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This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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School of Arts & Humanities
2018
Abstract

Despite the many current conflicts in the Middle East and the world, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still one of the most significant conflicts of the modern era. The reasons for this include the history and violence of this conflict and the lack of practical solutions for it. The significance of this conflict is reflected in its prevalence in many disciplines, such as political science and media studies. Related literature shows that Australian media coverage of this conflict has not been investigated thoroughly. Hence, this study attempts to bridge this gap in literature, aiming to identify how Australian media portray the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A sample of mainstream Australian print and online media was analysed. The sample included News Corp media (The Australian, the Herald Sun and news.com.au), Fairfax newspapers (The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald) and two news websites, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and Crikey. This study draws on Entman’s (1993, 2002) concept of framing as a crucial technique used to shape an event or issue, reflecting the power embedded in media texts. The Australian media corpora (consisting of 862,093 words) were created by uploading 1,201 news articles to online linguistic tool, Sketch Engine. These news articles, published in the sample of Australian media from January 2014 to June 2015, were examined using corpus-based analysis. By using critical discourse analysis (CDA), a small sample of the data was analysed to investigate the Australian media portrayal of the Israeli war on Gaza during July and August 2014.

The study shows that conflict and responsibility frames were more prominent than other frames, such as human interest and victim frames. This is due to the Australian media’s reliance on officials’ voices. These media relied on Israeli voices over Palestinian voices, and United States (US) voices over Australian voices. Consequently, by avoiding words such as occupation, resistance, victim and massacre, Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflect power of voices within media discourses.
The Australian media tended to legitimise Israeli attacks on Gaza and to delegitimise Hamas’s rocket attacks on Israel. This emerged through highlighting Israel’s right of defence, representing Israeli attacks on Gaza as a retaliation to Palestinian rockets, and foregrounding Palestinians and suppressing or backgrounding Israel as actors. The justification of Israeli actions resulted from media reliance on Israeli and pro-Israeli sources and voices. This justification was also relevant to acknowledging Israel as a state, Palestinians as stateless people and Hamas as a terrorist organisation and a non-state actor.

This study found that both Israeli and Palestinian casualties were represented in terms of numbers or statistics, and occasionally individualised. The human interest frame was only used to portray casualties when particular voices were used. Hence, this study demonstrates the need for more in-depth and humanistic coverage and contextual information about the conflict in Australian media.
Declaration

I certify that this thesis does not, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

(i) incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education;
(ii) contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text; or
(iii) contain any defamatory material.

Signed

Date 02 April 2018
Acknowledgments

I still remember that February 26th, 2014 when I met my Principal Supervisor, Associate Professor Debbie Rodan, for the first time. It was only my second day in Perth coming from the other side of the world after a long trip that started from the tiny Gaza Strip. I still remember my concerns and confusion on that day. However, these feelings disappeared as soon as I entered Debbie’s office and started discussing my ‘PhD journey’ with her. Since this date, Debbie has guided and supported me academically, and has encouraged me to engage in the academic environment at Edith Cowan University (ECU) and overseas. Thank you Debbie, for trusting my skills as a researcher, and for being by my side during moments of uncertainty.

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<th>Full Form</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Australian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France-Presse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIJAC</td>
<td>Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDS</td>
<td>The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical discourse analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Discourse analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>New South Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>The New York Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>The Sydney Morning Herald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCOP</td>
<td>United Nations Special Committee on Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Actor: includes people, organisations, political parties or countries that are involved in some way in an event (Kandil, 2009).

2. Alleged numbers of Palestinian casualties frame: this frame represents the numbers of Palestinian casualties during the Israeli war on Gaza in a way that challenges the validity of these numbers.

3. Australian voices: includes Australian government, parliament, party officials, as well as NGOs, pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian protesters and institutions in Australia.

4. Casualty: includes injured and killed Israelis and Palestinians from June 14th–August 31st, 2014 (before and during the Israeli war on Gaza 2014).

5. Collocate: a word that occurs frequently with another word within a predetermined span, usually five words on either side of the word under investigation (Baker, 2006; Baker, Gabrielatos, & McEnery, 2013a; Fairclough, 2015).

6. Comparison frame: this frame represents events related to the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 through comparisons, such as the comparison between policies of both Israel and Hamas towards civilians, either Palestinians or Israelis; and the comparison between the numbers of Israeli and Palestinian casualties.

7. Concordance: “a list of given word or word cluster with its co-text on either side” (Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008, p. 15).

8. Conflict frame: this frame emphasises conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, Israel and Hamas, and the conflict within the Israeli government about the Israeli military operation in Gaza.
9. Consequences frame: this frame represents the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 in terms of the consequences it has. This includes the economic consequences on the Gaza Strip and Gazans’ lives.

10. Corpus: a collection of text used to study language.

11. Human interest frame: this frame presents a human face and/or an emotional aspect to the portrayal of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through personalising and dramatising events related either to Palestinians or Israelis.

12. Israeli official: includes Israeli government, party and military officials, Israeli police and former Israeli officials.

13. Israeli resident: an Israeli person who lives permanently in Israel.

14. Negative representation/frame: portraying Israeli or Palestinian actors in a negative manner such as portraying Israel as an occupier or Hamas as a terrorist organisation.

15. News sources: sources from which media gathered news about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

16. NGO (international): non-government organisations such as Save the Children and Human Rights Watch.

17. Palestinian official: includes Palestinian Authority (PA), Hamas, Fatah and Islamic Jihad officials, as well as health officials.

18. Palestinian resident: a Palestinian person who lives permanently in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank or Jerusalem.

19. Positive representation/frame: portraying Israeli or Palestinian actors in a positive manner such as portraying Israel as the only democratic country in the Middle East, or portraying Palestinians as moderate.
20. Responsibility frame: this frame represents the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Israeli war on Gaza 2014, in a manner that attributes responsibility for the war’s causes and solutions to Israel, Hamas, Abbas, the US and the international community.

21. UN voices: includes the United Nations (UN) and United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) officials, and UN bodies such as the United Nations Children's Fund UNICEF.

22. Victim frame: this frame represents actors related to the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. These actors are mainly Palestinian and Israeli civilians and casualties who were portrayed as victims.

23. Voice: the source that Australian media relied on when covering and reporting events related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Publications and Presentations from This Thesis


Chapter 1: Introduction

Despite the variety and the differences, and however much we proclaim the contrary, what the media produce is neither spontaneous nor completely “free”: “news” does not just happen, pictures and ideas do not merely spring from reality into our eyes and minds, truth is not directly available, we do not have unrestrained variety at our disposal. For like all modes of communication, television, radio, and newspapers observe certain rules and conventions to get things across intelligibly, and it is these, often more than the reality being conveyed, that shape the material delivered by the media. (Said, 1997, pp. 48–49).

This thesis is about how one of the most complicated conflicts in the world is portrayed in the Australian media. It examined the representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, how the conflict was framed and to what extent these media reflected the reality of this conflict. It also investigated which elements of the conflict were included, excluded or downplayed, how the main actors were portrayed, and whose voices were silenced. In a nutshell, this study is about the language used in media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the voices that dominated and those that were downgraded, the contexts that contributed to the way the Australian media portrayed the conflict, and the resulting media bias.

1.1 Background and Rationale

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most significant conflicts of the modern era. It has been described as “the bloodiest, or one of the bloodiest, battlegrounds in today’s world” (Dowty, 2012, p. 2). Reasons for its significance include the history and violence of the conflict and the apparent lack of practical solutions to resolve it. The significance of the conflict is also related to parties involved in, and its sensitivity is shown through the interest of both international news media and academics round the world (Fahmy & Neumann, 2012). Therefore, the conflict is a popular research interest in many disciplines, including political science and media studies. The literature examining media coverage or representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is extraordinarily rich. However, the focus of most previous studies has been on investigating the media coverage in the United States (US). Numerous studies on
US media have been conducted, such as studies on Cable News Network (CNN) and *The New York Times (NYT)*; this may be related to the US involvement in this conflict.

On the contrary, the literature on Australian media representations or coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is markedly limited. Only two previous studies have examined Australian media portrayal and coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both studies addressed this conflict partially within their investigations of media portrayal of Arabs and Muslims in Sydney newspapers (Peter Manning, 2004), and portrayal of women suicide bombers from a gender perspective (Jaworski, 2010). Both studies analysed only Australian print media. Consequently, this study bridges this gap in the literature by examining Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict thoroughly and expanding the analysis to different types of media.

The significance of this study also emerges from the growth of Australian policy towards the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, and factors shape this policy. As discussed in Chapter 2, Australia by its position towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, maintains its relationship and alliance with the US. Since most of previous studies examined US media coverage of the conflict, it is crucial to study Australian media representations.

This research aimed to examine Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during 2014 and 2015. It investigated how the language used by media and journalists shaped these representations. This research is significant because it contributes to related theories where language, discourse and representation are connected. It demonstrates the value of analysing media discourse and language that is “tucked inside arguments about quite different problems” (Matheson, 2005, p. 2). This is also related to the significance of language choice in “determin[ing] meaning and imagery” (Peter Manning, 2004, p. 21). J. Richardson (2007) argues that language is social; it represents social realities and contributes to the production and reproduction of these realities. Language is “central to human activity” (J. Richardson, 2007, p. 10), and the use of language gives meaning to actions or “remove[s] meaning from” these actions (p. 10). Thus, it is important to examine the choices that media make when gathering news from specific sources or voices, or when opting for
particular words over others to shape meanings and representations of events, issues, individuals, groups or institutions. Specifically, this thesis argues that the journalists’ word choice affected media representations and the framing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This choice reflected how journalists or editors placed the reported topic or event and how this prompted the emergence of particular frames in Australian news coverage of the conflict.

In this research, it was crucial to investigate how relationships between media, discourse and power interact within texts to form media products, such as news articles, that represent an event or issue. Clearly, these interactions may also help shape these representations, which can affect how people perceive information related to the event or issue. Media analysis involves examining language as a social or a political action. This requires a “close analysis of language [that] seeks to show precisely how a group of words carries a particular meaning, which we can then identify as performing a political role in reinforcing or challenging power” (Matheson, 2005, p. 7). In this context, critical discourse analysis (CDA) was selected as an appropriate method because it aims “to explore who has the power to speak or to set the terms of her/his own representation in language events, and who lacks that power, forced to perform a self or selves mapped out by others” (Luke, as cited in Matheson, 2005, p. 65). This study analysed voices used by Australian media in their representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The power of some voices over others shaped the Australian media discourse on this conflict. Furthermore, the way in which main actors of the conflict were portrayed reflected the power embedded in media texts. Consequently, Australian media representations of the conflict were framed in particular ways that showed bias.

In this thesis, media representations, bias and framing are interconnected. These three aspects are related to the concept of salience and silence, in which media highlight some aspects of an event or issue and ignore or downplay others. Since media bias can result from media representations of events, issues and their actors, bias “occupies a conspicuous place in media research, and is of interest to media academics, journalists and politicians” (Hobbs, 2009, p. 100). In a related context, Kuypers (2006) argues
that “facts do remain neutral until framed” (p. 7), and bias can occur due to meanings “being embedded in a frame or story line that organizes them and gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring others” (Gamson, as cited in Kuypers, 2006, p. 7).

This study analysed samples of Australian print and online media. Newspaper selection was based on several factors: (i) variation in ownership; (ii) tabloid and broadsheet format; (iii) influence; and (iv) interest in international news coverage. Consequently, the newspapers selected were: The Australian (Australia’s national newspaper); the high-circulation newspaper the Herald Sun (both are owned by News Corporation Australia)1; The Age; and The Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) (both are owned by the Fairfax Media Limited, referred to as Fairfax in this thesis).

News websites were included in the analysis as online media based on four factors: (i) reputation and readership in Australia; (ii) availability of news articles archives; (iii) availability of international news coverage especially the Israeli and Palestinian affairs; and (iv) representation of media ownership and independence.

Based on those factors, three online news websites were selected: www.abc.net.au, which is the news site of the main publicly owned broadcaster, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) (www.abc.net.au); independent news website Crikey (www.crikey.com.au), which has a remit to cover international news; and www.news.com.au, owned by News Corp.

The main research question of this study was:

How did the Australian media represent the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

1 It is noteworthy that in 2013, News Limited changed its name to News Corporation Australia as part of the split from its parent company, News Corporation. Nevertheless, from this point and throughout the thesis, I use the abbreviation News Corp to refer to News Corporation Australia.
To address this question, this study combined corpus-based analysis and CDA. Drawing on framing theory, both methods also helped to: (i) determine which frames the Australian media used in their representations of events and issues related to the conflict; (ii) identify how main actors in the conflict were portrayed and how the power of both actors and voices shaped these portrayals; (iii) examine how actions of actors were legitimised or delegitimised; (iv) compare the media representations; and (v) identify whether there was a media bias that shaped these representations.

It is crucial to emphasise that corpus-based analysis assisted mainly with obtaining an overview of Australian media representations. CDA provided an in-depth analysis, explanations of these representations and, subsequently, comprehensive and thorough answers to the main research question.

This study also examined how Australian media framed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general, and the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 in particular. In her book, *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?*, Butler (2009) asserts that “there is no life and no death without a relation to some frame” (p. 7). Thus, she questions “how recognising lives (or not doing so) affects framing a subject?” (p. 5). She identifies that the power of frames lies in their ability to “decide which lives will be recognizable as lives and which will not” (p. 12).

Butler (2009) also asserts that recognition or non-recognition of lives depends on social and political conditions. Consequently, some lives are not grievable when they are lost. They are represented in a way that justifies their loss, and “rationalizes their death, [as] the loss of such populations is deemed necessary to protect the lives of ‘the living’” (Butler, 2009, p. 31). On the contrary, lives that are grievable are represented “as worthy of protection, as belonging to subjects with rights that ought to be honoured” (Butler, 2009, p. 41).

Based on Butler’s notion, representations of war casualties were addressed in this thesis. There was a focus on the extent to which Palestinian and Israeli lives were recognised by Australian media, and how this varied between selected outlets.
Additionally, it explored inclusion and exclusion as a framing mechanism in Australian media portrayals of war casualties.

This study indicates that conflict and responsibility frames were dominant in Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This was due to the focus on covering day-to-day events, relying on the voices of Israeli and Palestinian officials, and the avoidance of words that would help construct a human interest frame. Palestinian and Israeli casualties were mostly portrayed in a conflict frame, although the human interest frame was used occasionally to represent casualties from both sides. In a related context, including and excluding facts and voices in the Australian media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were crucial to the framing of related events and issues. Consequently, the findings indicate a media bias. However, this bias varied between selected media outlets. Bias was also shown in the imbalance of voices in Australian media reports related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and their portrayal of Israeli and Palestinian actors and their actions. This study showed that several factors resulted in the legitimisation of Israeli actions and delegitimisation of Palestinian and Hamas’s actions in Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014: the reliance on Israeli voices and pro-Israel voices; sources of news articles themselves; and the portrayal of Israeli actions as retaliatory to Palestinian actions.

1.2 Key Concepts

The title, content and theoretical framework of this thesis include key concepts that need to be highlighted and defined. These concepts include representation, discourse, frame, bias, and legitimisation and delegitimisation.

The main concept used in this study is representation. Hall (2013) considers representation a vital part of meaning production and exchange. As it involves the use of language, Hall (2013) defines representation as “the production of meaning through language” (p. 2). Expanding his definition, Hall (2013) states that:

Representation is the production of the meaning of the concepts in our minds through language. It is the link between concepts and language which
enables us to refer to either the ‘real’ world of objects, people or events, or indeed to imaginary worlds of fictional objects, people and events. (p. 3)

The relationship between language and representation emphasised in Hall’s definition leads to another term that is related to this study: discourse. Discourse as a term is also “problematic” (Baker, 2006, p. 3), due to the diversity of its use in social and linguistic research and its application to different types of language use or topics, including political and media discourses. According to Fairclough (1995b), discourse refers to spoken or written language, in addition to semiotic activities that produce meanings, such as non-verbal and visual communications. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s definition of discourse, Fairclough considers discourse a practice that “signif[ies] the world, constitut[es] and construct[s] the world in meaning” (as cited in Locke, 2004, p. 124), and as “the whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 20). As Foucault studied discourse “as a system of representation” (Hall, 2013, p. 29), discourse is not simply a linguistic term or concept. Rather, it is more about language and practice.

J. Richardson (2007) and Fairclough (2015) both define discourse as language in use, or language viewed in a certain way that is related to other parts of social process. The same notion emerged in Fairclough’s (2003) book, in which he considers discourses “ways of representing aspects of the world—the processes, relations and structures of the ‘material world’, the ‘mental world’ of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, and the social world” (p. 124). Thus, discourse is both shaped by the world and a shaper of the world. For instance, discourse is shaped by language—a medium used by people. Simultaneously, discourse shapes the language used by these people (Paltridge, 2006). These individuals contribute to the creation of a discourse within “a communicative event including conversational interaction and written text, as well as associated gestures, facework, typographical layout, images and any other ‘semiotic’ or multi-media dimension of signification” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 25).

As this thesis draws on framing theory, frame is another main concept used in this study. As many researchers assert, Goffman (1974) is the originator of the framing approach. His definition of frames, as “schemata of interpretation” (as cited in
Another definition of frame was proposed by William Gamson (1989), who defined it as “a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue” (as cited in Kuypers, 2006, p. 7). However, the most referenced definition, which was adopted in this study, is Robert Entman’s (1993, 2002). Entman (2002) argues that “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality” (p. 391) and by doing so, the reality is made more noticeable and significant within texts. According to Entman (2002), events are framed by elements such as “certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, [and] sources of information” (p. 392). A frame also has “enormous power to shape the way we view certain issues and situations” (Rane, Ewart, & Martinkus, 2014, p. 7). Kuypers (2006) argues that frames are so powerful because of their ability to make information more salient. Therefore, the power associated with framing is relevant to its crucial mechanisms: inclusions and exclusions. These inclusions and exclusions involve selecting particular aspects of events or issues, such as “facts, images and sources or interviewees” (Rane et al., 2014, p. 6). The significance of these inclusions and exclusions is demonstrated by their impact on audiences’ understanding of events or issues covered by media. Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2012) propose that the power of media framing “makes it important to investigate how news coverage portrays political issues and processes” (p. 605). This thesis drew on inclusions and exclusions as a crucial mechanism of framing and analysed inclusions and exclusions made by Australian media in their portrayal of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 in particular.

As mechanisms of framing, inclusions and exclusions can result in media bias. In his linkage of framing and bias, Entman (2007) distinguishes between three meanings of the term bias in relation to media:

Sometimes, it [bias] is applied to news that purportedly distorts or falsifies reality (distortion bias), sometimes to news that favors one side rather than providing equivalent treatment to both sides in a political conflict (content bias), and sometimes to the motivations and mindsets of journalists who allegedly produce the biased content (decision-making bias). (p. 163)
In this thesis, the term bias refers mainly to the bias in media content or discourse, which Entman terms *content bias*.

Throughout this thesis, the terms legitimisation and delegitimisation are used rather than *legitimation* and *de-legitimation*. To understand the meaning of both terms, legitimisation should be defined first. Legitimisation as “a dynamic, transactive process whereby speakers continuously enact, reproduce and rearticulate their legitimacy in relation to the (shared) assumptions, values or expectations of their audiences and to the discursive event in question” (Amer, 2008, p. 193). Further, van Leeuwen (2007) argues that legitimisation is “based on moral values, rather than imposed by some kind of authority without further justification” (p. 97).

Therefore, in the context of this thesis, legitimisation is the process in which practices or actions of actors, including individuals, groups or institutions, are made legitimate. According to Amer (2008), delegitimisation “involves imputing moral judgement whether explicitly or implicitly to respective actions and actors” (p. 3). He also refers to “(de)legitimation in media where journalists . . . seek to justify, discredit and favourably or unfavourably present particular actors and actions” (p. 3). As both delegitimation and delegitimisation are interchangeable, delegitimisation is used in this study.

### 1.3 Historical Background of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict dates back to November 2nd, 1917, when the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Arthur Balfour, released a statement in which Great Britain granted Jews a national home in Palestine. On November 29th, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed Resolution 181 in which a partition plan was proposed to divide Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state (Ben-Ami, 2006). In December 1947, the British “indicated that they would continue to rule Palestine until 15 May 1948” (Cohn-Sherbok & El-Alami, 2001, p. 46), when David Ben-Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency, declared the establishment of the State of Israel. This led to the 1948 war between Israel and the Arab armies. Israel won the war and occupied Palestinian lands, except East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Consequently, most Palestinians have become refugees in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and other Arab countries in the aftermath of the 1948 war that Palestinians call *Nakba* (an Arabic word meaning catastrophe). Strawson (2010) states that by the end of this war “in December 1948 the total figure of displaced Palestinians was put at 726,000 by the United Nations” (p. 137). The West Bank came under the Jordanian administration and the Gaza Strip fell to Egyptian administration from 1948 to 1967. In the 1950, the UN “focused on the humanitarian concerns of refugees . . . [while] there was silence about the issue of the Arab state in Palestine or the national rights of the Palestinians” (Strawson, 2010, p. 154). At the end of the 1950s, the first Palestinian group, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), was founded in Kuwait by Palestinian students, including Yasser Arafat (Cohn-Sherbok & El-Alami). In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was established in Jerusalem (Cohn-Sherbok & El-Alami).

Later, because of the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel occupied the remainder of Palestinian lands, including East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This war led to more Palestinians becoming refugees in other Arab countries, mainly in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. In December 1987, the First Palestinian *Intifada* (uprising) broke out and lasted until the Madrid Conference of 1991, when the US launched a diplomatic initiative in cooperation with Russia. The Madrid peace conference was an early attempt by the international community to initiate peaceful negotiations with Israelis and Palestinians, as well as Arab countries including Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. A year later, the PLO “officially accepted UN General Assembly Resolution 181—the partition Plan of 1947—and UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 [and thus] formally endorsed the ‘two-state solution’” (Dowty, 2012, p. 150).

On September 13th, 1993, the PLO President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin “signed a Declaration of Principles (Oslo Accords) in Washington, on the basis of the negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian teams in Oslo” (Dowty, 2012, p. 157). A main feature of the Oslo Peace Process was the establishment of autonomous governmental body, the Palestinian Authority (PA), and its associated governing institutions to administer Palestinian communities in the Gaza Strip and
West Bank. The return of Arafat “and the PLO leadership from Tunis on July 1, 1994, and the establishment of the first-ever Palestinian administration on Palestinian soil, was a dramatic event that temporarily revived some of the initial enthusiasm, at least on the Palestinian side” (Dowty, 2012, p. 157).

Following the Oslo Peace Process, “elections were held in January 1996 for a President and a Palestine Legislative Council; Arafat was elected President by an 87 percent majority, and his Fatah party supporters won 50 of the 88 Council seats” (Dowty, 2012, p. 158). During the Oslo Peace Process and throughout the 1990s, both sides were obligated to work towards a two-state solution. Israel and the PLO negotiated to reach a mutual agreement, but were unsuccessful. After the failure of the Camp David Summit between the US President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Arafat in July 2000, the Second Palestinian Intifada (Al-Aqsa Intifada) erupted. This Intifada’s “outbreak is mostly associated with the ‘visit’ by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount [Al-Aqsa Mosque] on September 28th, 2000 and the ensuing clashes” (Meital, 2006, p. 95).

In 2005, Israel withdrew from its settlements in the Gaza Strip and in 2006, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council. Thus, the US and many European countries cut funds to the PA. Moreover, Israel increased its siege on Gaza after kidnapping soldier Gilad Shalit in June 2006. A year later, a Fatah–Hamas conflict broke out, which eventually led to Hamas taking control of the Gaza Strip.

Israel launched a wide military operation, Cast Lead, on the Gaza Strip in December 2008, targeting official and civilian infrastructure, including mosques, houses, medical facilities and schools. This operation lasted for 22 days and resulted in the killing of more than 1,300 Palestinians (Dowty, 2012, p. 204). Again, in 2012, Israel launched the Pillar of Defence, which started with the assassination of Ahmed Al-Jabari, the leader of Hamas’s military wing in Gaza. The war lasted for eight days and ended with a ceasefire agreement sponsored by Egypt. According to Israeli human rights group B’Tselem, “167 Palestinians were killed, including 87 civilians. Six Israelis - two soldiers and four civilians - were also killed” (“Gaza crisis: Toll,” 2014, para. 18).
Israel launched military operation, Protective Edge, on the Gaza Strip in July 2014. Two months of continued shelling of different areas in the strip resulted in the death of more than 2,000 Palestinians—including women and children—whereas Israel lost 66 soldiers and six civilians. During the 2014 war, approximately 11,000 Palestinians were injured; however, only about 720 Israelis were recorded as having been injured. The number of Palestinian civilian deaths was considerable. Further, the number of injured citizens was extremely high compared to the number of casualties reported during the Israeli military operations in Gaza in 2008–2009 and 2012 (See Appendix B for a summary timeline of events of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014).

From 2015 until the present, the escalation between Israelis and Palestinians has continued, while Israel has expanded its settlements in Jerusalem and the West Bank. In February 2017, the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) passed “a law which retroactively legalises dozens of Jewish settlements built on private Palestinian land in the West Bank” (“Israel profile,” 2017, para. 82). Palestinians have also accused Israel of planning to partition the Islamic holy site Al-Aqsa Mosque, and Israel has escalated its operations in the West Bank and Jerusalem. See Appendix A for key events within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from 1917 to 2017.

Overall, there are several remaining issues between the Israelis and Palestinians. These issues include Jerusalem, refugees, residency, water, separation barrier and detainees. Importantly, the most complex issue within this ongoing conflict is refugees. The Israeli occupation of the Palestinian lands in 1948 and 1967 led millions of Palestinians to seek refuge in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Additionally, it resulted in the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in the Occupied Territories.

1.4 Theoretical Background

Framing theory is significant in media studies since it focuses on media production and tries to understand how it is shaped. Framing in media studies is related to news presentation and is considered one of the crucial techniques that media use to shape an event or issue (Hossain, 2015). Also, the frame in any news text is a reflection of
the power which is embedded in the text through the competing interests or actors (Entman, 2002). Therefore, media frames enhance the power of media. For instance, the frames employed by Arab satellite television networks while covering conflicts in Libya and Syria “have indeed played a role in influencing and shaping the outcome” of the uprisings in both countries (Elmasry, El Shamy, Manning, Mills, & Auter, 2013, p. 765). In other words, media can shape the public opinion and impact policy making through frames they employ in their coverage of conflict and violence. Therefore, media can construct the reality for their audiences by powerful frames they employ in covering specific events or issues, and through focusing on specific aspects of reality.

Entman (2002) provides the following functions for framing: diagnosing causes; making moral judgments; and suggesting remedies, offering and justifying treatments for the problems and predicting their likely effects. Drawing on Entman’s approach, Camaj (2010) reveals that the international news agencies emphasised conflict and excluded other aspects of issues related to the Kosovo status negotiations. Examples of these excluded aspects were “responsibility for causing or solving the problems and the impact of the problem on society or the economy” (p. 649). Entman’s perspective of framing functions are beneficial for identifying how the Australian media represent the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I analysed how these media cover events and issues related to the conflict such as the Israeli war on Gaza 2014.

As discussed in Section 1.2, salience and silence or inclusion and exclusion are the most significant aspects and mechanisms of framing. Entman (2002, p. 392) argues that selection and highlighting elements in a text are used to form an argument about “problems and their causation, evaluation, and/or solution”. These elements can be “certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences” (p. 392). Additionally, drawing on frame analysis as an approach requires examining the inclusions and exclusions in media texts regarding international affairs, as “framing sets the news agenda by highlighting specific events as international problems and ignoring others” (Melki, 2014, p. 167). Framing also includes source selection. Hossain (2015) recognises that sources are not only used by media outlets to obtain information about events but they can manufacture the news so it appears
“authentic to the audience” (p. 526). Whether sources are quoted directly or indirectly on sound bites in reporting, according to Dimitrova and Strömback (2012) they shape the framing of the news. A key reason that sources are significant as a framing device is that when news media rely on specific sources, the standpoint of the source shapes the reporting (Fahmy & Al Emad, 2011). Lecheler and de Vreese (2013, p. 149) identify that the news media’s “selective function” of frames determines which voices are included or excluded – that is, whose voice(s) is pushed behind the scenes. Hence, when investigating Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is crucial to take into account analysing inclusions and exclusions in media texts in terms of aspects of coverage, representations of related actors, and voices included or excluded in media reporting.

Framing impacts the way news stories are covered, and therefore, there are two main frames by which events and issues are represented in media: episodic and thematic frames. Iyengar (1991) distinguishes between both frames as follows. The episodic frame focuses on covering day-to-day events with no or less discussion of contexts of the main issue. In contrast, the thematic frame places issues in a more general context with a focus on causes, outcomes and solutions of these issues.

Other types of frames are identified by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) as cited in Steimel (2010). These frames include: conflict, human interest, responsibility, morality, and economic consequences. Camaj (2010) defines the previous frames as follows:

- Conflict frame: emphasises the conflicting nature of the event or issue by highlighting the conflict or dispute between groups, institutions or ideologies.
- Human interest frame: brings the humanistic aspect to news stories by focusing on people who are or will be affected by particular issues by emphasising the personal and emotional side of events or issues.
- Responsibility frame: emphasises the attribution of responsibility for the cause or solution of problem to an individual, institution or government.
- Morality frame: emphasises the moral and religious aspect of the issue/event/problem.
• Economic consequences frame: reports events/issues in terms of the consequences they have/will have on people or institutions.

In this thesis, it was found that conflict, responsibility and human interest were the most prominent frames used in Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, other frames emerged in the analysed data, such as comparison, victim, alleged numbers of Palestinian casualties, and urging Israel to stop its military operation in Gaza.

1.5 Researcher’s Background and Ethical Considerations

I am Palestinian, born in the Gaza Strip, only six years before the First Palestinian Intifada started in December 1987. Like any Palestinian child brought up in that era, I was highly familiar with words such as curfew, soldier, resistance and war. Since tear gas and clashes between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian youths and teenagers were a normal part of my daily life, I realised during my first year at school that ‘I am a Palestinian who is a refugee on my land’. My understanding of concepts of identity, land, occupation and refuge came from my grandmother’s stories about her village in the Occupied Palestine that she and her family had to leave in 1948 to become refugees in the Gaza Strip. This environment forced me through fear to refuse a tempting chocolate from an Israeli soldier’s right hand while he was hanging a weapon on his left arm. Five years later, a new concept was added to my childhood dictionary. This concept was peace and was learned when the Israeli Prime Minister Yitshak Rabin, and PLO President Yasser Arafat shook hands at the White House in Washington after signing the Declaration of Principles on September 13th, 1993.

Between the First Intifada, peace process and establishment of the PA in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, life started to change. The most important aspect for me was the absence of Israeli soldiers in the streets, the removal of curfews and fewer days off school. However, the Gaza Strip was still surrounded by Israeli settlements and Gazans were forbidden entry. Similarly, Gazans required Israeli permits to travel to the West Bank and Jerusalem.
In 2000 in the aftermath of the failure of the Camp David negotiations between Barak, Arafat and Clinton, and Sharon’s visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque, the Second Palestinian Intifada erupted. After this, a new term entered my life: *shelling*. The first time I heard this term was during my second year of undergraduate studies: a clear announcement that peace had ended. My understanding of the reality of occupation reached its peak when I left the Gaza Strip for the first time in my life. In summer 2003, I spent two frustrating days waiting for Israelis to allow me and other travellers to cross the border to Egypt after exhaustive checking.

Due to political circumstances and border closures between Egypt and Gaza, I was trapped in Gaza for 18 months while collecting data for my master’s thesis. As a result, it took longer than planned to finish my master’s degree in Media, which I obtained at the end of 2009. Upon obtaining the degree, I returned to Gaza to work as a lecturer in a Gazan university. In 2012, Israel launched its military operation, Pillar of Defence, which lasted for eight days. Although this was the second war in the Gaza Strip in less than four years, it was my first time to witness a real war, waiting for death at any and every moment, not thinking of anything except whether my family and I could survive.

From my master’s thesis, which addressed representations of women in the Palestinian print media, I realised that aspects of the reality in which Palestinians live are related to the outcomes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, when I considered PhD topics, I could not think of a more appropriate topic than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In 2014, I moved from Gaza to Perth to commence my PhD at Edith Cowan University (ECU). After I settled in Perth, I began my PhD proposal about Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Five months later, Israel launched its military operation, Protective Edge, on the Gaza Strip. I submitted my proposal at a time of great concern for my family and friends’ lives in Gaza. The Israeli war on Gaza was an extremely emotional period in my personal life, and it has been a critical stage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also motivated me to consider how I could use my background and experiences to reflect on my research. Conversely, as I watched and read the news from Gaza with the eyes of both a researcher and a Palestinian, some concerns were raised.
One of my main concerns while working on my PhD proposal was the sensitivity of this topic. I acknowledge that the data and the findings could be used in highly politicised critique of mainstream news representations. Thus, when I adopted my method, I had to consider ways to diminish any potential bias as a researcher, despite the importance of my personal background in the qualitative analysis.

My personal background is relevant to the analysis. As I lived most of my life in the Gaza Strip, I was involved, as a Palestinian resident, in events related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This has enhanced my understanding of the conflict in general and more specifically, of the differing media coverage of this conflict. Additionally, my lengthy engagement in media research (beginning in my undergraduate years) gave me a greater awareness of the importance of choosing appropriate methods for investigations.

This point is related to the reflexivity of researchers and to what extent the researcher should have a presence in his or her research. As a media researcher, I am driven by data. My role is describing and explaining what I find emerging, for example, from Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, drawing on appropriate methods. Hence, the analysis in this study started with corpus-based analysis, in which the data guide the researcher. Although corpus-based analysis is not a pure quantitative method, beginning the analysis with the identification of keywords in the Australian media corpora was definitely useful for diminishing or reducing potential bias. However, this method does not prevent bias, since its procedures depend on researchers’ choices in terms of words to be analysed or analyses to be expanded. Therefore, researcher bias cannot completely be avoided. I agree with Baker (2012) who states that “the aim for neutral objectivity is itself a ‘stance’” (p. 255). After the corpus-based analysis, CDA was conducted for a more thorough analysis. CDA is flexible and can be combined with other methods and analytical techniques, including quantitative methods. Baker (2012) asserts that analytical tools and methods that are based on data-driven approaches, using statistical approaches to provide a full overview of representations, can help to enhance CDA and findings. During analysis using CDA, I reflected on my background and knowledge of the
conflict. My background as a Palestinian enhanced the analysis and facilitated greater understanding for interpreting Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nevertheless, throughout the analysis using both methods, I relied on the data that provided the evidence supporting the arguments and findings of this thesis.

1.6 Structure of Thesis

This chapter has offered an overview of the thesis. A rationale for the significance of the study, definitions of key concepts used in this research, a brief historical background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and researcher’s background and ethical consideration were represented.

Chapter 2 presents relevant studies about media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It reviews the literature on media and political contexts in terms of the effects of international news agencies on international news coverage, and Australia’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Chapter 3 explains the research methodology. The methods used in this study (corpus-based analysis and CDA) and the advantages of combining both methods are discussed. Additionally, the analytical framework, which was developed from analytical frameworks used by other researchers, is presented and analytical procedures are outlined.

Chapters 4 to 6 present the findings of this study. Chapter 4 outlines the results of the corpus-based analysis used to examine the representations in the Australian media corpora. Chapter 5 explains Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. It focuses primarily on representations of events that sparked the war—the kidnapping and killing of Israeli and Palestinian teenagers in Jerusalem and Hebron, and events that led to the killing of Palestinian civilians. Chapter 6 presents the findings of Australian media representations of the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique used by the Israeli military during the war on Gaza 2014, as well as events related to Hamas’s rockets and tunnels. Chapter 6 compares media portrayals of both Palestinian
and Israeli casualties as the main actors in these events. In addition, it describes how actions of the two main actors, Israel and Hamas, were legitimised and delegitimised.

Chapter 7 relates the main findings of this study more broadly to the journalistic and political contexts of Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also explores the contexts that shaped and influenced these representations in the light of the literature.

Finally, Chapter 8 presents the conclusions and implications of this research and proposes future research.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to review studies related to representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of media and political contexts. As this thesis focuses on Australian media, the literature reviewed relates to media representations and international news coverage as well as political aspects relevant to Australia’s position and relations with both sides of the conflict.

Despite the sensitivity and difficulty of studying media representations of Palestinian-Israeli issues, many studies have investigated representations of this conflict in terms of media bias, discourse and language. These studies investigated media coverage of events and issues related to this conflict in different countries, including the US and United Kingdom (UK). However, Australian media coverage and representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have not been investigated thoroughly in literature. As highlighted in this chapter, there are only two studies (Jaworski, 2010; Peter Manning, 2004) that examined either partial or limited aspects of Australian media coverage of this conflict.

For Western media, including Australian outlets, reporting on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is considered part of international news coverage. This reporting can be affected by different factors, such as the hegemony of international news agencies over international coverage in general and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. Therefore, other factors are considered in this chapter. In addition, other factors are related to international relations and political positions could affect media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To examine the Australian media representations of this conflict, it is crucial to review the literature related to Australia’s position on the conflict and its relationships with both Israel and Palestinians.

In addition to the introduction and summary, this chapter consists of three main sections. Together, these sections offer a thorough overview of contexts related to the
topic of this thesis. The first section focuses on the literature on media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and involves three sub-sections: media bias, representations of actors and portrayal of casualties. The second section discusses literature on the influences of international news agencies on global news coverage. The third section reviews literature on Australia’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and involves two sub-sections: the position of Australian governments; and the position of the Australian public. The literature review concludes with a summary of pertinent aspects from previous studies.

2.2 Media Representations of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

This section reviews the literature on media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The purpose of this section is to: (i) establish the extent to which the media is biased or balanced in these representations, and what leads to this bias or balance; (ii) investigate how Israeli and Palestinian actors are represented in media; and (iii) determine approaches and methods researchers and authors have used in their examination of media representations of this conflict.

2.2.1 Media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and bias

The literature indicates that there is an abundance of studies examining media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some of these studies show that media are often biased in favour of Israel due to four main factors: the dominance of Israeli and pro-Israeli sources and voices in the coverage of conflict-related events (e.g., Almeida, 2011; Amer, 2008, 2009; Avraham & First, 2010; Aziz, 2007; Dunsky, 2008; Elmasry, 2009; Noakes & Wilkins, 2002; Roy, 2012; Thomas, 2011; Viser, 2003); employing frames that favoured Israel (e.g., Amer, 2008, 2009; Elmasry, 2009; Noakes & Wilkins, 2002); ignoring the historical and political contexts of the conflict (e.g., Dunsky, 2008; Slater, 2007; Thomas, 2011); and political and cultural factors that affect media representations (e.g., Amer, 2008; Jaworski, 2010; Marzano, 2011; Viser, 2003).

In terms of relying on particular sources, the media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict indicated bias based on the reliance on Israeli voices over Palestinian voices.
Dunsky (2008, p. 147) cites US media coverage of Israeli settlements as an example of “a pronounced imbalance in sourcing”. US media relied particularly on the voices of Israeli settlers rather than Palestinian voices, which were “rarely quoted directly” (Dunsky, 2008, p. 148). More specifically, the *NYT* coverage of the conflict tended to highlight the Israeli point of view more than the Palestinian perspective, through the predominant selection of Israeli sources. Amer (2009, p. 26) also shows that US author and columnist Thomas Friedman’s discourse on the Second Palestinian Intifada in the *NYT* relied on voices from the “Israeli left and right, experts, politicians and Israeli public in general”. Therefore, other voices such as human rights organisations, academics, and Arab or other media experts, were ignored in Friedman’s discourse in favour of the Israeli perspective. Correspondingly, the *NYT*’s op-eds and letters to the editor discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also tended to give prominence to US and Israeli points of view rather than the Palestinian perspectives, including Palestinian-US voices (Roy, 2012). Similarly, Almeida (2011) combined corpus and discourse analysis (DA) tools quantitatively and qualitatively to conclude that US newspapers relied heavily on official Israeli sources rather than official Palestinian sources. Consequently, US newspapers’ coverage of the conflict from 2002 to 2006 was biased towards Israel.

Studies of British media coverage on the conflict report the same findings of US media bias, expressed in the dominant presence of Israeli voices. For example, Philo and Berry (2011) found that Israeli voices and explanations were given a platform in reports on the killing of a Palestinian child in the Gaza Strip and 13 Arab Israeli in 2000 by the Israeli soldiers and policemen. Further, in their content analysis of news headlines to identify included and excluded angles or aspects of the conflict, Philo and Berry (2011) conclude that British media tended to “highlight Israeli statements, actions or perspectives” (p. 222), whereas Palestinians were “buried deep in the text of news bulletins” of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 1 and ITV (p. 222). Their analysis included verbal texts and visual images published in news bulletins on both channels during 2000–2002.
In contrast to previous studies, Noakes and Wilkins (2002) indicate that the use of Palestinian officials as a first source in the NYT and Associated Press (AP) increased during the post-Oslo period (1993–1998). This increase was due to “the growing legitimacy of Arafat and other official Palestinian political figures” (Noakes & Wilkins, 2002, p. 660). The researchers show that the use of official Palestinian and Israeli sources to cover Palestinian issues in US news media from 1984 to 1998, “decline[d] slightly” during the First Intifada (Noakes & Wilkins, 2002, p. 660).

The frames used in media representations of the conflict resulted in a reporting bias that favoured Israel. For instance, Amer (2009, p. 11) highlights that Israel was represented as “the ‘victim’” in Friedman’s discourse on the Second Palestinian Intifada in NYT. However, Palestinians and their leader Arafat were blamed for “‘rejecting’ Barak’s offer [during the 2000 Camp David Summit] and ‘resorting’ to violence” (Amer, 2009, p. 16). Friedman attributes “negative actions” (p. 16) to Palestinians. Similarly, Piner (2007, p. 75) argues that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was “misrepresented” in the US mainstream press coverage of related events after the Camp David negotiations in July 2000. US newspapers, The NYT and Washington Post, misrepresented the conflict by framing their coverage on the perspectives of the US President Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Barak, while simultaneously accusing Arafat of being “guilty of not ‘taking the extra steps’ necessary for peace with Israel” (Piner, 2007, p. 65). Hence, according to these studies, using this frame of attributing responsibility to Palestinians contributed to pro-Israel media bias.

Related studies indicate that media tended to use war and episodic frames more than peace and thematic frames in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict coverage. For instance, Fahmy and Eakin (2014) found that Ha’aretz, the NYT and The Guardian varied in their use of both war and peace journalism frames. Ha’aretz used more war frames than both the NYT and The Guardian. The war frames were indicated by the “visibility of effects of war, dichotomization, use of victimizing language, and emotive language” (Fahmy & Eakin, 2014, p. 98). Ha’aretz also employed more peace frames than the NYT and The Guardian. Peace frames identifiers included “people oriented reporting, avoiding dichotomization, avoiding victimization language, and using
objective, and non-biased language” (Fahmy & Eakin, 2014, p. 98). In another study, Ruigrok, van Atteveldt and Takens (2013) found that US, British and Dutch newspapers tended to employ episodic frames more than thematic frames to cover the Second Intifada. Hence, frames such as conflict, suffering and peace were dominant in the Washington Post, The Guardian and the NRC Handelsblad.

The conflict frame was used in media representations of the conflict more often than human interest and victim frames. For instance, Aqtash, Seif and Seif (2004) show that Palestinian children were placed in a frame of conflict in six news outlets that represented regional and international media. The media outlets included: the NYT and NBC TV in the US; BBC World Services radio station and The Guardian in the UK; Jerusalem Post in Israel; and Al-Jazeera TV in Qatar. Aqtash et al.’s study indicate that Palestinian children were rarely portrayed in frames rather than conflict. In other words, researchers found that these children “rarely manifest outside the narrative of violence and conflict by which they are very much defined” (Aqtash et al., 2004, p. 384). The textual analysis in their study confirm the findings of previous studies: the language used to represent Palestinian children was “framed and filtered through a discourse of conflict” (Aqtash et al., 2004, p. 384).

Although most studies on media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict show a pro-Israel bias, other studies indicate media bias in favour of Palestinians. For example, Dobernig, Lobinger and Wetzstein (2010) argue that European media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2009 was unbalanced “when visual and written elements are postulated as separate aspects” (p. 102). This imbalance occurred because coverage of the Gaza War (2009) in Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, Profile and The Guardian Weekly was more sympathetic towards Palestinians. However, the study suggested that media coverage was more balanced when both written and visual elements were examined. Put simply, Israeli voices dominated verbal reports, while Palestinian voices dominated visual representations.

Alternatively, some studies claim that media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is balanced (Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Slater, 2007; Trice, 1979). For example, Trice (1979) concludes that the US newspaper coverage of
the conflict was not biased. He found that 2,924 editorials in 11 US newspapers, including the **NYT**, the **Washington Post**, **Chicago Tribune** and **Los Angeles Times**, were not “totally supportive” or “critical” of any side or party (p. 320). According to Trice (1979), the US elite print media were “supportive of most Israeli policies and actions than those of the Arab states” (p. 324), and Palestinians were “the target of more criticism on the issue of their . . . attacks than any other single party on one other issue that arose during 1966–1974” (p. 319).

Another study that deemed media coverage of the conflict balanced is Slater (2007). Slater argues that the **NYT** coverage of the conflict “usually appear[s] to be moderate and balanced” (p. 120), as its news coverage highlighted the responsibility of both sides. This joint responsibility was attributed to Israel’s policy of settling in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and “Yasir Arafat’s poor leadership and his alleged decision to refuse reasonable compromises and instead turn to violence and terrorism” (Slater, 2007, p. 120). However, Slater (2007) found that since 2005, the **NYT** continued to misrepresent the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In effect, he viewed the **NYT** as more critical of Palestinians than Israelis because it placed “most of the responsibility for the past and present failure of the peace process on them [Palestinians]” (p. 120).

Deprez and Raeymaeckers (2010a, 2010b, 2011) note that the overall coverage of the conflict was reasonably balanced in Flemish daily newspapers. There was a significant difference in the representation of Israelis and Palestinians between the First and Second Intifadas in Flemish daily newspapers. The portrayal of Palestinians in the five Flemish newspapers changed from largely positive to predominantly negative between the two intifadas, while the opposite was the case for Israelis. During the First Intifada, Palestinians were portrayed as victims, whereas Israelis were represented as victims in the Second Intifada. While Israeli perspectives were not predominantly used to describe the intifadas, “the label ‘occupied’ was used far more often than the label ‘disputed’” in relation to the Palestinian Territories occupied by Israel (Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2010a, p. 107). Israeli sources were cited more frequently than Palestinian sources during both intifadas, and contextual backgrounds tended to be ignored (Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2010a). Deprez and Raeymaeckers (2011)
highlight that Flemish newspapers cited Israeli sources more frequently, but also left “space for Palestinian sources” (p. 196). Thus, the use of sources in Flemish newspapers does not reflect media bias towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Media bias in favour of Israel is shown through ignoring contexts related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Dunsky (2008) and Slater (2007) agree that US media tended to ignore historical and political contexts in their coverage of conflict-related issues. Consequently, US media representations of the conflict were biased in favour of Israel in terms of three related events and issues: Palestinian refugees; Israeli settlements; and the Second Palestinian Intifada.

First, Dunsky (2008) argues that US mainstream media coverage of the right of return of Palestinian refugees tended to ignore historical and geopolitical contexts. For example, the reporting in these outlets depicted Palestinian refugees as “an obstacle to peace” (Dunsky, 2008, p. 113) due to “their stubborn and obstinate clinging to those dreams” of returning to their homeland (p. 119). The way in which US mainstream media represented Palestinian refugees was consistent with the pro-Israel policy of the US.

Second, with regard to Israeli settlements, the NYT and Chicago Tribune failed to link the Israeli settlements issue with political and economic contexts, such as US aid to Israel. However, these newspapers criticised the Israeli government’s plan to “build six hundred new homes in the existing West Bank settlements” (Dunsky, 2008, p. 133). Overall, and similar to the reporting of Palestinian refugee issues, Dunsky (2008) found that in their coverage of Israeli settlements, US mainstream media ignored the effects of these settlements on Palestinian lives. Instead, journalists “tend[ed] to narrate Palestinian concerns in their own words, often characterizing what is supported by international law and consensus” (p. 148). Hence, this news coverage lacked related contexts, highlighted Israeli claims and ignored the effects of the settlements on Palestinians’ lives.

Third, Slater (2007) indicates that the NYT’s news coverage during the Second Palestinian Intifada lacked both historical context and “critical moral distinctions”
between Palestinian and Israeli violence (p. 108). Thus, the *NYT* coverage of the conflict lacked “intellectually or morally serious analysis” (Slater, 2007, p. 108). Similarly, US media neglected the Palestinian bloodshed in their news coverage of Israeli military operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank in 2002. Instead, in their news coverage, they “accepted the Sharon government’s frame that Israel was waging a war on terror” (Dunsky, 2008, p. 256), and continued to be in line with Washington’s policy towards this conflict.

In comparative studies, involving US media analysis, pro-Israel media bias was still evident in the editorial exclusion of contexts relating to the conflict. For instance, compared with the BBC and Al-Jazeera reports of the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip after the capture of Shalit, CNN did not provide any context for the Palestinian violence; however, reports gave clear justifications of Israeli violence (Barkho, 2007).

Similar to the findings of previous studies on US media representations of the conflict, Thomas (2011) shows that British media were biased in favour of Israel, in terms of aspects and angles that were emphasised or ignored. British media highlighted historical and situational contexts that were based on Israeli settlers’ positions. Furthermore, context was provided for the Israeli government’s perspective of Israeli withdrawal from settlements in Gaza in 2005 (Thomas, 2011). Thomas (2011) asserts that British media separated the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza from the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, and “failed to provide sufficient historical context during their coverage of the Gaza withdrawal” (p. 531).

According to some studies, the pro-Israel bias of media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflected political factors, including the foreign policies of countries in which the biased media operate. For instance, Viser (2003) attributes the *NYT’s* pro-Israel bias during the First and Second Palestinian Intifadas to the US foreign policy on the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Similarly, Marzano (2011) shows that the Gaza War of December 2008–January 2009 was portrayed by Italian press in an Islamophobic light. The study indicates that Italian
press representations of the Gaza War (2008–2009) were influenced by Italy’s pro-Israel position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under Berlusconi’s government.

In a related context, Amer (2008) proposes that the political culture of media home countries was a determining factor in influencing and shaping the NYT’s coverage of the Second Palestinian Intifada. He outlines two reasons for this: journalists’ ideological affinity with Israel; and pressures from well-resourced and organised public relations, and lobbying activities. Similarly, Jaworski (2010) indicates that visual representations of suicide bombings by Palestinian females in Australian print media were shaped by the political context in which they occur; this “context appears to have very little to do with the West” (p. 127). In other words, representations are also shaped by other contexts, for example norms, in addition to the context that events such as suicide bombings occur within. Consequently, Jaworski (2010) emphasises that:

if particular truths are produced about Palestinian female suicide bombing, it is because of the deployment of gendered and raced norms in western media as a site of representation. What is displayed as truth in relation to the suicide bombing carried out by the Palestinian women is not self-evident. Instead, the given is normed by gender, further conditioned by race. (p. 127)

2.2.2 Media Representation of Israeli and Palestinian actors

Media varied in their representations of Israelis and Palestinians according to their position on the conflict. Arab media tended to represent Palestinians as victims and Israelis as assaulted, while Israeli media tended to depict Palestinians as terrorists. This was the case for Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya’s coverage of the Israeli 2008–2009 war on Gaza. Conversely, one year later (2009–2010), both networks portrayed Palestinians as victims and Israelis as aggressors (Elmasry, et al., 2013). Alhossary and Abdullah (2014, p. 185) reveal that Al-Jazeera framed Palestinian prisoners as “heroes” and treated Hamas and Israel as equal powers. Al-Jazeera asserted that “Hamas won the battle” (p. 185) in its coverage of the Palestinian prisoner-Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit exchange of 2011. In contrast, Ha’aretz framed the Palestinian prisoners as “criminals” and diminished the role of Hamas in the swap (p. 185).
The Israeli media tended to portray Palestinians, including Arab-Israeli citizens either as enemies or as ‘the other’. For example, almost two decades ago, First (1998) reveals that Arab-Israeli citizens were represented by Israeli television as “a hostile minority” (p. 248) during the First Palestinian Intifada (1987–1988); this trend is still evident in Avraham and First (2010). These two researchers examined changes in the portrayal of Arab-Israeli citizens during two conflict-related events in two different periods: the Land Day on March 30th, 1976, and Al-Aqsa Intifada in October 2000. Although Avraham and First (2010) assert that the representation is a dynamic process influenced by both social and symbolic changing reality, their study indicates there was no change in the representation of Israeli Arabs as ‘enemies’ and ‘them’.

