes, Epictetus' road to freedom is principally defined by 'despising what is not up to us' (1990:329). This concept of despising what is not up to us is the most problematic aspect of an otherwise utilitarian view of virtue, free-will and determinism. Perhaps these problems arise chiefly through the stoic doctrine that 'nothing bad by nature happens in the world' (1990:331). Or the equally problematic notion that 'whoever wants to be free' should 'not want or avoid anything that is up to others. Otherwise he will necessarily be a slave' (1990:328).

Nevertheless, the notion that free-will and determinism are defined by these concepts of "what is up to you" and "what is not" is important to Furphy's theory of the controlling alternatives, its notion of choice and consequence, and the uplifting and upbuilding of nation and identity. Furphy's reasons for including the theory in the rewritten version of *Such is Life* has much to do with the basic precepts of stoicism on the idea of judgment, indicating that Furphy appeared to hold "attitudes" and "opinions" responsible for the needless ignorance, rivalry and division of nineteenth-century Australia. According to Epictetus, '[w]hat upsets people is not things themselves but their judgments about things....So when we are thwarted or upset or distressed, let us never blame someone else but rather ourselves, that is, our own judgments' (1990:326). Indeed, what is your own is '[y]our way of dealing with appearances' and 'whenever you are in accord with nature in your way of dealing with appearances...then you are joyful about a good of your own' (Epictetus, 1990:326).

In an example of "what is up to you" and "what is not", Epictetus states that '[i]llness interferes with the body, not with one's faculty of choice, unless that faculty of choice wishes it to' (1990:327). One could apply this example of determinism and free-will to one's attitude towards the Australian experience, saying that the appearance of the Australian environment is not up to one, whereas one's attitudes towards one's experiences within that environment are. But I do not think Furphy would have agreed with the notion that by asking what is up to and what is not, 'at each thing that happens to you...you will find that it interferes with something else, not you' (Epictetus, 1990:327). I think Furphy considered this to be as erroneous to ethics as Aurelius' notion that

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'What does not corrupt a man himself cannot corrupt his life, nor do him any damage either outwardly or inwardly' (bk 4, 8). As Furphy's depiction of the 1880s indicates, division, opportunism and rivalry may not corrupt a person, since a person can maintain his or her moral stature, as is the case with Stewart of Kooltoopa (Sil, 164-167), but they do affect his or her life both outwardly and inwardly.

Nor do I think that Furphy would agree entirely with Epictetus' notion that one must 'not seek to have events happen as you want them to, but instead want them to happen as they do happen, and your life will go well' (1990:327). In one sense, this is true, for one could argue that one's wants and attitudes should be in accord with the manner in which the Australian experience occurs as an event and not with Anglo-Australian values. But there is also a sense in which Epictetus' notion is untrue, for there is a need to distinguish between naturally determined events and the events which occur through human choices and consequences. For example, if rivalry, ignorance and division are seen as events that happen as they are meant to happen, then one must not interfere. But one could just as easily say that rivalry, ignorance and division are appearances which are up to human beings and their attitudes, and thus are consequences of their attitudes and choices. In this sense, one must interfere, for these events are not naturally determined.

Despite the problems with Encheiridion, I think its basic precepts of "what is up to you" and "what is not" relate well to Furphy's concerns and the theory of the controlling alternatives. As Epictetus points out,

\[\text{It shows lack of natural talent to spend time on what concerns the body, as in exercising a great deal, eating a great deal, drinking a great deal, moving one's bowels or copulating a great deal. Instead, you must do these things in passing, but turn your whole attention toward your faculty of judgment (1990:337).}\]

According to McLaren, 'Furphy's concern is...with how...we can ever produce a society in which justice will triumph over greed and ignorance' (1989:57). In this sense, I must disagree with Wallace-Crabbe, who states that 'Such is Life offers stoic humour as the only
response to an unpredictable fate and the terrible arbitrariness of personal decisions' (1962:145). In light of the previous investigation, I do not think that Furphy saw fate as being wholly unpredictable nor human choice to be always terribly arbitrary in a negative way. Nor do I agree with Turner's notion that the theory shows that '[t]he individual is powerless to determine his own destiny' (1954:173). Although the novels indicate that individuals cannot be in total command of their destinies, they do point out that, whatever the future may be, individuals exercise a great influence on that future. One could say, however, that the individual is powerless if he or she turns his or her attention away from their faculty of judgment, thus leading to ignorant choices and their consequences.

In this sense, I agree with Gilding's notion 'that Tom Collins...derives, at least partly, from the social frustration of the nineties and that the philosophy of the controlling alternative may be related to an easing of social and personal frustration' (1967:106). Barnes is right in noting that 'Collins' theory of the "controlling alternative" is an attempt at a positive statement about life in which free-will and determinism are reconciled in a theory of choice' (1976:167). Indeed, the theory points out that free-will and determinism should be seen as a matter of choice and consequence, not the straightforward cause and effect of popular opinion. Although Collins speaks of 'Cause (which is human Free-will) and Effect (which is Destiny)' (SIL, 70), it can be said that the popular notions of cause and effect tend to focus on determinism in an absolute sense, leading to a misunderstanding of the ethical dimension of the theory of the controlling alternatives.

As Barnes explains, '[l]ife is full of moments of choice, and we do not know when we are faced with the decisive choice; having chosen, we cannot avoid the consequences which a "major alternative" entails' (1971:130-131. My italics). One could say, therefore, that Such is Life attempts to educate its readers with the view that the uplifting and upbuilding of the nation is not only something which is up to us, but something that is a "major alternative", a choice with a series of consequences requiring one's faculty of judgment. In this sense, I think the novels foreground the recurring problem in nineteenth-century Australia: '[e]ach of us supported his argument with a wealth of illustrations and thus
fortified his own stubborn opinions to his own perfect satisfaction' (Sil, 48). Furthermore, the novels thematically incorporate the importance of self-reliance into this view, for it pushes the notion that neither uplifting nor upbuilding will be successful if individuals continue to be 'parlor soldiers' and 'shun the rugged battle of fate, where strength is born (Emerson, [1841] 1985:194).

According to Wilkes, 'Collins may entertain the theory of the "controlling alternative", but that is no reason to make it the master theme of Such is Life. In Rigby's Romance...it is not mentioned, and it does not figure in The Buln-Buln and the Brolga or in Furphy's letters' (1985:25). What I am suggesting is that readers need to understand Furphy's novels as philosophical narratives which do not continually promote the theory of the controlling alternatives overtly inasmuch as their episodes are textual structures built on the theory. In this sense, I do not agree with the view held by Wilkes (1985:47) that the key to the novels does not lie in the theory of the controlling alternatives nor in any other unifying hypothesis. Again, readers need to bear in mind Furphy's emphasis on observant reading, for any readers hoping to find direct references to the theory will be disappointed on numerous occasions and be led to the natural conclusion that the theory is not crucial to an understanding of the novels.

The function of the observant reader in this case is to understand the theory and constantly comprehend the operation of its principles in the novels' human order of things. In this sense, I disagree with Barnes' notion that the theory is 'intended to explain events; it does not relate character and circumstance....[for] there is no central theme of human behaviour' (1971:131. My italics). Nor do I agree with Partington's notion that '[n]ot all the examples [in the novels] provide support for the controlling alternatives thesis' (1993:97). According to Hamer, '[t]here are certain values that Such is Life does consistently affirm' (1964:147). And, as Gilding points out, '[i]n terms of the action, there is a related attempt to construct a theory of the sequence of events...Thus the theory, as an

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Perhaps this is why the phrase, "such is life," depending on the outcome of a choice, will be either intoned with a sense of victory, as Hartley argues (1986:167), or failure, as pointed out by G. W. Turner (1971:vi). To agree with Osland (1985:232), the phrase generally tends to function as an assertion of Tom's record being true to Riverina life and that his responses to life are tempered by the precepts of stoicism.
interpretation of human action, is a simplification of Collins' reflections' (1967:189). In short, the stress on choice and consequence is a major alternative not just in the alleviation of human ignorance, divisions and rivalries, but also in the actions that are the natural consequences of specifically articulated identities, of determined yet self-reliant roles played out in the Riverina's geography of players. As Epictetus points out,

[remember that you are a actor in a play, which is as the playwright wants it to be: short if he wants it short, long if he wants it long. If he wants you to play a beggar, play even this part skilfully, or a cripple, or a public official, or a private citizen. What is yours is to play the assigned part well. But to choose it belongs to someone else (1990:329).

Epictetus' advice to his stoic disciples could equally be seen as Furphy's advice to the currency lads and lasses of nineteenth-century Australia, particularly when it comes to exercising one's creativity freely and responsibly to flesh out a cultural alternative to Anglo-Australianism and its deterministic views of the convict taint. Within this context of currency, roleplay, rights, ignorance-shifting, judgment and the theory of the controlling alternatives, I shall leave the concluding words to Bhaskar, who states that,

[in so far as an agent is interested in preserving or extending or deepening or gaining some freedom, this will always involve trying to understand, in the sense of explaining, the character of some social or socially conditioned or affectable entity, structure or thing -in order to maintain (reproduce) or change (reform) or otherwise dissolve or defuse, or to stimulate or release it. To become or remain 'free', in the simple sense of being 'unconstrained', always potentially involves both a theory of those constraints and, in so far as the freedom is feasible, a practice of liberation or liberty preservation. One may be free or desire freedom, in this sense, from any kind of thing (1991:75).

150.
2.3. On Seeing Tom Collins as Implied Author and Hero.

If we recall the postscript of the letter to Stephens mentioned earlier, Furphy had stated that '[i]f the first 3 pars. of S. is L. compel the reader to think, their purpose is duly served' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:85). I have already argued that what readers ought to think about are the following issues in relation to the theory of the controlling alternatives: role-play, social architecture, ethics, free-will, determinism, knowledge and ignorance, rights, and choices and consequences. Indeed, I stressed that readers ought to consider the theory of the controlling alternatives as a key to understanding Furphy's novels in light of their thematic preoccupation with the concept of uplifting and upbuilding Australia. However, I think the theory of the controlling alternatives has a much broader scope in the novels than just a utilitarian solution to economic or political problems in the human order of things.

One can see that it is equally applicable to the concept of creativity, for the manner in which one chooses to represent a nation, or the way in which one chooses to express a newly-emerging cultural experience, depends on choices and consequences. I have already alluded to this somewhat in chapter one when I argued that Furphy considered the 1890s legend to be an ignorant celebration of an ignorance that perpetuated rivalry and division. It is important to bear in mind the success or failure of aesthetic well-being, for the manner in which an artist or artistic group exercises creative choice, appealing to popular sentiment in an over hasty fashion, influences the conventions of a particular cultural experience. In short, the way in which the bohemian artists saw "Australia" influenced the way in which Australia came to be seen by the popular majority both nationally and internationally. According to Furphy, this did little to inspire confidence in "Australia" and its "Australians".

Perhaps this is what Furphy meant when he wrote to Cecil Winter that '[t]here is much in your suggestion respecting the causes of pessimism in the Out-back man (who is the real Australian); but, as you say, Ignorance is at the root of it' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124. My italics). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the heavy preoccupation with artistic creativity and representation indicates that Furphy considered such creativity and representation 151.
to be *major alternatives*, not to be taken lightly, in the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia. If artists are seen as sowers, then Furphy saw the vast majority as sowing the wrong seeds on the fields of an Australian cultural imagination. If this is the case, then it is interesting to look at Furphy’s preoccupation with creativity and artistic representation within the context of authorship and the theory of the controlling alternatives. Indeed, a general glance at the structure of *Such is Life* reveals that the so-called random selection of events is, in fact, a highly crafted work which stresses the power of choices and consequences in ways of seeing and the production of meaning.

Just as Barnes (1990:243) emphasized Furphy’s drawing out the philosophical implications during the rewrite, Partington points out that ‘[i]t was during the rewriting that Furphy seems to have clarified in his own mind and then realized in the new text a richer and deeper conception of relationships between illusion and reality in literature and life’ (1993:17). But I disagree with Partington’s (1993:17) strange notion that the greater emphasis on choice and consequence through the controlling alternatives decreased the preoccupation with fact and fiction. Croft is incorrect to claim that the 1898 typescript of *Such is Life* ‘was far more concerned with the notions of art, artifice, realism, and romance’ (1991:61). I think readers will agree that the focus on art and life, fact and fiction, or illusion and reality have become much more sophisticated and much more central with the published *Such is Life* and the two later novels.

When Hope stated that *Such is Life* ‘is a novel based on a theory of the novel’, he is astutely correct, for ‘the structure is determined rigorously by Furphy’s philosophy of life’ (1971:109). But I disagree with key elements of his explanation of the theory. According to Hope,

> [e]ach of [Furphy’s] characters, at any particular moment, makes an act of free-will, for the moment presents him with two and only two alternatives of action. Once made, the course of action is determined by the force of a net of circumstances, geographical,

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7 For example, in several letters, to which I will refer in the next chapter when I investigate Furphy’s and Collins’ version of an Australian national type, Furphy considered Lawson’s later works to be indicative of an unnecessarily self-indulgent pessimism and, presumably, ignorance.
physical, biological, social and psychological, so complex that the individual has no chance of comprehending it and no power to alter it; his choice is always a blind choice and the pattern of his own life is like that of a ship sailing into an unknown port without a chart. The most trifling decision may lead to the most unforeseeable results as did Collins' decision to smoke while he crossed the river (1971:110).

Hope is right to draw our attention to the complex net of consequences that bind an individual to his or her choice. But I disagree with his reading blind choice into the theory of the controlling alternatives. While it may be true that many choices are rashly made, leading perhaps to an unforeseeable and incomprehensible number of consequences, it is not true to claim that Furphy saw choice as sailing a ship to an unknown port without a chart. Choice is not always blind choice. To read this into the theory of the controlling alternatives is a grave error, for it ignores the strong emphasis on reason and ignorance-shifting in Furphy's work. Hope is right to claim that Furphy 'is putting forward an entirely new theory of the relation of literature to life' as well as 'announcing a revolution in the nature of prose fiction' (1971:111). But he does not see that the theory concerns itself with the ethics of artistic creativity and representation. If one can say that the uplifting and upbuilding of the nation is a major alternative, subject to the conditions of the theory of the controlling alternatives, then one can lay the same stress on the concept of authorship.

In a letter to Cecil Winter, Furphy states that 'all creative Art— as distinguished from imitative— is in the nature of a confession. Man, in this vocation, is a god, a creator, and cannot create but in his own image' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:137). In short, an artist can create works of art based on his or her own ignorance, thus confessing ignorance, as is the case with Anglo-Australian art. But an artist also has the potential to create artistic representations within the context of wisdom, hence the stress on ignorance-shifting, for this can be seen as a commitment to the research and expression of experiential values, leading to a proper consideration of art and well-being in the community. If we recall Collins' preoccupation with
the creation of a "presence" in order to reify an authority, we can see that the image Collins reifies is dramatically opposed to the common production of cultural images, customs and traditions which constitute that which is now known as the Australian legend. Instead of a celebration of ignorance, or anti-intellectualism and anti-authoritarianism, Collins' new type of man is basically an extension, albeit a retranslated one, of current Western values for the sake of well-being.

In this sense, Furphy's view on art's purpose is no different from similar views of the time. Emerson states that '[t]he poet is the sayer, the namer, and represents beauty. He is sovereign and stands on the centre....Therefore the poet is not any permissive potentate, but is emperor in his own right' ([1844] 1985:262). Furthermore, '[t]he signs and credentials of the poet are that he announces that which no man foretold. He is the true and only doctor; he knows and tells; he is the only teller of news, for he was present and privy to the appearance which he describes. He is a beholder of ideas and an utterer of the necessary and the causal' ([1844] 1985:263). In much the same vein, Whitman states that '[o]f all mankind the great poet is the equable man....Nothing out of its place is good and nothing in its place is bad. He bestows on every object or quality its fit proportions neither more nor less. He is the arbiter of the diverse and he is the key. He is the equalizer of his age and land...he supplies what wants supplying and checks what wants checking' ([1855] 1994:486-487). In short, '[i]f [the poet] breathes into any thing that was before thought small it dilates with the grandeur and life of the universe. He is a seer...he is individual...he is complete in himself...the others are as good as he, only he sees it and they do not' (Whitman, [1855] 1994:488). Or, as Furphy stated, the creative capacity in man, rather than the imitative, makes him a god. One wonders if Furphy, as well as Emerson or Whitman, was acquainted with Sidney's *A Defence of Poetry*. According to Sidney, '[t]here is no art [or discipline] delivered to mankind that hath not the works of nature for his principal object, without which they could not consist, and on which they so depend, as they become actors and players, as it were, of what nature

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8 In *Rigby's Romance*, Collins refers to 'any poem of Walt Whitman's' as part of his canonic 'ten masterpieces of poetry' (53) by which one can attain a thorough education, even going so far as to say that Whitman's poetry is 'an acquired taste' (240).
will have set forth' ([1595] 1966:23). However, 'only the poet, disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigour of his own invention, doth grow in effect another nature, in making things either better than nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature' (Sidney [1595] 1966:23).

Simply put, the poet, or any artist for that matter, has an aptitude or a privileged talent and a freedom of creativity to match because he knows and sees what the common person does not. Equally, the poet or artist can create the vision splendid, for 'nature never set forth the earth in so rich a tapestry as divers poets have done' (Sidney [1595] 1966:24). It is for this reason that the poet or artist must equally comply with an ethics of representation, for 'the poet is representative', standing 'among partial men for the complete man' and apprising 'us not of his wealth, but of the common wealth' (Emerson, [1844] 1985:260-261). Given our theoretical climate on art, we tend to think that such a view on the freedom of creativity is extreme, especially within the context of authorship. Instead, we tend to focus on the complex web of social, cultural and historical processes that make a work of art the product of a time rather than the expression of an elevated state of awareness or divine genius, namely the author. Our modern view is, and will perhaps always be, best expressed by Roland Barthes:

Barthes places heavy emphasis on the grooves of culture (Kress, 155).
According to Barthes, 'we know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth', for 'the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the author' (1977:148). Barthes' view is simply a strategy for reading, for it does not prove that the concept of authorship is dead. Indeed, Barthes' reader is a sociological ideal rather than a sociological fact, being the product of a countermovement that is as extreme as the view it challenges. In short, Barthes pits a version of social determinism against the more traditional view of an unbridled freedom of creativity. But the social determinist view does not have the capacity to explain adequately the concept of artistic creativity and its relationship to individual free-will. Of the four views on creative free-will already discussed, it is only Sidney who suggests that the poet is not tied to an object or set of conventions, for he is 'lifted up with the vigour of his own invention', thus 'making things either better than nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature' (Sidney [1595] 1966:23).

Neither Emerson, Furphy nor Whitman suggests that the poet is free to create what he or she desires without any recourse to society or culture. In each of these three artists, the origin of the work is as important as its destination. In Furphy's views, an artist may be a god by his or her creative capacity, but even the creative power of a god is tied to the well-being of his or her community in a deeply responsible way. In this sense, the notions of authorship and creativity must strike a balance between freedom of invention and social determinism: a balance which Furphy achieves by the introduction of the theory of the controlling alternatives to Such is Life. Again, I do not think that Furphy aligned himself artistically to a common currency on art on the basis of cultural insecurity. Rather, I think Furphy saw a truth and value in this currency which needed to be promoted in the Australian literary scene, hence his discussion of authorship with Cecil Winter, who wrote under the nom de plume of "Riverina". In the spirit of A.G. Stephens, 'the branch should be shown growing upon the Tree, not severed from it' ([1901] 1973:vi).

According to Heseltine, 'Such is Life is nothing less than an attempt to use the resources of the self as the means of celebrating a nation as yet unstoried, artless, unenhanced' (1986:8. My italics).
One should not forget Furphy's emphasis on the "truth embellished" nature of artistic creativity. But, if we consider Barnes' (1981:xxi-xxii) notion that Collins' chameleon-like role-playing only generates the illusion of control, then one could also argue that Collins' identity, or Collins' many colours, is the effect of an eclectic pastiche, rather than a creation in one's own image. In short, Collins could be seen as nothing more than an identity that is shaped by the grooves or conventions of society and culture, revealing that the resources of the self are actually the resources of culture and society. One can also take note of both Barnes' (1990:57-62, 81, 96) and Franklin's (1944:10-22) biographical information on Furphy's stylistic flair for literary parody and say that Furphy's 'literary' identity and his sense of "self" are marked by the self-same processes.

This, then, leads us to consider an important problem: how can one create an original or distinct image in one's own image when one's identity is based on parody or imitation? In other words, how can one create in one's own image when one's identity is permeated through and through by otherness? Is identity or selfhood an act of creative or imitative art? In short, can someone, whether a literary figure or not, create from one's own image when that image is determined and directed by the grooves of society and culture? This has particularly severe implications for nation and national identity, for it follows that the pursuit of the self-image called Australian national identity cannot occur independently from that "otherness" which determines and directs it, namely the British Empire. Thus, Furphy's notion of creating in one's own image is an artistic fallacy, for one's creativity and one's image are determined and directed by an otherness which makes imitation supreme. Barnes' notion of the illusory nature of control is, in this sense, quite valid.

But to take such a hard view is to miss the point, for Furphy's meaning of creative art is fleshed out by the concept of the confession. Again, according to Furphy, "all creative Art -as distinguished from imitative- is in the nature of a confession. Man, in this vocation, is a god, a creator, and cannot create but in his own image" (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:137). Indeed, observant readers of the novels will agree that Furphy does not write nor create his "art" in a vacuum. Nor does he undertake his artistic endeavours in ignorance of the greater cosmopolis, for Furphy brings a wealth of 157.
experience and understanding to his work, which possibly accounts for the mature style of his narratives. There is a rather interesting truth in Furphy's predicing the confession to creative art that does indeed make art potentially creative rather than imitative. How is this so? Graham states that 'any depiction of nature that tries just to copy must fail, partly because every "copy" must involve seeing selectively, and partly because the work must reflect the representational resources available to the [artist]' (1997:89. My italics).

Indeed, Graham (1997:88-92) discusses the difference between representation in art and representationalism, the latter being concerned with seeing the mimetic value of art in terms of its ability to create a direct copy of reality. According to Graham, 'thinking about mimesis must eventually lead us to reject representationalism' as 'naive' (1997:89), for such a view rejects any work of art that does not offer a direct copy of reality. Representation in art and creativity means evaluating a work of art for the things it directs the viewer or reader to see and understand, especially that which is often overlooked in the day-to-day world. Furphy's style is one of creative representation, rather than a purely imitative representationalism. Furphy recreates or imitates the conventions or grooves of "reality" only insofar that he can direct the reader to think further about his or her reality. In this sense, it should be noted that Furphy's mimetic style, rather than copying reality or imitating a set of ready-made conventions, such as Anglo-Australian romance, employs specific resources of self, society and culture in order to create a sense of self, society and culture within the context of aesthetic well-being.

In this manner, Furphy foregrounds the fact that art and "life" are a process of selective seeing, of exercising control and using the confessional and representational resources of the self as a point of origin in order to control and direct a reader's attention to the purpose of a text and its destination. This is most important to bear in mind, for it is the key to gauging the value of Tom Collins and his artistic designs. As G.W. Turner explains, 'to be a chronicler [like Collins] is to be objective, a "camera"...Even a camera, however, focuses on particular details and points in chosen directions' (1990:41). Although Anderson speaks of communities, it can just as easily be said that the creative freedom of identities, both personally

158.
and nationally, ‘are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined’ (1991:6). According to Smolicz, identity, whether personal or national, ‘can only be understood by reference to individuals involved in cultural renewal, interaction and further development’ (1991:51). This is similar to White’s (1981:77, 87) concept of “generational renewal” discussed earlier. Furthermore,

(it is initiated through individual members who construct their personal cultural systems by re-interpreting and modifying the heritage(s) that have been transmitted to them by the home, school and other social agencies. This modification may be the result of members' own scientific and/or artistic creativity, as well as cultural inputs from outside sources, including the heritages of ethnic groups other than their own (Smolcz, 1991:51).

Or, as the philosopher Ernst Cassirer concludes in An Essay on Man,

(man cannot find himself, he cannot become aware of his individuality, save through the medium of social life. But to him this medium signifies more than an external determining force. Man, like animals, submits to the rules of society but, in addition, he has an active share in bringing about, and an active power to change, the forms of social life (1944:223).

This brings us back to a consideration of the concepts of free-will and determinism, or choices and consequences, within the context of creativity and authorship. In short, the theory of the controlling alternatives, besides being an ethical guide for conduct in daily affairs, stresses that authorship and creativity are equally a major alternative, especially if an author is concerned with the uplifting and upbuilding of cultural identity, or a nation and a community. Indeed, the emphasis on choices and consequences lends itself quite readily to the concept of seeing selectively, for the manner
in which an author chooses to represent the self, society and culture in art can influence the way in which readers think about the value of their identities and the way in which they can continue the process of cultural creativity. What the theory of the controlling alternatives brings to the concepts of authorship and creativity is, therefore, the concept of selection.

According to Furphy's views, the "truth embellished" narrative of personal and national identity must, at the point of origin, give due consideration to what one ought to represent in terms of the narrative's destination. In other words, one ought not to leave 'untold the lies that [one] ought to have told' in order to tell 'the lies [one] ought not to have told' (Sil, 272). Without mentioning the theory of the controlling alternatives, Partington explains that

Furphy wished to establish that no narration is simply a statement of unambiguous facts, since some selection must take place...and that there must therefore be some criteria of significance or interest at work to guide, explicitly or implicitly, that selection (1993:248-249. My italics).

Speaking of his narrative strategy in Rigby's Romance, Collins states that '[i]n recounting the event here, I am merely adjusting, not jumbling, the order of things -transposing and grouping my occurrences, after the manner of some more famous, if less faithful, historians' (216). According to Lever, '[Furphy's] ethic of equality cannot rest with a conventional realist novel of ordered narrative and stable character. So Such is Life adopts realist techniques at the same time that it questions their validity' (1996-97:158). Lever's observations are good, but it must be said that Furphy questions the validity of certain realist techniques only insofar as he questions their validity of representation. All narratives employ some realist techniques in order to communicate a message or value. Without a dose of realism, no narrative could reconcile its messages or values with the world of readers, which is its origin and destination.

Philosophically, Furphy understood that '[i]t is in literature -
poems, plays, novels—that our self-images are fashioned with the greatest complexity and where exploration of the constitutive images of moral and social life is most obvious. This is one of literature's peculiar powers and gives it, in this respect, pre-eminence among the arts' (Graham, 1997:129). It is an understanding that can be equally applied to Collins. Given that Furphy gave much consideration to the link between the controlling alternatives and authorship, as well as Tom Collins' concerns with uplifting and upbuilding Australia through a novel based on selected observations from pocket diaries, it is important to note that Collins is meant to be seen not simply as a product of Furphy's authoring, but should be seen distinctly as an author himself.

To make this more clear, we must turn to Wayne Booth's *Rhetoric of Fiction*, since it is his distinction between implied author and unreliable narrator that implicitly underpins past critical discussion of Furphy and Collins' relationship. According to Booth, "[o]ur sense of the implied author includes not only the extractable meanings but also the moral and emotional content of each bit of action and suffering of all of the characters" (1983:73). Furthermore, "[i]t includes...the intuitive apprehension of a completed artistic whole; the chief value to which this implied author is committed, regardless of what party his creator belongs to in real life, is that which is expressed by the total form" (Booth, 1983:73-74). In accordance with Booth's distinctions, Furphy has traditionally been identified as both the real and implied author, while Collins has been identified as an unreliable narrator.

Although Furphy is the real author of the novels, he is not the implied author. As I will show in a moment, critical opinion in the past has not adequately made this distinction, and has lead to inaccurate judgments about Tom Collins. In short, Collins is "[t]he "implied author" because he 'chooses, consciously or unconsciously, what we read; we infer him as an ideal, literary, created version of the real man; he is the sum of his own choices' (Booth, 1983:74-75. My italics). This is particularly so if we conceive of authorship as a skill, craft or work, as a process or labour of selection, of creativity and representation with choices and consequences. As Raphael states, 'the free creativity of an artist...is clearly a process of causation, of making, and it does not cease to be a process of causation when we
think of it as a series of free choices' (1994:110). Likewise, the process of free creativity or free choice does not cease to be free simply because it can be seen as a series of causations. Consider the following confession of our implied author, Tom Collins:

[t]he reader, however unruly under weaker management, is by this time made aware of a power, beyond his own likes and dislikes, controlling the selection and treatment of these informal annals. That power, in the nature of things, resides napoleonically with myself, and has, I trust, been exercised toward the information and edification of the few who fall under its jurisdiction -suggesting, as it does, Tom Hood’s idea of perfect rule: An angel from heaven, and a despotism (SiL, 263).

Speaking of the multiple levels of theory in Such is Life, both Brian Kiernan (1971b:135) and G.A. Wilkes (1985:39) argue that Furphy controls the theorising process and, in this manner, invites readers to respond to Collins at every stage of the narrative, thus making the novel a collaborative effort. This is undoubtedly true, for Furphy is the real author. But, because Collins is the implied author, one must be aware of the textual fact that it is Collins who invites us to respond to "Collins", since the reader’s very first acquaintance with him, in the opening paragraphs of Such is Life, is primarily an acquaintance between reader and implied author, not reader and hero. As Kiernan notes, 'behind the rambling, punning, self-mocking, self-condoning train of thought which renders [Collins'] responses is Furphy’s “placing” Collins’ idealization of himself (1964:138). This is Furphy’s artistic game, for he had wanted to see ‘Tom Collins severely slated for his pedantry, literary arrogance, and general offensiveness’ (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:139). But there is a strategy to this game which does not simply involve categorizing Collins as unreliable. In a letter to Kate Baker, Furphy states that

I have arranged with Grant Hervey to write a scorching criticism of S. is L., as soon as the book is out, 162.
accusing T. Collins of copying Miss Franklin... whereupon I shall retort, with some rancour. In the end, it will be demonstrated that the testimony of two men is true, and that the pseudo-Australian authors, whom you have been taking as your guides, don't know as much about the country as they pretend (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:100).

The structure of Such is Life is such that readers are meant to take Collins as the implied author who knows much about the country and has a vision for her future. This is particularly so if one considers the opening commentary to each chapter in Such is Life, as well as the proem to Rigby’s Romance, for it is there that Collins alludes to the ethically creative relationship between individual choice and consequence, and the process of selection that occurs with artistic representation or misrepresentation. But, once the initial opening paragraphs to Such is Life come to their conclusion, the relationship between reader and implied author shifts to reader and hero, and Collins becomes the central character in the narrative world of the Riverina. In short, one could say that each chapter in Such is Life has two beginnings. The first beginning presents Collins in the creative capacity and skill of the implied author, controlling the uplifting and upbuilding process. The second beginning, which fleshes out the world of the Riverina on carefully selected dates, depicts Collins as a hero who is, like any other hero, subject to the consequences of rivalry and division, the consequences of creative choice, as well as the consequences of particularly damaging versions of an Australian cultural identity.

Besides the importance of an historically social and cultural background to the novel, Such is Life demonstrates that readers are not absolutely free to interpret what they like, for they are under an implied authorial jurisdiction, or a monopoly of selected choices and consequences. This implied authorial jurisdiction does not lie with Furphy, but with Collins. As the real author, Furphy is a very clever

\[10\] In The Buln-Buln and the Brolga, Collins claims that he has ‘no desire to make myself the hero of my own story’ (14). This is true. Yet it can be said that this is but one of many examples of an authorial speech act whereby Collins practises the skill of authorship to make readers focus on Fred Falkland-Pritchard, Barefooted Bob and Lillian Falkland Pritchard as heroes. Furphy’s last novel deals with Collins’ authorial strategies in a much more subtly sophisticated manner.
strategist. In this sense, the view that Collins should be seen as an implied author challenges the traditional view that Collins is an unreliable narrator, since, according to Booth (1983:159), a narrator can only be unreliable if he or she is consistently inconsistent with the values or norms of the implied author and the text. Upon close examination of the central concern of the novels, namely the ideas of uplifting and upbuilding Australia, it can be said that the actions of Collins, as hero, are in no way inconsistent with the values and norms espoused by Collins, the implied author. Collins may lie from time to time and deceive other characters through role-playing, or he may not make clear connections between characters and events, but it is my contention that Collins' untraditional characterisation is not inconsistent with the value he places on observant reading as an implied author.

Booth (1983:159) points out that deception or lying do not necessarily indicate unreliability. Indeed, Booth argues that '[a] great work establishes the "sincerity" of its implied author, regardless of how grossly the man who created that author may belie in his other forms of conduct the values embodied in his work' (1983:75). Since Collins is both implied author and hero, it is simply illogical to maintain the view that his narrating is unreliable. It is better to say that Collins is not reliable in the traditionally expected sense, and that readers need to take his advice to read observantly in the same way that one needs to observe "life" observantly. In light of this, it is time to sample some of the critical views on Collins as an unreliable narrator. Clancy, in his book, *A Reader's Guide to Australian Fiction*, states that

> the narrator Tom Collins...undertakes to select entries from his diary and lay them before the reader. Only after a while does the 'observant reader' realize *what Collins himself* early admits -that the selection of entries is highly purposeful and that an *ironic gulf* has developed between Collins the narrator and Furphy the author (1992:34. My italics).

Firstly, Clancy makes the mistake of ignoring Collins' status as implied author by attributing authorship to Furphy. Secondly, if
one pays close attention to Clancy's words, then one begins to realize that what he states is contradictory. If Collins, as a narrator, has the power to craft a narrative selectively from his diaries, then Collins is an implied author, not simply a narrator. To say that 'Collins either fails to see [the significance of the carefully planted narratives] altogether, or sees it only partially' (1992:34) seems to me to be illogical. Because the diaries can be seen as notebooks from which Collins creates the novelistic narrative, readers assume that Collins possesses 'the more sterling, if less ornamental qualities of the chronicler' *Sil, 1*. Yet, as the opening commentary to each chapter in *Such is Life* indicates, this assumption is quickly overturned, for Collins purposefully brings to the skill or craft of chronicling the skill or craft of authorship. Collins may warn readers 'against any expectation of plot or dénouement', thereby securing them 'against disappointment' (*Sil, 52*). But it is interesting to note Collins' claim that 'sometimes an under-current of plot, running parallel with the main action, emerges from its murky depths, and causes a transient eddy in the interminable stream of events' (*Sil, 199*).

This indicates that Collins possesses an implied author's knowledge of the existence of a plot. Indeed, the fact that Collins admits to several acts of censorship in the presentation of his diaries ought to make the reader doubly aware that Collins is an implied author, just as he is the hero of the novels. Rather than observing a manufactured distance between Collins and Furphy, readers should equally be aware of a manufactured distance between Collins as an implied author and Collins as hero. In this sense, Croft's notion that '[T]om denies any plot in his rigorously empirical and aleatory record' yet 'unconsciously presents the alert reader with the plot' (1986:158) seems to me to be untenable. It might be better to say that by claiming there is no emphasis on plot, and then pointing out that one emerges, Collins consciously desires to make readers observe and think about what they are reading. Collins is quick to counteract the potential view that his narratives are purely ornamental or escapist, as with Anglo-Australian romance, requiring little or no thought, or that his narratives are not directly concerned with social architecture, or the uplifting and upbuilding of a nation and its identity.