In contrast, Karniel and Lavie-Dinur (2011) highlight that representations of Arab citizens in Israel on an Israeli reality television show varied during 2003–2007. Sometimes these representations reinforced stereotypes, while at other times, the stereotypes were completely contradicted or “did not have any special significance, as if the Palestinian Arab participants’ role as the ‘other’ was not even an issue” (Karniel & Lavie-Dinur, 2011, p. 82). Similarly, but with a focus on gender, Lavie-Dinur and Karniel (2013) found a variety of representations of Arab females on Israeli television. While sometimes their portrayal was “seemingly lacking in importance, as if the program was not dealing with an ‘Other’” (p. 65), at other times Palestinian Arab females were portrayed “in the form of a confirmation of a negative stereotype” (p. 65).

In a similar manner, the portrayal of the PLO in Israeli media changed over time. Wolfsfeld (1997b) examined the political, social and situational factors that can shape and change the role of news media in political conflicts over time, in his book News from the Middle East. Wolfsfeld (1997b) indicates that before signing the Oslo Accords in 1993, the PLO was framed as the ‘enemy’ and a ‘terrorist organisation’ by Israeli media, which had been forbidden by Israel to interview Palestinian leaders. In contrast, after signing the Declaration of Principles by Israelis and Palestinians, the PLO was portrayed as “a legitimate partner for peace” (Wolfsfeld, 1997a, p. 30).
Israeli media do not vary in their portrayal of Palestinians, either Arab Palestinians in Israel or other Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Using a comparative content analysis, Rinnawi (2007) shows no significant differences between media coverage by both Israeli newspapers, Yedioth Ahronot and Ha'aretz, during the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000. Palestinian populations in Israel were portrayed as a “threat to the Jewish social order” and the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as “terrorists” (Rinnawi, 2007, p. 161). For example, the actions by the dominant group (Jewish) were portrayed as “a defensive and necessary response to the actions of the disadvantaged group (Palestinians), who were presented as provocative” (Rinnawi, 2007, p. 164). In effect, Wolfsfeld, Avraham and Aburaiya (2000) show that Yedioth Ahronot was interested in informing the Jewish population in Israel “about the threat being posed by the Arab minority” (p. 130). They argue that Ha’aretz increased “the amount of space generally devoted to the Arab minority and a number of issues that are important to this sector” (p. 130).

In addition to Israeli media, other media representations tended to focus on portraying Palestinians as violent and Israel as a country under attack. In Australian media, as noted by Peter Manning (2004), Arabs, Muslims and Palestinians “[were] seen as violent to the point of terrorism . . . without reason, humanity or compassion”, while Israel, like the US and Australia, was portrayed as a country “under attack” (p. 45). Manning conducted a content and textual analysis of the two major Sydney newspapers, The SMH and The Daily Telegraph, examining representations of Arabs and Muslims over two years before and after September 11, 2001. His analysis showed how international coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict influences the representation of Arabs and Muslims. This is demonstrated in Manning’s analysis of Ross Dunn’s reports, the SMH’s Middle East correspondent whose:

portrayal of Palestinians largely comes without history or context. In a difficult round, he [Dunn] has chosen to avoid the fact of the occupation of Palestinian lands and the consequences that flow from it. Inevitably, the choice he makes in terms of language distorts the lens he is using to send his reports home. Palestinians become terrorists, Israelis, rightful defenders, and injured civilians, unfortunates caught in the crossfire. It is propaganda line the Israeli, US and Australian governments might want to hear, but it is not necessarily what two “independent” Sydney newspapers should be
reflecting. In the end, it lends itself to the demonisation of Palestinians as violent Arabs and effectively gives Islam the role of accomplice to Hamas and its suicide bombings. (p. 26)

Media outlets varied in their use of language related to representations of Israeli and Palestinian actors. Ozohu-Suleiman (2014) explores this difference through an analysis of 120 news stories. For instance, while Al-Jazeera English and Press TV used the word *brutal* to depict Israel for its treatment of Palestinian detainees and civilians, BBC World and CNN International employed the same word for portraying “attacks on Israel by Al-Qaeda and ‘Palestinian terrorists’” (Ozohu-Suleiman, 2014, p. 100). Further, according to these researchers, Al-Jazeera and Press TV “seem to have made a major contribution to reshaping global understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” despite the non-Western perspective they represent (Ozohu-Suleiman, 2014, p. 98).

Researchers analysing media representations of the conflict also focus on how Israeli and Palestinian actors stimulate their frames within media coverage of the conflict. In particular, according to Yarchi (2015), Israeli actors were more successful in promoting their frames to the foreign press during the 2012 Gaza War where “Israel’s actions were guided by imagefare considerations” (p. 301), compared with media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2008–2009. Yarchi (2015) examined the messages promoted by Israeli and Palestinian actors in US, UK and Indian media coverage of the Gaza War (2008–2009 and 2012). The analysis involved two stages. First, a qualitative narrative analysis of a sample of print media and their websites in the three countries. Second, a quantitative content analysis to identify frames in which events were portrayed by selected media and comparing actors’ “ability to promote their frames” in foreign media coverage in different countries (Yarchi, 2015, p. 294).

Within portrayals of Israeli and Palestinian actors, media tended to legitimise Israeli actions and delegitimise Palestinian actions. Israeli actions were mostly represented as retaliatory. In this regard, Amer (2008) states:

The construction of violence according to an attack versus retaliation has the function of legitimizing and delegitimizing political actors and their respective actions. It involves assigning positive values to the respective
actors such as the Palestinians are seen as active transgressors whereas the Israelis are seen as victims of such attacks and are in no position but to respond to these transgressions and act in self-defence. (p. 143)

In the same context, Amer (2009) argues that legitimisation of Israeli actions emerged from a blame the victim perspective, and the backgrounding or minimising of Israeli negative actions. Amer (2009) conducted a CDA on 20 articles by Thomas Friedman between 2000 and 2003. In his attempt to answer the main question of his research about Friedman’s construction of the Second Palestinian Intifada (including the portrayal of political actors and their actions), Amer (2009) states:

I demonstrated that an overall discourse strategy of positive in-group presentation and negative out-group presentation dominates the text and takes place within an overall argumentative structure which delegitimizes the Palestinian as violent, confused and irresponsible and legitimizes Israeli actors as peaceable, rational and flexible. (p. 26)

A similar legitimisation of Israeli actions emerged in studies on Israeli media representations of the conflict. For example, Rinnawi (2007) found that newspapers Yedioth Ahronot and Ha'aretz legitimised actions of Israeli Jews and delegitimised actions of Palestinians, including Arab-Israeli citizens. As indicated by Rinnawi (2007), the focus by both newspapers on the “violent nature” of “non-citizen Palestinians who were injured or attacked by Jewish settlers or . . . Israeli forces” resulted in legitimising “the use of force against them” (p. 165). He also found that while “aggression perpetrated against Arabs” was portrayed as events that “simply happened” (167), the two Israeli newspapers’ coverage of Jewish victims was extensive. Palestinian populations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were delegitimised by representations of them as “security threats and aggressors in the conflict” (Rinnawi, 2007, p. 174). Moreover, Palestinian victims were “blamed for violence committed by Israel against them” (p. 175).

### 2.2.3 Portrayal of casualties

The pro-Israeli bias of media is also demonstrated through the framing of Israeli and Palestinian killings. In particular, Elmasry (2009) notes that US newspapers, The NYT and Chicago Tribune, highlighted Israeli deaths more than Palestinian deaths during
the Second Palestinian Intifada. Elmasry (2009) explains both newspapers vindicated Palestinian deaths by supporting Israeli justifications of self-defence and claims of accidents of war. On the contrary, Israeli deaths were condemned and portrayed in reports as “unnecessarily aggressive” (p. 33), and Palestinian killers as “cruel and criminal” (p. 34). Equally, pro-Israel bias is shown in Aziz’s research (2007). Aziz’s content analysis of the NYT and AP’s coverage of the conflict found that both reflected a pro-Israel bias when reporting Israeli killings. This bias can be explained by the dependence on elite sources that restrict “the diversity of viewpoints and opinions leading to a one-sided perspective of the conflict” (p. 8).

While US media bias was revealed through content analysis in the studies above, a similar bias was found by conducting CDA (e.g., Amer, 2009; Roy, 2012). In his use of CDA, Amer (2008) reveals “a persistent pattern of toning down Israeli responsibility for Palestinian casualties through upgrading and downgrading specific events and using agentless passive structures and nominalizations” (p. 111). According to Amer (2008), NYT’s impersonalisation of Palestinian deaths by representing them in terms of numbers resulted in “an absence or insufficient account of the contexts or causes pertaining to the respective incidents” (p. 111). Therefore, these representations indicated a bias against Palestinians. By using CDA from a different perspective, Roy (2012) found that the NYT constructed Israelis as victims. Israeli victims were identified and personalised in NYT coverage, potentially due to the newspaper’s political and ideological leanings.

Similarly, British media coverage of Israeli and Palestinian casualties is also shown to display a pro-Israel bias. For instance, Philo and Berry (2011) assert that after the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, the British media reported Israeli casualties more frequently than Palestinians casualties. Furthermore, Israeli voices were quoted more often than Palestinian voices in British media coverage of the killing of a Palestinian child in the Gaza Strip and 13 Arab Israeli in 2000.

In contrast to the studies discussed so far, other research indicates that US media presented more balanced portrayals of Israeli and Palestinian casualties. Noakes and Wilkins (2002) illustrate that the NYT and AP portrayed Palestinians as “victims of
Israeli actions” (p. 664). However, they ascertain that this frame was limited to news items specifically related to injuries, deaths or difficulties faced by Palestinians. Portraying Palestinians in a victim frame did not necessarily indicate NYT or AP sympathy for Palestinians. Similarly, Dunsky (2008) argues that US media coverage of casualties during Israeli military operation Defensive Shield, in the West Bank in 2002, was balanced. Dunsky affirms that US media balanced “Israeli and Palestinians suffering and emotion” (p. 220) in their coverage of Israeli and Palestinian attacks.

Some studies found that European media also portrayed Israeli and Palestinian casualties in a more balanced manner, while other research (on the same media) indicate the opposite. For example, in their analysis of Flemish newspapers’ representations of Israeli and Palestinian casualties, Deprez and Raeymaekers (2010a, 2011) argue that Palestinian casualties were more individualised than Israeli casualties. News reports included victims’ names, professions and marital status, affording them a greater sense of identity. Conversely, Dobernig et al. (2010) state that representations of Israeli and Palestinian casualties during the Gaza War (2008–2009) in a sample of British, German and Austrian newspapers, were unbalanced. This imbalance was due to “empathy” with Palestinians and a focus on the “governmental power” of Israel (Dobernig et al., 2010, p. 88).

Israeli media varied in their portrayal of Palestinian casualties. While there was a tendency to represent Palestinian casualties in numbers, these casualties were sometimes portrayed as victims. Israeli coverage during the First Palestinian Intifada tended to represent Palestinian deaths more “statistically” and in less of a “humanitarian” manner than it did Israeli deaths (Wolfsfeld, 1997b, p. 158). Similarly, Korn (2004) reveals that Palestinian casualties during the Second Palestinian Intifada were reported in Ha’aretz as the number of people killed during armed clashes; yet, the majority injured and killed by Israeli military fire were unarmed civilians. As a result, Korn (2010) indicates that this statistical representation of Palestinian casualties “[made] it possible to mention Palestinian deaths without ascertaining the circumstances in which they were killed, or to obscure the fact that most of the dead were unarmed civilians” (Korn, 2010, p. 148). Specifically, Auerbach and Lowenstein
(2011) examined Israeli media representations of Palestinian child Mohammed Al-Dura (killed by the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip during the early days of the Second Intifada). They found that Al-Dura was portrayed impassively as an unfortunate and helpless victim. However, one study found that same Israeli media coverage portrayed Palestinian casualties using human interest and victim frames. Liebes and Kampf (2009) show a significant case–based on analysis of news photographs published by Yedioth Ahronot and Ha’aretz during 2000 and 2004–that Palestinians were portrayed as people living under occupation and as direct victims of the Israeli military.

According to some studies, the ideological stance of certain Israeli media outlets shaped the portrayal of Israeli and Palestinian casualties, resulting in media bias. Wolfsfeld (2001) originally expressed this view, stating that Israeli media coverage of casualties during the Second Palestinian Intifada was “graphic, horrifying, and ideological” (p. 116). Similarly, Rinnawi (2007) argues that ideological influence in Israeli media coverage was evident in the dominant portrayal of the Jewish perspective of attacks against Arab citizens in Israel during the first two weeks of October 2000. He notes that Israeli media tended to emphasise the violent nature of Palestinians in the West Bank (that is, those who were injured by Israeli settlers or forces). Additionally, Palestinian voices were excluded and the circumstances in which Palestinian citizens were injured were ignored (Rinnawi, 2007). Additional examples in the previous study show that Israeli media provided full names and photographs of Jewish victims and interviewed family members. No such details were provided about Arab victims.

The language used to represent casualties and related events varied and influenced how Israelis and Palestinians were portrayed. For example, Kandil (2009) shows that CNN represented the violence between both sides of the conflict as “a type of terrorism committed by one side (most probably the Palestinians) and a response to terrorism from the other side (the Israelis)” (p. 66). On the contrary, Al-Jazeera portrayed Palestinian violence as a response to Israeli violence, highlighting words such as occupation and resistance (Kandil, 2009). In his use of corpus and CDA analyses, Kandil (2009) found that although the BBC used the word occupation, neither
resistance nor terrorism was used in the BBC representations of the Palestinian violence. Philo and Berry (2011) show that British media used words such as murder, lynching and slaughter to describe Israeli deaths but not Palestinian deaths. Despite their sympathetic treatment of Palestinian child deaths, BBC1 and ITV used words such as ‘‘terrorists’’ [and] ‘gunmen’’ to describe Palestinian actors and not Israeli actors (Philo & Berry, 2011, p. 248).

In a related context, media did not distinguish clearly between Palestinian civilian casualties and combatants in terms of language use. Barkho (2007) argues that the BBC portrayed Palestinians as militants “and the targets of the Israeli attacks are bomb-makers, or master bomb-makers, militant groups, etc.” (p. 16). In addition, Barkho (2007, p. 16) reasons that the BBC occasionally “seems at a loss” in terms of its lexical choices for portraying Shalit—the Israeli soldier kidnapped in the Gaza Strip in June 2006. Shalit was depicted by the BBC as “kidnapped, another captured or seized [soldier]”, and “referred to as a captive Israeli soldier” (Barkho, 2007, p. 16). This variation of language to represent Israeli and Palestinian casualties and the broader conflict is the result of editorial policies and power relations in media institutions. Wolfsfeld et al. (2000), by combining a content analysis and in-depth interviews, shows that Israeli newspapers, Yedioth Ahronot and Ha’aretz, varied in language structure, routine and coverage of Arab Palestinians in Israel due to editorial policy differences. J. Richardson and Barkho (2009), by conducting CDA and ethnographic observations, argue that the power relations in the BBC affected the portrayal of the killing of Rachel Corrie, a US peace activist, by an Israeli Bulldozer in 2002. According to J. Richardson and Barkho (2009) the language used to report the event was influenced by policy:

We assume that the “sensitivity” with which the coverage is handled and decades of reporting the same conflict with its attendant “scrutiny” from all sides, as the respondents themselves admit, has created what can be termed as “the Middle East culture” compelling journalists and editors to watch every single word they write and broadcast. This culture has deep roots in the organisation to the extent that at least four senior editors—called “the four wise men” in the corridors of Bush house in London—have to agree before a new “softer” or “harsher” lexical item can be used. If the lexical item is of the so-called “loaded or sensitive” type, the issue may go to even higher
levels of the hierarchy. No other conflict the corporation currently covers receives the same degree of scrutiny, attention and editorial supervision. (p. 619)

Overall, literature on media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict indicates that media bias either for Israel or Palestinian was related to voices and frames used in media coverage and the selective representation of contexts. However, previous studies varied in terms of whether media were biased or balanced in favour of one of both parties. In other words, while most of these studies found a bias in favour of Israel, few studies indicate a pro-Palestinian media bias.

In conclusion, the literature shows that representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Australian media need investigation. The literature review indicates that researchers mainly focus on US media representations of the conflict, specifically The NYT, and CNN (e.g., Almeida, 2011; Amer, 2008, 2009; Aziz, 2007; Dusnky, 2008; Elmasry, 2009; Noakes & Wilkins, 2002; Piner, 2007; Roy, 2012; Slater, 2007; Viser, 2003). Some studies analysed British media portrayals (e.g., Barkho & Richardson, 2010; Philo & Berry, 2004, 2011; J. Richardson & Barkho, 2009). Fewer studies examined other Western media representations of the conflict, including Flemish, Australian, Russian media (Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Jaworski, 2010; Peter Manning, 2004). Nevertheless, both Peter Manning (2004) and Jaworski (2010) do not focus completely on representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first study analysed Australian newspapers representations of this conflict from the perspective of how Arabs and Muslims were portrayed, while the latter examined the portrayals of Palestinian female suicide bombers in Australian newspapers from a gender perspective. Both studies focus on analysing Australian print media rather than other types of media, including online platforms. Thus, there is a crucial need to bridge the gap in the literature through examining how Australian media portrays one of the most significant and complex conflicts: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In examining media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, related studies used various methods, including qualitative and quantitative methods. Several studies combined quantitative and qualitative methods, namely content analysis, and in-depth interviews (e.g., Avraham & First, 2010; Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2010a; First, 1998;
Karniel & Lavie-Dinur, 2011; Philo & Berry, 2011; Wolfsfeld, 1997b, 2001; Wolfsfeld et al., 2000). Related linguistic studies combined CDA and corpus analysis to investigate media portrayals of the conflict (e.g., Almeida, 2011; Amer, 2008, 2009). While some studies applied CDA (e.g., Alhossary & Abdullah, 2014; Kandil, 2009; Richardson & Barkho, 2009; Roy, 2012), other studies relied on content analysis only (e.g., Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2011; Elmasry et al., 2013; Ozohu-Suleiman, 2014; Rinnawi, 2007). Interestingly, the most recent research applied CDA; most of these are linguistic studies. Crucially, this thesis research conducted CDA as a qualitative method, in addition to corpus-based analysis. Kandil (2009) supports this approach and recommends conducting more qualitative CDA to “triangulate the findings of the corpus research” (p. 163).

Although researchers adopt various approaches to study media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, framing is the most significant approach used in related literature (e.g., Alhossary & Abdullah, 2014; Amer, 2008; Aqtash et al., 2004; Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2010b; Elmasry et al., 2013; Fahmy & Eakin, 2014; Noakes & Wilkins, 2002). For this reason, this research draws on framing theory to analyse Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Framing theory is the most appropriate theoretical framework to analyse media representations. For example, related studies show that media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lacked related contexts due to relying on episodic frames rather than thematic ones. This indicates a need to determine the dominant frames in such representations and media bias. Identifying media bias could be achieved by analysing framing mechanisms, such as sources, which is the approach taken in this study. In addition, analysing news sources may be useful through examining “how the selection of sources to be quoted correlates with the overall positive or negative representations of the different participants in the conflict” (Kandil, 2009, p. 162). This thesis examined how sources of news articles, and information within these articles, shaped Australian media representations of the conflict, and to what extent relying on these sources resulted in media bias.
The literature review shows that numerous studies have focused on analysing media coverage of events and issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These events and issues include: the First and Second Palestinian Intifadas (e.g., Almeida, 2011; Amer, 2008, 2009; Aqtash et al., 2004; Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Elmasry, 2009; Kandil, 2009; Liebes & Kampf, 2009; Philo & Berry, 2004, 2011; Richardson & Barkho, 2009; Slater, 2007; Viser, 2003; Wolfsfeld, 2001), Camp David negotiations in 2000 (e.g., Piner, 2007), the peace process (e.g., Wolfsfeld, 1997a, 1997b), Israeli settlements and Palestinian refugees (e.g., Dunsky, 2008), and the 2008–2009 Israeli war on Gaza (e.g., Elmasry et al., 2013; Ruigrok et al., 2013). This research is significant because it analysed the more recent media portrayals of the conflict, focusing on Australian media representations of the conflict during 2014 and 2015, when some significant events occurred, such as the Israeli war on Gaza during July and August 2014.

Covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and examining related media coverage are problematic. This conflict is one of the most sensitive and complex topics for researchers to study or media to cover. Therefore, media are careful in their coverage of the conflict to the extent that they avoid using some terms or words. In a related context, online news coverage of the conflict is encumbered with “symbolism, emotion, and soul-searching” (Segev & Blondheim, 2010, p. 82). Moreover, Richardson and Barkho (2009) assert that no other conflict the BBC covers “receives the same degree of scrutiny, attention and editorial supervision” (p. 619). They suggest that the sensitivity and continuity of media reporting of this conflict force journalists and editors to “watch every single word they write and broadcast” (p. 619). The same sensitivity applies to investigating media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is considered by Zelizer (2005) a “tricky endeavor” (p. 390).

The complexity of examining media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also relates to the positions and perspectives of researchers. Researchers in previous studies have used different terms and concepts to refer to the same aspect of the conflict. For instance, the complexity of the status of Palestinians and the position of researchers resulted in the use of a variety of terms to describe Arab Palestinians in
Israel. Previous studies used terms such as *Palestinians*, *Arab Israeli* and *Arab minority in Israel*. The use of these different terms is understandable considering the complex status of Palestinians. For example, some Arab Palestinians live in Israel and hold citizenship. Others live in East Jerusalem, where they hold Jordanian passports and Israeli travel documents. They are officially neither Israeli nor Palestinian citizens. Another category of Palestinians is those who live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and hold Palestinian passports.

Overall, the literature confirms the sensitivity of examining media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and how these findings could affect the judgment of media bias. For example, in her review of Philo and Berry (2004), Zelizer (2005, p. 392) maintains that the former study “delight[s] those who feel that British television news slants toward Israel and anger those who feel it slants toward the Palestinians”. Furthermore, Giner-Sorlla and Chaiken (1994) indicate that prior beliefs and attitudes have an impact on “judgments of bias in the media” (p. 178). Their study shows that participants who were pro-Israel considered US television coverage biased in favour of Palestinians, whereas pro-Palestinian participants deemed the same media biased against Palestinians. These findings are important because they show the contested nature of any coverage of the conflict.

The sensitivity of examining media representations of the conflict affects researchers’ judgment of other researchers’ bias in their examination of these representations. For example, US-Israeli author and researcher, Gadi Wolfsfeld, questioned the results of Philo and Berry (2004) in terms of British media’s pro-Israel bias. Wolfsfeld cited Evans-Prichard (2003), who stated that “60% of the British people believe that Israel is the greatest threat to world peace” (2006, p. 476), referring to the consistency that is supposed to exist between public opinion and media. However, I argue that news coverage is not necessarily consistent with public opinion. Thus, media coverage may not reflect the attitudes of public opinion towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and vice versa.

The next section explores the influences of international agencies on global news coverage, according to related literature. Since the reporting on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is part of international news in Australian media, it is crucial to explore the literature in terms of effects of international news agencies on international news coverage in general.

2.3 Influences of International News Agencies on Global News Coverage

This section reviews literature exploring the influence of international news agencies as a news source in shaping global news coverage. It aims to: (i) determine to what extent these agencies have an influence on foreign news coverage; (ii) identify other sources and factors that could influence the coverage of international news; and (iii) investigate the balance and imbalance of international news agencies’ coverage of international events.

The literature indicates that international news agencies have a significant influence on the coverage of global news in media around the world, which rely on these agencies as a news source (e.g., Cho, 1996; Cho & Lacy, 2000; Gupta, 2012; Kim, 2003; Nwuneli & Udoh, 1982; Paterson, Andresen, & Hoxha, 2012; Wu, 1998, 2003, 2007). Cho (1996), Cho and Lacy (2000), Gupta (2012) and Nwuneli and Udoh (1982) found that Japanese, Indian and Nigerian newspapers depended heavily on international wire services for international affairs. Similarly, Gupta (2012) concludes that Indian newspapers relied heavily on international news agencies like AP, Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Reuters for their international news coverage. He found that during June 1–10, 2011, three leading Indian newspapers selected 42.7% of their international news from the aforementioned agencies. Specifically, Cho and Lacy (2000) consider that Japanese newspapers’ reliance on international agencies for international news shows “the lack of investment by the newspapers in staff coverage of international events” (p. 11). Also, they predict that this dependence will result in the inclusion of more conflict news in Japanese newspapers, as agencies focus on news about international conflicts and disasters.

The literature shows that media outlets and newspapers take the same news from international news agencies and the media, sometimes without editing, for different media and newspaper editions. For instance, Cho (1996) argues that international news
coverage in 48 Japanese newspapers is probably quite similar because the media “depend on only one or two wire services” (p. 115). Similarly, in his focus on the organisational determinants in explaining the nature and structure of international news coverage in Korean newspapers, Kim (2003) indicates that newspapers relied on international news sources. Kim’s content analysis of 1,625 news articles in 20 newspapers reveals that newspapers selected the news articles from Western news agencies such as AFP, AP and Reuters for morning and evening editions.

Previous studies indicate that media (including newspapers) in developed countries rely on international news agencies for international news coverage to the same degree as developing countries. In the examination of the influence of systematic determinants on international news coverage in 38 different countries, Wu (1998) indicates that developing countries’ media reliance on international news agencies for foreign news coverage is “profound” (p. 74). Equally important, the media in Greece and the US “were even found to be exclusively influenced by the news agencies” (Wu, 1998, p. 74). This demonstrates the dominance of news agencies as a news source for developed or developing countries in international news flow and coverage.

Not only do international news agencies influence foreign affairs coverage in traditional media, they are also news sources for online media. Wu (2007) analysed 1,258 international stories published on CNN, NYT, cnn.com and nytimes.com, to examine several factors: the influence of trade, existence of news agencies, national and cultural traits, and geographic proximity. This study shows that news agencies are significant influencers in international news coverage in both online and traditional media. The influence of these agencies on the websites “seems greater than on the traditional media” (Wu, 2007, p. 539). Wu surmises that online media rely on news agencies as sources due to “the pressure to save money in web news production by importing more copy available from the news agencies” (p. 549). Hence, international news agencies affect foreign news in different media, from print to online, with varying levels of influence.

Social media platforms, like Facebook, Twitter and blogs, play a role in making additional sources available to journalists and newspapers. However, international
news agencies are still the main sources of foreign news. De Dobbelaer, Paulussen and Maeseele (as cited in van Leuven, Heinrich, and Deprez, 2015) reveal that most journalists tend to copy material from international agencies and international news media like the BBC and CNN “to verify the reliability of user-generated content before they incorporate it in their news output” (p. 587). Even in the new media era, there is still a crucial dependence of media on international agencies as news sources for several reasons: time constraints, unavailability of foreign correspondents and the cost of news production (Wu, 1998).

Despite their reliance on international news agencies as sources, media can shape their international news coverage in several ways. For instance, Kara and Atabey (2013) found that the Turkish Cypriot newspapers “added their own perspectives influenced by their local angles and ideological concerns” in the framing of Iraq and Lebanon wars (p. 185). Cho (1996) agrees with the findings of Kara and Atabey (2013), stating that some market factors, such as “competition, political, economic, and cultural ties” may influence news content (p. 4). Similarly, Fahmy (2005) argues that although western news agencies “dominate news production, they provide a variety of news to be framed differently by different media” (p. 394). In her content analysis of news sources used to visually portray the 9/11 attacks and the Afghan War in The International Herald Tribune and Al-Hayat, Fahmy found that the majority of images published in both newspapers were from the western news agencies AP, AFP and Reuters.

In other words, media may shape their international news in line with editorial policies, national concerns and international relations, regardless of their dependence on international news agencies as sources.

Some studies identified a lack of balance in Western agencies’ international coverage (e.g., Boyd-Barrett & Rantanen, 2004; Camaj, 2010; Paterson, 1997). Specifically, Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen (2004) assert that Western news agencies are “very imbalanced” because they prefer to cover political, economic and military news from the US and western Europe, relying on official and elite news sources (p. 34). However, Horvit’s analysis (2006) of Western news agencies’ coverage of the 2003
war debate on Iraq opposes Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen’s (2004) findings. Horvit claims that neither AP, AFP nor Reuters “significantly favored sources from its own country or region” (2006, p. 442).

While the literature shows that international news agencies have agenda-setting roles in covering international events, studies disagree on the extent of international news agencies’ balance in terms of news from various regions. Ambrogi-Yanson (2010) found that the online reporting of international agencies was balanced in terms of regional portrayals. He conducted his study on Yahoo News’ ‘World’ articles sourced from AP, AFP and Reuters, as well as international news covered by NYTimes.com in April 2010. Ambrogi-Yanson (2010) aimed to identify how Western news agencies, through a portal media outlet, portray the world. Ho (1998) infers that these news agencies distort the image of what was termed ‘Third World’ nations through their “control of a one directional flow of news” (p. 50). Studies found that these sources influence international news coverage. Further, their television news output crucially “shape[s] international television coverage around the world . . . [and] distort[s] coverage of international crisis and limit[s] coverage of other parts of the world, influencing the global news agenda” (Paterson, 1997, p. 50).

This demonstrates that international news agencies indirectly set the agenda for media that depend on them as a news source. For instance, Paterson et al. (2012) investigated the influential role of UK-based international television news agencies in the global news coverage of the events of Kosovo. They argue that international news agencies “go to extraordinary lengths to arrange coverage that may never be needed” (p. 117). Consequently, the material used by international agencies to cover specific events plays a significant agenda-setting role in the coverage of media reliant on these agencies as a news source.

Camaj (2010) also argues that international agencies play an agenda-setting role in media. They affect news coverage in media around the world by “influencing the development of the very concept of news and the news judgment and news gathering practices of their clients” (Camaj, 2010, p. 640). Through quantitative content analysis, the study focuses on the dominant frames in AP, Reuters, AFP and ITAR-
TASS’s reporting on Kosovo’s status negotiations over two years. It suggests that these international agencies are influenced by event-oriented factors, as they employed a conflict frame instead of a human interest frame. In other words, these agencies tended to employ episodic frames rather than thematic frames. Thematic frames facilitate greater understanding of the contexts of such conflicts. Hence, international agencies cover events separately from their contexts due to their agenda, which could influence international news sourced by media around the world.

Overall, different international and local media rely on international news agencies as news sources. This is specific for global news coverage, due to international agencies’ hegemony. Nevertheless, other factors may shape media coverage of international events and issues, such as editorial policies, and political and economic contexts of media. International news agencies are still one of the most influential news sources for both traditional and online media in developed and developing countries.

Related studies agree that the agenda-setting influence of these agencies shapes international news coverage of media around the world. Nevertheless, related literature varies in terms of international news agencies’ bias in international coverage. These differences relate to content, sources and the representation of different countries or regions.

Thus, international news agencies may have an influence in Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For the reasons outlined in the literature, this study focuses on analysing news sources that Australian print and online media rely on within their representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In addition to media contexts related to the coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, political aspects are also important to consider when examining media representations of the conflict. Hence, the next section explores the political context for this study by reviewing the literature on Australia’s position towards the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
2.4 Australia’s Position Towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Australia’s interests in the Middle East began with its role in “the Commonwealth imperial defence system which resulted in the deployment of Australian forces in the Middle East during both the First and Second World Wars” (Mansouri, 2007, p. 129). Australia’s traditional ties with Great Britain continued until the end of World War II, when Australia started to strengthen its relationship with the US. Australian foreign policy allegiance has shifted from Great Britain to the US since the Japanese attack on the US Pearl Harbour naval base in 1941. In the aftermath of this attack, Australia’s Prime Minister, John Curtin, stated in an address: “I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom” (“Over paid,” 2010, para. 1). Importantly, “World War II transformed Australian-American relations and the strategic alliance forged between the two countries left a significant legacy in terms of foreign policy and regional security” (“Over paid,” 2010, para. 3). As a result, alongside the US, Australia voted in favour of the UN partition plan to divide Palestine between Arabs and Jews in 1947 (Harris, 2012a), despite pressure from the UK on Commonwealth countries to abstain from voting on the UN resolution. It is of interest that since World War I “Australian forces have fought together with the United States military in every significant conflict” (U.S. Department of State, 2017, para. 2).

Allying the US by Australia continued during two major events in the Middle East. The first event was after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when Australia participated in the 1990 Gulf War, despite widespread opposition among the Australian public (Abadi, 2001). The second event was Australia’s military participation in Iraq from 2003 to 2008 and again in 2014. Australia’s military involvement in the US ‘War on Terror’ in the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 attacks in Washington and New York can be explained by Australia’s desire to strengthen its alliance with the US. Mansouri (2007) agrees with Cox and O’Connor (2012) that strengthening the Australian-US alliance was a motivation for the presence of Australian military forces in Iraq.
Australia’s alliance with the US has affected its foreign policy and position towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Consequently, this position is consistent with that of the US, who is the main ally of Israel. This is shown throughout this section, in which the literature on Australia’s position towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its relations with Israel and Palestinians is reviewed. The political environment affects how media operates and produces content. Therefore, this section explores the Australian historical and political contexts related to Australia’s position towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including governments, parties and public.

2.4.1 The position of Australian governments and parties

This sub-section aims to identify successive Australian governments’ foreign policies and Australian political parties’ positions on the main events and issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from 1947 to date. In addition, it aims to explore Australia’s relations with Israel and Palestine.

2.4.1.1 (1947–1966)

In 1947, Australia participated in the establishment of a UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) along with “various countries that had not been directly involved with the Palestinian and Jewish case” (Han, 2011, p. 35). Adelman (1992) states that Australian Foreign Minister Herbert Vere Evatt, who chaired the UNGA in 1947 was “a midwife at Israel’s birth” (p. 355). Australia voted in favour of the UN’s partition plan on November 29th, 1947, which recommended the partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state.

In the aftermath of May 1948, when Israel established its state in Palestine, Australia had to deal with two issues: recognition of Israel and Palestinian refugees. Knight and Patz (as cited in Mansouri, 2007) mention that Australia “was the first western nation to accord full recognition to Israel” (p. 130). On May 11th, 1949 “the UNGA passed—37 votes in favour, 12 against, and nine abstentions—Resolution 273 (III), which admitted Israel into the UN” (Harris, 2012a, p. 4). Reich (as cited in Rubenstein & Fleischer, 2007, From independence to the Six-Day War section) states that by 1955, Australia “had made several public statements in the United Nations supporting
Israel’s position” towards Palestinian refugees that “returning them to Israel was not practical and they should be resettled in their countries of current residence” (para. 3). It is noteworthy that from 1949 to 1966, Robert Menzies, who helped to create the Liberal Party of Australia, led the Liberal Country Coalition in Australia (“Our history,” n.d.).

2.4.1.2 (1966–1975)

The major event in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within this period was the Six-Day War in 1967 between Israel and the Arab countries. The Australian government showed a pro-Israel position. Harris (2012a) asserts that:

a few days before war began, Acting Prime Minister John McEwan restated Australia’s policy that the blockade of the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba by Arab forces was an illegitimate act, thereby conveying Australian support for Israel. (p. 7)

In a related context, Australia “was among the 46 countries opposing the proposal” that Yugoslavia presented demanding an immediate withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the Occupied Territories (Abadi, 2001, p. 571). Nevertheless, Abadi (2001) argues that by the 1970s, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) stressed “the need to find a solution to the Palestinian refugees problem” (p. 564) and “support[ed] moderate PLO leaders, [while] the Liberal Party rarely mentioned the Palestinian refugees and stressed the need to lend Israel greater support” (p. 564).

Despite being at their peak in the aftermath of 1967, Australia-Israel relations declined progressively after that. In addition, although Australia’s policy was consistent with the US policy on the Middle East, Australia was also interested in “maintaining good relations with the Arab states and, more widely, with the Moslem world, including Indonesia and Malaysia” (Davis, as cited in Reich, 1998, p. 334). Reich (1998) examined how Australia dealt with the crisis in the Middle East in 1967 stating that “Australia had a clear sense of its own interests and a sophisticated and independent policy making capability” (p. 329). Another study by Reich (2010) focused on Australia-Israel relations during 1967 and 1972, revealing that while Australia-Israel relations were at “their peak at the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War”, relations had
diminished gradually (p. 575). Reich (2010) and Abadi (2001) suggest several reasons for this: (i) Australia’s growing trade with the Arab countries; (ii) Australia’s political leadership changes; (iii) the pressures exerted by Australian political parties and public; and (iv) the growing frustration among some decision-makers in the media about the impasse of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The overall frustration was “attributed to Israel’s continuing occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and its refusal to commit itself in advance to total withdrawal” (Reich, 2010, p. 575). In other words, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian Territories and the economic relations between Australia and the Arab World affected relations between Australia and Israel from 1967 to 1972.

In 1972, a Labor government led by Gough Whitlam was elected in Australia. The election of the first Labor government since 1949 “marked a sharp departure in Australian policy toward Israel and Arab-Israeli issues” (Rubenstein & Fleischer, 2007, The Gorton, McMahon, and Whitlam Years, 1967–1975 section, para. 3). The shift of Australia’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was prominent when Whitlam’s government supported the creation of a Palestinian state after the PLO leader’s 1974 UN speech (Harris, 2012a). However, the Whitlam government limited its critique of Israel in terms of issues such as settlements. Borys (2014) suggests that this “is perhaps reflective of the extent to which the Whitlam Government was willing and able to stretch Australia’s position, opting for a soft, rather than hard critique” (p. 17).

2.4.1.3 (1975–1983)

Australian foreign policy tended to be more sympathetic to Israel in the era of the Liberal governments (1975–1983) than in the ALP government era (1972–1975). Abadi (2001) asserts that Fraser’s Liberal government “was even more pro-Israel than its predecessor” (p. 563). For example, in 1980 Australia voted against the UN resolution, demanding an “Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank” (Abadi, 2001, p. 574). In addition, the Fraser government repeatedly affirmed Israel’s right to existence and security, but did not recognise the PLO that “refuses to recognise Israel’s right to exist” (Harris, 2012a, p. 19). In other words, while Australia agreed on Palestinians’
right to an independent state, its stance towards the PLO was conditional on the latter’s recognition of Israel (Abadi, 2001). The foreign minister of the Fraser government, Andrew Peacock, said that “Israel could not be expected to negotiate with the PLO until the latter abandoned its call for Israel’s destruction and instead recognized Israel” (Rubenstein & Fleischer, 2007, 1975–1983: The Fraser years section, para. 3). Nevertheless, Borys (2014) argues that there was a development in Australia’s position towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to “the Fraser government’s increasing references to the right of Palestinians to a state of their own” (p. 19). Another example of this development in the Fraser government’s position on the conflict was during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Harris (2012a) asserts that in the aftermath of the massacre of Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in Lebanon, Fraser and his foreign minister “both spoke out strongly against Israel” (p. 20), calling for “the creation of a Palestinian ‘homeland’” (p. 21).

2.4.1.4 (1983–1996)

When the ALP was in power in Australia (1983–1996), Australia’s position towards Palestinians developed. For instance, Hawke’s Labor government (1983–1991) showed greater acceptance of Palestinians and the PLO (Rubenstein & Fleischer, 2007), recognised the Palestinian right to self-determination (Abadi, 2001) and called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state (Harris, 2012a, p. 23). Moreover, the Hawke government, in its first year in office, “conducted a review of its Middle East policy . . . [that] included tentative moves towards recognising the PLO as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” (Harris, 2012a, p. 24). The Hawke government’s foreign minister “describe[d] Israeli settlements in the West Bank as ‘illegal’” (Harris, 2012a, p. 25).

It is noteworthy that Hawke was the first Australian Prime Minister to visit Israel in February 1987. In his visit, which also included Jordan and Egypt, Hawke discussed “a prospective multilateral conference to kick-start a Middle East peace process, something that was opposed by the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir” (Harris, 2012a, p. 26). In a related context, Australia-Israel relations were strained in the late
1980s due to the policy of the Israeli government, led by Shamir, during the First Palestinian Intifada (Abadi, 2001).

Australia-Israel relations remained without significant changes in the early 1990s, when Paul Keating became the Prime Minister of the ALP’s new government. In comparison to the Hawke government, Keating’s government was less interested in Australian relations with Israel and Palestine, as Keating’s “personal focus in foreign policy was mainly on the Asia-Pacific region” (Rubenstein & Fleischer, 2007, The Keating Years, 1991–1996 section, para. 2). Nevertheless, “in May 1991, as acting Prime Minister, Paul Keating delivered a speech to the Zionist Federation of Australia, in which he labelled Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank ‘contrary to international law’” (Harris, 2012a, p. 29).

There was no significant change in Australia’s foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during Keating’s era. Australia was dissatisfied with the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians because of “Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank and the slow pace of the peace process” (Abadi, 2001, p. 579), and criticised Israel’s human rights record. Despite its dissatisfaction, the Australian government remained “moderate” in its criticism of Israel (Abadi, 2001, p. 579), and supportive of its security and a two-state solution (Rubenstein & Fleischer, 2007). Gareth Evans, Australian Foreign Minister in the Labor governments (1988–1996) pointedly denounced the Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, he called Arabs to acquiesce to settle Palestinian refugees in Arab countries, considering that demanding to return all Palestinian refugees to their homeland “was not a practical solution to the conflict” (Kapel & Alter, as cited in Abadi, 2001, p. 579). In 1990, Australia demoted its relations with the PLO because of the group’s “sympathetic attitude towards Saddam Hussein” during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Abadi, 2001, p. 579). Later, there was a slight shift in Australian foreign policy towards the PLO, which “was eventually accepted by the Keating Government as the ‘legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’” (Harris, 2012a, p. 14).

The Keating government also welcomed the official Declaration of Principles (Harris, 2012a). Consequently, Australia helped supervise the Palestinian elections of January
1996 after establishing the PA (Rubenstein & Fleischer, 2007). Australia also
“contributes to financial humanitarian assistance and developmental aid” to the
Palestinian Territories annually (Mansouri, 2007, p. 139).

2.4.1.5 (1996–2007)

The following Liberal government’s (1996–2007) policy on the Middle East was
slightly different from that of its Labor predecessors. The Howard government was
“labelled ‘pro-Israel’ by supporters and critics alike” (Harris, 2012a, p. 43). The
Howard government had a desire to “strengthen bilateral relations with Israel [since]
Foreign Minister Downer said in June 1996: Australia's relations with Israel will be a
high priority for this government” (Harris, 2012a, p. 36). The Howard government
was also committed to ensuring Israel’s security and Australia’s willingness to help in
the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians (Abadi, 2001). The Howard
government’s policy represented a “fairly muted criticism of the protracted Israeli
occupation of Palestinian Territories since 1967” (Saul, 2011, p. 427).

After the eruption of the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, Australia denounced the
violence between Israelis and Palestinians without blaming either side (Abadi, 2001).
In addition, Australia and the US voted against the UNGA’s resolution, which referred
the question of Israel’s separation barrier to the International Court of Justice
(Burchill, 2006; Han, 2011). Later, in 2002 and for the first time, the Howard
government emphasised in a public statement that “a Palestinian ‘state’ would be part
of any peace settlement” (Harris, 2012a, p. 35).

Australia’s policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not change dramatically
during Howard’s era, but events, like the September 11th attacks, had an impact on
this policy. Until the 2001 attacks, Australia’s Liberal governments strongly supported
Israel, but only acknowledged the same rights for Palestinians more recently (Burchill,
2006). According to Burchill (2006), since the 2001 attacks, the Australian
government has adopted a policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is in line with
Washington’s policy. Australia began to accept Israel’s right to self-defence “with the
so-called ‘war on terror’” (Burchill, 2006, p. 124), and its support of a Palestinian state
only comes “after Israel’s right to exist” and self-defence (p. 125). Moreover, Han
(2011) agrees with (Burchill, 2006) that Australia’s foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is associated with Australia’s desire to promote its alliance with the US. She argues that the pro-Israel lobby plays a role in shaping Australia’s policy on the conflict because this lobby has “significant relations with prominent figures in the Australian society” and political and financial abilities to “articulate its agenda” (Han, 2011, p. 178).

Thus, Australia had begun to vote against the UN resolutions, which criticised Israel only (Rubenstein & Fleischer, 2007). It is noted that from 2004 to 2007, Australia voted against the UN resolution, which considered the Israeli settlements illegal. In December 2003, “Australia was one of eight countries to vote against UNGA Resolution . . . [that questioned] whether the ‘separation barrier’ being constructed by Israel in the West Bank was in breach of international law” (Harris, 2012a, p. 40).

2.4.1.6 (2007–2017)

Harris (2012b) argues that Rudd and Gillard Labor governments maintained the Howard government’s policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is demonstrated by Australia’s support for Israel’s right to exist and defend itself. Thus, Australian foreign policy on the conflict was still pro-Israel when the two Labor governments were in power. An example of this bias was Australia’s stance on Israeli military operation, Cast Lead, in Gaza in 2008–2009. Australia condemned Hamas actions, and urged Israel to “be mindful of civilians” (Harris, 2012b, p. 12). According to Harris (2012b), Australia’s position was interpreted “as bias towards, or strong support for, Israel” (p. 12). Continuing its pro-Israel position, the Australian government rejected the findings in the UN Goldstone Report. Saul (2011) highlights that Australia opposed the Goldstone Report about the Israeli war on Gaza 2008–2009, without “providing reasons” (p. 435). Australia voted against a UNGA resolution that “called for, among other things, the Goldstone Report to be sent to the UN Security Council” on November 5th, 2009 (Harris, 2012b, p. 13).

Although Australia supported the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, this support was not reflected in Australia’s UN votes. For instance, when the PA “sought to become the 195th member of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) . . . . Australia, along with 13 other members, voted against admitting ‘Palestine’ to UNESCO” on October 31st, 2011. (Harris, 2012b, p. 20).

In contrast, there was a significant change in Australia’s votes on UN resolutions under the Rudd and Gillard governments. For example, Australia’s vote on the UN resolution that considered Israel’s settlements as illegal, changed from ‘against’ under Howard’s Liberal government (2004–2007), to ‘in favour’ from 2008 to 2012 under the two Labor governments (Westra, 2017). The Labor governments also shifted Australia’s vote on “the question of the applicability of the Geneva Convention to Occupied Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem” from ‘abstain’ to ‘in favour’ (Borys, 2014, p. 27).

It is noteworthy that within Gillard’s Labor government, an ‘internal disagreement’ emerged between the Prime Minister (Julia Gillard) and the Foreign Minister (Bob Carr) on the issue of the Palestinian attempt for a UN observer status (Borys, 2014). While Gillard “had given strong indications that Australia would oppose the Palestinian bid, Carr fought to shift the voting position” (Borys, 2014, p. 28). After his tenure, Carr criticised “the influence of the ‘Israeli lobby’ on the Prime Minister and on Middle East policy” (Borys, 2014, p. 28).

Australia used strong language against Israel due to the fake passport affair. In January 2010, Israel assassinated one of Hamas’s leaders, Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh, in Dubai, using forged Australian passports by Israeli intelligence. According to Dubai Police, there were “27 people involved in the assassination . . . . Four of the suspects travelled on Australian passports in the names of four dual Australian-Israeli citizens” (Lester, 2010, para. 8). Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith asserted that Israel was responsible, stating that “no government can tolerate the abuse of its passports, especially by a foreign government” (Lester, 2010, para. 4)). Further, Harris (2012b) considers the incident was “a significant event because of the strong language used by the Australian Government towards Israel” (p. 13), and the expulsion of an Israeli diplomat from Australia.
Under the coalition government led by the Liberal Party, Australia’s votes on several UN resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have changed. The Abbott government, elected in September 2013, shifted Australia’s votes from ‘in favour’ to ‘abstain’ on two UN resolutions in a marked “return to the policy position of the late Howard years” (Westra, 2017, para. 3). The first resolution “calls for Israel (as the occupying power) to comply with the 1949 Geneva Conventions in relation to the occupied Palestinian territories [and] the second backs a cessation order on Israeli settlements in those occupied territories” (Westra, 2017, para. 3). The Abbott government justified its votes on UN resolutions through the Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, who stated that the change “reflected the government’s concern that Middle East resolutions should be balanced” (Westra, 2017, para. 4). Bishop emphasised that the Australian government “will not support resolutions which are one-sided and which pre-judge the outcome of final status negotiations between the two sides” (para. 4).

Apart from votes on UN resolutions, the Abbott government tended to “align more closely with Israel” (Borys, 2014, p. 31). A further example of Abbott government’s pro-Israel policy was the decision to cease using the term occupied when referring to East Jerusalem. This decision was considered a significant change in Australian policy on the status of Jerusalem and the broader conflict (Borys, 2014). Moreover, in 2013 “Australia was one of just seven states to abstain” (Price, 2015, p. 14) from voting on the annual UNGA resolution that “stresses ‘that Israel, the occupying power should comply strictly with its obligations under international law’” (p. 13). Again, in 2014 Australia “chose to abstain from the vote” (Price, 2015, p. 14).

During 2008–2012, under Rudd and Gillard’s governments, Australia voted in favour of the UN resolution that considered Israeli settlements illegal. Under coalition governments led by the Liberal Party (2013–2016), Australia abstained from voting in the same resolution (Borys, 2014). Similarly, in 2014, Australia voted against a proposal in the UN Security Council, demanding that Israel end the occupation of Palestinian Territories within two years (Flitton, 2014a).
Recently, the position of the ALP towards recognising a Palestinian state has undergone a crucial development. During their recent state conferences, the ALP of New South Wales (NSW), Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) urged a future Labor government to recognise the State of Palestine. The Labor-led South Australian Legislative Assembly has also recently passed a motion urging the Australian government to recognise the State of Palestine (Michael & Edwards, 2017). The ALP’s recent position has been considered an indication of Labor’s continued adoption of a more pro-Palestinian position since 2012. This has been described as “trigger[ing] a flurry of lobbying, and an internal battle” (Murphy, 2017, para. 12).

It is predicted that the Australian position towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is likely to remain pro-Israel. Hynd (2013) argues that Australia’s abstention from the vote on Palestinian statehood at the UN is “an improvement on previous recent policy” (p. 946). Nevertheless, he predicts that regardless of the outcome of the 2013 federal elections, Australia’s policy would be strongly pro-Israel. On the contrary, Abadi (2001) argues that “changing political and economic constraints . . . forced [Australia] to readjust its policy towards Israel” (p. 563). Nevertheless, a change in Australia’s foreign policy towards the conflict is unlikely to occur in the short term.

The limited literature on Australia’s position towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shows that Australian foreign policy on this conflict tends to be pro-Israel, especially when the Liberal Party is in office or leads coalition governments. Liberals in Australia are more supportive of Israel than their Labor counterparts. Abadi (2001) concludes that Australian Liberal politicians are more “pro-Israel than their counterparts in the ALP” (p. 582). Nevertheless, he highlights that Australia has not adopted a policy that is against Israel’s interests and has always recognised Israel’s right to existence and security. This is despite Australia’s criticism of Israeli policies and practices and its assertion of the rights of Palestinians. Sheridan (2010) argues that Australia tends to be “an uncritical supporter for Israel”, and its foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict aligns with the policy of the US government (as cited in Han & Rane, 2011, p. 619).
The National Party of Australia (known as the Nationals and formerly as the Australian Country Party, and the National Country Party) supports the two-state solution (Borys, 2014). The Nationals, who are involved in the current Australian coalition government, “have been critical of incidents of rocket... attacks by Palestinians and require Palestine to officially recognise the Israel’s right to exist” (Kauter, as cited in Borys, 2014, p. 39). Furthermore, the Nationals “believed that Australia should have voted against” the Palestinian bid for UN observer status (Kauter, as cited in Borys, 2014, p. 39).

In contrast, the Australian Greens is likely to be more supportive of the Palestinian rights than their Liberal, ALP and National Party counterparts. Borys (2014) argues that the position of the Greens on Israeli settlements and East Jerusalem is aligned with the international community’s stance on these issues. In other words, the Greens oppose Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territories, requesting that Israeli settlement activities cease, and supporting a two-state solution (Borys, 2014). Moreover, the Greens party “appears more willing to make strong statements in response to events and escalations in the conflict” (Borys, 2014, p. 38). The different position of the Greens from the two major parties in Australia is due to the more flexibility of the Greens “to be able to appeal to diverse groups within Australia, without the risk of losing a large support base of voters (Borys, 2014, p. 38).

The difference between the Australian governments or parties’ positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be related to the language used by each government or party, and does not reflect their actual policy:

The difference between Governments in this policy area seems to be about the tone of the statements or the language used, rather than about overarching policy objectives. Certainly the various Australian Governments have spoken about the conflict differently and have been described as ‘pro-Israel’, ‘even-handed’ or ‘pro-Soviet’ for doing so. Australian governments have consistently stated their support for Israel to exist within secure and internationally recognised borders, and since the 1970s, have inched closer to explicitly advocating for the creation of a Palestinian state as part of a final peace settlement, culminating in the Howard Government’s statement to that effect. (Harris, 2012a, p. 44)
2.4.2 The position of Australian public

Although Australian governments tend to be pro-Israel, Australian public tends to support Palestinian self-determination over Israel’s self-defence and settlements. In other words, Australian public sympathises with the cause of Palestinian statehood (Han, 2011; Han & Rane, 2011; Hynd, 2013). A national online survey and in-depth interviews conducted by Han (2011) and Han and Rane (2011) indicate that while the Australian government’s foreign policy has a pro-Israel position, the Australian public tends to support Palestinian rights. In a similar manner, (Boyce, 2014) states that:

78% of Australians were opposed to Israel’s settlements policy, 80% wanted Canberra to argue for negotiations to be respectful of international law and human rights, and only 22% thought Jerusalem should be recognised as Israel’s capital. More recently at the time of the 2012 General Assembly vote on Palestinian non-member observer State status, 51% of Australians thought their country should vote “Yes” and only 15% “No”. (para. 5)

As a result of the inconsistency between government policy and public opinion in Australia, Hynd (2013) suggests that the Australian government should change its foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to conciliate domestic and international public opinion. This change could take place through greater lobbying from advocacy movements such as the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement (BDS) and “international pressure” (Hynd, 2013, p. 946).

The Australian government’s foreign policy, Australian public and Australian media have a marginal interest in the Israel-Palestine conflict (Burchill, 2006; Han & Rane, 2011). Han and Rane (2011) suggest that the lack of public concern regarding the conflict is “combined with limited media and public advocacy for policy change” (p. 629). Moreover, they propose that public opinion in Australia does not have a significant influence on Australia’s official policy on Israeli-Palestine issues. Moreover, Han (2011) suggests that the balance, shown in the Australian press towards both sides of the conflict, is inconsistent with what is indicated through the Australian policy. Thus, studies discussed so far indicate that Australian media do not have a crucial influence on Australia’s foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Despite the important relationship between the foreign policy of a country and both its public and media, related studies argue that Australian public and media do not significantly shape Australia’s foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The related literature shows no examples of studying media, except for Han (2011), who analysed *The Australian* and the *SMH* newspapers to examine the relationship between the Australian media and foreign policy. Han (2011) chose the two newspapers to make the sample representative of media coverage and ownership in Australia. Moreover, she preferred to analyse newspapers rather than other media like television to gain more in-depth information about events and issues.

Politics and international relations researchers examined Australian positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and relations with Israel and Palestinians during different periods. Burchill (2006) examined Australia’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after the September 11th, 2001 attacks in the US, during Howard’s Liberal government. Conversely, Han (2011) focused on the successive Labor governments’ policies on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the shift in Australia’s position on this conflict. They surveyed Australian public opinion to examine the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy making in Australia in relation to this conflict in 2010, when the ALP led the Australian government. Saul (2011) examined human rights in Australian foreign policy from 1945 to 2010 and explores Australia’s position on the violence between Israel and Palestine and related issues to human rights during both the Howard and Gillard eras. Consequently, there is now a need to investigate the current period, in which the coalition government, led by the Liberals, is in power in Australia. It is vital that Australia’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is investigated, particularly in light of changes in the Middle East, and Israel and Palestine.

**2.5 Summary**

This chapter has reviewed the literature on media and political contexts related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This literature review is divided into three sections: media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; influences of international news
agencies on global news coverage; and Australia’s position on the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The first section covered studies on media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This section included research on media bias in coverage of the conflict and media representations of actors of the conflict, and media portrayal of casualties. The logical conclusion of the literature review is that Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict require further investigation. Thus far, representations have been analysed according to limited and specific perspectives, mainly portrayals of ‘other’ and gender contexts. Previous studies have focused on Australian print media only. This review indicates that various methods, including quantitative and qualitative methods, were used to examine media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The most recent studies applied CDA and linguistic methods, mainly corpus analysis. While previous studies drew on various approaches, framing is the most significant approach used in these studies. Therefore, framing was used in this study to examine Australian print and online media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The second section covered previous studies on influences of international news agencies on global news coverage. The literature review in this section demonstrates the influence that international news agencies’ hegemony has on international news flow. However, while other factors, such as editorial policy and the political and economic contexts of media, can shape media coverage, international news agencies still play an agenda-setting role in international media coverage. Thus, this is considered in this study, especially when examining news sources that Australian media relied on to cover events related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The third section covered studies on Australia’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The literature shows that the Australian foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict tends to be pro-Israel. It also indicates that Australia is more pro-Israel when the Liberals are in power. In addition, previous studies revealed that government and public in Australia have different positions on the conflict.
The next chapter introduces the research questions, method and methodological procedures for data collection and analysis.
Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Design

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter reviewed the literature in terms of media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the effect of international news agencies on global news coverage, and Australia’s position on the conflict. The literature review also contributed to the establishment of the research questions of this thesis. This chapter provides a detailed overview of the methodology used in this thesis. I used two methods in this study: corpus-based analysis and CDA. Combining both methods helped identify and examine the language patterns and features used in the selected Australian media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This study drew on corpus-based analysis as a quantitative method, which helped expand the qualitative analysis, to examine representations of the conflict in Australian print and online media. Importantly, the use of corpus analysis in this thesis was preliminary. It was used only to obtain an overview about that data before conducting the CDA, which was the main method in this study. Thus, the findings of corpus analysis helped focus the qualitative analysis on a smaller sample of data, in which CDA was used to analyse Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. A CDA framework was used to answer the research questions that are related to: (i) voices used in media coverage of this war; (ii) representations of Israeli and Palestinian actors; (iii) inclusions and exclusion made; and similarities and differences of media coverage; and (iv) bias or balance of media coverage. As media use language to represent different events and issues, CDA assisted with the interpretation of media texts related to the conflict, revealing the contexts in which these texts were produced. Overall, combining these methods helped overcome the individual limitations of each approach.

The first section of this chapter defines corpus-based analysis and establishes the advantages, disadvantages and limitations of its use. The second section of this chapter focuses on CDA and the definitions and aims of discourse analysis (DA) and CDA. The next sub-sections discuss CDA, media and power as well as some approaches and
analytical frameworks of CDA used in previous studies. The third section explores the advantages of combining corpus analysis with CDA. It discusses the analytical frameworks used in previous studies that combine corpus analysis and CDA to examine media representations. The analytical framework used in this study to analyse Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is presented. It was adapted from analytical frameworks used by other researchers.

The main research question is also introduced, along with analysis procedures including data collection, an overview of the Australian media corpora, and functions of the online linguistic tool, Sketch Engine. After describing the Australian media corpora and presenting the stages of corpus-based analysis used in this study, the research questions and CDA procedures are outlined and explained. The chapter concludes with a summary, following an overview of data analysed using CDA in this thesis.

### 3.2 Corpus-Based Analysis

To understand corpus-based analysis, it is crucial to define *corpora*, which is the plural of corpus. Baker (2006) defines corpora as “representative samples of a particular type of naturally occurring language” (p. 1). Corpora can include either spoken or written discourse (Paltridge, 2006). This study conducted corpus-based analysis, which is a method of corpus linguistics. McEnery and Wilson’s original definition (as cited in Baker et al., 2013a) of corpus linguistics is the “study of language based on examples of ‘real life’ language use” (p. 25). Gabrielatos and Baker (2008) argue that corpus linguistics is more methodological than theoretical. Thus, Baker (2006) argues that corpus linguistics is different from “purely qualitative approaches” because it applies a stronger quantitative methodology (p. 1). It uses word frequencies of linguistic phenomena and “specific measures of statistical significance” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 30). Similarly, Fairclough (2015) takes the view that corpus linguistics has a stronger quantitative element as it aims to “obtain quantitative information about a corpus of language texts” by using specific measures such as keywords and collocations (p. 20).
Mautner (2009) and Almeida (2011) highlight that corpus linguistics is a methodology that uses computer software, mainly concordance programs, to analyse textual data. Conversely, Fairclough (2015) argues that corpus linguistics is not an analysis as such because it needs to be conducted alongside qualitative analysis; however, it is “a tool which can serve analysis” (p. 20) and is “potentially useful” (p. 20) for discourse studies. Due to the quantitative and statistical purposes of corpus linguistics and the application of it to various and large numbers of texts, most researchers believe corpus linguistics enhances a richer analysis of text as it expands on qualitative analysis. Consequently, a richer analysis results from identifying “patterns of meaning, use, or attitude” (Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008, p. 6), because the identification of “emerging patterns (e.g., keywords, collocations) lead to the examination of their (expanded) concordances, or, when needed, the examination of whole texts” (p. 6).

Many researchers argue that corpus analysis is a useful method for examining linguistic features and patterns of texts (Baker, 2006, 2012; Baker et al., 2013a; Baker, Gabrielatos, & McEnery, 2013b; Fairclough, 2015; Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008; Paltridge, 2006; Rababah, 2015). For example, corpus analysis assists to examine linguistic features and patterns of a text, such as collocations and concordances, and occurrences and reoccurrences of these linguistic features in general language use or a specific discourse. Corpus-based analysis, according to these researchers, offers the advantage of:

- reducing the potential of researcher bias by providing quantitative evidence or patterns
- enhancing the credibility of research findings due to the large data being studied, which provides a more representative sample
- providing statistics about certain features of discourse, and revealing types of language strategies and patterns that are most frequent or popular in discourses, facilitating greater understanding of particular phenomena
- increasing the opportunity to identify new patterns that can help justify further investigations
revealing either more or less frequent word choices, which indicates how language is employed within the text as well as identifying both the dominant and resistant discourses, and

- flexibility, either when building corpora or using them as a reference, or expanding on the findings derived from smaller-scale analysed texts.

Nevertheless, corpus-based analysis has some disadvantages and limitations. Regarding researcher bias, corpus-based analysis does not guarantee that bias will be avoided. According to Baker (2006), corpus researchers can be selective in their choice to highlight or downplay some aspects of their research findings or interpretations. The potential for researcher selectivity or bias may occur because of the large numbers of frequencies and results that researchers obtain from corpus-based analysis; the researcher chooses only some samples to expand the analysis.

Another limitation of corpus-based analysis also can emerge if the researcher needs to examine visual communication, investigate information about text producers, or do further text interpretations. As Baker (2006) argues, the online tools of corpus-based analysis, such as Wordsmith and Sketch Engine, are restricted to verbal texts or discourses, including written and transcribed spoken communication. Additionally, there is no “standardized way of encoding images in corpora” (p. 18). The limitations of corpus-based analysis continue when investigating the production and interpretation of texts. Corpus-based analysis techniques are less helpful when answering research questions relevant to the following approaches: (i) text authors, their positions and ideologies; (ii) an audience; and (iii) circumstances of production. This is because corpus-based analysis “contains decontextualized examples of language” (Baker, 2006, p. 18). Baldry (as cited in Baker, 2006) and Paltridge (2006) agree that corpus analysis can result in abstracting text from its context, since it does not consider the contextual aspects of texts, including the roles of text producers and readers. Consequently, the researcher needs to interpret frequencies resulting from corpus-based analysis, as well as interpreting the findings, which are open to argument or dispute. Moreover, corpus-based analysis usually neglects “the social, political, historical, and cultural context of the data” (Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008, p. 33). As a
consequence, the value of its findings is “limited” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 6). Thus, corpus analysis is not able to explain the reasons underlying phenomena and is not sufficient by itself to examine contexts. Therefore, this study used corpus-based analysis in combination with CDA.

In addition to its limitations, there are some difficulties encountered when using corpus-based analysis. These difficulties relate to sampling, time and the analysis itself. According to McCarthy and Carter (2001), sampling difficulties can arise when deciding which types of texts and discourses should be included in the sample, as well as determining the size of the corpus and the quantity of data to be collected and examined (as cited in Paltridge, 2006, p. 161). Second, corpus-based analysis can be time consuming, especially when researchers need to learn how to use online tools, such as Wordsmith and Sketch Engine, to build their own corpora or conduct statistical tests. This becomes more difficult when the research is conducted on many texts. I encountered a similar issue in this study, since it took many months to upload data into Sketch Engine, in addition to the time needed to learn how to use the software.

3.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

This section focuses on CDA as another method used in this study. It presents definitions and aims of DA and CDA, before discussing the relationship between discourse and power, and how CDA can be used to examine power relations in media discourse. In addition, it presents CDA approaches and analytical frameworks that lent crucial aspects to the development of the analytical framework used to examine Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, mainly the Israeli war on Gaza 2014.

3.3.1 Definitions and aims

Analyses of discourse have been developed since the 1970s from several disciplines within humanities and social sciences, including linguistics, literary studies, sociology, psychology and communication (Beaugrande, 2002; van Dijk, 1988). According to Paltridge (2006), discourse analysis (DA), is “a view of language at the level of text” (p. 1), and “an approach to the analysis of language that looks at patterns
of language across texts as well as the social and cultural contexts in which the texts occur” (p. 9). DA aims to explore language beyond “the word, clause, phrase and sentence” (Paltridge, 2006, p. 2), and is concerned with patterns of language to understand the relationship between language and the social and cultural contexts in which language is employed. DA also examines ways of using language and helps to investigate the influences of relationships on language use (Paltridge, 2006). In relation to media analysis, DA helps to investigate “which representations of the social world predominate . . . [and] analyses how meaning is made differently in different media texts, and therefore what different ways of seeing and thinking tend to be found there” (Matheson, 2005, p. 1).

Teo (2002) identifies a branch of DA referred to as critical linguistics, which explains discourse production processes. This branch of DA is CDA, which is “a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). However, scholars vary in their perceptions of whether CDA is an analysis, approach or method. Paltridge (2006) argues that there are “different views on what CDA actually is” (p. 179). For example, Fairclough (2010) views CDA as a DA that aims to investigate how relations of power and struggles of power shape discursive practices, events and texts, and aims to explore the relationships between discourse and society, and discourse, ideology and power. These interact in “wider social and cultural structures, relations and process” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 93). Fairclough’s concept appeared in his earlier works, when he defined CDA as an “analysis of the dialectical relationships between discourse (including language but also other forms of semiosis, e.g. body language or visual images) and other elements of social practices” (2003, p. 205). Nevertheless, he considers CDA an independent method, which can be used “in combination with theoretical and analytical resources in various areas of social science” (2003, p. 210).

On the contrary, J. Richardson (2007) argues that CDA is a theory, method and an approach to examine language use, and that it aims to “explore and expose the roles that discourse plays in reproducing (or resisting) social inequalities” (p. 6). However,
Wodak and Meyer (2009) oppose Richardson’s view and assert that CDA is not a theory, nor does it provide one. Their position is supported by van Dijk (2001), who agrees that CDA “does not have a unitary theoretical framework” (p. 353). Another view can be gleaned from Baker (2006), who suggests that CDA is “a form of critical social research that can be applied to a range of texts in order to address . . . questions” (p. 73). Baker’s view (2006) is similar to Locke’s (2004) perception of CDA as “a scholarly orientation” (p. 2) at both micro and macro levels. This study uses CDA as a method, but not a theory. Framing theory was used instead.

CDA helps with examining linguistic features in a particular discourse and aims to identify factors and contexts that shape this discourse. For instance, Woods and Kroger (as cited in J. Richardson, 2007) assert that the overall aim of CDA is to “link linguistic analysis to social analysis” (p. 21). In the same context, Fairclough (2015) argues that CDA involves “critique of discourse and explanation of how it figures within and contributes to the existing social reality . . . to change it . . . in particular aspects” (p. 6). Therefore, CDA extends beyond identifying features and types of discourse, to identify the factors and reasons involved in shaping discourse. It also explores the relationships between the use of language and the contexts in which language is used. Thus, when using CDA to analyse media discourse of a specific event, the aim of analysis is not only to reveal the linguistic patterns used by media to represent the event. It also helps identify political, economic and social reasons beyond media representations of the event, and factors resulting in this particular media discourse. Hence, CDA interprets, critiques and explains discourse because it reveals what discourse is. Moreover, it explains contradictions between reality and “what it is claimed and expected to be” (Fairclough, 2015, p. 8), and contradictions within and between discourses (Jäger & Maier, 2009).

Therefore, the use of CDA in this thesis was important to explain Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. CDA offered rich explanations beyond the linguistic patterns found by using corpus-based analysis and CDA tools. I also used CDA in this study because it deals mainly with language, the medium of communication in news media. Additionally, CDA is an appropriate method for
analysing media representations of events and issues, and analysing power in discourse. As shown in Section 3.3.2, CDA helps examine power in media discourse and contexts within which media portray events and issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is one of the aspects this study aimed to explore, given that CDA can help identify bias in media coverage.

3.3.2 Critical discourse analysis, power and media

To understand the relationships between CDA and power, it is crucial to first explain the relationship between power and media discourse.

3.3.2.1 Power and media discourse

Discourses represent the exercise of power in a society as they “institutionalize and regulate ways of talking, thinking and acting” (Jäger & Maier, 2009, p. 35). Fairclough (1995a, 2010) argues that there is a dual relationship of discourse and power, and discusses two aspects of this relationship. First, the concept of discourse implies a “reproduction and negotiation of power relations” within discursive practices (Fairclough, 2010, p. 129). Second, the dominance of a group over a society, or a particular part of a society, can shape “discursive practices and orders of discourse” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 130) in a way that may be “unbalanced” (p. 130). Media discourse demonstrates this well because power influences this discourse. This power can be the power of actors and voices within discourse, or the power of the media itself in shaping media discourse. Barkho and J. Richardson (2010) highlight that social values and institutional practices interact with each other to shape media discourse and representations.

Fairclough (2015) distinguishes between power in discourse and power behind discourse in his explanation of unequal confrontation, in which an individual or a group has control over the contribution of others:

Power in discourse includes the exercise of power in what [we] call ‘unequal encounters’ such as classroom discourse, where one participant (sometimes more) controls the contributions of others; power behind discourse includes the power to shape and constitute ‘orders of discourse’, or what discourses and genres are available for example to those engaging in work in
universities, or how has access to which. Both of these are matters of ‘power over’ . . . When people who are unequal in power are not co-present, the effects of power in discourse may be less obvious. (p. 27)

The power in media discourse, based on Fairclough’s notion, is related to who has access to media, whose voice is included, and which sources are used. Consequently, this power can be analysed. For instance, Felder (as cited in van Dijk, 1996, p. 93) emphasises that minority groups and organisations whose social and economic power are limited, lack “the usual forms of organised media access, such as press conferences, press releases and public relations departments”. Further, the power differences between elites and minorities in relation to media access “result in differential access to the structures of news reports” (van Dijk, 1996, p. 93). The power of particular groups, such as elites, and their ability to access media, results in the selection and prominence of particular media representations of events and issues.

Van Dijk (1996) suggests that measures of access to discourse are useful to assess the power of social groups and their members who have unequal access. For instance, to assess or indicate the power of actors or voices related to a specific event or issue, the patterns of access to the mass media (as suggested by van Dijk, 1996) can be analysed. These patterns include individuals or groups who have access to media and journalists; therefore, they can be interviewed, quoted and described in news reports. These varying levels of media access can cause inequality or bias. Hence, Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis examine the voices that Australian media used in their representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 to assess the media’s bias or balance.

Regarding inequality and bias in media discourse, Barkho and J. Richardson (2010) assert that news media are “rarely balanced” (p. 4). For instance, the media can be biased towards specific sides or parties of a conflict. These authors also suggest that media mostly favour the most powerful institutions, individuals and groups. Fairclough (2001) demonstrates that “the balance of sources and perspectives and ideology in the British media was overwhelmingly in favour of existing power-holders” (p. 43). In this regard, Fairclough (2001) argues that media play a mediated role between “power-holders and the mass of the population” (p. 43). Hence, to analyse power and inequality in media discourses, it is crucial to explore source and
forces “manipulating the discursive and visual representations of news as well as the verbal and social activity behind them” (J. Richardson & Barkho, 2009, p. 618). Similarly, J. Richardson and Barkho (2009) assert that to examine how power, hegemony and inequality interact within media discourse, it is necessary to investigate the sources that can affect news coverage and media representations. This thesis examined sources and voices in Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as main actors of this conflict.

3.3.2.2 Critical discourse analysis, power and media discourse

CDA provides one way to investigate the relationship between discourse and social power by describing and explaining “how power abuse is enacted, reproduced or legitimised by the text and talk of dominant groups or institutions” (van Dijk, 1996, p. 84). Further, CDA aims to study the reproduction of power and power domination of one group over others within forms of domination and social inequality (van Dijk, 2005, 2009; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). CDA analyses “the language use of those in power”, who are perceived as holding responsibility for “the existence of inequalities” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 9). As social action reflects power in specific fields, CDA investigates linguistic phenomena, actions and facts to identify the relationships between social power and language, and effects of power difference in social structures (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). In other words, language is “a medium of power that can be used to sediment inequalities of power and legitimate iniquitous social relations” (J. Richardson, 2007, p. 13).

In addition, CDA helps explore the socio-political conditions that shape discourse through revealing how power structures are constructed within discourses (Teo, 2002). CDA also assists in exploring “the effects of power and ideology in the production of meaning” (Locke, 2004, p. 32), and helps identify the power of media discourse, either the power in or behind the discourse. Consequently, this study used CDA to examine: (i) how the power of the main actors of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was reflected in Australian media representations; (ii) how their actions were legitimised or delegitimised; and (iii) whose voices were prominent.
3.3.3 Critical discourse analysis approaches and analytical frameworks

This section discusses analytical frameworks for using CDA to analyse media discourses, focusing mainly on the frameworks of Amer (2008, 2009), Fairclough (1995a, 1995b, 2001, 2010, 2015) and van Leeuwen (1996, 2008). There are three reasons for the emphasis on these frameworks. First, all frameworks were used specifically to analyse media. Second, they were used to examine aspects of media representations that are focus areas in this research (i.e., representations of the actors of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). Third, drawing on these frameworks helped adapt analysis steps to use CDA in analysing media representations in this thesis.

3.3.3.1 Fairclough’s framework

Fairclough’s approach to CDA is based on a three-dimensional conception of discourse. Fairclough (2010) explains that any discourse constitutes: (i) a language spoken or written text; (ii) discourse practice including text production and interpretation; and (iii) sociocultural practice in the immediate situation, wider institution or organisation, and societal levels.

Thus, Fairclough’s (2010) approach to CDA includes “linguistic description of the language text, interpretation of the relationship between the (productive and interpretative) discursive processes and the text, and explanation of the relationship between the discursive processes and the social processes” (p. 132). For Fairclough, text is shaped by “the nature of the discourse practice of text production” (p. 132). This discourse practice leaves “‘traces’ in surface features of the text” (p. 132); thus, it controls how these features of a text will be explained. This framework is concerned with connections between properties of texts and social processes and relations including ideologies and power relations (Fairclough, 1995a). This thesis drew on this framework to analyse Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014, starting from a textual or linguistic level of analysis (including an intertextual level) and finishing with contextual levels (see Section 3.5).

Other researchers emphasise the advantages of Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework because it “provides a more accessible method of doing CDA than
alternative theoretical approaches” (J. Richardson, 2007, p. 37). For example, Locke (2004) argues that an advantage of Fairclough’s framework is that “it highlights the society and discursively embedded nature of any text” (p. 42). Fairclough’s framework is useful as it “provides multiple points of analytic entry” (Janks, 2002, p. 27), and “permits differing foci for analysis” (Locke, 2004, p. 42).

Fairclough’s CDA framework has been used in media analysis and considers three stages of analysis: description of formal properties of the text; interpretation of the relationship between text and interaction; and explanation of the relationship between interaction and social context (Fairclough, 2001, 2015). Fairclough (1995b) used his CDA analytical framework to analyse a report (published in The Sun in 1985) about a government document on hard-drug abuse. He used the same framework in his 2001 research (Fairclough, 2001). His analysis included three stages. The first stage included analysing vocabulary, grammar and textual structure, while the second was concerned with discourse processes and their dependence on background assumptions. Finally, the third stage dealt with the relationship of discourses to processes of struggle and power relations. Within his analysis, Fairclough considered the situational context and discourse type in addition to intertextual context and related presuppositions.

As Fairclough (1992b) considers discourse representation “a form of intertextuality in which parts of specific other texts are incorporated into a text” (p. 273), the concept of intertextuality was highlighted within his discussion of the three-dimensional analytical framework. Intertextuality means that “for any particular text or type of text, there is a set of other texts and a set of voices which are potentially relevant, and potentially incorporated into the text” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 47). Therefore, Fairclough (2003) suggests that for intertextual analysis, it is useful to begin with “a significant initial question [that] is: which texts and voices are included, which are excluded, and what significant absences are there?” (p. 47). In his discussion of intertextuality, Fairclough highlights the term presuppositions. He defines presuppositions as “propositions which are taken by the producer of the text as already established or ‘given’” (Fairclough, 1992b, p. 283). In relation to presuppositions, Fairclough (1992b) refers to what is considered as internal intertextuality:
Within an intertextual account of presupposition, the case where the presupposed propositions do constitute something taken for granted by the text producer can be interpreted in terms of intertextual relations with previous texts of the text producer. A special case of this is where a proposition is asserted and established in one part of a text, and then presupposed in the rest of it. (p. 283)

Fairclough (2003) also referred to “the aspect of the ‘external’ relations of texts [for example] relations between one text and other texts which are ‘external’ to it, outside it, yet in some ways brought into it” (p. 39). In a related context, J. Richardson (2007) argues that revealing a detailed and complete meaning of a text can only be achieved when this text is “contextualised and ‘read’ in relation to other texts and other social practices” (p. 100). For example, J. Richardson (2007) refers to a headline, published in The Daily Telegraph on March 18th, 2005: “‘Palestinians and Israelis take new step on peace path’ . . . [where] the use of the modifiers ‘new’ suggests that steps have been taken on this ‘peace path’ before” (p. 100).

Drawing on Fairclough’s framework, the analysis in this study started with identifying linguistic patterns in the Australian media discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict using corpus-based analysis and CDA tools. Representations of the conflict’s actors and voices used in the media, and inclusions and exclusions made within these representations were analysed. Next, intertextuality in related texts was investigated partially through analysing presuppositions as a CDA category. Internal and external intertextualities were also considered.

3.3.3.2 Amer’s framework

Amer (2008) used this framework in his linguistic study to examine the NYT’s representation of Israeli and Palestinian political actors and their actions during the Second Palestinian Intifada. In his article, Amer (2009) examined the delegitimisation in US journalist and columnist Thomas Friedman’s discourse by analysing how the Intifada is represented in Friedman’s NYT columns. He conducted a CDA of a corpus of 20 columns written by Friedman, and published over a six-month period during 2000–2003. Amer’s research questions focus on the intertextual traces of other voices and discourses. Particular processes of exclusion and inclusion of particular themes
were examined. Overall, both studies draw on framing theory and a mixed analytical framework to examine media representation of a political event and conflict.

Drawing on Fairclough (1992) and van Dijk’s (1991, 2001) frameworks, Amer (2008) proposes a three-level analytical framework. His framework, which is shown below, included analysing discourse at textual, intertextual and contextual levels:

**At the textual level**

- What topics and propositional meanings are expressed in relation to political actors and violent actions?
- What implications are drawn upon in constructing Palestinian and Israeli actors and their actions?
- What transitivity and lexical choices are assigned to actors and their actions?
- What elements of the clause or the text are emphasized or backgrounded and de-emphasized?
- What metaphors are used in constructing actors and their actions?

**At the intertextual level**

- What voices and discourses do journalists draw upon in their texts and how are they used in constructing political actors and their actions?
- What presuppositions are drawn upon in the construction of Palestinian and Israeli actors and their actions?

**At the contextual level**

- What are the political, cultural and institutional contexts and conditions which relate to or influence the construction of the Intifada in the newspaper discourse? (Amer, 2008, p. 42)

Amer’s framework was useful for this study. I drew on the research questions Amer included in each stage of analysis. The questions helped formulate some of the questions that this thesis attempted to answer, particularly those related to using CDA to examine Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 (see Section 3.5.4).
3.3.3.3 van Leeuwen’s framework

This sub-section discusses some CDA categories presented by van Leeuwen in his approach to analyse representations of actors. These categories include suppression and backgrounding, personalisation and impersonalisation, and assimilation and individualisation. The next section presents the CDA approach and analytical framework that partially draws on these categories. Drawing on van Leeuwen’s approach helped address a research question of this thesis related to Australian media representations of Israeli and Palestinian actors and their actions.

In his CDA framework to analyse representations of social actors, van Leeuwen (2008) highlights the CDA category of exclusions as an aspect of representations. He states that representations “include or exclude social actors” (p. 28), and “some of the exclusions may be ‘innocent’” (p. 28). Van Leeuwen (1996, 2008) suggests that innocent exclusions can be related to media assumptions that readers already know about excluded information or that the information is irrelevant. Other exclusions can be strategic. In this regard, van Leeuwen (2008) asserts that events or issues related to immigrants are represented by “creating fear . . . [and] setting up immigrants as enemies” (p. 28). Some exclusions, as van Leeuwen (1996, 2008) emphasises, leave no traces in media representations (e.g., social actors and their activities). Thus, van Leeuwen (2008) argues that this kind of exclusion can help with a critical comparison of different representations of some social practices, not when analysing a single text, because there are “no traces behind” in these representations (p. 29). This thesis examined different samples of Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Israeli war on Gaza in particular, in order to compare these representations in terms of inclusions and exclusion made by the media.

Van Leeuwen (2008) defines full exclusions of social actors and their actions as radical exclusions because no traces of actors are left in the text. He also refers to these radical exclusions as suppression. In this regard, for van Leeuwen, suppression refers to the complete absence of references to the actors. He refers to less radical exclusion as backgrounding. According to van Leeuwen (2008), backgrounding means that “the excluded social actors may not be mentioned in relation to a given action, but they are
mentioned elsewhere in the text” (p. 29). Another CDA category that can be added to van Leeuwen’s categories above is *foregrounding*. Foregrounding an actor means placing it at the front for the reader or viewer. Further, foregrounding an actor is usually accompanied by activating this actor’s actions or roles. Suppression, backgrounding and foregrounding were among the CDA categories used to analyse Australian media representations of the actors of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The findings of CDA (see Chapters 5 and 6) show how Israeli and Palestinian actors were suppressed, backgrounded or foregrounded in relation to their actions.

In relation to representing actors’ actions and roles, van Leeuwen (2008) states:

> Representations can endow social actors with either active or passive roles. Activation occurs when social actors are represented as the active, dynamic forces in an activity, passivation when they are represented as “undergoing” the activity, or as being “at the receiving end of it”. (p. 33)

In addition to the discussion of suppression, backgrounding and foregrounding, another CDA category discussed by van Leeuwen (2008) is *assimilation* and *individualisation*. He argues that assimilation is realised by plurality. For example, if media represent Israeli and Palestinian actors as *Israelis* and *Palestinians*, this means that media have assimilated all Israeli and Palestinian actors. According to van Leeuwen (2008), assimilation can also be realised by a collective word or phrase, such as *community* and *nation*, or by the presence of definite or indefinite quantifiers. For example, if casualties are referred to as statistics or numbers (e.g., ‘100 were killed’), this means that they were assimilated. Van Leeuwen refers to the previous practice as *aggregation*. In contrast to assimilation, individualisation can be realised by singularity. For example, when media represent casualties during a war, giving details about names, ages and circumstances in which they were killed or injured, this means that these casualties have been individualised by media.

Another CDA category van Leeuwen (2008) discusses is personalisation and impersonalisation of social actors. *Personalisation* can be realised by personal or possessive pronouns, proper nouns, or nouns as well as adjectives, while *impersonalisation* can be realised by abstract nouns or concrete nouns (van Leeuwen,
The importance of impersonalisation comes from its potential effects on the identity and role of social actors. Van Leeuwen (2008) highlights that impersonalisation can background the identity and role of social actors, by “lend[ing] impersonal authority or forc[ing] to an action or quality of a social actor . . . [and] add[ing] positive or negative connotations to an action or utterance of a social actor” (p. 47). Chapters 5 and 6 include examples of how Israeli and Palestinian actors were personalised by Australian media through proper nouns such as Benjamin Netanyahu, Mahmoud Abbas and Khaled Meshal. Impersonalisation of both actors occurred through concrete nouns such as Israel and Palestinians.

The usefulness of the van Leeuwen’s CDA framework has also been emphasised by other scholars. Fairclough (2005) asserts that van Leeuwen’s framework “has been widely used within CDA, and . . . can provide precise descriptive accounts of selectivity (inclusion/exclusion, degrees of salience and backgrounding), relative concreteness and abstraction/generalization, as well as such options as generic and specific reference” (p. 63).

### 3.4 Combining Corpus Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis

This section discusses the advantages of combining corpus analysis and CDA according to various scholars and analytical frameworks used by other researchers to examine media representations. Drawing on these frameworks, the analytical framework used to analyse Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also presented.

#### 3.4.1 Advantages of combining corpus analysis and critical discourse analysis

Corpus analysis enhances CDA because it analyses linguistic patterns, such as keywords and collocations, as well as patterns of meaning, use or attitude. These enhancements help expand analysis and examine the whole text, and manage the number of selected texts to be analysed (Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008). Corpus linguistic quantitative approaches also enhance CDA by frequency lists and specific statistical measures that facilitate more thorough analysis (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). These
approaches also offer concordance lines for further qualitative interpretation of the occurrences of words and their collocations (Mautner, 2009). Since the findings of corpus-based analysis in this study showed that many linguistic patterns in the Australian media corpora were relevant to the Israeli war on Gaza 2014, the number of news articles could be reduced for analysis using CDA. The findings of keyword, frequency and collocation analysis conducted using online linguist tool Sketch Engine, also helped obtain an overview of Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its actors.

Corpus analysis helps to diminish researcher bias, and as argued by some researchers, this can enhance the credibility of further qualitative analysis (Baker et al., 2008; Mautner, 2009). It enables researchers to approach texts “free from any preconceived or existing notions regarding their linguistic or semantic/pragmatic content” (Baker et al., 2008, p. 277). However, Baker (2012) warns against exaggerating when it comes to the sufficiency of corpus methods to diminish researcher bias, as this bias cannot be completely avoided. Baker (2006) argues that even with quantitative patterns obtained from corpus analysis, there is still a possibility of researcher bias because interpreting these patterns is based on the researcher’s own position on the phenomenon under investigation. Using corpus-based analysis in this study helped diminish potential researcher bias because I was driven by data resulting from the Sketch Engine analyses, before CDA was conducted (see Section 3.5). Nevertheless, I agree with Baker’s perspective that researcher bias cannot be totally avoided.

This study found corpus analysis, as a quantitative method, useful to analyse discourse or media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and obtain an overview of these representations. However, corpus-based analysis, by itself, is not a sufficient method and its findings cannot be generalised without a more thorough analysis, which was CDA in this case. Lindlof (as cited in J. Richardson, 2007) asserts that “quantitative methods have been insufficient” to interpret the meaning of texts and to identify the contexts in which written or spoken texts occur (p. 15). The quantitative content analysis of newspapers was cited by J. Richardson (2007) as an example of the limitations of quantitative methods in media analysis. J. Richardson (2007)
emphasises that the latter method only studies the content of newspaper texts, but “not any social or contextual factors outside of, or subsequent to, the text itself” (p. 17). Nevertheless, Partington (2015) argues that statistical analyses “are still representations . . . [and] the greater number of reliable abstractions we have at our disposal to know and express them, the better” (p. 223).

3.4.2 Analytical frameworks for combining corpus analysis and critical discourse analysis

This section discusses the different analytical frameworks used by other researchers to conduct corpus analysis and CDA. This thesis drew on these frameworks to present an analytical framework to analyse Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some analytical frameworks comprising a combination of corpus analysis and CDA were presented in studies that focus on the use of language in historical, social, political and media contexts. This section discusses analytical frameworks used to examine media representations, including representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (e.g., Almeida, 2011; Baker, 2012; Baker et al., 2013a, 2013b; Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008; Kandil, 2009). These frameworks were useful in this research to develop an analytical framework that included corpus-based analysis and CDA to examine the Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Through combining CDA and corpus linguistics, Baker et al. (2013a) examined representations of Islam in the British press. Baker and his colleagues adopted the same analytical framework of corpus-assisted CDA, used previously in Baker et al. (2008). The stages of this framework combine corpus analysis and CDA throughout examining a phenomenon (such as media representations of a specific topic) and comprise:

- conducting a context-based analysis of the topic or phenomenon by identifying discourses through wider reading and reference to other CDA studies
- establishing research questions and corpus building procedures
- conducting corpus analysis on frequencies, keywords and concordances in the corpora by developing the procedures and/or relying on the existing literature
• conducting a qualitative analysis or CDA of a smaller sample of data, such as particular texts or samples of concordances
• formulating new hypotheses or research questions to identify further discourses based on the findings resulted from conducting both analyses in the previous stages
• conducting an intertextual analysis or interdiscursivity, and
• formulating new hypotheses and as a result conducting a further corpus analysis to identify additional discourses (Baker et al., 2008).

The framework used by Baker et al. (2008) and Baker et al. (2013a) is useful for analysing media representations. However, it is not practical to conduct the analysis shown in the stages above in studies conducted by individual researchers who are restricted by time and budget. Therefore, I did not use this analytical framework in its entirety in this study; rather, I implemented only some analysis stages suggested in the studies above.

A second approach was used by Gabrielatos and Baker (2008) to examine the discursive construction of refugees and asylum seekers in British print media, and involved two main stages. The first stage involved conducting corpus-based analysis to investigate linguistic patterns and trends in the texts, while the second stage involved applying a CDA on a small sample of texts in the corpus. The analysis included labelling social actors, forms of argumentation and strategies of shared findings. The corpus of the UK press constituted 140 million words from 175,139 articles published in a range of 19 newspapers, including six daily tabloids (The Sun, Daily Star, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Daily Mail, People) and daily broadsheets (such as The Guardian and The Telegraph), Sunday editions and other regional newspapers. By using Wordsmith software to conduct corpus-based analysis, Gabrielatos and Baker’s approach involved the following stages:

• deriving keywords through a frequency-based comparison of tabloid and broadsheet texts, focusing on words that directly reference refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants and migrants
• examining words and keywords qualitatively via detailed line-by-line concordance analyses, to identify semantic or discourse prosodies
• investigating collocations of these words and conducting further concordance analyses, and
• investigating frequencies of various terms to explore changing discourses.


• focusing on the word Muslim and its plural form, which were clearly frequent in the corpus as both an adjectival modifier of nouns and as a noun itself
• focusing on the most typical contexts in which Muslim occurred as a pre-modifying adjective
• expanding the analysis to examine common patterns in this context including words relating to extreme belief, such as extremist(s), fundamentalist(s) and militant(s)
• using Sketch Engine’s Word Sketch function to identify salient adjectives and verb collocations of the extreme belief words, when they occur as nouns
• examining the extreme beliefs words’ dispersion across the corpus, and
• conducting further analyses of collocates and frequency lists.

A combination of corpus analysis and CDA was also used by Kandil (2009) to examine media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He combined methods of CDA and corpus linguistics to investigate the representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in US, Arab and British media, represented by CNN, Al-Jazeera
Arabic and BBC respectively. In his linguistic study, Kandil (2009) used corpus analysis techniques such as “frequency lists, keyword lists, collocation lists, collocation grids, and concordancers” (p. 19). By using Wordsmith, Kandil’s analytical framework included:

- obtaining a list of words that are essential in examining the corpora
- analysing of keyword lists and their comparison to obtain a preliminary overview of relevant topics to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that selected news outlets highlighted or lessened
- investigating the key topics that appeared in the keyword analysis through using data from frequency lists, collocation lists, collocation networks and concordances of the term terrorism to identify the patterns of use of this term in each corpus, and
- exploring other key issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by examining the keywords occupation and settlements, and analysing concordance lines of the word settlement to identify the ways in which these themes are represented in each corpus.

Similarly, Almeida (2011) combined CDA and corpus linguistics to examine the representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in US media. Almeida’s approach to using corpus linguistics relied on using the ATLAS.ti program. News stories related to the conflict were coded according to the categories of words and phrases being analysed. Next, the occurrence of individual terms from each category was counted. Almeida (2011) drew on the resulting statistics to identify characteristics of US media discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to explain the variety and frequency of discourse structures.

Drawing on the analytical frameworks above, I developed an analytical framework to use in the examination of Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
3.4.3 The analytical framework for analysing Australian media corpora

This study drew on the analytical frameworks used by Baker et al. (2013a), Baker (2012) and Kandil (2009) to examine Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Relying on some of the analytical stages conducted in the previous studies, a modified analytical framework was developed, and involved:

- building Australian media corpora by uploading data to Sketch Engine
- obtaining word lists using the Word List function in each corpus in Sketch Engine
- determining keywords that would be examined
- examining frequencies of these keywords and their forms in each corpus
- comparing frequencies of keywords and some other relevant words in each corpus
- conducting word sketch analyses of the main and most frequent words (as nouns) in each corpus to identify adjectival and noun modifiers
- grouping similar types of words resulting from conducting the previous step to determine the kinds of themes and topics of each corpus, and to help identify frames in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was portrayed
- conducting concordance analyses of some word sketches of keywords in each corpus
- examining collocations of keywords and high- and low-frequency words in each corpus to identify the most dominant linguistic patterns in the corpora
- examining concordances of the more and less frequent words and collocations to reveal the contexts in which they were used in each corpus, and
- conducting CDA on a smaller sample of data from the corpora.

3.5 Data Collection and Analysis Procedures

This section presents the analysis procedures followed to collect data and analyse Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It begins with an overview of the Australian media corpora and describes the procedures for data
collection and building the corpora on Sketch Engine. Additionally, it outlines the stages of corpus-based and CDA that comprise the analysis for this study.

3.5.1 Building Australian media corpora

The Australian media corpora comprised 691,634 words, spread over 1,201 news articles about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict published between January 2014 and June 2015. The corpora were compiled from four Australian tabloid and broadsheet newspapers: The Australian, Herald Sun, The Age and SMH, and three Australian news websites: ABC, news.com.au and Crikey.

Table 3.1 General statistics of the corpora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media outlet</th>
<th>Number of news articles</th>
<th>Number of words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Australian</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>242,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herald Sun</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>31,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>news.com.au</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>104,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Age</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>86,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>79,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>118,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crikey</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>1,201</strong></td>
<td><strong>691,634</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Australian mainstream print media was chosen because print media usually has greater in-depth coverage than audio and visual media. In addition, as McKnight (2012) shows, newspapers play a significant role in setting the political agenda “because they have the biggest newsrooms and every day they originate far more stories than any other news medium” (p. 8). When choosing the sample of Australian print media, the priority was a representative sample of national and high-circulation Australian newspapers. Moreover, variations in ownership, tabloid and broadsheet format, influence and the interest in international news coverage of each newspaper were considered. Hence, four newspapers were selected: The Australian, the Herald Sun, The Age and the SMH. The variety of Australian newspapers in this study enabled
the researcher to analyse representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a representative sample of Australian media.

*The Australian* is one of the two national newspapers in Australia, while the *Herald Sun* has a “mass circulation” (McKnight, 2012, p. 13). Whereas both newspapers are owned by News Corp, *The Age* and the *SMH* are owned by Fairfax. Both organisations are “representative of two key news media organisations in Australia” (Han, 2011, p. 78). Thus, *The Australian* and the *SMH* represent the two major news proprietors in the Australian media sector (Han, 2011).

Alternatively, the internet is a main source of information for most people in this era, and a medium that numerous researchers investigate for its role in covering wars and conflicts (Fahmy & Al Emad, 2011). Further, between 2014 and 2015, 86% of people were internet users in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Thus, the sample also included three online news websites: the ABC news website, www.abc.net.au, which is the online platform of the main publicly owned broadcaster; the largest independent news website, Crikey, www.crikey.com.au, which has a remit to cover international news, and www.news.com.au, which is owned by News Corp.

These websites were selected based on four factors: (i) reputation and readership in Australia; (ii) availability of news articles archives; (iii) availability of international news coverage, especially Israeli and Palestinian affairs; and (iv) representation of media ownership and independence. Other Australian news websites were not included in the analysis since they focus on national events and issues rather than international affairs.

Data were retrieved from Factiva database using keywords: *Israel, Israeli, Palestinian, Gaza, West Bank* and *Jerusalem*. All related news articles published in the selected media outlets were then uploaded to Sketch Engine. The data were installed in Sketch Engine in separate corpora, as shown in Table 3.1, which includes numbers of news articles as well as the numbers of words contained in each corpus.
3.5.2 Conducting corpus-based analysis

Using online tools of corpus-based analysis (such as Sketch Engine) provides researchers with frequency counts, which can be useful when comparing frequencies in a text within one corpus or different corpora. This helps identify “whether a word occurs more or less often than expected” (Baker, 2006, p. 68). Frequencies are also helpful to determine which words and phrases are not frequent in a text or a corpus.

Keyword analysis is a useful feature of Sketch Engine. This type of analysis is “the statistically significantly higher frequency of particular words or clusters in the corpus under analysis in comparison with another corpus, either a general reference corpus, or a comparable specialized corpus” (Fairclough, 2015, p. 20). Thus, it was useful to apply keyword analysis to examine corpora of selected Australian media to identify the more frequently used words in each corpus. Initially, keyword analysis was used in this study to obtain a list of words, before examining concordances to identify contextual use of these words. These word lists were relied upon to determine which keywords in corpora would be used to conduct collocation and concordance analyses. According to word lists obtained through Sketch Engine, the most frequent and relevant words to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Australian media corpora were *Israel, Israeli, Palestinian, Hamas* and *Gaza*.

In addition to word lists, another function of Sketch Engine is to provide frequencies of words. Frequencies can provide the researcher with “a sociological profile of a given word or phrase” (Baker, 2006, p. 68), which enhances the understanding of how this word or phrase is used in particular contexts. However, the function of frequencies is limited because they “may not show evidence of . . . making a specific lexical choice over others”, which could be significant when identifying dominant discourses (Baker, 2006, p. 47). Therefore, it is not effective to examine frequencies only, because contexts of particular words or phrases still need to be investigated. Hence, expanding keyword analysis to lower frequency words was necessary to avoid ignoring other language choices of Australian media in their coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This expansion was considered when conducting collocation analysis in the next stages of corpus analysis in this study.
The analysis began by examining frequencies of some keywords and their forms in each corpus. The focus was on frequencies of words such as Israel, Israeli, Palestine, Palestinian, Gaza and Hamas (see 0). The analysis then expanded to compare frequencies of some words in each corpus, such as Israel, occupied and occupation, Hamas, terrorist and terrorism. To obtain an initial idea about the overall picture of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in each corpus, word sketch analyses were also conducted on each corpus. Word sketches are “collocates of a word within particular grammatical structures [that] are thus grouped together” (Baker et al., 2013a, p. 37). Given the topic of this research, the focus was on how the main words and keywords that are frequent and relevant to the conflict were characterised in the corpora. Thus, word sketches of the following words were generated using this function of Sketch Engine: Israeli, Palestinian and Hamas. Word sketches of the previous words (as nouns) in the Australian media corpora were examined (see Appendix G). This allowed the researcher to identify the frames in which Israelis and Palestinians were represented in the selected media. It is noteworthy that the word sketch function of Sketch Engine did not work with the words Israel, Palestine and Gaza due to the insufficient data in the corpora as shown by the software.

Sketch Engine also effectively identifies collocations and “specifies the grammatical relationship between them . . . [as it] takes into account the positions of the collocates in relation to each other, and the grammatical tags of each” (Baker et al., 2013a, p. 37). A collocate is a word that occurs frequently with another word within a predetermined span, usually five words on either side of the word under investigation; it helps understand meaning and association between words (Baker, 2006; Baker et al., 2013a; Fairclough, 2015). When conducting a collocation analysis, researchers must decide on a span; span means “a range either side of a word within which we consider candidate collocates” (Baker et al., 2013a, p. 35). This study followed the span in the default setting of online tool Wordsmith. This span was also applied by Baker et al. (2013a), that is, five words either side of the search word when they used Sketch Engine for corpus analysis. Baker and his colleagues (2013a) argue that longer spans “can throw up unrelated cases”, while “shorter spans result in fewer collocates” (p. 35).
These collocations are useful for CDA because they “can help to reveal ideological uses of language” (Baker et al., 2013a, p. 36). Therefore, they provide information on the most frequent or salient ideas associated with a word and they are “statistically determined” (Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008, p. 11). According to Baker (2006, p. 114), collocation analysis provides the researcher with the most dominant lexical patterns about a subject. It also helps save the researcher’s time and provides the analysis with a clear focus by identifying the most significant relationships between words in a corpus. In this study, high and low frequent collocations of frequent words in corpora were examined. The high-frequency words include *Israel, Israeli, Palestinian, Hamas* and *Gaza*.

In addition to the functions above, the main function of online linguistic tools is examining concordances. Gabrielatos and Baker (2008) define a concordance as “a list of a given word or word cluster with its co-text on either side” (p. 15). Baker (2006) also considers a concordance as “a list of all of the occurrences of a particular search term in a corpus, presented within the context that they occur in; usually a few words to the left and right of the search term” (p. 71). A concordance represents the “association between two words, occurring repetitively in naturally occurring language (Baker, 2006, p. 13). Concordance analysis is used for identifying “patterns of language use, based on repetition” to examine texts or discourses (Baker, 2006, p. 77). This can provide evidence for determining which discourses are dominant. Concordance analysis helps researchers “regulate the amount of co-text provided from a few words on either side of the node to the whole text . . . then, can be used in ways akin to ‘quantitative’ analysis” (Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008, p. 15). Thus, concordance analysis is one of the most effective techniques within corpus-based analysis. This research used concordance analyses drawing on the results of frequency, word sketches and collocation analyses, to identify the contexts in which these words were used in each corpus of Australian media corpora. Appendix I shows an example of concordances generated by Sketch Engine for the analysis in this study.
It is noteworthy that data analysis procedures were developed according to the words generated or resulted from conducting the analyses above. Table 3.2 summarises the steps of analysis, drawing on the analytical framework used in this study.

Table 3.2 Stages of analysing Australian media corpora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis/function</th>
<th>Words generated/examined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Word lists</td>
<td>Israel, Israeli, Palestinian, Gaza, Hamas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency analysis</td>
<td>Israel, Israeli, Israelis, Palestine, Palestinian, Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word Sketch</td>
<td>Israeli, Palestinian, Hamas (as nouns), grouping word sketches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of each keyword in to categories included: war/conflict/crime,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>political leaning, nationality, race, religion and location,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>characteristics, collective, type of people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concordance analysis</td>
<td>Concordances of word sketches of the words Israeli: innocent,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>left-leaning, right-wing, lobbyist, many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concordances of word sketches of the word Palestinian:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>innocent, moderate, angry, brave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concordances of word sketches of Hamas: bloodthirsty, evil, Islamist and radicalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collocation analysis</td>
<td>Collocation of Israel, Palestinian, Gaza, Hamas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concordance analysis</td>
<td>Concordances when settlement, right, rocket, Jewish, occupation, Apartheid and Australia were collocations of Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concordance analysis</td>
<td>Concordances when Abbas, land, Jerusalem and refugee were</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>collocations of Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concordance analysis</td>
<td>Concordances when terrorist was a collocation of Hamas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5.3 Overview of critical discourse analysis data

Relying on existing texts, collected for creating the Australian media corpora, a smaller sample of news articles were selected to conduct CDA. Wodak and Meyer (2009) argue that “there is no CDA way of gathering data” and most CDA approaches do not “explicitly recommend sampling procedures” (p. 27). This research’s dataset included news articles related to the Israeli war on Gaza 2014, published in the selected Australian media from June 14th to August 31st, 2014. All news articles, relating to the following prominent and most significant events and themes, were analysed:
• incidents of kidnapping and killing three Israeli teenagers and a Palestinian teenager in Hebron and Jerusalem
• ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique
• targeting of Palestinian civilians by Israel, including the shelling of four children on a Gaza beach, shelling nine children in a playground, and the Shujaiya and Khuza’a massacres
• Israeli shelling of UN schools in Gaza, and
• Hamas rockets and tunnels, and related events, such as Israeli soldiers and civilian casualties, and claims of Israeli soldiers’ capture.

Not all news articles related to ceasefire talks between Israelis and Palestinians were analysed. Those news articles were only analysed when they were linked to ceasefire violations by one or both sides. Thus, 293 news articles, from both print and online media, were analysed. Of these articles, 146 were published in the newspapers, while 147 were published online. Table 3.3 shows that 40.4% of news articles analysed from print media were news reports, but 63.9% from online media were news reports.

Table 3.3 Types of news articles in Australian print media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>The Australian Herald Sun</th>
<th>The Age</th>
<th>SMH</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News story</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News report</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News feature</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op-Ed</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the contrary, news features constituted only 6.9% and 1.4% of news articles published in Australian print and online media respectively. Opinion pieces (editorials, columns and op-eds) were less common than news pieces (news stories, news reports and news features) as indicated in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.
To minimise the number of articles for analysis using CDA, I excluded readers’ letters in newspapers. Letters were analysed in the corpus analysis. However, they were excluded when CDA was conducted since they do not reflect the direct position of newspapers towards the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. Further, this minimised the amount of data to be analysed using CDA. Photographs were also excluded from analysis. Sontag argues that photographs cannot provide an interpretation or understanding on their own, since “we need captions and written analysis to supplement the discrete and punctual image” (as cited in Butler, 2009, p. 66). Moreover, a photograph is “selective” (Sontag, as cited in Butler, 2009, p. 66) as it gives only a partial aspect of reality and lacks “narrative coherence” (Sontag, as cited in Butler, 2009, p. 67). Although Sontag admits that photographs generally “relay affect” (as cited in Butler, 2009, p. 68), in addition to portraying or representing events or issues, she argues that “in times of war, this transitive affectivity of the photograph may overwhelm and numb its viewers” (p. 68). In addition, not all photographs related to the topic of this thesis could be published in media. This is because of the sensitivity of photographs that depict deaths, as well as media policy, which prohibits the publication of graphic images. In other words, as most of the photographs related to the Israeli war on Gaza portrayed death or injury, only some of these were published, especially in Western media. Thus, photographs published in Australian media represented only a small part of the realities of war. Furthermore, data from newspapers were collected from the Factiva database, in which photographs are not included. Therefore, the analysis focused exclusively on texts.