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These are all big issues for a character who is generally considered to be unreliable. As I will discuss shortly, Collins' implied authorship is an integral part of the strategic game Furphy is playing. Nevertheless, the view that Collins is an unreliable narrator has persisted without adequate rational ground. Despite the fact that G.W. Turner discussed Collins' chronicling within the context of photography and selection, he states that '[w]e are in the hands of an "unreliable narrator"', for '[w]e must accept the factual part of the narrative, but the writer's analysis of the facts and theorizing about them must be suspect' (1990:50). To be suspicious of Collins' theoretical analysis of the accepted facts is a matter of analytical disagreement, not unreliability. Another odd evaluation is Douglas' notion that 'Collins the narrator...tries to come to grips with what has happened to him, and Furphy the author, who knows more than Collins ever can, works very subtly' to show that 'Collins gropes through the blind alleys and deceptive ways of life' in an attempt to master '[t]he overall vision of Furphy's' (1978:22).

In a somewhat similar fashion, Zeller writes that Furphy 'set up an implied author with whom the appreciative reader can collaborate in creating meaning about life in the Riverina (and life generally)' (1988:44). But Collins is still 'a notoriously unreliable narrator' and 'the business of storytelling should serve as a warning to the reader of Such is Life not to approach the book as dogmatically as Collins approaches most subjects' (Zeller,1988:48). Indeed, '[w]e (the expert Australian readers whom Furphy has created) sit outside Collins' Riverina world and understand things better than he does', and yet 'it is the job of the yarnr to do more than just entertain; he must also enlighten' (Zeller, 1988:48). Zeller's yarnr is presumably not Collins, but Furphy, despite the fact that he claims Collins to be the novel's implied author. Furthermore, it is also strange that he does not see that Collins sits outside the world of the Riverina by virtue of his being the implied author, or that Collins, as hero, acts in accordance with the values and norms of the novels. As Booth had stated, 'I have called a narrator reliable when he speaks for or acts in accordance with the values and norms of the work (which is to say, the implied author's norms)' (1983:158).

Equally bizarre is Oliver's notion that 'Furphy uses Collins much as Conrad uses Marlowe, not only to gather the facts but also
to guarantee them' (1944:17). It is bizarre because Oliver claims that 'Furphy needs to establish the character of Collins very carefully, since his narrator is not only to interpret the enclosed story for us; he is also to misinterpret it' (1944:16-17. My italics). Barnes makes much the same claim, for he states that 'Furphy intends that the reader should discover the inadequacies of the nominal narrator as an interpreter of the circumstances he records' (1976:153). In Barnes' view, '[w]hen Collins is “afflicted” [by the roles he plays or a labyrinth of thought]...he ceases to be a reliable narrator, and the observant reader must become his own interpreter' (1976:159). What both Barnes and Oliver seem to miss is the fact that Collins is as much an implied author of the circumstances he records as he is the hero. In this sense, if the reader must rely on his own interpretative capacities, then he must also rely on Collins for direction.

According to Gilding, 'Tom Collins is Furphy's key method of giving unity to the “yarns”' (1967:85). Interestingly enough, Gilding (1967:152) is quite prepared to claim that Collins is the controlling consciousness of The Buln-Buln and the Brolga, but not Such is Life. And yet Gilding maintains the standard view that 'Collins is a “mere annalist” who is temporarily incapable of recording his fact objectively', for 'he is deceived in his cherished belief that he is always objective' (1967:26). Indeed, 'Tom is a philosopher who never arrives at the right conclusion and whose complicated reasonings are, for the most part, merely manifestations of vanity' (Gilding, 1967:84). On a similar note, Devlin-Glass states that 'Tom is an unreliable philosopher, although a stimulating and comic one; he is dramatically conceived as a clownish figure and continually satirised by Furphy' (1974:84. My italics). Furthermore, '[Tom's] weakness as a thinker is his tendency to reach firm conclusions on the scantiest of evidence', even though '[t]here is often a modicum of good sense and justice in what Tom proposes' (1974:84).

Croft thinks that '[t]he reasons for Tom's blindness are his intellectual rigidity and his reluctance to change a hypothesis to fit the facts' (1991:87). Thus, '[w]hen the reader has a clear idea of just who and what Tom Collins is, she is then in a position to sift the clues from certain “extracts from the diary of Tom Collins” and to rearrange them into the novel created by Joseph Furphy' (Croft, 1991:87). Croft's proposal is both pointless and strange, since the
reader is already presented with a novel created by Joseph Furphy. Equally, Partington states that 'Collins sometimes sees more than those around him, but on other occasions he sees less... Clues rain thick and fast [and] Tom possesses none of the three attributes of intuition, veracity and memory to which he lays claim and he constantly displays the very failures in understanding he castigates in others' (1993:61). However, on the preceding page, Partington claims that 'Collins himself seems to have adequate credentials in both spheres of 'practical knowledge based on direct experience and theoretical knowledge based on vicarious experience' (1993:60). Which is it to be?

More confusing, however, is Henricksen's (1985:43) view that Furphy's novels do not have heroes nor villains; rather they have anti-heroes. Henricksen's view is taken directly from Kiernan, who argues that 'Collins is the anti-hero as author, and his role as the anti-hero could be defined as his consciousness of his failure to live up to what he imagines the expectations of the reader of fiction to be' (1971a:6). In other words, Collins is an author who knows that he is unreliable because he cannot write for the masses, nor can he gauge his market. This is despite the fact that Collins does not want to write 'in the painfully simple manner so often affected in literature attended for the "masses'" (BBB, 88). As Collins states, 'I have one style of narrative - take it or leave it' (RR, 249). Nevertheless, the commonly accepted view seems to be that Collins is unreliable, and readers must follow the clues given by Furphy, the implied author, in order to see the truth of Collins' errors.

But, critics who maintain that Furphy is the implied author oversimplify their appreciation of the novels, and err in their evaluation of Collins. Indeed, it is important to understand Collins' following confession, from Rigby's Romance, about his narrative strategies, for this best explains what occurs in Such is Life and The Buln-Buln and the Brolga:

[i]n recounting the event here, I am merely adjusting, not jumbling, the order of things - transposing and grouping my occurrences, after the manner of some more famous, if less faithful, historians (RR, 216).

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Within the context of Collins' confession, one is reminded of Manning Clark's concept of the historian:

[e]very historian, like every writer, must accept his fate as a Merlin, a man in whom there is both an innocent child and a devil, a creator and a destroyer. Such a man has no difficulty in accepting the etymology of the word 'historian'. The histor was the wise man who told a story about the past, vouched for the accuracy of the events he described, and used those events to communicate to his readers or his listeners his vision of life. The histor must be able to entertain his readers or audience -that is, hold them. He must have something to tell them about their world -that is to say, he is the true psychedelic or mind expander. He shows them clearly something of which they had been but vaguely and dimly aware. The histor must choose a subject which touches men deeply, write about things that matter....Above all, history must be told in the same way as all great stories have been told.....That is to say, the writer must do three things: create a time, place, and people....Happily, for the historian there is a source of inspiration. There is Clio, the muse of history....Now the word Clio comes from a Greek verb which means to celebrate. I mention this to remind you that every historian must preserve a balance, a harmony between his duty as an artist to celebrate life as it is, and a duty as a moralist to show how the world can be improved (1980:32-33).

Clark's "historian" brings much scope to Collins' confession that his authoring and chronicling represents 'Tom Hood's idea of perfect rule', namely '[a]n angel from heaven, and a despotism' (StL, 263). Equally, it does much justice to a proper appreciation of Furphy's claim that Collins is concerned with the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia. Despite his predominantly post-structural reading of the novel, and his not classifying Collins as an implied author, I must agree with Hartley's notion that

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If we accept that Collins is responsible for every word of *Such is Life*, and within the framework that the novel constructs itself we have no other choice, as far as I can see, then we must recognise that Collins himself—as is certainly apparent in many sections, if not all—is a very erudite and capable character, with a penchant for irony, a finely-honed perceptual capacity that can hunt out the mystery behind the horse-and-saddle incident, and a highly sophisticated sense of play (1986:166-167).

In Hartley’s words, Collins is ‘one of the most complex and finely-wrought characters in Australian literature’ and to maintain that he is an unreliable narrator ‘is a reduction of Furphy’s full artistic achievement’ (1986:166). This artistic achievement is the very fact that ‘Collins...acts as a double to Furphy as author’ (Indyk, 1986:307). As Arthur states, ‘the reader is presented with a pseudo-autobiographical chronotope....Its time is, or purports to be, the time of the writing of the novel; its place, the place of writing’ (1987:55). Indeed, Arthur notes that ‘there are two poised pens and two autobiographical chronotopes, that of the original diarist and that of the later chronicler/editor who selected from the diaries’ (1987:54. My italics). But in each chronotope exists the skill or craft of an implied author who not only selects from life anecdotes for his diaries, but also selects from those diaries specific anecdotes for works of fiction with a purpose.

What, then, are we to make of the critical opinion that Collins’ ego perverts any sense of objective reliability? Devlin-Glass states that ‘Tom’s ability to interpret personalities is extremely defective because his own ego interferes, protesting its own ever-imposing needs’ (1974:78). Similarly, Osland claims that ‘[a] philosopher can only be as good as the faithfulness of his observation of the facts of life, and Tom’s observation of life, and hence his observations on life, are distorted by the reflection of his own ego....The ego that distorts Tom’s observations also leaves its mark on his philosophy’ (1985:233). Perhaps this is what G. W. Turner meant when he stated that ‘[t]hough a misguided philosopher [such as Collins] represents only a particular philosophy, his exposure is apt to implicate
philosophy in general' (1990:50). One can say this about any philosopher, scholar or artist who exerts some influence on their respective disciplines, whether they turn out to be misguided or not.

Mitchell is closer to the truth: '[e]very man, using whatever powers of perception and reasoning he possesses, tries to find a hypothesis which will explain his own experiences and those of others. He brings to the test of his experiences hypotheses which claim to offer a satisfying solution. Furphy makes it increasingly clear that no single hypothesis of which he knows will explain more than part of the complex pattern of experience as he observes it' (1967:150-151). This is a good explanation of the ego's relationship to the world, tying in nicely with Furphy's emphasis on ignorance-shifting and knowledge. Indeed, Collins' view that 'truth is relative' and 'not absolute' (BBB, 8) is a surprisingly modern and astute observation of an ego's relation to the world, and an ego's desire to make sense of the world. Furthermore, the fact that an ego interferes with the world, serving up a selected vision, does not necessarily endanger the road from ignorance to wisdom. Nor does it dictate that the ego is unreliable.

The view that Collins is an unreliable narrator is the greatest red herring in critical studies on Furphy. But where did this view originate? I think the answer to this question can be found in Furphy's 1903 review. In this fascinating piece of Australian literature, Furphy wrote that

> [o]riginality is a characteristic of *Such is Life*; and this is attained, to begin with, in the simplicity of the scheme. Setting out with an unpremeditated purpose of amplifying the diary-memoranda of one week -the book naturally falls into seven chapters. The first date is taken at hazard, from a series of filled-up pocket diaries....Then for sufficient reasons, the diary-records cease to be consecutive, and are henceforth separated by monthly intervals....Underneath this obvious dislocation of anything resembling continuous narrative, run several undercurrents of plot, manifest to the reader, though ostensibly unnoticed by the author (1969:130. My italics).
Within the framework of an implied author in *Such is Life*, this last point is simply illogical. How is an author able 'to mask coincidence and cross purposes, sometimes too intricate' (1969:130) if he cannot notice several undercurrents of plot in his own narrative? Indeed, how can readers notice an *ostensibly unnoticed* undercurrent of plot while the implied author cannot? Is it not better to say that the implied author's masking intricate coincidences and cross purposes within the narrative must necessarily result in an *ostensibly unnoticed* plot, since masking implies no direct intention to show things overtly to the reader, including plot? Would this not determine the way in which Collins depicts himself within the narrative world of the Riverina?

A.A. Phillips is incorrect to say that '[w]e do not see through Tom's eyes, for we often know more than he does.... Moreover, the reader sees Tom himself, and sees him not at all as Tom does' ([1958] 1980:39). How is it that the reader can see more of Collins than Collins himself when the reader must rely on Collins as the implied author? Is it not fair to say that the masking of coincidence and cross purposes necessarily indicates both a breadth of vision and a crafting of plot, which is a knowledge? The vast majority of critics have taken Furphy at face value, without giving due regard to an observant reading of the review he wrote. It must be mentioned that Furphy wrote the review as a reviewer, making no mention of his being either the implied or real author of *Such is Life*, and readily attributing authorship to Collins several times.

To say that there are several undercurrents of plot *ostensibly* unnoticed by the author indicates that the author, whether real or implied, either pretends not to notice the undercurrents of plot or has no intention of foregrounding these undercurrents to his readers in the traditionally expected sense. Because this is the case, Collins is not an unreliable narrator in Booth's sense of the term. But, Collins is not a reliable narrator in the traditional sense of *overtly* guiding the reader through the finer details of plot or character development. Furthermore, Collins is not a reliable author in the traditional sense of *overtly* guiding the reader through the twists and turns of his narratives. Either of these two views runs contrary to the stress placed on observant reading. Despite his traditional reading of the novels, Croft's idea of 'Tom's...cunning concealment'
(1991:36) offers an excellent insight into Collins' strategies as implied author and hero.

What, then, is Furphy trying to achieve with the review? The review is a brilliant narrative strategy, designed to alert readers to several important factors in the novel and encouraging them to read observantly. In short, Furphy was diplomatically trying to direct his readers to observe certain clues. It is quite plausible that he strategically hid his disappointment in the fact that not even the man he saw as his intellectual equal, namely William Cathels, had read the novel observantly. Although Cathels' letter to Furphy on *Such is Life*, reproduced in Barnes' biography (1990:263-265), has much positive commentary about the novel, there is nevertheless an uncertainty in Cathels' observations, as if he were trying to be cautious about a novel he neither liked nor understood. As Croft explains, 'Furphy's friend, Cathels...praised Joe [Furphy] for his skills as a chronicler, and found justifications for his ornate style, while never sensing anywhere in the book that there might be a plot or any unifying principle at all' (1991:49).

Indeed, the scenario is much the same with A.G. Stephens, for he did not 'seem to pay any attention to Furphy's letter in May about the cunning use of a by-play in the plot', since 'Stephens thought of the work [not] as a novel [nor] as having a plot, nor of the narrator as being involved in any by-play' (Croft, 1991:48-49). Stephens considered *Such is Life* simply as 'a record of Australian life' (Croft, 1991:49). Equally, '[j]ust as Stephens had not followed up the lead given him in Furphy's letter when he read the manuscript, Cathels either did not remember, or failed to take the hint' (Croft, 1991:49). Barnes states that 'Stephens was a recognized literary authority' and that, 'in Furphy's personal universe, Cathels also was an authority, and one whose opinion of [Furphy's] writing mattered greatly' (1990:267). I think the unobservant reading of these two important figures in Furphy's life amply justifies Furphy's strategy, for it seems strange that Furphy should send Stephens a review of his own novel when the latter asked for a synopsis, unless Furphy pragmatically wanted to show something, as well as curb any future misreadings or misunderstandings.

In a letter to Stephens dated May 2, 1897, Furphy wrote, 'you will notice that a certain by-play in plot and éclaircissement is hidden from the philosophical narrator, however apparent to the matter-of-fact reader' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:29).
By placing the blame on Tom Collins' inability to "notice" the clues, he thereby solved the potential problem of having to rewrite the narrative so that Collins did supply the clues, which would effectively change the style of the novel, turning it into the kind of literature for the masses Furphy so despised. However, he equally opened up an opportunity for critics to create that rather fallacious issue of the unreliable narrator in Such is Life. I believe Furphy did not expect the current consequences to arise, since he seems to think that his observant reader, once properly prompted, would not see Collins as flawed, but as an implied author who masks coincidence and cross-purposes, including the by-play of plot, in order to challenge the conventions of popular literature. Furphy tried to correct contemporary and future misreadings in a diplomatic manner. The reason for this diplomacy is best explained by Collins, who states that 'no person except the systematic and successful hypocrite has too many friends, or too good a character. Any fool can get himself hated, if he goes the right way to work; but the game was never yet worth a rap, for a rational man to play' (SiL, 162).

Given the rivalry and division in colonial Australia, this is also an excellent justification by Collins for his own diplomatic selections or censorship, as is the following:

[b]uilt into the moral structure of each earthly probationer is a thermometer, graduated independently; and it is never safe to heat the individual to the boiling-point of his register. You never know how far up the scale this point is, unless you are very familiar with the particular thermometer under experiment....Nations, kindreds, and peoples are individuals in mass; and here the existence of an overlooked boiling-point is the one thing that makes history interesting (SiL, 240).

Most readers are aware of the fact that Collins selects the most discerning narratives of his experiences because, whenever selections appear too risqué, Tom strategically changes tack in accordance with the emphasis on choices and consequences, or selection and the controlling alternatives. Much of chapter three in Such is Life is a 174.
fuller and more carefully overt working-out of this principle. As Collins states, 'in the race of life, my son, you must run cunning, reserving your sprint for the tactical moment' (Sil, 215. My italics). Kiernan states that 'Tom not only presents an image of himself to the characters in the book, but also attempts to present a flattering image to us' (1964:137). If we recall Croft's (1991:88) proposition, we must agree with him about seeing Tom Collins as a gentleman. Collins strives to be the hero and labours to maintain that image. But Collins does not simply labour to give his readers a well-groomed, aristocratic image of himself. Instead, Collins labours to create the right qualities for the newly-emerging national type. As Collins freely confesses, the 'foolish reader will be instructed' and 'the integrity of narrative preserved' (Sil, 113).

Collins is not only quick to censor an incident, but also very particular about making his reader aware of a strategic need for such censorship. When Jack the Shellback tells Collins the tale of the penguin and the man-o'-war hawk, Collins states that 'he gave me such a description of this afflicted bird as, in the interests of science, I have pleasure in laying before the intelligent public. I must, however, use my own language. Jack's rhetoric, though lucid and forcible, would look so bad on paper that the police might interfere with its publication' (Sil, 275). This is one of many authorial comments by which Collins justifies his selections ethically. Indeed, the self-same reason is given in the authorial commentary of chapter two, where Collins states that 'anyone who has listened for four hours to the conversation of a group of sheep drovers...will agree with me as to the impossibility of getting the dialogue of such dramatis personae into anything like printable form' (Sil, 52). And, in the authorial comments of chapter seven, Collins observes that

[the routine record of March 9 is not a desirable text. It would merely recall forth from fitting oblivion the lambing-down of two stalwart fencers by a pimply old shanty-keeper; and you know this sort of thing has been described ad sickenum by other pens, less proper than mine -described, in fact, till you would think that, in the back-country, drinking took the place of Conduct, as three-fourths of life; whilst the remaining 175.
fourth consisted of fighting (SiL, 263).

But, according to Collins, 'outside the shearing season, you might travel a hundred miles, calling at five shanties, without seeing a man the worse for drink; and you would still be likely to go a thousand miles, calling at fifty shanties, without seeing any indication of a fight' (SiL, 263). Through these examples, readers can see that Collins' selections are ethically justified within the context of artistic representation and uplifting and upbuilding, particularly in light of the prevailing rivalry and division in nineteenth-century Australia. Equally, it can be said that Collins writes for the widest possible readership, indicating that the craft or skill of authorship is one which takes into consideration the origin and destination of a narrative. Again, 'no person except the systematic and successful hypocrite has too many friends, or too good a character. Any fool can get himself hated, if he goes the right way to work; but the game was never yet worth a rap, for a rational man to play' (SiL, 162). In selecting, crafting or censoring "life", there is an appeal to an ethical strategy and wisdom in matters of artistic representation and cultural production for the sake of an aesthetic well-being within the individual and the community.

We could say that Collins, as the implied author, uses an heroic image of himself to present himself as the ground for the newly-emerging national type. But we must also say that Collins, within the skill or craft of authorship, understands such a presentation to be strategically possible but never absolute. This is because Collins has, like so many currency lads or lasses, 'a commission to use [his] own judgment, and take [his] own risks, like any other unit of humanity' (SiL, 1). In this sense, one can understand why Collins has 'Collins' state, '[l]et each of us keep himself behind the spikes on this question of restricted capability' (SiL, 32. My italics). Or that 'truth may be relative, not absolute' (BBB, 8). What is important to realize is this. If one were editorially to remove all the passages where Collins addresses his reader personally about his narrative strategies, then one could argue that Collins would become the narrator of a narrative which generates the illusion of an accurate representation of life. In this sense, events could occur of which Collins would be completely unaware.

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As it stands, however, Collins quite openly confesses to the reader that his random selections are subject to his capacity to censor that which he deems unsuitable. In short, he acts in the capacity of an author with his notebooks, generating illusions and crafting a narrative with a particular design in mind, namely the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia. In terms of Furphy's artistic designs, readers ought to keep in mind that the content of *Such is Life* has been placed there by Collins as an implied author. It is a choice that Furphy made both willingly and strategically. This illustrates quite neatly the immense scope which the theory of the controlling alternatives has for Furphy in both an artistic and a personal sense. As Gilding notes, but does not pursue further, 'behind the philosophy of the controlling alternative lies an awareness of the complexity of human experience; and behind the conception of Collins the philosopher lies a Collins who responds in a consistent way to this experience' (1967:97).

2.4. Uplifting and Upbuilding the Antipodes: concluding remarks on Authorship.

At a particular stage of the narrative strategies in *Such is Life*, Collins refers to 'Joe Collins' (93). This is interesting, for it generates the question as to how far apart Furphy and Collins are in the real and implied author relationship. At times, both share a remarkably close biographical affinity, which Barnes (1990) and Croft (1991) note. Indeed, Furphy states that 'I write only of what I know' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124). And in a letter to Miles Franklin, Furphy wrote, 'I find it best to take some actual occurrence as a bed-log, and build thereon -telling the story, not as it did happen, but as it should have done' (Barnes and Hoffmann, 1995:177). Artistically, Furphy places great emphasis on the "truth embellished" technique. Furthermore, it is Collins who also lays claim to this artistry when he states that '[i]t will just show you how much the novelist has to answer for; following, as he does, the devices and desires of his own heart; telling the lies he ought not to have told, and leaving untold the lies that he ought to have told' (*SiL*, 272. My italics).

In an earlier essay, Barnes states that 'Collins can hardly be 177.
separated from his creator, stylistically, although one must say that, when Furphy writes as Collins, he writes as a man with a license to display his wit and learning, but he does not always judge very happily what the reader will recognize' (1981:xxiii). To a certain extent, this is true, for Furphy's emphasis on observant reading, of piecing together a series of scattered clues, runs the risk of veiling his strategy and designs too deeply under the guise of formlessness. Nevertheless, by using the character and nom de plume of Tom Collins, as well as the emphasis on observant reading, Furphy is able to give his novels not only the capacity for social commentary, but also the quality of a philosophical investigation into the artistic nature of personal and national identity. Concerning Such is Life, Hartley states that identity is synonymous with 'plot,' becoming 'as much a matter of exclusion, or concealment, as of inclusion, or mapping-out' (1986:156).

One can extend this rather apt observation to both Rigby's Romance and The Buln-Buln and the Brolga. Although Hartley does not make the connection, his emphasis on inclusion and exclusion principally captures the concepts of authorship and selection, of choices and consequences in the theory of the controlling alternatives. In this sense, I disagree with Croft, who states that '[it] is often assumed by readers of the three major works that Tom Collins' opinions are those of Joseph Furphy, and that they express the same socialistic idealism that is evident in some of his letters. That is far from the truth. Tom's ideas on political economy are often thoroughly conservative' (1991:94). This is problematic, for I think both Furphy and Collins express an interest in socialist ideas, as I have already argued, but they are not socialists. Again, it is my contention that both are Philosophes who express their faith in an enlightened new world and its type.

Nor is it entirely clear just what Croft means by claiming that Collins is thoroughly conservative, for Collins is concerned with the creation and dissemination of a way of seeing and responding to life in Australia that challenges the more conservative ideology of Anglo-Australianism. Although Croft rightly makes a distinction between Joseph Furphy and Tom Collins, it is unfair and problematic to suggest that Collins' radicalism and philosophizing is simply a guise for his 'conservative leanings' (1991:95) and desire to amass capital.
What one finds in the relationship between real author and implied author, or Furphy and Collins, is a carefully woven tapestry of affinities and distances, for Collins represents the chosen other whereby Furphy sought to fathom the value of his experiences in the Riverina and to communicate the meaning of that value in light of uplifting and upbuilding. Furphy himself had said that 'as T.C. I can make myself objectionable with better grace' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:84).

In terms of the value of Tom Collins, this is the crucial link between Furphy and his implied author, for uplifting and upbuilding in the daily plebiscite cannot be separated from the concepts of authorship and selection. Nor can uplifting and upbuilding be separated from the ethics of representation in art, for Furphy and Collins stress that the production of stories in a newly-emerging social and cultural identity must consider the well-being of the individual and the community, as is evident in Furphy's use of the adjective “truth embellished”. For this reason, I must disagree with Barnes' notion that 'in Collins's narrative we see a man acting in ignorance of how his actions in the present will affect not only his own future but that of others' (1979:19). To have an awareness of the ethics of representation, of what the self ought to do in art and life, is to have an awareness of how that articulation strategically, as a response to life, can have an impact on the human order of things. This is an important aspect of the wonderfully complex relationship of values between Furphy and Collins as real author and implied author.

According to Barnes, 'he [Collins] is a version of Furphy himself, or, to put it another way, he is Furphy playing a role, and I am inclined to think that this role was necessary to Furphy as a writer' (1979:12). But, readers are meant to see that Collins is also "Collins" on his own terms and with his own resources of self proper to him, hence his articulation of the theory of the controlling alternatives and his engagement with the concepts of authorship, selection, “truth embellished” representation, “presence” and role-play. Croft (1991:265) points out that Furphy's book of collected poems, edited by Kate Baker and first published in 1916, was the first work by Furphy to have authorship accredited to him. During his lifetime, Furphy refused to drop his nom de plume, stating to
Stephens that 't]here is one thing I hate; yea, two that I abhor; and
these three things are celebrity, fame, renown, and reputation; also
there are five things that my soul lusteth after; and these be
obscurity and privacy' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:84).
Besides privacy, I think Furphy knew that public recognition of his
being the author of Such is Life would spoil what he sought to
achieve with Tom Collins.

In this sense, Croft's notion that, '[f]or Joseph Furphy, Tom
Collins' writings are lies' and, 'for Tom Collins, romances, such as
those which form the basis of Furphy's three novels, are also lies'
(1991:51) is much too problematic\textsuperscript{12}. Croft may point out that Such is
Life has 'two authors: one fictional and one real' (1991:85), but he
devalues Furphy's designs for Collins by remaining with the concept
of an unreliable narrator due to the etymological origin of "Tom
Collins". Whether or not Collins actually exists in the normal sense
readers attribute to an author does not matter. Tom Collins'
fictionality in no way negates the more important issue of why
Collins exists and how art, especially through the intimacy between
language and literature, is a crucial element in expressing the
fundamentals of that existence in the world. As I have already
argued, readers ought to see both a similarity and a difference
between the "Tom Collins" of Australian folklore and the "Tom
Collins" of the novels. The meaning and value of both "Tom
Collinses" is intimately related to yarning or the tall story, but each
yarns or tells tall tales for different reasons.

Unlike the practical Joker of Australian folklore, readers are
meant to see, through the Collins of the novels, an intimate
relationship between identity, well-being and narrative strategy in
the world outside literature. As Furphy had stated to Stephens, 'the
usages of Riverina rasped the scales from my eyes' (Barnes and
Hoffmann, eds, 1995:85). Indeed, on many occasions in Such is Life,
Collins takes great care in communicating the look and feel of the
Riverina through his expositions of the environment. This, I think, is
important, for the Riverina is meant to be seen as the quintessential
environment where colonial society, both rural and urban, strives to
establish a cultural value in the Australian experience. As an

\textsuperscript{12} I will discuss the issue of lying more fully in the next chapter when I examine its thematic
predominance in The Buln-Buln and the Brolga in light of uplifting and upbuilding a national type or
"identity".
analogy, the Riverina is an expansive space and time of events where the act of recognizing an event and seeing that event as it unfolds leads to the phenomena in which the self qualifies the environment with value and meaning. It can be said that the Riverina is a geography of players, where the self-other relationship predominates because of colonial rivalry and divisions and a strong presence of international identities.

Although Collins, as implied author, uses himself, as a hero, to fill this space and time with value, he also stylistically employs the Riverina itself, drawing the reader's attention to that curious event and phenomenon known as the mirage. In the opening authorial commentary to chapter four of Such is Life, Collins states that

\[ \text{the mirage is one of Nature's obscure and cheerless jokes; and in this instance, as in some few others, she is beyond Art. She even assists the illusion by a very slight depression of the plain in the right place. In fact, an artist's picture of a mirage would be his picture of a level-brimmed, unruffled lake; also, the most skilful word-painter, in attempting to contrast the appearance of water with that of its fac-simile (sic), would become as confused and hazy as any clergyman taxed to differentiate his creed from that of the mollah running the opposition. And Nature, in taking this mirthless rise out of the spectator, never repeats herself in the particulars of distance, area, or configuration of her simulacre (StL, 129-130. My italics).} \]

Nature is beyond art because "she" is beyond man's control. Yet nature's mirage makes man aware of the possibility of art by stimulating man's interest in geographically specific optical illusions. But the qualities generally associated with mirages or simulacra in nature also indicate that what one can create in art may not be easily distinguished from the artistic production of values from another social and cultural landscape or geography. Although the mirage in art has a much more stable existence than the mirage in nature, because the former is a phenomenon rather than an event,
Collins strongly suggests that artistic images, despite the skill or craft of the author or artist, are not wholly exempt from generating the same eventful qualities. One could take Collins' commentary on the mirage as a parable for the need to establish control over selection in artistic creativity, especially with the uplifting and upbuilding of a national identity and the production of an appropriate cultural creed for the Australian experience. If left to the choice of another, such as Anglo-Australianism, then the consequent images and experiences which can selectively define an Australian identity and creed will suffer.

Indeed, the facsimiles that are called Australiana will be hard to differentiate from British values and ways of seeing. This, then, leads us to a consideration of the concept of the "Antipodes", for one can say that national identity or the national type, in much the same manner as the mirage, is an optical illusion generated by specific features in an environment and the way in which people respond to those features. More importantly, the optical illusion of a national type depends on ways of seeing and attributing value, or an attitude. As Elliot (1966:51) indicates, the most persistent attitude, through which Australia and Australiana has been seen, is that of the Antipodes, or the land of topsy-turvydom. According to Elliot, this Northern European notion was bound up with the idea that, '[i]n the new world, the slate was clean, perfection was in [man's] grasp, and [he] was yet again to prove his quality' (1966:52). In short, new worlds 'always presented themselves in terms of an expanding human happiness' (1966:52). This is interesting, for the value of the Antipodes, as an attitude, is intimately tied to a European concept of well-being in an exotically new, yet strangely familiar, landscape.

In this sense, according to Elliot, Australia did not quite make the grade:

[a] man must arrange his mind according to his inherited dispositions. This seems to have been even more difficult, and therefore in many respects a slower process, in Australia than in America. The environment itself was stranger; the landscape made greater demands. There were far fewer natural similarities than the settler had discovered in America;
it was inevitable that there should be much reluctance to accept and become identified with a landscape and conditions of life in which so many of the articles were novel and unfamiliar. *It was the antipodes*, the land of opposites; the landscape, the plants, the birds, the animals, all held a strangeness that kept the notion of anomalousness before the mind. Moreover, in practical life not only did the seeker after the lost paradise discover that labour in this vineyard could be heavier, and nature more uncertain in her rewards, than in the old land; but the freedom for the spirit promised in the new country, if it really existed - and in some real senses it did - was purchased dear at the cost of a forbidding isolation. To be lived in at all, the Australian environment demanded imperatively a far from gentle reorganization of the whole of a man's habits and attitudes (1966:54. My italics).

In short, Australia was more antipodean than any other "Antipodes". It was, in terms of "identifiable" values, a land of mirages. But, while the landscape¹³ was different, indicating that the production of stories about the environment would communicate this difference, it is equally fair to say that writing the Australian experience cannot be totally severed from a universally acceptable manner of producing meaning and value in the western cultural tradition. Collins is aware of this, and his invoking of the parable of the mirage also indicates that environmentally specific cultural productions have both differences and family resemblances, or particulars and universals. Readers should see Collins' Riverina as an environment which not only emphasises the need for ethics in matters of artistic representation, but also as an environment which shows that certain selections in the cultural production of a common identity or type have, or can have, family resemblances with an already existing body of national or cultural productions.

As Furphy stated in his 1903 review, '[t]he corresponding penalty of [a] National consciousness is a certain narrowness of

¹³I will discuss landscape in more detail in the next chapter when I investigate Furphy's and Collins' version of an Australian national type.
outlook, a spontaneous impression that the sun rises over the Barrier Reef, and sets behind the Leeuwin' (1969:128). In Furphy's view, as well as Collins', this kind of narrow awareness or spontaneous impression is the direct result of an unnecessarily ignorant rejection of Western culture and, more importantly, Australia's place in the Western cultural canon. When Collins claims that 'the coming Australian is a problem' (SiL, 144), or that a single type is a problem because, 'lacking generations of development' like the squatter, 'there are a thousand types' (SiL, 164), he strongly suggests that the Australian branch cannot be severed from the western tree. Historically, therefore, one ought to see the concept of the Antipodes and its focus on national identity as a tug-of-war between "Australian" and Anglo-Australian attitudes.

It might be said that what Anglo-Australians despised, "Australians" celebrated, and vice-versa. If one considers the Boer War, for example, one can see this conflict of attitudes emerge in the opposing concepts of Anglo-Australian "jingolism" and Australian "larrikinism". According to Evans et al, 'young larrikin males (and to some degree, their female companions) had come to be typified as the epitome of disorderliness' while' [y]oung men who volunteered to fight in the South African war...were usually viewed as upstanding examples of loyal, well-disciplined manhood' (1997:78). Indeed, Docker (1986:52-53) draws an interesting comparison between the "Australian" antipodes, or the world-upside-down, and Bakhtin's concept of the carnival, suggesting that larrikinism was the popular means by which "Australians" expressed their dislike of Anglo-Australian cultural imperialism. According to Kunzle, '[t]he broadsheet theme of the World Upside Down....lent itself historically to a variety of interpretations, and was capable of fulfilling diverse and even contrary social and psychological needs'(1978:39-40).

But the staple diet of this broadsheet theme was the conflict of attitudes between two opposing groups, respectively holding dominant and subordinate social positions, who were each devalued by the other's use of '[t]he principle of inversion' (Kunzle, 1978:41). This conflict of attitudes appears to irk Furphy, for he sees the "Australian" antipodean attitude, fostered by the Bulletin school and its celebration of difference and uniqueness of identity, as an unnecessary rejection of the western cultural canon and so an
unnecessary celebration of ignorance. Again, Furphy had stated to Cecil Winter that '[t]here is much in your suggestion respecting the causes of pessimism in the Out-back man (who is the real Australian); but, as you say, Ignorance is at the root of it' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124. My italics). Despite the fact that '[t]he Empire was an emotional necessity and a source of national security and political stability' (Stewart, 1996:5), I do not think that Furphy nor Collins wanted Australia to follow, in a jingoistic manner, 'the English drumbeat' (SiL, 139). In the authoring of an identity or the creation of a national optical illusion, both Furphy and Collins emphasise that the concept of the Antipodes, or the world-upside-down, rather than remaining caught in the grip of two opposing views, ought to come under the same ethical emphasis as any other artistic process of selection and representation.