Table 3.4 Types of news articles in Australian online media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>ABC</th>
<th>news.com.au</th>
<th>Crikey</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News story</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News report</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News feature</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5.4 Critical discourse analysis approach

This research did not follow a particular approach or analytical framework; instead, it combined approaches from authors or scholars discussed in Section 3.4.2. Researchers, in their use of CDA, can use aspects of different analytical frameworks. When conducting DA or CDA, it is possible “to combine elements from different discourse analytical perspectives and, if appropriate, non-discourse analytical perspectives” (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 4).

Wodak and Meyer (2009) argue that “there is no consistent CDA methodology” (p. 31). However, they highlight that “some features are common to most CDA approaches” (p. 31), including inclusions and exclusions, voices, actors and lexical choices.

The main research questions related to CDA in this study were:

1. How did the Australian media represent the Israeli war on Gaza 2014?
2. What frames did the Australian media use in their representations of events that were related to the war?

To answer both main research questions, the study aimed to answer the sub-questions in relation to the Israeli war on Gaza 2014:

- What voices did the Australian media rely on within their coverage of this war?
- How were the main Israeli and Palestinian actors and their actions portrayed in Australian media coverage? And what lexical choices were assigned to them and their actions?
- How were Israeli and Palestinian actions legitimised or delegitimised in Australian media coverage?
- What inclusions and exclusions were made by Australian media within their coverage?
- What presuppositions were made in Australian media coverage?
• How did Australian media vary in their representations of the war? And to what extent did Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza reflect a bias or balance?

Drawing on the analytical frameworks presented in the previous section, and to answer the questions above, an analytical framework to conduct CDA was developed. This framework drew on framing theory and considered the linguistic, intertextual and contextual levels when analysing the texts. Thus, it constituted a combination of the following categories:

• sources of news article
• voices and direct and indirect quotes
• actors: characteristics, actions and roles (suppression, backgrounding and foregrounding, activation and passivation, individualisation and assimilation, personalisation and impersonalisation)
• frames
• inclusions and exclusions, and
• presuppositions.

Figure 3.1 shows the various stages of the analysis in this study, addressing the main research question and including stages of both corpus-based analysis and CDA.
How did the Australian media represent the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

Sample of Australian print and online media

Australian media coverage of the conflict 2014 - 2015

Framing

Building Australian media corpora on Sketch Engine

Conducting corpus-based analysis

Conducting CDA on a smaller sample of data (Gaza War 2014)

Sources

Voices

Actors

Inclusions & Exclusions

Frames

Presuppositions

Contexts of Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Figure 3.1 Data analysis procedures
The analysis using CDA started with identifying the linguistic features in Australian media discourses on the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. These features were identified from analysing lexical choices made in Australian media portrayals of events, themes and actors. Common features between this CDA framework and framing as a theoretical framework are those related to frames, voices, and inclusions and exclusions. Next, the analysis moved to the intertextual level of the texts, in which presuppositions were made by journalists and writers. Analysing the texts within this level was important to study texts in relation to other texts. Thus, it was possible to compare different representations in the same or different media. As argued by Wodak and Weiss (2005), “individual texts always relate to past or even present texts” (p. 127). The same notion is emphasised by J. Richardson (2007), who states that “texts cannot be viewed or studied in isolation since texts are not produced or consumed in isolation” (p. 36). Intertextual analysis “crucially mediates the connection between language and social context and facilitates more satisfactory bridging the gap between texts and contexts” (Fairclough, 1992a, p. 195). Therefore, after analysing presuppositions in Australian media discourse on the Israeli war on Gaza 2014, the findings of the linguistic and intertextual stages were linked to a larger media and political context. This final stage (see Chapter Seven) included a contextual analysis of CDA findings, considering the findings of corpus-based analysis. It aimed to provide comprehensive explanations of Australian media representations.

3.5.5 Frame analysis

In this study, I used an inductive approach to identify frames that the Australian media employed in their coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. I used the approach that Touri & Koteyko (2015) refers to as “commonly used approach”. In this approach, I started with the most theoretically defined frame categories that include: conflict, human interest, responsibility, victim and consequences frames. These basic frame categories assisted with identifying more specific frames such as alleged numbers of Palestinian casualties and urging Israel to stop its military operation in Gaza.

As discussed in the thesis introduction, framing mechanisms include language used in media coverage. Van Gorp (2007) cite Gamson and Lasch (1983) and Pan and Kosicki
(1993) who discuss that frame “manifest itself in media content through various framing devices, such as word choice, metaphors, exemplars, descriptions, arguments, and visual images” (p. 64). The main frames in this study were identified as follows:

- **Conflict frame:** was identified when there was an emphasis on the conflict, for example between Israel and Palestinians, Israel and Hamas, and within the Israeli government, and also when the conflicting nature in the coverage of related events or issues was emphasised. The conflict frame was also identified through the reproach between the two sides of the conflict.

- **Human interest frame:** was identified where there is description in media reporting that personalise, dramatise and emotionalise the news. For example, this frame emerged when there was an emphasis on the personal and emotional side of related events and issues, and a narrative or description that focuses on people who are or will be affected by the conflict.

- **Responsibility frame:** was identified when the frame presented events or issues in a way attributes responsibility for causing or solving problem to a particular individual, institution or government, such as Israel, Hamas, Abbas, US and international community.

- **Victim frame:** was identified when the reporting described casualties as victims. Words such as victim or innocent were indicators of this frame.

- **Consequences frame:** was identified when media reported events or issues in terms of consequences on people or institutions such as Palestinian civilians, Israel and Hamas.

Keywords were also used to indicate the presence of the frames above. Table 3.5 shows examples of keywords that indicated the presence of each frame found to be used by the Australian media in their coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Examples of keyword indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>conflict, war, vows, threaten, reject, violation, violence, claim, attack, assault, confessions, clashes, escalate, bombing, hostilities, bombardment, strike, onslaught, aggression, fighters, fighting, enemy, aggressive, shot, hits, launches, bombards, fire, intensify, troops, shells, rocket, missile, retaliations, offensive, revenge, reprisals, disagreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human interest</td>
<td>deadly, killed, die, genocide, murder, suffering, bloody, blood, casualties, civilians, traumatised, shocked, child, injuries, displaced, homeless, desperate, terrified, scared, horror, sobbing, tears, humanitarian, loss, shelter, fleeing, morgue, terror, grieving, rubble, escape, cold-blooded, massacre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>blame, responsible for, accused, responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>victim, innocent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>contrast, in contrast, by contrast, while, in turn, different, despite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justifying Israeli operation</td>
<td>Israel’s right to exist, Israel’s right of defence, defend itself, Israel cannot be blamed, no country could tolerate that, justified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condemnation</td>
<td>criticised, condemned, condemnation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alleged numbers of casualties</td>
<td>Claim, disguised, question, illusion, disproportionate, false premise, big lie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Consequence, cost, losses, have brought, has left, outcome, caused by, affected by, have paid, expectation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawful frame</td>
<td>Humanitarian Law, International Law, laws of war, violation, illegal, prohibited, war crimes, criminal, International Criminal Court in The Hague (ICC), treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urging Israel to stop its operation in Gaza</td>
<td>Urging, called on, called for, broker an end, must take all necessary steps, must do more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning</td>
<td>Warned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.6 Summary

This chapter explained the research methodology of this thesis. It presented and justified the rationale behind data collection procedures and analysis. The chapter began with a discussion of corpus-based analysis: its definition, advantages, disadvantages and limitations. Next, it discussed CDA in terms of its definitions and aims, and relationship with power and media discourse. Further, several CDA approaches and analytical frameworks drawn on in this study were reviewed.

The chapter also presented the advantages of combining corpus-based analysis and CDA, discussed the analytical frameworks used by different scholars to conduct corpus analysis, and presented the analytical framework of corpus-based analysis and CDA used in this study (drawn from previous frameworks).

In the data collection and analysis procedures section, the creation of Australian media corpora was described. The section discussed online linguistic tool Sketch Engine, which was used to conduct corpus-based analysis, including the tool’s functions (e.g., word lists, word sketches, collocations and concordances). The section concluded with an overview of the data analysed using CDA to examine Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014.

Chapter 4 reports on the findings of analysing Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Data were gathered from corpus-based analysis on the Australian media corpora. This chapter presents an overview of these representations and leads to thorough explanations in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4: Representations of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in Australian Media Corpora

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the findings of the corpus-based analysis conducted on the Australian media corpora created by Sketch Engine. The corpora constituted 691,634 words, spread over 1,201 news articles about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict published between January 2014 and June 2015. The corpora were compiled from four Australian newspapers: The Australian, Herald Sun, The Age and SMH, and three Australian news websites: www.abc.net.au, www.news.com.au and www.crikey.com.au. The corpus analysis findings provide an overview of how the Australian media portrayed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Israeli and Palestinian actors. From analysing these corpora, representations of the conflict were relevant to the coverage of events rather than in-depth discussions of topics covered in the corpora. Moreover, less prominent negative representations of Israel emerged in the Australian media corpora compared with representations of Palestinians, including Hamas. The findings of corpus-based analysis indicate that the most prominent linguistic patterns in the Australian media corpora were related to the Israeli war on Gaza 2014.

The analysis started with obtaining word lists from each corpus to identify keywords, which then formed the focus of the Australian media corpora. As the main research question is ‘How did the Australian media represent the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?’, the initial focus was on how Israel and Palestinians were represented or characterised in the Australian media corpora. Next, an analysis was conducted on word sketches of small numbers of words that were both frequent and highly relevant to the conflict. These words are Israeli, Palestinian and Hamas. Word sketches of each keyword were grouped into categories. Categorising adjectival and noun modifiers of keywords was helpful to identify topics and frames related to representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Australian media corpora. In addition, the analysis was expanded to include frequency, collocation and concordance analyses of the keywords.
Israel, Israeli, Palestinian, Gaza and Hamas). The analysis was also expanded to high and low frequent words and collocations of these keywords in the Australian media corpora.

4.2 Word Lists from Australian Media Corpora

To gain a general overview of the Australian media corpora, I used the Word List function in Sketch Engine to obtain lists of the most frequent words in each corpus. This Word List function helped identify keywords (including verbs, nouns and adjectives) in each corpus. The 20 most significant frequent words in Australian media corpora are shown in Table 4.1. The most relevant and frequent words in the Australian media corpora are Israel, Israeli, Palestinian, Palestinians, Gaza and Hamas. Table 4.1 indicates that most words are more relevant to war and conflict than peace and negotiations. The selected Australian media covered the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014. This is shown through the most frequent words such as Gaza, Hamas, rocket, civilian, war, kill, death and ceasefire. Conversely, from the word lists created by Sketch Engine, it is evident that words such as occupation, occupied, Jerusalem, refugee, innocent, victim and resistance are less frequent in the Australian media corpora. In addition, the high frequent words in the Australian media corpora, such as rocket and ceasefire show that there was more focus on day-to-day events within the conflict. On the contrary, the low frequent words such as occupation and Jerusalem show the lack of Australian media coverage and discussion of main issues within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Table 4.1 Most frequent words in Australian media corpora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corpus</th>
<th>Top 20 keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Australian</td>
<td>Israel, say, Israeli, Palestinian, Gaza, Hamas, Jewish, Palestinians, state, people, Netanyahu, peace, government, child, year, war, make, Australia, West, East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herald Sun</td>
<td>Israel, Gaza, child, Hamas, say, Palestinian, rocket, Israeli, people, kill, war, more, civilian, day, death, make, Palestinians, world, many, Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News.com</td>
<td>Gaza, say, Israel, Israeli, Palestinian, Hamas, AFP, kill, rocket, source, picture, people, strike, attack, AP, ceasefire, more, Jerusalem, Palestinians, soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Age</td>
<td>Israel, say, Gaza, Israeli, Palestinian, do, Mr, people, Hamas, government, war, kill, attack, East, Palestinians, family, year, take, child, Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>Israel, say, Gaza, Israeli, Palestinian, do, Mr, Hamas, people, war, kill, child, government, East, attack, Palestinians, Netanyahu, more, Australia, year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>say, Israel, Gaza, Palestinian, Hamas, Mr, rocket, kill, Netanyahu, people, attack, Palestinians, Jerusalem, minister, ceasefire, do, war, more, official, conflict, civilian, Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crikey</td>
<td>Israel, Gaza, Israeli, do, say, Palestinian, child, people, Hamas, year, Palestinians, conflict, war, take, Netanyahu, Lynch, go, political, last, write</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3 Keywords of Australian Media Corpora

From word lists created by Sketch Engine, the main and relevant keywords in the Australian media corpora are Israel, Israeli, Palestinian, Gaza and Hamas. The analysis was expanded to a frequency analysis of keywords Israel, Israeli and Palestinian as well as their various word forms. When comparing frequencies of all forms of these three keywords in the Australian media corpora, it is noted that frequencies of Israel and its forms are higher than frequencies of Palestine and its forms, as shown in Figure 4.1. Forms of Israel include Israeli and Israelis, and forms of Palestine include Palestinian and Palestinians.
The total columns in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show that Israel was substantially more frequent than Palestine in the Australian media corpora. When considering the details in each corpus, the difference between the frequencies of Israel and Palestine is prominent in the corpora of The Australian, news.com.au and ABC. Nevertheless, the frequency gap between Israel and Palestine is slightly less evident in other Australian media corpora. When comparing frequencies in both tables, it is evident that recognising Israel as a state and not Palestine, resulted in higher frequencies of Israel than Palestine in Australian media corpora.

Figure 4.1 Frequency comparison of Israel and Palestine
Table 4.2 Frequencies of *Israel* forms in Australian media corpora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corpus</th>
<th>Frequencies of <em>Israel</em> forms</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Israel</em></td>
<td><em>Israeli</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Australian</td>
<td>2,955</td>
<td>1,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herald Sun</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News.com</td>
<td>1,127</td>
<td>1,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Age</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>1,446</td>
<td>1,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crikey</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,702</td>
<td>4,438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Frequencies of *Israel* includes frequencies of *Israel*, *israel* and *ISRAEL*, and frequencies of *Israeli* include frequencies of *Israeli*, *israeli* and *ISRAELI*.

On the contrary, *Israeli* was slightly more frequent than *Palestinian* in Australian media corpora, while *Palestinian* was more frequent than *Israeli* only in the *Herald Sun* corpus. In contrast, *Palestinians* was more frequent than *Israelis* in Australian media corpora. Nevertheless, both words had the same frequency in the *Herald Sun* corpus. I analysed whether there is a significant difference between the total of frequencies of forms of *Israel* and *Palestine* in the corpora. A Chi-square test was calculated comparing the frequencies of both forms. A significant difference was found ($\chi^2(30)=458.336$, $p > 0.05$).
Table 4.3 Frequencies of *Palestine* forms in Australian media corpora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corpus</th>
<th>Frequencies of <em>Palestinian</em> forms</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Australian</em></td>
<td>243</td>
<td>1,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Herald Sun</em></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News.com</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Age</em></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>SMH</em></td>
<td>109</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ABC</em></td>
<td>81</td>
<td>799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Crikey</em></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>3,614</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note*. Frequencies of *Palestine* includes frequencies of Palestine, palestine and PALESTINE, frequencies of *Palestinian* include frequencies of Palestinian, palestinian and PALESTINIAN, and frequencies of *Palestinians* include frequencies of Palestinians and palestinians in Australian media corpora.

4.4 Word Sketches of Keywords in the Corpora

As *Israeli*, *Palestinian* and *Hamas* were among the most frequent words in the Australian media corpora, word sketches of each keyword were generated to identify topics and events covered by Australian media. Furthermore, they helped identify frames used by these media in representing actors of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

4.4.1 Word sketches of *Israeli*

When *Israeli* was tagged as a noun in the Australian media corpora, its adjectival and noun modifiers tended to be grouped in the categories shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 Adjectival and noun modifiers of *Israeli* (as a noun)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Collocates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War/conflict/crime</td>
<td><em>kidnapping, death, soldier, rocket, bombing, attack,</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>peace, occupation, combatant, atrocity</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leaning</td>
<td><em>left-leaning, far-right, right-wing</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality/race/religion/location</td>
<td><em>Arab, Jewish, Australia-born</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td><em>confounded, recalcitrant, eminent, innocent, disloyal</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td><em>many, individual, most, more, several, house, less,</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>other, few, dozen, average, product, government,</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of people</td>
<td><em>middle-class, leader</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td><em>young, boy</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td><em>Year</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Word sketches of *Israeli* that related to war, conflict and crime in the Australian media corpora indicated a focus on covering events related to the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014. Words such as *death, kidnapping, soldier, rocket, attack* and *kill* were related to events such as Hamas’s claims of kidnapping Israeli soldiers, death tolls among Palestinians due to Israeli attacks, and Palestinian rockets that targeted Israel during the 2014 war.

One of the modifiers of *Israeli* in the Australian media corpora was *innocent*. To identify the contexts in which *Israeli* (as a noun) was characterised as *innocent*, I conducted concordance analyses. The only case in which *innocent* was a modifier of *Israeli* was in *The Australian* corpus. The context was related to Hamas rockets that *The Australian* argued “produced an inevitable Israeli retaliation, which is exactly what Hamas wanted, no matter what the cost to innocent Palestinian civilians and innocent Israelis too” (Sheridan, 2014b, p. 24):

| innocent Palestinian civilians and *Israelis* too. There is nothing to show for all innocent the |

The concordance above shows that Israeli and Palestinian civilians were represented as equally innocent in *The Australian* corpus. Nevertheless, because this was the only
such case in all Australian media corpora, this indicates that Australian media avoided using the word *innocent* when portraying Israelis and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general.

To identify the contexts in which words related to political leaning were modifiers of *Israeli*, I conducted a concordance analysis to determine when left-leaning, left-wing and right-wing were collocations of *Israeli* in the Australian media corpora. This helped to assess how the Israeli left and right wings were portrayed.

The left-leaning in Israel was represented in *The Australian* in a positive frame. It was portrayed as moderate and supportive of a Palestinian state. To identify the context in which the Israeli left-leaning was portrayed, I expanded the following concordance:

| condemned by Palestinians and | *Israelis* as racist, and was criticised by the many left-leaning | White |

The context above emerged within *The Australian* coverage of the Israeli elections in 2015. *The Australian* highlighted the support of the Israeli left towards Netanyahu’s “disavowal of Palestinian statehood” (Walker, 2015, p. 9), which was depicted by Palestinians and many left-leaning Israelis as “racist” (p. 9).

Whereas left-leaning Israelis were portrayed in a positive frame, the Israeli right-wing was portrayed in a negative frame. For instance, in coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014, news.com.au covered the Israeli right-wing demonstrations, celebrating their army operation in Gaza. Further, news.com.au quoted their chants: “[t]here’s no school tomorrow, there’s no children left in Gaza” (“Far-right Israelis,” 2014, para. 1). This is shown in the following concordance:

| murderous tinderbox for 30 years.” *Israelis* caught on camera chanting ‘There’s no school |

Far-right
Similarly, the negative portrayal of the Israeli right-wing emerged in the ABC and Crikey corpora, although this was in a different context. To identify the related context, I expanded the following concordance of Israeli in the ABC corpus:

| at the site, citing visits by right-wing Israeli | seeking prayer rights there. Reuters Two |

The concordance above is relevant to the ABC coverage of Palestinian attacks in Jerusalem, and Israel’s restrictions on Palestinians’ access to the Al-Aqsa mosque. Palestinians “accuse[d] Israel of trying to change the delicate status quo at the site, citing visits by right-wing Israelis seeking prayer rights there” (“Death toll,” 2014, para. 9), while “permitting only Muslim men older than 35 to enter the compound of the Al-Aqsa mosque” (para. 9). I also expanded the following concordance in the Crikey corpus:

| genocide of Palestinians and right-wing Israeli | adopting Neo-Nazi insignia ... Furthermore |

Expansion of the concordance above led to finding that Crikey quoted the letter by Holocaust survivors in which they condemned the ‘genocide’ in Gaza, attributing the responsibility to right-wing Israelis who “are adopting Neo-Nazi insignia” (Carlton, 2014, para. 15).

Various topics and positive frames of Israelis emerged when many was frequent as a modifier of Israeli in the Australian media corpora. A concordance analysis identified further contexts when Israeli was modified by many. For example, a positive frame of Israelis emerged when I expanded line 1 of Table 4.5. The concordance in this line refers to Israel’s settlements and the position of many Israelis who “are opposed to the settler vision of a greater Israel indefinitely governing a majority Arab population” (Carr, 2014, p. 12). Another positive frame of Israelis emerged in the news.com.au corpus. The latter referred to bomb shelters in southern Israel, and Israelis posts of selfies from these shelters (see Table 4.5, line 2). Similarly, a positive representation of Israelis emerged in the SMH corpus (see Table 4.5, line 4). Many Israelis were
portrayed in a positive frame as they were “helping the Palestinians” (Burton, 2015, p. 24), and a group of Israeli women “stand at checkpoints” (p. 24).

Table 4.5 Concordance sample when many is a modifier of Israeli

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>controversial within Israel. Point out many Israelis are opposed to the settler vision of a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>campaign get them down. Faux fear many Israelis decided to ham up their bomb shelter experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>our arms weaken.” In recent years, many Israelis on the political left had “forgotten” the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>quick to point out that there are many Israelis helping the Palestinians. She mentions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Australian media also portrayed many Israelis in a sympathetic frame. For instance, by expanding line 3 of Table 4.5, I revealed that writer Daniel Gordis quoted former Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, in his article, published in The Age during the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014: “Let us not delude ourselves from seeing the hatred that inflames and fills the lives of the hundreds of thousands of Arabs who live around us. Let us not avert our eyes, lest our arms weaken” (p. 31). Moreover, Gordis commented on the previous quote stating “many Israelis on the political left had ‘forgotten’ the loathing that surrounds them. It is Hamas that has reminded them, Hamas that has rekindled Israeli resilience, with the deaths” (p. 31)

4.4.2 Word sketches of Palestinian

Word sketch of Palestinian were generated in each media corpus. When Palestinian was tagged as a noun, its adjectival and noun modifiers tended to be grouped in the categories shown in Table 4.6.

The most significant characteristics of Palestinian, according to modifiers of the word as a noun in the Australian media corpora are innocent, moderate, angry and brave. To identify the contexts in which these characteristics were related to the representations of Palestinians in the Australian media corpora, Table 4.7 shows concordances when innocent was a modifier of Palestinian. As innocent was a
collocation of Palestinian only in *The Australian* and *Herald Sun* corpora, Table 4.7 includes only four concordances. This could indicate that it was rare for Palestinians to be characterised as innocents in the Australian media corpora.

Table 4.6 Adjectival and noun modifiers of Palestinian (as a noun)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Collocates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War/conflict/crime</td>
<td>dead, blackmail, sellout, death, shoot, occupied, soldier, unarmed, injured, masked, truce, army, massacre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leaning</td>
<td>pro-, right-wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality/race/religion/location</td>
<td>Christian, Arab, local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>ordinary, -suffering, innocent, rational, heroic, proud, influential, moderate, ready, presumed, angry, eligible, ordinary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>land, most, many, sixth, dozen, more, three-quarter, citizenship, circumstance, territory, other, experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of people</td>
<td>civilian, student, resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>young, juvenile, -year-old, teenage, child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>editor, senior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>time, pm, past, long, access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concordances in lines 1 and 2 in Table 4.7 indicate that the contexts in which Palestinians were portrayed as innocent were related to *The Australian* coverage of Palestinian casualties during the war on Gaza in 2014. In other words, line 1 refers to an indirect quote by Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, who was “deeply troubled by the deaths of hundreds of innocent Palestinians” (Nicholson & Owens, 2014, p. 2). Line 2 refers to Israeli media criticism of the Israeli military operation in Gaza. *The Australian* quoted Israeli newspaper *The Jerusalem Report*, which stated that “Israel went into operation Protective Edge in early July fighting a ruthless band of Islamist terrorists; it emerged a month later accused of the slaughter of innocent Palestinians” (Lyons, 2014m, p. 7).
Table 4.7 Concordances of innocent Palestinians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>troubled by the deaths of hundreds of innocent Palestinians and she welcomed the announcement of a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>later accused of the slaughter of innocent Palestinians, it said. “French President Francois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>on residential areas, killing innocent Palestinians, and no one is questioning the source of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>to protect Israel is to murder innocent Palestinians He claims the Israeli Defence Force targets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, lines 3 and 4 show concordances of innocent Palestinians in the Herald Sun corpus. Both cases were related to the Israeli war on Gaza, in which Palestinian civilians were represented as innocent. For instance, Israel and Netanyahu were blamed for bombing residential areas and killing innocent Palestinians.

Positive representations of Palestinians emerged in Australian media corpora when moderate was a modifier of Palestinian. I conducted a concordance analysis to identify contexts in which moderate was a modifier of Palestinian. Moderate was a modifier of Palestinian (as a noun) in the corpora of The Australian, news.com.au and the SMH. An expansion of line 1 of Table 4.8 revealed that The Australian indirectly quoted the president of the Zionist Federation of Australia, Danny Lamm, when he criticised Bob Carr, former Australian foreign minister. Lamm stated that “Carr demonstrated anti-Israel views by agreeing to personally award the 2003 Sydney Peace Prize to Palestinian activist Hanan Ashrawi” (Grand, Ferguson, & Bramston, 2014, p. 1). On the contrary, Albert Dadon, a Melbourne Jewish lobbyist, “supported that decision as encouraging moderate Palestinians to shape their future nation” (Grand et al., 2014, p. 1).

Similarly, moderate Palestinians were portrayed as an appropriate partner of Israel. Line 3 shows a concordance in which the international editor of the SMH quoted Thomas Friedman, NYT foreign affairs columnist. Friedman suggested that to restrict Hamas rockets, “the Palestinians of Gaza demand that the rockets stop . . . . The only
sustainable way to do it is by Israel partnering with moderate Palestinians in the West Bank to build a thriving state there” (Hartcher, 2014, p. 16). A clearer positive frame of Palestinian emerged in the corpus of news.com.au. The latter referred to peace efforts by “more moderate Palestinians” (line 2), that Hamas aimed “at derailing” (Perry, 2014, para. 11).

Table 4.8 Concordances of moderate Palestinian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>that decision as encouraging moderate Palestinians to shape their future nation. Yet as Carr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>derailing peace efforts by more moderate Palestinians. For Netanyahu, each round with Hamas offers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>it is by Israel partnering with moderate Palestinians in the West Bank to build a thriving state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Negative representations of Palestinians emerged in the Australian media corpora. Word sketches of Palestinian indicate that angry was a characteristic of Palestinians in the news.com.au corpus. Hence, I conducted a concordance analysis to identify contexts in which angry was a modifier of Palestinian. An example is the following concordance:

attack”. As the news spread, Palestinians gathered outside the teenager’s home

Expansion of the line above in Sketch Engine shows that news.com.au covered the events in Jerusalem after the killing of Palestinian teenager Mohammed Abu Khdeir by a group of Jewish extremists. News.com.au portrayed the clashes between angry Palestinians and Israeli police:

Israel’s army radio said the teenager was snatched on [sic] today while hitchhiking in East Jerusalem and his body dumped in a forest in the western part of the city, in what was described as a “suspected revenge attack”. As the news spread, crowds of angry Palestinians gathered outside the teenager’s home and began throwing stones at police, who responded with

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sound bombs and rubber bullets. (“Palestinian teen Mohammed Abu Khder found dead,” 2014, para. 2–3)

4.4.3 Word sketches of Hamas

Word sketches of *Hamas* in the Australian media corpora indicate a focus on violent characteristics of Hamas. Table 4.9 shows word sketches of *Hamas* (as a noun) in the Australian media corpora. This is demonstrated through words such as *rude, nihilistic* and *evil*. In addition to word sketches included in characteristics category, other negative frames emerged in the category of war, conflict and crime. These words include *guilty, bloodthirsty* and *terrorist*.

Table 4.9 Adjectival and noun modifiers of *Hamas* (as noun)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Collocates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War/conflict/crime</td>
<td>responsible, conflict, crush, murder, support, sacrifice, rocket, target, rejectionist, ceasefire, tunnel, foe, peace, gunman, terror, attack, missile, rocket, casualty, win, guilty, bloodthirsty, terrorist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality/race-religion/location</td>
<td>Islamist, south, Islamic, Palestinian-militant, Palestinian, Gaza-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>rival, de-fanged, isolate, rude, plain, defiant, exclusive, quick, slight, psychological, credibility, similar, nihilistic, strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>group, entity, movement, organisation, place, thing, organisation, faction, team, plot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of people/position</td>
<td>militant, fighter, spokesman, leadership, supporter, figure, operative, leader, official, deputy, commander, spokesman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>teenager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>year, pause, first, day-long, six-hour, last, end, hour, time, month, pm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To develop a more comprehensive overview of topics and contexts in which *Hamas* was represented in Australian media corpora, I conducted concordance analyses on
some modifiers of *Hamas* in the corpora. These modifiers included *bloodthirsty* and *evil*.

In the *Herald Sun* corpus, *bloodthirsty* was a modifier of *Hamas* as a noun. For example, when the following concordance line was expanded, *Hamas* was clearly portrayed as *bloodthirsty*:

```
now in partnership with the  
         *Hamas*  —is an equally perverted organisation
bloodthirsty
```

This portrayal of Hamas as bloodthirsty was in a context in which the writer, Alan Howe, referred to the partnership between Fatah and Hamas, and defined the latter in his own words:

> But his Fatah party and the West Bank it runs—and now in partnership with the bloodthirsty Hamas—is an equally perverted organisation poisoning the minds of its children so that their “struggle” will span generations. Like former PLO leader Yasser Arafat, to whom Abbas was an adviser, they don’t want this fight to end; they are defined by it. (Howe, 2014, p. 55)

Word sketches of *Hamas* indicate that in the *Herald Sun*, news.com.au and *The Age* corpora, Hamas was represented as *terrorist*. Additionally, from further concordances when *terrorist* was a collocation of *Hamas* (see Table 4.25, Section 4.8.1), such representation emerged in all Australian media in this study.

In all Australian media corpora, except the Crikey corpus, *Islamic* and *Islamist* were modifiers of *Hamas* (when it was tagged as a noun). Thus, Hamas was represented in a frame related to religion or belief. However, *Islamist* was more frequent than *Islamic* as a modifier of *Hamas*. Table 4.10 shows that in six of 11 cases, *Islamist* was a modifier of *Hamas* in news.com.au corpus. Expansion of the six lines in Table 4.10 revealed that five lines refer to events related to the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014. These events include Hamas’s rockets, truce and ceasefire talks, and blaming Hamas for the conflict in Gaza. Only one case referred to the removal of Hamas from the European Union terror list (line 6).
Table 4.10 Concordances of *Islamist Hamas* in the news.com.au corpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>an escalation with the Islamist movement <em>Hamas</em>, which controls the Palestinian enclave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>campaign against Gaza after its Islamist foe <em>Hamas</em> rejected a six-hour truce and fired dozens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>running for cover, the Islamist movement <em>Hamas</em> remained defiant and warned the Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>forcefully” and blamed the Islamist movement <em>Hamas</em> for breaching the ceasefire. Egypt said</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>again accused Palestinian Islamist group <em>Hamas</em> of responsibility for the outbreak of fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>removal of Palestinian Islamist movement <em>Hamas</em> from its terror blacklist. The court ruled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although Hamas was represented as a Palestinian and Islamist group in news.com.au corpus, *The Australian* and *Herald Sun* tended to represent Hamas as an Islamist or Islamic group only. *Palestinian* was not a modifier of *Hamas* in the corpora of *The Australian* and *Herald Sun*. Fairfax newspapers *The Age* and *SMH* as well as the ABC tended to represent Hamas as a Palestinian faction and an Islamic or Islamist movement. Yet, neither *Islamic* nor *Islamist* were modifiers of *Hamas* in the Crikey corpus.

This section described the use of Sketch Engine’s Word Sketch function and presented an overview of Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This overview focused predominantly on representations of the main actors of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Australian media corpora. Expansion of concordances of word sketches of *Israeli*, *Palestinian* and *Hamas* revealed significant representations and frames. Israeli and Palestinian civilians were represented as equally innocent in relation to Israeli attacks during the Gaza War 2014 and Palestinian rockets. When *many* was a modifier of *Israeli*, Israelis were mostly portrayed in positive and sympathetic frames. However, the Israeli right-wing was represented negatively
compared with left-leaning Israelis. Conversely, both negative and positive representations of Palestinians emerged within resulting word sketches. Word sketches of *Hamas* uncovered largely negative representations, as it was portrayed as a bloodthirsty, evil and radicalised terrorist organisation.

In the next sections, I expand to collocation and concordances analyses of *Israel*, *Palestinian*, *Gaza* and *Hamas*. Collocation and concordance analyses helped obtain a further overview of how these keywords were used in Australian media corpora in relation to other words. In addition, analyses identified related topics that these keywords were used to cover in the corpora.

### 4.5 Collocations of *Israel*

To provide the most dominant linguistic patterns in media about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and to identify the most significant relationships between *Israel* and other words in the Australian media corpora, I used the Collocation function of Sketch Engine on each corpus. The most frequent collocations of the word *Israel* in Australian media corpora are illustrated in Table 4.11, which shows the top 10 collocations ordered by frequency. The most frequent collocations of *Israel* include only nouns, verbs and adjectives (excluding auxiliary verbs).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corpus</th>
<th>Top 10 collocations of <em>Israel</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Australian</td>
<td>Gaza, say, Hamas, state, Palestinian, rocket, war, Palestinians, Israel, do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herald Sun</td>
<td>Gaza, rocket, Israel, war, peace, Hamas, defend, Palestinians, stop, do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News.com</td>
<td>Gaza, Hamas, say, rocket, source, AFP, border, southern, fire, Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Age</td>
<td>Gaza, say, Hamas, rocket, Palestinian, Israel, attack, military, war, state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>Gaza, Palestinian, rocket, Hamas, say, Palestine, war, Israel, attack, security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Gaza, Hamas, rocket, Palestinian, Israel, minister, militant, war, Netanyahu, Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crikey</td>
<td>Gaza, Times, Hamas, say, Palestinian, aim, Australia, right, Palestine, Israel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.11 indicates that the most frequent collocations of *Israel* are related to the Israeli war on Gaza. This is indicated through collocates such as *war, Hamas, Gaza, rocket, attack, military* and *militant*. Therefore, most representations of Israel in Australian media corpora were related to the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. However, other collocations in Australian media corpora refer to other topics or issues within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For instance, one of the most frequent collocations of *Israel* in *The Australian* corpus was settlement. It is noteworthy that the word *settlement* was not a high-frequency collocation of *Israeli* in the other corpora. However, I conducted a concordance analysis of *Israel* when *settlement* was a collocation in all corpora as shown in Table 4.12. Expansion of the lines in Table 4.12 indicate the contexts in which *settlement* was used in the Australian media corpora. A 10-concordance sample of concordances of *Israel* when *settlement* was a collocation shows that while *The Australian* considered that aspects of Israel’s settlement policy “have been ill-advised” (see Table 4.12, line 1), it claimed that this was not the main obstacle to peace and an obstacle to the two-state solution. Instead, its perceived main obstacle to peace was “that most of the Arab world will not accept the idea that Israel as a Jewish state has a right to exist and live in peace and security” (Sheridan, 2014a, p. 24). It is noteworthy that *The Australian*’s portrayal of Israeli settlements as part of coverage of the death of former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who was referred to as “the Father of Settlements” (Lyons, 2014f, p. 1). In a related context, *The Australian* discussed Australia’s stance on Israel’s settlements in the West Bank. It quoted Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, who emphasised that the Australian government “did not regard all Israeli settlements in the West Bank as illegal” (Lyons, 2014i, p. 16).

*Settlement* was a collocation of *Israel* in a fewer number of concordances in both Fairfax newspapers and ABC compared with *The Australian*. However, by expanding lines 3, 4 and 5 of Table 4.12, these settlements were depicted in the previous media outlets as illegal. On the contrary, from five concordances of *Israel* when *settlement* was a collocation in the news.com.au corpus, it is indicated that the website focused on day-to-day events in relation to Israel’s settlements. One example of these concordances is shown when expanding line 2 of Table 4.12. Overall, concordances
of Israel when settlement was a collocation in the Australian media corpora did not show any in-depth coverage of Israel’s settlements of Palestinian lives, particularly in terms of the impact of Israel’s settlements on Palestinian lives.

Table 4.12 Concordances of Israel when settlement is a collocate in the Australian media corpora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>varies from 50,000 to 90,000. Aspects of Israel’s settlement policy have been very ill-advised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>together the next coalition government. Israel approves settlement homes From: AAP ISRAEL is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>illegitimate”. Such universal opposition to Israel’s settlement enterprise is not just a matter of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>to see which international law has declared Israel’s settlements illegal. The answer is that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>the first decade of the twenty-first century, Israel expanded its illegal settlements in the West</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Settlement is not frequent as a collocation of Israel in the Herald Sun and Crikey corpora

4.5.1 Israel and Palestinian rockets

Table 4.11 (Section 4.5) shows that rocket is frequent as a collocation of Israel in all Australian media corpora. This emphasises that within the coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014, Australian media focused on covering events related to rockets of Hamas and other Palestinian factions that targeted Israel. Table 4.13 presents a sample of concordances of Israel with rocket as a collocation in all Australian media corpora. I randomly selected one example from each media corpus: The Australian, Herald Sun, news.com.au, The Age, SMH, ABC and Crikey. These examples are listed in this order of media corpora. The most prominent representations emerged within the coverage of Palestinian rockets that targeted Israel.

When rocket was a collocation of Israel in their corpora, The Australian and Herald Sun portrayed Palestinian factions and militants as terrorist groups and terrorists (see line 1 and 2). When I expanded line 2, the context emerged was related to the Herald
Sun coverage of Palestinian rockets and Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Herald Sun portrayed the situation in Gaza as an Israeli response or reaction to Palestinian rockets. News.com.au represented Palestinian rockets in a statistical frame (line 3): “Hamas and other militants in Gaza have fired more than 2400 rockets at Israel since hostilities began on July 8, many deep into the Israeli heartland and toward most of the country’s major cities” (Barzak & Heller, 2014). News.com.au also highlighted the launching of Hamas rockets after the rejection of a ceasefire extension (line 3). The same statistical frame was used in the SMH coverage of Palestinian rockets (line 5). The Age referred to Hamas’s perspective on the rocket attacks (line 4). Further, Israel’s rocket interceptor system, Iron Dome, which “can immediately calculate whether a Hamas rocket launched in Gaza will hit a built-up area in Israel” (Friedman, 2014, p. 18) was highlighted.

Table 4.13 Concordances of Israel when rocket is a collocate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Israelis were now living under rocket range and Israel had neutralised 3670 “terror targets”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>terrorist group) fires rockets continuously into Israel and then Palestinians are killed when Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Gaza have fired more than 2400 rockets at Israel since hostilities began on July 8, many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>civilians. To Hamas, the rocket attacks on Israel are legitimate because the state of Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>six days ago. More than 100 rockets struck Israel the day before, the Israeli Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>if it stopped firing rockets into Israel Israel would have ceased its operation in Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>destroy Hamas’s rocket sites and tunnels. Israel attempted to minimise casualties, Hamas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, line 6 refers to the ABC coverage of Palestinian rockets targeting Israel during the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014, as well as Israel’s Iron Dome. Glen
Falkenstein, a policy analyst at the Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), portrayed Hamas’s rockets as a main reason for the Israeli military operation in Gaza; a cessation of the operation was conditional on stopping the rockets:

Hamas knows that if it stopped firing rockets into Israel, Israel would have ceased its operation in Gaza. Yet, Hamas combatants have increased their firing range to over 160 km, which means rockets have been fired at Israeli cities as far north as Haifa, Hadera and Zikhron Ya’akov, as well as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. (2014b, para. 6)

In its coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza, Crikey attributed the Israeli military operation in Gaza in 2014 to Palestinian rockets and the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers in June 2014. In addition, when line 7 was expanded, both frames of defending Israel’s actions and comparing the latter with Hamas’s actions emerged:

Israel could have bombed Gaza to rubble and killed tens of thousands of Arabs if that had been its aim. But it wasn’t. Israel’s aim was to destroy Hamas’ rocket sites and tunnels. Israel attempted to minimise casualties, Hamas attempted to maximise them. (Dalidakis, 2014, para. 5–6)

This sub-section showed the significance of Palestinian rockets during the war on Gaza 2014 as a topic discussed in the Australian media corpora. Although Palestinian and Hamas rockets were represented statistically according to the concordances in Table 4.13, other representations referred to these rockets as a justification for the Israeli military operation in Gaza 2014.

4.5.2 Jewish Israel and occupation

Although the collocate Jewish was not among the top 10 collocations of Israel, it was still frequent in the corpora, particularly in The Australian corpus. There was an emphasis in Australian media corpora on representing Israel as a Jewish state and a homeland for Jews (see Table 4.14).
Table 4.14 Concordances of *Israel* as a *Jewish* state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>demand for the Palestinians to recognise <em>Israel</em> as a “Jewish” state. He said, through fact, for thousands of years, what is now <em>Israel</em> has been the Jewish homeland and has had terrorism will stop with the Jewish state of <em>Israel</em> no,” she said. “They’ll move on to more legal sense. Colin Rubenstein, <em>Australia</em>/ &amp; Jewish Affairs Council PM denies making saying these elections would decide whether “<em>Israel</em> remains a Jewish State”. PM vows to block of hostilities with the Jewish state. “<em>Israel</em> must accept the demands of the Palestinian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Jewish* is not frequent as a collocation of *Israel* in the Crikey corpus.

However, when *Jewish* was a collocation of *Israel* in *The Age* corpus, it was part of an affiliation. In other words, expansion of line 4 of Table 4.14 found that *Jewish* was used to refer to Colin Rubenstein, the Executive Director of the AIJAC.

*Occupation* was a more frequent collocation of *Israel*, but only in Fairfax newspapers, *The Age* and *SMH*. It is of interest that *occupation* was a collocation of *Israel* in 16 and 18 concordances in *The Age* and *SMH* respectively. To identify the contexts in which *occupation* was a collocation of *Israel* in the Australian media corpora, Table 4.16 shows only a random sample of the concordances in which *occupation* was used in all corpora. It is indicated from random samples of these concordances that Australian media referred to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands within direct or indirect quotes from sources including Palestinian, and pro-Palestinian sources. For example, by expanding line 1, Table 4.15, it was found that the Palestinian Chief Negotiator Saeb Erakat was quoted in *The Australian*.  

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Table 4.15 Concordances of *Israel* when *occupation* is a collocate in the Australian media corpora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>people, stop Israeli crimes and end <em>Israel</em> ’s prolonged occupation.” Meanwhile,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Palestinians displaced from their land in 1948 and <em>Israel</em> ’s military occupation, along with posters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>conflict viewed as unjust and rooted in <em>Israel</em> ’s occupation of Palestinian territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>them. But Australia should equally condemn <em>Israel</em> ’s illegal occupation of Palestinian territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>of the BDS campaign, which calls for an end to <em>Israel</em> ’s occupation of the Palestinian territories</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Occupation* was not frequent as a collocation of *Israel* in the *Herald Sun* and news.com.au corpora

However, line 2 of Table 4.15 refers to *The Age* coverage of the Pope Francis’s visit to the Palestinian Territories in May 2014, indicating a reference to Israel’ occupation of Palestinian lands. Within this coverage, *The Age* correspondent Ruth Pollard (2014u) stated:

> Huge banners depicting scenes from the Bible blended with images of Palestinians displaced from their land in 1948 and Israel’s military *occupation* [emphasis added], along with posters of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Pope Francis, a dove of peace between them. (p. 11)

In its coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014, the conflict in Gaza was portrayed by the *SMH* as “unjust and rooted in Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory and the constant expansion of settlements on land recognised by the United Nations - and Australia - as theirs” (Allard & Kolziol, 2014, p. 25). This representation of the conflict (as shown by expanding line 3 of Table 4.15) did not reflect the position of both newspapers; it gave only some contexts relevant to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian Territories.
Although *occupation* was a collocation of *Israel* in the Australian media corpora within direct or indirect quotes, Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands, including East Jerusalem was described as illegal. Expanding line 4 of Table 4.15 shows one example where the writer Ben Saul, in his article published on the ABC, stated that “Australia should equally condemn Israel's illegal occupation of Palestinian territory” (Saul, 2014b, para. 9). Apart from describing the Israeli occupation as illegal, Crikey referred to the Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories in an article that was related to the BDS (Line 5).

4.5.3 Israel/Australia in Australian media corpora

*Australia* was one of the most frequent collocations of *Israel* in the corpora of *The Australian*, *The Age*, *SMH* and *Crikey*. Nevertheless, *Australia* was still frequent in other corpora. Hence, I conducted concordance analyses on each corpus to identify topics and contexts that emerged when *Australia* was a collocation of *Israel* in Australian media corpora (see Table 4.16). While Table 4.16 presents these examples, the findings of a 10-concordance sample analysis of each corpus is included in this sub-section.

Australian media discussed relationships between Australia and Israel. Within these discussions, different topics and contexts emerged in the Australian media corpora, including Australia’s position on Israeli settlement and East Jerusalem, and Australian’s decision to cease referring to East Jerusalem as *occupied*. For instance, *The Australian* emphasised Australia’s support of Israel’s settlement policy: “Israel’s pro-settlement right wing now regards Australia as one of its biggest supporters” (Lyons, 2014d, p. 3). Further, within its coverage of the Australian government decision to cease using *occupied* to refer to East Jerusalem, *The Australian* highlighted the position of the AIJAC:

> A prominent Jewish leader yesterday defended Attorney-General George Brandis’s move to have the Australian government cease referring to east Jerusalem as “occupied”. Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council executive director Colin Rubenstein hailed the decision as a constructive and neutral approach amid criticism from many quarters. (Baxendale, 2014, p. 7)
Similarly, *The Age* was interested in covering Australia’s decision regarding East Jerusalem. It relied on Israeli media sources and highlighted Palestinian voices:

According to the Haaretz report, “Palestinian officials, who heard in the media about the meeting, boiled with anger”. Dr Erakat did not mince words in his letter to Ms Bishop. “Australia’s ambassador to Israel meeting with Israeli officials in East Jerusalem has the effect of attempting to legitimise the illegal situation on the ground and may be deemed as aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting illegal Israeli policies”, he wrote. (Flitton, 2014b, p. 21)

In a similar context, *The Age* also quoted Australian and Palestinian voices:

The comments came as Australia’s ambassador to Israel Dave Sharma told an Israeli website the entire West Bank area should not be referred to as “occupied”. The ambassador of the general delegation of Palestine to Australia and New Zealand and the south Pacific, Izzat Abdulhadi, said the statements were “totally inappropriate”. (Whyte, 2014, p. 9)
Table 4.16 Concordances of *Israel* when *Australia* is a collocate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>achievements, Australia is very similar to <em>Israel</em>, the strongest democracy in the Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>pro-Palestinian rallies across Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Corp Australia MAJOR airlines have shunned <em>Israel</em> for a second day, while Washington renewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>rocket attacks on the much better defended <em>Israel</em>. Australia should be doing everything</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>For Western nations, including <em>Israel</em>’s narrative dominates as master.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>pm Australia’s biased friendship towards <em>Israel</em> undermines peace and forsakes justice for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>business relations between Australia and <em>Israel</em>—for example through boycott, divestment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Australian media linked Israel-Australia relationships with the Jewish community in Melbourne and Sydney, and the federal elections, as indicated by *The Australian* reporters:

In NSW, the political relationship with the Jewish community was limited by the perception there were few votes in it for Labor. This is because the Liberal Party has cornered the Jewish vote in safe inner-Sydney seats while, in the western suburbs, Labor’s priority is the fast-growing Islamic vote. (Grand et al., 2014, p. 1)

There was also a discussion about Australia’s relationship with both Israel and Palestine in *The Australian*. In this discussion, Peter Beattie, former premier of Queensland and patron of the Australia Israel Labor Dialogue, referred to Australia’s long-term economic future in relation to Israel, Palestine and the Middle East, in his article published in *The Australian*:

It is for these reasons that I signed on as patron of the newly formed Australia Israel Labor Dialogue. The goal is to bring progressive people in Australia
and Israel together to find common solutions to issues in both our countries. Our relationships with Israel and Palestine are not just about politics, they’re about our long-term economic future, and that of the Middle East. (2015, p. 22)

Related concordances show that Australian media covered the position of former Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Bob Carr towards the Jewish lobby in Australia. *The Australian* highlighted that Carr criticised both the Jewish lobby in Australia and its effect on the policy of former Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard:

> It is clear he [Bob Carr] is referring mainly to the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council. In short, he says we wielded “extraordinary influence” over the Office of the Prime Minister when Julia Gillard was prime minister, and expressed an “extreme right-wing Israeli view”. (Rubenstein, 2014a, p. 12)

In the same context, the ABC quoted Carr, who considered that “‘extreme right-wing’ pro-Israel lobbyists had an “unhealthy” influence on Australia’s policy towards Israel and the Occupied Territories” (“Former foreign minister,” 2014, para. 2). Similarly, one concordance from *The Age* shows that the newspaper highlighted Carr’s critique of Australia’s support of Israel through its votes on UN resolutions, referring to the AIJAC effect on Australian foreign policy:

> In his book, Diary of a Foreign Minister, Mr Carr suggests Ms Gillard supported Israel in a controversial United Nations vote on Palestinian recognition because Australian foreign policy had been “subcontracted” to Melbourne-based pro-Israel group the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council. (Knott, 2014, p. 8)

*The Age* continued highlighting Carr’s stance on Australia’s votes on UN resolutions and Israeli settlements:

> When Carr is told by Gillard not to raise concerns about the expansion of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories and oppose a UN vote recognising Palestine, he is livid. He rolls Gillard in cabinet on the UN vote, motivated by a conviction that Israel’s settlement expansions have gone too far. (Allard, 2014, p. 31)

In a related context, *The Age* discussed Australia’s vote on the UN resolution, after which Palestine became a UN non-member observer state:
It is clear that Labor is still to resolve internal tensions stemming back to the 2012 vote on whether to accept Palestine as a UN non-member observer state, where Australia eventually abstained. There is nothing to fear from such debates, and Australia’s stance on the Israel-Palestinian conflict should never be set in concrete. ("Palestine is occupied," 2014)

Carr’s critique of Australia’s votes on UN resolutions and its position on the conflict emerged in the SMH corpus. The SMH criticised the dominance of Israeli narratives on Western countries, including Australia (line 5). In the same context, Australia’s support of Israel was criticised, referring to the colonial-settler project that both countries present. It was stated that “it is only possible to systematically ignore the trauma experienced by Palestinians by privileging the humanity of one group (Israelis) above the other, arguably because of Australia’s affinity with Israel as a colonial-settler project” (Abdel-Fattah, 2014, p. 38). Moreover, Abdel-Fattah (2014) stated that “Australia’s unwavering support for Israel places it on the wrong side of history. It is high time Australia realised that pursuing an ethical and honest approach to the conflict is in the interests of Palestinians and Israelis” (p. 38). SMH readers also criticised Australia’s pro-Israel votes on UN resolutions:

I was sickened to learn that Australia has grovelled to Israel and, against national and global opinion, aided and abetted the US in rejecting a United Nations resolution aimed at bringing Israel’s status as an occupying country to a timely end. It is clear Israel has absolutely no intention of participating in serious negotiations with the Palestinian authority, as witnessed by its never-ending construction program for Jewish settlements on occupied land. (Williams, 2015)

Further, line 6 of Table 4.16 shows a concordance in which Australia’s ‘biased’ relationship with Israel was criticised by the writer, Ben Saul, in his ABC article. Saul discussed Israeli violations of International Humanitarian Law and human rights. He considered that Australia’s biased relationship towards Israel “undermines peace and forsakes justice for Palestinians, while serving neither Australian nor Israeli interests” (2014b, para. 1). He also urged Australia to “attempt to sue Israel in the International Court of Justice” (2014b, para. 21):

Australia should condemn Israel’s refusal to readmit Palestinian refugees, and to provide remedies for the ethnic cleansing of Arabs - documented by
Israeli historians - which accompanied the foundation of Israel in 1948. Australia should condemn the periodic Israeli military operations which cause excessive civilian casualties, illegally destroy property, and sometimes even deliberately target civilians. (para. 10–11)

Concordances of *Israel* when *Australia* was a collocation in the Australian media corpora indicate that the contexts were relevant to the AIJAC. For example, in four concordances out of ten, *The Australian* referred to the AIJAC. Within these four concordances, the AIJAC was mentioned in news articles or readers’ letters. One such example involved Jeremy Jones, the Director of International and Community Affairs in the AIJAC, Co-chairman of the Global Forum for Combating anti-Semitism and former president of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry. Equally, out of three concordances in the *Herald Sun* corpus, two concordances show that the context was related to the AIJAC. The two writers, Jamie Hyams and Sharyn Mittleman, of *Herald Sun* articles were both senior policy analysts at the AIJAC. Similar to *The Australian* and *Herald Sun*, six out of 18 concordances of *Israel* when *Australia* was a collocation in *The Age* corpus referred to the AIJAC. These were related to voices affiliated with organisations, such as Colin Rubenstein, the executive director of the AIJAC. Similarly, the *SMH* and ABC published articles that quoted sources affiliated with the AIJAC. These examples include writers such as Falkenstein and voices such as Israel’s ambassador to Australia, Shmuel Ben-Shmuel. This indicates that these Australian media relied on publishing articles written by staff at the AIJAC or on sources and voices from this council.

Australian media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza emerged when analysing concordances of *Israel* when *Australia* was a collocation. Line 2 (see Table 4.16) refers to the *Herald Sun* coverage of pro-Palestinian rallies in Australia during the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014. Expansion of line 4 shows that *The Age* presented a reader’s position in which Australia was demanded to do “everything it can to” stop the war, by “urging the US to pressure Israel to end its disproportionate attacks that are inflicting such a cruel toll on Gaza civilians, and on Hamas to end its rocket attacks on the much better defended Israel” (Trembath, 2014, p. 32). In *The Age* readers’ letters, Abbott was criticised for being “silent on the deaths of innocents in Gaza”
The same reader also stated that “the least Mr Abbott can do is to recall the ambassador to Israel to show Australia’s disapproval” (p. 20).

Apart from the contexts above in which Australia was a collocation of Israel in Australian media corpora, other economic and cultural contexts related to Australia-Israel relationships emerged. For example, the SMH covered pro-Palestinian protests against the Israeli Film Festival in Australia in August 2014, quoting Damian Ridgwell from the Palestine Action Group. He stated that “events celebrating Israeli culture ‘should not be held in Australia as Israel carries out genocide against the Palestinians’” (“Palestine group,” 2014). Additionally, expansion of line 7 (Table 4.16) indicates that Crikey discussed Australia-Israel business relationships and BDS within its coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014:

When I asked Jacobs and Livingstone at the event about the possible impact of the war in Gaza on business relations between Australia and Israel—for example through boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS), they demurred at the time. (Paddy Manning, 2014, para. 9)

Crikey also discussed support from some Australian academics for a boycott of Israel:

A Ha’aretz article on the matter registers the attitude of Jewish leaders from embarrassment to outrage at Shurat HaDin’s behaviour. Colin Rubenstein of the Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council pointedly said he had not been consulted on the case and refused to comment. (Brull, 2014, para. 10)

All 11 concordances of Israel when Australia was a collocation in the news.com.au corpus, are related to the sources (e.g., News Corp Australia Israel) of news articles. An example is included in line 3, Table 4.16. Importantly, Netanyahu was frequent as a collocation of Israel in the ABC corpus. This indicates that the ABC relied on the voice of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to portray the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

### 4.6 Collocations of Palestinians

I used the collocation function of Sketch Engine to identify collocations of Palestinian for each Australian media corpora (see Table 4.17 for the top 10 collocations). The
most frequent collocations of Palestinian include nouns, verbs and adjectives (excluding auxiliary verbs).

I examined high and less frequent collocations of Palestinian to identify topics and contexts in which the word was used in Australian media corpora. Table 4.17 shows that Israel and Israeli are among the top 10 collocations of Palestinian in Australian media corpora. Further, the table indicates that words such as child, civilian, Gaza and kill were high-frequent in Australian media corpora. The concordances of such words refer to the Israeli war on Gaza 2014.

Table 4.17 Most frequent collocations of Palestinian in Australian media corpora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corpus</th>
<th>Top 10 collocations of Palestinian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Australian</td>
<td>Authority, state, Israel, child, say, Israeli, Abbas, Mahmoud, kill, leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herald Sun</td>
<td>Israel, Israeli, player, say, child, Hamas, state, death, people, Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News.com.au</td>
<td>Israeli, kill, say, Gaza, Israeli, militant, Hamas, more, Abbas, people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Age</td>
<td>Authority, say, Israel, kill, Israeli, territory, state, Mahmoud, President, more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>state, Authority, Israel, say, Israeli, territory, death, kill, Abbas, Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>say, Israel, Israeli, kill, Abbas, Gaza, civilian, official, president, Mahmoud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crikey</td>
<td>child, territory, people, state, Israel, Gaza, Israeli, baby, occupied, right</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.17 indicates that Abbas was a high-frequency collocation of Palestinian in some Australian media corpora. Nevertheless, I examined concordances of Palestinian when Abbas was a collocation to identify how Abbas, as a Palestinian actor, was represented in these corpora.

4.6.1 Portrayal of Abbas

Although Abbas was not in the top 10 collocations in some Australian media corpora, it was frequent in others and relevant to Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, I conducted a concordance analysis when Abbas was a collocation of Palestinian in Australian media corpora. Concordances of Abbas
explore the portrayal of a main Palestinian actor in Australian media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Concordances of *Palestinian* when *Abbas* was a collocation in *The Australian* corpus show that the newspaper covered events related to Palestinian attacks in Jerusalem. Expansion of line 1 (see Table 4.18) revealed that this concordance referred to the newspaper coverage of Palestinian attacks in Jerusalem in November 2014, when Netanyahu attributed responsibility for these attacks to Abbas’ provocation. From a further 10-concordance sample of *Palestinian* when *Abbas* was a collocation in *The Australian* corpus, other topics emerged. These include the attack by two Palestinians on a synagogue in Jerusalem (for which Netanyahu blamed Abbas), and the attack by a group of Jewish settlers who fired a mosque in a West Bank village, that “came a day after Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas warned that Israel was leading the region into ‘a devastating religious war’ by allowing leading politicians to visit the al-Aqsa mosque site in Jerusalem” (Lyons, 2014v, p. 10).
Table 4.18 Concordances of *Palestinian* when *Abbas* is a collocate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Benjamin Netanyahu blamed the attack on <em>Palestinian</em> leader Mahmoud Abbas. “Today’s terrorist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Palestinian unity government led by moderate President Mahmoud Abbas. This may be the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>would likely give a role to Western-backed President Mahmoud Abbas, the main political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>insisting it has no partner in the peace talks. <em>Palestinian</em> Authority President Mahmoud Abbas said</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>to join the International Criminal Court. <em>Palestinian</em> Authority president Mahmoud Abbas’ decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>distinction is clear to most world leaders.” <em>Palestinian</em> president Mahmoud Abbas has accused Israel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Abbas* is not frequent as a collocation of *Palestinian* in the Crikey corpus.

*The Australian* blamed Abbas and other Palestinian leaders, including Yasser Arafat, for not accepting offers or deals from former Israeli prime ministers Ehud Barak (in 2000), Ariel Sharon (in 2005) and Ehud Olmert (in 2008). *The Australian* emphasised that these “offers would have guaranteed unprecedented Palestinian autonomy and, eventually, statehood” (“The Gaza war,” 2014, p. 13).

Similarly, the other News Corp newspaper, the *Herald Sun*, highlighted the Israeli offers to Palestinians that Abbas refused. The *Herald Sun* coverage of the Palestinian unity government (see Table 4.18, line 2) shows one concordance of five cases in which *Abbas* was a collocation of *Palestinian*. When expanding this line, Abbas was portrayed as a moderate Palestinian leader. The same portrayal emerged when the *Herald Sun* covered Pope Francis’s invitation to Israeli and Palestinian leaders to visit the Vatican. Abbas was also portrayed as moderate leader in *The Age* coverage of:

- former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s death
- plans for a Palestinian unity government and peace process
- the Pope Francis’s visit to the Palestinian Territories, and
the Israeli war on Gaza 2014.

When the *Herald Sun* referred to Abbas’ partnership with Hamas in the Palestinian unity government, Abbas was portrayed in a different way:

You may have seen that the Palestinian Authority leader, Mahmoud Abbas, is being portrayed as a moderate who welcomes the ceasefire. He is moderate in the manner that the IS gangs wiping Christianity and Shi’ite Muslims off maps make al-Qaeda seem like good guys. (Howe, 2014, p. 55)

Abbas was represented as ‘Western-backed’. A concordance from the news.com.au corpus is displayed in Table 4.18 (line 3). Expanding this line showed that this concordance was related to news.com.au coverage of ceasefire talks between Israelis and Palestinians during the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014. A 10-concordance sample of *Palestinian* when *Abbas* was a collocation in the corpus of news.com.au shows that the latter covered the kidnapping and killing of Palestinian teenager Mohammed Abu Khdeir in Jerusalem, and the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014. Abbas was quoted as accusing Israel of committing “genocide” against Palestinian people in Gaza (“Israel committing ‘genocide’,” 2014, para. 1).

Abbas’ quotes were also highlighted in *The Age*. For example, Table 4.18 (line 4) shows a citation of Abbas after Netanyahu’s victory in the 2015 Israeli elections:

Israel has continued with its aggressive program of settlement construction, while insisting it has no partner in the peace talks. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas said a two-state solution was impossible with a new government led by Mr Netanyahu, but said he was willing to negotiate with any government that accepted two states. (Pollard, 2015a, p. 22).

Abbas’ comments on Israeli strikes during its war on Gaza in 2014 were highlighted on the ABC. An expanded line 6 (see Table 4.18) indicates that Abbas accused Israel of a massacre in Shujaiya neighbourhood in eastern Gaza. More concordances of *Palestinian* when *Abbas* was a collocation in the ABC corpus show that the ABC covered Abbas’ decision to apply for membership of the International Criminal Court.

Other topics and contexts emerged in the *SMH* corpus, according to concordances. For instance, line 5 (see Table 4.18) refers to Abbas’ decision to join the International
Criminal court, which “came after the failure of the last round of peace talks in April and a United Nations Security Council resolution in the last hours of 2014 that proposed an end to Israel’s decades-long military occupation” (Pollard, 2015c, p. 11). Additionally, Abbas was a collocation of Palestinian in the SMH coverage of the following topics and events:

- Palestinian unity government
- ceasefire talks during the Israeli war on Gaza
- the attack on the synagogue in Jerusalem, and
- the death of the Palestinian minister Ziad Abu Ein from tear gas fired by Israeli troops during a protest in the West Bank.

Overall, Abbas was represented as a moderate Palestinian leader who is backed by Western countries. Abbas' portrayals were neutral or positive, except in The Australian corpus, in which he was critiqued for his position towards Israeli offers as a solution for the conflict.

4.6.2 Representations of land, Jerusalem and refugees

In this sub-section, I expand the analysis to some less and low frequent collocations of Palestinian, including land, Jerusalem and refugee. When land was a collocation of Palestinian, different topics and contexts emerged in the concordances (see Table 4.19). In News Corp media, contexts were related to Israeli settlements. An expanded line 1 found that the context in which land was a collocation of Palestinian in The Australian corpus was related to Israel’s settlements. It was considered that these settlements are “clearly the main factor now fuelling the conflict: they are systematically eating up land which Palestinians say should be their state and are often being built on privately owned Palestinian land” (Lyons, 2014ab, p. 15). Similarly, it was argued in the Herald Sun that Israel uses “peace talks” (Wakim, 2014, p. 31) for gaining more time, in which it builds more settlements in Palestinian lands (see Table 4.19, line 2). Equally, line 3 indicates that news.com.au covered Israeli settlements in Bethlehem in the West Bank.
Table 4.19 Concordances of *Palestinian land*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>are often being built on privately owned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>more “peace talks” buy more time for more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>said it would expropriate 400 hectares of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bank estimates that Israeli restrictions on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Israeli-only roads and towns on occupied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>international law, including the full return of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>land in the occupied West Bank to affirm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The contexts in which land was a collocation of *Palestinian* in the corpora of both Fairfax newspapers, *The Age* and *SMH*, were related to their coverage of Israel’s restrictions on Palestinians. This coverage included Israeli restrictions on Palestinian farmers’ access to their lands and water in the West Bank. When expanding line 4, Table 4.19, I found that it was stated in *The Age* that these restrictions “costs the Palestinian economy more than $US700 million ($911 million) each year, resulting in poverty rates as high as 33 per cent in the Jordan Valley” (Pollard, 2015b, p. 15). Similarly, *SMH* readers highlighted Israeli restrictions on Palestinians in the West Bank. As shown in line 5, one reader stated “the West Bank [is] full of Israeli-only roads and towns on occupied Palestinian land” and that Israel ignores the international law (Phillippou, 2015, p. 38). Importantly, newspaper readers discussed some aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that mainstream coverage sometimes lacks.
Line 6 shows that the ABC emphasised the need for a balanced Australian policy, that “would insist that peace negotiations must respect Palestinian rights under international law, including the full return of Palestinian land” (Saul, 2014b, para. 13).

In the Crikey corpus, the concordance of Palestinian when land was a collocation referred to the two-state solution and Israel’s settlement policy. Expanding line 7 revealed that it was stated that Israeli plans “will expropriate four square kilometres of Palestinian land in the occupied West Bank to affirm that Israel’s goal is hardly consistent with the much touted two-state solution” (Neering, 2014, para. 2).

While Jerusalem was a low-frequency collocation of Palestinian in Australian media corpora, I investigated related contexts (see Table 4.20).

Table 4.20 Concordances of Palestinian when Jerusalem is a collocate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>government’s position on the legal status of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gaza to near Jerusalem, where thousands of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>emotionally charged east Jerusalem funeral of a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>occupied East Jerusalem, and depriving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>between East Jerusalem and other parts of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>said, listing the Israeli victims of recent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Australia has decided to stop referring to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In The Australian, SMH and ABC corpora, the context in which Jerusalem was a collocation of Palestinian related to Australia’s stance on East Jerusalem and its decision to cease referring to East Jerusalem as occupied. Line 1 (Table 4.20) shows
an example that refers to the Australian government’s position on East Jerusalem in *The Australian* corpus. Similarly, line 5 shows that former Australian foreign affairs ministers Bob Carr and Gareth Evans criticised the Australian government’s stance on East Jerusalem in the *SMH* on June 10th, 2014:

The International Court of Justice in 2004 declared not only that the West Bank was occupied but that this was illegal. The court made no distinction between East Jerusalem and other parts of the Palestinian territories. If East Jerusalem is not to be referred to as “occupied”, why not Nablus or Bethlehem? If the Australian government can say “occupied East Jerusalem” is fraught with “pejorative implications” what is to stop Ms Bishop applying this to the occupied West Bank as a whole? It is a short step away for the Coalition government to declare that all the West Bank, with its population of more than 2 million Arabs, is no more than a “disputed” territory. (p. 19)

A similar critique of this decision emerged in the *Crikey* corpus. An expanded line 8 (see Table 4.20) shows that writer Nigel O’Connor believed this decision “has outraged Palestinians” (2014b, para. 1), although it “has won friends in the Israeli government” (para. 1).

Apart from Australia’s decision to cease referring to East Jerusalem as occupied, *The Age* covered the suffering of Palestinians in East Jerusalem because of Israeli settlements. For instance, (as indicated by expanding line 4) Palestinian human rights activist and co-founder of BDS, Omar Barghouthi, was quoted: “illegal Israeli settlement . . . is responsible for the theft of Palestinian land and water resources, denying many Palestinian workers access to jobs in occupied East Jerusalem, and depriving Palestinian farmers of their most fertile land” (Pollard, 2014l, p. 18).

In the *Herald Sun*, news.com.au and ABC corpora, the contexts in which Jerusalem was a collocation of Palestinian related to the coverage of specific events. The *Herald Sun* coverage related to clashes between Palestinians and Israeli police in Jerusalem during the Israeli war on Gaza (line 2). Similarly, news.com.au covered the kidnapping and killing of Palestinian teenager Mohammed Abu Khdeir by a group of Jewish settlers in Jerusalem in July 2014 (line 3). In its coverage of Jerusalem synagogue attacks in November 2014, the ABC quoted Netanyahu (see line 6), who accused

*Refugee* was a low-frequency collocation of *Palestinian*. Nevertheless, concordances of *Palestinian* when *refugee* was a collocation were examined to identify related contexts. The Palestinian refugees issue was discussed in *The Australian* in a context shown in line 1 (see Table 4.21). This context relates to the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, and Kerry’s attempts to press Netanyahu to “agree to a formula that would enable the return of some Palestinian refugees who fled or were expelled from Israel when the Jewish state was created in 1948” as sourced from Israeli daily newspaper *Maariv* (“Mid-East talks,” 2014, p. 6). While *refugee* was not as frequent as a collocation of *Palestinian* in the *Herald Sun* corpus, *refugee* was a collocation of *Palestinian* in news.com.au. The context shown in line 2 (see Table 4.21) refers to the news.com.au coverage of the Israeli shelling of a UN school in the Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza during the Israeli war in 2014. This shelling occurred “where the UN agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) said it had been trying to coordinate with the army over the evacuation of civilians, without success” (“Israeli shell attack,” 2014, para. 12).
Table 4.21 Concordances of *Palestinian* when *refugee* is a collocate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>formula that would enable the return of some <em>Palestinian</em> refugees who fled or were expelled from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>school in the north, where the UN agency for <em>Palestinian</em> refugees (UNRWA) said it had been trying over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Israel and respect the right of return of <em>Palestinian</em> refugees (a major stumbling block over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>- massacred hundreds of civilians in the <em>Palestinian</em> refugee camps at Sabra and Shatila. An</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>should condemn Israel’s refusal to readmit <em>Palestinian</em> refugees, and to provide remedies for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>in 1967, a right of return for <em>Palestinian</em> refugees, and full equality for Palestinians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Refugee* is not frequent as a collocation of *Palestinian* in the *Herald Sun* corpus.

*Refugee* was used as a collocation of *Palestinian* in the coverage of the BDS campaign in *The Age*. Additionally, it was used in the *SMH* coverage of the death of former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. First, *The Age* corpus (line 3) emphasised that for the BDS campaign, Israel must respect the right of return of Palestinian refugees, which is “a major stumbling block over decades of failed peace talks between Israel and Palestinians” (Pollard, 2014, p. 18). Importantly, six out of eight cases in which *refugee* was a collocation of *Palestinian* in *The Age* corpus referred to the Yarmouk Camp for Palestinian refugees in Syria. Second, within its coverage of Sharon’s death, the *SMH* highlighted the massacre of Palestinian refugees at camps in Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon in 1982 (line 4). Sharon was blamed for the massacre, as “his troops did not intervene while Israel’s Lebanese allies - a far-right Christian militia known as the Phalange - massacred hundreds of civilians” (O’Loughlin & Carman, 2014, p. 31) in the two camps.

The topic that emerged when *refugee* was a collocation of *Palestinian* in the ABC corpus was related to Australia’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An
expanded line 5 (see Table 4.21) indicates Saul (2014b) argued “Australia should condemn Israel’s refusal to readmit Palestinian refugees, and to provide remedies for the ethnic cleansing of Arabs - documented by Israeli historians - which accompanied the foundation of Israel in 1948” (para. 10).

The context in the corpora of Crikey was different, although line 6 (see Table 4.21) indicate similar topics emerged when refugee was a collocation of Palestinian. In other words, Crikey covered some academics of the BDS, such as Jack Lynch from the University of Sydney. Lynch “supports the principles of the BDS campaign, which calls for an end to Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories it occupied in 1967, a right of return for Palestinian refugees, and full equality for Palestinians in Israel” (Brull, 2014, para. 7).

Overall, I examined concordances of Palestinian when words land, Jerusalem and refugee were collocations to identify related contexts in the corpora. When land was a collocation of Palestinian, the contexts were relevant to Israeli settlements, and were sometimes related to the coverage of specific events. In this regard, Fairfax coverage was more in-depth. Both newspapers covered Israel’s restrictions on Palestinians due to settlements and separating Palestinian lands. However, there was no mention of occupation in this context.

Jerusalem was a low-frequency collocation of Palestinian in all Australian media corpora. The contexts related to the media coverage of specific events, such as clashes or attacks in Jerusalem. However, The Australian, The Age, SMH, Crikey and its readers, and ABC’s readers discussed issues such as the suffering of Palestinians in Jerusalem, Israel’s settlements in East Jerusalem, and the Australian government’s decision to cease referring to East Jerusalem as occupied.

Refugee was a low-frequency collocation of Palestinian in Australian media corpora. Therefore, concordances examined in this section show that the Palestinian refugee issue did feature prominently in Australian media. The right of return of Palestinian refugees was mentioned within the coverage of events like the death of Sharon and the
limited discussion of the peace process. Within this kind of coverage, no sufficient historical background was given.

4.7 Collocations of Gaza

Gaza was one of the most frequent words in the Australian media corpora. Therefore, it was a keyword in these corpora. I conducted a collocation analysis of Gaza for Australian media corpora. The most frequent collocations for Gaza are presented in Table 4.22, which includes only nouns, verbs and adjectives (excluding auxiliary verbs).

Table 4.22 shows that Israel, Hamas and rocket were among the top 10 collocations of Gaza in Australian media corpora, indicating a focus on coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014. Rocket was among the most frequent collocations of Gaza, which demonstrates a prominent media interest in the Palestinian rockets that targeted Israel, especially during the 2014 war.

Alternatively, blockade featured in the top 10 frequent collocations of Gaza only in the Herald Sun corpus. This could indicate that Australian media downplayed coverage of Palestinians in Gaza affected by the siege imposed by Israel since 2006, while coverage of Palestinian rockets and other events related to the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014 were more prominent.

The only instance of Palestinian or Palestinians as a frequent collocation of Gaza can be found in the Crikey corpus. Nevertheless, collocations such as people, civilian and child were among the top 10 collocations of Gaza in the corpora of the Herald Sun and Crikey.
Table 4.22 Most frequent collocations of Gaza in Australian media corpora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corpus</th>
<th>Top 10 collocations of Gaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Australian</td>
<td>Israel, Hamas, Strip, Israeli, rocket, war, say, conflict, Bank, West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herald Sun</td>
<td>Israel, rocket, child, Hamas, Strip, death, civilian, West, Bank, blockade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News.com.au</td>
<td>Israel, City, Israeli, Strip, strike, source, rocket, AFP, say, border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Age</td>
<td>Israel, Strip, say, war, Israeli, rocket, City, Hamas, militant, conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>Israel, Strip, war, Hamas, say, rocket, conflict, Israeli, militant, City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Israel, say, Israeli, rocket, conflict, Hamas, kill, war, fire, ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crikey</td>
<td>Israel, Strip, People, Palestinian, war, conflict, Carlton, July, Hamas, Palestinians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Israel was prominent as the most frequent collocation of Gaza in all Australian media corpora. This is due to Israel’s war on Gaza in 2014, its conflict with Hamas and the depiction of these events by Australian media. To identify further contexts and topics, I conducted a concordance analysis on Israel when it was a collocation of Gaza in each media corpus.

The concordances in Table 4.23 show cases in which Israel was a collocation of Gaza in Australian media corpora. While the research focused predominantly on these concordances, analysis was expanded to include other concordance samples of each corpus to further explore related topics. The Australian focused mainly on the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. Hence, The Australian referred to Israel’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique, in which Israel dropped leaflets and fired warning shells before destroying civilian targets in Gaza. This was cited as Israel’s attempt to reduce civilian casualties (see Table 4.23, line 1). Other topics that emerged in The Australian corpus included casualties from both sides, Israeli strikes on Gaza, Palestinian rockets, Israel’s military objectives of its Gaza operation, and ceasefire talks.
Similarly, the *Herald Sun* covered the Israeli perspective of the Israeli war on Gaza. An expansion of line 2 shows that the *Herald Sun* highlighted Israel’s military objectives, including its aim to destroy Hamas’s tunnels and rocket launchers. Equally, there was a marked focus by news.com.au on Palestinian rockets that targeted Israel during the 2014 war and Hamas’s tunnels. The news.com.au coverage also emphasised that Israeli strikes resulted in deaths among Gazans. Further, it provided background information on the previous Israeli wars on Gaza, ceasefire talks and the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers in Gaza. 

*The Age* and *SMH* focused their coverage of the conflict on events related to the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. However, other topics were covered by Fairfax newspapers, such as the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians and the two-state solution. This indicates that Fairfax newspapers’ coverage of the conflict offered a greater depth of coverage than other selected media, which focused mainly on day-to-day events. Nevertheless, Fairfax’s in-depth discussion was not comprehensive.
Concordances in Table 4.23 indicate that News Corp and Fairfax media covered the Gaza blockade from different perspectives. For example, line 3 indicates that news.com.au reported on what it termed an Israeli and Egyptian ‘blockade’ of Gaza. News Corp focused on what it considered as Egypt’s participation in the Gaza blockade, while The Age covered the blockade from a different perspective: it asserted that Israel’s blockade violated Humanitarian International Law (see Table 4.23, line 4).

Apart from the Gaza blockade, when Israel was a collocation of Gaza, the ABC (line 6) focused its attention on the substantial death toll of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. It emphasised that Palestinian deaths were non-combatants. It also covered the Israeli strikes on Gaza, as well as Palestinian rockets, and the international position on the Israeli targeting of Palestinian civilians and Hamas’s targeting of Israel (with rockets launched from Gaza). Additionally, the ABC highlighted Israeli claims that Hamas was using Palestinian civilians as human shields. The ABC coverage did not ignore the population from eastern Gaza displaced by the Israeli ground military operation in 2014, Israel’s blockade and restrictions on Gaza’s population.

Table 4.23 (line 7) demonstrates that Crikey addressed the consequences of the Israeli war on Gaza, including the economic effects on Gaza’s population and infrastructure. Other topics emerged in the Crikey corpus in relation to the conflict, including the targeting of Palestinian civilians and Israel’s blockade of Gaza. Crikey readers criticised media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza, in which Ben Ferguson from CNN called the Israeli military “incredibly compassionate . . . for warning Palestinians before bombing their homes” (Herbert, 2014a).

4.8 Collocation of Hamas

The Australian media portrayed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Israeli war on Gaza, frequently, as it is a Hamas-Israel conflict. This is evident in Table 4.22, in which Hamas was one of the most frequent collocations of Gaza.

As Hamas was also a keyword in Australian media corpora, I conducted further collocation and concordance analyses of Hamas in each corpus to identify how Hamas
was portrayed. The most frequent collocations of *Hamas* (including nouns, adjectives and verbs, except auxiliary verbs), in the order of their frequencies in Australian media corpora, are shown in Table 4.24.

*Israel* was the most frequent collocation of *Hamas* (except in the corpora of the *Herald Sun*). Nevertheless, *Israel* as a collocation of *Hamas* was still highly frequent in all Australian media corpora. Another frequent and relevant collocation of *Hamas* was *rocket*, indicating that Australian media coverage focused on Hamas’s rockets. Concordances of *Israel* when *rocket* was a collocation had already been explored. Therefore, to avoid potential repetition, I did not investigate concordances when *rocket* was a collocation of *Hamas*.

Table 4.24 Most frequent collocations of *Hamas* in Australian media corpora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corpus</th>
<th>Top 10 collocations of <em>Hamas</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Australian</td>
<td>Israel, Gaza, rocket, say, leader, war, fire, do, group, Israeli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herald Sun</td>
<td>rocket, Israel, Gaza, civilian, attack, fire, terrorist, do, Palestinian, launch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News.com</td>
<td>Israel, Gaza, say, rocket, militant, Palestinian, leader, group, AFP, wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Age</td>
<td>Israel, Gaza, rocket, say, do, Israeli, civilian, tunnel, group, attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>Israel, Gaza, rocket, say, war, group, attack, Palestinian, Israeli, do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Israel, Strip, say, Israeli, rocket, conflict, Hamas, kill, war, fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crikey</td>
<td>Israel, rocket, say, Gaza, year, military, Carlton, Egypt, Fatah, try</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.8.1 Representing terrorist *Hamas*

*Terrorist* is one of the top 10 collocations of *Hamas* in the corpora of the *Herald Sun*. Consequently, it is more likely that Hamas was portrayed as a terrorist organisation or group in this corpus. To investigate further, I conducted a concordance analysis of *Hamas* when it was portrayed as a terrorist organisation or group in all corpora. *Terrorist* was still frequent and significant in some corpora in this study, although it was less frequent in other Australian media corpora. Therefore, to identify contexts related to this portrayal of *Hamas*, I conducted a concordance analysis to identify the context in which *terrorist* was a collocation of *Hamas* in each corpus (see Table 4.25

145
for a concordance from each corpus). I also expanded the analysis to other concordances of each corpus to gain a more comprehensive overview of the portrayals of Hamas.

*The Australian* represented Hamas as terrorist organisations citing Israeli sources. Table 4.25 (line 1) shows a concordance of *Hamas*, in which it was portrayed as a “murderous terrorist organisation” (Lyons, 2014j, p. 7). This concordance was part of a quotation by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in coverage of Fatah and Hamas negotiations for an end to the Palestinian split:

Abu Mazen (Mr Abbas) needs to choose between peace with Israel and an agreement with Hamas, a murderous terrorist organisation that calls for the destruction of the state of Israel and which both the US and the European Union define as a terrorist organisation. (Lyons, 2014j, p. 7).

In another context, commentator Jennifer Oriel (2015) criticised the European Parliament’s decision to remove Hamas from its terror list:

The European Parliament uncritically acknowledged the terrorist group Hamas as a standing government in its motion to recognise Palestinian statehood. Australia and the US were the only two members of the UN Security Council to vote against recognition of Palestinian statehood in December. (p. 22)

Not only did *The Australian* portray Hamas as a terrorist group that rules Gaza, it also represented it as an Islamist terrorist organisation. In other words, *The Australian* placed Hamas in the same category as ISIS. Mark Regev, a spokesman for Netanyahu, was quoted in *The Australian*, stating that “Hamas remains an extremist Islamist terrorist organisation. It belongs to a family of ruthless and violent movements that includes ISIS, Hezbollah and the Nusra Front” (Lyons, 2014q, p. 10). A sample of concordances of *Hamas* when terror*ist* was a collocate depicts Hamas as a terrorist organisation; this portrayal was used *by* *The Australian* to justify Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip.
Table 4.25 Concordances of terrorist Hamas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concordances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>peace with Israel and an agreement with Hamas, a murderous terrorist organisation that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>its people. As a terrorist organisation, Hamas applies selective memory to the civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>and members of the European Union, class Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kidnapping and killing Israeli boys is a horror. Hamas is a terrorist group. It uses human shields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>negotiate issues, to partner with the terrorist Hamas entity, which is committed to Israel’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>attempt to weaken terrorist organisation Hamas. Mr Ben-Shmuel says Israel is trying to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>sticking point—Palestine is not a state, and Hamas is a terrorist non-state actor. This complication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the Israeli war on Gaza, *The Australian* reported on the disappearance of Israeli soldiers whom Hamas claimed to have kidnapped. *The Australian* stated that “Hamas usually kidnaps civilians or soldiers and holds them as bargaining chips to secure the release of terrorist suspects” (“Phone call,” 2014, p. 7).

Similarly, in its coverage of Palestinian civilian killings, the *Herald Sun* supported Israeli claims that Hamas used Palestinian civilians as human shields (see Table 4.25, line 2). This report portrayed Hamas as an Islamic terrorist organisation and used emotive language: “a manipulative, terrorist cult born of a rancid culture that is fuelled by neighbouring extremists” (Howe, 2014, p. 55). Within these portrayals, the *Herald Sun* compared ‘terrorist Hamas’ with ‘democratic Israel’, referring to Israel as “the only democracy in the Middle East” (Wakim, 2014, p. 31).

Like its News Corp counterparts, News.com.au also portrayed Hamas and other Palestinian factions as terrorist organisations. Line 3 shows the concordance of Hamas in the news.com.au corpus when terrorist was a collocation. This concordance is
related to removing Hamas from the terror blacklist of the European Parliament. While the same topic emerged in The Australian corpus, the context in which the topic was covered by news.com.au related to Hamas’s online campaign:

A statement posted by one of the group’s media officials said it . . . “aimed to send a message to the European public” which has “demonstrated its solidarity with the Palestinian cause” that Hamas is “not a terrorist movement, but a nationalist liberation movement”. (“Hamas mocked,” 2015, para. 11)

There were a few cases in which terrorist was a collocation of Hamas in Fairfax newspapers. Some cases in The Age and SMH corpora were letters to the editor. In only eight cases in The Age, Hamas was represented as a terrorist organisation (as designated by the US and EU), but only its military wing is listed by Australia as a terrorist organisation (see line 4). Hamas’s portrayal as a terrorist group in The Age was based on its rocket attacks on Israel:

Having withdrawn voluntarily from Gaza, it found itself with a huge refugee camp on its border, which the terrorist organisation Hamas could use as a military base. With the convenient cover of a helpless civilian population, Hamas could escalate its rocket attacks to target every major Israeli city, knowing that any retaliation would be likely to create a humanitarian crisis. (Daley, 2014, p. 33)

Similarly, in The Age articles relating to the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers in Hebron (June 2014), Israel’s right to self-defence was emphasised:

Kidnapping and killing Israeli boys is a horror. Hamas is a terrorist group. It uses human shields to protect its munitions and its fighters. It actively invites Israeli attacks that inevitably wreak havoc on innocent Palestinians. Every country has a right to defend itself. (Rothkopf, 2014, p. 18)

However, a different perspective of Hamas emerged in The Age corpus:

As Israel’s international reputation takes a renewed hammering, Netanyahu needs to recognise that the other “terrorist” organisation, Hamas, also reflects legitimate Palestinian aspirations. (George, 2014, p. 20)
Within only seven cases, in which terrorist was a collocation of Hamas, the SMH highlighted Israel’s military objective in Gaza in 2014: destroying ‘Hamas terrorist infrastructure’. Sharyn Mittelman (2014), a senior policy analyst at the AIJAC, wrote:

It is important to remember that Hamas started this round of conflict and had the opportunity to end it, but now Israel’s operation is aimed at degrading Hamas’ extensive terrorist structure to stop the rockets now and into the foreseeable future. (p. 20)

Like the News Corp media corpora, the SMH portrayed Hamas as an Islamist terrorist group. Hamas was represented as “a proscribed terrorist group dedicated to Israel’s destruction and the genocide of Jews, determined to create bloodshed on both sides to strengthen its power” (Rubenstein, 2014b, p. 16). This quotation positions Hamas as a terrorist group that aims to destroy Israel and commit genocide against Jews. Similar to its representations in The Age, Hamas was compared to ISIS, according to the Israeli voices used as sources in the SMH.

Portraying Hamas as terrorist continued in readers’ letters published in the SMH. In a letter regarding the Gaza blockade, the reader stated “the blockade was instituted only after Israel withdrew completely from the Gaza Strip and was subsequently subjected to rocket fire and terrorist attacks from Hamas” (Freedman, 2014, p. 17). In this example, Hamas was portrayed as the “root cause of the conflict” (Freedman, 2014, p. 17)

Hamas’s portrayal on the ABC was related to coverage of the kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers in Hebron in June 2014. Relying on US sources, the ABC portrayed Hamas as a terrorist organisation “known for its attacks on innocent civilians and which has used kidnapping in the past” (Cooper, 2014g, para. 15). Similar to other outlets, the ABC relied on Israeli sources such as Netanyahu and military spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner. Table 4.25 (line 6) refers to the ABC article that quoted Israel’s ambassador to Australia, Shmuel Ben-Shmuel, who stated that Israel’s war on Gaza “an ongoing attempt to weaken terrorist organisation Hamas” (Brissenden, 2014, para. 2). Hamas and other Palestinian factions were also portrayed as terrorist groups by Falkenstein (2014b) who stated that “more than 2,200 rockets
have been fired by *Hamas and other terrorist groups* [emphasis added] from the Gaza Strip into Israel since July 8, and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have responded by attacking terrorist targets in Gaza” (para. 2).

Within its coverage of the Palestinian unity government, the ABC highlighted Hamas’s status as a terrorist organisation with the US and EU. The reason for this categorisation was “its refusal to recognise Israel, renounce violence and accept interim Israeli-Palestinian peace deals” (“Gaza conflict: Temporary,” 2014, para. 29). Further, for the ABC, US recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organisation resulted in the US Congress imposing “restrictions on funding for the Palestinian Authority, which typically runs at $500 million a year, in the event of a unity government” (Cooper, 2014i, para. 6).

Hamas was also compared to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the ABC’s portrayal of the group as a terrorist organisation. It was stated that “Egyptian courts banned the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas as terrorist organizations, and imprisoned most of the symbols of the 25 January 2011 revolution” (Abou El Fadl, 2014, para. 41).

There were two cases in which *terrorist* was a collocation of *Hamas* in the Crikey corpus. The first was a quotation from the UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping, Herve Ladsous, regarding UN interference in Gaza in the aftermath of the war-driven humanitarian crisis. Ladsous stated “Palestine is not a state, and Hamas is a terrorist non-state actor” (Beard, 2014, para. 2). The second example, written by Philip Dalidakis, a commentator for Sky News and ABC News, was published in Crikey:

> I support a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and I oppose the expansion of settlements in the West Bank as counter-productive. But I also oppose people hiding behind the cloak of “proportionality” to deny Israel the right to defend itself while giving a free pass to proscribed terrorist organisations such as Hamas. (2014, para. 11)
4.9 Summary

This chapter has discussed the findings of corpus-based analyses on Australian media corpora using online linguistic tool Sketch Engine. The various functions of this online software provided a general and detailed overview of Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Starting from the Word List function, keywords in Australian media corpora were identified. I expanded the analysis to include collocations, concordances and frequency analyses. The analysis included both high- and low-frequency words and collocations in the corpora. The keywords in Australian media corpora were *Israel, Israeli, Palestinian, Gaza* and *Hamas*. Obtaining word sketches of *Israeli, Palestinian* and *Hamas*, categorising and expanding to concordance analyses helped identify topics and contexts and obtain an overview of the representation of actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Representations of the conflict were found to be relevant to the coverage of events, rather than in-depth discussions of these topics. Additionally, positive representations of Israel emerged in concordance analyses. However, less prominent negative portrayals of Israel emerged in Australian media corpora. Both positive and negative representations of Palestinians, and negative representations of Hamas emerged, when words such as *terrorist* and *bloodthirsty* were used in Australian media corpora. Overall, word sketches of *Israeli* and *Palestinian* indicate that Australian media avoided using words such as *innocent* in their representations of both Israelis and Palestinians.

The most dominant linguistic patterns resulted from collocation analyses of keywords *Israel, Palestinian* and *Gaza*. These patterns were indicated from collocations such as *kill, rocket, militant* and *civilian* that were relevant to the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. Alternatively, other patterns were less dominant. For example, *occupation* as a collocation of *Israel* was frequent in both Fairfax newspapers. Expansion to concordance analysis when *Australia* was a collocation of *Israel* demonstrated the variety of related topics covered by Australian media. These topics included Australia’s decision to cease referring to East Jerusalem as occupied, Australia’s pro-Israel bias and the effect of Jewish organisations in Australia, such as the AIJAC, on Australian foreign policy. Related concordances also indicated that Australian media published articles written by AIJAC staff. Table 4.11 shows that international news
agency AFP was among the top 10 collocations of Israel in the news.com.au corpus. This could indicate that news.com.au relied on AFP as a news source.

I also examined concordances of Palestinian when land, Jerusalem and refugee were collocations to identify related contexts in the corpora. When these words were collocations of Palestinian, the reporting was found to be more likely related to event coverage. Fairfax coverage was more in-depth than other corpora.

The next chapter presents the findings of CDA on a smaller sample of news articles related to the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014. It focuses on Australian media representations of the two main events that sparked the war: the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers in Hebron and a Palestinian teenager in Jerusalem. In addition, it presents the findings of the analysis of events related to Palestinian casualties that resulted from Israeli attacks.

Chapter 5 presents the findings of analysis of frames, voices, portrayals of Israeli and Palestinian actors, and inclusions and exclusions in the Australian media coverage of the 2014 war.
Chapter 5: War Frames, Violations and Legitimisation

5.1 Introduction

In Chapter 4, the findings from the corpus-based analysis indicated that Australian media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was extensive during the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. Consequently, I used CDA to examine a smaller sample of news articles included in Australian media corpora. This chapter provides the findings from the CDA on the sample of data published in selected Australian media from June 14th to August 31st, 2014.

This chapter focuses on Australian media representations of the two main events that sparked the war: the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers in Hebron and a Palestinian teenager in Jerusalem. It also provides descriptions of the representations of the events related to Palestinian casualties that resulted from the Israeli attacks. The events during the war included:

- Israeli attacks on Gaza and targeting civilians including children (Israeli shelling in which four children were killed on a Gaza beach and nine children were killed in a playground in Gaza City)
- Israeli shelling of UN schools in Gaza, and
- Shujaiya and Kuza’a massacres.

Frames used in Australian media representations of the events above are explored in this chapter. In addition, this discussion identifies voices included in media coverage of these events, the portrayal of Israeli and Palestinian actors, their characteristics, actions and roles; and inclusions and exclusions. Related findings relevant to the research questions of this study (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5.4) helped identify to what extent the media were balanced or biased in their representations of events related to the Israeli war on Gaza 2014.

The findings in this chapter indicate the significance of the voices used in media on the framing of events related to the conflict. Australian media, quantitatively and
qualitatively, relied more on Israeli than Palestinian voices. Consequently, at times, the Israeli military operation in Gaza were justified and legitimised in Australian media. However, because this reliance on Israeli voices varied between outlets, full or partial exclusions of some aspects and the use of victims’ voices also varied. As a result, the research found that while victims’ voices were occasionally used in some coverage, they were noticeably voiceless in others. The prominence of frames such as responsibility, the occasional use of frames such as human interest, and the exclusion or downplaying of other frames (e.g., victim) were evident in the analysis.

This chapter addresses the key research question relating to the representations of actors. Similar to the previous chapter, the CDA findings indicate that Israel was portrayed positively, while Hamas was portrayed negatively. However, media varied in terms of their portrayals of Israeli and Palestinian actors and their actions.

Chapter 5 presents the findings on Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 and provides a general overview of the data that were analysed. Further, it focuses on the CDA findings according to the events and themes related to the conflict. First, the overview presents some quantitative aspects of the findings. Later, discussion shifts to the findings of the qualitative analysis.

5.2 Overview of Data

When conducting CDA, 293 news articles from selected Australian media (from June 14th to August 31st, 2014) were analysed (see Table 5.1).
### Table 5.1 Number of news articles analysed using critical discourse analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media source</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Australian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herald Sun</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News.com.au</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Age</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crikey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before presenting the findings of the qualitative analysis, this section presents a statistical overview of the data to determine the dominant sources of news articles, voices and frames that emerged in these articles (in each media and overall).

#### 5.2.1 Sources of news articles

The selected Australian media (see Table 5.1) relied on their correspondents and editors in their coverage of events related to the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. In other words, media correspondents, reporters and editors wrote 49.1% of related news articles. The Australian relied on its correspondents, reporters and editors the most (64.5%); similarly, the SMH also relied heavily (53.9%) on correspondents in its coverage of related events. Print media coverage relied less on columnists than other sources such as news agencies. Among the four newspapers included in the analysis, the SMH relied on its columnists most (7.7%). External writers such as politicians, community leaders, academics and public intellectuals constituted 6.2% of sources that selected Australian media outlets relied on for coverage of Gaza War events.

Articles sourced from news agencies, such as Reuters, AFP, AP and Australian Associated Press (AAP), constituted 36.2% of articles related to the 2014 war. Both the ABC and news.com.au relied on news agencies the most (54% and 53.6% respectively). Conversely, the Herald Sun and Crikey did not source articles from news agencies and only 3.8% of articles published in the SMH originated from agencies. Furthermore, only 4% of articles published in all media were from undefined...
sources. The percentages of undefined sources were the highest in the *Herald Sun*, *The Age* and *SMH* (see Appendix C). Australian media in this study took only 2% of their articles from other news sources, such as the BBC, *NYT* and *New York Post*. Overall, the reliance of the selected Australian media on news agencies was prominent. This prominence varied between each outlet. However, news websites, the ABC and news.com.au, relied on agencies more than other media.

**5.2.2 Israeli v. Palestinian voices**

In Australian media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014, Israeli voices included Israeli government, military, parliament, political parties, health officials, and former and undefined officials. Palestinian voices included the PA, Hamas and other Palestinian factions’ officials (such as Fatah and Islamic Jihad officials), Palestinian health officials and undefined officials.

Israeli voices were slightly more dominant than Palestinian voices in Australian media portrayals. Israeli voices constituted 39.8% of all voices used in media coverage, while Palestinian voices constituted only 33.2% (see Appendix D). Nevertheless, the difference between media use of both Israeli and Palestinian voices is not greatly marked. However, when considering frequencies and percentages in each media, the gap between the reliance on Israeli and Palestinian is more significant. For example, in *The Australian*, 44.7% of voices used were Israeli, while only 23.3% were Palestinian. This gap is smaller in the *Herald Sun*, news.com.au and ABC, although these platforms also favoured Israeli voices over Palestinian voices (see Appendix D).

In contrast, Palestinian voices were used more frequently than Israeli voices in *The Age* (45.7%) and *Crikey* (46.1%), compared with Israeli voices (29% and 30.8% respectively). Similarly, the *SMH* relied on Palestinian voices over Israeli voices (34.9% v. 27.3%). Despite this, the gap between both voices in the *SMH* was slightly less evident, compared with gaps in *The Age* and *Crikey*.

Different categories of Israeli and Palestinian voices were used by Australian media in their coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Appendix E shows that 87.6% of Israeli voices quoted in Australian media were officials, while Palestinian officials’
voices constituted only 73.2% of all Palestinian voices relied on by Australian media. Moreover, 95.5% of Israeli voices used in the ABC coverage of events were officials, and 81% of Palestinian voices were also officials.

While 19.4% of Palestinian voices included in Australian media coverage were Palestinian residents, only 2.5% of Israeli voices were residents (see Appendix E) Palestinian residents’ voices were prominent in The Age (32.9%), the SMH (29.7%) and Crikey (66.7%). While Palestinian media constituted only 2.3% of Palestinian voices used in Australian media coverage, Israeli media constituted 7.9% of Israeli voices.

Australian print and online media used the voices of Palestinian non-government organisations (NGOs) (3.2%) more than it used the voices of Israeli NGOs (0.8%). Similarly, media outlets used the voices of Palestinian experts and academics more than they used Israeli experts and academics. The Australian was the outlet that relied most heavily on Israeli NGOs (2.7%), while the media outlet that used Palestinian NGOs voices most was The Age (5.9%). On the contrary, the media outlet that used both Israeli and Palestinian experts and academics’ voices most was the SMH (3.5% and 8.1% respectively).

Overall, Israeli voices were more dominant than Palestinian voices in Australian media coverage of the conflict. Although the overall gap between the media use of both voices was not greatly marked, it was more significant when considering frequencies of the use of both voices by each media outlet. This significance was clear in The Australian. Conversely, the significance of the gap between the use of both voices, in favour of Palestinian voices, was more prominent in The Age than it was in other media. Further, Australian media used Israeli and Palestinian officials’ voices more than any other types of voices in the coverage.

5.2.3 Other voices

Australian voices comprised only 3.3% of voices used in Australian media coverage of events related to the Israeli war on Gaza. UN and US voices were more dominant, since they constituted 10% and 7.1% of all voices in selected media. It was only in the
*Herald Sun* that Australian voices were used slightly more than US voices were. Other voices, such as the EU (1.5%), Arab (2.3%) and international NGOs (1.1%) were used less by Australian media than the voices mentioned above (see Appendix D).

### 5.2.4 Frames

Conflict was the most dominant frame used in Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 (43.3%). The *SMH* coverage of this war was the only exception; the human interest frame was most dominant in this newspaper (40.8%) (see Appendix F). The dominance of the conflict frame indicates that Australian media portrayed the war by focusing on the conflict between both sides, mainly Israel and Hamas. Despite this finding, frequencies and percentages of the frames used in Australian media coverage, such as human interest, victim and consequences frames, show a smaller focus on stories related to the effect of the war on people’s lives (from both sides of the conflict). In other words, human interest, victim and consequences frames constituted only 18.2%, 3.5% and 1.3% respectively of the frames used in Australian media coverage.

Table 5.2 Frames used in Australian media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human interest</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justifying Israeli operation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condemning Israeli actions</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alleged numbers of casualties</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responsibility frame was the second most dominant frame (22.4%) used in Australian print and online media. By employing this frame, the media attributed
responsibility for the war, heavy human loss, and the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers to Hamas, Israel, Abbas, the US and the world community.

Although The Australian was the only outlet that used the frame of ‘alleged numbers’ of Palestinian casualties, this frame constituted 4.1% of the frames used in this newspaper coverage of the 2014 war. The comparison frame was also used in the Australian media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza. This frame constituted only 3% of frames used and is investigated further in the qualitative analysis of this chapter and Chapter 6.

5.3 Representations of the Israeli War on Gaza 2014

The analysis focused on the representations of specific events and the emergent themes. These events include the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers in Hebron and a Palestinian teenager in Jerusalem. Australian media highlighted the incident in which three Israeli teenagers (Eyal Yifrach, Gilad Sha’er and Naftali Frankel) were kidnapped and killed in Hebron. Another event was the kidnapping and killing of Palestinian teenager Mohammed Abu Khdeir by Jewish extremists in Jerusalem. The selected sample of Australian media highlighted these incidents as they “set off an escalation in tensions with Hamas that led to the Israeli offensive in Gaza” (Casey & Solomon, 2014, p. 8). Both events were considered the catalyst of Israeli military operation Protective Edge on the Gaza Strip in July and August 2014.

In addition to the aforementioned events, this chapter illustrates representations of the events related to the Israeli shelling of Palestinian civilians. These events include Israeli shelling that resulted in the killing of four children on a beach and nine children in a playground in Gaza, Israeli shelling of UN schools, and the Shujaiya and Khuza’a massacres.

5.3.1 Representations of the kidnapping and killing of teenagers

This section discusses Australian media representations of the kidnapping and killing of Israeli teenagers in Hebron and a Palestinian teenager in Jerusalem.
Various frames emerged in the Australian media coverage of the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers in Hebron and a Palestinian teenager in Jerusalem. These frames included responsibility, conflict and human interest. The responsibility and conflict frames were more prominent in News Corp media and the ABC, while the human interest frame was more prominent in Fairfax newspapers. In News Corp media and ABC platforms, responsibility was attributed to Hamas, early in the coverage. However, the ABC highlighted that Hamas “neither confirmed nor denied involvement in the disappearance of the students nor in the cross-border rocket salvoes from Gaza” (Cooper, 2014b, para. 24).

This responsibility frame emerged when Netanyahu, who blamed Hamas for the kidnapping and killing of the three Israeli teenagers, stated:

Israel has publicly blamed Hamas for the teenagers’ abduction and staged a major crackdown on the West Bank . . . Mr Netanyahu told ministers . . . “Hamas is responsible, and Hamas will pay,” he asserted in a statement, adding the teenagers “were kidnapped and murdered in cold blood by human animals. Satan has not yet invented vengeance for the blood of a small child”. (“Bodies of three,” 2014, para. 7–9)

The conflict frame was prominent in News Corp media, ABC and Crikey coverage of both incidents. This frame emerged, for example, when The Australian portrayed Abu Khdeir’s kidnapping and killing as a “revenge for the murder of three Israelis whose bodies were dumped in a pit in the West Bank” (Lyons, 2014aa, p. 17), and as “an opportunistic criminal act by a fringe group” (Dally & Slezak, 2014, p. 10), that “puts Israelis and Palestinians dangerously on the brink of a new intifada” (Lyons, 2014o, p. 1).

News.com.au also used a conflict frame to represent the killing of Abu Khdeir:

Hamas has warned that Israel will pay for the kidnap and murder of a Palestinian teenager in annexed east Jerusalem, in suspected revenge for the murder of three Israeli teenagers. “We send our message to the Zionist entity and its leaders, which hold direct responsibility (for the murder), that our people will not let this crime pass, nor all the killings and destruction by your settlers,” the Islamist movement said on Wednesday. “You will pay the price
for these crimes,” it said of the incident, in which the Palestinian youth was reportedly kidnapped and killed early on Wednesday. (“Militants tell Israel,” 2014, para. 1–4)

The conflict frame is also evident in the coverage of both incidents in the ABC and Crikey. The ABC stated “the hostilities began . . . after three Jewish students were abducted in the occupied West Bank and were later found killed . . . [and] a teenage Palestinian was kidnapped and found killed in Jerusalem” (“Gaza conflict: Israel’s,” 2014, para. 23–24). Further, Crikey portrayed the killing of Abu Khdeir as a “retaliatory killing” (O’Connor, 2014a, para. 1).