Indeed, what one finds with Collins is a synthesis of these two extreme views, indicating that Collins, as an implied author, presents his readers with an image of an emerging Australian type different from the articulated images of the time. Without my referring to specific episodes, readers ought to see this design in the novels, especially with the contrast between Collins and the bullockies, as well as other masculine identities in the novelistic world of the Riverina. Furthermore, this design of providing an alternative direction for the newly-emerging type can be found in the numerous references to the Australian woman and her values. By utilising the concept of the Antipodes in a positive manner, and by employing Collins as both an implied author and a hero, Furphy negotiates his way through the ignorant extremes of Australianism and Anglo-Australianism to show that an aesthetic well-being is possible because an arbitration between these two views is possible.

In short, the novels indicate that the theme of a world upside down, or the Australian antipodean attitude, can add greater scope to an already existing body of values in the western cultural canon. I think Furphy would have sided with Walt Whitman's opening lines in the 1855 preface to *Leaves of Grass*: 'America does not repel the past or what it has produced under its forms or amid other politics or the idea of castes or the old religions', for America 'accepts the

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14 Because Collins is a currency lad, it is interesting to see the novels and the issues I have been discussing as advice to the currency lads and lasses of the 1880s and 1890s, especially in matters of authorship and artistic representation in the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia.
lessons with calmness' (1994:383). Indeed, it is my contention that Furphy wanted to see the self-same "antipodean" attitude take firm root in Australia. In short, the antipodean attitude is, for Furphy, the act of seeing value in the new world, an emphasis on ethics and selection, and an awareness of the controlling alternatives in light of past errors\(^\text{15}\). The manner in which Furphy expresses this belief will be the focus of investigation in the next chapter, where I will discuss Tom Collins' relationship, as both an implied author and hero, to the newly-emerging type and the role of the self-other relationship in the production of an identity.

\(^{15}\) To a certain degree, Furphy's relationship with the "past" is much more secure than that other Australian nationalist who was influenced by Whitman, namely Bernard O'Dowd. Indeed, in O'Dowd's poem "Australia", there is an uncertainty towards the past that makes it "the fatal nest", rather than a series of lessons from which Australia can learn.

About the time when Fred went to England, Steve Thompson and I, confident that we were men of the time, departed from our homes in different directions, to fulfil, severally, our great destinies. Our efforts, by the way, have been rewarded by a measure of success.

-The Buln-Buln and the Brolga, 1948:39-

3.1. Reading and Weaving a Nation: morality and the loosely federated yarns.

Collins reminds his reader that, '[w]hen I undertook the pleasant task of writing out these reminiscences, I engaged, you will remember, to amplify the record of one week; judging that a rigidly faithful analysis of that sample would disclose the approximate percentage of *happiness, virtue &c., in Life* (StL, 52. My italics). But there are many incidents in the narrative where Collins considers censorship to be necessary. Reiterating his commitment to the reader at a later stage in the novel, Collins states, '[o]f course, I am committed to any narration imposed by my random election of dates; but just notice that perversity, that untowardness, that cussedness in the affairs of men' (StL, 204). Because of this, the changes made by Collins indicate a strong, ethical concern for the idea of authorship. This is particularly so with Anglo-Australian romance and its use of a system of values that 'persists in viewing Australian characteristics and deviations as more or less exotic' (Furphy, 1969:128). Equally, there is opposition to 'the fully-emancipated native born', whose values create a 'National consciousness' with a 'certain narrowness of outlook' (Furphy, 1969:128).

Barnes points out that, '[a]long with Lawson and Paterson, Furphy was creating an image of the Australian type' (1979:36). However, there are problems with Barnes' statement, particularly if readers think of placing Furphy in the same school of thought as
either Lawson or Paterson. This mistake is made by Vance Palmer, who concludes *The Legend of the Nineties* by claiming that Furphy, Lawson and Paterson 'established the type -the Joe Wilsons, the Clancys, and the Tom Collinses- and at the same time they fixed the habit of regarding it as a literary norm' (1963:170). But Palmer's view, as Cantrell (1977:xxvi) suggests, is much more indicative of a nationalist mind set in the twentieth century than a truth about the 1890s nationalist period. Indeed, the 1892 debate between Paterson and Lawson, as discussed in detail by Bruce Nesbitt (1971), or more recently by Mark Horgan and Michael Sharkey (1996), points to the inconclusiveness of the debate, as well as the strategies used by many nationalist writers to prop up their versions of bush life rather than engage with the issue of realism set down by Lawson.¹

Setting aside the complexity of the debate itself, it is important to be aware of the debate's significance to Furphy and Tom Collins. Although nationalism was an influential factor, the Lawson and Paterson debate was not directly concerned with an emerging national type. Rather, it was concerned with 'the bush as an important source of artistic inspiration' (Horgan and Sharkey, 1996:66). As Cantrell explains, although Paterson 'seemed to suggest that Lawson was merely being pessimistic about the bush,....what was at stake, for Lawson at least, was the whole notion of the relationship of a writer to his society' (1977:xxi). In short, '[s]hould the writer attempt to fabricate and idealise his experience in the interests of a national ideal? Or should he try to depict the world as he saw it, in spite of the hurt to himself and his readers?' (Cantrell, 1977:xxi). Although it is not a clear-cut argument, it is nevertheless an ethical one. And it is an ethical argument in which Furphy participated. According to Partington,

[If some experiences are more likely than others to foster Absolute Truth or greater relative truths, relationships with the land are often thought to be an especially vital element. One of the most celebrated

¹ Of further interest is the notion that, according to Paterson, the debate was deliberately staged and had initially been prompted by Lawson's suggesting that he and Paterson would profit by it (in Horgan and Sharkey, 1996:69. See also Cantrell, 1971:138 and Nesbitt, 1971:4). One wonders if Lawson had wanted to use Paterson and his style as a vehicle for his own ideas concerning realism in art, and that the debate, although staged, culminated into what Paterson later called 'the “undignified affair”' (in Nesbitt, 1971:3).]
literary controversies during the period in which Furphy was conceiving the original *Such is Life* was between Banjo Paterson and Henry Lawson as to whether the Bush was at heart beneficent or malevolent. Although Furphy is not a lyrical writer, his descriptions of the vast open plains of the Riverina are powerfully evocative....Yet he is on the side of Lawson against Paterson and pours scorn on arcadian notions of a benign *Australia Felix* (1993:167-168).

While there is validity to Partington's claim, I do not think he "pours scorn" on Paterson as a show of support for Lawson's anti-arcadian polemic. Furphy's relationship to Lawson and Paterson is of a much more subtle complexity than Partington states. In a letter to Cecil Winter, dated the 28th of July, 1904, Furphy (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:169) admired the poetry of both men, although he believed Lawson to be the greater poet. However, in a letter to Winter, written six months earlier, Furphy (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:147) mourns the loss of Lawson's poetic genius to drink and self-indulgence. Furphy did not admire Lawson's prose, considering it to be pessimistic and as detrimental to the artistic uplifting and upbuilding of a true sense of community in Australia as Anglo-Australian romance. When discussing the causal relationship between pessimism and ignorance 'in the Out-back man' a year earlier, Furphy had written to Winter that 'the pessimist is simply a man who errs in his interpretation of Nature' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124).

According to Nesbitt, 'Furphy was actually challenging Lawson's major premise, not defending it' (1971:12). Furphy's letters give us much more information about his views on Lawson than on Paterson, yet I am inclined to think that Furphy saw some validity to both sides of the debate. Ethically speaking, there is no difference between Paterson's and Lawson's position in the debate, for both are ultimately concerned with individual and communal well-being. Both stress the importance of understanding the land and one's relationship to it and within it, yet they do so from two opposing styles. In this sense, the Lawson and Paterson debate offers nothing more than an artistic stalemate. If one romanticises the land and its
people, then one misunderstands one's relationship to the Australian environment and one's chance of success in it. Yet, if one depicts the grim reality of that environment, constantly stressing struggle or battle, then one undermines the human capacity to accept challenges and to hope, which are two important things that a romantic perspective can offer in the face of adversity.

Furphy appears to be aware of this dilemma, offering an alternative way of seeing and responding. I think the following passage from *Such is Life* is an indirect yet revealing reference to the debate:

> it is not in our cities or townships, it is not in our agricultural or mining areas, that the Australian attains full consciousness of his own nationality; it is in places like this [Riverina], and as clearly here as at the centre of the continent. To me the monotonous variety of this interminable scrub has a charm of its own; so grave, so subdued, self-centred; so alien to the genial appeal of more winsome landscape, or the assertive grandeur of mountain and gorge. To me, this wayward diversity of spontaneous plant life bespeaks an unconfined, ungauged potentiality of resource; it unveils the ideographic prophecy, painted by Nature in her Impressionistic mood, to be *deciphered artight* only by those willing to discern through the crudeness of a dawn a promise of majestic day (*Sil*, 65. My italics).

Readers ought to note the style of the language, for it oscillates between realism and romanticism. Throughout the three novels, Collins' style is a moderation of realist and romanticist principles, namely an emphasis on depicting the way things are, as well as an emphasis on a way of seeing and responding where man does not sink into pessimistic resignation. It is my contention that Furphy wanted to present Tom Collins, in terms of character, as a hybrid between a Joe Wilson and a Clancy, and that the debate between Lawson and Paterson ought to be considered as an important factor in gauging the value of Collins. Of further interest, readers ought to see that Collins, through his status as implied
author, indicates quite cleverly that realism, or chronicling, does not faithfully depict what is there, but is a case of 'seeing selectively' (Graham, 1997:89) and cannot avoid a degree of romanticising. As Furphy points out in his 1903 review of Tom Collins' novel, 

[w]hen...reinforced by acute observation, and cast into literary form, [the National consciousness] invests with interest the minutest details of National life. Add humour, sympathy, and felicity of phrase, together with that rarest of mental qualities, initiative, and the subtle touch of nature is achieved. Such fiction may be truer than truth itself, since the latter, often anomalous and untypical, is always part-hidden from view. But here a new light of significance is flashed on the commonplace; a shade of actuality softens the bizarre; and each scene, action or colloquy, carrying authenticity on its face, becomes an indispensable accessory to the completed work. This describes Tom Collins -at his best (1969:128-129).

If one recalls Furphy's stressing a truth embellished style to Cecil Winter, then one ought to see that this idea is a mean between the two styles set forth by Paterson and Lawson. According to Horgan and Sharkey, '[t]he melancholy interpretation of the outback had become as hackneyed as the golden age connotations against which Lawson launched his attack' (1996:91). Because the opposing realist and romantic styles had such sway in Australian narratives, I think Furphy considered them to be false alternatives, for they maintained a division and rivalry that affected the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia. In terms of representing a way of seeing and

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2 I think it is important to note that, of the three writers, Furphy is the eldest, while his implied author, Tom Collins, is roughly the same age as Lawson and Paterson. For this reason, as well as his fervour for The Australian Society of Irresponsibles, I tend to think that Furphy saw himself artistically not only as a promoter, but also as a teacher of Australian art. In a letter to Cecil Winter, Furphy writes that "[y]esterday a young swell cove of 25 (stranger to me) called on me at the shop to ask the loan of "S'L."", for a week, as he had arranged to contribute an evening's address to a local Literary Ass. on Aus. Lit....This young fellow, I found, knew as much of Aus. Lit. as I know of Chinese...so I took pity on him. By arrangement, I collected all the Aus. Lit. available, which I am to place in his hands tomorrow" (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:169). Furthermore, it is quite likely that he was, through Such is Life, attempting to educate Australian writers in matters of artistic representation.
responding to life which is beneficial to individual and communal well-being, Furphy seems to suggest quite strongly that both Lawson and Paterson respectively followed 'the devices and desires of his own heart; telling the lies he ought not to have told, and leaving untold the lies that he ought to have told' (StL, 272. My italics).

With such designs underpinning Furphy's novels, we ought to see the value he places on observant reading, and consider Steve Thompson's comments from the lost child episode in chapter five of Such is Life:

I compare tracking to reading a letter written in a good business hand. You mustn't look at what's under your eye; you must see a lot at once, and keep a general grasp of what's on ahead, besides spotting each track as you pass. Otherwise, you'll be always turning back for a fresh race at it. And you must no more confine yourself to actual tracks than you would expect to find each letter correctly formed. You must just lift the general meaning as you go. Of course, our everyday tracking is not tracking at all (StL, 189).

Firstly, the lost child to whom Thompson's comments refer is Mary O'Halloran, the 'perfect Young-Australian' (StL, 73). Keogh (1989:61) and Scheckter (1981:69) note that Mary O'Halloran functions as a symbol of the nation's future, and it is fitting to see Thompson's comments as stressing the need for observant reading and truth embellishment in light of tracking the national future. This is particularly the case, as Furphy suggests, when it comes to serving up the 'details of National life' (1969:129). However, because of the Lawson-Paterson debate, Furphy adds another dimension to this state of affairs, and that is an ethical emphasis on the moral ramifications of a particular genre and its articulation of life. Furphy makes clear that the way in which an author imagines the community or the landscape, through a chosen genre, will affect the way people respond to life and the way the idea of nation is seen, for these 'imaginary models...constitute the only reality that there is' (Graham, 1995:129).

In short, Furphy's three novels express the modern view that
the novel itself is a powerful medium in which the idea of nation can be observantly read and tracked. According to Benedict Anderson, 'the novel and the newspaper...provided the technical means for "representing" the kind of imagined community that is the nation' (1991:25). This view can be extended to art generally. Yet Anderson is correct to point out that the novel has the greater ability to construct 'societies' as 'sociological entities of such firm and stable reality that their members...can even be described as passing each other on the street, without ever becoming acquainted, and still be connected' (1991:25). As Brennan explains, 'read in isolation, the novel was nevertheless a mass ceremony; one could read alone with the conviction that millions of others were doing the same, at the same time' (1990:52). Bearing in mind the notion that the novel has the capacity to imagine the unity of nation, it is now time to consider what Furphy may have meant by his idea of a loose federation.

In a letter to Cecil Winter, Furphy wrote, 'I made a point of loosely federating these yarns (if you understand me); till by-and-by the scheme of "S'Life" suggested itself. Then I selected and altered and largely rewrote 7 of these stories, until they came out as you see' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:125. My italics). Barnes is perhaps the first to propose an investigation on the effect of the loosely-federated structure in Such Is Life. He argues that '[t]hrough the diary plan and the interlocking narratives Furphy gives an impression of the seeming shapelessness and uncertain consequences of events of everyday life' (1971:130). Again, in his monograph on Furphy, Barnes repeats these conclusions, adding that 'Such Is Life tends to be an accumulation, an aggregation of parts, rather than an organic unity' (1979:28-29). As Barnes later states in his biography of Furphy, 'though he apparently talked of writing a novel long before Such Is Life took shape, it is unlikely that he began with a clear intention of writing a single prose work' (1990:170). Barnes makes it sound as if great authors produce great works, or that great works must necessarily have an unmistakable organic unity from their initial conception to the final draft.

Perhaps one is now in a better position to understand Barnes' notion that 'Furphy had "federated" or organised his stories around a central idea which he illustrates: the book shows us the inexplicable
irony of circumstance, but it does not, as Hardy's *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*, imply a vision of man in the universe' (1971:131). Rather than an inexplicable irony of circumstance, Furphy's novel, through Tom Collins, does imply a vision of man in the universe, although it may not necessarily be the same as Hardy's. This vision of man has much to do with his need to express his sense of self and community, and to uplift and upbuild this need artistically if there is something morally wanting in the existing narratives on human experience. Speaking of the 'loose federation' of episodic 'yarns' and Furphy's 'craftsmanship,' A.A. Phillips states that '[t]o judge the gaps, to devise a convincing means to make the additional revelation, must have demanded a most determined energy of invention' ([1958] 1980:39). Phillips ([1958] 1980:39) further argues that this aspect of Furphy's craftsmanship reflects the manner in which our knowledge of others in society is constituted: a point with which I agree, although I would also extend this to the knowledge of selfhood.

Barnes touches on this aspect of the novel when he explains that, 'by 1893 Furphy was committed to Tom Collins and a series of 'loosely federated' narratives in which Collins's presence and mental habits provided the basic connection between separate actions' (1990:221. My italics). According to Croft, '[t]he very experience of reading *Such is Life* is indeed that of dealing with a "loose federation" in which the federated pieces slip and slide in their hierarchy, but never lose their federal identity' (1989:17). This is one of the main reasons why I think Collins ethically lays claim to 'a generally haphazard economy with poietical justice' (*Sil*, 52). With its "random" acts of selection, as well as the theory of the controlling alternatives, the idea of a loose federation is significant to the novels' view of identity or "character". I will return to this in a moment. For now, we need to look more closely at the idea of guardianship because it further clarifies the relationship between morality, the national type and Furphy's belief in a purpose. As I have cited in chapter one, Furphy had stated the following to Cecil Winter:

Now, a man doesn't need to be a psalm-singing sneak to admit that beyond the material elements of life, beyond the minerals, plants and animals, beyond the changing seasons, and so forth, there lies a purpose.

194.
We don't know definitely what this purpose may be; but I don't think it is fulfilled by plethoric banking accounts. Same time, I believe it is fulfilled by the production of men and women of high moral standard, calm courage, and clear intellect (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124. My italics).

Or, as Furphy had written in a letter to Cathels, it seems 'to me that the purpose of our life was to make this world somewhat less of a disgrace to its alleged Creator' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:49). According to Collins, 'may not the Ultimate Happiness of the Moral Universe be in some way consistent with the cross-purposes of human life?' (RR, 260). But, as Collins also explains, 'there is joy amongst us over one blackleg of maximum ability and minimum integrity' (RR, 227). Within this context of high moral standards, calm courage and clear intellect, one is reminded of Plato's idea of the just man, namely harmony between reason, courage and desire in the individual. It is important to note that Plato's idea of justice in the individual is crucial to his idea of justice in society, and, in this sense, it is also the key factor in his idea of social guardianship, or the Guardians. As Plato makes clear, 'our properly good guardian will have the following characteristics: a philosophic disposition, high spirits, speed and strength' (Rep. bk2.376c).

Plato's idea of the Guardians is important to the idea of uplifting and upbuilding the nation in Furphy's novels, especially since there is a close relationship between artistic representation, a national type or guardian-image and well-being in the community. Discussing the education of the Guardians, Plato (Rep. bk2.376c-377c) stresses the value of first impressions that leave permanent marks, suggesting that the education of their minds must begin with stories of a fictional, or "truth-embellished" nature. It is interesting

3For those who are not familiar with Republic, it is important to note that 449a-457b, in book five, deals extensively with equality between the sexes, concluding that the only valid difference between men and women is a woman's capacity to bear children. Other than that, Plato sees no reason to exclude women from the same occupations as men, including guardianship, if their aptitude for the position deems them properly fit to fulfil the role. For this reason, the use of "man" in the phrase "the just man" is generic, not gender specific. I think this idea underpins Furphy's emphasis on "the production of men and women of high moral standard, calm courage, and clear intellect", as cited above. Equally, this idea underpins Collins' emphasis on the Australienne in Such is Life. This issue will be discussed more fully in the third section of this chapter.
to see ‘the magnificent myth’ (Rep. bk3.414b-415d) and ‘The Myth of Er’ (Rep. bk10.614a-621d) as truth-embellished stories, and that their first impressions are meant to leave permanent marks on the minds of the young. The result of such a move is to provide solid ground for justice in the individual and well-being in the community. For this reason, Plato concludes that ‘our first business is to supervise the production of stories, and choose only those we think suitable, and reject the rest’ (Rep. bk2.377c).

To return to Furphy, this is important, for the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia must begin with its stories. And, since the first impressions of stories leave permanent marks, it is fair to say that the qualities necessary to successful guardianship must begin with the correct representation of a type. Furphy’s stress on the three elements indicates the importance of artistically considering a guardian-type which assists in ‘the production of men and women of high moral standard, calm courage, and clear intellect’ (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124).

Clearly, the guardian-type in art is intimately related to identity, roleplay, censorship and well-being. This is equally so for Plato, who suggests that ‘[i]f [our Guardians] do take part in dramatic or other representations, they must from their earliest years act the part only of characters suitable to them - men of courage, self-control, piety, freedom of spirit and similar qualities’ (Rep. bk3.395c). In short, the Guardians ‘should neither do a mean action, nor be clever at acting a mean or otherwise disgraceful part on the stage for fear of catching the infection in real life. For...dramatic and similar representations, if indulgence in them is prolonged into adult life, establish habits of physical poise, intonation and thought which become second nature’ (Rep. bk3.395c-d). Leaving aside the finer details of Plato’s rather problematic theory of art in book ten of Republic, as well as the relationship between Plato’s theory and Furphy’s own ideas on art, it is fair to say Furphy supported Plato’s views on the need for censorship because certain ‘representations definitely harm the minds of their audiences, unless they’re inoculated against them by knowing their real nature’ (Rep. bk10.595b). This view applies equally to Collins.

But Furphy also agreed with Plato’s notion that literature needs ‘defenders’ who can prove ‘in prose...that she doesn’t only give
pleasure but brings lasting benefit to human life and human society’ (Rep. bk10.607d). To a certain extent, one ought to see Furphy’s novels as a defence in prose of a great variety of literature, just as one ought to see Collins, with his ‘ten masterpieces of poetry’ (RR, 53), as their chief defender. If Such is Life is not ‘a formless slab’ (Green, 1930:127) or a narrative built by ‘magpie-like greed for information’ (Green, 1961:613), then what is the purpose of the many and varied literary allusions? As I have already discussed in chapter one, and as noted by Partington (1993:147, 208), G. W. Turner (1986:173) and Henricksen (1985:127), Furphy sees an amalgamation of an emerging Australian culture with the European tradition as beneficial to human life and society in Australia. As suggested in the 1903 review, an Australian literature which offers little more than an ‘insular survey’ is ‘contemptible’ and ‘obscene’ (Furphy, 1969:128).

The idea of seeing Collins as a defender of literature is quite fruitful when it comes to understanding his ‘affected mannerisms’: a term used by Furphy to make ‘the casual reader’ aware of the profuse number of ‘more or less apt...quotations and inferences’ (Furphy, 1969: 129. My italics). Gilding is correct in stating that ‘the mannerism’ reinforces ‘a sense of Collins’ character’ (1967:210). But I disagree with his notion that Collins’ affected mannerism ‘deflates both Collins and the unrealistic way in which “poetic” notions are entertained’ (1967:210). One ought to investigate Collins’ affected mannerism within the uplifting and upbuilding of an identity, the theory of the controlling alternatives and the idea of a loose federation. However, according to Hartley, ‘[n]ot only does literature, and more pertinently fiction, pervade [Collins’] speech, but it invades his perception’ (1986:161). Employing old world literature or fiction to see and respond to life is not an uncontrollable phenomenon, as suggested by Hartley’s use of the verb “invade”, but a loosely-federated and politically finite “fabric” woven by Collins. Nor do I agree with Partington, who claims that Collins ‘can cite the Bible, classical myths and literature...[as well as] a range of contemporary political and anthropological commentators...but [he] is rarely able to draw an appropriate lesson from these to illustrate his argument or to illuminate a problem’ (1992:147).

Collins’ affected mannerism, being an extension of his status
as implied author, strategically mines the serviceable material of the European tradition in order to help weave together the value of the unique Australian experience. For example, R.S. White notes that 'the Shakespearean element is by no means incidental or merely a matter of a display of learning', for '[m]any of the quotations have an intrinsic connection with the situations Collins is describing' while 'others are used to create a network of literary echoes and connections that bear upon the moment' (1989:10). In this sense, intertextuality is both a political and interpretative tool in the moral strategy of uplifting and upbuilding the idea of nation. And it is for this moral strategy that otherness is used selectively to establish a thematically beneficial alliance between old and new. Even though I have used the term “intertextuality”, which it undoubtedly is, there is a much more appropriate idea for this technique: an idea with which Furphy may have been familiar, given the theological interests of his family generally. That idea is midrash.

Deist and Burden explain that midrash is a method whereby one ‘makes use of the so-called method of stringing of pearls of the rabbis’ so that one supports one’s ‘argument’ by citing ‘one after the other a whole series of Old Testament texts’ (1980:61). The reason for this is simply that ‘these texts contain references to the idea which [one] is arguing about’ (Deist and Burden, 1980:62). According to Jacobs, midrash is ‘[t]he method by which the ancient Rabbis investigated Scripture in order to make it yield laws and teachings not apparent in a surface reading’ (1995:345). It is a point equally made by Deist and Burden, who add that midrash, as a form of exegesis, ‘quite simply means “interpretation” or “investigation”’ (1980:62). As Boyarin makes clear, ‘[m]uch of midrash presents itself in the form of a paraphrase of the Biblical text in which verses and parts of verses from many places in the canon are combined into a new discourse’ (1987:539-540). Boyarin states that ‘midrashic reading’ recognises the scope of a verse beyond its initial context ‘by inscribing or grafting it into other [syntagmatic] chains’ or contexts: a process he calls ‘recontexting’ (1987:543).

Boyarin suggests that midrash is basically a strategic tool for keeping alive a cultural tradition within a troubled status quo:

the rabbis, faced with the disruption of their times, 198.
the destruction of the Temple and Jewish autonomy in Palestine and with the necessity for appropriation of Scripture for their times, found the creation of a radically intertextual literature the ideal interpretative and reconstructive tool, which preserved the privileged position of the Biblical text by releasing it from its position of immobilised totality. The midrash reaches its goal via a hermeneutic of recombining pieces of the canonized exemplar into a new discourse. We thus see how its intertextuality served both the revolutionary and conservative periods of the midrash and its authors, preserving the old wine by pouring it into new bottles (1987:555. My italics).

Both Furphy and Collins are keen to pour old wine into new bottles, striving to keep alive the more salient laws and teachings of a cultural tradition by working pieces of the old canon into a new discourse supporting rights and the new world experience. The purpose of this is to educate an Australian readership in matters of judgment, conduct and responsibility, and to expose them to a cultural insight or wisdom which Furphy and Collins believe holds true regardless of socio-economic structures or historical change in western civilization. Partington argues that 'Furphy is somewhat selective in quotation, since his main objectives are to attack all forms of hierarchy and advance egalitarian principles' (1993:151). While Furphy and his implied author are selective about which wine to pour, it is not true to say that they attack all forms of hierarchy, since the main objective is to overturn the idea of aristocracy and to advance both the idea of rights and right judgment. If and when Furphy and Collins advance egalitarian principles, then they do so because such principles are judged to be concurrent with both natural and civil rights in light of uplifting and upbuilding.

Bearing in mind Collins' affected mannerism, the loosely-federated structure, and the emphasis on national character and type through the moral idea of guardianship, we ought to now readdress the idea of 'the observant reader' (Sil, 2). Barnes states that '[t]he "observant reader" comes to see that Such is Life does show how life has "presented itself" to a very observant and exact chronicler (which
is what Collins claims to be), who does not always grasp the significance of what he is chronicling' (1976:153). This indicates that the observant reader must 'assume part of the responsibility normally carried by the narrator in a work of prose fiction' (Barnes, 1976:153). While I do not disagree with this allusion to reader-response theory, I do disagree with Barnes' notion that the issue of the observant reader is simply concerned with the exposure of Collins' 'inadequacies' (1976:153). In my opinion, Barnes makes the mistake of observing Collins simply as a narrator, ignoring the latter's claim 'to have enough money...to purchase the few requisites of authorship' (Sil, 1).

The question of Collins' inadequacy or unreliability is best explained by Collins' own confession to the reader that, '[i]n the race of life, my son, you must run cunning, reserving your sprint for the tactical moment' (Sil, 215. My italics). If one were to ask what must the observant reader observe of Collins' 'fair picture of Life, as that engaging problem has presented itself to [him]' (Sil, 2), then I would argue that he or she must chiefly observe Collins' reasons for censoring and his cunning articulation of the aesthetic representation, or Collins' truth-embellished strands of national life. On this note, it is useful to refresh ourselves with Collins' notion that 'no person except the systematic and successful hypocrite has too many friends, or too good a character. Any fool can get himself hated, if he goes the right way to work; but the game was never yet worth a rap, for a rational man to play' (Sil, 162). As Croft suggests, 'Tom's unreliability does not come from obtuseness, but from cunning concealment' (1991:36. My italics), although Croft seems to think that this is only applicable to the Andy Glover episode.

Put simply, one must observe Collins' dual status of implied author and hero, and his ability to harness the midrashic power of literature and its storehouse of ideas for the purpose of reconciling a penal colony with the idea of nation, as well as challenging the value of contemporary stereotypes, both Anglo-Australian and Australian, which fuel division and rivalry. Collins' intellect is not, as Croft states, like the 'soft sofa' that 'takes' on 'the impression of whomever sat on it last' (1991:155). This statement is undermined by his earlier and more valuable notion of Collins' cunning concealment.

One must take heed of Collins' confession that '[t]he
reader...is...made aware of a power, beyond his own likes and dislikes, controlling the selection and treatment of these informal annals' and that '\[t\]hat power, in the nature of things, resides napoleo

nically with myself' (SlL, 263). For this reason, I disagree with Barnes' notion that the loosely-federated structure 'turns life into a matter of accident,' or that '\[m\]an has free will at moments, but he can only exercise it blindly; he is essentially passive, being acted upon by circumstances' (1979:20. My italics). Although Collins is shown to be passive to some of the circumstances of life, his theory of the controlling alternatives equally shows that life's loosely-federated circumstances are actively authored, or modelled and censored, as a means to an end.

Using the sign of the currency lad to harness the power of language and ideas, Collins articulates "Collins" to weave an epistemologically and morally rich environment for the community and the idea of nation, as well as weaving together certain qualities or criteria for the national type as a loosely federated idea. Collins suggests that the national type, as an ethically manufactured image, must be, to some extent, a loose federation so that the type inspires loyalty to the community and its cultural experiences. According to Collins, '[l]oyalty to something is an ingredient in our moral constitution; and the more vague the object, the more rabid will be our devotion to the symbol' (SlL, 117). But the novels also express urgency in devotion to the right kind of symbol. As Collins shrewdly states, '[i]nstead of remaining a self-sufficient lord of creation, whose house is thatched when his hat is on, you have become one of a Committee of Ways and Means - a committee of two, with power to add to your number' (SlL, 71).

Despite his recurring concern with morality, many readers have felt that Collins has a dubious moral constitution because of the outcome of the Andy Glover episode, but I would like to point out that Collins frequently extends his civility and follows a number of "bush" customs throughout the novels. This is evident when Collins comes across the stranger during the sandstorm known as the Wilcannia shower, and gives him 'half a pint of water' from his already low supply, as well as tobacco and an offer to lend him 'five bob' (SlL, 267). The stranger accepts Collins' offerings with the exception of the money, stating 'I've got a couple or three notes left;
and even if I hadn't, I'd think twice before I touched your money. Money's a peculiar thing' (SL, 267). The observant reader ought to bear in mind Willoughby's noting the 'feverish excitement and... demnable race for what the Scriptures aptly call "filthy lucre"' (SL, 35). Or his noting that, '[i]ke most things in this country, it appears to be a matter of £ s. d.' (SL, 29). One can add to this the opportunism of a great variety of characters in Such is Life and Rigby's Romance, or the actions of Barefooted Bob in The Buln-Bulin and the Brolga, as well as the observations on human nature in some of Furphy's letters.

The Wilcannia shower episode, like so many other episodes in the three novels, evolves around the crucial issue of justice. Firstly, I agree with Wilson's (1979:128) sharp observation that justice is the staple theme of the very comic chapter three in Such is Life, of which the Glover episode is a part. However, I would like to add that the idea of duty is equally important. Chapter three is interesting not because the reader sees the naked Collins strategically trying to obtain clothes, but because he encounters a lack of justice and duty in a variety of situations, particularly in regards to Andy Glover. With the Glover episode, it is frequently pointed out by critics that Collins has money while Glover has none, and that Collins ignores the ethical meditation on poverty "delivered" by his own mighty meerschaum (SL, 85-91). This leads Croft to state that Collins is 'too mean to share' (1991:156), a conclusion which is more or less restated in Croft's (1996:224) last essay on Furphy.

Yet the meditation on poverty is not so much a meditation on poverty, but an attack on the Church's disregard for 'earthly justice' vis-à-vis their 'conception of heavenly justice', which 'is found in the concession of equal spiritual birthright, based on the broad charter of common humanity, and forfeitable only by individual worthlessness or deliberate refusal' (SL, 88). To all intents and purposes, Collins does not ignore his duty to Glover, nor does he do him an injustice simply because 'purse-pride' and 'a sort of moral laziness, together with our artificial, yet not unpraiseworthy, repugnance to offering a money gift, had brought me out rather a Levite than a Samaritan' (SL, 95). Again, the Wilcannia shower episode, as well as Willoughby's observations on the pious zest for money in the colonies, gives the reader the necessary information

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that money is seen as a peculiar thing, and that justice is much better extended through gifts of food, tobacco and tea or water. One could argue that without money, even if one does view it as the root of all evil, one could not afford to offer gifts to a 'worn and weary brother' (Sil, 266) such as the Wilcannia stranger, or a 'bent and haggard wreck' (Sil, 91) like Andrew Glover.

As the episode clearly shows, Collins' act of supplying Glover with 'damper[,]...a large wedge of leathery cheese, a sheath-knife, and the quart pot and pannikin' (Sil, 91), as well as 'a plug of...tobacco' (Sil, 93), does not make him a mean individual or morally dubious because he consciously withholds his money. Furthermore, the Glover episode is not just confined to this short encounter, for it recurs on several occasions and, in each case, the issue of justice and duty in human relations comes to the fore with much scope. This is particularly the case with the "run-in" between Quarterman, the local Justice of the Peace, and Glover with regard to the burning of the former's haystack. There are several important points which readers need to observe. Firstly, it pays to observe Quarterman's character closely, since the outcome of the Glover episode depends on him, not Collins. During an encounter with another swagman, to whom he gives 'the usual civilities' of 'a pannikin of tea, some fried fish, and the slice of the edge of a damper' (Sil, 121), Collins is informed of Quarterman's character and the mood in the district:

[The swagman] followed fishing and duck-shooting for a living; but there was so many informers about these times that a man had to keep his weather-eye open if he wanted to use a net or a punt-gun. People needn't be so particular, for there was ole Q- had been warning and threatening him yesterday, and here was the two young Q-s out this morning at the skreek of daylight, falling red-gum spars to build a big shed, and the ole (man) out on horseback, picking the best saplings on the river. Ole Q- was a J. P. His place was just across the flat, with a garden reaching down to the lagoon. Q- himself was the two ends and the bight of a sanguinary dog' (Sil, 121).
Collins goes to see Quarterman in order to enquire after Pup, who had gone missing while Collins was busy stealing clothes from the latter's washing line. Collins finds Quarterman 'dining in solitary grandeur', and asks him if he has seen 'a big blue kangaroo dog' (Sil, 122). Quarterman's attitude is arrogant: 'I'm not thinking about your dog. You and your dog! I'm thinking about a valuable stack of hay I had burnt this morning; and you've given me a clue to the incendiary' (Sil, 123). This is interesting, for Collins had given Quarterman no clue whatsoever in regards to the perpetrator who burnt his haystack. Collins' playful description of his 'informer' (Sil, 122) are answers to Quarterman's questions concerning just how Collins came to know that Pup was on his property. In other words, Quarterman simply assumes that Collins' informer is the same man who burnt his haystack. What is even more interesting is Quarterman's own aptitude for knowledge. From a textual point of view, the interview between Collins and Quarterman unfolds over three pages, and the observant reader can safely assume that the interview lasts approximately ten to fifteen minutes.