In contrast, while the frame of attributing responsibility to Hamas was dominant in News Corp media coverage of both incidents, the human interest frame was more prominent in Fairfax newspapers. The SMH portrayed the kidnapping and killing of Abu Khdeir in a human interest frame:

In Jerusalem, in the mourning tent for Mohamed Abu Khedair, his grief-stricken father, Hussein, sits in the shade of the grapevine covering his family’s garden. “He was a lovely child,” Hussein says. “He wanted to be an electrician, but just two months ago I visited his school and his teacher told me he should be an actor, a comedian, he had so much humour inside him”. (Pollard, 2014s, p. 23)

However, this study found that the human interest frame was used less often in other Australia media. For example, in its coverage of the beating of Abu Khdeir’s cousin, Tareq, by Israeli police, news.com.au used a human interest frame. It quoted the teenager’s parents, who said their son was savagely beaten in police custody (“Jewish extremists,” 2014). News.com.au also referred to “a video surfaced on YouTube showing Israeli border police beating and kicking a handcuffed semi-conscious figure on the ground, before dragging him away” (“Jewish extremists,” 2014, para. 16).

Overall, the victim frame was less prominent in Australian media representations of the kidnapping and killing of the three Israeli teenagers and the Palestinian teenager. For examples, the three Israeli teenagers were portrayed as victims when the ABC quoted US President, Barack Obama. The latter stated that the US “condemns in the
strongest possible terms this senseless act of terror against innocent youth” (Brissenden, 2014, para. 22).

5.3.1.2 Voices

Australian media used both Israeli and Palestinian voices in their coverage of the kidnapping and killing of the three Israeli teenagers and the Palestinian teenager. However, media varied in their use of Israeli and Palestinian voices. For example, some exclusions were made within representations in News Corp media, in particular The Australian and the Herald Sun. Palestinian voices were sometimes excluded, especially in the early coverage of incidents, while Israeli voices were more dominant. Consequently, Abu Khdeir’s story was excluded from some of The Australian and Herald Sun articles.

In The Australian coverage, voices of Israeli officials were dominant; Israeli government and party officials were used to blame Hamas for the kidnapping incident. For instance, The Australian cited Netanyahu, who blamed Hamas for the kidnapping and killing of the teenagers (e.g., Lyons, 2014o, 2014aa). Furthermore, Israeli Deputy Defence Minister, Danny Danon, called for the “eradication” of Hamas (Lyons, 2014o, p. 1), and Meretz party leader, Zahava Gal-On, demanded “a distinction between the perpetrators, who should be punished to the full extent of the law, and the moderate forces in the Palestinian Authority” (Lyons, 2014r, p. 12).

In its reliance on Israeli voices, the ABC predominantly used Netanyahu’s voice in its coverage of the kidnapping. Netanyahu “accused . . . Hamas of kidnapping the teens, and launched sweeping search operations to find them” (“Israel hits Gaza,” 2014, para. 8), and “demand[ed] Western-backed Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas abrogate a reconciliation deal he reached with Hamas” (“Bodies of Israeli teenagers,” 2014, para. 13). Overall, reliance on Israeli voices, particularly in News Corp media, legitimised Israeli actions.

Palestinian voices were used in Australian media coverage of the kidnapping and killing of the Palestinian teenager. For instance, news.com.au highlighted Hamas’s voice as it “warned that Israel will pay for the kidnap and murder of a Palestinian
teenager” (“Militants tell Israel,” 2014, para. 1), accusing Netanyahu of “giving orders to settlers” to carry out Wednesday’s kidnap” (para. 11). It also used the voice of PA president, Mahmoud Abbas, who “demanded that Netanyahu act against revenge attacks and called for Abu Khder’s killers to be caught and punished” (“Israel moves,” 2014, para. 11). Similarly, Abbas’ voice was highlighted in The Australian, when he “called on Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to condemn the kidnapping” (Lyons, 2014b, p. 8) of Abu Khdeir and demanded Israel “take measures on the ground to stop the settler attacks and the chaos that was left in the aftermath of Israel’s acts of escalation” (p. 8). Importantly, Israeli voices were excluded in Fairfax’s early coverage of Abu Khdeir’s kidnapping, before the announcement that the boy was burnt alive by six Jewish extremists (Israeli settlers).

Abbas’ voice was also used in the ABC coverage of Abu Khdeir’s killing. For example, the ABC stated Abbas “demanded Israel condemn the kidnapping and suspected murder of [Abu Khdeir]” (“Palestinian Authority,” 2014, para. 1). The ABC also quoted a Palestinian voice, Fatah official Dmitry Diliani, asserting that the Israeli government “bears responsibility for Jewish terrorism and for the kidnapping and murder in occupied Jerusalem” (“Palestinian Authority,” 2014, para. 16). At the same time, The Age used the voice of a Palestinian official, who “appealed for UN intervention to stop Israel’s week-long campaign of arrests and air strikes over the suspected kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers in the occupied West Bank” (“UN help,” 2014, p. 15).

Despite mainly relying Israeli officials’ voices (such as Netanyahu and Israeli police) in the coverage of the kidnapping events, the voices of victims’ families were also used. For instance, in the early coverage of the kidnapping of the Israeli teenagers, the ABC quoted Rachel, the mother of Naftali Frankel, who “said in a televised statement [that] Israel was working to bring the teens home” (Cooper, 2014g, para. 11). Further, the ABC used Abu Khdeir’s family voice when they emphasised that “Israeli settlers are responsible for the killing” (Cooper, 2014a, para. 3).
In its coverage of Abu Khdeir’s killing, *The Australian* quoted his mother, Suha:

Suha reflects on the sense of different treatment when I ask why, given so much surveillance material, she thinks police have not apprehended the culprits? “Because they (the kidnappers) are Jewish,” she says. “If the kidnappers were Arabs they would have got them within five minutes.” Mr Netanyahu has promised a thorough investigation, but here there is scepticism. “If it was my son who had kidnapped the three Israelis my house would have been destroyed,” Suha says. “But because we’re Arabs we don’t get the same legal rights or care as if we were Jews”. (Lyons, 2014w, p. 11)

In addition to Israeli and Palestinian voices, Australian media used US and Australian voices to portray both incidents. For example, the ABC employed the US voice as the latter “urged Abbas’s PA to ‘take all necessary steps to prevent an atmosphere of revenge and retribution’” (“Israel boosts,” 2014, para. 21) and “condemned the killing of a Palestinian youth in apparent revenge for the murders of three Israeli teenagers” (“United States,” 2014, para. 1). Similarly, *The Australian* used the voice of Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbot, who described the incident as a “shameful act” (Lyons, 2014c, p. 7), condemning “all acts of terrorism” (p. 7). In its coverage of the beating and arresting of Abu Khdeir’s cousin, news.com.au quoted US State Department spokesman Jen Psaki, who stated that the US was “profoundly troubled” (“US says,” 2014, para. 7) by the reports on Tareq, and called for “a speedy, transparent and credible investigation and full accountability for any excessive use of force” (para.8).

5.3.1.3 Actors

Australian media tended to represent Hamas negatively with regard to the kidnapping incidents. For example, *The Australian* published an article by Israel’s Ambassador in Australia, Shmuel Ben-Shmuel (2014), in which he described Hamas as the “devil”, “murderous organisation”, and the “key impediment to lasting peace” (p. 11). Hamas was also portrayed as being not “different from any other radical organisation operating in the region, like al-Qa’ida [or] like ISIS” (Nicholson, 2014, p. 12). In another example, *The Australian* referred to previous incidents in which Hamas “kidnap[ped] civilians or soldiers and [held] them as bargaining chips to secure the release of terrorist suspects” (“Phone call,” 2014, p. 7). The article referred to Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons as terrorist suspects. In addition, it was stated
that Hamas “decided to take advantage of the unrest Mohamed’s murder unleashed and to escalate its rocket attacks on Israel” (Lyons, 2014aa, p. 17). Hamas was also personalised in *The Australian*, in which its leader Khaled Meshal was portrayed as he “led the cheer squad that extolled their abductors’ actions” (“Hamas not fit,” 2014, p. 17). Similarly, news.com.au portrayed Hamas as a terrorist group who was responsible for kidnapping and killing the three Israeli teenagers (“Bodies of three,” 2014), as it “kidnapped Israelis in the past” (“Israel releases,” 2014, para. 18). In a similar manner, the ABC portrayed Hamas as a “terrorist organisation known for its attacks on innocent civilians and which has used kidnapping in the past” (Cooper, 2014b, para. 15).

Negative representations of Palestinians emerged, mainly in news.com.au coverage of the kidnapping. It is noteworthy that news.com.au focused on Palestinian ‘violence’ and ‘anger’ in the aftermath of the incident. For example, it was stated that “more than 200 angry youths began throwing stones and blocked the light rail from passing through a nearby settlement neighbourhood” (“Palestinian teen Mohammed Abu Khder found dead,” 2014, para. 14).

In contrast, positive representations of Israel emerged within Australian media coverage of the incident. For instance, news.com.au highlighted a positive representation of Israel as “a small country with an ‘all for one and one for all’ mentality” (“Israel releases,” 2014, para. 23). It also emphasised the “national spirit of solidarity in Israel” (“Israel releases,” 2014, para. 23). However, when Israel was personalised, negative representations emerged. For example, the Israeli government led by Netanyahu was depicted as “the most right wing, hawkish, government in Israel’s history . . . . [that] has used this tragic event to blame Hamas for the kidnapping” (Dally & Slezak, 2014, p. 10). At the same time, the right wing in Israel was accused of having an agenda, as it “wants to escalate the growth of Jewish settlements in the West Bank due to the three Israeli murders” (Lyons, 2014ac, p. 6). In a related context, *The Australian* mentioned an increase in violence by Israeli settlers towards “Palestinians, their homes and their fields” (Dally & Slezak, 2014, p. 10).
Australian media tended to background Israeli actors in the kidnapping and killing of Abu Khdeir:

A Palestinian teenager has been kidnapped and killed [emphasis added] in an apparent act of revenge for the murder by militants of three Israeli youths, triggering clashes in east Jerusalem … the teenager was snatched on [emphasis added] today while hitchhiking in east Jerusalem and his body dumped [emphasis added] in a forest in the western part of the city. (“Palestinian teen Mohammed Abu Khder found dead,” 2014, para. 1–2)

Another example of this backgrounding tendency is demonstrated in the SMH coverage of Abu Khdeir’s killing. It was stated that Abu Khdeir “was burnt alive” (“PM blames Hamas,” 2014, p. 18). In the same way, Israeli police were backgrounded in the news.com.au coverage of the beating of Abu Khdeir’s cousin in Jerusalem (e.g., “Jewish extremists,” 2014; “US says,” 2014). However, details of Israeli Jews involved in the kidnapping and killing of Abu Khdeir were suppressed in The Australian (see Lyons, 2014c).

Conversely, Australian media tended to foreground Palestinians actors and occasionally background them. For instance, the ABC foregrounded Palestinian militants as “they want to kidnap Israelis to win concessions from the Israeli government” (Cooper, 2014g, para. 17). Similarly, the ABC foregrounded Hamas by stating that Hamas “abducted them [the Israeli teenagers]” (“Bodies of Israeli teenagers,” 2014, para. 1), and that Hamas “has a history of these sort of brutal kidnappings and murders” (Brissenden, 2014, para. 17). The same tendency of foregrounding Hamas as an actor emerged in news.com.au coverage, in which it was stated that “three Israeli teenagers . . . were kidnapped in the West Bank by members of the Islamist movement” (“Fireball shoots,” 2014, para. 10).

In their representations of Israeli actions, Australian media varied in their use of active and passive structures. While News Corp media tended to use active structures for Israeli actions, it tended to use passive structures for these actions related to the incidents. For example, news.com.au stated that Israel “blamed [emphasis added] Hamas for the teenagers’ abduction and staged a major crackdown on the West Bank” (“Bodies of three,” 2014, para. 7), and “accused [emphasis added] Hamas of being
behind the abductions and launched a frantic manhunt throughout the West Bank, arresting nearly 400 Hamas operatives in the process” (para. 14). A second example is in The Australian coverage of Abu Khdeir’s kidnapping. The Australian used a passive structure to represent the involvement of Israeli Jews. The newspaper described Abu Khdeir’s abduction, stating that “the youth was forced [emphasis added] into a car” (Lyons, 2014c, p. 12). The same passive structure was used in news.com.au, when the news site referred to negative actions of Israeli Jews. However, news.com.au used an active structure when referring to Israel’s positive actions relating to the killing of Abu Khdeir, and a passive structure to describe negative actions relating to the beating of his cousin, Tareq, by Israeli police in Jerusalem. For instance, a passive structure was used in news.com.au’s headline that affirmed that the Palestinian teenager “was burned alive” (“Palestinian teen Mohammed Abu Khdeir was burned alive,” 2014), while it used an active structure to refer to Netanyahu’s action, in which he “condemned” the killing and “ordered investigators to work ‘as quickly as possible’ to track down the perpetrators” (“Militants tell Israel,” 2014, para. 5), and “called the teenager’s father to convey their condolences and express outrage over the murder” (“Israeli war planes,” 2014, para. 19). The actions of Israeli police who beat Abu Khdeir’s cousin were reported in a passive structure (see “Jewish extremists,” 2014).

On the contrary, The Age and the ABC reported the Israeli escalation in the West Bank after the kidnapping and killing of the three Israeli teenagers, in which both used active structures to report on Israeli actions. For instance, The Age highlighted Israeli military actions when the latter “swept into Jalazoun refugee camp, outside Ramallah . . . touching off confrontations in which soldiers shot and killed a 20-year-old Palestinian man and wounded another” (“PM blames Hamas,” 2014, p. 18), and “continued raids there on Saturday night, entering 146 homes and arresting 10 members of the Hamas movement” (“UN help,” 2014, p. 15). The ABC used an active structure to portray Israel’s actions of “raid[ing] Palestinian towns and villages, detaining Hamas activists and closing the group's institutions” (“Bodies of Israeli teenagers,” 2014, para. 10). Further, it used an active structure to cover the demonstrations in which “several
hundreds [of] Israeli demonstrators, some chanting ‘death to Arabs’, blocked the main entrance to Jerusalem” (“Palestinian Authority,” 2014, para. 20).

Similarly, the ABC tended to passivate negative Israeli actions and activate positive actions. For example, in its coverage of Abu Khdeir’s killing, a passive structure was used: “the boy was forced into a car by three Israelis” (“United States,” 2014). Alternatively, an active structure was used to state that Netanyahu “phoned Mohammed Abu Khdeir’s father and promised his attackers would be prosecuted” (“Beaten Palestinian,” 2014, para. 8). The Israeli actions were passivated in relation to the beating and arresting of the teenager Tareq, who “was subjected to a brutal beating by Israeli border police” (“Beaten Palestinian,” 2014, para. 1), and then “freed on bail but a judge . . . ruled he is to remain in the Jerusalem area of Beit Hanina during the investigation” (para. 3).

The Australian media’s use of active and passive structures varied along with Israel’s actions. Likewise, they varied their use of these terms to report on Palestinian actions. The Age, for instance, activated Palestinian actions in relation to Israel’s escalation after the deaths of the Israeli teenagers. It was stated that Palestinians “appealed for UN intervention to stop Israel’s week-long campaign of arrests and air strikes over the suspected kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers in the occupied West Bank” (“UN help,” 2014, p. 15). News.com.au used an active structure for Palestinian actions in article headlines (see “Fireball shoots,”, 2014; “Israel says,” 2014), while it used a passive structure to represent Palestinian actions in the same event in the text. It stated “three Israeli teenagers, one of them also a US citizen, have been kidnapped in the occupied West Bank, presumably by Palestinians” (“Israel says,” 2014, para. 1). However, in the same article it quoted a senior Israeli official who referred the action to Palestinians (see (“Israel says,” 2014). It is noteworthy that both news articles cited above were taken from different sources, AFP and AAP. Regarding Hamas actions, active structures were used. It was stated that Hamas “[had] warned that Israel [would] pay for the kidnap and murder of a Palestinian teenager” (“Militants tell Israel,” 2014, para. 11), and “accused Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of ‘giving orders to settlers’ to carry out [the kidnap]” (para. 11).
5.3.1.4 Portraying victims

Australian media tended to individualise victims of the kidnaping incidents in Hebron and Jerusalem. For instance, the names and ages of the three Israeli teenagers, and the circumstances in which they were kidnapped and killed, were mentioned:

Eyal Yifrah, 19, Gilad Shaar, 16, and Naftali Fraenkel, a 16-year-old with dual Israeli-American citizenship, disappeared while hitchhiking home near the West Bank city of Hebron late at night on June 12 and were never heard from again. . . had been studying at Jewish seminaries in the West Bank. (“Bodies of three,” 2014, para. 1–2)

Similarly, the same tendency emerged in Australian media coverage of the kidnaping and killing of the Palestinian teenager in Jerusalem. The SMH quoted the Palestinian Attorney-General who “said soot was found in the lungs of Mohammed Abu Khdeir, 16, whose charred body was found in a forest” (“Palestinian boy,” 2014, p. 13). A further example was evident in the news.com.au coverage:

Mohammed Abu Khder, 16, was kidnapped from the Shuafat neighbourhood of Arab east Jerusalem on Wednesday and his burnt body was found hours later in a west Jerusalem forest, in an attack Palestinians believe was carried out by Jewish extremists. (“Palestinian teen Mohammed Abu Khder was burned alive,” 2014, para. 2)

The circumstances in which Abu Khdeir was kidnapped and killed were reported in Australian media. For example, The Australian reported that the teenager “was forced into a car. . . as he walked to a mosque opposite his house in the suburb of Beit Hanina to attend early prayers for Ramadan” (Lyons, 2014b, p. 8). The article highlighted the anger among the Israeli Arab community, triggered by the insufficient efforts of Israeli authorities to find the killers, as well as “the different treatment the boy and his parents had received compared with the families of the three Jewish youths” (Lyons, 2014g, p. 7). Although the Israeli and Palestinian teenagers were all victims, they were portrayed in different ways in the media. The Australian quoted Abu Khdeir’s father, who said “If things were different and an Arab kidnapped an Israeli, it would have been uncovered in moments” (Lyons, 2014b, p. 8), and referred to the delay by the Israeli authorities in Jerusalem in investigating the incident. In addition, Israeli police
“had suggested [earlier that] the boy may have been murdered as part of a family feud” and questioned the victim’s father (Lyons, 2014g, p. 7).

5.3.2 Representations of the Israeli shelling of children on a beach and playground in Gaza

In separate events in July 2014, four Palestinian children from the same family (the Bakr family) were killed in an Israeli shelling on a Gaza beach, and nine children were killed when they were targeted by another shell in a playground in El Shati Camp in Gaza City. Although Australian media highlighted these events, the coverage varied in terms of depth and voices. I begin with media framing of both incidents before exploring more features of media representations including: (i) media use of voices; (ii) their representations of Israeli and Palestinian actors and their actions; and (iii) their portrayals of casualties resulted from both incidents. Within this exploration, I also discuss inclusions and exclusions made by the media.

5.3.2.1 Frames

Australian media used frames such as conflict, human interest and responsibility in their coverage of the killing of 13 children in Israeli attacks on a beach and a playground in Gaza. News Corp newspapers The Australian and the Herald Sun did not cover both events specifically; they were reported within coverage of other events. Therefore, The Australian used the conflict frame. The newspaper coverage asserted that “the deaths of four cousins who were playing on a Gaza city beach when they were hit by Israeli shellfire also provoked outrage” (“Reports from Gaza,” 2014, p. 23). The conflict frame was also used when The Australian covered the killing of nine children by another Israeli shelling a few days later (Lyons, 2014x, p. 9).

While The Australian used the conflict frame, the Herald Sun and news.com.au used the human interest frame to represent the killing of the Bakr’s children:

But an image that has been tattooed on my mind is the sight of four mothers who lost their children. They were aged between nine and 11, from the same extended family . . . I was at the hospital when the mothers were told their sons were dead. I saw them howl in despair. Primal screams that punch you right in the heart”. (Stefanovic, 2014, p. 21)
Although the human interest frame was prominent in the news.com.au coverage, victim and conflict frames were also used. News.com.au highlighted that the children were “playing on the beach, [when] they had become the unwitting victims of one of Israel’s relentless attacks” (“Israeli strike on Gaza,” 2014, para. 6). In addition, a conflict frame emerged in the news.com.au coverage of the Israeli shelling of the children in the playground:

The overnight strikes came after a day of heavy Hamas-Israeli fighting in which nine children were killed by a strike on a Gaza park where they were playing, according to Palestinian health officials—a tragedy that each side blamed on the other. (“Israel fire missile,” 2014, p. 13)

Similarly, the same frames, human interest and conflict, emerged within the Fairfax newspapers and ABC coverage of both events. For instance, the human interest frame was used in The Age in its coverage of the beach attack:

Ten-year-old Ismail was playing soccer on the beach when he was torn down by a shell fired from an Israeli gunship in the Mediterranean just off the beach in Gaza City. The desperate attempts of Ismail and his three cousins, Mohamed, 11, Zakaria, 10, and Ehad, 9, to run from the attack shocked the world. (Pollard, 2014e, p. 24)

The same frame was used in SMH coverage of an incident in which more children were killed in a Gaza playground:

Earlier on Monday, eyewitnesses reported a missile hit Shamali Street in Gaza’s al-Shati camp. Ambulance sirens wailed above the cries of shocked families who had, minutes earlier, raced from their houses to find at least eight children torn to pieces by rocket fire. (Pollard, 2014c, p. 25)

Both human interest and conflict frames were used in ABC coverage of the Israeli shelling that resulted in the killing of four children on the beach and nine children in a playground:

In one incident, four boys aged between eight and 11 were killed on a Gaza beach when they were hit by Israeli fire in full view of several foreign journalists. Israel’s military said the deaths appeared to be the “tragic outcome” of an Israeli strike targeting Hamas militants. (Cooper, 2014e, para. 11)
Although there was no direct coverage of the incidents in Crikey, a human interest frame emerged when Crikey included a background about Palestinian child killings during the conflict in 2008–2009. This previous war, described as a “brutal 23 day devastation of Gaza . . . resulted in . . . many children burnt through to their bones by Israel’s use of white phosphorus [that did not] discriminate between combatants and children” (Johnson, 2014, para. 3).

Responsibility frames were used in the coverage of both events in the Australian media. Responsibility was attributed to Palestinian militants, Hamas and Israel. The attribution of responsibility to Palestinian militants “whose rockets fell short and hit the Shifa Hospital and the Beach (Shati) camp” (“Israel fire missile,” 2014, para. 43), emerged in news.com.au. In this context, the latter highlighted Israel’s denial of targeting the playground in which nine children were killed, and claims that “a rocket launched by Gaza militants misfired and landed in the park” (“Israel fire missile,” 2014, para. 21). Equally, the SMH reported that “Israel denied it was responsible . . . saying a rocket misfired by Palestinian militants in Gaza was to blame” (Pollard, 2014q, p. 24).

Responsibility was attributed to Hamas in News Corp’s coverage of the beach killings. For example, news.com.au quoted the Israeli military “calling the casualties a ‘tragic outcome’ but blamed Hamas for exploiting the death of its citizens to gain international sympathy” (“The Gaza conflict,” 2014, para. 8). Similarly, the Herald Sun attributed responsibility to Hamas when it stated that the latter was responsible for using the death of Palestinian civilians, including children and women, for public relations and as “emotional blackmail to stop Israel from retaliating” (“Herald Sun,” 2014c, p. 36). While responsibility was attributed to Hamas, the Israeli shelling of children on the beach was justified in the Herald Sun when it was stated that “Gaza is a tiny strip of land on the borders of Israel and Egypt, and targets are difficult to separate from schools, hospitals and houses” (“Herald Sun,” 2014c, p. 36). It is of interest that both The Australian and Herald Sun excluded the fact that the four children were playing in an open area next to the beach in Gaza City, and there were no specific military targets in the surrounding area.
Fairfax newspapers and the ABC attributed responsibility to Israel for the deaths of the nine children. For instance, SMH correspondent Ruth Pollard wrote that Israel “was attempting ‘to escape from this crime and its fears that this crime will be exposed and [it will be] held judicially accountable’” (Pollard, 2014q, p. 24). The ABC attributed responsibility in a similar manner:

Inside Gaza itself, eight children and two adults were killed by a blast in a park as an unofficial truce, sought by the United Nations for the Muslim Eid al-Fitr festival, collapsed. Residents blamed the explosion on an airstrike, but Israel said a misfiring militant rocket caused the carnage. (“Gaza conflict: Eight,” 2014, para. 3–4)

5.3.2.2 Voices

Israeli and Palestinian voices were included in the ABC coverage of both incidents. These voices included Israeli military, Palestinian witnesses and health officials. Australian media used Israeli voices in their coverage of both incidents. For example, the Herald Sun used Israeli voices in its coverage of the four children’s deaths. It also used the voices of Netanyahu, who “blamed Hamas” for the deaths (“Herald Sun,” 2014c, p. 36) and Israeli President Shimon Perez, who considered the killing of civilians in air strikes on Gaza a “moral dilemma” (“Herald Sun,” 2014c, p. 36). Similarly, news.com.au used Israeli military spokesmen’s voices in its coverage of both incidents. For example, it quoted the Israeli army when it blamed Hamas for “exploiting the death of its citizens to gain international sympathy” in the aftermath of targeting the four children on the beach (“The Gaza conflict,” 2014, para. 8). In the same way, Israel’s denial of targeting the children on the beach and playground was featured in The Age and SMH. Israeli spokespeople stated that the army “had no intention of harming civilians” (“Innocents lost,” 2014, p. 24).

Australian media also used Palestinian voices in their portrayal of the beach and playground killings. News.com.au used Palestinian officials’ perspectives in the coverage of the second event when it stated “Palestinian police and civil defence said an Israeli missile hit as children were playing on a swing set” (“Israel fire missile,” 2014, para. 20). Gaza’s Interior Ministry spokesman Eyad al-Bozum said that “he
believe[ed] that shrapnel found in the dead and wounded [was] evidence of Israel’s role in the incident” (“Israel fire missile,” 2014, para. 46).

Hamas officials and Palestinian medics’ voices were used occasionally, although Israeli voices were used more often in Australian reports on the incidents. The SMH quoted Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri (see Pollard, 2014q). Further, a Palestinian medic, Hamdi Kahlout, was quoted by The Age’s correspondent in Gaza:

This time they are here for Ahmed Bakr, 20, who was badly injured nine days ago and was one of the few patients evacuated to the French Hospital in East Jerusalem for treatment. He died on Tuesday and his body was brought back to Gaza on Wednesday. “They are not coping,” Kahlout says. “They have lost so much and they are so upset, it is difficult to know what to do”. (Pollard, 2014f, p. 26)

In addition to the previous Palestinian voices, Australian media used the voices of Palestinian residents and witnesses of both incidents. These voices were used mainly in Fairfax newspapers, news.com.au and ABC coverage. For instance, the voices of children’s families were highlighted in The Age’s coverage of the deaths of the children on the beach:

“He was growing up one centimetre by one centimetre and suddenly in one second, a missile hit him and he was cut to pieces,” Ismail’s father, Mohamed al-Bakr, 52, says. “He went out to play and he came back in pieces.” . . . Sahar, Ismail’s mother, says: “I do not want Jewish mothers to feel the pain that I feel”. (Pollard, 2014e, p. 24)

News.com.au also used the voice of the Bakr family:

The boys’ uncle, Abdel Kareem Bakr, 41, raged at Israel after the attack. “It’s a cold blooded massacre,” he said. “It’s a shame how come they didn’t identify them as kids with all of the advanced technology they claim they’re using”. (“Israeli strike on Gaza,” 2014, para. 14–16)

In a similar manner, news.com.au and ABC quoted Palestinian witnesses. One witness quoted in news.com.au said the children “were playing and were happy, enjoying Eid, and they got hit” (“Israel fire missile,” 2014, para. 22). Correspondingly, the ABC quoted another witness who said that he “saw the children playing . . . . Seconds later a missile landed” (“Gaza conflict: Eight,” 2014, para. 13). On the contrary, the News
Corp newspapers, *The Australian* and the *Herald Sun*, excluded the voices of the victims’ families. However, other Palestinian sources and voices, such as Palestinian media, were used in *The Australian* to portray the incidents in which the nine children were killed. For instance, the Palestinian Maan News Agency was quoted, stating that “the families had taken advantage of a lull in bombing to have the outing near the beach. Israel claimed an errant shell by militants rather than an Israeli shell killed the children” (“Reports from Gaza,” 2014, p. 21).

5.3.2.3 Actors

Australian media varied in their portrayal of Israel as a main actor and its actions in relation to both incidents. News Corp newspapers *The Australian* and *Herald Sun* tended to either suppress or background Israel and use passive structures to report Israel’s actions, while Fairfax newspapers *The Age* and *SMH* tended to foreground Israel and use active structures to represent its actions. In contrast, news.com.au and the ABC tended to suppress or background Israel as an actor and to use both active and passive structures to report on its actions.

In its portrayals of actors related to both events, *The Australian* tended to background Israel as an actor and use a passive structure when referring to Israeli actions. *The Australian* supressed Israel as an actor in the playground killings by using the verb ‘died’ instead of ‘killed’ when referring to the killing of the nine children, and did not identify whether the shelling was the action of Israelis:

> In Gaza, nine children in a playground *died* [emphasis added] when *a shell landed* [emphasis added] in their midst. According to Maan news agency, they were part of an outing by a group of families celebrating the first day of the Muslim holiday, Eid al-Fitr. (Lyons, 2014x, p. 9)

Similarly, the other News Corp newspaper the *Herald Sun* tended to use passive structures in its coverage of the Bakr family, whose children “*were killed* [emphasis added] when they *were hit by shells* [emphasis added] fired from an Israeli naval vessel while they played on a beach” (“Herald Sun,” 2014c, p. 36). The newspaper reported that the children “were playing on the beach when they *were killed by missiles fired* [emphasis added] from an Israeli navy ship” (Stefanovic, 2014, p. 21).
In contrast, in relation to the coverage of the beach killings, *The Age* and *SMH* tended to foreground Israel as an actor and to use an active structure to refer to its actions, as demonstrated in an example from *The Age*:

Banging on the metal door, members of the Bakr family - who have already known such grief - were there to collect another of their dead. They had already buried Mohammed Bakr, 9, Ahed Bakr, 10, Zakaria Bakr, 10, and Mohammed Bakr, 11, all killed on July 16 when *Israeli gunboats fired* [emphasis added] on the beach as the four boys tried to run for safety. (Rothkope, 2014, p. 18)

Nevertheless, Israel was suppressed as an actor in *SMH* coverage of the killing of the nine children in a playground in Gaza, who were “torn to pieces by rocket fire” (Pollard, 2014c, p. 25).

News.com.au tended to either suppress or background Israel as an actor in related news articles and used active and passive structures when referring to its actions. In its coverage of the Israeli shelling of the children on the beach, news.com.au used an active structure in the headline: “Israeli strike on Gaza kills four Palestinian boys” (“Israeli strike on Gaza,” 2014). However, Israel was backgrounded as an actor in the text of the same news article, which stated that “two other shells had targeted—and killed—four other children who had been playing football on the beach further down” (“Israeli strike on Gaza,” 2014, para. 9). While news.com.au backgrounded Israel as an actor in the first incident, it suppressed Israel in its coverage of the second event. This is indicated in the headline “Eight Palestinian children killed as missile slams into UN refugee camp playground” (“Eight Palestinian children,” 2014), and in the text, where it was stated that “exchanges of fire have killed eight Palestinian children in a Gaza refugee camp and four people in Israel” (“Eight Palestinian children,” 2014, para. 1). In relation to the second event in another text, Israel was backgrounded again (see “The Gaza conflict,” 2014; “Israel fire missile,” 2014).

The ABC used active and passive structures to refer to Israeli actions related to both incidents, along with backgrounding Israel as an actor. For instance, in one of its headlines, it reported “four boys killed in strike on Gaza beach” (Cooper, 2014e). In this example, the ABC used a passive structure to refer to the Israeli shelling that killed
four Palestinian children from the same family. On the contrary, the active structure was used in another article, which stated that “an Israeli gunboat off Gaza’s Mediterranean coast shelled a beach, killing four boys - two aged 10 and the others 9 and 11 - from one family and critically wounding another youngster” (“Gaza conflict: Temporary,” 2014, para. 31). In reports of the second incident, in which nine children were killed, the ABC backgrounded Israel as an actor (“Gaza conflict: Eight,” 2014).

5.3.2.4 Portraying Palestinian casualties

Australian media individualised the four children killed in the Israeli shelling of a Gaza beach. Yet, this was not the case when the media represented the nine children killed in another Israeli shelling in a playground in Gaza City. The children who were killed in the second event were reported only in terms of numbers; details about their names, ages and the circumstances in which they were killed were excluded.

It is noteworthy that both incidents were not reported in a specific manner on Crikey. Crikey represented the killing of Palestinian children during the broader conflict statistically. For instance, it was stated that “an estimated 190 Palestinian children [had] been killed . . . (in less than three weeks) due to Israeli strikes that [were] purported to be targeting ‘militants’” (Johnson, 2014, para. 2).

5.3.3 Representations of the Israeli shelling of United Nations schools

This section explores Australian media representations of the Israeli shelling of three United Nations (UN) schools in Gaza. Israel shelled five UN schools in the Gaza Strip in July and August 2014. However, Australian media focused predominantly on three of these attacks on schools in northern and southern Gaza, where Palestinian civilians were sheltering, in Beit Hanoun, Jabalia and Rafah. On July 24th, 2014, an attack on a UN school in Beit Hanoun in northern Gaza killed at least 15 and injured 200 Palestinians (Beaumont, 2014). Again, at least 15 people, mostly children and women, were killed and more than 100 were injured when Israel shelled another UN school in the Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza on July 29th, 2014 (Sherwood, 2014). The third Israeli shelling reported by Australian media was the shelling of a school in Rafah, southern Gaza, on August 3rd, 2014 where 3,000 civilians were sheltering

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(Human Rights Watch, 2014). The shelling killed at least 10 people and resulted in the injury of dozens (Burke, 2014). The Palestinian death toll of Israeli attacks on UN schools in the Gaza Strip during the 2014 war reached more than 40.

5.3.3.1 Frames

Various frames emerged in the Australian media coverage of the Israeli shelling of UN schools in Gaza. One of the most prominent frames in this regard was justifying the Israeli shelling. This frame was used mainly in The Australian and Herald Sun. Both newspapers justified Israeli actions by emphasising Israel’s right to defend itself from Palestinian rocket attacks and highlighting Hamas’s use of Palestinian civilians as human shields and the storage of rockets and weapons in schools. In addition, both newspapers employed other frames such as conflict and responsibility to portray related events. One example, published in The Australian on July 26th, 2014, after the Israeli shelling of the Beit Hanoun school, shows how both frames were used in the same text:

This week, a stash of rockets was discovered in a building between two UN schools housing 3000 displaced Palestinians. Deliberate or not, the collateral damage inflicted on Palestinian families by Hamas has been vast. They deserve far better. As Israel exercises its right to defend itself, Hamas’s predilection for hiding its arsenals among civilians has been one of the main reasons for Israel’s ground incursion into Gaza, a campaign that already has cost the lives of several dozen Israeli soldiers. (“Reports from Gaza,” 2014, p. 23)

Similarly, news.com.au used conflict and human interest frames in its coverage of the attacks. Both frames were employed within news.com.au coverage of the Jabalia school:

Fifteen Palestinians were killed when an Israeli shell slammed into a UN-run school where hundreds of civilians had taken refuge, sending the death toll in Gaza soaring to 777, despite world efforts to broker a cease fire. The strike hit a school sheltering some of the 100,000 Palestinians driven out of their homes in search of a safe haven after weeks of deadly fighting between Israeli troops and Hamas militants. The shell crashed in the middle of the courtyard on Thursday where people had set up camp, leaving the ground covered in bloodstains. (“Israeli shell attack,” 2014, para. 1)
A variety of frames were used in Fairfax coverage of the shelling of UN schools. *The Age* and *SMH* employed human interest, conflict, victim, comparison and lawful frames. The human interest frame was more prominent in *The Age*, while the conflict frame was more prominent in the *SMH*. The following example shows the human interest frame used by *The Age* to represent the Israeli shelling of the school in Beit Hanoun:

That toll may rise again after an attack on a United Nations school in Gaza sheltering Palestinians displaced by the fighting. At least 15 people were killed - many of them children - and more than 200 were wounded, as gruesome images of panic, death and fear emerged from the Beit Hanoun Elementary school compound. (Pollard, 2014g, p. 23)

The same human interest frame emerged in *The Age’s* representations of the shelling of the Jabalia school. The newspaper relied on portrayals of Palestinian casualties as a result of the shelling, such as Ibrahim Suliman’s story:

Four days before his death, Suliman had made the agonising decision to separate his extended family of 30, dividing them between the four local schools sheltering Palestinians in a desperate bid to keep them alive. The shell attack on the UN school in Beit Hanoun in which 15 people died and 200 were injured early on July 24 had terrified Suliman, his cousin Yassin Suliman said as he waited to collect his body for burial. “Let’s not die together,” he told his wife and children when the shelling from the Israeli tanks around their home in Beit Lahiya became too much and they were forced to flee. (Pollard, 2014f, p. 26)

While the human interest frame was evident in *The Age* coverage of the attacks, the conflict frame was prominent in the *SMH*’s portrayal of the same event. For example, the *SMH* highlighted quotations from Israeli military, who claimed that the Israeli shelling of the school in Beit Hanoun was a response to Palestinian militants’ rockets:

The incident - in which 15 people died and a further 150 were injured - occurred during intense fighting between the IDF and militants in the area near the school in Beit Hanoun, the military said [in] a statement. “The militants fired anti-tank missiles at IDF soldiers, who then responded by firing several mortars in their direction.” (Pollard, 2014p, p. 14)
Like Fairfax, the ABC employed various frames to portray the events. The most prominent frames were conflict, responsibility and human interest. The victim frame, as with other media coverage of related events, was less prominent.

Crikey used the responsibility frame to blame to both Hamas and Israel for their failure to protect civilian lives. Freelance writer Matthew Beard (2014) argued that the situation in Gaza required the intervention of other parties:

> Whether Gaza formally constitutes any of these is up for debate, but the moral point is the same: people are dying needlessly, and we have a responsibility to defend them. Most of the responsibility for this protection falls, as Adams argues, on Hamas and Israel themselves. However, given that each is demonstrably failing in this task, someone else needs to step in. (para. 6)

A human interest frame also emerged in Beard’s (2014) article, when he criticised the targeting of civilians by Israel. He referred to an Israeli media source:

> In an environment where the Times of Israel can publish a piece entitled “When Genocide is Permissible”, and Gaza continues to be subjected to rocket fire, it appears clear that civilian lives are not being treated with respect and dignity. (para. 5)

5.3.3.2 Voices

Australian media relied on a range of different voices in their coverage of the Israeli shelling of UN schools, including Israeli, Palestinian, UN, US and Australian officials, and Palestinian medics and witnesses. Media relied heavily on Israeli voices, such as the Israeli government and military officials. For example, The Australian highlighted Israeli claims that Hamas “is using these [UN] facilities to fire rockets at civilians in Israel” (Lyons, 2014z, p. 1). Furthermore, the Israeli military claimed that “it [did] not operate or target international organisations in the Gaza Strip” (Pollard, 2014o). Similar claims by Israeli military were quoted after the shelling of the Beit Hanoun school, when military spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner stated:

> Israel’s defence force is investigating the incident, saying militants use civilians and international bodies as shields and suggesting Hamas rockets landed in the area too. “It could be errant fire from the IDF or rockets landing
Palestinian voices were also used in the Australian media coverage of the attacks on schools. For instance, *The Australian* used the voices of officials, medics and witnesses, while these voices were excluded from the *Herald Sun* coverage. It is noteworthy that Palestinian casualties’ voices were excluded from both newspapers. However, the *Herald Sun* portrayed Palestinian civilians as people who “are at the most risk with few places to hide in the densely populated city” (“Herald Sun,” 2014d, p. 65). Similarly, the ABC largely excluded the voices of Palestinian casualties because of its reliance on official sources. Nonetheless, the ABC occasionally used the voices of Palestinian witnesses:

Laila Al-Shinbari, a woman who was at the school when it was shelled, said families had gathered in the courtyard expecting to be evacuated in a Red Cross convoy. “All of us sat in one place when suddenly four shells landed on our heads ... bodies were on the ground, (there was) blood and screams,” she said. “My son is dead and all my relatives are wounded including my other kids”. (“Gaza conflict: Palestinians blame,” 2014, para. 6–8)

Australian media used the voices of the UN and UNRWA in their coverage of the Israeli shelling of UN schools. *The Australian* and *Herald Sun* reported condemnation from UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon. Both newspapers also emphasised that the UNRWA “that runs many schools in Gaza . . . revealed it had found another hidden cache of weapons” (Lyons, 2014ae, p. 7). In addition to using the UNRWA’s voice, the ABC highlighted Israel’s potential violations of International Humanitarian Law by targeting the UN school in Jabalia:

UN Relief and Works Agency head General Pierre Krahenbuhl issued a denunciation of the strike, saying the school’s location had been communicated to the Israeli army 17 times. “I condemn in the strongest possible terms this serious violation of international law by Israeli forces,” General Krahenbuhl said. “This is the sixth time that one of our schools has been struck.” (“UN school in Gaza,” 2014, para. 9–11)

It is of interest that US officials’ voices were more prominent than Australian voices in Australian media coverage. For example, US voices were used in Fairfax
newspapers, when the White House described the shelling of the Jabalia school as “totally unacceptable and totally indefensible” (Pollard, 2014a, p. 23), and “said there was little doubt it was Israeli artillery that hit the school” (p. 23). Australian voices were used to indicate the nation’s position on the events. Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop condemned the shelling. The ABC quoted Bishop, who described the Israeli shelling of UN schools as “indefensible” (“Gaza conflict: Julie Bishop,” 2014, para. 1). She stated that Australia demanded “a full investigation” (para. 1), and called on Israel to take “necessary steps to prevent civilian casualties” (para. 8), while practising its ‘right to self-defence’.

5.3.3.3 Actors

Australian media tended to either suppress or background Israel as an actor in their coverage of the Israeli shelling of UN schools. For example, Israel was suppressed in Herald Sun and news.com.au coverage of the Beit Hanoun school shelling, where “at least 15 people were killed by shelling that hit a school compound” (“Herald Sun,” 2014d, p. 65):

A UN school in Gaza crowded with hundreds of Palestinians seeking refuge from fierce fighting came under fire last night, killing at least 15 civilians and leaving a sad tableau of blood-spattered pillows, blankets and children’s clothing scattered in the courtyard. (“10,000 Palestinian protesters,” 2014, para. 16)

Israel was also suppressed as an actor in The Australian and Herald Sun in relation to the attack on the school in Jabalia. Correspondent John Lyons (2014p) inferred that “it seems it was the shelling of the UN school . . . that killed children as they slept that finally pushed the US to seriously pressure both Israel and Hamas for a ceasefire” (p. 11). Further, Israel was backgrounded by The Australian in relation to its shelling of the UN school in Rafah:

On a weekend when there was international uproar over a strike on a UN-run school in Gaza that killed 10 people, three of them members of Islamic Jihad . . . Outrage such as that expressed over the UN school strike is justified (UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon termed it “a moral outrage and criminal act”). This newspaper’s consistent view is that Israel should be no more
immune to criticism than Hamas and the jihadists when it is responsible for such civilian carnage. (“Jihadist slaughters,” 2014, p. 24)

Equally, Israel was backgrounded in the Fairfax and ABC coverage of the attack on the school in Jabalia, as reported in The Age:

Four donkeys lay dead at the gate of the Jabalia Elementary Girls School in Gaza, the first indication of the bloody human toll inside. Three heavy artillery shells hit the United Nations school in the early hours of Wednesday, killing 19 and wounding at least 100. More than 3300 Palestinians were sheltering there after fleeing from Israel’s military operations in Gaza. (Pollard, 2014i, p. 16)

On the contrary, The Age suppressed Israel as an actor in its shelling of the school in Rafah. It was stated that the “attack hit directly outside the UN school . . . in which at least 3000 Palestinians were sheltering, and blew shrapnel inside the school grounds, striking people in the playground and spraying through classroom windows” (Pollard, 2014b, p. 14).

In their portrayal of Israel’s actions in events related to the shelling of UN schools, the Australian media varied in terms of its use of active and passive structures. While News Corp newspapers The Australian and Herald Sun passivated Israeli actions, news.com.au activated the same actions. Thus, the Herald Sun stated that “at least 15 people were killed by shelling that hit a school compound” in Beit Hanoun (“Herald Sun,” 2014d, p. 65). In contrast, news.com.au used an active structure to refer to the Israeli shelling of a school in Jabalia. It stated that Israeli “shells struck a UN school in Gaza . . . killing 16” (“United Nations school,” 2014, para. 1). The same active structure emerged in news.com.au coverage of the Israeli shelling of the school in Rafah (see “Israeli air strike,” 2014).

Conversely, The Age, SMH and ABC used both active and passive structures to portray Israeli actions. For instance, The Age used an active structure to report on the Israeli shelling of the UN school in Rafah. However, The Age used a passive structure to refer to the Palestinian killings during the earlier Israeli shelling of the school in Beit Hanoun. It was stated that “15 people were killed [emphasis added] - many of them children - and more than 200 were wounded” (Pollard, 2014g, p. 23). The ABC also
used both active and passive structures to represent Israel’s actions. For instance, in its coverage of the Rafah school shelling, the ABC used an active structure to report on Israeli actions. It reported that an Israeli air strike “[had] killed [emphasis added] 10 people and wounded about 30 in a school in southern Gaza” (“Gaza conflict: 10 killed,” 2014, para. 1).

Apart from activating and passivating Israel’s actions, Australian media tended to use active structures when representing the actions of Hamas and other Palestinian factions. For example, *The Australian* and *Herald Sun* tended to activate Hamas’s actions when referring to its use of civilians as human shields. Correspondingly, the ABC used an active structure when it was stated that Palestinian militants “use[d] civilians and international bodies as shields” (“Gaza conflict: Palestinians blame,” 2014, para. 3).

5.3.3.4 Portraying Palestinian casualties

Australian media varied in their representations of Palestinian casualties in the shelling of UN schools. While News Corp and the ABC tended to represent these casualties in terms of numbers, Fairfax newspapers tended to individualise them.

News Corp and the ABC often represented these casualties in terms of numbers. For example, it stated that the “Israeli shelling of a UN school in Gaza’s Jabaliya refugee camp has killed at least 15 people” (“UN school in Gaza,” 2014, para. 1). The only exception was *The Australian* and ABC’s quotation of Palestinian resident Laila Al-Shinbari, who “was one of the women who had fled to the school” (Lyons, 2014l, p. 11) in Beit Hanoun, where her son was killed and relatives were injured. In contrast, *The Age* and *SMH* tended to individualise Palestinian casualties in addition to representing them statistically. Although Palestinian casualties in the attacks on schools in Beit Hanoun and Rafah were portrayed only in numbers, casualties in the shelling of the school in Jabalia were individualised:

> I was sleeping when the first shell landed,” said 15-year-old Rezeq al-Adham [emphasis added] as he lay in Kamal Adwan Hospital awaiting surgery to save his injured right leg. “I escaped into the school yard and that is when the second shell landed”. (Pollard, 2014h, p. 17)
A further case of individualisation of Palestinian casualties was Fairfax’s coverage of the same event. In the following example, the name and age of a casualty were reported, in addition to the circumstances related to his death:

His lifeless body lies on the cold metal tray, bloodied stumps covered in hastily wrapped bandages mark where his legs once were. Doctors at Shifa Hospital had worked hard to save Ibrahim Suliman [emphasis added], but in the end the injuries he sustained in the Israeli attack on the United Nations girls’ school in Jabalia early on Wednesday proved too great. . . . The 42-year-old strawberry farmer [emphasis added] died alongside two of his cousins but the rest of his family survived. Thirteen others also died and a further 100 were injured. (Pollard, 2014c, p. 25)

5.3.4 Representations of Shujaiya and Khuza’a massacres

During its military operation, Protective Edge, Israel committed a massacre in the Shujaiya (also spelled Shejaiya and Shijaiya) neighbourhood in eastern Gaza on July 20th, 2014. The heavy Israeli shelling by F-16s, tanks and mortar launchers on the crowded neighbourhood resulted in the killing of “at least 100 Palestinians” (Beaumont & Sherwood, 2014, para. 2). Ten days later, Israeli shells killed another 17 people at a busy marketplace in the Shujaiya neighbourhood during a four-hour ceasefire (Tomlinson & Duell, 2014). Earlier, on July 23rd, 2014, the Israeli army committed another massacre in Khuza’a village in southern Gaza. The Israeli army “fired bullets and artillery shells at hundreds of Palestinian civilians who attempted to leave the village” (Weiss & Horowitz, 2014, para. 3). Israeli forces also “fired at ambulances and prevented them from entering the village” (para. 3). This section presents the findings from analyses of media representations of the massacres mentioned above.

5.3.4.1 Frames

The most prominent frame in Australian media representations of the Shujaiya and Khuza’a massacres was the human interest frame. News Corp media portrayed the Shujaiya massacre in this frame, using description as a frame mechanism:

More than 100 Palestinians have been killed since Sunday—most of them civilians—as Israel attacked one suburb, Shejaia, with tanks and helicopters. Due to the heavy bombing, ambulances were unable to retrieve the dead and
injured, and bodies were reported to be lying in the streets. “Too many innocent people are dying,” UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said, asking Israel to “exercise maximum restraint”. (Lyons, 2014y, p. 9)

The Shujaiya massacre was similarly portrayed in another example in *The Australian* (see Lyons, 2014s). The same description mechanism was used by news.com.au:

As Israel’s blistering offensive on Shejaiya showed no sign of easing, thousands could be seen fleeing for their lives after heavy shelling left casualties lying in the streets. Footage from the area showed vast clouds of black smoke billowing into the sky as the shelling continued and Gaza’s eastern flank burned. Ambulances were unable to reach much of the area along the border with Israel because of heavy fire. But as the ceasefire got under way, a convoy of ambulances entered, with medics seen picking up at least three dead bodies. (“Hamas claim kidnap,” 2014, para. 24–27)

The human interest frame also emerged in *The Age* and SMH coverage of casualties and destruction in Shujaiya. For example, *The Age* portrayed the Palestinian killings in this frame:

“There are so many dead we cannot count them,” Mohamed, 36, said. “We pulled about 150 people from the rubble and we are scared there are more bodies underneath”. He said residents received a pre-recorded message from the Israeli Defence Forces telling them to evacuate two days before the intense shelling started. “It was such a general message we could not believe it was true - Israel was asking every single resident from Shujaiya to leave”. (Pollard, 2014v, p. 15)

Although there was no direct coverage of the Shujaiya and Khuza’a massacres in Crikey, a human interest frame emerged in the coverage of related events. Crikey emphasised the suffering of displaced people from Shujaiya and those who lost their homes in the heavy shelling. This contributed to the emergence of a human interest frame:

Coming up to one of the makeshift homes of a Palestinian family inside a warehouse in the Gaza Strip, Omar Fathy Gragee tells us he would love to let us inside, but his wife had just had a baby, with no electricity, running water, food or supplies. I asked Gragee how he and the 30 others of his family from Shejaiya were surviving. He said: “We are trying to get whatever we can from people”. (Cordoba, 2014, para. 2)
In addition to the human interest frame, frames of justification and responsibility emerged. *The Age* stated that “Hamas fighters were hiding among the residents and had stored weapons beneath concrete apartment complexes” (“Might overwhelms,” 2014, p. 18). Similarly, a frame of attributing responsibility to Hamas emerged when Netanyahu accused Hamas of using Palestinian civilians as human shields by telling them not to leave target areas: “Hamas told [civilians] not to so they could be used as human shields” (Lyons, 2014y).

The conflict frame was also used in the coverage of the Shujaiya massacre by News Corp and the ABC. For instance, the ABC portrayed casualties during the Israeli operation in Shujaiya using a conflict frame:

> Officials in Gaza say more than 80 people [were killed] during an Israeli assault on the neighbourhood of Shejaiya, in what some locals say is the heaviest fighting they have seen since 1967’s Six-Day War. Thirteen Israeli soldiers were killed, with a total of 18 now dead since the ground invasion began. Hamas is also claiming to have captured an Israeli soldier. (Cooper & Brown, 2014, para. 2–3)

The conflict frame also emerged in news.com.au coverage of the same event. It was stated that “heavy fighting continued overnight . . . a day after dozens of Palestinians - many of them civilians - and 13 Israeli soldiers were killed in the area” (“UN Security Council,” 2014, para. 7). The conflict frame was also used along with the victim frame in Australian media coverage of the Khuza’a massacre:

> There was no let-up to the violence in Gaza, however, with most of Thursday’s 82 victims killed in and around Khuzaa, a flashpoint area east of Khan Yunis which has been the site of intensive fighting since Tuesday. (“Israeli shell attack,” 2014, para. 9)

### 5.3.4.2 Voices

Australian media used Palestinian prominent voices in their coverage of the Shujaiya and Khuza’a massacres. Palestinian officials’ voices, such as Abbas were used, as well as Palestinian health officials and medics:

> At Gaza City’s Shifa hospital, casualties were being brought in by the minute, some in ambulances, others in cars and trucks. Among them were
many children screaming in agony, some peppered with shrapnel wounds. “This is the worst I’ve ever seen it,” said Doctor Said Hassan, who has worked at the hospital for eight years. Fights broke out in the emergency room as hysterical parents banged on the walls in fear and sorrow. (“Hamas claim kidnap,” 2014, para. 33–36)

In the Australian media coverage of the Khuza’a massacre, Palestinian health officials’ voices were used along with the Red Cross:

Gaza’s health ministry issued a call for international protection for civilians in the area, with the Red Cross saying anyone leaving home was being targeted by Israeli fire. On Wednesday, the Red Cross and Palestinian ambulances managed to evacuate 150 people from the area following negotiations with both sides, and another convoy of 10 ambulances pulled out another eight bodies and 92 wounded on Thursday, the ICRC said. (“Israeli shell attack,” 2014, para. 10–11)

The voices of Palestinian casualties and their families, as well as witnesses’ voices, were also used in Australian media coverage of both massacres. The Australian quoted Palestinian resident Sabah Mameluke, who “arrived at the hospital with her mother and her two daughters, both of them barefoot” (Lyons, 2014u, p. 8). In a similar way, the ABC quoted injured Palestinian man Ahmed Mansour, who stated “They killed our people . . . They even shelled people as they fled their houses” (Cooper & Brown, 2014, para. 28–32). Further, families of the dead were used, as shown in the following example from news.com.au:

Among the dead were women and children, as well as a Palestinian paramedic and a cameraman who were killed when the ambulance they were in was hit, with the ongoing fire hampering efforts to recover the bodies. “He wasn’t a fighter, he was a fighter for humanity,” wailed one relative as the family buried him. “He was an ambulance worker, did he deserve to die?” (“Hamas claim kidnap,” 2014, para. 30–32)

Palestinian witnesses’ voices were also used. The Age quoted a Palestinian resident in coverage of the destruction in Shujaiya:

Nissana Sukar picked her way carefully over the mountain of twisted metal, smashed concrete and rubble that once was the apartment block next to her home. As Israeli drones buzzed overhead and the boom of shelling echoed through the air, she tried to recover something - anything - from the wreckage of her own apartment. All she was able to salvage was a bag of disposable
nappies before moving to safer ground as people began warning that Israeli
tanks were on the move nearby. (Pollard, 2014v, p. 15)

Israeli voices were used in Australian media coverage of both massacres. For example, *The Australian* cited Netanyahu’s quotes to the BBC. He stated that Israel “target[ed] only the sources of terror and this (Shejaia) is a source of terror [and] asked in every way for the civilian population to leave” (Lyons, 2014y, p. 9). Israeli voices were used, and consequently, the Israeli military operation in Shujaiya was justified. It was stated that according to Israel, “its operation was aimed at [a] Hamas leader and at Hamas rocket sites and tunnels in the area” (Cooper & Brown, 2014, para. 7). Moreover, the ABC quoted the Israeli military that said “it had urged all residents of Shejaiya to leave the area . . . accusing Hamas militants of firing 140 rockets from the area since July 8, and using civilians as human shields” (Cooper & Brown, 2014, para. 33). In the same context, the Israeli perspective was highlighted through Israeli military voices such as Major Arye Shalicar, who stated:

> At this point it is very hard to check each single allegation but we have a major-general who is about to look into each single incident during the operation and is going to put together a report. “We have time and again proven we do everything in our power to not hurt civilians, even though they were deliberately put into the front lines by Hamas. We have called, we have warned through radio, SMS, flyers, leaflets and even knocking on the roof . . . to make sure no civilian is hurt”. (Pollard, 2014n, p. 14)

Similarly, Israel’s military voices were used to justify the shelling of the Shujaiya market during a four-hour ceasefire. As quoted in the ABC, the Israeli army “said the truce did not apply in areas its troops were operating” (Brown, 2014, para. 2). News.com.au also used the voice of the Israeli army to justify the market attack:

> The strike came shortly after the Israeli army said it was observing a humanitarian lull that would be in force for four hours from 1200 GMT (10 pm AEST Wednesday). But it said the lull would not apply in areas where troops were “currently operating,” in a move denounced as a publicity stunt by Hamas. (“UN Secretary General,” 2014, para. 13–14)
5.3.4.3 Actors

Australian media tended to background Israel as an actor in relation to both massacres, and used active and passive structures to portray Israel’s actions. For instance, when the SMH represented the Israeli shelling of the market in Shujaiya during a ceasefire period, Israel was backgrounded and its action was passivated:

As thick black smoke billowed from the initial air strike witnesses said emergency services and civilians rushed to help the dead and injured, only to be hit with a further two air strikes minutes later. The attack was carried out [emphasis added] during a four-hour “humanitarian lull” announced by the IDF - it had warned “the humanitarian window will not apply to the areas in which IDF soldiers are currently operating”, including Shujaiya. Amid scenes of panic and carnage, with bodies torn apart and the injured being carried by hand to waiting ambulances, the people of Gaza prepared for another terrifying night of bombardment from Israeli navy boats and F-16s. (Pollard, 2014i, p. 16)

Conversely, news.com.au used an active structure in its coverage of the Shujaiya market massacre. It stated that Israel “bombed [emphasis added] a crowded fruit and vegetable market, killing 15 people and injuring 150” (Lyons, 2014z, p. 1). Similarly, the ABC activated Israel’s actions in the shelling of the market in Shujaiya. It reported that “Israeli shells [had] killed at least 17 people at a busy marketplace in the east of Gaza City during a four-hour ceasefire” (Brown, 2014, para. 1).

5.3.4.4 Portraying Palestinian casualties

Australian media varied in their portrayal of Palestinian casualties during both massacres. For example, while Palestinian casualties during the Israeli ground operation in Shujaiya were represented statistically in Fairfax newspapers, casualties in Khuza’a were individualised. The Age referred to “18 members of the al-Najar family [who] were trapped in their house in Kuza’a village when the shell hit, killing them and wounding many others” (Pollard, 2014d, p. 21). More details were also given about the casualties during the same events, in which names, ages and circumstances were reported:

“Just before the 24-hour ceasefire came into effect on Saturday, an Israeli air strike hit a two-storey building in the Sheikh Nasser area, eastern Khan...
Yunis, belonging to Sameer Hussein Mohammed An-Najjar,” the UN said. “Twenty family members were reportedly killed, including 11 children, four of them aged one year or under. Five women, two of them pregnant, were also killed.” According to local reports, the family had earlier fled the fighting in Khuza’a to take refuge in the Khan Yunis area. (Pollard, 2014o, p. 14)

The Age tended to individualise Palestinian casualties in Kuza’a, and relied heavily on witnesses’ voices. This is indicated in The Age correspondent Ruth Pollard’s (2014m) report, published on August 8th, 2014:

Some men held a child in each arm, those who could raised their hands in surrender. Others held white flags, while four carried elderly relatives on their shoulders. But as the extended Abu Rujaila family - a terrified group of 30 children, 30 women and 25 men – made their way towards the Israeli tanks at the entrance to their village, they say the soldiers opened fire. The group had already counted 17 bodies on the street and it was as they met a larger gathering of about 3000 residents also trying to flee that at least 35 people were shot and many seriously injured. The decision to flee their homes in the Gazan village of Khuza’a on July 25 was an agonising one, says 38-year-old Tamer Abu Rujaila . . . Tamer, his wife Maysa Sulaiman Abu Rujaila, 27, and their four children were convinced they would be killed if they tried to escape. But then the Israelis fired a large charge into the cluster of houses in their street and the force of the blast convinced him they must take a chance and evacuate. “I felt it would be certain death if we stayed,” he says. “We tried to contact the Red Cross but they did not respond, so we decided to hold white flags and walk out”. (p. 12)

The ABC represented Palestinian casualties statistically during the Israeli military operation in Shujaiya. Nevertheless, casualties were slightly individualised when they were related to targeting Hamas leaders by Israeli shelling. For example, casualties were individualised in reports that an Israeli air strike killed Hamas official Kahlil Abu Hayya’s son, daughter-in-law and two children (see “Gaza conflict: Israel expands,” 2014; “Palestinian president,” 2014).

5.4 Summary

This chapter has investigated Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. It has explored representations of events related to Israeli attacks on Gaza that killed Palestinian civilians, in addition to representations of the two events that sparked this war: the kidnapping and killing of Israeli and Palestinian teenagers. The
analysis focused on frames and voices used in these representations. It also focused on how actors of related events, mainly Israel and Hamas, were represented, to what extent both actors were foregrounded, backgrounded or suppressed, and how their actions were represented.

This chapter indicates how voices or sources used by Australian media were crucial mechanisms in framing these events. For instance, the human interest frame was more evident when Palestinian voices were used, particularly those of medics, casualties and witnesses. In contrast, conflict and responsibility frames were most evident when media used various voices from both Israeli and Palestinian sides.

Australian media varied in their portrayal of events, in terms of the depth of coverage, representation of actors related to the events, and portrayals of Palestinian casualties. Media tended to either suppress or background Israel as an actor, while foregrounding Palestinian actors. Nevertheless, Israel was foregrounded and an active structure was used to report its positive actions, while Israel’s negative actions were suppressed or backgrounded (see Section 5.3.2.3).

Overall, the variation in Australian media representations of Israel’s war on Gaza in 2014 helps determine to what extent selected media outlets varied in their broader representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The findings presented in this chapter show how events and actors related to the conflict were portrayed by Australian media, as well as what frames were used. Hence, the analysis in this chapter provides a thorough understanding of these representations, along with the findings included in previous and subsequent chapters.

The next chapter explores the themes that emerged from the analysis of media portrayals of Israel’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique, and Hamas rockets and tunnels. It describes representations of related actors, Israeli casualties and claims of Israeli soldiers’ capture and death. In addition, the following chapter presents further explanations of: (i) how actions of main actors in relation to the killing of civilians were legitimised or delegitimised; (ii) whether this legitimisation or delegitimisation, in addition to frames and inclusion and exclusion, shows media bias; and (iii) to what
extent overall media representations of both themes reflect recognition or non-recognition of lives based on Butler’s concept discussed in the introduction of this thesis.
Chapter 6: Ungrievable Lives: When the Military Knocks on the Roof

6.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter explored representations of events related to the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. It focused mainly on representations of events that sparked the war and events related to Israeli attacks on Gaza in July and August 2014. These events included the kidnapping and killing of Israeli teenagers in Hebron and a Palestinian teenager in Jerusalem, and events related to Israeli attacks on Gaza that resulted in Palestinian casualties. Findings in the previous chapter were presented in terms of frames and voices used in Australian media representations of these events. Moreover, it illustrated how Israeli and Palestinian actors and their actions were represented, and what inclusions and exclusion were made within these representations. It also examined Australian media portrayals of casualties.

This chapter continues to explore Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014, with a focus on representations of prominent themes such as Israel’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique, and Hamas’s rockets and tunnels. In addition, this chapter illustrates how Israeli casualties and claims of Israeli soldiers’ capture and death were portrayed.

Further, it aims to clarify several key aspects of the research: (i) to what extent Israel’s use of the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique was legitimised, and Hamas’s rockets and tunnels were delegitimised by Australian media; (ii) how these legitimisations and delegitimisations of Israeli and Palestinian actions were reflected in media portrayals of the killing of civilians from both sides; (iii) how the media varied in this regard; and (iv) to what extent this shows media bias. Another key aspect this chapter aims to explain is to what extent frames of these casualties and related events, and inclusions and exclusions made by Australian media, indicate recognition or non-recognition of Israeli and Palestinian lives.
This chapter reveals three key findings. First, the use of particular sources and voices in Australian media contributed to legitimising Israel’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ and delegitimising Hamas rockets and tunnels. The Australian media’s reliance on Israeli and US voices in coverage of the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique legitimised the actions, indicating the power of these voices to shape particular representations and frames. Second, inclusions and exclusions made by Australian media reflected a pro-Israel bias. For example, when covering events related to the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique, Israel’s right of defence was highlighted, while Palestinians’ right to defend themselves was ignored in coverage of Hamas rockets and tunnels. Third, both Israeli and Palestinian casualties were mostly portrayed in terms of numbers. Palestinian casualties were more individualised than Israeli casualties. Nevertheless, individualising Palestinian casualties and portraying them in human interest frames was occasional in Australian media and accompanied by the use of particular voices or sources.

This chapter is organised into two main sections. The first presents the analysis of Australian media representations of Israel’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique. It includes three sub-sections that discuss: (i) legitimising the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique; (ii) framing the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique; and (iii) the inclusions and exclusions made within representation of events related to the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique.

The second main section examines Australian media representations of Hamas’s rockets and tunnels. It constitutes four sub-sections that explore: (i) how Hamas’s rockets and tunnels were delegitimised; (ii) how they were framed; (iii) how Israeli casualties were portrayed; and (iv) how the alleged capture of Israeli soldiers’ during the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 was represented.

6.2 Representations of Israel’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ Technique

During its military operation in the Gaza Strip in 2008–2009, 2012 and 2014, the Israeli army used a technique called ‘Knock on the Roof’. This technique “involved striking a building—typically its roof—with a small munition prior to the larger, main strike” (Groll, 2015, para. 1). Israel claimed that by using this technique, it attempted
to minimise Palestinian civilian casualties. However, some Palestinian civilians were killed by the initial blast or in the following airstrike due to the very short time between the shelling of their houses by warning missiles and destructive ones. This time varied between half an hour and one minute in different cases. As a part of this technique, Israel’s army dropped warning leaflets on some areas in the Gaza Strip, and made telephone calls to demand the evacuation of residents. International human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International, condemned this technique. Amnesty International director in the Middle East and North Africa, Philip Luther, stated that Israeli attacks were “carried out deliberately and with no military justification . . . [and] were a collective punishment against the people of Gaza and were designed to destroy their already precarious livelihoods” (“Amnesty: Israeli strikes,” 2014, para. 11–12). The first section presents the findings of how Australian media legitimised and framed the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique, and inclusion and exclusions made by the media.

6.2.1 Legitimising ‘Knock on the Roof’

Australian media tended to portray the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique in a way that legitimised this technique. Thus, the coverage favoured Israel. News Corp coverage largely justified or defended Israel’s use of this technique. The Australian, for example, portrayed the technique as an Israeli attempt to reduce Palestinian civilian casualties and avoid harming their lives. The technique was represented as a unique policy used by Israel for “warning the residents of any house about to be bombed” (Hyams, 2014, p. 14). It was also represented as an Israeli intention to “give those in the house 15 minutes to leave before an Israeli jet returns with a missile with a warhead that will demolish the house” (Lyons, 2014ad, p. 7). Furthermore, the technique was represented as ‘an eye for an eye’. In this regard, The Australian quoted Mordechai Kedar, an Israeli researcher who was previously an Israeli intelligence officer. The researcher emphasised that ‘Knock on the Roof’ was “a matter of giving [militants] a price tag for what they do” (Mitnick & Abuhamda, 2014, p. 7). Hence, according to this Israeli voice, this technique was not merely a warning, but “an element of revenge . . . ‘an eye for an eye’” (p. 7).
Similarly, Fairfax newspapers *The Age* and *SMH* legitimised Israel’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique. For instance, *The Age* represented this technique as an Israeli effort to “prevent civilians being caught in the crossfire” (Pollard, 2014r, p. 23), by “ringing up houses telling [Palestinian] people there is an attack about to happen” (Pollard, 2014r, p. 23), and alerting “[Palestinian] families before attacks on their homes” (Pollard, 2014e, p. 24). The previous representation of this technique in *The Age* relied on quotations from Mark Regev, chief spokesman of the Israeli Prime Minister. The *SMH* also used the same voice when referring to the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique. Israeli claims were highlighted in a statement by Regev: “If we know there are kids in the house we don’t bomb it - we are as surgical as is humanly possible in a very difficult situation” (Pollard, 2014s, p. 23).

Correspondingly, the ABC justified Israel’s use of the technique. For example, the ABC published an article by Falkenstein, who justified the technique. Falkenstein (2014b) represented ‘Knock on the Roof’ as a method used by the Israeli army “where it fire[ed] missiles without explosive warheads at the site as a warning to those present” (para. 9).

The Australian media’s reliance on Israeli voices resulted in the legitimisation of the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique. This was clear in News Corp media. *The Australian*, for example, relied on Israeli sources, such as military officials, in the coverage of events related to the technique. Additionally, news.com.au used Israeli army officials’ perspectives to portray this technique:

> He said when Israel identifies a home used by Hamas as a “command and control centre,” it calls the inhabitants and orders them to leave. It then fires a “non-explosive munition” at the roof as a warning and looks for people to leave. Only then does it destroy the structure. (“Northern Israel hit,” 2014, para. 56)

News.com.au also used Israeli military voices in its coverage of the Israeli shelling of the Al Wafa hospital, along with the voices of the hospital’s international volunteers:

> Four foreign volunteers—from England, the US, France and Sweden—have set up camp at the rehabilitation centre to deter the military from targeting it. English volunteer Rina Andolini, 32, said the patients range in age from 12
to over 70 and none can walk or move without assistance. She said there are also 17 Palestinian staff members. Ms Andolini said the patients are living in a constant state of fear, intensified by the Israeli tank shelling from across the border. When asked about the situation at the rehabilitation centre, the office of the Israeli military spokesman said its residents “have been asked repeatedly to leave.” “There is a rocket launching site in the area,” the military said, adding that Gaza militants use the centre to hide “behind civilians”. (“Israeli strike on Gaza,” 2014, para. 40–45)

Further examples of legitimisation using Israeli voices emerged in the ABC’s coverage of related events. An Israeli military spokesman was quoted in ABC coverage of the Israeli shelling of a residential tower block in Gaza City, where Palestinian residents were called by the Israeli military “10 minutes before the attack . . . and told to evacuate” (“Gaza conflict: Israeli air strike,” 2014, para. 2). The website quoted an Israeli military spokesman, who said “the building [had] been used as a command centre by Hamas militants” (“Gaza conflict: Israeli air strike,” 2014, para. 4). Israeli army voices were also quoted in ABC coverage of an attack on the Al-Aqsa hospital in central Gaza. Although the Israeli army “had no immediate comment”, the ABC referred to previous quotations, in which the army had “accused Hamas . . . of firing rockets from the grounds of Gaza hospitals and of seeking refuge in the buildings” (Cooper, 2014d, para. 12).

The way in which Israeli and Palestinian actors were portrayed in Australian media reflected some legitimisation of Israel’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique. Reporting on this technique alongside Israel’s claims of Hamas’s using human shields resulted in a more positive portrayal of Israel, and a more negative representation of Hamas. Therefore, Israel’s actions, including the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique, were legitimised. For example, Israel was portrayed as ‘protector’ and ‘saviour’ since it was “taking extraordinary steps to minimise civilian casualties on both sides” (Falkenstein, 2014a, p. 12), while Hamas was portrayed as “involving their own civilians in warfare as human shields” (p. 12). The Australian also presented a positive portrayal of Israel as “sacrificing its own to reduce the Palestinian toll” (Kenny, 2014, p. 24). Conversely, a negative representation of Hamas was provided by the same writer, Falkenstein (2014b), who claimed in his ABC article that “Hamas deliberately enmeshes itself within the civilian population, which means that innocent people will die despite
Israel’s best efforts to take precautions” (para. 1). He also accused Hamas of
“attempting to use the loss of life to increase international pressure on Israel” (para. 13). It was claimed that “many [Palestinian civilian] deaths could likely have been
avoided if Hamas leaders had not urged Gazans to ignore IDF warnings to leave a
combat zone” (Falkenstein, 2014a, p. 12), and that “two-thirds of those killed have
been combatants” (Hyams, 2014, p. 14). These claims by the two AJJAC policy
analysts, Falkenstein and Hymas, legitimised Israel’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique,
despite the high number of Palestinian casualties.

The legitimisation of this technique was accompanied by the use of active structures
in relation to Israel’s actions. For instance, The Australian portrayed Israeli actions
using active structures and legitimising these actions. The newspaper referred to Israeli
warnings to Palestinian residents to evacuate their houses. It was stated that Israel
“fire[d] [emphasis added] warning shells and carefully select[ed] [emphasis added]
the targets of Hamas militants and other weaponry” (Kenny, 2014, p. 24). Similarly,
news.com.au used an active structure to portray positive Israeli actions, such as efforts
to minimise the number of casualties among Palestinian civilians stating that “Israel
[was] making efforts [emphasis added] to minimise ‘collateral damage’” (“Israel
boasts,” 2014, para. 5). These efforts, according to news.com.au, included “warning
calls to residents and preceding big attacks on buildings with smaller bombs, a practice
dubbed ‘roof-knocking’” (Perry, 2014, para. 7). Again, news.com.au used an active
structure to represent Israeli actions in relation to the shelling of a Gaza mosque. It
stated that the Israeli military “telephoned [emphasis added] him [a Palestinian
resident] at 3am, warning him to evacuate his nearby home five minutes before the
mosque was attacked” (“Hamas vows,” 2014, para. 8).

Similar to News Corp media, Fairfax newspapers tended to activate Israel’s actions
related to the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique. The Age used an active structure to report
on Israeli army actions, in which the military was “ringing up houses telling people
there is an attack about to happen” (Pollard, 2014r) and dropping leaflets into some
areas in Gaza “warning residents to evacuate before further strikes” (Robertson,
2014a, p. 12). The Age highlighted that “there [was] at least an effort to prevent
civilians being caught in the crossfire” (Pollard, 2014r, p. 23). The same active structure was used in *The Age* when it stated that “IDF never targets civilians under any circumstance” (Pollard, 2014e, p. 24), and “rejects in the strongest terms any assertion of targeting families” (p. 24). In the same way, the *SMH* portrayed Israeli army actions using an active structure (see Pollard, 2014q; Pollard, 2014s).

On the contrary, the ABC tended to use both active and passive structures to refer to Israeli actions related to the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique. For example, both active and passive structures were used in ABC coverage of the shelling of a residential tower block in Gaza City:

> An Israeli air strike *has destroyed* [emphasis added] a residential tower block in the centre of Gaza City, with initial reports saying at least 17 people were wounded. Residents in the building *were called* [emphasis added] 10 minutes before the attack on Saturday (local time) and told to evacuate. (“Gaza conflict: Israeli air strike,” 2014, para. 1–2)

In contrast, news.com.au tended to use a passive structure to refer to Israeli actions that resulted in the deaths of Palestinian civilians. For instance, in its coverage of the attack on the Al Haj family in Khan Younis in southern Gaza, news.com.au backgrounded Israel as an actor and portrayed its actions using a passive structure:

> Residents in the crowded Khan Younis refugee camp in southern Gaza were at a loss to explain why the Al Haj family home *was targeted* [emphasis added] last night. The blast killed Mahmoud Al Haj, his wife, Basma, and six of their children. (“Northern Israel hit,” 2014, para. 45–46)

6.2.2 Framing ‘Knock on the Roof’

In justifying Israel’s use of the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique in Australian media, a responsibility frame emerged in the coverage of the Palestinian civilian death toll. This frame was evident when responsibility was attributed to Hamas for the killing of these civilians. News Corp media, in particular *The Australian*, attributed responsibility to Hamas due to the organisation “urging residents to remain in their homes to provide cover for its rocket launch squads” (“Palestinians need security,” 2014, p. 13); “hiding militants among civilians” (“Israel launches ground,” 2014, para. 10) and “weaponry among the homes, hospitals and schools of Gaza—among the children” (Kenny, 2014,
and “putting their own people in the line of fire” (“Israel claims,” 2014, para. 1). The responsibility for the number of casualties was also attributed to Gazans, who were dehumanised. For instance, on July 25th, 2014, *The Australian* published an article by Thane Rosenbaum, a senior fellow at New York University’s School of Law, who blamed Gazans for “elect[ing] Hamas” (p. 11) and “shelter[ing] terrorists and their weapons in their homes” (p. 11). The following is a further example of blaming Gazans for electing Hamas:

> When Israel warned them of impending attacks . . . . you forfeit your right to be called civilians when you freely elect members of a terrorist organisation as statesmen, invite them to dinner with blood on their hands and allow them to set up shop in your living room as their base of operations. (Rosenbaum, 2014, p. 11)

Additionally, Falkenstein (2014b) attributed responsibility to Hamas for using civilians as human shields. Falkenstein (2014b) also placed the responsibility on Palestinian civilians (in a reference to the Kwarae family, who were “massing on the rooftops of Hamas sites”) (para. 10). Similarly, Sharyn Mittelman (2014), a senior policy analyst at the AIJAC, stated in the *SMH* “for Hamas, civilian casualties support its propaganda war as the more civilian casualties there are, the more international pressure is placed on Israel” (p. 20).

Within the coverage of Palestinian casualties from Israel’s use of ‘Knock on the Roof’, a frame of ‘alleged numbers’ emerged in *The Australian*. This frame emerged in Falkenstein’s article (July 23rd, 2014a), in which he stated “Hamas governs Gaza, including the health ministry, and is the primary source for much of the casualty statistics that are being reported” (p. 12). Again, Hamas was blamed for the apparent “propaganda strategy . . . . and illusion” about the number of Palestinian casualties (Oboler, 2014, p. 10). Moreover, Andre Oboler, whose article was published in *The Australian* (August 11th, 2014), cited the BBC’s head of statistics saying that “the figures [of Palestinian casualties] presented are highly improbable” (p. 10).

The same frame, ‘alleged numbers’ of Palestinian civilian casualties, also emerged in *The Australian*. For instance, Rosenbaum (2014), who discussed the civilian status of these casualties, stated that “the asymmetry is complicated even further by the status
of these civilians” (p. 11). In the same context, Oboler (2014) suggests that the numbers of Palestinian civilian casualties “conceal many Hamas combatants” (p. 10). He referred to “a similar situation . . . in Operation Cast Lead (2008–09) when Hamas, at the time, claimed only 50 fighters were killed but later admitted to a figure of 600 to 700 fighters” (p. 10).

A comparison frame was used in addition to the ‘alleged numbers’ frame that emerged in *The Australian*. The use of the comparison frame contributed to the statistical representation of Palestinian casualties; it portrayed them as ungrievable or worthless lives (cf. Butler) in the light of the death tolls of Middle Eastern conflicts, such as the conflict in Syria:

Reports indicate that about 650 Palestinians have died along with 30 Israelis in the current conflict. This is a serious death toll. Yet it is only a fraction of the dead in the civil war in Syria, where Shia Muslims are engaged in deadly battle with Sunni Muslims. Al Jazeera America reported this week that more people had been killed in Syria in two days this week than in the two-week-old Israel-Gaza conflict. (Henderson, 2014, p. 24)

When using a human interest frame, Fairfax and Crikey’s coverage of ‘Knock on the Roof’ and related events differed from News Corp and ABC coverage. The human interest frame was more prominent in *The Age*, *SMH* and Crikey. For example, this frame emerged in *The Age* coverage in which a partial story was reported about Al Haj family, whose house in southern Gaza was shelled by Israel, killing 10 Palestinian civilians, including parents and their children:

Mahmoud, 55, and his wife Basmah, 52, were sitting with six of their eight children when two missiles from an F-16 hit their apartment. Mohamed al-Hajj, Basmah’s brother, who lives next door, ran outside to see what had been hit. “I followed the sound and the dust and I found my sister’s place blown apart,” he says. “I found my sister lying here, she was not dead yet but her leg was cut off,” he says. “I took her in my arms and drove her to Nasser Hospital. Half an hour later, as they were trying to save her, she died.” Mahmoud and Basmah’s son, 25-year-old Yasser, was at his friend’s house nearby when the missiles hit. “I couldn’t see through the dust and smoke - as I got closer, I saw that it was my place and I started to scream.” His parents, along with six brothers and sisters, died in the attack. “They were innocent civilians living in a refugee camp,” he says. (Pollard, 2014e, p. 24)
Similarly, in Crikey, a human interest frame was used by relying on Palestinian witnesses’ voices and describing the circumstances in which Palestinian civilians live. For example, Crikey represented the situation in northern Gaza in the aftermath of Israeli army evacuation messages:

In Beit Lahia, a village in the northern Gaza Strip where residents are reportedly receiving messages from the Israeli military to evacuate their homes before a ground invasion. Majda Tantish remains indoors with her family as much as possible while the bombing continues. It is the third time in five years they have lived through such horror, and the mother of four says the family prepares by stocking up on food and water. (O’Connor, 2014a, para. 4)

Another frame that emerged in the Crikey coverage of Israel’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique was demands for Israel to avoid civilian casualties. Australian ethicist and moral philosopher Matthew Beard (2014) demanded Israel “take unprecedented steps to avoid civilian casualties” (para. 10). Beard also stated that “if the IDF genuinely desire the protection of civilians, they ought to welcome additional steps for their protection” (para. 10). He suggested in the same article that the presence of peacekeepers in Gaza “would also mitigate the extent to which Hamas would be able to use human shields” (para. 9).

6.2.3 Inclusions and exclusions in reporting ‘Knock on the Roof’

While legitimisation of Israel’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ campaign emerged in Australian media coverage through reliance on Israeli sources and voices, Australian media also used Palestinian voices. For example, The Australian used Palestinian health officials and witnesses’ voices together with Israeli voices in its coverage of an attack on a house in southern Gaza, which killed eight members of the Kware family:

In one such strike, a group of Palestinians positioned themselves on the roof of the Kaware home in the Gaza town of Khan Younis after a warning. They had hoped to act as human shields to prevent an attack, says a family member [Palestinian witness]. Instead, the strike went ahead and eight people died, the Palestinian Health Ministry [Palestinian health official] said. Israeli army spokesman Peter Lerner [Israeli military official] said the military believed the Kaware house had been evacuated. Only after the bombs were released did soldiers realise civilians had returned to the house, he said. (Mitnick & Abuhamda, 2014, p. 7)
Similarly, the ABC used Palestinian voices together with Israeli voices in its coverage of events related to the technique. Palestinian voices, such as Hamas and Palestinian health officials, were used. For example, in the Israeli shelling of two houses in southern Gaza, inhabitants “had received a telephone call from an Israeli intelligence officer asking them to leave the house because it would be bombed, and the family evacuated in time” (Cooper, 2014f, para. 9). The ABC also quoted Palestinian health officials and Hamas officials who “denounced Israel’s bombing of houses as ‘exceeding all red lines’” (Cooper, 2014f, para. 14). At the same time, Palestinian medics’ voices were used in ABC coverage of the Israeli shelling of the Al-Aqsa hospital in central Gaza. It was stated that “Gaza health workers . . . denied Hamas militants are using the hospitals as a [sic] safe havens” (“UN school in Gaza,” 2014, para. 26).

On the contrary, news.com.au, The Age and ABC relied mainly on Palestinian witnesses in their coverage. News.com.au quoted a Palestinian resident, who was warned by the Israeli military to evacuate his house before they shelled a mosque nearby. The resident stated that he “couldn’t tell all [his] neighbours, so [he] evacuated [himself] and [his] neighbour and after five minutes an F-16 fired one rocket and after that a bigger rocket destroyed the mosque” (“Hamas vows,” 2014, para. 9). Another example is The Age’s reliance on Palestinian witnesses’ voices in its coverage of cases in which Palestinian civilians or families were killed. A further example is the use of Palestinian witnesses’ voices in the ABC coverage of the Israeli shelling of a residential tower in Gaza:

The owner of the building, Salah Abu Samhadana, said more than 30 families are now homeless. “We were informed about half an hour before the shelling took place,” he said. “The tower has 12 floors and 32 families were living there. The minute we evacuated, the place was hit by a warning rocket and immediately after that the F-16 fighter jets fired two rockets”. (“Gaza conflict: Israeli air strike,” 2014, para. 6–9)

While Israeli and Palestinian voices were included frequently in Australian media coverage of the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique, international voices were included only occasionally. This occasional inclusion emerged only in news.com.au, in which international voices criticised the technique. News.com.au used the voices of
international human rights organisation Amnesty International, which stated that there “is no way that firing a missile at a civilian home can constitute an effective warning” (“Israel boasts,” 2014, para. 17). News.com.au also highlighted the viewpoints of critics who considered the Israeli army warnings to Palestinian civilians “more about psychological warfare than saving lives” (“Israel boasts,” 2014, para. 16), as “not all phone calls—or small bombs—are followed up by a full attack” (para. 16).

While the effectiveness of the technique was not discussed sufficiently in Australian media, concerns about the effectiveness of this technique were raised:

In some cases, it appears that concerned persons did not understand that their house had been the subject of a “roof-knock”, such as the in [sic] case of the Dheir home, where the family in the house did not understand that the strike was a warning until they were told by a neighbour that they had to flee. While on their way out, 19 out of the 22 individuals present in the house died, including 9 children. In two other cases, families fled buildings following an air strike on the roof or top floor believing that the strike was a warning, only to be struck by a targeted missile once outside the house and on the street. (Human Rights Council, 2015, p. 65)

Details of Palestinian casualties as resulting from Israel’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique, were included in some media in this study. Nevertheless, the same details were excluded in other media. For instance, The Age and SMH coverage included the story of Abu Jarad’s family, in which “eight died and 12 were injured” by an Israeli shelling without “warning” (Pollard, 2014e, p. 24). This story included voices of witnesses. The Age quoted relative Alian, who denied Israeli claims that the family was warned before shelling. Alian was quoted in The Age: “[they] have no fighters in [their] family, [and they] are not affiliated with any faction or party” (Pollard, 2014e, p. 24). These details were excluded from News Corp media. Similarly, while Australian media excluded some details about the killings of the Al Haj family in southern Gaza, these details were included in Fairfax newspapers. Nevertheless, other details were excluded, or not highlighted sufficiently, in The Age and other media. These details related to witness accounts that indicated that the Al Haj house was in “a residential area, free from any military activity and that there had been no ‘roof-knock’” (Human Rights Council, 2015, p. 34).

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In most cases, Palestinian casualties were represented as statistics in ‘Knock on the Roof’ stories. For example, News Corp media tended to impersonalise and assimilate Palestinian casualties killed in events related to the technique. In only a few cases, Australian media individualised these casualties, but the details given were still limited or excluded voices of victims’ families or Palestinian witnesses. This varied between media outlets. When reporting on the Al Haj family, news.com.au, The Age and SMH included details of casualties, such as names, ages and the circumstances in which they were killed. On the contrary, The Australian reported the Israeli shelling of the Kaware family. Limited details were reported, with a reliance on Israeli sources, and no individualisation of victims. Continuing with the coverage of the same event, Falkenstein (2014b) referred to the Kaware family by stating that “a number of civilians in Gaza have been seen massing on the rooftops of Hamas sites” (para. 10), excluding the fact that Israel targeted the family house, which was not a Hamas site. Overall, some details related to the incident were excluded in all selected media, such as “several witnesses denied that anyone remained after the warning and stated that people attempted to evacuate the building, but there was not sufficient time to do so” (Human Rights Council, 2015, p. 47).

The viewpoint adopted in Australian media regarding the ‘Knock on the Roof technique’, combined with the reliance on particular voices, resulted in some exclusions and the highlighting of some aspects while ignoring others. For example, the media did not communicate what Palestinian civilians could do in the 15 minutes or less after a warning shelling. Moreover, media did not highlight or mention that these small warning rockets could cause casualties among Palestinian civilians. Similarly, there was no coverage of the emotional effect of the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique on Palestinian civilians. However, in a report by Lyons (2014u), The Australian correspondent in Gaza stated that Israel “[said] it [gave] residents 15 minutes to leave the building but at least one video has shown only one minute passing before the second missile hits and destroys the building” (p. 8). Warning these civilians by shelling their houses with small rockets only a few minutes before firing destructive rockets was an important aspect ignored by News Corp and other selected media.
It is noteworthy that there was no direct coverage of the technique in the *Herald Sun*. Nevertheless, the newspaper highlighted a crucial fact. In an editorial, it stated that “there is nowhere to go in Gaza to avoid air strikes, even when there are warnings certain sites are to be targeted” (“Herald Sun,” 2014c, p. 36) and that Gaza’s population live “cheek by jowl” (p. 36). In another editorial, the newspaper portrayed the Gaza Strip as “one of the world’s most densely populated places” (“Herald Sun,” 2014a, p. 28).

**6.3 Representations of Hamas’s Rockets and Tunnels, and Israeli Casualties**

During the Protective Edge operation, rockets from Gaza hit Israel. Some were intercepted by Israel’s missile defence system, Iron Dome. Hamas rockets mainly targeted cities in southern Israel, such as Ashdod, and its long-range rockets reached other cities, including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, forcing Israelis into shelters. Earlier, Israel claimed that its operation in Gaza aimed to stop Hamas rocket threats and protect Israeli civilians. Nevertheless, the Israeli death toll was 72, including only six civilians (Ben-David, n.d.). Israel also asserted that its operations in Gaza aimed to destroy Hamas’s tunnels. Israel “discovered 32 tunnels, 14 of which extended beyond the Green Line into Israel” (Human Rights Council, 2015, p. 30). During the 2014 war, Hamas militants crossing the border through the tunnels engaged in combat with Israeli soldiers. These Palestinian attacks through the tunnels were considered legitimate by the UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on the Gaza conflict, since they “were only used to conduct attacks directed at IDF positions in Israel in the vicinity of the Green Line” (Human Rights Council, 2015, p. 31).

In relation to the tunnels, Israel declared that soldier Hadar Goldin was abducted by Hamas before the former announced his death on “August 1st, 2014, near Rafah during an operation to find and destroy Hamas tunnels” (“Israel changes status,” 2016, para. 8). According to Israeli sources, on July 20th, 2014, another soldier Shaul Aron “was killed along with six other soldiers, when his armored personnel carrier was hit in eastern Gaza” (“Israel changes status,” 2016, para. 7). Later, both soldiers were “defined as fallen troops with ‘status of missing prisoners’” (“Israel changes status,”
2016, para. 1). Israel stated that “the remains of both soldiers are being held by the Hamas” (“Israel changes status,” para. 2).

The preceding section focused on Israeli’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique and the media portrayal of Palestinian casualties, while Section 6.3 explores how Hamas’s rockets and tunnels were delegitimised in Australian media. Specifically, it discusses Australian media portrayals of Israeli casualties and the alleged capture of Israeli soldiers to obtain a full picture of Australian media representation of events that affected both side of the conflict. In addition, it compares the portrayals of Palestinian and Israeli casualties.

### 6.3.1 Delegitimising Hamas’s rockets and tunnels

Australian media tended to delegitimise Hamas rockets and tunnels, while legitimising the Israeli military operation in Gaza in 2014 and Israeli attacks that killed many Palestinians. *The Australian* highlighted that Hamas rockets were the reason for Israel’s military operation in Gaza because Hamas was “raining down its stockpiles of 10,000 rockets, supplied by Iran and Syria, on Israel” (“Ceasefire must,” 2014, p. 15), and “attempt[ing] to infiltrate Israel by tunnel and by sea, forcing Israel to degrade Hamas’s ability to continue these attacks” (Hyams, 2014, p. 14).

News Corp media portrayed Hamas rockets as the main reason for Israeli military operations in Gaza in 2014. Additionally, they portrayed Israeli shelling as retaliatory to these rockets. *The Australian* emphasised that Israeli actions in Gaza were merely responses to Hamas rockets and that Israel had the right to defend itself:

> In responding to Hamas’s aggression, Israel is doing no more than any self-respecting country in a similar situation would do. How many nations, for example, would tolerate one of their main international airports being targeted for attack from a neighbouring state that was committed to its destruction? (“Ceasefire must,” 2014, p. 15)

Australian media highlighted the right of Israel to defend itself against Hamas’s rockets and tunnels by using Israeli voices, such as Netanyahu (see Cooper & Brown, 2014), and US voices, such as the US Secretary of State John Kerry, who “supported
Israel’s right to destroy rockets and tunnels that militants increasingly were using for cross-border attack” (Solomon, Casey, El-Ghobashy, & Fitch, 2014, p. 11).

Hamas’s rockets were also represented in news.com.au as “triggering the [Israeli] response” (“Israeli war planes,” 2014, para. 3) and the escalation between the two sides during the Israeli war on Gaza was portrayed as being caused mostly by Palestinian militants (see “Jewish extremists,” 2014). Similarly, the Herald Sun portrayed Israeli air strikes as ‘retaliation’ for rocket attacks from Gaza on southern Israel (“Herald Sun,” 2014b). Additionally, the ABC portrayed Israeli air attacks on Gaza as a response to Palestinian rocket attacks. In other words, Israeli attacks were represented as retaliation. Nevertheless, in one case, an opposite portrayal emerged. Palestinian rockets were reported as coming “several hours after Israel staged about 16 air strikes on targets across Gaza” (“Israeli suspects,” 2014, para. 15).

Representations of Hamas rockets were different in Crikey. Although the overall coverage of these rockets was limited, the news site considered Israeli attacks on Gaza in 2014 and rockets from Gaza as “sparked by the murder of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank on June 12” (O’Connor, 2014a, para. 3). Regarding these rockets and Hamas’s use of Palestinian civilians as human shields, it was suggested in Crikey that having peacekeepers in Gaza would protect civilians from both sides of the conflict:

The presence of peacekeepers would also mitigate the extent to which Hamas would be able to use human shields. Large collections of civilians would be protected by armed personnel conducting weapons searches, patrolling the area and genuinely creating a harbour from the storm of war. Furthermore, peacekeepers could be stationed to protect critical infrastructure, preventing these from being bases from which Hamas could launch rockets and subsequently preventing the need for Israel to destroy such facilities. Finally, providing genuine safe zones for noncombatants actually enhances Israel’s ability to fulfil the mission it claims it has a moral and legal right to pursue: preventing Hamas’s ability to conduct attacks on Israel. (Beard, 2014, para. 9–10)

Legitimising Israeli shelling and delegitimising Palestinian rockets continued in News Corp media, to the extent that Gazans were indirectly blamed for electing Hamas in The Australian:
The people of Gaza overwhelmingly elected Hamas, a terrorist outfit dedicated to the destruction of Israel, as their designated representative. Almost instantly, Hamas began stockpiling weapons and using them against a more powerful foe with a solid track record of retaliation. (Rosenbaum, 2014, p. 11)

In a related context, Israeli air strikes on Gaza were legitimised in the Herald Sun. In doing so, Israeli voices, such as former Israeli President Peres, stated that “there was little alternative to Israel’s air strikes while rockets continued to land in southern Israel” (“Herald Sun,” 2014c, p. 36). The following is a further example of the legitimisation of Israeli air strikes in Gaza through a focus on the perspective of Arnold Roth, a Melbourne-raised Jew living in Jerusalem:

Roth is cynical about the placement of Hamas rocket launchers, and scathing about their targets—“ordinary people”, he argued, against whom the militants “pray for any sort of hit”. “These rockets are stored in, and fired from, the kinds of sites that everyone would regard as unacceptable: schools, mosques, hospitals,” he said. “It guarantees them a double advantage. As targets, these places are generally off-limits to the Israeli military, so they give a degree of immunity. But if they do get hit, the damage, injuries or death give the rocket men the public relations points they need to keep their backers satisfied”. (Carlyon, 2014, p. 39)

Overall, in the three News Corp media, Israeli air strikes were legitimised when referring to Palestinian or Hamas rockets. For example, both The Australian and Herald Sun used the same presupposition, that “no country should have to tolerate” such rocket attacks (Whinnett, 2014, p. 2). There are further examples of the use of the same presupposition in different articles published in The Australian to report on Palestinian rockets:

- “No democratic nation like Israel is likely to tolerate the indiscriminate firing of rockets that are aimed specifically at its citizens—Jewish and Arab alike. Hamas rockets do not, and cannot, target military or command and control sites.” (Henderson, 2014, p. 24)
- “Every nation has an inalienable right to defend itself from attack.” (G. Richardson, 2014, p. 12)
• “‘No country should have to tolerate arbitrary and indiscriminate attacks upon its civilian population by rocket fire and infiltration through tunnels,’ Ms Bishop said.” (Nicholson & Owens, 2014, p. 2)
• “For no nation anywhere can be expected to allow attacks like those launched by Hamas on Israel’s civilian populations to go unpunished.” (Loudon, 2014, p. 11)

Similarly, the *SMH* delegitimised Palestinian rockets and tunnels, using the same presuppositions above. Yair Miller (2014), president of the NSW Jewish Board of Deputies, stated in his *SMH* article that “no country can sustain a situation where its civilian population is routinely bombarded by its neighbour” (p. 18). Another example is in a *SMH* article by a senior policy analyst in the AIJAC:

> Israel is currently under attack as Hamas and other jihadist groups have fired more than 1600 rockets into its territory this month. The rockets have sent millions of Israeli citizens - Jews, Muslims, Christians, Druze - sprinting into bomb shelters. They have as little as 15 seconds to run for cover. *It is not a situation any country would tolerate* [emphasis added]. (Mittelman, 2014, p. 20)

In both *The Age* and *SMH*, Hamas rockets and tunnels were also delegitimised. For instance, in *The Age*, Hamas rockets were considered “illegal because they either deliberately target[ed] civilians or [were] fired indiscriminately” (Saul, 2014a, p. 29). This indiscrimination was because “Hamas [did] not aim [rockets] solely at military targets, or their technological inaccuracy [made] them incapable of avoiding civilian areas” (Saul, 2014a, p. 29). Similarly, in the *SMH*, Hamas rockets were delegitimised by the voice of Peter Wertheim, of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry. Wertheim was quoted in the *SMH*, stating that Hamas “used building materials earmarked for civilian and humanitarian purposes in order to build tunnels into Israel to attack Israeli civilians” (Snow, 2014, p. 30). Alternatively, Hamas tunnels were legitimised in *The Age*, in which it was stated that “Hamas’s use of tunnels to launch surprise attacks on the Israeli military forces is not illegal” (Saul, 2014a, p. 29). In his article published in *The Age* on July 29th 2014, Ben Saul justified this by stating that “infiltrating enemy territory and surprising enemy forces is a permissible strategy in
war, as is capturing enemy soldiers” (p. 29). In a related context, The Age and SMH Hamas rockets were framed to legitimise Israeli operations in Gaza:

> Israel is absolutely justified in defending its people and its territory from the constant and intensifying attacks by Hamas terrorists operating from Gaza. Israelis are threatened daily: from the skies by rockets and, as happened three weeks ago, through random kidnappings and killings. Israel’s military considers Gaza the above-ground facade to an “underground city” of tunnels, bunkers and weapons storage centres. Israel does not see an end to it. (“Might overwhelms,” 2014, p. 18)

Conversely, the ABC emphasised that Palestinian militants aimed rockets at Israel to end the Gaza blockade (see “Gaza conflict: Israelis,” 2014). Furthermore, the ABC contended that during a later stage of the conflict in Gaza, Palestinian rockets “focused on Israeli kibbutzim, or collective farms . . . a strategy of sapping the Jewish state’s morale without triggering another ground invasion [of Gaza]” (“Gaza conflict: Israel, Palestinians,” 2014, para. 9).

Australian media highlighted that the Israeli military operation in Gaza aimed to target and destroy Hamas’s tunnels. The Australian emphasised that Israel aimed to target “tunnels between Gaza and Israel built by Hamas” (Lyons, 2014k, p. 14). Simultaneously, these tunnels were portrayed in The Australian as a “different threat” (Philp, 2014, p. 9), “a strategic threat, and ‘a high priority’ to be demolished in [sic] the Israeli military in Gaza” (“Hope blown away,” 2014, p. 34). In this context, the newspaper quoted Netanyahu who “vowed to destroy Hamas’s tunnel network ‘with or without a ceasefire’” (Lyons, 2014e, p. 11), and the Israeli military highlighted Gaza’s threat to Israel:

> The Israeli military says its forces have uncovered more than 30 tunnels in Gaza, with some of the burrows reaching into Israeli territory and designed to launch surprise attacks on Jewish communities along the border. The military said on Sunday it found a tunnel that led directly into the dining room of an Israeli kibbutz. Other underground passages, the military says, serve as weapons caches and Hamas bunkers. (“Gaza conflict: Ceasefire stalls,” 2014, para. 37)

The delegitimisation of Hamas’s rockets in the Australian media was due to using particular voices that condemned Hamas rocket attacks on Israel. By using US and

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Australian voices, the media emphasised the US and Australian condemnation of the Hamas rocket attacks. For instance, *The Age* highlighted Obama’s condemnation of these attacks (see Pollard, 2014). Further, *The Age* used Australian spokespeople (politicians from federal and NSW parliaments), who stated that “Hamas rockets were unjustified and threatened Israeli civilians” (Doherty, 2014, p. 6). Similarly, the ABC highlighted condemnations of rocket attacks that targeted Israel. In this context, it used several officials: White House spokesman Josh Earnest (see “Israel bombards Gaza,” 2014); Australian Communication Minister Malcom Turnbull (the current Prime Minister) (see Brown, 2014); and German Chancellor, Angela Merkel (see “Israel vows to intensify,” 2014). UN voices were also used in ABC’s coverage of related events. The ABC cited condemnations of Hamas rockets by UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon, and Deputy Head of the UN Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs, Maria Jose Torres (see “Gaza conflict: Palestinians blame,” 2014; “Israel, militants trade,” 2014). However, the Turkish voice was used in a different context when the ABC quoted Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan, who stated that “[Hamas] is firing rockets. But is there anybody who died?” (Cooper, 2014h, para. 23).

The Australian media’s delegitimisation of Hamas’s rockets and tunnels and legitimisation of Israeli military operation in Gaza were accompanied by particular representations of Hamas. Australian media tended to use active structures to report Palestinian and Hamas’s actions related to rockets and tunnels. Hamas was also foregrounded as an actor. For example, *The Australian* stated that “Hamas . . . significantly escalated the rockets, and attempted to infiltrate Israel by tunnel and by sea, forcing Israel to degrade Hamas’s ability to continue these attacks” (Hyams, 2014, p. 14). Additionally, Ahron Shapiro wrote in the *Herald Sun* that “Hamas forced this war on Israel—refusing to stop attacking even after Israel agreed to a ceasefire and stopped shooting back. Israel is obligated to defend its citizens, just as Australia would do if rockets were pounding Melbourne” (Shapiro, 2014, p. 33).

Nevertheless, backgrounding Palestinians and Hamas as actors and using passive structures to report their actions were more prominent in *The Age* and ABC compared
with other selected Australian media. For example, The Age stated that “three civilians have also been killed, with more than 2800 rockets fired into Israel” (Pollard, 2014f, p. 26). Backgrounding Hamas by using passive structures to describe its actions was also evident in ABC coverage of events related to Hamas’s rockets and tunnels, although this was less often. For instance, it was stated that “more than 60 rockets were fired from the Palestinian enclave, some deep into Israel” (Cowan, 2014, para. 43).

6.3.2 Framing Hamas’s rockets and tunnels

The Australian media used various frames in their coverage of events related to Hamas’s rockets and tunnels. For example, the responsibility frame was used in News Corp coverage of the Palestinian rockets, including Hamas’s rockets. Attributing responsibility to Hamas was evident within the coverage of these rockets, which targeted Israel during the war on Gaza 2014. Similarly, the Herald Sun attributed responsibility to Hamas for launching rockets that claimed to have caused the Israeli military operation in Gaza (see Bolt, 2014). The same frame emerged in The Australian coverage of the Israeli shelling of Al-Aqsa hospital, when Hamas was blamed by Israel for storing rockets:

Israel said the target of Monday’s attack wasn’t the hospital in the central Gaza town of Deir El-Balah but rockets stored on the adjacent lot. Israel said fighters from Hamas, the militant group it has been targeting, were storing anti-tank missiles “in the immediate vicinity”. (Solomon et al., 2014, p. 11)

In their coverage of Palestinian rockets and violations to ceasefires, the three News Corp outlets and the ABC attributed the failure of the ceasefires to Hamas’s rockets. For instance, The Australian referred to the UN Secretary General and Abbas’ criticism of Hamas’s rejection of the ceasefire proposal (Falkenstein, 2014a, p. 12). Hamas was also blamed in The Australian for “breaking a planned 72-hour ceasefire in Gaza after it had started” by launching a rocket after an Israeli attack that killed 27 Palestinians (“Ceasefire broken within hour,” 2014, p. 1). In the same context, News Corp media highlighted Netanyahu’s orders to his negotiators to leave Cairo after rocket attacks by Palestinian militants on southern Israel, and to his army to launch air strikes on Gaza (“Hope for truce,” 2014; “Israel quits,” 2014; Lyons, 2014n).
Similarly, news.com.au highlighted Hamas’s resumed rocket attacks and its vow “not to agree to a ceasefire until its demands [were] met, including the easing of Israel’s tight blockade of the region and the release of former Hamas prisoners” (“Israeli strike on Gaza,” 2014, para. 24). It is noteworthy that News Corp media relied on Israeli voices in its coverage of ceasefire violations, attributing responsibility to Hamas for launching rockets during the ceasefire:

The Israeli military said that Gaza militants had fired eight rockets and mortars at Israel since the ceasefire began, one of which was intercepted. “Once again, Hamas and the terror organisations in Gaza have blatantly broken the ceasefire to which they committed, this time before the American Secretary of State and the UN Secretary General,” Mr Netanyahu’s office said in a statement shortly after the fighting broke out. (Barzak & Estrin, 2014, para. 14–15)

News.com.au also attributed responsibility to Palestinian militants for breaking the ceasefire. For example, news.com.au considered that breaking “the quiet with pre-dawn rocket attacks” resulted in the failure of mediators to achieve a ceasefire deal (Zaanoun, 2014, para. 9). Although the same frame of responsibility emerged in news.com.au coverage, the website highlighted a fact downplayed by both The Australian and Herald Sun. News.com.au referred to the Israeli operation in the West Bank (after the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers) that resulted in the killing and arrest of a number of Palestinians. According to news.com.au, this Israeli escalation in the West Bank “triggered a surge in rocket attacks against southern Israel by militants in the Gaza Strip, which triggered retaliatory Israeli air strikes almost nightly” (“ Bodies of three,” 2014, para. 4).