During this time, Collins is subjected to a variety of name changes. At the beginning of the interview, Collins introduces himself and, contrary to Barnes' (1976:165) opinion, he does not give an alias nor does he play a role. Quarterman acknowledges Collins' name, using it three times only. From the fourth time onwards, Collins is addressed by the following names respectively: 'Mr. Connell', 'Mr. O'Connell', 'Mr. O'Connor', 'Mr. Connor' (Sil, 123), 'Mr. Connelly', 'Mr. Conway' (Sil, 124), 'Mr. Connellan', and 'Mr. Collingwood' (Sil, 125). This is despite the fact that Collins, shortly after being addressed as Mr. Conway, is asked by Quarterman for his 'address' (Sil, 124). Collins informs his reader that 'I wrote my name and official title, giving our departmental office in Sydney as a fine loose postal address, and laid the paper beside the magnate' (Sil, 124. My italics). Collins authorially shows that the Justice of the Peace is careless with any evidence given to him. Glover's incarceration for burning the hay stack does not happen because Collins had purposely implicated Glover with the crime.

Addressing Quarterman diplomatically, Collins confesses that 'I can't help taking a certain interest in this matter. Would it be impertinent in me to ask who the person was that saw the suspected
incendiary up the river on yesterday afternoon?' (SiL, 124). Quarterman replies that his informant is 'Mr. Arthur H-', who is a 'very respectable man, having personal knowledge of the incendiary' (SiL, 124). Once again, Quarterman is careless in matters of criminal inquiry, since observant readers know that Collins is the incendiary for whom the Justice of the Peace is looking. Collins himself tries to point this out: 'I think you will agree with me that a successful criminal prosecution is a Pyrrhic victory at best. At worst- that is, if you fail to prove your case; and, mind you, it's no easy matter to prove a case against a well-informed man by circumstantial evidence alone- if you fail to prove your case; then it's his turn, for malicious prosecution; and you can't expect any mercy from him' (SiL, 124).

Collins reiterates his point: 'you may be morally certain of the identity of the scoundrel, but your proofs require to be legally impregnable' (SiL, 125). Collins cites the Johnson case, where 'the scoundrel...got at Johnson for false imprisonment', stating that 'you hold the incentive in reserve, I think you said?' but 'pardon me- is it a sufficient one?' (SiL, 125). According to the angry Quarterman, 'I don't take much incentive to be sufficient for a vagabond without a shirt to his back!' (SiL, 125). Collins continues to press home his point: 'true...but "Seek whom the crime profits", says Machiavelli. What profit would it be to such a scoundrel to do you an injury, Mr. Q-?' (SiL, 125). Quarterman's answer is indicative of the division and rivalry between currency and Anglo-Australianism: 'the propertied classes is at the mercy of the thriftless classes' (SiL, 125). It is for this reason alone that the Justice of the Peace is determined to bring the incendiary 'to the book', making 'an example of him' and to 'make him smoke for it' (SiL, 123).

Quarterman backs down from arguing 'the matter' any further with 'Mr. Collingwood', noting from the written information Collins gave him that 'your business keeps you on the move' and that he ought to see his daughter, 'Miss Jemima, and tell her I authorise her to give you the dog. And a very fine dog he is' (SiL, 125). To all intents and purposes, Quarterman's moral stance is firmly based on a customary prejudice, which has probably been strengthened by his being the victim of arson 'at Ballarat' (SiL, 123), and his role as Justice of the Peace appears to do nothing more than perpetuate the
ignorance and injustice of the ongoing division and rivalry in the colonies. This conclusion is further supported by the evidence surrounding the haystack itself. When Collins sees Jemima Quarterman, she tells him that

[f]ather's not himself to-day....He blames us for burning an old straw-stack; and I'm sure we never done it. Mother's been at him to burn it out of the way this years back, for it was right between the house and the road; and it was '78 straw, rotten with rust. But I'm glad we didn't take on us to burn it, for father's vowing vengeance on whoever done it; and he's awful at finding out things' (SiL, 126).

Collins tries to convince Jemima that the fire could have been started in a variety of possible ways. According to Jemima, '[i]t seems very reasonable, sir....Anyway, I'm glad the old stack's out of the road. The place looks a lot cleaner' (SiL, 127). From the information given, the valuable haystack is not so valuable after all. But Quarterman's desire to prosecute the vagabonds and thriftless classes puts Glover in an awkward position. As Quarterman states to Collins, whom he calls Mr. O'Conner, 'I been the instigation of bringing more offenders, and vagabonds, and that class of people, to justice than anybody else in this district. If I'd my way, I'd stamp out the lawless elements in society' (SiL, 123). One wonders how many of these "offenders" suffered much injustice through the prejudices of men like Quarterman. Also, the fact that Glover suffers from both ophthalmia and deafness makes him unable to defend himself against the quick and clever prosecution of the Justice of the Peace, and one further wonders just how just Quarterman is by taking advantage of Glover and, perhaps, others like him.

It is after the retelling of this episode (SiL, 294-296) that Collins extends his duty and a sense of justice to Glover once more, by giving him his ophthalmia glasses which had lent an air of authority to his scholarly guardian-type. I agree with Croft (1991:201) that Collins understands his role in the incarceration of Andy Glover, but I do not think that the incarceration itself is the surprise which leads Collins to censor his recognition of Glover. Nor
do I agree with Indyk (1986:314-315), who suggests that Glover is Collins' double, and that the return of the swagman towards the close of *Such is Life* makes Collins unwillingly accountable for his earlier actions, which had led to Glover's imprisonment. As I have discussed, Collins does not attempt to escape the issue of justice or duty, since it is fundamental to his concerns with uplifting and upbuilding. Collins' cunning concealment of his identity is part and parcel of avoiding the wrath of Glover's mate, Terrible Tommy Armstrong, who is 'one of your practical, decided, cocksure men; guided by unweighed, unanalysed phenomena, and governed by conviction alone- the latter being based simply, though solidly, upon itself' (*Sil*, 296-297).

Terrible Tommy Armstrong is no different from Quartermaster and it is more than likely that Collins would prefer to wait for a tactical moment. Agreeing with Barnes (1993:46), I find that much of the confusion in this issue is the result of misreading Collins' role in the episodes involving Andy Glover. But I would equally extend this observation to Collins' role in the novels. According to Richters, *Such is Life* chronicles the moral history of its narrator and culminates in his fall from...grace at the moment when he fails or refuses to acknowledge even to himself the identity of the swagman [Glover] (1979:246). Because of this, Richters concludes that 'the central and possibly the unifying subject of *Such is Life*...is the history of Tom Collins' moral decline' (1979:246). In support of this conclusion, Richters states that Furphy, as an author, is concerned with 'the problem of man's "fallen" nature...through the actions as well as the theories of his narrator' (1979:257. My italics). Indeed, Richters writes that 'Furphy grapples with the further paradox not only of a recalcitrant reality but of a recalcitrant philosopher whose very philosophizing puts his humanity at risk' (1979:257).

I do not follow Richters' point, since many episodes in the three novels show Collins actively involved in the promotion of humanity within the context of equality, liberty, fraternity and the idea of happiness. Although Indyk notes that '[t]here seems to be nothing about himself that he isn't prepared to alter if the situation demands it', I have problems with his notion that Collins' 'pragmatism lends itself so well to the evasion of responsibility that it must raise the question as to whether there can really be any
morality in his attitude at all' (1986:314). It is true that Collins is pragmatic, executing suitable roles for certain situations, but he does not have a morally vacant attitude. Indyk seems to indicate this when he concludes that '[t]he diversity of his social “parts” allows no escape from the claims of social equality and moral responsibility' (1986:315). Whenever Collins does play a role, deceiving a particular character, he does so for a specific moral purpose. For example, Collins deceives Glover's mate and Avondale's boundary-rider, Terrible Tommy Armstrong, into believing that he is a fellow Scot, but the purpose of this deception is to find a safe-haven for Warrigal Alf's bullocks until Alf recovers from his illness (Sil, 160).

Nor do I agree with Croft's notion that '[t]he progress of the novel [Such is Life] shows the gradual deterioration of Tom from the energetic and charitable being of the first chapters, to the dandified conservative of the last chapter, whose callous but necessarily selfish treatment of Andy Glover is the final glimpse we are given of him in this novel' (1996:218). If Collins' treatment of Glover is necessarily selfish, then why bother to discuss Collins' gradual deterioration or moral decline? Would it not be better to investigate the idea that Collins is cruel to Glover in order to be kind? And, if this were the case, what purpose would it serve? Nevertheless, Croft believes that '[c]lothes are the signs of this deterioration' because Collins, having 'accumulated a bell-topper', semiotically shifts from an egalitarian image to a 'symbol of the bloated plutocrat' (1996:218). Since Collins never describes it, how does Croft know Collins' manner of dress in the initial stages of the novel? Rather than a bloated plutocrat, these clothes, along with the mighty meerschaum pipe, are meant to symbolize scholarly presence and authority.

Contrary to Croft's notion, Collins does not 'forget his simple duty to give alms and relieve the suffering of a fellow human being' (1996:225). Besides the Glover and Wilcannia shower episodes, readers ought to note that Collins helps Rory O'Halloran by giving him money, as well as his 'Shakespear as a keepsake, with a billy and pannikin, and a few days' rations' (Sil, 63), or the convivial way in which he shares tobacco with Willoughby (Sil, 34). And readers ought to bear in mind Collins' calm courage, clear intellect and high moral standard during Warrigal Alf's illness, particularly with the rescue of Alf's bullocks from impoundment at Yoongoolee station.
This is despite the fact that Warragal Alf is first introduced as an 'evil natured beggar' \textit{(SL, 6)} by Mosey, and that his reputation with the rest of the bullockies is no different, particularly William Cooper. Collins is not, as Suárez-Lafuente argues, 'a theorist' who is 'too slow and irresolute for action' (1994:45). Nor is Croft right to say that 'Tom is the epitome of that Wesleyan ethic which Rigby attacked, and which Joseph's elder brother John, epitomised -a committed Christian who nevertheless is quite happy to accumulate while others starve' (1996:225).

But this leads us to consider what kind of moral Justice and duty the novels put forth. Given the relationship between Glover and Quartermann, it is fair to say that the idea of justice in the novels is shaped by an informed proportionalism, rather than actions based on hearsay or ignorant speculation. Also, because justice requires action, it pays to bear in mind Collins' theory of the controlling alternatives, since any course of action must be decided on the basis of its ethical consequences. In short, the novels shape the idea of justice in light of consequentialism. The interesting thing to bear in mind, though, is the equally strong emphasis on duty, or deontology, whereby any action must be carried out within a given framework of \textit{customary} moral imperatives, as suggested by the idea of a national type. Although consequentialism and deontology stand opposed, it appears Furphy believed that neither can escape the requirements of the other, and that morality is best served by a proportional appeal to law, custom and situational ethics. Such a view is concurrent with the rest of his thought, particularly his emphasis on natural and civil rights in the 'practical, workable code of daily life' of the 'Sermon on the Mount' \textit{(SL, 89)}.

\textbf{3.2. Half Bushman and Half Bookworm: identity, well-being and the guardian-type.}

That Collins, as implied author, is preoccupied with the aforementioned issues is perhaps what Furphy, writing to Stephens, meant by 'the plan of the book is not like any other that I know of, - at least I trust not' \textit{(in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:29)}. In a letter to Franklin on the subject of \textit{My Brilliant Career}, Furphy wrote that 'our joint yet independent record ought to demonstrate the
existence of a bush-born type somewhat different from the crude little semi-savage of conventional Australian fiction' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:148). I think readers are meant to see Collins not only as this bush-born type, but also as the ground for the national type. Furthermore, I think Furphy believed that the self-same observation could be made about Franklin’s Sybyla Melvin, and it is interesting to bear her in mind when investigating Collins’ artistic rendering of the Australienne. Bearing in mind Plato’s comments about first impressions and permanent marks through fiction, it is my contention that Collins, as the implied author, creates and articulates a truth-embellished image of his self in order to flesh out artistically the right qualities of an Australian type. Because Collins is concerned with guardianship, readers ought to see him as a personification of Furphy’s belief in the relationship between a ‘purpose’ and ‘men’ with ‘high moral standard, calm courage, and clear intellect’ (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124.).

Collins should be seen as an artistic rendering of Plato’s three elements in the individual, demonstrating the need for their balance in order to achieve just actions toward people and society. It is interesting to note that Collins refers to himself as ‘Plato’ (BBB, 121, 125), and that he clings ‘to Plato’s beautiful thought...that no soul misses truth willingly’ (Sil, 87). What is this truth? Given that Collins’ thematic concerns take their cue from similar themes in Republic, this truth can be defined by the undeniably damaging effect of ignorance, division and rivalry. For this reason, Collins stresses the importance of education because it teaches one the skills to judge justly for well-being, both socially and individually. Nowhere is this more pertinent in both the novels and Republic than the first impressions and permanent marks of artistic representation in light of guardianship. The truth that no soul will miss willingly is to safeguard the right way of seeing life and responding to life for well-being.

As Socrates makes clear, this argument ‘is not a trivial one’, for ‘our whole way of life...is at issue’ (Rep. bk.1.352d). With this in mind, Collins’ notion that ‘we always think in words’ (RR, 137) is a rather revealing one, as is his statement that ‘[w]e are not such stuff as dreams are made on, but precisely the reverse’ (RR, 261). For this
reason, to know that one thinks in words is as important as knowing how to judge the impact of one's thought within the context of natural and civil rights. As Collins states, nothing is 'worse than a locally-seated and curable ignorance which makes men eager to subvert a human equality, self-evident as human variety, and impregnable as any mathematical axiom' (SlL, 87). Insofar as Collins' intellectualism is concerned, I think Furphy would have agreed with Milner's view that '[t]he function of the radical intellectual was to connect immediate objective to long-term ideal, in a rhetoric that could inspire both idealism and practical action' (1988:263). In a discussion on the psychological bases of national identity, William Scott states that identity and identification 'is a definition of self in terms of group membership', and that 'national identity may be represented as a [geometrical] congruence between self-concept and nation-concept' (1991:33).

But he is quick to point out 'that there are degrees of identification' (1991:34). While it is fair to say that 'judged characteristics of the nation may be incorporated into the self', it is equally important to note that 'judged characteristics of the self may be projected onto the nation' (Scott, 1991:34). For Scott, this kind of 'identification serves primarily to strengthen the ego against a hostile world by associating the self with a powerful other' (1991:34). Bearing in mind Collins' affected mannerisms, Scott's comments are beneficial to an understanding of Collins' uplifting and upbuilding in the novels' order of things. However, in Collins' case, there is also a greater awareness of one's impact on individuals and society, particularly with what one sees, weaves and projects onto the wider community through narrative. Readers should not see Collins' articulating his self, as ground for a national type, merely as an egoistic defence against a hostile world. Instead, readers ought to see that the self he projects onto the national type is one which emphasizes a high moral standard, calm courage and clear intellect. Any hostility is reserved for all forms of ignorance which undermine these qualities in guardianship.

Overall, the image of the national type supported by the novels is best explained through Furphy's own description of himself, namely 'half bushman and half bookworm' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:156). Defending his own learned style to the
reader, Collins states that "this habit of mine was acquired early in life, when my chief ambition was to emulate, or even excel, Macaulay's erudite "schoolboy" (BBB, 89). More importantly,

any genial pedant that casually assumes you to know who Oliver Cromwell was -when, in point of fact, you neither know nor want to know- is an angel of light compared with the transparent prig who, in simple sentences and words of one syllable contends (as in a book lying before me now) that the landlord is the greatest of all benefactors, seeing that to him the tenant owes his hovel, his pig-sty, his hen-house -in a word, his foot-hold on the crust of this planet. Distrust the presumptuous snob who avowedly writes down to an implied standard of adult information or intelligence, thus adding the insult of condescension to the injury of sinister purpose (BBB, 89).

The value of education has little to do with education for its own sake, but with a strategic need to foreground democracy and rights. For this reason, it is important to note that Collins' use of the term philosophy, or philosopher, should be seen within the context of a way of life, not simply a focus on academic argument or logic. Even though Plato's and Furphy's views on democracy differ, this view parallels Republic, where Socrates is presented as the embodiment of a moral and intellectual style of life towards the good. As Trevor Saunders explains, "Platonic justice" is an internal, psychological state, the condition of functional harmony between the rational, spirited and appetitive "parts" of the soul, a harmony crucially characterized by the domination exercised by reason and knowledge' (1987:26-27). Indeed, the idea of supervising the production of stories, as well as Plato's theory of art, strongly supports this kind of interpretation, for censorship suggests that the value of first impressions is wholly dependent on the idea of permanent marks in light of the good, which is the effect first impressions have on well-being.

To return to the novels, Plato's idea of the good, as an emphasis on well-being, contributes to their central theme, further 212.
qualifying the idea of uplifting and upbuilding within the context of democracy and rights, as well as clarifying the reason for a concern with the ethics of artistic representation, truth-embellishment, guardianship and the national type. Whether or not he was aware of the term, Furphy's novels show a deep concern for the Socratic idea of *eudaimonia*. According to Saunders, "[h]appiness" is the conventional but somewhat misleading translation of *eudaimonia*. It is not primarily a feeling, a warm glow of serenity and contentment; it is rather an objective state of affairs, something like "achievement and success in living" (1987:25). As Saunders explains, 'Socrates' view of the world was fundamentally teleological. He saw it as a rationally ordered structure, in which men, like many other things, have a function. That function is to fit in with the whole; that is what man is, in some sense, for' (1987:25). Furphy's view of the world seems to be similarly teleological, given the consistent use in the novels of the phrase "such is life", as well as the phrase "the order of things".

In this sense, '[t]o fit in, to fulfil one's function, is presumably advantageous and leads to happiness [*eudaimonia*] and [m]oral knowledge is, therefore, knowledge of that function' in light of knowing 'what will bring good and what will bring evil' (Saunders, 1987:25). With this in mind, it pays to recall Collins' notion that '[a]lternate sunshine and rain is the law of Nature; alternate smiles and tears is the law of human life; and this rhythmic reaction is as necessary to healthy moral being as the tide to the sea, or the wind to the atmosphere' (BBB, 23). Since the novels are concerned with *eudaimonia*, it is fruitful to bear in mind the general view of the national type in the 1890s. As White has already noted, 'many Australians were not content simply to be proved worthy of the old stock: some were so bold as to suggest that the new type was in fact a decided improvement on the old' (1981:73). Indeed, 'the virtues of the convicts, their enterprise and self-reliance, were said to have been passed on to the Australian type, while their faults had been bred out' (White, 1981:75).

In an age preoccupied with eugenics, White states that 'the idea of a national type reinforced ideas about the importance of "character" in the lives of men and women', for 'national prosperity, morality, and so on were thought to result from national character' 213.
Bearing in mind Scott's (1991:33-34) views on the degrees of identification between self and nation, the novels stress that the national type must be a symbiosis of self-qualities and other-qualities, and not simply a narrow provincialism. Discussing the notion that 'almost any serious writer' aims to make 'his reader a different person from what he was before', Northrop Frye states that '[t]wo forms of identity are involved in studying a work of literature. There is identity as, which is a basis of ordinary knowledge, and is a matter of fitting individuals [or things] into classes' (1990:77). And, '[t]here is also identity with, which has several dimensions' (Frye, 1990:78). According to Frye, '[a] metaphor of the "A is B" type expresses an identity with that is not found in ordinary experience', so that '[t]identity in this context means unity with variety' (1990:78).

Frye's views are quite applicable to Furphy's authorial intentions for two reasons. Firstly, the midrashic style of the novels, through Collins as the implied author, treats the national type as a categorically intertextual and recontextual process. Secondly, the educational dimension of the novels, through Collins' heroic self, approaches the national type as a vehicle for well-being, or a metaphorical identity-with the idea of the good. Although he does not connect Collins to the idea of authorship, preferring to approach him as a character and narrator, Wilson does observe that 'Tom creates himself out of his diary entries', for 'both his clarities and opacities, his sharpness and obtuseness, are self-bestowed' (1979:135. My italics). Discussing the closing paragraph, which is concerned with roleplay, Wilson states that '[t]he last sentences are important. They indicate the most difficult task of all in an anatomy of how (and what) men know: the problem of knowledge has both an outside and an inside; thus everyone must be an object of knowledge to himself' (1979:142). But, given the focus on individual and communal well-being, this view needs to be qualified, for the value of the self as an object of knowledge cannot be divorced from eudaimonia.

For this reason, I must disagree with Partington, who states that 'Furphy clearly believed that personal identity was already highly ambiguous in the Riverina. Collins' chameleon-like character may be a portent of a future in which the emancipated self can assume almost any role or point of view and possess very little other-directed social content and social identity' (1993:145). Partington's
comment is problematic, since identity, as the novels indicate, cannot be divorced from its social context, nor from the social idea of the good or well-being. But one should not take this to mean that identity is wholly determined by the social, for the idea of authorship, along with the theory of controlling alternatives, stresses the complexity of individually articulated roles throughout "life". As Wilson notes, 'all characters play roles, and all imply more than they tell' (1979:142). In short, 'role-playing is not limited to Tom...but pervades the novel in multiple instances' (Wilson, 1979:142). Because of the nature of the discussion, it is important to consider the following, if somewhat lengthy, declaration by Collins:

O. W. Holmes remarks that each of us is the totting-up of two columns of figures - paternal and maternal. This is true of the very small baby; it is not true of the adult. The latter is the totting-up of one column, namely, his own self-discipline - headed, to be sure, by Holmes's twofold total as a single item....Certainly, self-discipline is very largely directed and limited by extraneous conditions (BBB, 7).

And,

[1] it is an axiom of mine -and in no way clashing with what I said just now touching the column of figures, headed by Holmes's twofold total- that a man, if not trimmed, espaliered, and pot-bound, by routine systems of education or social conventionalities, naturally burgons into a specialist. I would go so far as to say that, not only is each individual designed to do something well, but he is fashioned by Nature to do that something better than anybody else. Man, though born in a state of deplorable helplessness and sottish ignorance, is inherently dowered with certain rudimentary talents. These, reaching the dignity of joey-faculties, are developed, this way or that way, by the operation of a Will, which (never forget) is in turn moulded by outward conditions. And there being no

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Such thing in Nature as uniformity of power, the strongest of these faculties -circumstances being favourable- dominates and dwarfs the rest.... Under present conditions, we find one man who can do nothing but cheat; another who can do nothing but show off; another who can do nothing but loaf; another who can do nothing but toll. And so on (BBB, 15-16).

Given its emphasis on the shaping of character and identity, readers ought to be aware of three very pertinent elements in the passage, namely education, experience and aptitude or talent. In the preliminary discussion to the idea of justice, society and guardianship, Socrates states that 'no two of us are born exactly alike. We have different natural aptitudes, which fit us for different jobs' (Rep. bk.2.370b). More importantly, it is 'better to exercise one skill [technē] than to try to practise several', just as '[i]t is fatal in any job to miss the right moment for action' (Rep. bk.2.370b). One could say that Collins' aptitude for roleplay is naturally suited to the skills of authorship and, with an educated awareness of matters regarding eudaimonia, he chooses the right moment to weave together a truth-embellished and loosely-federated national image, hence his joy at being unemployed. As Socrates states, '[q]uantity and quality are therefore more easily produced when a man specializes appropriately on a single job for which he is naturally fitted, and neglects all others' (Rep. bk.2.370c).

For this reason, Socrates concludes that 'we should make it our business, if we can, to choose men with suitable natural aptitudes for the defence of our state' (Rep. bk.2.374e). According to Socrates, '[i]n other cases this does not matter much -the community suffers nothing very terrible if its cobblers are bad and become degenerate and pretentious; but if the Guardians of the laws and state, who alone have the opportunity to bring it good government and prosperity, become a mere sham, then clearly it is completely ruined' (Rep. bk.4.421a). Although he would not disagree with these points, especially with the poor examples set by the colonial governments in the federation debate, I think Furphy believes that the degeneration of skills and moral principles in the
community does harm the community. Given the many episodes where Collins either sets or makes a moral example, the novels strongly suggest that it is important to safeguard aptitude, skills and **eudaimonia** at all levels of human interaction, especially if one desires to achieve and maintain a national community.

Yet Plato is aware of this fact, for he has Socrates state that 'cohesion' is 'the result of common feelings of pleasure and pain which you get when all the members of a society are glad or sorry at the same successes and failures' (*Rep.* bk.5.462b). His solution is to make words which denote possession a communal idea, rather than an individual one, so that '[o]ur citizens, then, are devoted to a common interest, which they call *my own*; and in consequence entirely share each other's feelings of joy and sorrow' (*Rep.* bk.5.464a). Despite his sharing Plato's belief in the need for a common good, Furphy shows this to be very problematic, given the sheer complexity of life in the daily plebiscite and peoples' tendencies to privilege natural rights over civil rights in light of desire. One only needs to look to the first chapter of *Such Is Life* to see that some of the bullockies' opportunism undermines any true sense of community because of degenerated skills and moral principles. This, in turn, affects their identity or roleplay, their opinions of others and other's opinions of them, which ultimately find a voice and a value in the much grander narratives of Australian national identity and experience.

Given the novels' concerns with **eudaimonia**, it is interesting to note that the idea of the good finds equal voice in the thought of Epictetus, whom Furphy called 'that grand old stoic' because he made 'the path of self respect...so plain, so attractive, and so practicable' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:147). However, unlike Plato's exclusive concern with a guardian class, Epictetus seeks to make the principles of **eudaimonia** applicable to all. In a discourse entitled 'What Is The True Nature Of The Good?', Epictetus states that it is 'the power to understand how [to] deal with...impressions' (*Dts.* bk.2.8.6). Elsewhere, he states that '[t]he specific material that the good and noble man works upon is his own governing faculty...and it is the function of the good man to deal with his impressions in accordance with nature' (*Dts.* bk.3.3.1). And, in an earlier discourse, Epictetus states that 'if you ask me what is
the good of man, I can only reply to you that it consists in a certain disposition of our choice' (Dis. bk.1.8.16. My italics). For this reason, 'it is the task of the educated man to form a right judgment in all...cases', for 'whatever the difficulty that afflicts us, we must bring forward, the appropriate aid against it' (Dis. bk.1.27.2).

As the first passage of Enchetridion strongly implies, eudaimonia is knowing that '[s]ome things are up to us and some are not up to us' (1990:325). If we recall Enchetridion's emphasis on roleplay, especially its claim that your choice 'is to play the assigned part well' because the choice of the role 'belongs to someone else' (1990:329), then it is important to see that one's identity is based on the right judgment of certain impressions in light of the good, or well-being. Bearing in mind Collins' concern with authoring and censoring certain impressions, chiefly those of characters or identities who upset or have the potential to upset the uplifting and upbuilding of an Australian identity, the idea of personal and national identity in the novels is conceived no differently from Plato's concern with aptitude, skills and eudaimonia, nor Epictetus' concern with impressions, disposition and judgment. Collins' discussion of the theory of the controlling alternatives uses Shakespearean identities to look at the results of certain choices and consequences, due to certain aptitudes and judgments, within the context of the good or well-being. With Hamlet as the first example, Collins states that up to a certain point of time, the Prince governs his own destiny - at least, as far as the Ghost's commission is concerned, and this covers the whole drama. He is master and umpire of his circumstances, so that when two or more lines of action, or a line of action and a line of inaction, appear equally efficacious, he can select the one which appears to be of least resistance. But subsequent to that point of time, he is no longer the arbiter of his own situation, but rather the puppet of circumstances. There are no more divergent roads; if he desires to leave the one he has chosen, he must break blindly through a hedge of moral antagonisms. His alternatives have become so lopsided that practically there is only one course open.

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The initial exercise of judgment was not merely an antecedent to later developments of the plot; it was a Rubicon-crossing, which has committed the hero to a system of interlaced contingencies; and the tendency of this system bears him away, half-conscious of his own impotence, to where the rest is silence. The turning point is where Hamlet engages the Players to enact the Murder of Gonzago (Sil, 69).

Referring to Othello’s question, “Who can control his fate?”, Collins replies, “[n]o one indeed. But every one controls his options, chooses his alternative. Othello himself had independently evolved the decision which fixed his fate, recognising it as such an alternative’ (Sil, 69). To return to the issue of identity, or roleplay, one can say that its articulation, or the art of playing, is an option which, as a major or minor alternative, fixes one’s fate toward a certain direction. This seems to be the case with Macbeth, for Collins states that “[t]he interest of the play centres on the poise of incentive between action and non-action, and the absolute free will of election. But that election once made, we see -and the hero himself acknowledges- a practical inevitableness in all succeeding atrocities which mark his career as king’ (Sil, 69).

This observation is applicable to Collins’ use of the other two key Shakespearean identities. In other words, the articulation of an identity is central to the issue of choice and consequence, as well as the issue of judging one’s first impressions correctly, particularly in light of eudaimonia. Illustrating the point that numerous judgments concerning impressions or aptitudes are made unwisely, Collins states, ’how often do we accept a major-alternative, whilst innocently oblivious to its gravity!’ (Sil, 69). According to R.S. White, ’[i]t seems perfectly valid -and quite helpful- to argue that each of Shakespeare’s tragic heroes makes a profoundly important decision which turns out to be either misguided (in the case of Othello), or compulsive (Macbeth), or wilful (Lear), or conscientious (Hamlet) -and that none of these decisions is initially contemplated solely on a moral level’ (1989:20).

But, while ’Macbeth and Hamlet do indeed debate the moral nature of their future conduct’, I must disagree with R.S. White’s
notion that "they can be seen as just as "irresponsible" in their own ways as Collins" (1989:21. My italics). Regardless of how one sees Hamlet, Othello or Macbeth, Collins is far from morally irresponsible. Nevertheless, for R.S. White,

Collins' theory...can steer us away from what I regard as the two great dead-ends of Shakespearean criticism: the notion of the "flawed hero", which becomes fairly irrelevant, and the notion that Shakespeare is somehow mystically interested in morality as an abstract philosophical issue rather than as embedded in the impetuous actions of men and women played upon the stage in gripping narratives. It also encourages us not to accept the "heroes" at their own estimate but instead to focus attention on their actions and the consequences for others in the play (1989:21)

Although R.S. White's observations concerning the net result of Collins' theory are very astute, I must disagree with his notion that the theory makes the issue of a tragic flaw irrelevant. It is more than likely that Furphy was familiar with the idea of the tragic flaw, and he may have taken it to mean an ill-judgment based on aptitude and impulse in light of a major alternative of choices and consequences. I do not think one should take this to mean, as Partington does, that 'fatal decisions are the result of basic character defects in great minds' (1993:212). This is an oversimplification, for it suggests that tragic consequences are unavoidably determined, thereby nullifying the issue of choice. If one considers the tragic flaw within the context of natural aptitude or disposition, remembering that Collins' concern with uplifting and upbuilding shows him equally concerned with impressions and judgment, then one could say that Shakespeare's tragic heroes serve to illustrate the complex relationship between one's aptitude, one's choice and the consequences of one's identity and action on others in light of eudaimonia.

Given the nature of the discussion so far, I must also disagree with Barnes' notion that '[t]he central character, Tom Collins, is
fully established as a personality, but we do not receive the experience *through* his mind' (1971:118-119). Nor does Furphy, according to Barnes, 'attempt to record the movement of the human mind' (1971:119). Opposing Furphy to Virginia Woolf, Barnes explains that 'his concern is with the pattern of events, not the human consciousness', and so '[h]e creates characters from the outside, as they appear to the observer', revealing 'them mainly through their speech' (1971:118). While this last point is not untrue, I find Barnes' claims to be a good illustration of an incorrect use of intertextuality as an interpretative tool. The assumption that Woolf's style is *the* style for mapping the movement of the human consciousness, and the conclusion that Furphy's style, because it is not like Woolf's, does not concern itself with the mind, are simply fallacious.

More than any other quality, readers identify with Collins through his mind. More importantly, the development of "his" novels, because of uplifting and upbuilding, concern themselves chiefly with the many aspects of the mind's movement through time and space, namely first impressions and permanent marks, aptitude, education, judgment, choice and consequence, and *eudaimonia*. Barnes may be correct in saying that '[a]s a writer, he [Furphy] has more in common with the comic novelists of the eighteenth century than with the psychological realists of his own time' (1979:35), but this does not mean that 'Furphy is no explorer of feelings' because 'he shies away from the region of private experience', or that the novel has an 'inner emptiness' (Barnes, 1979:24). Bearing in mind my contention that Collins is a *philosophe*, one ought to see his inner life as an inner Enlightenment, whereby the aforementioned issues concerning the mind and *eudaimonia* are passionately addressed to his observant reader, his philosophical confidant. Nowhere is this more prevalent than the various meditations in the three novels.

Given the importance of artistic representation, guardianship and the national type in the novels, the meditations illustrate Collins' fundamental belief in the self-evident truth of rights, education and rational judgment to the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia and its national type. As Collins states, '[e]rudition, even in the humblest sphere of life, is the sweetest solace, the unfailing refuge, of the restless mind; but if the bearer thereof be not able to
do something well enough to make a living by it, his education is simply outclassed, overborne, and crushed by his own superior ignorance’ (Sil, 34). Furthermore, this situation is equally the case for Furphy, as the many letters discussing ignorance-shifting and the essay on world federation testify. More importantly, each meditation tackles a particular issue in order to stress the universal value of fine tuning one’s judgment for amendments in knowledge and artistic representation, thereby foregrounding the role of the mind and inner life to achieve eudaimonia. No example from Such is Life better illustrates this need for the fine tuning of judgment than Collins’ meditation on gentlemen (Sil, 31-34), which is the first to occur in the novel, as noted by Wilkes (1985:4-5).

Taking pity on Willoughby’s struggles, Collins states that ‘he was a type -and, by reason of his happy temperament, an exceedingly favourable type- of the “gentleman,” shifting for himself under normal conditions of back-country life’ (Sil, 32). Because of this, Collins launches his attack:

Urbane address, faultless syntax, even that good part which shall not be taken away, namely, the calm consciousness of inherent superiority, are of little use here. And yet your Australian novelist finds no inconsistency in placing the bookish student, or the city dandy, many degrees above the bushman, or the digger, or the pioneer, in vocations which have been the life-work of the latter (Sil, 32).

Using Willoughby, Collins’ point is to illustrate that outdated or inappropriate values in art, within the context of first impressions and permanent marks, lead to ill-judgment and unnecessary struggle:

Without doubt, it is easier to acquire gentlemanly deportment than axe-man’s muscle; easier to criticise an opera than to identify a beast seen casually twelve months before; easier to dress becomingly than to make a bee-line straight as the sighting of a theodolite, across strange country in foggy weather; easier to recognise the various costly vintages than to live.
contently on the smell of an oil rag. When you take this back elevation of the question, the inconsistency becomes apparent. And the *longa* of Art, viewed with the *brevts* of Life, makes it at least reasonable that when a man has faithfully served one exclusive apprenticeship, he will find it too late in the day to serve a second. Moreover, there are few advantages in training which do not, according to present social arrangements, involve corresponding penalties (Sil, 32).

Collins' attacks on the idea of gentleman should be seen within the context of judgment, aptitude, skill and *eudaimonia*. Discussing the dangers of 'ignorance' in 'each sphere of life' (Sil, 32), Collins does not reject the idea of gentleman entirely, but seeks to recontextualize it in light of the idea of rights, as well as the aptitudes and skills naturally suited to life in the back-country. Despite the fact that an actual gentleman, who 'was brought up so utterly and aristocratically useless', is deemed to be 'mentally and physically...fit for anything',

> [o]ur subject is not the “gentleman” of actual life. *He* is an unknown and elusive quantity, merging insensibly into saint or scoundrel, sage or fool, man or blackleg. *He* runs in all shapes, and in all degrees of definiteness. Our subject is that insult to common sense, that childish slap in the face of honest manhood, the “gentleman” of fiction, and of Australian fiction pre-eminently (Sil, 32-33).

Indeed,

> it is surely time to notice the three-penny braggadocio of caste which makes the languid Captain Vernon de Vere (or words to that effect) an overmatch for half-a-dozen hard-muscled white savages, any one of whom would take his lordship by the ankles, and wipe the battlefield with his patrician visage; which makes the
pale, elegant aristocrat punch Beezlebub out of Big Mick, the hod-man, who, in unpleasant reality, would feel the kick of a horse less than his antagonist would the wind of heaven, visiting his face too roughly; which makes a party of resourceful bushman stand helpless in the presence of flood or fire, till marshalled by some hero of the croquet lawn; above all, which makes the isocratic and irreverent Australian fawn on the “gentleman,” for no imaginable reason except that the latter says “deuced” instead of “sanguinary,” and “Jove” instead of “by sheol.” Go to; I'll no more on 't; it hath made me mad (SIL, 33).

Collins suggests that if Australian art does not change its attitudes or values to the idea of gentleman, then its first impressions and permanent marks will leave too many in an ill-prepared state, making grave misjudgments about their aptitude and skill to survive in the back-country. In short, Anglo-Australian art perpetuates a mindset where too many will struggle like Willoughby, for the environment will quickly level the utterly and aristocratically useless man:

And don't fall back upon the musty subterfuge which, by a shifting of value of the term, represents “gentleman” as simply signifying a man of honour, probity, education, and taste; for, by immemorial usage, by current application, and by every rule which gives definite meaning to words, the man with a shovel in his hand, a rule in his pocket, an axe on his shoulder, a leather apron on his abdomen, or any other badge of manual labour about him -his virtues else be they as pure as grace, as infinite as man may undergo- is carefully contradistinguished from the “gentleman”. The “gentleman” may be a drunkard, a gambler, a debauchee, a parasite, a helpless potterer; he may be a man of spotless life, able and honest; but he must on no account be a man with broad palms, a workman amongst workmen. The “gentleman” is not
necessarily gentle; but he is necessarily genteel. Etymology is not at fault here; gentility, and gentility alone, is the qualification of the 'gentleman' \( (SiL, 33) \).

According to Croft, '[Collins] does, it is true, indulge in a number of attacks on the concept of a gentleman, but we should be sensitive to his inconsistencies and contradictions' \( (1991:88) \). There is neither inconsistency nor contradiction in the attacks. Instead, one ought to see Collins' meditation as an attack launched by a gentleman and a \textit{philosophe} against an aristocratic idea of gentleman, which keeps 'the Lower Orders' \( (SiL, 34) \) from self-evident rights such as the uplifting and upbuilding of their personal and national identity. Collins does not attack the idea of gentleman in order to nullify it entirely, for he is 'no more inclined to decry social culture than moral principle; but [Collins acknowledges] no \textit{aristocracy} except one of service and self-sacrifice, in which he that is chief shall be servant, and he that is greatest of all, servant of all' \( (SiL, 33. \text{My italics}) \).

One only needs to re-examine the dialogue between Willoughby and Collins after his first meditation to note that the issue of sharing tobacco is designed to foreground the importance of social welfare between men of the Riverina \( (SiL, 34) \). In this sense, it is important to note that the transaction occurs between two 'types' of gentlemen, namely Collins and Willoughby, against a background of heroes who indulge more in opportunism than egalitarianism. Barnes is right to note that Willoughby is 'an anti-heroic version of the English gentleman' \( (1990:218) \). But, rather than an attack on Willoughby's own character, the meditation on gentleman is, for Collins, the first of many meditations where he strategically attacks the aristocratic principles of Anglo-Australianism in both art and life. Again, I shall appeal to Croft who argues that '[m]any readers will disagree violently with the notion of Tom Collins as a gentleman, but I would ask them to look carefully at what we see of Tom in Furphy's works' \( (1991:88) \). But Collins' idea of the new world gentleman does not involve an acceptance of old world attitudes.

Dutton is wrong to conclude that 'Tom Collins, complete with ragbag of disorganised knowledge and Shakespearean quotations, [is] lost somewhere between the gentleman and the bullock-driver, and
belonging to neither species' (1965:15. My italics). Collins is far from lost. Like Willoughby, Collins wants to make himself 'mutually agreeable' so that 'the natural result is a grace and refinement' (Sil, 35) of character. However, this should not be seen as a pandering to Anglo-Australian custom or values. Instead, Collins' idea of a gentleman is not aristocratic, but defined by the principles of the Rights of Man, which he considers to be fundamental to the uplifting and upbuilding of the Australian nation and its type. For this reason, Willoughby's notion that such a measure of grace and refinement can only be achieved through 'inherited wealth' (Sil, 35) is overturned by the consistent stress on equality, education and rational judgment in light of the good or well-being. As Collins states,

[t]o be sure, there are men of social culture who gallantly and conspicuously maintain an all-round superiority in the society to which I myself hereditarily belong, namely the Lower Orders; but their appearances are like angel's visits -in the obvious, as well as in the conventional but remoter sense. I can count no less than three men of this stamp among my ten thousand acquaintances. When the twofold excellence of such ambidexters is not stultified by selfishness, you have in them a realised ideal upon which their Creator might pronounce the judgment that it is very good. Move heaven and earth, then, to multiply that ideal by the number of the population. The thing is, at least, theoretically possible; for it is in no way necessary that the manual worker should be rude and illiterate; shut out from his rightful heirship of all the ages. Nor is it any more necessary that the social aristocrat -ostentatiously useless, as he generally is- should hold virtual monopoly of the elegancies of life (Sil, 34).

As I have discussed several times throughout this thesis, the contrast between the old and the new is a strategy of equal force in the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson. One can say that Emerson is
also concerned with guardianship, and that his guardian-type is best articulated in 'The American Scholar'. On an Epictetian note, Emerson states that '[t]he office of the scholar is to cheer, to raise, and to guide men by showing them facts amidst appearances. He plies the slow, unhonored, and unpaid task of observation' ([1837] 1985:95). Furthermore,

[t]he scholar is that man who must take up into himself all the ability of the time, all the contributions of the past, all the hopes of the future. He must be an university of knowledges. If there be one lesson more than another which should pierce his ear, it is, The world is nothing, the man is all; in yourself is the law of all nature, and you know not yet how a globule of sap ascends; in yourself slumbers the whole of Reason; it is for you to know all; it is for you to dare all (Emerson, [1837] 1985:103-104).

Emerson argues that '[l]ife is our dictionary. Years are well spent in country labors; in town; in the insight into trades and manufactures; in frank intercourse with many men and women; in science; in art; to the one end of mastering in all their facts a language by which to illustrate and embody our perceptions' ([1837] 1985:93). As Collins states, 'there is something well worth study in the spectacle of a man' (RR, 227). According to Emerson, '[c]olleges and books only copy the language which the field and the work-yard make' ([1837] 1985:94). And, in this sense, 'Man Thinking must not be subdued by his instruments. Books are for the scholar's idle times' (Emerson, [1837] 1985:89). But, from reading Furphy, one gets the impression that books do more than just "copy" the language of the "field" and "work-yard". They creatively give shape to life. Perhaps it might be said that the book which thematically treats life is more important than life itself. This is because the book unifies the experiences of life and embeds those experiences with a purpose.

Emerson makes clear that '[e]ach age, it is found, must write its own books; or rather, each generation for the next succeeding. The books of an older period will not fit this' ([1837] 1985:87-88). If and when this occurs, then there is 'creative reading as well as
creative writing' (Emerson, [1837] 1985:90). In short, '[w]hen the mind is braced by labor and invention, the page of whatever book we read becomes luminous with manifold allusion. Every sentence is doubly significant, and the sense of our author is as broad as the world' (Emerson, [1837] 1985:90). Barnes argues that '[Furphy] did not want to accept the generally pessimistic forecasts of the evolving Australian type' (1990: 233). Indeed, 'the character of Tom Collins himself is a denial of the commonly accepted view of Australians as having no interests in things of the mind, and the whole work implicitly denies that English society provides a norm against which the Australians will be found wanting' (Barnes, 1990:233). As Emerson explains,

\[t\]he main enterprise of the world for splendor, for extent, is the upbuilding of a man. Here are the materials strewn along the ground. The private life of one man shall be a more illustrious monarchy, more formidable to its enemy, more sweet and serene in its influence to its friend, than any kingdom in history. For a man, rightly viewed, comprehendeth the particular natures of all men. Each philosopher, each bard, each actor has only done for me, as by a delegate, what one day I can do for myself ([1837] 1985:99-100. My italics).

Because Collins is meant to be seen as the Australian scholar, I must disagree with Barnes' notion that '[t]he fictional world of Such is Life is notable for its “absences”. Collins is a man on his own: his background is suggested only in the vaguest way, and no clear sense of his biography emerges from the narrative' (1990:222). Collins' background is marked purposefully by a multiplicity of occupations rather than vagueness. Among others, he is seen as a civil servant (25, 37) and ex-bullock-driver (46) in Such is Life, as a drover (xviii) and a swagman (249) in Rigby's Romance, and a mechanical expert (1) in The Buln-Buln and the Brolga. Because readers first see him as a 'Deputy-Assistant-Sub-Inspector' (SiL, 94) and 'an official of the ninth class' (SiL, 37), it is interesting to bear in mind the idea of the public or civil servant and compare Collins with his superior,
Rudolph Winterbottom.

The result of such a comparison is quite fruitful, for Winterbottom's only merit for securing his official position appears to be his place in an Anglo-Australian aristocracy. As Willoughby states, 'I scarcely think Mr. Rudolph Winterbottom holds any Government situation. His private fortune is fully sufficient for all demands of even good society. Ah! now I have it! His son Rudy -his third or fourth son- holds some appointment' (Sil, 38). Within the context of the national type as a scholarly guardian-image and the novels' aforementioned concerns, as well as Collins' own scholarly aptitude and skills, Rudolph Winterbottom hardly seems fit to hold a position which is superior to Collins. Despite his Anglo-Australian paternalism, Winterbottom is artistocratically useless, and Collins unveils this fact by showing his readers Winterbottom's letter, in which Collins is given his official orders with 'child-like penmanship' and 'chance-like orthography' (Sil, 131). To all intents and purposes, the comparison between "Collins" and Winterbottom allows Collins, as implied author, to foreground the injustice to the idea of rights.

More importantly, Collins' numerous occupations and roles foreground the scholar's various connections to the "system", suggesting that he is out to neutralise rivalries and is himself an emerging sign of the national type in all its complexity and loosely-federated diversity. Like Whitman, whose relevance I will discuss a little more in a moment, Collins lays claim to his "self" as being 'large' and containing 'multitudes' (Leaves of Grass, 79). And, like Emerson, who originally expressed this synthesis of the one and the many in the character of the American Scholar, Collins wishes to make clear that 'Man is not a farmer, or a professor, or an engineer, but he is all. Man is priest, and scholar, and statesman, and producer, and soldier....Man is thus metamorphosed into a thing, into many things' ([1837] 1985:84). For this reason I must disagree with H.P. Heseltine, who states that

...the intricate complexities of plot create an enormous gap between the ultimate purpose of the novel and the stuff of which it was made. By a tremendous effort of the will and imagination Furphy bridged that gap through the very artifice of his plotting, an effort
which for once allowed a nineteenth-century novelist almost to escape the tyranny of an uncertain self (1986:8. My italics).

There is actually no gap between the ultimate purpose of the novel and the stuff of which it was made, for the loosely federated sketches of National life focus the reader's attention on the need for an imagined community through the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia. Collins may claim that 'we know what we are, but we know not what we shall be' (Sil, 70). But this should not be seen as a confession of uncertainty. Instead, this claim ought be seen within the context of Collins' capacity as scholar and teacher for both the bullockies and his readers. In other words, rather than an uncertain self, one ought to see a preoccupation in the novels with the truth-embellished self. And, given the issues discussed in this section, one can say that Collins attempts to teach an appropriate way of seeing and responding to life for the sake of eudaimonia. In a letter to Kate Baker, placing great value on her vocation as a teacher, Furphy writes '[y]our work will never perish. Your contribution to the sum of human progress is definite and genuine' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:99).

Given Furphy's emphasis on the importance of creating a eudaimonically truth-embellished self, it is interesting to compare Collins to Whitman. Collins makes several important allusions to Whitman. In Such is Life, Collins states that 'whatever else a man sings, he always sings himself. But you must know how to interpret' (258). In Rigby's Romance, the allusion is more direct, for Thompson reminds Collins of the 'ten masterpieces of poetry' the latter had told him about 'at Deniliquin in the spring of 1872' (53). Included in the 'ten masterpieces' is 'any poem of Walt Whitman's' (53), which suggest that Leaves of Grass itself may be one of the ten masterpieces.

Of further interest is Collins' notion that Pup, his kangaroo-dog, is 'a law unto himself (RR, 240): a phrase used by Whitman, in his poem, 'For Him I Sing', to express his intent to awaken the natural self-reliance of the new world Man or American Adam, which I will discuss more in a moment. Although Pup's antics throughout the novels suggests that to be 'a law unto himself' means to be
unruly, I do not think that this is entirely the case. The phrase also foregrounds Pup's natural self-reliance, and it is this idea of a natural self-reliance, tempered by a moral consciousness, which readers need to bear in mind when dealing with Collins. I think this is what Furphy meant when he wrote to Cathels, asking him for information on Kingsley's novel, that 'Tom C., like Pup, is a law unto himself' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:42). However, Pup is self-reliant or "a law unto himself" in a natural order of things, while Collins is self-reliant or "a law unto himself" within the moral constraints of a human order.

Besides Furphy, another strong supporter of Whitman was the Australian poet, Bernard O'Dowd, whom Furphy described to Cecil Winter as 'an ideal democrat -able and scholarly, strong and sympathetic, temperate and uncompromising, absolutely without fear and without reproach' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:132). According to McLeod (in McLeod, ed, 1964:9-17), O'Dowd addressed many groups, including The Australaeum and the Australian Natives' Association on the spirit of Whitman and democracy. Indeed, when one reads the letters O'Dowd wrote to Whitman (in McLeod, ed, 1964:18-39), one becomes aware of the great zeal the former had for his "teacher". Perhaps Furphy had had personal discussions with O'Dowd or had listened to him giving a public address on Whitman and democracy, since '[h]is son Sam was a member of the Australian Natives Association for a short while in the 1890s' (Barnes, 1990:156).

Setting aside Whitman's status as real author, one of the first observations that can be made about Whitman's Leaves of Grass is its rendering of Whitman as both implied author and hero, or creator and created. Indeed, the ideas of truth-embellishment and well-being are key themes throughout the work. As Whitman wrote in 'Song of Myself', 'Long enough have you dream'd contemptible dreams,/ Now I wash the gum from your eyes' (LG, 75). For this reason, one can say that Whitman is also a teacher of a way of seeing and responding to life which is conducive to eudaimonia. In other words, Whitman is concerned with the uplifting and upbuilding of America. Furthermore, considering that the self-same themes exist in both Leaves of Grass and the three novels, readers ought to note that Collins and Whitman, within the idea of authorship, write from an
enlightened belief in equality, liberty and fraternity, creating a truth-embellished, heroic self as full expression of these beliefs.

Collins' 'Riverina' and Whitman's 'America' represent the genesis of a nation and the means by which a new people shall rise. As R.W.B. Lewis explains, '[i]n the case of Whitman, the type of extreme Adamic romantic, the metaphor gains its power from a proximity to the literal, as though Whitman really were engaged in the stupendous task of building a world that had not been there before the first words of his poem' (1962:114). Speaking of the mystical dimension of 'Song of Myself', Miller Jr explains that '[t]he traditional mystic attempted to annihilate himself and mortify the senses in preparation for absorption into the Transcendent' while 'Whitman magnifies the self and glorifies the senses in his progress toward Union' (1962:93). Or, as Lewis notes, 'Whitman acted on the hopeful conviction that the new Adam started from himself; having created himself, he must next create a home' (1962:115). In this sense, 'the Adamic personality...had to become the maker of his own conditions...if he were to have any conditions or any achieved personality at all' (Lewis, 1962:115).

In his poem, 'For Him I Sing', Whitman declares,

For him I sing,
I raise the present on the past,
(As some perennial tree out of its roots, the present on the past,)
With time and space I dilate and fuse the immortal laws,
To make himself by them the law unto himself.


What is implied by this 'law unto himself'? Firstly, that a man can be made a law unto himself is the staple theme of Leaves of Grass. In this sense, 'For Him I Sing', as well as 'One's-Self I Sing', function as a prelude to the artistic uplifting and upbuilding of man by way of the self-evident, natural and civil rights of all men and women, which were established by the French National Assembly and its Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens in 1789, supported by Paine ([1791] 1995) and asserted by Jefferson's 232.
Declaration of Independence. Regarding these prefatory poems, Middlebrook states that they establish 'the identity of "Myself," or "the Real Me," as a fiction -the personification of an act of imagination' (1974:27). I think Whitman's style is a perfect example of Furphy's idea of truth-embellishment, for identity in *Leaves of Grass* is more than simply an imaginative act or fiction. Rather, Whitman's style employs the new world to create the new world, telling the lies he ought to have told. In this sense, identity is an act of eudaimonic creativity which attempts to establish the justice of 'self' and 'nation' through man's self-evident rights, or his being a law unto himself.

As Collins had stated, 'human equality' is as 'self-evident as human variety, and impregnable as any mathematical axiom' (*Sil*, 87). In short, '[t]he principle of being a law unto one's self means *self-reliance*' (Briggs, 1968:213. My italics). Or, in the words of Emerson, who coined the term,

[t]here is a time in every man's education when he arrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance; that imitation is suicide; that he must take himself for better for worse as his portion; that though the wide universe is full of good, no kernel of nourishing corn can come to him but through his toil bestowed on that plot of ground which is given to him to till (1985 [1841]: 176).

Whitman, as both the implied author and hero, is the prophet of a nation with the new covenant or gospel, *Leaves of Grass*, under his arm. He is prepared to assert his new-found identity through an act of self-reliance and 'turn the bridegroom out of bed and stay with the bride myself' (*LG*, 59). As Briggs notes, '[Whitman] maintained that nature and the cosmos or God are not significant but for the soul of man. Man gives meaning to the universe' (1968:66). According to Whitman, 'I hear and behold God in every object, yet understand God not in the least' (*LG*, 77). In this sense, '[t]he reality of God for Whitman is in man, not either theism or pantheism or deism or atheism' (Briggs, 1968:86). Nor is the reality of God evident in an old world order of kingship, divine right and aristocracy, as indicated by

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the injustices of George III against the American colonies.

Paine, arguing against Burke’s theological ‘catalogue of barriers...between man and his Maker’, asserts that ‘[t]he Mosaic account of the creation’ fully expresses ‘the unity or equality of man’, which ‘places him in a close connection with all his duties, whether to his Creator, or to the creation, of which he is a part’ ([1791] 1995:118). Briggs explains that ‘Whitman made a synthesis of en-masse and individual, which was his conception of true democracy’, emphasizing ‘the independent individual worth of every man and the necessity for self-reliant individuals under the protection and encouragement of just law and free government’ (1968:213). But Whitman’s synthesis of individual and en-masse must be seen within its proper context, namely the idea of self-reliance and the God-given natural and civil rights for all men and women.

From Collins’ frequent meditations to Whitman’s loafing with ‘a spear of summer grass’ (LG, 27), one can argue that Collins’ novels, like Whitman’s Leaves of Grass, are a ‘gift’, reserved ‘for some hero, speaker or general,/ One who should serve the good old cause, the great idea, the progress and freedom of the race’ (LG, 11). One could also imagine Collins singing to his novels the words Whitman had sung to his volume of poems: ‘falter not O book, fulfil your destiny’ (LG, 4). Like Whitman, Collins thinks he is ‘no sentimentalist, no stander above men and women or apart from them’ (LG, 47). And, like Whitman’s 1855 Preface, Collins similarly believes that the ‘[g]reat genius and the people of these states must never be demeaned to romances’ (LG, 497. My italics). Whitman states that ‘[a]s soon as histories are properly told there is no more need of romances’ (LG, 497): a statement which can greatly assist the reader’s understanding of the designs in Collins’ truth-embellished diary.

In ‘By Blue Ontario’s Shore’, Whitman speaks of ‘[a] nation announcing itself in which he shall ‘reject none, accept all, then reproduce all in my own forms’ (LG, 297). Whitman’s “self” sets out to become the national image of redemption and, in his 1855 preface to Leaves of Grass, Whitman’s Emersonian spirit proclaims that ‘America does not repel the past or what it has produced under its forms or amid other politics or the idea of castes or of the old religions....[America] accepts the lessons with calmness...’ (LG, 483). 234.
This seems to be a direct defence of the Declaration of Independence and its stress on self-evident rights, for Whitman argues that 'Americans of all nations at any time upon the earth have probably the fullest poetical nature' and 'the United States themselves are essentially the greatest poem' (LG, 483). But, according to Whitman, America is great not just because America accepts the lessons of history with calmness, but because America 'is...a teeming nation of nations' (LG, 483).

Joseph Jones (1976) notes that the American nineteenth-century nationalist movement is an influential index for the shaping of Australian nationalism. However, despite the influence on some Australian writers of Paine, Jefferson's Declaration, Emerson and Whitman, Jones does not link Furphy to this line of thought. Bearing in mind the rich diversity of nationalities in the Riverina, the novels imply that Australia has the potential to be great because she too can be a teeming nation of nations. Nevertheless, Jones is content to leave the American influence on Furphy with Bellamy's Looking Backward, thus categorizing Furphy's work, especially Rigby's Romance, as primarily socialist and Furphy as a 'workingman's apostle' or 'the spokesman of labour' (1976:101). Thus, 'Rigby's views are Furphy's' while 'the narrator "Tom Collins" opposes him as a conservative counterfoil' or simply 'plays the fool' (1976:102). In an article written eleven years later on American and Australian literary connections and disconnections, Kiernan (1987) cites Jones' conclusions, maintaining much the same attitude towards Furphy and Collins as Jones.

But, rather than socialist, one ought to see the concern with labour and labouring classes in the novels as humanist. This humanism is a direct result of the right to equality, liberty and fraternity for all men and women, not just the aristocracy. As Barnes notes, '[t]hose who have taken Tom Collins to be a representative of the Bush Legend have seldom acknowledged just what an oddity he is' (1990:204). Contrary to Barnes' (1990:157) earlier notion, this observation must equally be extended to include both Furphy's and Collins' relationship to socialism. To illustrate the point, let us look at how Collins does not fit comfortably into the "either/ or" categories of Kate Schaffer's list concerning "the typical Australian": a list much more suited to Lawson or the Bulletin's journalistic style.

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Typical Australian ('me')

practical
rough and ready manners
natural/ common man
improvisor/ original
'near enough' standards
laid back
skeptical of
religion
intellectual/ cultural
pursuits
Jack/ egalitarian
fiercely independent
a mate
swears/ gambles/ drinks
freedom

Other (not-me)

theoretical
polished manners
affected/ civilized man
planner/ derivative
exacting standards
hard working
believer in
religion
intellectual/ cultural
pursuits
master/ elitist
officious authority
an individual
controls swearing,
gambling, drinking
containment

(Schaffer, 1988:19-20).

One can say that Collins, as both implied author and hero, purposefully conflates this "self-other" list at most points, challenging only the issues of swearing, gambling and drinking. Although Collins had made a bet with Moriarty, one needs to remember that even Moriarty had noted Collins' opposition to gambling (SiL, 225). In other words, Collins' wants to see the typical Australian as a manifestation of both sides of the list, with the exception of certain qualities which jeopardise eudaimonia. This is more than likely the case, for Thompson, stressing his acquaintance with Collins since their youth, states that, regardless of what they did, '[i]t was always his way' (SiL, 24). Yet, in the words of Thompson -words which can be connected authorially to Collins- Tom Collins

[c]omes as near the blackfellow as it's possible for a white man to get. And you couldn't kill him with an axe. Then start him at any civilized work -such as splicing a loop on a wool rope, or making a yoke, or

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wedging a loose box in a wheel- and he has the best hands in the country. At the same time, it's plain to be seen that he has been brought up in a class of society that sticks a napkin, in a bone ring, alongside your dinner plate (SiL, 25).

Within the context of an ethically proper representation of the Australian type in literature, Thompson's speech applauds the all-round achievements of Collins' identity *vis-à-vis* the other bullockies' scathing comments, including his own earlier comment that Collins' 'philosophy mostly consists in thinking he knows everything, and other people know nothing' (SiL, 24). But, whether or not Collins' abilities are true is not the issue. It is more than likely that Collins, as the implied author who controls the content of the bullockies' dialogue, is serving up a truth-embellished, heroic self-hood. But it is truth-embellishment in keeping with guardianship, with uplifting and upbuilding for *eudaimonia*. Collins' identity cannot be studied without observantly reading the many issues surrounding uplifting and upbuilding. Although Wilson is right to note that Tom's 'identity is far more elusive than the simple judgments of the first chapter permit' (1979:141), Collins gives ample clues to his own heroic identity as a half bushman and half bookworm.

Because this is the case, it interesting to note the role of the bullockies. The importance of this matter is tied directly to the way in which Collins orients and articulates his self-image as the ground for the national type within the uplifting and upbuilding of the nation. This is especially apparent in his inquiries on the "Coming Australian" and the "Australienne". Croft may conclude that 'the agents of redemption in Furphy's novels are women' (1991:272), but the image of man is also stylistically drawn to be an agent of redemption. As I will discuss more fully in the next section, it is fair to say that only some images of women in the three novels are agents of redemption, for the character of Maud Beaudesart is neither an agent of redemption in Collins' novels nor in Furphy's novels. But before we can come to this issue, we must explore the redemptive potentiality of men in the narratives, since it is crucial to the masculine image of the scholarly guardian-type presented by Collins.

If, for Furphy, the real Australian is 'the Out-back man' (in 237.
Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124), then one can see that Furphy’s rendition of the bullockies is a depiction of a “raw” social system which can uplift and upbuild Australia. But, while issues such as the duffing of grass and the drought foregound the rivalry and struggle between ‘the Lower Orders’ (SIIL, 34) and an ‘Australian aristocracy’ (SIIL, 26), the novels also foregound an opportunistic rivalry in the Lower Orders that circumvents any attempt at communal purpose. One is reminded of Furphy’s earlier comment that life’s ‘purpose’ will never be ‘fulfilled by plethoric banking accounts’ (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124). For example, Collins indicates that the newly arrived Scot, ‘Tom [Armstrong] had acquired, without any severe wrench of his finer feelings, the boundary man’s hostility to the bullock driver’ (SIIL, 159). Given Collins’ views, this customary hostility is unnecessary. Nor is it necessary that, generally speaking, ‘[e]ach of us supported his argument with a wealth of illustrations and thus fortified his own stubborn opinions to his own perfect satisfaction’ (SIIL, 48).

Nevertheless, the bullockies ought to be seen as part of the raw material for nationhood, since they represent the social class for whom the Rights of Man were written. Consider the following exchange between Collins and Lushington in Rigby’s Romance:

“It takes my breath away,” murmured Lushington.
“I’ve been strangely misinformed respecting the erudition of bullock drivers. Latin and Milton. Are they all like this?”
“Certainly not. Other branches of knowledge are no less ably represented. They excel chiefly as linguists” (RR, 121).

Although Lushington, a man educated in law (RR, 120) is impressed by Thompson’s commitment to memory of Milton’s verse, the emphasis is not on the bullockies’ ability to learn or swear, but their reasons for learning. As Collins tells his readers, Thompson ‘told me that he had committed to memory this particular passage, thinking it might come in handy for courting purposes’ (RR, 121). Equally, Dixon’s commitment to learn Latin from Willoughby was not an acquisition of knowledge for the sake of ignorance-shifting or
the upbuilding of man, but a desire to possess a knowledge by which to beat one's rivals. As Dixon states, 'when you git into an argument with a feller, you can jist watch yer (adj.) slant an' lay the opponent over with a sort o' bull's-eye phrase, an' he ain't got a word to say. What the (sheol) can he say?' (RR, 37). Dixon's learning simply perpetuates rivalries between men because he has the potential to frustrate his opponent with 'educated words' (RR, 37). As Collins replies, 'yes, it gives you an unmerciful purchase....But a man should spread his studies a bit' (RR, 37).

While the bullockies' aptitudes and skills show promise, the raw material needs to be shaped, hence the focus on the value of judgment, education and ignorance shifting in the novels. Both Furphy and Collins believe that education would smooth over the division, rivalry and opportunism which pitted man against man, colony against colony and the colonies against federation. Furthermore, it seems evident that Furphy wanted to counteract the apathy and fear of bushmen towards their own ignorance. As Collins explains, 'amongst well-bred bushman, lack of information is always carried off by august indifference; otherwise there would be derogation of dignity. Of course, in cases where assistance can be rendered or advice given, a certain chastened interest is even justifiable, but this interest must be purely objective, and entirely foreign to anything like curiosity or solicitude' (RR, 241-242). But, while 'the bushman must know all that may become a man', Furphy, as well as Collins, work to remedy the general notion that 'anything that [the bushman] doesn't know...isn't worth knowing' (RR, 242).

Old Price's notion that Thompson's curse 'was invidiously ownin' to yer own (adj.) misjudgment' (Sil, 19) is significant, as regards the following excerpt from a dialogue between Rigby and Thompson:

"...Steve! I have known and respected your father for five-and-twenty years- Will you promise to carefully read the Encheiridion of Epictetus, if I give you the

* Of further interest, Thompson states that 'though they couldn't improve one another, they infected one another. Willoughby took Dixon's style of swearing with him for a keepsake, and left Dixon his style of slapping Latin in people's faces. Hanged if I know which habit is the worst' (RR, 73). And, according to Thompson, Willoughby, armed with Dixon's "habit", has found work in a Sydney insurance office.

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book to-morrow?"

"No, I'll swear I won't!" replied Thompson, in quick alarm. "The name's quite enough for me. I can find enough worry in knocking out a living, without any help from that class of people. Bad thing to know too much" (RR, 268).

Firstly, this dialogue unveils an interesting paradox, namely that members of a society value education, yet show a tremendous aversion to being educated in matters of judgment. Furthermore, the curse can be seen as Thompson's aversion to using his intellect, courage and desire, or the three elements which make an individual just in a balanced way for his own well-being. He fails to realize that, within the context of the controlling alternatives, his curse is the result of his own misjudgment, and thereby fails to recognize that his misfortunes are the consequence of his own ignorant choices. And, within the context of articulating an identity, one can say that Thompson's curse is equally a failure to tell the right lies, or an inadequate truth-embellishment of one's identity within the context of eudaimonia and roleplay. As a case-study, Thompson demonstrates that the bullockies have an aptitude for learning and a strong sense of judgment in accordance with their skills, which is their means of survival. But, in a moral sense, readers ought to observe that their three elements are not balanced, and that any knowledge they possess is devalued in light of eudaimonia.

3.3. The Coming Australian Debate: landscape, gender and the Australienne.

According to Tiffin, '[d]ichotomies of many types helped to frame the ideas of what nineteenth-century Australia and its inhabitants were', most notably 'the development in attitude to landscape, climate and environment' (1987:60). Indeed, '[e]arlier speculation about genetic mutation gave way to ideas and models of social response' wherein 'the landscape's essential weirdness' was compared to 'climatic norms elsewhere' until '[i]t was largely replaced by an attitude which foregrounded the practical difficulties of life in the bush' (Tiffin, 1987:60). In short, climate and landscape are
crucial when it comes to imagining national type or identity in the antipodes, particularly with either an evolutionary degeneration or regeneration of the Anglo-Saxon species. White (1981:81-83) explains that the Coming Australian debate was part of a more widespread, Anglo-Saxon debate on The Coming Man, with white-male supremacy utmost on the racial agenda, and that the image itself was an intellectual product derived from popular literature concerned with men of empire and action.

Several Bulletin articles tackle these issues either separately or often confusingly together. According to an article vis-à-vis Clarke’s views on the 10th of November, ‘race-quality is not altogether a matter of food and climate. In any historical comparison, much must be allowed for racial heredity; much for difference in complexity of civilisation; much for the constant evolution of humanity’ (1894:6). Yet the self-same article stresses that ‘the Bulletin asks its correspondents all over Australia to forward information of characteristic national developments as foreshadowed in individuals, or classes, or localities, always providing that they be chronicled with brevity and brains’ (1894:6). Another article, published on the 29th of December, suggests that ‘it would be a good thing for Australians if the average temperature of their continent could be reduced 10 degrees all round’, since ‘the quick change from childhood to adult age [due to climate] tends to weaken the national physique’ (1894:6).

However, in an interesting about-face, the article equally argues that ‘the bush, giving health and strength not to be found in alleys and factories, dowers manhood and womanhood with dignity....Theiris a stoic philosophy; that of the coast is gay and epicurean’ (1894:6). Furthermore, ‘there is a note of feminine frivolity about Australian cities; a tinge of masculine harshness about the Australian bush’ whereby ‘the cities judge intuitively; the bush reasons logically’ (1894:6). Indeed, an article published on the 27th of October, 1894, gets to the heart of the matter. According to

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5 In The Annotated Such is Life (1991:467-470), there is an extensive summary of the opinions held by Clarke, Trollope, Froude, O’Rell, Shaw and Adams concerning the debate of the Coming Australian in the 1890s. Equally, one can look at the Bulletin article on page 6, Saturday, the 27th of October, 1894, for an overview of the debate.

6 One can turn to Dr. H. Marten’s two essays, published respectively in the Bulletin on the 28th of July and the 11th of August, 1900, for a greater scientific discussion of climate and premature aging. Marten’s views come from a paper delivered to the South Australian branch of British Medical Association, and was originally published in The Australasian Medical Gazette, July 1900.
It is in our power by politic government to alter many of the conditions of national life, and so to weaken, if we cannot withstand, the currents of deterioration in our national character. If observers and thinkers can but determine the nature and force of those currents, and statesmen can erect a barrier to their influence, the Republic of Australia will long live to amuse its children with the prophecy of Marcus Clarke [*that the Australian race will be extinct in five-hundred years*] (1894:6).

This self-same programme underpins the comments in the following article on Federation, written by Ernest Favenc and published on the 19th of January, 1895,

*the Murray* is the Nile of Australia....The bond of union, then, between [New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia] may be said to be based upon the one great river system....The unification of the four provinces, whose life-blood may be said to be the Murray and its host of tributaries, must eventually lead to the reclamation of the whole continent for purpose of close settlement....With all the new science of the world within our grasp, and the hereditary pioneer spirit in our hearts, the foundation of a great nation that will people Australia from end to end should be now laid in the eastern half and, by the natural and irresistible progress of expansion, gradually embrace the continent (1895:6).

Where does Furphy stand in this debate? To all intents and purposes, I think Furphy understood that the debate had much to do with a search for meaning and the need for *eudalmonic* certainty. He also saw the Coming Australian debate as something which stems from a human order of things rather than a natural one. As Furphy had stated to Stephens, 'I am a Biological Agnostic because
Darwinism is unduly boomed' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:95). This is not to say that climate or landscape do not play a part in national types, but they are not the sole factor, as the debate indicates. Like Collins, I think Furphy thought the views in the debate to be nothing more than 'Nankin palaces of porcelain theory, which will fall in splinters before the first cannon-shot of unparleying fact' (SiL, 144). I also think the novels indicate that the Coming Australian is not subject to biological or racial deterioration, but socio-cultural reevaluation, since pioneer societies will always forego some of the customs which established societies deem "civilized" and necessary. In short, '[t]he Coming Australian is a problem' (SiL, 144) because '[c]onfused identity seemed to be in the air' (SiL, 292). And, for Furphy, confused identity was in the air because of ill-judgments in light of eudaimonia.

For this reason, I must disagree with Barnes' notion that, lacking 'the strength of the emotional link he feels' for the landscape, which 'is intellectualised to the point of abstraction', Furphy 'does not try to give concrete form and substance to his hopes, he does not try to visualize the future in relation to the particular landscape' (1986:101). Furphy's landscape is intellectualised precisely because the future relationship between "Australians" and their environment depends on judgment, controlling alternatives and knowing what is up to you and what is not. Perhaps the emotional element is downplayed because, as Elliott points out, '[t]he element of surprise is quite gone, the attachment complete' and, for Furphy, 'it is never a question of explaining an improbable vista or justifying a grotesque one', since '[t]he naturalness of nature no longer calls for apology' (1966:66). Furphy seems to indicate that no matter what the credentials of the writer, any view on the Coming Australian is subject to authorship. Some views are better than others, but all must bear in mind the impact they will have on the reading public, especially when it comes to their seeing and responding to life.

Because of Furphy's emphasis on judgment, roleplay and the ethics of truth-embellishment, I disagree with Johnson's (1965) hasty generalization that Australian fiction, unlike American fiction, offers no road out, or no option for its heroes to cross the frontier and evade the social structures and responsibilities which society dictates. The falsity of this view is equally foregrounded by Paterson's
verse, which offers a road out through the city-bush dichotomy, or Lawson's earlier verse on unionism, democracy and Republicanism. To all intents and purposes, the road out of one society is the road into another. Johnson (1965:24-25) rightly suggests that the Australian interior places the Australian hero face to face with death, but this is no different from the American hero, despite differences in geography. Simply put, the frontier is not just a physical space. It is also a mental and social space, or a way of seeing and responding to life whereby an error of judgment can lead to catastrophe. For this reason, I must disagree with Croft's notion that 'the realistic world of Riverina' is, in fact, 'a distorted world' which 'a theologian might call Hell' (1986:160. My italics). Rather than seeing and responding to the bush as hell, Collins lays claim to the 'fine open country we have in the interior' (BBB, 65).

This leads me to question Vincent Buckley's notion that 'Furphy's characters do not experience Australia as a source-country; nor does any of them give much sign that he thinks of himself as having a destiny, to be gladly affirmed and lived out' (1979:84). According to Buckley, '[w]hen a country is a source-country, it is already potential to poetry' (1979:78). Buckley provides a list of criteria that enables a country to become a source-country, which includes

* habits of perception pregnant with the language which presents them;
* images, natural objects and events, places and their conformations, tending towards archetype or towards some importance in history;
* place-names, proper names. Perceived systems of genealogy and of the relation of families to places;
* historical events, especially those which are linked with legend and/ or poetry, or which changed the fortunes, or rulership, or ownership, and hence the psychic processes, of the race, such as emigration, famine, dispossession, land wars.
* a language, if retained.
the traces in emotion of a language, if lost;
* patterns of family life;

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* legends, adaptations of still earlier myths, imaginative manners of controlling both the hot human and cold inhuman sea;
* folklore, Fairy raths. Sacred trees. Hearth-customs. Significance of days, wells, rocks, gestures, paths. These separated out for purposes of “belief” and also merged with the day-to-day life of the people.
* an accent, a pace, a pitch, a rhythm of speech.
* a political imagination and need

Buckley argues that 'most of these things could not be brought to Australia. What remained was the ache of their absence' (1979:78). Comparing Australia to America, he believes 'that America, faced with the same contradictions as ourselves made persistent and even programmatic attempts to overcome them -to become, in short, a source-country' while the Australian project suffered under 'laconicism' (1979:85). I cannot but reject Buckley's proposition. Furphy's novels may not encompass all the above criteria, but they certainly do encompass some. Perhaps the strongest criteria for enabling a country as source-country is a political imagination and need, a move towards a national type, habits of perception or generic ways of seeing, and the accent, pace, pitch or rhythms of speech. Whether one sees them as Collins' or Furphy's, the novels possess all these criteria, for the Riverina enables Australia as a source-country, as a teeming nation of nations. Interestingly enough, Buckley, in an essay published six years later, states that 'Furphy identified himself as all-embracing Australian', calling him, 'if the comparison be not too bizarre, the Walt Whitman of his time and place' (1986:42).

I would now like to address some main points by Kay Schaffer, especially her notion that '[t]he bush against which [the masculine Australian character] forms a sense of identity is represented as a feminine other' (1988:42). Given Collins referring to Australia as the 'virgin continent' who has 'long...tarried her bridal day!' (Sil, 65), it is true that the land, or bush, in Furphy's fiction, is representatively feminine, as feminist critics, writing about Furphy, agree. But his depiction of this "otherness" of the land is not in the manner that Schaffer argues as being representative of the 1890s nationalist.
tradition. Schaffer's (1988) findings on the construction of Australian national identity are based on her notion of Lawson as the founding father of a masculine tradition: a tradition which sees the feminine "other" from an entirely negative perspective. Because of this, Schaffer states that

> In Lawson's fiction the bush is an evocative presence. It can be awesome, endless and enduring. Yet it is also harsh and unforgiving. It forms a constant, silent and ultimately unconquerable backdrop for the bushman.... The bushman resolves neither his struggle for survival against the landscape nor his battle for authority against the British civilization. Like his digger counterpart, he often ends his days in bitter resignation—dazed by the bush, crazed by drink or dead in the struggle. The struggle with the land-as-other determines the nature of this character, the Australian character (1988:42).

While this may be an appropriate reading for Lawson, as well as other authors Schaffer cites, it is an unsuitable reading of the Australian character and landscape in Furphy's novels. As I have already discussed, Furphy was not entirely satisfied with Lawson's grim realism. For Furphy, Lawson's crowning achievement was the optimistic depiction of young Australia in his verse. Thus, Schaffer's notion that the Australian national identity is marked by a masculine struggle with the land-as-other, or 'the bush as cruel mother' (1988:22), often ending in bitter resignation, is problematic when it comes to Furphy. Schaffer's discussion of Francis Adams' 1890s article on the death of Burke and Wills is particularly interesting here. She writes that '[Adams'] use of the term "absorption" suggests the power of the bush, like the fantasy of the primal mother, to suck up its inhabitants, assimilating them into its contours and robbing them of a separate identity' (1988:52).

According to Schaffer, '[t]his is a powerful fantasy in Australia' (1988:52). Readers of Such is Life will be aware of the fact that the aristocratic Burke and Wills are not national heroes. As Mosey states, 'Wills was a pore harmless weed, so he kin pass' but Burke...
died for want of his sherry an’ biscakes’ (Sil, 26). It is only Willoughby, the aristocrat, who argues that Burke and Wills are ‘gentlemen...who have exhibited in a marked degree the qualities of the pioneer’ (Sil, 26). According to Mosey and the other bullockies, ‘there ain’t a drover, nor yet a bullock driver, nor yet a stock-keeper, frome ‘ere to ‘ell that couldn’t ‘a’ bossed that expedition straight through to the Gulf, an’ back agen, an’ never turned a hair -with sich a season as Burke had. Don’t sicken a man with yer Burke. He burked that expedition, right enough’ (Sil, 26). Burke and Wills’ death had nothing to do with the “absorptive” power of the bush. Instead, their deaths are marked by Burke’s incompetence.

Furphy, like Schaffer, sees “absorption” into the bush as a powerful fantasy in Australian writing rather than an actual fact. This is consistent with his focus on the ethics of representation. Schaffer (1988:17, 29) is remarkably quiet on Furphy, subordinating him to her masculine nationalist tradition epitomised by Lawson. In order to maintain her feminist critique of the manly Australian national identity, she focuses on Barbara Baynton ‘as a dissident in her radical resistance to the social and political consensus regarding woman’s place within the Australian tradition’ (1988:169). But one should be equally aware of a similar dissidence in Furphy. As Devlin-Glass notes, while Furphy cannot ’be exculpated entirely of sexism’, his ‘attitudes to gender are complex and multi-layered’ (1991:39). She argues that ‘he critiques gender construction’ in the sense that his novels are an ‘examination of male ratiocination’ (1991:39).

Devlin-Glass’ notion is problematic, since Furphy sees ratiocination as a crucial tool in the uplifting and upbuilding of individuals, communities and nation. Nevertheless, Devlin-Glass rightly indicates that

Furphy’s...construction of the land is significantly different from the one considered normative by the constructors of the radical nationalist tradition, for whom the bush is either a “vision splendid” or harsh, destructive, and synonymous with failure, a threat to identity and sanity....[H]e is not driven by the imperative to conquer and to master, or to the brink of madness. Although he, like his contemporaries,
unconsciously sexualises the landscape, his approach is not phallocentric. Rather, he sees the relationship between man and the land as interactive (1991:40).

But, as Devlin-Glass states, 'if she is a virgin, awaiting consummation, a metaphor which...had much currency in the period, then it is on her terms, and the suitor must prove his worthiness' (1991:41). This notion of proving one's worthiness on "her" terms shows that 'the concept of a contract between man and nature is crucial' (Devlin-Glass, 1991:41). According to Devlin-Glass, 'Furphy often depicts failed or falling small selectors and instead of finding the land itself responsible...he seeks human agency' (1991:42). Again, Furphy seeks the source of failure in errors of judgment, as the Epictetian flavour of the theory of the controlling alternatives indicates. As Keogh states,

[t]he Australian land renders meaningless attempts to see it from a European perspective, with a corresponding failure and sterility in attempts to impose upon it a too strictly European landscape. This is also symbolized by the treatment of women and sexual relationships in the text. Despite a strongly pessimistic undertone, the outlook is not totally bleak. There are some signs of hope, a suggestion that a fusion of the two conflicting elements, land and landscape, is possible (1989:55. My italics).

The land is feminine, while landscape, as explained by Keogh (1989:55), signifies the man-made physical or mental environment, or the masculine way of seeing. In this sense, the emergence and survival of the "Australian" depends not only on a masculinity which can turn the land into a landscape, but also on a femininity which reads the land and "her" 'ungauged potentiality of resource' (SiL, 65). As Collins suggests, "she" -both Woman and land- must be '[f]aithfully and lovingly interpreted' in order to unveil her 'latent meaning' (SiL, 65). In other words, '[w]hen "landscape" arises directly from the conditions of the natural environment, life will be fruitful, peaceful, fair and just. The opposition between land and landscape is

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used in [Such is Life] to examine not just economic struggle, but the whole ideological basis of the future Australia' (Keogh, 1989:63). Martin thinks that this 'suggests a bush invested with female and male attributes or aspects' (1992:73).

Devlin-Glass argues that '[t]he land's destructive mode was, for Furphy, able on some occasions to be circumvented by prudent bush-wisdom, and, if not, ameliorated by men and women acting cooperatively' (1991:43). I must disagree, therefore, with Partington's notion that 'the centre of Furphy's interest, like that of Lawson, is men rather than women' (1993:107). Nor do I agree with Lever's conclusion that 'the novel's failure to address the “other half” of human experience is put before the reader as a failure of fiction' (1996-97:161). This is despite her noting that 'Furphy too deserves to be read in terms of feminist concerns', for 'his novels proclaim an interest in gender and gender representation, gendered writing and reading' (1996-97:157). Given the complexity of his novels, Lever's evidence is rather limited, for her view is based on a reading of an excised portion 'from the original Such is Life later published as “Rigby and the Authorress”' (1996-97:153).

It is interesting to note that the novels' time period coincides with the early stages of the Australian suffrage movement, most notably, as discussed by Anne Summers (1994:396-397), the Women's Christian Temperance Union in New South Wales during 1882 and the Women's Suffrage Society, founded by Harriet Dugdale and Annette Bear in Victoria during 1884. I think Furphy is pro-feminist, and the movement's campaigns in the 1890s either shaped or coincided with his own views on women's roles in society. Barnes points out that '[i]n the original Such is Life the theme of gender confusion was highlighted by Furphy's adoption of non-sexist pronouns -"se", "sim" and "sis"- which could be used to cover both male and female' (1990:227). Summers (1994:395-396), Sheridan (1988:29-30) and White (1981:77) note that the rise of Australian feminism cannot be separated from the rise of Australian nationalism. Discussing The Dawn, Sheridan (1988:38-40) and Docker (1991:3-25) respectively note that the magazine, although it had never been as piously nationalist as the Bulletin, was principally concerned with the uplifting and upbuilding of women because it saw them as the moral force in the regenerative evolution of an
Australian society and culture, which, according to many feminists, was in a state of decay due to men and their immoral needs. According to Summers,

[t]he feminists had identified as the two most important tasks of the modern family the socialization of children and the control and confinement of sexuality. They argued that 'the family' was in danger of becoming ineffective because these two functions were being jeopardized by the disjunction in the relationship between domestic and political life. Both functions were in need of reform, reinterpretation or reconfirmation and they saw women in their God's Police role as providing the linchpin to this social renovation. They saw that women needed avenues of political expression to be able to effect domestic reforms [and, for this reason, they lobbied for the vote] (1994:414).

As Docker notes, '[w]here the Bulletin considered men superior in evolution because of their possession of rationality, The Dawn assumed women's rationality and considered men inferior in evolution because of their lack of purity' (1991:52). This led to an intense and absurd attack by the Bulletin writers on feminism and the New Woman, as noted by Docker (1991:47-55), Sheridan (1988:34) and White (1981:83), for they felt that she would hamper the progress of the masculine national type and its programme of enlightened democracy in Australia. Yet Docker, in light of Sylvia Lawson's The Archibald Paradox, states that the Bulletin's attitude was 'ambivalent and varied', for 'they approved of the New Woman in so far as she was distant from puritanism, temperance, religion and didn't go around accusing men of molesting her' (1991:53). In short, they approved of her when she was rational.

Although Furphy wrote for the Bulletin, he is not a Bulletin writer, as I pointed out earlier. His own concerns, as well as those of his implied author and hero, are not far removed from 1890s feminism, most notably 'the link between family and society' in which 'women were performing their duties as citizens by producing 250.
and educating children who could contribute actively to the
development of the nation' (Summers, 1994:414-415). As he had
stated to Winter, 'I believe [purpose] is fulfilled by the production of
men and women of high moral standard, calm courage, and clear
intellect (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:124). Besides 1890s
feminism, this view is equally found in Republic (bk5.451c-457b),
where Socrates advances the view that women's equality and
suitability for guardianship should be judged on aptitude rather than
sexual difference. In light of Collins' uplifting and upbuilding, I
would like to refute Croft's claim that '[w]hen we read the works as
novels by Joseph Furphy, rather than as the diaries of Tom Collins,
it is possible to see the women characters as being far more
important than they appear to be for Tom' (1983:1).

One does not have to appeal to Furphy's text to see the value
of women, for such a possibility is equally recognizable in Tom's
"text". This is especially so with 'the short, silky moustache which is
the piquant trade-mark of our country-women' (SiL, 211-212). As
Martin states, '[t]he moustache is, in Furphy, a signifier of a
profound disruption of the division between the sexes' (1992:69). For
Martin, the moustache-as-sign allows 'individual bodies [to] assert
difference and avoid the stereotyping [normally associated with the
fixing of gender]' (1992:75). This is because the moustache indicates
that the "Australian" Woman reconstructs her gender role by
appropriating customary masculine values, indicating that gender is
not a fixed and natural set of attributes, but a truth-embellished
construction subject to personal, historical and environmental
change in light of eudaimonia. In this sense, I disagree with Lever's
notion that '[t]he sexual stereotypes on which the novel [Such is Life]
seems to operate are proven time and again to be unreliable guides to
the physical identity of characters' (1996-97:159).

Nor do I agree with Croft's (1983:10) notion that Collins is
blind to the positive value of Australian women because all he can
see is their moustache. Collins may see Jemima Quarterman initially
as a gender oddity, but he is not repulsed by her masculine and
definite qualities. He may state that he was' horror-stricken'
because "Jim" was a magnificent young woman, riding barebacked, à
la clothes-peg', but 'she was' also 'a phantom of delight' (SiL, 115).
Collins' initial 'revulsion of feeling' quickly turns into 'the quickest
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and fullest' passion he had 'ever experienced' (SiL, 115). Indeed, 'it was some minutes before' Collins became 'his own philosophic self again' (SiL, 115), seizing the chance to use her as evidence of a particular "Australian" type, for he states that '[e]ven in the distance, I fancied her attitude was that of a girl who had imprudently set in motion a thing that she was powerless to stop' (SiL, 115).

In his first letter to Miles Franklin, Furphy 'desired to draw [her] attention to some striking parallelisms in My Brilliant Career and [his] own book Such is Life', especially the 'remarkable' parallel between 'the bush-born girl' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 148), namely Sybilla Melvin and Jemima Quarterman. Furphy praises Franklin's My Brilliant Career because 'no book yet published contains so many echoes of my own literary ideas and avowals as yours does' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 153). Contrary to the letters Furphy wrote to Cathels, he is less concerned with knowledge, preferring to discuss the Australian experience. Lever notes that Furphy praised Franklin as the true bush girl who offered a feminine expression of the experience of Australia which was so dear to him' (1996-97:156). More than this, I think Furphy had found in Franklin and Sybilla Melvyn the clear intellect, calm courage and high moral standard necessary to the "Australian" type.

Spender notes that 'much of [Australian] women's literature embodies a search for individual and communal identity' (1988:xv). Discussing My Brilliant Career, Spender states that

Miles remained well within the traditions of literary women's concern with love and marriage, but she didn't merely ask questions -she rebelled, and with great gusto. In almost swashbuckling manner, she scoffed at some of the conventions that were supposed to be sacred in women's lives: the heroine Sybilla Melvyn rejects romance -and suitors- and determines to lead an independent, full and creative life (1988:274).

Equally, but in the context of the drama, Docker explains that '[t]he Australian heroine, the vigorous and independent currency lass, was made of altogether sterner stuff, as she strode the
nineteenth-century stage, cowering villains and rendering pale its male heroes' (1991:xxvii). It is this independence of character, of making 'no apologies for being egotistical', as well as the writing of 'a yarn' rather than 'a romance' (Franklin, [1901] 1990:1), which made Furphy personally admire Franklin. Indeed, her introduction to My Brilliant Career maps out much the same concerns with the ethics of representation as Furphy's novels. For example, Furphy wrote that

I like your portrait [in My Brilliant Career] exceedingly well. It bespeaks frankness, courage, generosity, surpassing sweetness of disposition, and mental capacity of the highest order. Above all, it conveys to me the conception of value -womanly value; and this is idea that I would wish to impress upon yourself. You are an exceptional girl. Don't hold yourself cheap....If you knew me as well (through reading my book) as I know you (through reading yours), you would perceive that there is no need for ceremony between us. We have much in common. Though doubtless many people know even more of bush life than we do, I question -with all modesty- whether any can depict it as well. Let this be our point of contact (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 153).

According to Barnes and Hoffmann, 'out of his fascination with [Miles Franklin] came a series of deeply-felt and deeply-considered letters in which [Furphy] gave of his best' (1995:27). As Furphy argued to Franklin, attempting to dissuade her from becoming an expatriate,

[t]here is variety enough here; between the seething Pandemonium of the cities and the hallowed solitudes of the Out-back; between the serrated profile of the Great Divide and the long, long levels of Riverina. And literature has hardly yet touched the fringe of Australian life-conditions. Practically nothing has been exploited but the amenities of the Home-station, the hardships of the Selection, and the most unlikely

253.
nugget found by the reduced gentleman. Stay among the eucalypti, Miles, and earn the adoration of your countrymen by translating the hosannas and elegies of the Bush into vernacular phrase (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:166).

In light of this, I dispute Croft's notion that, 'having failed in the male world of materialism, [Furphy] constructed a world of metaphor and spirit which he associated with the female' (1983:10). It is not 'a deep sense of failure' which led Furphy to construct 'his two-layered novels where women show heroic, positive values' (Croft, 1983:10), but an emphasis on ignorance-shifting and better judgment towards men and women in the "Australian" experience. Barnes argues that '[t]he world Furphy creates is a world of masculine values, in which the experiences of wives and mothers are treated only marginally' (1990:222). Given the immense scope that uplifting and upbuilding entails, Barnes' statement is problematic. What one needs to consider is why the focus on specific women is what it is, for Collins claims that 'I always make a point of believing the best where women are concerned' (Sil, 118). Furphy himself had declared to Miles Franklin that he had an 'unbounded faith in the Australian woman in general, and the meteoric Miles in particular' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:182).

In order to see more clearly the novels' attitude to women, one ought to begin with an analysis of the aristocratic woman, Maud Beaudesart, and the American woman, Kate Vanderdecken. In a letter to Cathels, Furphy (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:42) points out that Maud Beaudesart is the daughter of Kingsley's hero, Sam Buckley. According to Furphy, 'this is a breach of literary etiquette', but '[t]he author of Geoff. Hamlyn deserves no courtesy' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:42). Martin states that 'Mrs Beaudesart, the most sinister female, is after all centred in the home and amongst the pastoralists, while Alf [Molly Cooper] and Jim [Jemima Quarterman] have a free range of the landscape and gender possibilities' (1992:75). Towards Jemima Quarterman, the romantic descriptions of her beauty (Sil, 132) say more about her value as Currency lass than a perpetuation of the traditionally 'stereotyped woman of the male literary imagination' (Croft, 1983:3). But, towards
Beaudesart, the aristocratic woman, Collins exercises his cunning concealment, for she is 'the archetype of the fatal woman' (Croft, 1983:3), representing danger for the Australienne. One can see this in Beaudesart’s sharp treatment of Ida (Sil, 211-214), another Currency lass. As Collins states,

Levites, tribesmen, and Gentiles alike, used to poke fun at me over Mrs. Beaudesart; but the fact that they thought they knew my real standing, whereas they didn’t, seemed to weigh so much in my favour as to make their banter anything but provoking. Yet my relations with the gentlewoman were painful enough (Sil, 210).

Beaudesart’s crusty values run contrary to Collins’ interests in the Lower Orders. As Collins explains to his reader, Maud Beaudesart had been ‘a singularly handsome young lady’ but ‘became a veritable heroine of romance’ (Sil, 209). Furthermore, her nuptial interests in him make Collins feel that he is ‘a done man’ (Sil, 228), as is evident in the following exchange between Moriarty and Collins:

“You don’t want to marry her, then, after all?”
“How long do you suppose I would last?”
“Well, don’t marry her” (Sil, 228).

One must remember that Beaudesart, before her interest in Collins, had already been widowed three times (Sil, 209-210, RR, 87), and this prompts Collins, towards the close of Such is Life, to fabricate a scandal involving himself in order to escape Beaudesart’s interest in him. As Collins states, ‘I must help her to keep up the grisly fraud of feminine reluctance’ for ‘I have the dubious satisfaction of knowing that the enterprise brings me a good many days march nearer home’ (Sil, 228). The plan fails, for the scandal only increases Maud’s interest in her “Tom Collins”, whom Montgomery, the squatter, had introduced as ‘the last lineal descendant of Commander David Collins, R.N.’ (Sil, 210). Because of this, it is incorrect to conclude, as Brady does, that ‘Collins prefers erotic daydreams to real women’ and a misreading to suggest that 255.
'[t]he “tawny-hair’d tigress with slumberous dark eyes” he dreams of is *always submissive* and makes no claims on him’ (1981:64. My italics).

Nor is it correct for Barnes to state ‘[t]he farcical plot involving Mrs Beaudesart presents [Collins] as the male ego threatened by the possibility of marriage and domesticity’ (1990:222). As Collins remarks about Beaudesart, the novels’ dangerous tigress, ‘if [she] assumes -if she merely takes for granted- that I’m going to marry her, I must do it, to keep her in countenance....Of course, she had no business to accept me unawares’ (*Sil*, 228). The Ouidian tawney-hair’d tigress is anything but submissive or passive, as noted by Knight’s (1969:248-250) discussion of Collins’ reading of Ouida’s *Strathmore*. She is quite capable of making claims on men, for her exotic sexuality appeals directly to male desire. As Collins states, ‘what a sweet, spicy, piquant thing it must be to be lured to destruction by a tawny-hair’d tigress with slumberous dark eyes’ (*Sil*, 130). More importantly, the dangers of the aristocratic *femme fatale* indicate the need for the new world woman with her clear intellect, calm courage and high moral standard.

With this in mind, let us consider Kate Vanderdecken. In a letter to Kate Baker, Furphy, working on *Rigby’s Romance*, writes

I think there is something beautiful (don’t you?) in the picture of the ever-faithful woman [Kate Vanderdecken] making her long over-sea pilgrimage to find that her demigod [Jefferson Rigby] has absolutely forgotten that she ever existed. A lesser genius than the present scribe would make Rigby an unworthy person; but here we find him enthroned as a man humanly perfect in intellect and principle, besides being gentle, brave and chivalrous. Now this is the true tragedy -the tragedy of the heart. None of your adultery or manslaughter business. Red paint is too cheap for the present artist (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:75).

To most Furphy critics, Kate Baker’s response is well known. Recalling a conversation with Furphy, she had stated,
I didn't [see the tragedy]; that was a man's view. I couldn't see any woman of spirit tailing over a continent to look for a man who had never made a move to find whether she was alive or not. The best part in Kate Vanderdecken was where she "hoist sail and away" and "left the lord lamenting".

Rigby deserves shooting! Despite Tom Collins's efforts to get him to make some sort of amends to Kate, Rigby doesn't make even an attempt. Brave? Chivalrous? Brrrr!

The story, however, serves for a peg on which Joseph Furphy can hang his Ethico-cum-philosophic pedantry (in Franklin, 1944:165-166).

Franklin's view of Rigby is 'that he remains a wooden figure' and 'like Kate Vanderdecken he is described but never comes alive' (1944:165). According to Franklin, '[i]n Kate Vanderdecken, Furphy's discernment of womanliness versus femininity collapses into masculine sentimentality over feminine graces' (1944:157). This is in direct opposition to her notion that, in Such is Life, '[s]ome of Furphy's studies of women are as excellent as his observations of men or horses' especially 'with unattractive women, or those past nubility' (1944:157). But, several years after the conversation with Kate Baker, Furphy had written, in a letter to Cecil Winter, that '[t]he "romance" -remotely founded on fact- was [just] written in a leisurely and wanton frame of mind, and the accessories filled themselves in, so to speak, up to the desired size of the book' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:147). Between such an initially strong expression of an intention and a later, casual allusion to the Kate and Rigby romance, what was Furphy trying to achieve with these two heroes?

Did he seriously reconsider their roles after Kate Baker's retort? Or were his initial intentions less than serious? Questions such as these are not easily answered, but the published version of the novel does not subordinate the character of Kate Vanderdecken to Jefferson Rigby. The title, Rigby's Romance, suggests more of a pun on Rigby's actual romance with state socialism than with his old flame, Kate Vanderdecken. As Croft states, 'Furphy's ideal male is
beyond the lure of the sirens, in love with a set of ideals rather than a real woman' (1991:242). Or, as Gilding notes, 'Rigby has romance in his life - but it is not directed at Kate. Rigby is in love with the political cause he espouses, which is almost to say, with argument itself' (1967:29). Rigby is not Furphy's ideal male hero, for Kate's character cuts much too strong an imprint on the reader's mind. She does not wait for Rigby, and one gets the impression that her leaving indicates a pragmatic character rather than a heroine of romance who dotes on a supposedly ideal man or "demigod".

One ought to see the value of Kate Vanderdecken in contrast to Mrs. Beaudesart. As Collins states, '[t]he women were in no way alike, save that both were attractive to the eye, and both bore evidence of that social cultivation which is every women's birthright; and would be every woman's inheritance if men in name were men in reality' (RR, 87). Franklin, noting this comparison, states that 'Mrs. Beaudesart and Kate Vanderdecken, his most extended portraits of women, are both out of plumb with reality' (1944:157-158). As we already know, Beaudesart represents an aristocratic, stock-in-trade literary character. Yet Franklin rightly indicates that Kate Vanderdecken is also a stock-in-trade literary character, but I disagree with her notion that she 'belongs to Victorian stock female roles' (1944:159). While Collins' sympathies do not lie with Beaudesart, they are 'centred on Miss Vanderdecken' (RR, 22). Why is this so? According to his own 'twenty-three years' contemplation' (RR, 22) of her image, Kate had the 'figure of a beautiful, though somewhat mynheer [manly or masculine, RD] looking, sheaf of contradictions' with 'unavailing remorse... on her damask cheek' (RR, 19).

It would seem that Collins, as implied author, has his heroic self sympathise with a stock-in-trade victim of romance. But her masculinity is also noted through his use of the Dutch "mynheer". It is in this sense that the novel resumes the contrasts between old world types and new world types begun in *Such is Life*. And, if the old world type of woman, such as Beaudesart, makes herself known by a fatal and unrelenting expression of interest in a potential lover, then the new world type of woman, such as Kate, is prepared to be pragmatic rather than traditional. Kate will not pursue nor make claims on Rigby in the same manner as Beaudesart pursues and
makes claims on Collins. As Croft notes, 'Kate compromises neither her dignity nor her independence to accomplish her ends' (1991:226). The new world type is clearly meant to be seen as more desirable in terms of the self-evident right to self-definition and self-expression.

In terms of the strategic value of Kate Vanderdecken, I would have to disagree with Croft, who argues that 'the story of the complementary half of Rigby's romance, Kate Vanderdecken, is never articulated properly by Tom and only partly understood by him. That is also the case with the two main female characters [Molly Cooper and Lillian Falkland-Pritchard] in his other major works' (1983:1). The issue of Tom's only partly understanding the value of Molly Cooper and Lillian Falkland-Pritchard will be dealt with a little later, but it is obvious that Tom's status as both implied author and hero severely problematises Croft's claim. According to Collins, Kate is, '[b]y the foot, American', for 'the foot of the American woman is a badge as distinctive as the moustache of the Australiennne' (RR, 5-6). Collins also states that 'there was a good expression in the foot now under notice; it was a generous, loyal, judicious foot, yet replete with idealism and soulfulness' (RR, 6).

The "foot" actually alludes to a sense of stateliness or surefootedness in nation and direction. Thus, the presence of Kate, as a national type of post-civil war America, suggests that Collins is alluding to the potential for unity amid diversity, especially rivalry. One can infer that Collins, as well as Furphy, conceives of a similar future for "Australia", and that the surest sign of this future is the mustachioed Woman. One should approach Collins' theory of 'sex-charm' and 'sex-value' (RR, 10-11) with this in mind. Defining the two terms, Collins states that '[t]he former conveys passion; the latter adoration. The former sees femininity; the latter, womanhood. And these are the two extremes' (RR, 11). Furthermore,

...it is worthy of note that, where the controlling masculine minds are moved or biased by the sex-influence, the force is exercised by a woman, not by a female. And not till the peach-bloom of youth is gone can the woman dominate the female and her personality reach its maximum angel-loveliness or its most formidable devil-beauty.

259.
...the world is swayed by women, not by females. And each man, be he king or beggar, is a little world of his own. If he be swayed by a female, as kings and beggars frequently are, he is an extremely little world.

But don't misapprehend me as identifying or confounding femininity with youth, and womanhood with maturity. Just as many a man, having outlived the boy's enthusiasm and ingenuousness, retains the boys uselessness and self-conceit, so, in the other sex, mere femininity too often accompanies maturity. When this occurs -in fact, when the case is one of incorrigible femininity- the subject is good for two things only: to suckle fools and chronicle small beer (RR, 11).

Although Croft discusses Collins' theory, arguing that it is a development of 'Rory O'Halloran's A Plea for Women in Such is Life' and noting that 'Kate...belongs to the second category' (1991:225, 226), he does not explore it any further within the context of a comparison between Beaudesart and Kate. A Plea For Woman (SiL, 75-77) argues for the sex-value of women, challenging the biblical notion that women have 'a preternatural bias toward sin in a general way' by contrasting the evil of 'the Solomon-woman' with the goodness of the modern 'Shakespear-woman' (SiL, 76). While Beaudesart is, through her sex-charm, the sinister aristocrat or Solomon-woman, Kate Vanderdecken, as the American type of new world Woman, is the manifestation of sex-value, possessing dignity, surefootedness and independence. She is the embodiment of the Shakespeare-woman, possessing clear intellect, calm courage and high moral standard. Kate may be 'a stock female role', but she is not 'Victorian', as Franklin claims (1944:159). Although Kate recedes into the background during the sermon on the Murray, perhaps justifying to some extent Franklin's notions, she returns in full force in Collins' allusion to the powerful and versatile image of "Kate" in Shakespeare's Taming of the Shrew (RR, 236).

Rigby may think that Kate is 'petulant and quarrelsome' as well as 'frivolous and heartless' (RR, 17), but he is no Petruccio. As Croft explains, Rigby is 'a small-souled, over-bearing, and essentially
heartless man, who hides his deficiencies under a cloak of idealism' (1991:245). The value of Kate exceeds that of Rigby, simply because 'Shakespeare's Kate would have been more than a match for Rigby' (Croft, 1991:222). In this sense, the comparison between Kate Vanderdecken and Shakespeare's "Kate" is very appropriate to the new world type of Man, since the play explores the idea of love and friendship. "Kate" is quite prepared to live with Petruccio so long as it does not mean sacrificing her spirit, her 'loyal' and 'lofty nature' (RR, 17), nor her rights. Collins is alluding to the Shakespearean "Kate" not just in Kate Vanderdecken, but also in the "Australienne", since both are seen to possess the very masculine traits of self-definition, vitality and independence of identity necessary to nation-building and eudaimonia.

3.4. Men, Women and Marriage: the imagined community through the Australian romance.

According to Barnes, '[w]hen [Furphy] introduced Rory O'Halloran and his wife [Deborah] into the revised version of Such is Life, he came closer to his own marital situation [to Leonie] than anywhere else, but not in a way that invited any identification' (1990:221). Or, as Partington notes, 'Furphy's portrayal of the ongoing hostility between Rory O'Halloran and his wife can be seen as a reflection of his own miserable marriage, which neither party ever made any move to terminate' (1993:96). Much can be said about the marriage of Rory and Deborah O'Halloran in light of Furphy's marriage to Leonie. But I think one should approach the O'Halloran episode as a parable of Young Australia's future, especially since the narrative is woven tightly around the theme of sectarian rivalry. Both Keogh (1989:61) and Scheckter (1981:69) note that the child, Mary O'Halloran, functions as a symbol of the nation's future and that the success of her future is jeopardised by her parents' sectarianism.

Collins introduces Rory as 'a Catholic of the Catholics' (Sil, 54) and Deborah as 'a red hot Protestant', strategically pointing out that 'she didn't want Dan [Rory], and Dan didn't want her, but somehow they were married before they came to an understanding' (Sil, 56). Given the stress on judgment in light of the controlling alternatives, Collins points to the dogma which underpins this
rivalry in two ways. Firstly, he states that 'I tried, in a friendly way and confidential way, to draw him out respecting certain of his Church's usages and tenets, which I knew to be garbled and falsified by Protestant bigotry' (SL, 57). Secondly, Collins dedicates a significant portion of his narrative to elucidate to his readers the finer points of this rivalry in the old world (SL, 57-61). As Croft notes, Collins' 'long digression on the history of sectarianism in Northern Ireland' is 'to prove the point that the division was not the product of theological difference, but was engineered by the landed-class of Ulster to divide and rule the peasantry' (1991:141).

One could equally look to Hughes (1987:182-183) for an account of the social engineering that divided Ireland, legally privileging Irish Protestants over and above the Irish Catholics and literally stripping the latter of all their entitlements. Through Mary O'Halloran's death, this engineered sectarianism is shown to have devastating consequences for the future of Young Australia. As Collins states, 'a clearer-sighted Jeremiah could never have prophesied the deliberate introduction of hydrophobia for dogs, glanders for horses, or Orangism for men. Yet the latter enterprise has been carried out' (SL, 58). In short, '[s]omeone has carried his congenial virus half-way round the globe, and tainted a young nation' (SL, 58). As Evans et al note,

[t]eligious antagonism and violence flared periodically in nineteenth and early twentieth century Australia between English, Welsh, Scottish or Irish Protestants and Irish Roman Catholics. Religious differences were sharpened by ethnic rivalries as old world struggles between Anglo-Saxon colonisers and colonised Irish Celts were transported with these migrants into Australia. In these conflicts, the Irish, who were roughly one-quarter of the colonial population, were usually the underdogs. As citizens, they were, on average, poorer, less well placed, more excluded and less powerful than many Protestants were. They were at various times the subjects of prejudice, suspicion and occasional assault. This did not mean, however, that Irish Catholics did not, at other times, also
According to Collins, '[i]t was a vital and personal fact to [Rory], though only a historical truth to me, that this hereditary war of the Big-endians and Little-endians had been conducted by our own immediate forefathers' (Sil, 60). Indeed, 'Rory couldn't get away from the strong probability that my grandfather had overpowered his own contemporary ancestor in the name of the Glorious, Pious and Immortal Memory, and had chopped his head off with a spade' (Sil, 60). This is despite the fact that Rory had freely migrated to Australia approximately 'thirteen years before' (Sil, 56), staking his 'future on the prosperity of Australia' (Sil, 57). But Rory does not arrive in Australia to make a clean start, preferring instead to perpetuate Old World history, legends and myths. As Collins notes, Rory was 'dreamy, idealistic' and 'born of a legend-loving race' (Sil, 61), implying that this, rather than reason, formed the basis of his judgment, choices and consequences.

According to Hughes,

the story of English oppression and Irish resistance did not evaporate in Australia. On the contrary, it survived most tenaciously as one of the primary images of working-class culture, flourishing long after the [Convict] System itself had receded from memory. The Irish stuck to one another. They were clannish and had long memories....They always felt they were being punished, not for their crimes, but for being Irish. In Australia, as in Ireland, each act of oppression contributed to a common fund of memory; fact might waver into legend, but the essential content did not change. By the 1880s, when the Protestant majority in Australia had all but sublimated the "hated stain" of convictry, the Irish still kept the memory of the System alive (1987:194-195).

Readers of Such is Life are now in a better position to appreciate Collins' attack on the 'Catholic and Protestant slaves of dogma', and Furphy's own views in the strategically written line, 263.
'small sympathy have ye from this Josephus' (Sil, 60). Franklin may note that 'Mrs. O'Halloran is introduced in bare outline only' (1944:161), but she does not see that Deborah's dogmatism is, like Rory's, strategically designed to foreground the sectarian rivalry which will lead to the tragedy of Mary's death (Sil, 187-192). Croft states that '[g]iven such a background it is not surprising that Mary/Young Australia should go astray and lose her bearings even in the Utopia paddock, torn as she is between a seductive patriarchy and a punitive matriarchy, between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism' (1991:141). As Keogh (1989:62) and Scheckter (1981:68) note, Mary's landing on her head in the bilby-hole and her dying by suffocation symbolically seems to indicate that mental attitudes caused her downfall as Young Australia.

From the sectarian rivalry of the O'Hallorans, readers encounter the next debilitating mental attitude towards Young Australia in the marriage of the Vivians, or the "Sollickers". The Vivian/Sollicker episode cunningly alludes to Anglo-Australianism, or "Britishness" in 1890s' Australia. On first meeting, Collins, 'the Irresistible', encounters Edward Vivian, or Sollicker, 'the Immovable' (Sil, 137). Croft states that '[t]o Tom, Sollicker appears [as] the immovable object of the old feudal order, while he himself is the irresistible new order for whom compassion and individual rights are more important than property' (1991:166). In short, old world attitudes meet the new, and

[w]hen a collision of this kind takes place, it sometimes happens that the Irresistible bounces off in a more or less damaged state; at other times, the Immovable is scattered to the four winds of heaven in the form of scrap, while the Irresistible, slightly checked, perhaps, in speed, sails on its way. But you can never tell (Sil, 137).

In terms of uplifting and upbuilding, the Vivian/Sollicker episode is one of mixed blessings. Collins manages to save Warrigal Alf's bullocks from impoundment at Yoongoolee by Edward Vivian, the station's boundary rider, as well as secure the medicine needed to help Warrigal Alf. Croft notes that '[t]he only way Tom can turn
Sollicker around is to appeal to his feudal notion of chivalry and to the idea that an Englishman would not impound an invalid’s working bullocks’ (1991:166). But, despite Collins’ strategic victory, this is also the episode where Collins specifically concedes that the Coming Australian is a problem (Sil, 144). Why is this so? In order to answer this question, it is best to clarify some of the important details of the episode.

As well as meeting Edward Vivian, Collins also meets his wife, Helenar Vivian. According to Collins, she was ‘[a] tall, slight, sunburnt, and decidedly handsome young woman, with a brown moustache’ (Sil, 143). From these details, the evidence of the “Australienne” remains intact. But, unlike Jemima Quarterman, Helenar Vivian does not, strictly speaking, display what Collins would call sex-value. Observant readers will note that she leans more towards sex-charm. Helenar Vivian has an ‘ill-concealed vainglory’, a ‘sunny laugh’ and a ‘comely face, over flowing with merriment’ (Sil, 143). Readers will also recall that, when Edward Vivian commented on her flirtatious manner towards Collins, ‘an inch of Helenar’s tongue shot momentarily into view’ (Sil, 143). Or, when Collins prepares to return to Alf with the medicine, Helenar personally saw him off, ‘testing with her finger and thumb the integument on [Collins’] near flank’ (Sil, 144). As Croft notes, ‘Tom’s interview with Mrs. Vivian is fraught with sexual undertones....[and] it is also apparent that she is a lively, open woman with an independent and cheeky nature’ (1991:166).

But, I disagree with his notion that ‘[a]t no time do we sense that she is being condemned for her past actions, nor that she feels badly about them’ (Croft, 1991:166). Helenar Vivian’s past actions are important, for they concern the paternity of the bush born child, Roderick Vivian. Although Collins does not spell it out, the correct details of Roderick's familial relations are nevertheless apparent. This is particularly evident with the discrepancies between the length of time the Vivians have been married (Sil, 142) and Roderick’s age (Sil, 143). In other words, Helenar was pregnant for four months at Yoongoolee before she married Edward: a marriage requested by their employer. Furthermore, the young Vivian’s Christian-name, ‘in honour of Muster M’Intyre’ (Sil, 142), as well as his ‘comically Scottish...features’ (Sil, 144), indicate that he is the true son of 265.
Roderick M'Intyre, the owner of Yoongoolee station, where 'there was nothing...but Highland pride, and Highland eczema and hunger' (Sil, 153).

When Collins, referring to Roderick's Currency lad status, proclaims to Edward that 'you're an Englishman, and you're proud of your country; but I tell you we're going to have a race of people in these provinces such as the world has never seen before' (Sil, 143), Edward, the Immovable, firmly disagrees. But even Edward is perplexed by the physical qualities of his "son", for he states that '[c]limate plays ole Goozeb'ry wi' heverythink hout 'ere' (Sil, 144). Thinking that Roderick is his son, Edward believes that colonial Australia wreaks havoc upon the otherwise stately qualities of the English type. As Edward states to Collins, pointing to both himself and his "son", '[c]'lonians bea n't got noo chest, n' mo'n a greyhound' (Sil, 144). Edward's belief about the effects of the climate foregrounds his ignorance concerning Roderick's true paternity. But, Edward's beliefs also leads Collins to doubt the emerging national character, for he states that 'the Coming Australian is a problem' (Sil, 144). When Collins returns to Alf, he 'contemplated the unconscious outlaw', noting that

Alf...was a decidely noble-looking man, of the so-called Anglo-Saxon type, modified by sixty or eighty years of Australian deterioration. His grandfather had probably been something like Sollicker; and the apprehensions of that discomfortable cousin were being fulfilled only too ruthlessly. The climate had played Old Gooseberry with the fine primordial stock. Physically, the Suffolk Punch had degenerated into the steeplechaser; psychologically, the chasm between the stolid English peasant and the saturnine, sensitive Australian had been spanned with that facilis which marks the descensus Averni (Sil, 161. My italics).

Are we meant to take Collins seriously? I think we are, but not because he himself is swayed by a causal link between climate, landscape and 'racial degeneracy' (Sil, 161), nor with any similar view suggesting the emergence of some rugged heroic type. Given the
consistent emphasis on judgment and the Epictetian controlling alternatives, as well as the ideas of truth-embellishment and the ethics of representation, the Coming Australian is a problem because of unsound judgments based on climate and type. Although Roderick will not suffer the same fate as that other Young Australian, Mary O'Halloran, his potentiality to create Young Australia is curbed because of "Britishness". One could say that Roderick the Irresistible has met Edward the Immovable. The Vivian marriage, unlike the O'Halloran marriage, works, but it will not inspire a positive, new world type. Collins, as well as Furphy, strategically indicates that Roderick Vivian will share the same outlook as other British-Australians who, in the 1890s, believed that 'Britishness was genetic—a racial and familial bond—the bond of an offspring to a parent, of a devoted son and daughter to their "dear old Mother"' (Evans et al, 1997:24).

In other words, Collins hints that Roderick Vivian 'will define himself nationally only in a secondary way', forsaking the creation of 'self-images which emphasised their [Australian] distinctiveness from the people of the British Isles' (Evans et al, 1997:25). This is what readers of Such is Life should bear in mind when they are confronted with the use of the word "Sollicker" for the Vivians. Wilkes (1990:306, 1996:19), as well as "The Annotations" (1991:460), define the term within the context of words like "big", "good", "great", "whopper" or "force". For this reason, I think "Sollicker" alludes to a subject of the Empire, and that his being nicknamed "the Immovable" by Collins further supports this. Since Collins would rather build an Australia for Australians, creating a distinct self-image vis-à-vis other nationalist images, the term "Sollicker", as a sign indicating a British or jingoistic attitude, poses a distinct problem for "the Coming Australian". In short, a "Sollicker", like the Anglo-Australian romance novelist, will tell the wrong lies, hand down the wrong identity, and be the cause of much ill-judgment in light of eudaimonia and the Australian experience.

Bearing in mind Roderick Vivian, we must turn our attention to that other illegitimate son in Furphy's novels, namely Fred Falkland-Pritchard. Like Roderick Vivian, Fred ought to be seen as an illegitimate son of the Empire. Indeed, the theme of illegitimacy, in the Pritchard paternity, is introduced when Fred's "father" had 267.
told Collins' father that he 'was the illegitimate son of an illegitimate son of George IV' (BBB, 5). Further in the novel, when Collins tells his reader that Fred's "father" had 'died of some unpronouncable scientific term signifying internal haemorrhage of irascibility and malevolence' (BBB, 37), the details of Fred's illegitimate status are revealed in a series of clues for the observant reader to piece together (BBB, 38-39). I will not go into the full details of Fred's illegitimate status, except to say that he is the son of Sir William Falkland and Miss Kirkham, the 'seventh daughter of the Rev. Clarence Kirkham, incumbent of Thorpe Mullock, a parish contiguous to Falkland Lodge' (BBB, 38).

Readers ought to bear in mind the familial relations between the "Sollickers" and M'Intyre at Yoongoolee, for Miss Kirkham was married off to Fred's "father", Sylvester Pritchard, at the encouragement of Sir William, in the same manner as M'Intyre encouraged the marriage between Helenar and Edward. Evidence in the novel suggests that Sylvester Pritchard, a 'road contractor' in Victoria and a man who 'could always manage to boss half a dozen men, picked for servility and cheapness' (BBB, 5), was employed at the Falkland estate in England, having a similarly immovable mental attitude as Edward Vivian. Furthermore, both natural fathers of the bastard sons have substantial fortunes and are already married, suggesting that while they are concerned with the welfare of their illegitimate sons, they are also concerned with the outbreak of a scandal. And finally, just as Roderick Vivian had been named 'in honour of Muster M'Intyre' (SiL, 142), a textual clue to his true paternal relations, Fred also carries the truth of his illegitimacy in his patronymic. As Collins cleverly indicates, '[t]hese family entanglements [between the Falklands and the Pritchards] seem to afford a clue to the origin of hyphenated names' (BBB, 39).

I use the term "cleverly" because Collins' authorial articulation of Fred's details direct the observant reader to see that hyphenated names afford a clue to such family entanglements, especially illegitimacy. Like Gilding (1967:167, 1971:xvi), one might be tempted to say that Furphy, rather than Collins, is directing his reader's attention to Fred's true status. But this can only be done at the expense of seeing Collins purely as a hero. Barnes is correct in noting that Collins is 'now only a shadow of the original', but he is 268.
not 'a mannerism' (1990:365). Collins steps back from centre stage because it is taken by Fred Falkland-Pritchard. In other words, Collins, as Croft (1991:250) notes, acts in the capacity of verifying the "truths" of Fred's elaborate yarns. Yet this act of verification is not to expose Fred as just 'a skilful liar' of 'pathetic fantasies' (Croft, 1991:250), but to show the function of the lie in the art of nation and identity.

For this reason, I disagree with Croft's notion that Collins' status in *The Buln-Buln and the Brolga* is simply that of 'a realist' (1991:250). Devlin-Glass also sees Collins as a realist or rationalist who cannot accept romance, arguing instead that it is Furphy who 'enlarged upon the positive value of the romantic lie' (1974:88). This is true but problematic. Besides ignoring Collins' authorial status and truth-embellished style, Devlin-Glass makes no distinction between romance and romanticism when she uses the adjective "romantic". Nor does she make a distinction between the customs of Anglo-Australianism and Currency in regards to the positive value of romance and marriage. In this sense, I am not sure what to make of Devlin-Glass' notion that '[t]he romantic/realistic dichotomy reveals itself as increasingly untenable and artificial as Furphy's examination of lying proceeds' (1974:88). Despite this, Devlin-Glass (1974:75) is right to note that *The Buln-Buln and the Brolga* is a much more thematically tidy piece of writing, continuing with patterns of thought set out in the previous novels.

Gilding is astute in observing that *The Buln-Buln and the Brolga* is the result of Furphy's full recognition that reality is like the novel in that reality and social structures are constructions of the wills and imaginations of the minds who inhabit, who in fact create, them' (1971:xiv). But I cannot agree with his claim that 'the point of attack [in the novel] is ebullient Australian nationalism, in particular the city dweller's exaltation of the bush' (1967:172). Like the previous novels, the distinction between realism and romanticism, or Lawson's and Paterson's styles, is merged, since the national type must be strategically truth-embellished and loosely-federated in order to make its eudalmonic value appealing to all. As Collins states towards the close of his narrative,

[t]here must...be something in Fred, after all -some
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magnetic property, enabling him to draw from the heterogeneous mixture of society such a finely-tempered bit of steel. And, beyond controversy, there was only one thing in Fred. Therein, as a matter of mere necessity, his magnetism must lie (lie is good). Moreover, this magnet-metaphor may serve to throw light upon many of the conjugal successes and disasters that have puzzled philosophers (BBB, 141).

Although Fred is an illegitimate son of the Empire, he is, as Collins explains, 'eligible for membership in the Australian Natives' Association' (BBB, 39) because he was, like Roderick Vivian, born in Australia. As I have already discussed, Roderick Vivian's creativity is, as Currency lad, curbed by the "sollicker" mental attitude. But, the question generated by this juxtapositioning of familial relations is whether or not the same mental attitude will influence Fred Falkland-Pritchard. Or will he, like Collins, be concerned with the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia? Although The Buln-Buln and the Brolga thematically returns to familiar ground, its thematic tidiness, or cohesion, centres around an exploration of a principal theme, and that is the value of lying. Collins states that '[l]ying commends itself to the juvenile mind as being easy, inexpensive, and convenient; and in course of time the habit becomes fixed' (BBB, 8). Also, '[l]ying is, of all the arts, the most popular and cosmopolitan' (BBB, 8).

From this, Collins proceeds to discuss historical examples related to the liar's paradox, stating that 'of all the accusations of mendacity which from time immemorial have primed our atmosphere, probably not one has been groundless -except, perhaps when some Chinaman, after a few hours patient controversy, has applied the epithet to his jibbing horse' (BBB, 8). The liar's paradox, with the exception of its inapplicability to certain contexts, transgresses the notion that something must be either true or not true, as is the case with Collins' statement that 'truth is relative, not absolute' (BBB, 8). According to Von Wright,

[t]he antinomies of logic have puzzled people ever since they were discovered -and will probably continue

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to puzzle us for ever. We should, I think, not regard them as much as problems awaiting a solution, but rather as providing a perpetual-raw material for thinking. They are important, because thinking about them challenges the ultimate questions of all logic - and therefore of all thinking (1983:25).

For Von Wright, the liar’s paradox is an example of ‘an antinomy’ because ‘the conclusion of the argument...is a contradiction’ (1983:27). Von Wright’s approach to the liar’s paradox is very fruitful for the novels, since it allows us to take two wonderful antinomies from the novels as raw material for further thinking about the novels. Firstly, the notion that the novels are not fiction, as often stated by Collins. And secondly, the notion that the novels are not fact, as implied by Collins’ claim to authorship and censorship. It would be futile, as Von Wright suggests, to try and solve these two antinomies logically. To attempt to do so would mean missing the point of the liar’s paradox. Because of the contradictory outcome of true and not true, the liar’s paradox blurs the distinction between fact and fiction. The value of the liar’s paradox for the novels rests with thinking about, or seeing and responding to the idea of truth-embellishment in light of the ethics of representation, thus challenging the idea that all forms of lying are morally reprehensible.

Despite his earlier claim that Collins verifies the truth behind Fred’s stories, I find it strange for Croft to say that ‘there are no hidden stories which might make Fred’s fantasies real’ (1991:253). Firstly, Collins only verifies some of the truths from which Fred builds his fantasies. As Collins states, ‘I knew him to tell the truth three times’ (BBB, 9), and Collins proceeds to relate the three episodes to his reader (BBB, 9-37). Rather than verifying the reality of Fred’s fantasies, which is a logical contradiction, Collins uses the truth about Fred to foreground the truth-embellished style, which Fred uses to refashion heroically both the three episodes and his self later in the novel. Within the context of the liar’s paradox as a narrative technique, Partington states that ‘one possible solution is that Furphy wished to establish that no narration is simply a statement of unambiguous facts, since some selection must take
place' (1993:248). As Zeller explains, 'what we learn about the yarn is that it is something more than simply a well-formed tale. It is a story in which the teller has invested not only something of himself, but also something of the life around him' (1988:48).

For this reason, Croft's notion that '[t]he skilful fabulist can corrupt the world of the real, and substitute for it the illusions of fiction' (1991:257) seems rather perplexing. The novels indicate that the dangers of fiction, chiefly romance, are everpresent, but since reality is constantly permeated by fiction, it does not necessarily follow that fiction corrupts reality. Although the potential is readily there, yarning, or lying is not always about corrupting reality. It is also about being well-deceived in light of eudaimonia. As Collins states, 'old Dr Johnson says that the greatest sublunary happiness consists in being well deceived - well deceived' (BBB, 20). Or, as Collins later points out, 'let a man devoutly and constantly believe in himself, and he will find a multitude of others to believe in him also' (BBB, 74). In this sense, I do not agree with Barnes' claim that 'The Buln-Buln and the Brolga has less intellectual weight', even though it displays 'both a fascination with the techniques of narration and a confidence in handling them' (1990:365).

Bearing in mind the principal concern with lying, the first theme to which the reader is introduced is the notion 'that no man is a hero to his vally-de-sham' (BBB, 4). There are several reasons for this. Firstly, Collins has just received a letter from Fred, who has informed him that he has a 'wife and three (3) children' (BBB, 2) and is on his way to Echuca. Secondly, Collins' encounters with the O'Halloran and Vivian marriages, as well as the unfruitful romances in Rigby's Romance and the stories of infidelity told by Warrigal Alf in Such is Life, lend strength to Collins' notion since it appears that male and female relations, in Riverina, have little or no success. And thirdly, it serves as an introduction to Fred Falkland-Pritchard, whose aptitude for lying seems to indicate no more success with women than the other male heroes. As Collins states, '[Fred's] one positive quality was mendacity' while '[h]is negative qualities spread out in an old man plain of comprehensive incapability, in the centre of which, his solitary characteristic reared its awful form above the clouds and midway left the storm' (BBB, 4).

Indeed, 'you could sit down and rest in the cool shade of one
of his fabrications. Tasteful, audacious and adroit in his one art, he was limp and washy and generally inadequate outside that speciality (BBB, 4). All in all, Collins seems to have much evidence in favour of his 'theory that women do not love their husbands' (BBB, 40), further suggesting that the "Coming Australian" seems to have very little hope. As Zeller states, '[f]rom his theory Collins reasons that Mrs. Pritchard must indeed hate her husband because he is good at nothing but lying; once she sees how little truth there is in Fred's yarn's, their marriage is doomed' (1988:45). According to Collins, '[w]omen's love is romantic, and flows like the Solway in romantic atmosphere, but ebbs like its tide when a more intimate knowledge has resolved that atmosphere into its prosaic components' (BBB, 43). In short, 'the hero vanishes' when 'the scare-crow truth of masculinity, the incorrigible he-ness of the he-feller, comes out only too brightly under the penetrating rays of Hymen's slush-lamp' (BBB, 42).

Despite the bitter tone, one should not jump to the conclusion that Collins is sexist, for it foregrounds his disappointment with both the pervasiveness of sex-charm over sex-value and his past encounters with marriages. As Barnes states, 'nowhere in his fiction does Furphy portray marriage as a fulfilling relationship' (1990:188). That is, of course, until readers encounter the Falkland-Pritchard marriage. Thus, while Collins has much evidence in favour of his theory, it is not rock-solid. Nor is it meant to be. As Collins confesses, 'my theory of the feminine vally-de-sham ought to be stated as subject to certain exceptions' (BBB, 74-75). Indeed, the theory is a strategy, and the authorial Collins uses Fred and his abilities to overturn the notion that 'no man is up to the husband-ideal of a loving woman' (BBB, 44-45). In terms of lying, Fred may be 'the over-indulger' (BBB, 8), but the point is made: marriage requires the same eudaimonic principles needed for uplifting and upbuilding a nation, namely correct judgment, truth-embellishment, an understanding of one's controlling alternatives and guardianship. As Collins states, '[t]he fact is, that authority or precedence, however ridiculous, being once accepted and enthroned, is apt to paralyse judgment' (BBB, 85), hence the emphasis on telling the right lies.

For this reason, one must be wary of Croft's notion that Collins does not 'understand married love and what we must call folie 273.
à deux' (1983:9). According to Croft, 'Furphy's main interest in this short novel is the relationship of man and wife, and how marriage can only work if there is a shared delusion. Marriage, he seems to be saying, has to be based on illusion rather than reality' (1991:248). It is a view shared by Partington, who states that '[w]hen a marriage is...happy, as with Fred...and his wife, the main reason seems to be that one party is mistaken about the character of the other' (1993:97). Unfortunately, neither Croft nor Partington takes into account the idea of truth-embellishment and the consistent focus on the ethics of representation in all three novels. To all intents and purposes, it can be said that Collins' preoccupation with uplifting and upbuilding is also applicable to Fred.

From being an initially 'pusillanimous' young Australian, who spent his 'juvenile days' as a 'scapegoat' for 'the bad boys of the generation' (BBB, 4), Fred emerges as the hero of the Franco-German War, selected 'out of 180 000 men' by the Emperor of France to perform a service that [the Emperor] would trust to no man but an Australian' (BBB, 111. My italics). Fred's importance to the War effort is such that, when Fred is wounded, the Emperor sends for 'Dupong...the cleverest surgeon in the world -a man wearing thirteen Continental orders on his breast' (BBB, 114). It is this man who proudly proclaims that nothing can kill Fred, for '[h]e has the Australian constitution -the constitution of a horse!' (BBB, 114). Fred celebrates his truth-embellished identity, telling the right lies and turning the old world on its head with the kind of antipodean heroics worthy of the "Coming Australian". This process enhances the Falkland-Pritchard marriage and, subsequently, enhances Young Australia, for Fred the Currency Lad has given heroism and legend to his children, who will presumably create and narrate the Australian experience in a grand manner.

Within this context, the reader needs to remember the details of the relationship between Rory and his daughter, Mary O'Halloran, 'the perfect Young-Australian' (StL, 73). Rory, the Irish Catholic, was 'born of a legend-loving race' (StL, 61) and, according to Collins,

was [Mary's] guide, philosopher, and crony. He was her overwhelming ideal of power, wisdom, and goodness; he was her help in ages past, her hope for years to
come (no irreverence intended here; quite the reverse, for if true family life existed, we should better apprehend the meaning of "Our Father, who art in heaven"); he was her Ancient of Days; her shield, and her exceedingly great reward (StL, 74).

It is interesting to note that the first marriage encountered in the three novels raises the question of "true family life" and asks the reader to consider the meaning of "Our Father, who art in heaven". Apart from the obvious biblical reference within the context of sectarian rivalry, there is also a clever pun on Rory's heroic status in the eyes of Mary, and the sense that Rory's ability to yarn could lead to an Australia legend "if true family life existed" in light of uplifting and upbuilding. Despite the fact that the O'Halloran episode leads to tragedy, the relationship that Rory has with his daughter is a strategic forerunner to Fred's relationship with his children. Stylistically, the Falkland-Pritchard marriage indicates "true family life", but the paradox to this truth is the necessity of embellishment. What, then, does this say about Lillian Falkland-Pritchard? As I have pointed out earlier, the previous encounters with marriage or romance lead readers to expect a sorry state of affairs for the Falkland-Pritchard marriage and anticipate a rather unsavoury quality to Fred's wife. According to Collins' theory,

Fred's antithetical complement...would carry a stern, practical, masterful look; also the poor woman would be sour in temper and repellent in manner, through continual brooding over her grand mistake (BBB, 66).

From this, Collins, acting as the 'gushing novelist' (BBB, 66), gives his readers a nomenologically detailed account of her features in accordance with her unsavoury character. But, one should not take this at all seriously, for Collins has already pointed out that nomenology is a science which 'sometimes runs cronk' (BBB, 66). Gilding states that, in his description of Lillian, Collins 'himself departs far from actuality' (1971:xvi). While this is true, I think Collins is strategically leading his readers to the value of Lillian to the Falkland-Pritchard marriage in light of a "true family life" for 275.
Young Australia. Once confronted with Lillian, Collins states immediately that '[n]omenology...was at fault once more' (BBB, 68. My italics), indicating that Collins is completely aware of its fallaciousness from past experiences.

In face and figure she was beyond criticism; not only negatively perfect, but almost aggressively attractive. Analysed, this attractiveness was of the kind that faithfully indexes a true woman's temperament -which implies much, and nothing but good. Owing to many co-operate causes, the Australian woman of the best type has probably no equal on earth; and Fred's wife was a satisfactory illustration of our country's possible achievement in the most momentous and far-reaching of all national commissions. In no respect was she like her picture; indeed, I noticed with a touch of chagrin that even her moustache was golden brown instead of rusty black (BBB, 68).

Not only does Lillian have sex-charm, she is also the shining example of sex-value evident in the "Australienne". Croft argues that "Mrs Falkland-Pritchard is all that a novelist could ask for in a heroine" (1991:255). But, to approach Lillian as the novelist's perfect heroine is to overemphasise her sex-charm in light of her sex-value. I think Lillian Falkland-Pritchard represents the high moral standard, calm courage and clear intellect which Furphy thought so important. Croft is correct in noting that 'Mrs Falkland-Pritchard and Tom share common intellectual interests' (1991:250), for there are many instances in the novel where Lillian can be said to represent sex-value for Collins. However, there is one instance where a dialogue between Collins and Lillian foregrounds an important aspect of her sex-value, and that is a woman's influence on 'the controlling masculine [mind] of her husband, who, 'be he a king or a beggar, is a little world of his own' (RR, 11):

"Tell me, Mr Collins, do you find much change in him since you were boys together?"

"No change," I replied, with my habitual

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truthfulness. “Only the ripened fulfilment of his early promise. I may tell you that, in the olden days, we simply recognised his superiority and let it go at that. In fact, he’s gifted with a power that I’ve never equalled.”

“I’m glad to hear you say so,” rejoined Mrs Pritchard, evidently relieved. “I do admire a magnanimous spirit. But -speaking confidentially-doesn’t it seem strange to you that the world, against its own interests, passes by men like Fred, and lavishes place and power on mere nobodies?”

“Not more strange than true, however,” I replied, veiling my bewilderment under a sympathetic air. “And -apart from the injustice perpetrated- society, in so doing, sustains a loss.”

“Yes; but, you see, Mr Collins, the sin of society, in this case, is visited on the victim, as well as on society itself. I should like to see society suffer the whole penalty. Of course, you can reason the question out dispassionately, while I feel the injustice day by day, as I see condemned to inaction hands that the rod of empire might have swayed.”

“Or waked to ecstasy the living lyre,” I rejoined thoughtfully; and I maintain, even now, that my quotation was the more apt of the two -heartless, maybe, but just a desperate grip at something tangible in this chaotic situation (BBB, 72-73).

According to Croft (1983:10, 1991:272) readers ought to see Lillian as the hero of the The Buln-Buln and the Brolga. While this is not untrue, one should not negate Fred’s status as hero. Rather, readers ought to bear in mind Franklin’s notion that Furphy observed ‘what every woman knows, but what few men have moral courage to admit; that men’s creative work needs to be nurtured by women’ (1944:38). Whether or not ‘Lillian Pritchard’ sees ‘through [Fred’s] lies’ or ‘accepts them as fact’ (Zeller, 1988:45) is not the issue. What is important is her capacity to nurture Fred’s creative potential in accordance with the high moral standard, calm courage
and clear intellect of her sex-value. She completes the family's sense of purpose and is relieved to hear that Collins equally appreciates the power of Fred's magnanimous spirit. Collins may do 'his best to be cultured and civilised...even to the point of agreeing with the wife's inflated opinion of her husband' (Croft, 1991:256), but one should recall Collins' recognition of Fred's ability 'to draw from the heterogeneous mixture of society such a finely-tempered bit of steel' (BBB, 141).

Again, the novel's preoccupation with lying, through the liar's paradox, challenges the notion that all forms of lying are morally reprehensible. Fred's lies serve to uplift and upbuild, and, in light of the ethics of representation, it is worth noting that his 'power...lay largely in the quality of compatability and congruity' (BBB, 103). As Collins explains, '[y]ou would never hear him say, like your first-person singular novelist-liar, "my blood ran cold" - "I was unnerved with terror" - "I never was so frightened in my life" - or words to similar purport' (BBB, 103). In accordance with Collins' views, such lies are morally reprehensible. Indeed, '[F]red could see the inconsistency' and, '[w]ith the instinct of genius, he perceived that the genuine hero, relating his little adventure, never descends to that sort of palaver, simply because attested courage neither knows nor needs any such paltry folk' (BBB, 103).

Despite the style of his last novel, one wonders whether or not Furphy used Fred Falkland-Pritchard to point out that the uplifting and upbuilding of Australia, or the art of nationhood, is not just a process of Federation, but also "Frederation". Also, one wonders if Fred's truth-embellished character, as the heroic Coming Australian, is meant to be seen as a guide to the value of Tom Collins. If this is the case, then one is faced with reconciling Collins' scholarly philosophical type with Fred's swashbuckling hero. Perhaps Furphy hoped that the reading public would take to Fred's truth-embellished character more than they had done to Tom Collins, and that Fred's popular image, in conjunction with Collins' commentary on Fred's aptitude and skills, would spark public interest in the issues first articulated by Collins in Such is Life, namely that uplifting and upbuilding Young Australia depends not just on the art of nation-building, but also on clear intellect, calm courage and high moral standards.

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With this in mind, it is the romance plot which is most in need of reassessment, of observant reading and thinking within the context of Collins' preoccupation with uplifting and upbuilding. Croft states that 'Molly's and Alf's story is the core of Such is Life' because 'the thread which runs through [chapters one, four, six and seven] is the story of the Coopers and the Morrices, of Molly and Alf' (1991:112). But Croft also proposes the following perplexing question: '[i]f the Molly/Alf story is the core of Such is Life, why is it hidden?' (1991:113). According to Croft, '[t]here are no simple answers to this question, because they lie deep in Furphy's own nature, and deep in the ideas of the time' (1991:113). I am not entirely satisfied with Croft's observations. It is true that the Molly/Alf romance is an important aspect of the novel, but I do not think it is the core. The romance plot is but one more treatment of the idea of uplifting and upbuilding, which is the most likely candidate for the "core" of Such is Life, as well as the other two novels.

According to Nina Knight, 'the story of Molly and Alf is the longest and the most intricate, and it has contributed largely towards establishing Such is Life as an elaborately structured work of fiction' (1969:245). This is certainly true, but to read Such is Life through the romance plot alone leads to some very problematic conclusions about Collins. Although many critics have given their interpretation, I find their views unsatisfactory. I think this is largely due to three factors. Firstly, the idea of uplifting and upbuilding has largely been ignored. Secondly, no critic has fully considered Furphy's idea of authorship nor Collins' status as the implied author. And thirdly, the issue of Collins' induction has not been satisfactorily investigated. It is this last point to which I want to draw my reader's attention. No reading of the romance plot will do justice to Such is Life so long as it ignores the philosophical idea of induction. Indeed, the intricacy of the romance plot turns on this form of epistemology. As Collins states to Stewart of Kooltoopa, 'my information [about Warrigal Alf] is derived from no random hearsay, but is obtained by an intransmissible power of induction, rare in our times' (StL, 170).

Although there is no hard evidence, it seems likely that Furphy had been exposed to some of Hume's ideas. Barnes (1990:57) notes that the Furphy family knew the Scotsman, James Hutcheson, who was self-educated and well-read in British philosophy. Barnes (1990:57) points out that Hutcheson was both a leading public figure in Kyneton and John Furphy's master when he was an apprentice. It is also quite possible that Furphy had read many works of British philosophy for himself at either The Mechanics Institute in Shepparton, or the public library in Melbourne.

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What does induction mean? Hospers (1990:188) explains that induction infers conclusions about a future event from a sample of like events in the past. Using the example of throwing a stone up into the air, he states that 'we can't validly deduce “It will fall to the ground” from “It has always done so,” but we consider that it has always done so as evidence that it will do so in the future' (1990:188). As Hume originally wrote in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 'I shall allow...that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other; I know, in fact, that it is always inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of [a priori] reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning' ([1777] 1990:799). According to Hume, '[t]hat there are no demonstrative [or a priori or deductive] arguments in [matters of fact and existence] seems evident, since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change and that an object, seemingly like those we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects' (Enq. [1777] 1990:799).

And, '[t]o say that it is experimental is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities' (Enq. [1777] 1990:799). In this sense, Hume states that '[i]f there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience [as demonstrative or a priori evidence] becomes useless and can give rise to no inference or conclusion' (Enq. [1777] 1990:800-801). Hospers (1990:190) explains that inductive reasoning can never be deductively valid because conclusions are not inferred with certainty from the premise. This view is held by Russell, who states that

[6] For Hume, a priori or demonstrative reasoning, as opposed to 'moral reasoning' or a posteriori reasoning concerning 'matters of fact', are 'the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic' (Enq. [1777] 1990:794). Because this is so, one cannot demonstrate the relationship between cause and effect in matters of fact as one can with number and, in this sense, conclusions based on matters of fact or experience have no certainty of outcome.
Experience has shown us that, hitherto, the frequent repetition of some uniform succession or coexistence has been a cause of our expecting the same succession or coexistence on the next occasion (1912:62).

According to Hume, 'all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity, which we discover among natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those, which we have found to follow from such objects' (Enq. [1777] 1990:800. My italics). In short, '[f]rom causes, which appear similar, we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions' (Enq. [1777] 1990:800). Within this context, the idea of probability is, for Hume, 'the concurrence of...several views or glimpses [that imprint] the idea more strongly on the imagination; gives it superior force and vigour; renders its influence on the passions and affections more sensible; and in a word, begets that reliance or security, which constitutes the nature of belief and opinion' (Enq. [1777] 1990:811).

Because of this, Hume concludes that, '[a]s a great number of views...concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the imagination, beget that sentiment which we call belief, and give its object the preference above the contrary event, which is not supported by an equal number of experiments, and recurs not frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future' (Enq. [1777] 1990:812).

Although he does not discuss the issue of certainty and probability, or a priori and a posteriori reasoning, in any detail, I assume this is what Croft (1991:50, 87, 274) alludes to when he states that Collins' mistakes are chiefly due to the perils of induction. According to Croft, 'Tom's major intellectual characteristic is his reliance on induction to establish an hypothesis, and blindness in the face of facts which deny that hypothesis. The best example of this is his unswerving belief in his theory of nomenclology' (1991:96). And yet, Collins knows that nomenclology, 'like all other sciences except Mathematics, sometimes runs cronk' (BBB, 66). Collins is not unaware of the possibility of contrary outcomes associated with the inductive method. More to the point, Croft believes that '[f]or Furphy, the truth, reality itself, was a fiction; it was story. For Tom Collins, writing was a record of fact based on

Because of the importance of truth-embellishment for both Furphy and Collins, Croft's view is clearly false. Readers should not assume that, because of the lack of certainty, '[t]he suchness of life which we see from [Collins'] pen is one which is produced by induction, and it is usually wrong' (Croft, 1991:173). One of the most remarkable features of the novels is their focus on the widespread use of induction in inferring and evaluating the many facets of the suchness of life. This is interesting, for Hospers (1990:191) and Russell (1912:63, 69) both note that human beings, as well as animals, are naturally inclined to infer inductively in daily life. Hume's views on this matter are no different, but he does offer a reason as to why inductive inferences occur. In A Treatise of Human Nature, he states that 'all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation', for '[i]t is not solely in poetry and music [that] we must follow our sentiment, but likewise in philosophy' (1911:105).

In other words, '[w]hen I give the preference to one set of arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority of their influence' (THN. 1911:105). According to Hume, '[o]bjects have no discoverable connection together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another' (THN. 1911:105-106. My italics). Within the context of inductive inferences, Hume argues 'that the supposition, that the future resembles the past, is not founded on arguments of any kind, but is derived entirely from habit, by which we are determined to expect for the future the same train of objects to which we have been accustomed' (THN. 1911:134-135). In this sense, 'there is no probability so great as not to allow of a contrary possibility; because otherwise it would cease to be a probability, and would become a certainty' (THN. 1911:136). But Hume also points out the following:

[s]hould it here be asked me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those sceptics who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possessed of any
measures of truth and falsehood; I should reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person, was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity, has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connection with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking, as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine....My intention...is only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects, are derived from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures' (THN. 178-179).

According to Stuart Hampshire, 'Hume tried to convince his readers that there can be no knowledge that can be called distinctively philosophical knowledge, no hope of rational insight into the structure of reality' (1966:4). Hampshire states that '[a] philosopher may study the anthropology of knowledge; he may describe the deep-rooted habits and customs which form our view of the external world and the system of our ordinary beliefs', but 'he can only remove the illusions and the pretences of traditional philosophy' (1966:4). Most importantly, a philosopher's job is to point out 'the illusion that there must be some ultimate justification of our habits of thought, which is external to these habits themselves' (Hampshire, 1966:4). I must disagree with some of Hampshire's interpretation of Hume, for Hume had stated that none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience, or to reject that great guide of human life; it may surely be allowed a philosopher to have so much curiosity at least, as to examine the principle of human nature, which gives this mighty authority to experience, and makes us 283.
draw advantage from that similarity, which nature has placed among different objects (*Enq.* [1777] 1990:800).

Hume does not argue that no knowledge can be philosophical. Nor does he discount the possibility of a rational insight into the structure of reality, but he does stress that a knowledge which claims to know that structure with certainty is false, since no conclusions derived from matters of fact can know the a priori relationship between causes and effects. Because of the fallaciousness of any claim to an a priori insight into the structure of reality, Hume is opposed to any traditional philosophy which concerns itself with demonstrative proofs of experiential "facts". In this sense, Hume (*Enq.* [1777] 1990:803) argues that the ultimate justification for our habits of thought, concerning matters of fact, is custom, and that custom is one's experience of an operation which has the propensity to repeat itself without human reason or understanding. Using the example of heat and flame, Hume states that 'we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other', and that '[a]ll inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of [a priori] reasoning' (*Enq.* [1777] 1990:804).

According to Hume, '[c]ustom...is the great guide to human life', since '[t]hat principle alone, which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past' (*Enq.* [1777] 1990:805). Hume's views on customs and habits are quite important to an understanding of the three novels and the romance plot, since the three novels show that the issue of induction is more complicated than Croft affords. It is true that probability in cause and effect is not certainty, and that certain probable effects are more than likely to be met with a contrary outcome. But this is not always the case. In other words, there are certain probable outcomes, which we may infer by way of custom or habit, that are more than likely to be fulfilled. When such outcomes are not fulfilled, we tend to look for the reason as to why they are not rather than conclude that an inductive method is wrong. In these cases, we tend to examine the relationship between customs or habits of thought, degrees of support, and external but contrary influences.

When reading Furphy's novels, I think that these points ought
to be kept in mind. Interestingly enough, the word induction itself seemed to have had some currency in the 1890s, particularly with the Coming Australian debate, and its usage sheds light on Collins' induction and the romance plot. In a *Bulletin* article published on the 10th of November, 1894, the writer states that

in any conjectural horoscope of the coming Australian, we must start from things as they are, not from things as they have been. History may be a light to our path, but it can never be the path itself. With patient observation of facts for a few years more, sufficient should be known of Australian character as modified by Australian conditions to enable general principles, the result of alien experience, to be aptly applied. But, without preliminary induction, deduction is a tool which slips in the hand (6).

Or, as Collins states,

[w]hat authority had the boundary man [Roderick Vivian] or I to dogmatise on the Coming Australian? Just the same authority as Marcus Clarke, or Trollope, or Froude, or Francis Adams -and that is exactly none. *Deductive reasoning* of this kind is seldom safe. Who, for instance, could have deduced, from certain subtly interlaced conditions of food, atmosphere, association, and what not, the development of those silky honours which grace the upper lip of the Australienne? No doubt there are certain occult laws which govern these things; but we haven't even mastered the laws themselves, and how are we going to forecast their operation? (*Sil*, 144. My italics).

What Collins calls nature's "occult laws" is described by Hume as nature's secret powers. According to Hume, 'nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles, on which the influence of these
objects entirely depends' (Enq. [1777] 1990:798). What we apprehend we do by way of custom, but custom gives us no insight into the relational power of the natural causality between two things. In Robert Wilson's view, 'Such is Life is, without a doubt, a philosophical novel' because 'two philosophical problems dominate the novel', namely 'the often-discussed issue of free will versus determinism' and 'the nature of knowledge' (1979:127).

More to the point, Wilson contends that '[h]ow men know -by what means and with what limitations- is the "central" problem of Such is Life and shapes, at least in part, its structure' (1979:128). And, '[i]n the course of Such is Life, Tom comments upon two ways of knowing, each of which is a solution to the persistent problem of knowledge' (Wilson, 1979:129). According to Wilson (1979:129), these two ways of knowing are, firstly, the subsumption of things to already established categories or laws, and secondly, an empirical identification of things which assert their individuality and thereby resist general classifications or categorization. Wilson (1979) calls the former categoric knowledge, and the latter tautegoric knowledge. Discussing Collins' claim that 'the best kind of knowledge is acquired from observation and experience' (SiL, 274), Wilson argues that it ought to be seen within 'his contempt for the English upper classes (and the novelists, such as Kingsley, who glorify them) since their knowledge depends upon already-formed categories' (1979:129).

Wilson (1979:129) thinks that Furphy cleverly does not allow Collins' conclusions to stand because Collins' consistently fails to recognize and identify things properly vis-à-vis pre-existing categories. According to Wilson (1979:131), knowledge, or ways of knowing in the novel, is either categoric or tautegoric, and Collins' preference for the tautegoric is his downfall. But Wilson makes a grave mistake when he assumes that Collins' preference for the tautegoric exhibits a continual disregard for the categoric. While it is true that Collins attacks the Anglo-Australian idea of aristocracy and its categories, it is not true that he has contempt for categoric knowledge altogether. I do not see how Wilson could have come to this conclusion since Collins is quite prepared, as I have already shown, to refer intertextually to a variety of canonical works, which can be said to constitute Wilson's definition of categoric knowledge. Yet Wilson acknowledges this, noting that 'Tom's chronicles are remarkably full
of categorical propositions’, and ‘[n]ot all of these are false,...but their mere presence sets off the theory that knowledge is experiential, particular, and intuitive’ (1979:137).

That Collins gives preference to the tautegoric is true, but this preference should be seen as a consistent effort to recontextualize the categoric so that readers may judge and appreciate better the Australian experience, as indicated by the ideas of uplifting and upbuilding. Or, in light of the above-mentioned *Bulletin* article, Collins’ preference for the tautegoric is the use of induction to observe general principles or customs and habits which could categorically delineate an Australian character. Wilson is right to note that a strict adherence to ‘categorical knowledge’ can ‘lead to stiff-necked prejudices’ (1979:130), but he fails to mention that the greater result of such categorical knowledge is the deep-seated and widespread colonial division and rivalry between the customs and habits of Anglo-Australianism and the idea of currency, as indicated by Quartermann’s character. Perhaps this is another reason why Collins claims that ‘[t]he coming Australian is a problem’ (*Sil*, 144). Nevertheless, Wilson soundly judges that ‘the requirements of knowing have emerged from the novel as both categoric and tautegoric, neither being of much account on its own’ (1979:142).

To put it in simple terms, knowledge is constituted by both inductive and deductive methods. Yet Wilson fails to consider how many categories are themselves the product of tautegoric or inductive knowledge. In other words, how many categories are created by experience, customs and habits. Upon realising that he is on the Victorian, rather than the New South Welsh side of the Murray, Collins confesses the following to his reader:

[m]y worldly-wise friend,...[i]f you have never been bushed, your immunity is by no means an evidence of your cleverness, but rather a proof that your experience of the wilderness is small. If you have been bushed, you will remember how, as you struck a place you knew, error was suddenly superseded by a flash of truth; this without volition of judgment on your part, and entirely by force of a presentation of fact which your own personal error -however sincere and
stubborn—had never affected, and which you were no longer in a position to repudiate (Sil, 106).

Perhaps one of the fundamental points that the novels make about induction and the use of categories is the notion that, in experience, truth comes from error, and that error changes the categories which underpin one's judgment, one's seeing and responding to life through custom and habit. This point is made almost twenty years later by John Dewey in his *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. According to Dewey, '[o]ld truth has its chief value in assisting the detection of new truth....Endless and persistent uncovering of facts and principles not known—such is the true spirit of induction' ([1920] 1957:34). Indeed, '[c]ontinued progress in knowledge is the only sure way of protecting old knowledge from degenerating into dogmatic doctrines received on authority, or from imperceptible decay into superstition and old wives tales' (Dewey, [1920] 1957:34). Furphy appears to use Collins to point out that induction modifies established customs and habits, and that ignorant evaluations lead to the permanent marks which form some "new" customs or habits, but not necessarily one's which inspire *eudatmonia*.

This adds scope to the novels' focus on ignorance-shifting and their Epictetian emphasis on judgment, suggesting that inductive ways of seeing and responding to life can be improved by a tautegoric breaking or remaking of certain categories. It also explains why Collins is so openly preoccupied with censorship, since he is keen to point out that authors and artists must select and represent, or break and remake "life" in a manner that is sufficient for *eudatmonia*. To all intents and purposes, Furphy's use of the term "induction" is similar to that in the aforementioned *Bulletin* article. But Furphy is also astutely aware that customs and habits find their chief outlet in literature and art, and that literature and art generate the customs and habits which form the notion of culture.

As one can see, Collins' use of induction in the novels is not so clear-cut as Croft concludes. Croft is right to point out that 'Tom's reliance on the powers of induction leads him to some strange conclusions about Warrigal Alf' (1991:173), but the situation is not so simple that one can conclude that Collins is wrong. Despite being
aware of Collins' cunning concealment, Croft seems to take no heed of the possibility that cunning concealment runs throughout the romance plot. Even an appeal to Furphy's 1903 review cannot support the notion that Collins is wrong, since the review offers a rather interesting observation on this matter. Furphy states that '[u]nderneath this obvious dislocation of anything resembling continuous narrative, run several undercurrents of plot, manifest to the reader, though ostensibly unnoticed by the author' (1969:130. My italics). This simply suggests that the implied author either pretends to be unaware of a plot or has no intention of foregrounding these undercurrents to his readers. It does not state that the plot is wholly unnoticed by the implied author, which, in terms of Furphy's creative results, is absurd.

As I mentioned earlier in my thesis, Furphy was attempting to steer both current and future readers of Such is Life in the right direction, and the easiest way to do this was to point out both the existence of a romance plot and Collins' thematic strategies. In a letter to Cathels, which the editors, Barnes and Hoffmann, believe to have been written in 1895, but may also have been written as early as 1894 or as late as 1896, Furphy states that he 'worked [Johanna Jorgensen] into my opus as Nosey Alf, the boundary rider, Cooper's sister supposed to have suicided, -though the narrator, Collins, never thinks of establishing the connection' (1995:24). According to a footnote by Barnes and Hoffmann, 'there is no way of telling whether the version Furphy was working upon was the "final copy" of Such is Life, as he hoped, or an earlier draft' (1995:24-25). But Barnes and Hoffmann think it is the final copy and that the year is 1895. If this is the case, then it pays to bear in mind that this final copy is the hand-written manuscript which he later edited into the 1903 novel at Stephens' request. More importantly, the fact that Collins never thinks of making the connection does not mean that Collins does not know the connection. It is more than likely that Furphy wanted to give Cathels a clue to Collins' strategy.

For this reason, I must disagree with Deborah Crisp, who states that '[i]t is generally considered a clever irony that, despite the copious hints planted by Collins the author, Collins the first-person fails to recognise the "true" identity of Nosey Alf Jones towards the end of Such is Life' (1994:6). This is a very debatable statement and
can only be supported by providing evidence of a clear distance between Collins as implied author and hero. More importantly, it is debatable because it fails to address the complex issue of induction which links Collins, as implied author, to Collins, the hero, and vice versa, in an _eudaimonic_ evaluation of life through art. Crisp's essay is itself a rather strange investigation of the romance plot, since she concludes that readers ought not to look to Molly Cooper for 'Nosey Alf's identity', but 'outside the pages of _Such is Life_', for such a move would 'reassess the evidence from a wider and more objective perspective' (1994:8). I think she places too much emphasis on reader-response theory, which does nothing more than advocate a dangerous idea of liberty in interpretation and devalues intertextuality as a method for greater insight into a work of literature.

Within the context of Collins relationship to the romance plot and its characters, Nina Knight (1969:250) explains that Collins is quite correct about many details in Warrigal Alf's life, but his strange conclusions stem from his interpreting Alf's love story through Ouida. I think Collins' playfulness with Ouida is meant to foreground the inept use of inductive categories in seeing and responding to life. In other words, readers should not expect the novel's romance plot to conform wholly to the classic ingredients of the categorical romance, nor should they discount the ingredients of the romance category altogether. As Croft states, the Molly/ Alf 'story is a story of fidelity, of love, and it involves the classic ingredients of the romance: the genesis of love, its thwarting, suffering, and the quest for fulfilment' (1991:112). I disagree, therefore, with Keogh's notion that, because of her disguise, Molly Cooper 'represents the woman who has broken free of traditional restrictions and who will therefore be more the equal of her partner rather than his property' (1989:62). Molly's disguise is far from a wilful breaking free in the sense that Jemima Quarterman has broken free. Instead, Molly's role as Nosey Alf is forced upon her because Anglo-Australian custom or habit responds to her facial disfigurement by making her unacceptable for marriage. But this leaves her in a catch-twenty-two, since the only option for her is marriage.

Throughout her masquerade as Nosey Alf, Molly Cooper pines for her fiancé, Alf Morris, despite being jilted by him because she was
no longer an object of beauty. Indeed, of all the female characters in the three novels, there are only two who sufficiently meet the criteria for the common notion of the romance heroine, namely Molly Cooper and Maud Beaudesart. Although not alike in their attitudes to love, both come from Anglo-Australian families, both are ruined financially by the economic mismanagement of a family member, and both possess the feminine quality of yearning for the customary husband. As Rodriguez notes, '[n]ot only does Furphy make Nosey Alf faithful to a romantic and virtuous love, conceived and actively pursued only when both partners are free; he gives her fineness of feature apart from the area of injury, and a womanly figure' (1975:181). This point is equally noted by Martin, who adds that '[h]is hut offers an additional record of his nature -the area in the front is swept, he grows flowers, [and] he keeps a domesticated cat' (1992:71). Knight thinks that '[t]he story of Alf and Molly relates to the Victorian romantic novel, to various other elements in Such is Life itself and, most importantly, to Collins' continual rejection of the novelist's art' (1969:255).

What Collins rejects is not the novelist's art but the telling of the wrong lies. Nevertheless, Knight's observations are quite helpful. Readers ought to be aware of the immense playfulness throughout the romance plot, particularly with the relationship between inductive categories and identity. In order to support his notion that Collins uses categories wrongly, Wilson uses many examples to point out 'Tom's plain misinformation' (1979:136), most notably Collins' definition of a ship-chandler. According to Collins, a ship-chandler is '[a] man that supplies candles to ships' (SL, 22). This is where the problems begin, because the text does not give any good reason for us to think that Collins seriously believes his own definition. Indeed, the definition is a reply to Mosey's asking what a ship-chandler is, and Mosey's question is itself an interruption of William Cooper's story about his sister, Molly, and her misfortunes. The two most likely reasons for this definition are, firstly, that Collins is being facetious to Mosey's interruption, and secondly, that Collins is pointing to the elaborate yet logical word-play and clues throughout the romance plot for his reader.

It is interesting to note that Collins, the implied author, has Willoughby tell an amusing pun on the same page that Cooper 291.
begins his story about Molly: "[a] student, returning from a stroll, encountered a countryman, carrying a hare in his hand. "Friend," said the student quietly, "is that thine own hare or a wig?" The joke, of course, lies in the play on the word "hare" (SL, 20). Willoughby's explanation of the pun is a clue to the reader to read observantly and think about the way in which words and their meanings can offer leads within a certain context. To return to the word "ship-chandler", its general definition is a dealer or merchant of shipping supplies, such as canvas or ropes. But, etymologically speaking, "chandler" can also mean a maker and merchant of candles since it derives from the French word, chandeller, meaning candle-seller, and has its origin in the word chandelle, or "candle". To all intents and purposes, Collins' use of a "category" is one in which he foregrounds polysemy as a strategic tool to the finer points of the romance plot.

To consider another, more pertinent example, let us look at the following exchange between Moriarty and Collins on the subject of Nosey Alf:

"...Alf's a mis -mis -mis -dash it".
"Mischief-maker?" I suggested.
"No. -mis -mis".
"Mysterious character?"
"No, no. -mis -mis".
"Try a synonym."
"Is that it? I think it is. Well Alf's a misasynonym -woman hater- among other things" (SL, 232).

The word Moriarty is looking for is, of course, misogynist. But the word-play is an interesting one and serves to unveil some salient leads by the pun on the prefix "mis-". Furthermore, the use of the word "synonym" also offers some sharp clues to Nosey Alf's true gender, which, with the many added clues that Collins cunningly foregrounds, ought to lead readers to conclude that Nosey Alf is Molly Cooper. In short, misasynonym is meant to lead the observant reader to make the move from "man" to "wo-man" through the use of the prefix "mis-". Another example is the name "Nosey Alf" itself, in the sense that it is a direct clue to the disfigured Molly Cooper, as described by William Cooper in chapter of one. But, to be called
"nosey" also points to someone who is, proverbially speaking, deeply interested in the affairs of another. Although the word-play in the romance plot is, at times, quite direct, it can also be very elaborate. For this reason, readers need to tread carefully, for it is wrong to say that Collins misses Nosey Alf's true identity.

Rather, the emphasis is strongly on observant reading and on the tauteorical reevaluation of categories, particularly with the "romance" genre and its customary or habitual depiction of male and female relations. As I have already discussed, Furphy's novels put forth the notion that the new world is historically and politically marked by the meaning of the New Man and the New Woman. Croft may note that Collins' 'question "Who is she?" leads us to the hidden story of Molly Cooper' (1983:10). But, the question 'Who is she?', which Collins asks in the Warrigal Alf episode (Sil, 135) and the Nosey Alf/ Molly Cooper episode (Sil, 258), also directs us to the categorical values and features of the emerging "Australienne" in light of an inductive uplifting and upbuilding of the nation. As Collins states to the facially disfigured Nosey Alf/ Molly Cooper,

[do we love a woman for her beauty, for her virtues, or for her accomplishments?....In the first place...we must inquire what the personal beauty of woman is, and wherein it consists. It consists in approximation to a given ideal; and this ideal is not absolute; it is elastic in respect of races and civilizations, though each type may be regarded as more or less rigid within its own domain (Sil, 260).

Although he had offended Nosey Alf/ Molly Cooper earlier on, by quoting the proverb that 'A woman's first duty...is to be beautiful' (Sil, 259), an obvious slap in the face for Molly Cooper, Collins' explanation of the customary or habitual ideal of woman's beauty includes the potential for the retranslation of such ideals to suit the "Australian" experience. Collins foregrounds how categories influence our ways of seeing and responding to life, or our judgment, and he indicates that these categories can be remade tauteorically. One wonders whether or not Collins' view spurs Molly Cooper to abandon her role as Nosey Alf, the boundary rider, and pursue Warrigal Alf to 293.
Queensland. As Collins states, '[s]poken words inform the emotional side of our nature, through the intellectual' (Sil, 254), but the true nature of social or cultural customs and habits is more properly felt rather than seen. In keeping with Collins' emphasis on truth from error, one wonders if Nosey Alf/ Molly Cooper has seen the light in regards to the customary or habitual nature of beauty, understanding that a new approximation of beauty can increase the probability of her own happiness.

Croft thinks that the romance plot will not 'end in marriage', for 'Furphy was too much of a realist to let his romance end in such a state; instead he ends the story with a possibility, but no suggestion of a resolution' (1991:112). Indeed, '[as] with many formulations of the romance to be written in the early twentieth century, this one ends without closure, but it is a romance nevertheless -a particularly modern one which stresses gender confusion, the unresolved pursuit of happiness, and a deracinated restlessness' (Croft, 1991:113). But is not the possibility of resolution a suggestion of resolution? The Alf/ Molly romance should be read as a parable for the future direction of "Australia", particularly its customs and habits which influence the socio-cultural way of seeing and responding to life. In this sense, one ought to bear in mind the success of the Falkland-Pritchard marriage and its emphasis on truth-embellishment. Perhaps Furphy was of the opinion that the categories which we use in making our judgments not only have a tautegoric basis, but also end up being truth-embellished.

In this sense, Furphy seems to suggest that the success of a union between men and women in the Australian experience is wholly dependent upon a reevaluation of customs and habits toward gender roles. Bearing in mind Collins theory of sex-charm and sex-value, Such is Life seems to indicate that Molly Cooper moves from the former to the latter during the course of the novel. Instead of remaining an Anglo-Australian daughter, who lives her life in disguise because of inherited social customs and habits, she becomes a woman with calm courage, high moral standard and clear intellect. The situation seems to be much similar with "Warrigal" Alf Morris, who, during his illness and confessions to Collins, sees that beauty is not a necessary condition of marriage. Given the emotional bond
between Molly Cooper and Alf Morris, one could say that the success of their romance depends on their fulfilling certain conditions indicated by the Falkland-Pritchard marriage, though not necessarily to that extreme.

In a letter to Miles Franklin, Furphy states that 'moral squalor is a poor foundation on which to build romance. Apart from all puritanism or sanctimoniousness, there is such a thing as self-reverence' (in Barnes and Hoffmann, eds, 1995:160). According to Croft, 'Furphy...realised the power of romance. The "mawkish" love story in Bellamy's Looking Backward made the novel in his opinion. And that love story led to the popularisation of Bellamy's radical social theories' (1991:113). In light of Collins' concern with uplifting and upbuilding the nation through literature and art, readers ought to be aware that the romance plot is but one piece in a much larger puzzle, and that it is a piece designed to emphasize both Furphy's and his implied author's views on categories, judgment, experience and social relations. In this sense, one could say that the Alf/ Molly romance plot is an Australian romance which moves from moral squalor to self-reverence, foregrounding a way of seeing and responding to life that is conducive to eudaimonia.
4. Conclusion: remarks on observant reading for future studies on Furphy.

The originality of this thesis began with the teasing out of Barnes' suggestion that *Such is Life* needed to be seen as a cultural creation. But this thesis has taken Barnes' suggestion to all three novels, locating them firmly within the 1880s, and employing a socio-historical reading of that period in order to appreciate the novels more accurately. This had not been done previously. Equally, it has been the aim to appreciate Furphy's novels on the basis of what he meant by Collins' relationship to the ideas of uplifting and upbuilding. Using Furphy's letters, the 1903 review and textual evidence, the thesis has argued that a much more coherent view of the novels is to look at Collins as their implied author and hero, and that the novels themselves represent Collins' moral response to the colonial rivalry and division which plagued the federation movement in the 1880s. Indeed, the traditional view of Furphy as the actual and implied author of the novels, and Collins as the unreliable narrator, has been shown to be inconsistent with the novels themselves for a variety of reasons. Finally, the extended discussion of these main points has resulted in a much needed reevaluation of the romance plot and some other key episodes.

Despite claiming this crucial ground, more work needs to be done. For this reason, I think we need to end with a question. What does Furphy mean by observant reading? Critical opinion has shown that the idea is important, since it is consistently pointed out that Collins is not an observant reader. But many critics have failed to draw out the full implication of the relationship between Collins as the implied author and the hero, adhering to the customary view that there is a clear case of unreliable narration in the novels. This is not the case. Furthermore, many critics have approached the idea of observant reading as a simple act of gathering and interpreting facts correctly. To a certain extent, Collins does appear to suggest this when he claims to have 'the more sterling, if less ornamental qualities of the chronicler' (*SiL*, 1). But the idea of 'an intuition which reads men like sign-boards', as well as 'a limpid veracity; and a memory which habitually stereotypes all impressions except those
relating to personal injuries' (*SiL*, 1), indicates something more.

Observant reading requires the reader to engage with matters of fact in light of authorship, as well as uplifting and upbuilding. In this sense, the sterling elements of the chronicler do not amount to an ability to see facts for what they are, but to see them for what they could be. Collins' strategy is to 'afford to the observant reader a *fair* picture of Life as that engaging problem has presented itself to [him]' (*SiL*, 2. My italics). A fair picture of life is not necessarily a factually true one, as is meant to be the case with journalism. In terms of observant reading, the idea of life as an engaging problem, and the fair picture as a solution, anticipates the unravelling of ambiguities and complexities characteristic of close reading. A fair picture is not simply reading and rereading the novels. It is reading and thinking about the issues set out in the opening paragraphs of *Such is Life*, issues which represent Collins' *response* to life.

Furthermore, these issues are carried through to the other two novels, so that the three novels together offer a response to the ideas of uplifting and upbuilding, or federating a nation. For these reasons, I think the idea of observant reading is an ethical one because it emphasizes an engagement with the way people see and respond to life, and the way they live life. As an ethical idea, observant reading brings immense scope to the *core ideas* of uplifting and upbuilding, and these core ideas unveil the exceedingly complex relationship between art and life. Given Collins' concerns, Furphy is wise to incorporate that complexity into his novels, particularly through the interrelated ideas of personal identity, national identity and authorship.

In short, matters of fact may help to give a distinct flavour to an artistic reading of life, but the final product must be, as the novels stress, both truth-embellished and ethically right. As Furphy wrote to Franklin, 'I find it best to take some actual occurrence as a bed-log, and build thereon -telling the story, not as it did happen, *but as it should have done*' (Barnes and Hoffmann, 1995:177. My italics). But, one must not follow 'the devices and desires of his own heart; telling the lies he *ought* not to have told, and leaving untold the lies that he *ought* to have told' (*SiL*, 272. My italics). Readers and critics ought to bear in mind Plato's emphasis on first impressions and permanent marks, as well as his idea of the magnificent myth,
and its role in maintaining well-being or eudaimonia in Republic.

Because of the core ideas of uplifting and upbuilding, as well as the issue of natural rights and civil rights, it is my contention that the novels require an ethical investigation of many of their episodes, for the authorial Collins encourages the observant reader to ask questions about their details. For example, in regards to the Glover episode, consider the following questions. In terms of duty, is it better to give someone who is down on his luck, food or money? If you gave them money, what would they do with it? Is it just to prosecute someone on the basis of custom or appearance? Given that customs necessarily lead to specific ways of seeing and responding to life, do customs necessarily lead to justice or well-being? Is it just to prosecute someone for damaging or destroying a part of your property which is considered worthless or an eye-sore? In short, each episode has a specific set of questions which need to be investigated ethically, for readers of the novels should not make rash conclusions about Collins' moral position, as has been the case in the past.

I would also like to suggest that future research pay more attention to Rigby's Romance. Of the three novels, this one has been the most neglected. The reason for this seems to be the notion that the novel simply represents a word-for-word espousal of Furphy's basic belief in socialism. This is not the case. As I have already argued in my thesis, Furphy is not a socialist, and any expression of interest in socialism ought to be seen within the context of a Philosophe's demand for human rights and moral progress. More importantly, Rigby's Romance is itself much too complicated a novel to be an espousal of socialism. Rigby himself does not fare well, and that has much to do with his notion that 'man is a law-abiding animal' and that you can make men anything you please by Act of Parliament' so long as 'such Act is sanctioned by a preponderant moiety of the national intelligence' (RR, 201). As I argued in my thesis, it is possible to make individuals Australian by an act of parliament, but I hardly think anyone could be made good, happy or virtuous in this way. Rigby's belief is problematic, and I think Rigby's socialist "Sermon on the Murray" is the antithesis of Christ's democratic "Sermon on the Mount", for Rigby shapes and divides humanity by law, while Christ brings it together through an appeal to rights and the compassionate side of human nature.

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Rigby’s arrogant relationship to the other heroes during his determinist sermon strongly suggests that human nature is the spanner in the socialist’s deterministic order of things. As Binney states, ‘[y]our system is outside the range of practical politics’ because ‘[i]t would press too hard on personal liberty’ (RR, 205). If Furphy’s Rigby was, in any sense, the ideal male hero, then it should follow that, stylistically, Rigby ought to have disciples, not enemies. Readers should bear in mind Plato’s Socrates, whose disciples challenge him, but do not threaten ‘to tilt’ him ‘into the ensanguined river’ (RR, 200). Within the context of uplifting and upbuilding the human order of things, I think Rigby’s Romance continues the study of human nature begun in Such is Life, and that Rigby himself is not excluded. This is especially the case when it comes to Rigby’s opportunistic nature, as I have discussed in the first chapter of my thesis. Also, readers ought to bear in mind that Collins is still the implied author, despite his diminished status as hero, and that Rigby’s dialogue is ultimately controlled by him. Because this is so, I think future readers ought to examine the contrast between Collins’ belief in rights with Rigby’s belief in law.

Finally, besides Shakespeare and the Bible, as well as other works that form Furphy’s midrashic string of pearls, I think future research particularly needs to consult the following texts in order to appreciate better the intellectual dimension of the novels:

- Paine’s The Rights of Man.
- Epictetus’ Encheiridion and The Discourses.
- Aurelius’ Meditations [to Himself].
- Plato’s Republic.
- Whitman’s Leaves of Grass.
- Emerson’s essays, particularly ‘The American Scholar’ and ‘Self-Reliance’.
- Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature and An Enquiry into Human Understanding, particularly the issues of induction, customs and habits.

With this in mind, whatever aspect of the novels they discuss, future readers of Furphy need to pay close attention to the following set of interrelated ideas:

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- eudaimonia.
- rationalism and ignorance.
- induction (particularly in terms of tautegoric and categoric "knowledge").
- customary and habitual conclusions in ways of seeing and responding to life.
- intertextuality and recontextuality.
- authorship and roleplay.
- natural rights and civil rights.
- the ethics of artistic representation.
- observant reading and truth-embellishment.
- censorship.
- the relationship between personal and national identity.
- the theory of the controlling alternatives.
- social architecture.

Although I have tried to place them in a coherent sequence, no idea holds greater value than another. The value of each idea is shaped by others in the list, and the whole gets its value from the unifying consciousness of Tom Collins, as well as the core ideas of uplifting and upbuilding that are his concern. Furthermore, these ideas give value to the statement, “Such is life”, because they provide the background for meaning. Furphy may state in his 1903 review that ‘the studied inconsecutiveness of the “memoirs” is made to mask coincidence and cross-purposes, sometimes too intricate’ (1969:130), but this should not be taken as advocating an absolute freedom in interpretation. This makes reading Furphy more complicated, and it is, as some have argued, Furphy’s downfall to make such demands on his readers. But this does not detract from the fact that an observant reader must be a methodical reader who reads to think within a supplied frame of reference, namely the ideas in the list, the socio-historical context, Furphy’s belief in an Australian literature, his passion for certain key works in the Western tradition, and a concern with an enlightened uplifting and upbuilding of Australia. To ignore these things will only devalue Furphy’s concerns, leading to some untenable conclusions in regards to Tom Collins, as has been the case in the past.
References to *Such is Life* are taken from the *Annotated* version which, like the John Barnes edition of 1981, reproduces the 1903 facsimile originally published by the *Bulletin Newspaper Company*. References to *Rigby's Romance* and *The Buln-Buln and the Brolga* are to the Angus and Robertson editions of 1946 and 1948 respectively. However, one could use the Turner edition of *Rigby's Romance* which was published by Rigby/Seal in 1971, since the latter is a facsimile of the former.

With *The Buln-Buln and the Brolga*, readers will find that the 1948 and 1971 editions do not, unfortunately, correlate, since changes have been made to the layout of the text, especially with the absence of the ‘contents’ page from the 1971 edition. My choice for working with the 1948 edition of *The Buln-Buln and the Brolga* is based on the opinion that its ‘contents’ page places Furphy’s last novel in the tradition of *Such is Life*, because of its important allusions to ‘factual’ events that unfold in Collins’ truth-embellished narratives.


301.


Ewers, J. K. (1943). *Tell the people! an examination of the little-known writings of Joseph Furphy -(Tom Collins)- in the light of their value for Australia to-day*. Sydney: Currawong.


306.


307.


309.


310.


Sutherland, B. (1951). 'Joseph Furphy, Australian.' *University of Toronto quarterly*, 20 (2), 169-182.


313.


314.