In a related context, the responsibility frame was used in ABC coverage of events related to Hamas’s rockets. This frame emerged when the ABC quoted Israeli sources that “accused Hamas of firing several rockets” a few hours before the end of a ceasefire (“Gaza conflict: Israelis,” 2014, para. 9). Netanyahu’s spokesman stated that another rocket attack “was a grave and direct violation of the ceasefire” (“Gaza crisis: Truce,” 2014, para. 10). This responsibility frame also emerged when the ABC quoted US State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf, who blamed Hamas, stating that it had

A comparison frame was also evident in News Corp coverage of Palestinian rockets targeting Israel. This comparison frame emerged, for example, when Melissa Parke, a Labor MP in Australia and a former UN aid worker in Gaza, was quoted in The Australian. Parke compared the number of Palestinian casualties caused by Israeli attacks with Israeli casualties caused by Hamas’s rocket attacks (Owens, 2014). Hamas and Israel were compared in The Australian in relation to rocket attacks:

No matter how much grief and horror we feel over the civilian casualties of Gaza, we also know Israel has the right and obligation to protect its citizens from persistent and indiscriminate Hamas rocket attacks. Yet Israel is the fashionable villain, not Hamas and not even Islamic State. (Hartman, 2014, p. 8)

In addition to the frames above, Australian media used conflict and human interest frames; both frames emerged in News Corp coverage. The following is an example of a conflict frame used in The Australian coverage of mutual accusations between Hamas and Israel in relation to the ceasefire violations:

“Israel has violated the ceasefire in order to sabotage efforts at a truce,” Hamas said. But Israel said it was the 11th time a ceasefire had been rejected or violated by Hamas since hostilities began. “The rocket fire which broke the ceasefire also destroyed the foundation on which the talks in Cairo were based,” Israeli spokesman Mark Regev said. (Lyons, 2014n, p. 8)

A human interest frame was also used in The Australian coverage of the impact of Palestinian rockets on Israeli residents, in southern Israel in particular. The Australian portrayed Israelis as finding a “breakthrough” (Lyons, 2014p, p. 11) during a 72-hour ceasefire after “being traumatised by rockets” (p. 11). The suffering of Israelis was also emphasised in The Australian. They were:

being woken through the night by sirens giving them between 15 seconds – if they live in border towns such as Sderot or Ashdod – to 90 seconds – if they live in Tel Aviv or Haifa – to go to the reinforced ‘safe rooms’ in their house or a public shelter” (Lyons, 2014h, p. 2).
In the same way, a human interest frame emerged in the Herald Sun’s coverage. This frame was used by citing Israeli voices, such as former Israeli president Peres, who said “what can we do, if they are shooting at us and don’t let our mothers and our children have a full night’s sleep?” (“Herald Sun,” 2014c, p. 36). Another example of the human interest frame emerged in the Herald Sun coverage. However, this frame was positioned using voices of Jews in Australia, such as Ahron Shapiro (2014) who stated in his Herald Sun’s article:

It’s dinner time and my phone is making a jarring, pinging noise. And then another. And another. “What’s that noise, Abba?” my three-year-old asks me, using the Hebrew name for Daddy. I say it’s just a message. But I know it’s not an incoming SMS. It’s incoming TNT—a rocket, indiscriminately launched by Hamas or other terror groups from Gaza into Israel. My elderly mother and my brother live near Jerusalem and some days ago I downloaded Red Alert, the most popular app in Israel. It alerts one of incoming rockets in real time and lets you know what Israeli towns and cities are under attack. (p. 33)

A human interest frame also emerged in a Herald Sun editorial. This editorial stated that residents in Israeli “towns and villages live[ed] in fear and amid the constant wail of warning sirens [and] frightened children [were] being taught in windowless concrete rooms” (“Herald Sun,” 2014a, p. 28). News.com.au highlighted the same information, but also employed a human interest frame and victimised Israel:

In the battle for global public opinion, Israel may be a victim of its own success in preventing domestic casualties. Its Iron Dome missile defence system has shot down incoming Hamas rockets, leaving many in Tel Aviv with the conflicting sensation of fear and the desire to post videos of the interceptions online. No Israelis have been killed in the past week, while more than 160 Gazans have died, many of them civilians. (Perry, 2014, para. 11)

In Fairfax newspapers, conflict and human interest frames emerged in The Age and SMH coverage of Hamas rockets and tunnels. For example, Palestinian rockets attacks, which targeted Israel, were represented in a conflict frame in The Age:

The fighting continued until the last moment, as gunboats shelled along Gaza’s Mediterranean coast and tanks fired heavy ordnance from the east, while militants from Gaza fired rockets into central and southern Israel,
triggering sirens in Ashkelon, Ashdod and the Eshkol region. (Pollard, 2014a, p. 23)

Yet, when representing the effect of Palestinian rockets on residents in southern Israel, the *SMH* used a human interest frame. This frame was evident in the use of Israeli voices, such as that of Israeli Prime Minister spokesman Regev (see Pollard, 2014s). The human interest frame also emerged when describing Israelis running to shelters. Israeli residents had “fifteen seconds in which mothers driving young children have to stop the car, unbuckle them and somehow rush them into a bomb shelter” (Miller, 2014, p. 18).

Similarly, a human interest frame was used in the *SMH* victimising Israel:

> Israel withdrew every citizen and soldier from Gaza in 2005. It left developed farmland, homes, schools and other infrastructure for the Palestinians as a goodwill gesture. It did not get peace in return; it got bombed. The limited blockade Israel has imposed took hold only after Hamas took control and commenced the bombardment. (Miller, 2014, p. 18)

A human interest frame appeared in ABC coverage, despite the dominance of the conflict frame. For instance, the impact of Palestinian rockets on Israelis’ lives was highlighted, as these rockets sent Israeli people from cities such as Ashdod and Tel Aviv to bomb shelters (Cooper, 2014e; “UN school in Gaza,” 2014). A further example of this human interest frame is shown in the following:

> On the Israeli side, rocket impacts wounded at least two people, medics said. In the Israeli port city of Ashdod, motorists scrambled from their cars and raced for the relative safety of apartment block entrances as a siren sounded, a scene repeated in other Israeli towns near the Gaza Strip. (“Israel bombards Gaza,” 2014, para. 11–13)

### 6.3.3 Portraying Israeli casualties

Although the human interest frame emerged in Australian media coverage of the impact of Palestinian rockets on Israeli daily life, a conflict frame was used to portray Israeli casualties. These casualties were mostly represented in terms of numbers. For example, it was stated that “61 soldiers and three civilians were killed [and] that total included five soldiers” (Lyons, 2014e, p. 11). In a few cases, more details about the
condition of Israeli casualties and the locations and circumstances in which they were killed or injured were reported. An Israeli emergency services spokesman was quoted, stating that “three people were injured, one very seriously . . . [and this] occurred in the southern port city of Ashdod” (“Northern Israel hit,” 2014, para. 5), where rockets were fired from Gaza. Another example also shows that Israeli deaths were reported as statistics, with some information provided about the circumstances in which they were killed, relying only on Israeli military and police sources. No other details such as names and ages of casualties were reported:

The Israeli army said three more soldiers were killed in combat inside Gaza on Wednesday, raising to 32 the total number of soldiers killed since the start of a ground operation on July 17. A Thai farm labourer also died when a rocket fired from Gaza struck the greenhouse where he was working in southern Israel, police said. (“Hamas militants,” 2014, para. 12–13)

While Fairfax newspapers’ portrayal of Israeli casualties were similar to portrayals in News Corp media, the ABC represented these casualties with more individualisation. The Age and SMH portrayed Israeli casualties in terms of numbers. These representations did not include any details about casualties’ names and ages, only the nationality of one casualty and the condition of four injured Israelis, including soldiers (see Pollard, 2014a, p. 23; Robertson, 2014b). On the contrary, there was more individualisation of Israeli casualties in ABC coverage. For example, the ABC reported that Israel’s first fatality was “wounded near the Erez crossing into Gaza” (“Israel resumes,” 2014, para. 4). The Israeli casualty was individualised by the ABC, which reported his age and the circumstances of his death. The ABC quoted Israeli health officials, who stated that “the 38-year-old was delivering food to soldiers serving in the area” (“Israel resumes,” 2014, para. 5). Only five weeks later, the first Israeli child was killed, by a mortar attack from Gaza, and this death was also reported. This Israeli child casualty was again individualised by the ABC, which stated that the child was four years old and was killed by a rocket in “a border collective farm” (“Gaza conflict: Hamas executes,” 2014, para. 14).

In a related context, The Australian and Herald Sun emphasised the effectiveness of Israel’s missile defence system, Iron Dome, in terms of preventing or diminishing
casualties. Similarly, both Fairfax newspapers highlighted the small number of Israeli casualties due to this system, although some rockets reached Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (see Pollard, 2014k, 2014r, 2014t) and some landed in fields or unpopulated areas (see Pollard, 2014j, 2014w). Likewise, the ABC emphasised that the Iron Dome system contributed to the achievement of “no Israeli deaths or serious injuries” (“Israel air strikes,” 2014, para. 12). The ABC reported more reasons for the small number of Israeli casualties, including the inaccuracy of Palestinian rockets and the Israeli network of air raid sirens and shelters (Cooper & Brown, 2014).

Although Crikey coverage portrayed Israeli rocket attack casualties in terms of numbers, this representation was in a different context. In Crikey on August 28th, Mike Carlton (2014) compared the Palestinian and Israeli death tolls:

The figures are horrifying. Agence France Press estimated that more than 2000 Palestinians were killed in seven weeks of war, including 493 children. Some 10,000 people were injured, 3100 of them children, of whom around 1000 will suffer some permanent disability. And about 475,000 people have been left homeless … By contrast, Israel’s ambulance service counted just five civilian deaths and 37 injuries—only one critical—from Hamas rockets and mortars over the 50 days. Technology again; Israel’s Iron Dome missile defence worked brilliantly. But to what end? American historian Barbara Tuchman nailed what she called the march of folly: the wooden-headed (her words) pursuit by nations of policies catastrophically against their own interests. (para. 5)

6.3.4 Representations of alleged Israeli soldiers’ capture

Within their coverage of Hamas’s tunnels, the Australian media covered Israel’s announcement of a missing soldier, Shaul Aron. Later, the media reported on Israel’s accusations towards Hamas for capturing soldier Hadar Goldin, and Israel’s subsequent announcement of his death. The Australian considered that the “disappearance of an Israeli soldier complicated international efforts to negotiate a ceasefire” (Lyons, 2014t, p. 8), and that the kidnapping of this soldier would be problematic for Israel who had “a policy of doing whatever is necessary to bring its soldiers, dead or alive, back from a war” (p. 8).
Australian media relied on various voices in this coverage. For instance, *The Australian* and news.com.au relied on Israeli and US voices to report Israeli claims of the disappearance and death of Goldin. In addition to Israeli military and government voices, news.com.au relied on US voices such as President Obama, who called for the unconditional release of the Israeli soldier (“Gaza Strip: Israel demands,” 2014). Another US voice, US Deputy National Security Advisor Tony Blinken, emphasised that if Goldin’s abduction was confirmed, this was an “absolutely outrageous action by Hamas, using the cover of a ceasefire to conduct a surprise attack” (Barzak & Estrin, 2014, para. 13). Hamas voices were used in news.com.au, when the Hamas armed wing “denied any knowledge about the fate of the missing soldier” (“Gaza Strip: Israel demands,” 2014, para. 7), and announced that it ha[d] lost contact with one of [its] combatant groups” (para. 7). The same voices were used in *The Australian* when Hamas “claimed capturing an Israeli soldier” (Lyons, 2014y, p. 9).

Similarly, there was a reliance on Israeli voices in earlier coverage of Hamas’s claims to have kidnapped Aron, whose death Israel announced later. News.com.au quoted a spokesman for the Israeli military that was investigating Hamas’s claim, and Israel’s Ambassador in the UN, Ron Prosor, who denied the soldier’s abduction, stating that “those rumours [were] untrue” (“Hamas claim kidnap,” 2014, para. 2). Nevertheless, Hamas sources were used in news.com.au coverage of the same event. A Hamas spokesman “said in a televised address the Israeli soldier Shaul Aaron is in the hands of the Qassam Brigades” (“Hamas claim kidnap,” 2014, para. 4).

Both Fairfax newspapers used Hamas voices in coverage related to the alleged soldiers’ abductions more than News Corp media did. For instance, Hamas voices were used and Hamas itself was personalised when “its military wing, al-Qassam Brigades, denied a soldier had been captured” (Pollard, 2014b, p. 14) and when Hamas spokesman, Sami Abu Zuhri “accused Israel of ‘misleading the world’ by saying Lieutenant Goldin had been kidnapped” (Pollard, 2014b, p. 14). Yet, the Israeli army’s voice was not ignored in *The Age* and *SMH*, because later the Israeli military was quoted as it “announced [that] Lieutenant Hadar Goldin had not been captured but instead had been ‘killed in battle in the Gaza Strip’” (Pollard, 2014b, p. 14). The *SMH*
used Israel’s military spokesperson’s voice in its coverage of the same events (see Pollard, 2014w).

The ABC also covered Israeli accusations of kidnapping, using both Israeli and Hamas sources:

The military says the attack occurred an hour-and-a-half after the ceasefire came into effect and Palestinian militants resumed firing rockets into Israel around the same time. Hamas’s armed wing says it has no information on the whereabouts of the soldier. “The Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades has no information on this soldier,” it said in a statement. “We have lost contact with one of our combatant groups, which was fighting in the sector where the soldier went missing and it is possible that our fighters and this soldier were killed”. (Cooper, 2014c, para. 10)

Later, the ABC covered the Israeli announcement of Goldin’s death and stated that “Goldin’s suspected abduction led to the collapse of a US and UN-brokered ceasefire” (“Gaza conflict: 10 killed,” 2014, para. 16). At the same time, it quoted Hamas’s perspective on this event:

Seeking to shift responsibility, Hamas said it believed its gunmen had struck before Friday’s ceasefire began and that if they captured Lieutenant Goldin, he probably died with his captors in heavy Israeli barrages that followed. (“Gaza conflict: Israeli vows,” 2014, para. 19)

With regard to inclusions and exclusions made by Australian media in this context, while there were facts and details included by one outlet, the same facts and details were excluded by other selected media. For instance, *The Age* included one fact that was excluded from other media analysed in this study. This fact is related to an Israeli policy used when confronted by Palestinian attempts to capture soldiers. The Israeli army calls this policy ‘the Hannibal directive’, and it was included in *The Age*’s coverage:

If soldiers see a comrade being taken prisoner they are to fire to prevent – “at all costs” - his captors getting away with him, even if it means killing the Israeli captive himself. The controversial directive has been in effect for 27 years, but except for the case of Gilad Shalit – a soldier whose captors escaped with him eight years ago despite fire directed at them - it is not known to have been implemented until recently. (Rabinovich, 2014, p. 37)
It was considered in *The Age* that this policy was implemented during the attempted capture of Goldin. Therefore, there was a heavy Israeli shelling of the area in which the capture attempt took place in Rafah. Later, the Israeli army announced the death of this soldier although his body was not found:

An hour after a temporary ceasefire in Gaza went into effect on August 1, Hamas fighters in the town of Rafah killed two Israeli soldiers and escaped with a third, Second Lieutenant Hadar Goldin, 23. Israeli artillery and tanks laid down a massive barrage on the area in an attempt to prevent the captors from escaping towards Gaza City. About 150 Palestinians were later reported killed in the shelling. But the Israeli officer was not located despite an intensive house-to-house search. Hamas later declared that one of its units might have been involved but that it was apparently wiped out in the barrage. (Rabinovich, 2014, p. 37)

It is noteworthy that either no details or limited details were given about the incident in which Hamas claimed to have captured Aron. Later, Israel announced his death. On the contrary, the Australian media, News Corp media in particular, provided some background about Hamas tunnels. It referred to the “tunnel [that] was used in 2006 to capture the Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, who was held for five years before being released in a prisoner exchange program” (Carlyon, 2014, p. 39).

### 6.4 Summary

This chapter illustrated Australian media representations of the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique used by Israeli military during the war on Gaza 2014, and events related to Hamas’s rockets and tunnels. Media portrayals of Palestinian and Israeli casualties were also investigated, as well as portrayals of the main actors: Israel and Hamas. In this regard, Israeli actions related to its shelling of targets in Gaza were legitimised, while Hamas rockets and tunnels were delegitimised. Although Australian media coverage of the Gaza War 2014 included discussions of Israel’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique and claims of Hamas’s use of civilians as human shields, some crucial aspects were ignored, excluded or not sufficiently highlighted. For example, some lawful and humanistic aspects of events related to Israel’s use of this technique were excluded or not highlighted sufficiently.
The use of Israeli voices or pro-Israel in the analysed news articles resulted in the legitimisation of the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique, and the delegitimisation of Hamas rockets. This indicates how these sources and voices were crucial in the shaping of the Australian media representations of the main themes included in this chapter and the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 in general. The analysis highlighted the power of voices and sources to shape these representations through using particular frames. The example of the ‘alleged numbers’ frame that emerged in an article by a senior analyst at the AJJAC, explains how relying on Israeli and pro-Israel sources and voices played a role in framing events in News Corp media. Applying the same notion to Fairfax, the use of Palestinian voices (witnesses) resulted in the prominence of the human interest frame in Fairfax newspapers coverage.

The findings in this chapter also confirm the findings in previous chapters, in which I revealed that Australian media tended to represent Israel positively and Hamas negatively. The findings indicate that these representations were affected by the news sources from which the media gathered information. Australian media varied in portraying both Hamas and Israel in terms of backgrounding and foregrounding them as actors, and using active and passive structures to represent their actions. The media tended to suppress or background Israel and use an active structure when referring to Israeli actions related to the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique. An active structure was used to report the actions considered positive by the Australian media, while a passive structure was used to refer to the Israeli actions of shelling Palestinian targets and killing Palestinian civilians. In contrast, the selected media tended to foreground Hamas as an actor and use an active structure to report Hamas’s actions in relation to Palestinian rocket attacks that resulted in Israeli casualties.

Australian media also varied in their portrayal of Palestinian casualties. For example, when comparing News Corp and Fairfax coverage of Palestinian casualties, Fairfax’s individualisation of the casualties was more evident, but only in a few cases. Despite the media use of human interest frames in representing Palestinian casualties, this does not necessarily reflect a full recognition of their lives. The Australian media portrayed these casualties as what Butler (2009) refers to as “lost but are not fully recognizable
as a loss” (p. 74). Conversely, Australian media representations of Israeli casualties also lacked individualisation. However, within representations of the impact of Hamas’s rockets and tunnels on Israeli lives, these lives were likely to be more grievable and recognised (cf. Butler), compared with Palestinian lives, especially considering the tolls from both sides. In other words, although both Israeli and Palestinian casualties were mostly portrayed in terms of numbers, the Australian media reporting on these casualties, in some cases, displayed more recognition of Israeli lives. Palestinian casualties were more individualised due to the difference between the number of Palestinian and Israeli casualties. Additionally, individualising Palestinian casualties and portraying them in human interest frames were occasional in Australian media and was accompanied by particular voices or sources.

Overall, Australian media coverage of events related to Israel’s ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique and Hamas’s rockets and tunnels tended to be pro-Israel. This is evident in the emphasis on Israel’s right of defence and the justification of its military operation in Gaza, and the ignoring of the right of Palestinians to defend themselves. Further, positive representations of Israel and negative representations of Hamas, and the way in which both sides’ actions were portrayed, indicate that Australian media coverage was in favour of Israel, particularly News Corp media.

Chapter 7 offers a deeper discussion of the main findings of this study, based on the theoretical framework and existing literature.
Chapter 7: Discussion

7.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the findings of the research in relation to the existing literature to address the research questions. It also discusses the political and journalistic contexts that shaped Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The main aim of this study, as presented in the introduction of this thesis, was to investigate Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on framing theory. By using corpus-based analysis and CDA, this study addressed the main research question: How did the Australian media represent the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? The analysis using CDA in Chapters 5 and 6 aimed to answer the research sub-questions related to media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 in terms of the frames and voices used by Australian media. Alongside this, the research investigated how the main Israeli and Palestinian actors and their actions were portrayed in Australian media, and how these actions were legitimised or delegitimised. The lexical choices, and inclusions and exclusions made by Australian media were also examined within the framing of events. Moreover, the study explored the extent to which Australian media representations of the conflict were balanced or biased, and how they varied in this regard.

The six sections of this chapter discuss the key findings of this study and explore the contexts in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was portrayed by Australian media. The first section explains how frames and voices shaped Australian media representations of the conflict and to what extent this reflected media bias. Other factors that resulted in media bias are explored to explain the variation of Australian media representations in this regard. This study showed that Australian media relied on Israeli voices more than on Palestinian voices. More specifically, they relied on Israeli officials more than on Palestinian officials, while Israeli residents’ voices were less evident than Palestinian residents’ voices. The study also indicated that the conflict frame was dominant in Australian media. This conflict frame was associated with media reliance on officials’ voices and the avoidance of specific words.
Consequently, the human interest frame was less prominent than other frames. This study indicated a pro-Israel bias because the Israeli point of view was more prominent in Australian media coverage.

The second section discusses Australian media representations of Israeli and Palestinian actors. This study found that Australian media tended to either suppress or background Israel and its actions, while it foregrounded Palestinian actors and their actions. The third section explains the portrayal of Israeli and Palestinian casualties based on Butler’s notions (see Chapter 1). The findings indicate that both Israeli and Palestinian casualties were represented in terms of numbers or statistics, and occasionally individualised. Palestinian casualties were covered more due to their higher numbers compared to Israeli death toll.

The fourth section explains how Israel’s actions were legitimised by the Australian media and how Palestinian actions were delegitimised. This study found that legitimising Israeli actions in relation to its attacks in Gaza and delegitimising Palestinian actions in relation to their rocket attacks were evident in Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014.

The fifth section discusses how the inclusions and exclusions made by Australian media shaped the representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014. The findings of both corpus-based and CDA analyses indicate that inclusions and exclusions made by Australian media shaped their representations of the conflict.

Finally, the sixth section explores how power in media influenced the contexts in which Australian media and journalists represented the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These contexts include the political contexts in which Australian journalists work and produce their reports.

**7.2 Frames, Voices and Media Bias**

Throughout this thesis, Australian media were found to have represented the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a conflict frame. This conflict frame emerged in both
quantitative and qualitative analyses as the most dominant frame. The dominance of
the conflict frame resulted from the media portrayals of the conflict as between Israel
and Hamas, and relying on the voices of Israeli and Palestinian officials. Consequently, Australian media had a lesser focus on the humanistic aspects of these events. This finding shows that the media did not consider or highlight sufficiently the stories that involved humanistic aspects of events related to the conflict. The dominance of conflict frames in the media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict supports previous studies. For instance, Aqtash et al. (2004) revealed that Palestinian children were placed in a frame of conflict in six news outlets, including the NYT; the BBC; The Guardian, Jerusalem Post and Al-Jazeera, which portrayed Palestinian children without focusing on related contexts.

Frames such as the human interest, victim and consequences frames were less
dominant, despite the tragedy of war and the death toll, particularly on the Palestinian side. This was due to less focus being placed on stories of casualties compared with coverage of the conflict itself, media reliance on officials’ voices, and the avoidance of words such as victim, innocent and massacre. Media avoidance of these words is also shown in the findings of Philo and Berry (2004, 2011), in which it was indicated that the BBC avoided using the word massacre to describe Palestinian deaths in the Jenin Camp during the Israeli military operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank in 2002. Again, this study highlighted how the subtle use of vocabulary in media coverage affected the frames used to portray events and issues related to the conflict.

According to my findings, the use of some terms and not others reflected the position of Australian media towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Pan and Kosicki (1993) argue that “the words chosen by a news reporter reveal the way that reporter categorizes the subject on which he or she is reporting” (as cited in Kuypers, 2006, p. 14). In other words, word choice is also a crucial mechanism of framing. For instance, Australian media used the words dead and death instead of killed and killing in a few cases when referring to the killing of casualties during the Israeli war on Gaza. As a consequence, the human interest frame was less evident in this regard. As a result, the representation of Palestinian casualties in Australian media coverage did not reflect a
full recognition of the value of their lives, which were sometimes represented as
ungrievable (see Section 7.4).

The responsibility frame was another prominent frame in Australian media coverage
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This was shown throughout the findings of corpus
analysis and CDA in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Due to the launching of rockets from Gaza,
responsibility for the deaths among Palestinian civilians was attributed mostly to
Hamas because the civilians were killed during Israel’s retaliatory attacks (according
to the media). This frame of attributing responsibility to Hamas was more evident in
News Corp media and the ABC.

Inclusions and exclusions as well as sources and voices are crucial mechanisms of
framing, as indicated by Entman (1993, 2002). This study showed that both
mechanisms were used to frame events and issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict in Australian media, and indicated media bias in this regard. For example,
Australian media excluded, except occasionally, the perspective that Israel is an
‘occupier’ of Palestine. This was due to the reliance on Israeli voices, and not
highlighting the Palestinian point of view. *The Australian* correspondent Lyons
(2017a) has another reason for the rare use of *occupier* or *occupation* by Australian
media:

> Journalists who write about Israel – even if they do not live there – can enjoy
> a very pleasant life on one condition: that they never mention the occupation.
> You can have all-expenses-paid trips to Israel. You can stay at the best hotels
> and eat at the best restaurants. You can be invited to speak at conferences in
> Australia, Israel or London. Your spouse will have their airfare paid also.
> You will be made to feel important. Your editors will be told what a good
> journalist you are. But to get all of this you must never mention the
> occupation nor make any serious criticism of Israel. Many journalists
> comply. (p. 281)

An imbalance in the use of Israeli and Palestinian voices was shown in Australian
media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014. For example, the quantitative
overview of data in Chapter 5 showed that Israeli voices were more dominant than
Palestinian voices in Australian media coverage of the 2014 war. The findings of CDA
in Chapter 6 also indicated that Israeli voices were more prominent. This is consistent
with the findings of previous studies. For instance, Deprez and Raeymaeckers (2010a, 2011) found that Israeli sources were cited more frequently than Palestinian sources during the First and Second Palestinian intifadas in Flemish newspapers. Another example is the work of Philo and Berry (2010), which revealed that the British media, in their coverage of the Second Palestinian Intifada, excluded the view that Palestinians “were resisting an illegal military occupation” (p. 202). Conversely, the same media highlighted the Israeli perspective, stating that they “were fighting a ‘War on Terror’” (p. 202). The reason for this imbalance, according to Philo and Berry (2010), was “that Israeli representatives were given twice as much time to speak . . . as [were] Palestinian sources” (p. 202). In other words, Philo and Berry (2011) found that Israeli views were “endorsed and highlighted, and that Palestinian Arab perspectives were more likely to be downgraded or simply absent” (p. 233). Further, the imbalance increased because of “the prominence given to American sources who tended to support the Israeli position [compared to British sources]” (Philo & Berry, 2010, p. 202). In a similar manner, US voices, supporting Israel, were more dominant than Australian voices; and this was one of the reasons for media bias in Australian media coverage according to the findings of this study.

Media reliance on Israeli officials indicate a bias in Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014, as shown in Chapters 5 and 6. This finding agrees with the findings of Korn (2010), whose study showed that “the dependence of Israeli journalists on military sources and their tendency to follow official explanations is anchored in an ingrained bias” (150) in Israeli media representations of events related to the Second Palestinian Intifada. Similarly, Amer (2008) concludes that “Israeli sources [were] quoted more than Palestinian sources due to the use of senior Israeli political and military officials who [were] used to define, explain and evaluate the situation” (p. 111). Hence, the media bias revealed in this study resulted from the media excluding facts, or aspects of related events or issues, or not highlighting these facts or aspects efficiently, as well as relying on particular voices, which is a new contribution to knowledge and adds support to earlier studies.
Throughout this thesis, the analysis has revealed that Australian media preferred Israeli voices over Palestinian voices in their coverage of the 2014 war. The prominence of Israeli voices was more evident in News Corp newspaper *The Australian*, while Palestinian voices were more dominant in Fairfax newspapers and *Crikey*. For instance, both *The Age* and *SMH* used Palestinian voices slightly more when they covered the kidnapping and killing of Palestinian teenager Abu Khdeir. However, these preferences were due to the greater media access of Israeli voices, particularly those of the officials, compared to Palestinian voices. Therefore, in this research, the dominance of the voices of Israeli officials in Australian media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resulted in a media bias. As previous studies have also shown and Loewenstein asserts that “the Palestinians are poor at providing basic factual information, and the Israelis, while they have efficient information networks, ‘are very quickly to put their line, but their information is sometimes unreliable’” (as cited in Loewenstein, 2009, Chapter 10, Section 4, para. 1). In addition, as Mathew Carney, ABC reporter and producer states, Palestinians “just can’t get themselves together in presenting an effective voice to the media” (Loewenstein, 2009, Chapter 10, Section 4, para. 4), while Israelis “have become masters in media manipulation” (Chapter 10, Section 4, para. 4). Moreover, Israel controls the media by issuing “press releases after an incident and then restricting access to journalists trying to get to the location of the event” (Loewenstein, 2009, Chapter 10, Section 6, para. 1). According to my analysis, this technique was used during the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014. The Israeli army issued statements after Gaza War events. Therefore, Australian media relied on these statements and Israeli military spokesmen, such as Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner, Brigadier General Moti Almoz and Major Arye Shalicar. In a similar way, Almeida (2011) found that both Israeli and Palestinian officials were quoted more when the US media was seeking information, but that Israeli officials were quoted more often in this regard.

The reliance on Israeli officials by Australian media can also be explained by the restrictions that journalists face. Levy (2010) asserts that Israeli blocking of media coverage in the Gaza Strip, which included Israeli media, resulted in the media “not providing the service it is supposed to provide” (p. 45). Regarding the West Bank,
Loewenstein (2009) mentions that the only Western and Israeli journalist permanently based in the West Bank is Amira Hass, the *Ha’aretz* correspondent. For Western media correspondents, it is “much more dangerous to live and work as a reporter in the Palestinian sector, and English isn’t the primary language spoken” (Loewenstein, 2009, Chapter 10, Section 4, para. 3).

The voices of Israeli and Palestinian officials were more prominent than the voices of Israeli and Palestinian ‘residents’ as revealed in my CDA. In addition, Palestinian residents were quoted more than Israeli residents were. The findings of this study are consistent with those of Dobernig et al. (2010), who argued that in both the visual and verbal representations of Israeli military operation in Gaza in 2008–2009, the Palestinian side was portrayed through relying on “individual civilians, whereas the Israeli side [was] shown with political and government officials” (p. 102). In my study, the Israeli official voice was the loudest over other Israeli voices, Israeli residents were rarely interviewed by the media, and anti-Israeli government voices among the Israeli society were usually hidden and excluded. On the contrary, the Palestinian and official residents were interviewed according to the requirement and need of the coverage, and as the casualties of the Israeli war on Gaza were significantly more on the Palestinian side, the voices of Palestinian residents were used more than Israeli residents; however, the voices of Palestinian officials were still more prominent than Palestinian residents.

The quantitative overview of data as well as the qualitative analysis provided in Chapter 5, shows that the Australian media relied on the voices of Palestinian residents more than the voices of Israeli residents. The use of Palestinian residents’ voices was mostly in relation to the media coverage of the Israeli attacks in Gaza during the 2014 war that resulted in the killing of a significant number of Palestinian civilians. Therefore, the media correspondents interviewed Palestinian residents (civilians), including casualties, their families and witnesses based on what the coverage of these events required. On the contrary, the use of Israeli residents’ voices was less evident because the incidents in which Israeli civilians were killed or injured during the war were limited in comparison to the number of Palestinian civilians killed or injured.
Likewise, in US media coverage of the conflict during 2002–2006 “news writers often interviewed the families of injured or slain Palestinians” (Almeida, 2011, p. 1590), while “the families and friends of Israeli victims of the bombings were infrequently interviewed” (p. 1591). Almeida (2011) also found that Palestinian civilians were quoted more frequently than Israeli civilians. According to my research findings, Israeli residents’ voices were used occasionally, particularly when reporting Palestinian rockets that hit Israel during the war, and discussing the impact of these rockets on the lives of Israelis. My study clearly indicates that the Israeli official point of view was always more prominent in this regard.

Apart from the dominance of Israeli voices, which resulted in media bias, US voices were also used more than Australian voices (see Chapter 5). This could be related to the involvement of the two countries: the US is more involved than Australia, because it is the main ally of Israel. Australian voices were; however, used occasionally, for example when quoting Australian officials in the coverage of Australia’s position towards some events related to the Israeli war on Gaza 2014. These officials included former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and current Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop. Importantly, Australian media relied on statements by US and Australian officials rather than interviews, and thus the US voices were found to be more prominent than the Australian voices in this study. Similarly, Kandil (2009) found that CNN tended to “devote much space to Israeli or American officials who usually provide justification for the acts of violence committed by Israeli and present the Israeli side in the position of self-defence” (p. 101).

The Australian media used UN voices in their coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014; however, these voices were less prominent than those of Israeli and Palestinian officials. UN voices were mainly used when referring to the UN and UNRWA position towards the situation in the strip and the killing of Palestinian civilians. Thus, the use of UN voices was relevant to the day-to-day coverage of the conflict. On the contrary, voices of other international organisations were not prominent in Australian media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza. In this context, the voices of human rights organisations, including Israeli human rights organisations such as B’Tselem, were
occasionally used in Australian media coverage of the 2014 war. Therefore, my study has shown that the lawful frame was not evident in the coverage.

This study did not find clear evidence between bias in Australian media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and their reliance on international news agencies. The media selected for this study took 36.2% of news articles from these agencies (see Appendix C). The reliance on international agencies as a news source was evident mainly in the news websites, the ABC and news.com.au coverage, and less evident in *The Age, SMH* and *Herald Sun* coverage. Similarly, Wu (2007) revealed that online media relied on news agencies as sources, and the influence of these agencies could be more evident on online media than traditional media including newspapers (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). International news agencies, mainly Reuters, AP and AFP, are based in the US, UK and France. These countries are considered “powers” in the world (Thussu, 2007, p. 10). In general, international agencies reflect these countries’ policies and positions in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this context, anti-Palestinian bias in the US and British media is “reflected indirectly in the Australian media” (Loewenstein, 2009, Chapter 10, Section 3, para. 1). This is due to the lack of resources and the reliance of Australian media on US and British media such as the *NYT, Washington Post, CNN* and *The Guardian*.

However, media bias is not only relevant for the reasons stated above. As shown in Chapter 2, Australian foreign policy is both pro-Israel and pro-US; however, the level of Australian media support for both countries varies. For example, the coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by News Corp media is consistent with the official US and Israeli perspective. News Corp is owned by Rupert Murdoch, an Australian-born US mogul, who “has controlled 70 per cent of Australia’s newspaper market including the top selling papers in Melbourne and Sydney, the tabloid *Herald Sun* and *Daily Telegraph*, as well as his flagship daily, the *Australian*” (McKnight, 2012, p. 7), and “has often been accused of interfering in the political processes of Western democracies, particularly in Australia, Britain and the United States” (Hobbs, 2009, p. 138). Despite the pro-Israeli position of News Corp indicated in this study, reporting by *The Australian* correspondent Lyons, reflected a neutral perspective or a slightly
critical view of Israel. With regard to Fairfax newspapers’ representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, *The Age* and *SMH* were more balanced in their coverage of events related to the conflict as revealed in my corpus and CDA analyses. Although the quantitative data presented in Chapter 5 showed that *The Age* and *SMH* quoted Palestinian voices more often than Israeli voices, the qualitative analysis indicated that both newspapers balanced their use of voices when covering events. This balance of using sources enabled a more balanced point of view. Furthermore, the reporting of the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014 by the Fairfax correspondent Ruth Pollard, resulted in highlighting the Palestinian perspective, particularly that of residents. The Israeli perspective and Israeli officials’ voices were still dominant due to restrictions on news gathering and textual practices of media correspondents that can reflect bias. In a similar context, Korn (2010) argues that “the dependence of Israeli journalists on military sources and their tendency to follow official explanations is anchored in an ingrained bias” (p. 150). However, the variety of voices used by both Fairfax newspapers allowed more humanistic frames to arise. Additionally, this study found that ABC coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014 tended to be more neutral than News Corp coverage, although Israeli voices were slightly more prominent than Palestinian voices in ABC coverage.

In contrast, Crikey tended to be neutral in its coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This was due to the overall interest of Crikey of discussing issues related to the conflict rather than covering specific events only. Although the number of Crikey news articles analysed was limited, these articles focused on overall issues, rather than individual events. Crikey also suggested solutions for the conflict (see Chapter 6). Nonetheless, Crikey coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza tended to be pro-Palestinian since Palestinian and pro-Palestinian voices were more prominent than Israeli and pro-Israeli voices. Therefore, Crikey was mostly critical towards Israel, its military operation in Gaza and its targeting of civilians including children.

### 7.3 Representations of Israeli and Palestinian Actors

The thesis findings of both corpus analysis and CDA clearly show that Australian media tended to represent Hamas negatively and Israel positively. In this context,
Hamas was a prominent actor because the conflict was portrayed as between Israel and Hamas. For example, the corpus analysis revealed a focus on the violent characteristics of Hamas. In addition, according to the corpus analysis findings in Chapter 4, Hamas was portrayed as a terrorist organisation, and sometimes as an Islamic terrorist organisation. Within the representations of Hamas as a terrorist organisation, Australian media ignored or downplayed Palestinians’ rights of defence and self-determination. According to DeLaet (2015), “the application of the label terrorist to violence perpetrated by specific groups is political . . . [as] ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’” (p. 66). This concept was ignored in Australian media. The media examined in this research mostly ignored the Palestinian perception of Hamas as a resistance movement and Israel is an occupier. These findings on representations of Israel and Hamas are similar to the findings of Kandil (2009). Kandil (2009) found that CNN represented Israeli acts of violence positively as “the in-group and their allies”, to the extent that CNN was “avoiding the use of the word terrorism to describe these acts even if the victims [were] civilians” (p. 101). In contrast, when portraying Palestinians, CNN adopted “negative representations of the out-group and their allies (by their bad actions and mitigating their good actions)” (Kandil, 2009, p. 102).

My analysis showed how Hamas was blamed for the killing of Palestinian civilians and the targeting of Israel with rockets in Australian media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza. In most cases, Israeli actions were portrayed as a retaliation to Palestinian actions or Hamas rockets. The same finding was indicated by Amer (2008) since Israelis were “portrayed as acting in retaliation to Palestinian attacks” (p. 140). Similarly, Philo and Berry (2011) found persistent patterns in British television news, in which Israeli attacks on Palestinians were referred to as a “‘retaliation’ or ‘a response’” (Philo & Berry, 2011), but Palestinian attacks were rarely referred to as a “‘response’ or ‘retaliation’” (p. 232). Furthermore, Philo and Berry (2010) found that Palestinians were “seen to initiate the trouble or violence and the Israelis [were] then presented as ‘responding’ or ‘retaliating’” (p. 203). Thus, my research supports existing studies.
In a related context, Israeli journalist Gideon Levy (2010), discusses retaliation discourse from his perspective as:

We started it with the occupation, and we are duty-bound to end it—a real and complete ending. We started the violence. There is no violence worse than the violence of the occupier, using force on an entire nation, so the question about who fired first is therefore an evasion meant to distort the picture. (p. 21)

When representing the actions of the main actors, Israeli and Hamas, there was a difference in the grammar and structure used by media. As demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, while Australian media tended to use active structures to report Palestinian actions, including Hamas’, they tended to use passive structures to portray Israeli actions of shelling, killing and violations including targeting Palestinian civilians during the 2014 war. Nevertheless, active structures were used to portray ‘positive’ Israeli actions and were particularly clear in News Corp media. On the contrary, the same active structures were used only occasionally in Fairfax newspapers to portray Israeli actions of targeting Palestinian civilians, such as the killing of four children in an Israeli shelling on a Gaza beach. My research showed that Australian media varied in their portrayal of actions by the main actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Based on van Leeuwen’s approach to analysing representations of Israeli and Palestinian actors, the findings of this study indicate that Australian media tended to foreground Palestinians and Hamas as actors, while suppressing or backgrounding Israel and Israelis as actors of what can be considered as negative actions. These findings support Amer’s (2008) research, in which he found a tendency for NYT coverage of the Second Palestinian Intifada “to foreground and emphasize Palestinian violent actions and their Israeli victims while Israeli violent actions tend[ed] to be mitigated, backgrounded or removed from the headlines” (p. 84). Amer also argues that the actions of the Israeli army were backgrounded or suppressed using passive structures.

The findings of my research and the findings of previous studies show that foregrounding, supressing or backgrounding actors varies according to the media’s position towards these actors, as well as the events and issues in which these actors
were involved. For instance, Alhossary and Abdullah (2014) found that Israeli newspaper *Ha’aretz* foregrounded the role of Israel in the release of Shalit, and backgrounded the role of Hamas in the actual implementation of the exchange. Further, Al-Jazeera “foregrounded Israel, its officials, and its defense forces by representing them as negative actors in active processes” (Alhossary & Abdullah, 2014, p. 182). In addition, the variation in media representations of actors can be due to the actors’ actions, either positive or negative. In other words, as evident in my analysis, the position of media towards particular actors and their actions affected the language used to portray these actors and their actions. Therefore, the way in which Australian media suppressed, backgrounded or foregrounded Israelis and Palestinians reflected these media positions towards both actors and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general.

### 7.4 Portrayal of Palestinian and Israeli Casualties

Frames used in Australian media coverage of Palestinian casualties varied between each outlet (see Chapters 5 and 6). For example, in its portrayal of the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers and a Palestinian teenager, News Corp tended to use responsibility frames, mainly attributing responsibility to Hamas, while Fairfax tended to use human interest frames. The human interest frame emerged in the coverage of events related to civilian killings due to the use of Palestinian voices, such as witnesses and medics, and using description as a frame mechanism. Frames varied due to media position and source of news articles. The use of the human interest frame was due to the reporting by correspondents on the ground, who are able to report the actuality of events rather than relying on information from other sources.

This study indicates that Palestinian and Israeli casualties were mostly portrayed in a conflict frame, although the human interest frame was used occasionally to portray casualties from both sides. The humanistic aspect that emerged in Australian media representations of Palestinian casualties was due largely to reporting on particular events and using Palestinian voices, such as witnesses and medics. In other words, the humanistic aspect only was clear when the events and the use of particular voices forced it. Noakes and Wilkins (2002) suggest that humanistic aspects that emerged in
NYT and AP representations of “Palestinians as ‘victims of Israeli actions’” were related to the particular coverage that portrayed “injuries and deaths among Palestinians or difficulties they faced” (p. 664).

While the analysis in this study revealed that the human interest frame was used in the Australian media coverage of Palestinian casualties, it does not necessarily mean there was full recognition of Palestinians’ lives. Based on Butler’s approach, recognising and not recognising lives does not depend only on the frame that events are represented within. My study revealed other factors that shaped Australian media representations of lives of Palestinians and their casualties. These factors included the position of the media itself towards the event, its editorial policy, the sources of news articles and the information within these articles.

Non-recognition of lives in Australian media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 was relevant to representing Palestinian and Israeli casualties in terms of statistics or numbers rather than individualising or personalising them. The analysis showed that this statistical representation was related to reporting the death toll of both sides within the coverage of related events. This research also indicates that representations of Palestinian casualties were more prominent than representations of Israeli casualties, since this reflects the relative numbers of casualties on both sides. My study partially agrees with Amer (2008), who found that Palestinian casualties “tend[ed] to be mitigated, impersonalized, generalized, backgrounded or reported in terms of statistics or numbers” (p. 111). However, he found that Israeli casualties were “made prominent and emphasised” (p. 79). Similarly, Philo and Berry (2010) argue that the deaths of Israelis were “very marked” in British media coverage (p. 204). My study findings disagree with the findings of both studies in terms of the prominence of Israeli casualties over Palestinian casualties. A possible reason for this difference is that both studies, Amer (2008) and Philo and Berry (2010), examined media coverage of the events of the Second Palestinian Intifada in which both Israeli and Palestinian attacks resulted in killings and injuries on both sides. In contrast, the current study investigated media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza, in which most killings and injuries
were on the Palestinian side. Thus, it is the nature of the conflict examined that affects the prominence of casualties from a particular side.

In this study, the individualisation of Palestinian and Israeli casualties in Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 was occasional. Moreover, this occasional individualisation varied between Australian media in this study. The Australian, Fairfax and the ABC tended to individualise Palestinian casualties in their coverage of events; however, individualising these casualties was more evident in Fairfax newspapers. Israeli casualties were also occasionally individualised by providing limited details. These details were limited due to the low number of Israeli casualties and other reasons mentioned in a report published by the UN Human Rights Council (2015):

As a result of Israel’s lack of cooperation and denial of access to its territory, the commission faces difficulty in identifying victims who had been injured in rocket attacks and was unable to examine individual cases in detail. (p. 21)

Within Australian media representations of Israeli casualties, a conflict frame emerged. Therefore, Israeli casualties were mostly portrayed in terms of numbers. It is noteworthy that the ABC portrayed these casualties with more individualisation than other Australian media in this study. However, a human interest frame emerged in the coverage of the impact of Palestinian rockets on Israeli lives, in which these lives were clearly recognised as lives worth protecting.

One explanation of the difference between recognising Palestinian and Israeli lives in Australian media could relate to Butler’s (2009) statement about “why we mourn some lives but respond with coldness to the loss of others” (p. 36). My analysis of Australian media indicates that several factors explain this difference: (i) position of each media towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general, and the Israeli war on Gaza in particular; (ii) voices on which the media relied on; (iii) sources of news articles; and (iv) Australia’s political position in terms of recognising Israel as a state, and considering Hamas as a terrorist group, and Palestinians as stateless people.
Consequently, Australian media representations of Israeli and Palestinian lives were partially “differentiating between those populations on whom my life and existence depend, and those populations who present a direct threat to my life and existence” (Butler, 2009, p. 42). In the last quotation, if the word my is replaced with Israel’s, then Butler’s notion could apply to Australian media representations of Israelis, whose lives were worthy of existence and protection, and Palestinians whose deaths were sometimes regretted but viewed as necessary for Israeli’s existence and right of defence. Accordingly, as Palestinian lives were portrayed in the Australian media in terms of statistics and sometimes indirectly represented as a threat to the Israeli state, the killing of these lives was received with ‘coldness’. Thus, representations lacked the humanistic aspect, except occasionally.

One example of representations of Palestinian casualties in Australian media was shown in Chapter 6. Palestinian casualties were compared with other killings, such as those in Syria. This example indicates that Israeli and Palestinians’ lives were represented according to Butler’s notion of recognising lives. In this case, Israeli lives were portrayed as “worth defending, valuing, and grieving when they are lost” (Butler, 2009, p. 42), while Palestinian lives were portrayed as “not quite valuable, recognizable or, indeed, mournable . . . and ungrievable” (pp. 42–43). Therefore, considering the number of Israeli and Palestinian casualties, the lives of Palestinians were not fully recognised by Australian media. These lives were represented as lost, but not fully recognised. This kind of media representation lacked a humanisation discourse, which Butler (2009) discusses in relation to grievability as follows:

Certain norms have been operative in establishing who is human and so entitled to human rights and who is not. Implicit in this discourse of humanization is the question of grievability: whose life, if extinguished, would be publicly grievable and whose life would leave either no public trace to grieve, or only a partial, mangled, and enigmatic traces? (pp. 74–75)

Although my study did not show an intentional media bias in terms of portraying Palestinian and Israeli casualties, previous studies have found that media have been biased in their representations of casualties from both sides. In this study, Palestinian casualties were more prominent because there were more of them than Israeli
casualties. Therefore, this cannot be considered a bias in favour of Palestinian casualties. In the same way, the frames used to portray Palestinian casualties were not considered biased in favour of Palestinians. For example, Noakes and Wilkins (2002) argue that the US media’s framing of Palestinians as victims was not considered biased. Noakes and Wilkins (2002) illustrate in their analysis that the NYT and AP portrayal of Palestinians as “victims of Israeli actions” (p. 664) was associated with news items related to injuries and deaths among Palestinians. Thus, portraying Palestinian casualties in a human interest or victim frame does not necessarily reflect NYT or AP sympathy with Palestinians. In contrast, Philo and Berry (2010, 2011) argue that British media coverage of Israeli and Palestinian casualties was biased. They attribute the bias to the prominent coverage of Israeli casualties “even though in real terms Palestinians were still experiencing much higher losses” (2011, p. 223) and that the “killings of Israelis were treated in a very different fashion to the killings of Palestinians” (2010, p. 205). Another reason for media bias was revealed by Amer (2008), who found “a persistent pattern of toning down Israeli responsibilities for Palestinian casualties through upgrading and downgrading specific events [during the Second Palestinian Intifada]” (p. 111).

7.5 Legitimising Israel and Delegitimising Palestinians

This study showed that two factors resulted in legitimising Israeli actions and delegitimising Palestinian and Hamas’s actions in Australian media representations of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014: the reliance on Israeli voices and pro-Israel voices, and the sources of news articles. For example, legitimising the Israeli shelling of UN schools and civilian targets was prominent in articles written by senior policy analysts in the AJJAC, such as Ahron Shapiro, Glen Falkenstein, Jamie Hyams and Sharyn Mittelman.

Legitimising Israeli actions in Australian media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 was based on Israeli’s right of defence. At the same time, highlighting Israel’s right of defence was linked with the ‘threat’ of Hamas’s rockets. In other words, the justification and legitimisation of the Israeli military operation in Gaza in Australian media was based on Israel’s right of defence and its aim to demolish Hamas rockets.
and tunnels. Butler (2009) discusses that killing can be done under cover, security or democracy. These forms were used by Australian media to legitimise Israeli actions, including its attacks on Gaza and its ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique. Security and democracy are used by some countries or states to justify wars and killings. The same justification was used in the Australian media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014, thus legitimising Israeli actions. Butler (2009) asserts that nations such as the US or Israel argue that their survival is served by war, and clearly the following notion was highlighted in the Australian media:

Lives are divided into those representing certain kinds of states and those representing threats to state-centered liberal democracy, so that war can then be righteously waged on behalf of some lives, while the destruction of other lives can be righteously defended. (p. 53)

Legitimising Israeli actions related to Palestinian civilian killings and delegitimising Palestinian and Hamas’s actions related to rockets and tunnels were also relevant to: acknowledging Israel as a state, Palestinians as stateless people and Hamas as a non-state actor. In this study, the legitimisation of Israeli actions in Australian media portrayed the conflict as between Israel and Hamas, portraying Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Therefore, for the media, Israel has the status of state, Palestinians are considered stateless, and Hamas is a terrorist organisation and non-state actor. Therefore, Israel and its actions were legitimate, while Palestinians and Hamas and their actions were illegitimate. As Butler (2009) explains:

If, for instance, someone kills or is killed in war, and the war is state-sponsored, and we invest the state with legitimacy, then we consider the death lamentable, sad, and unfortunate, but not radically unjust. And yet if the violence is perpetrated by insurgency groups regarded as illegitimate, then our affect invariably changes. (p. 41)

The difference in status between Israel and Palestinians affected how Australian media in my study represented Israeli and Palestinian lives and actors. The loss of Palestinian lives was viewed as less lamentable than the loss of Israeli lives. Further, as shown in Chapter 6, Hamas and other Palestinian factions were criticised in Australian media for firing rockets indiscriminately into Israel. These rockers were considered a threat to the state of Israel and the lives of Israeli citizens. On the contrary, the Israeli army
was not criticised for targeting Palestinian civilians in Gaza and using the ‘Knock on the Roof’ technique, although targeting civilians is a violation of International Humanitarian Law. Both sides violated “the principle of distinction [that] requires that parties to a conflict distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand, and combatants and military objectives on the other hand” (Human Rights Council, 2015, p. 11).

The findings of this study support those of Peter Manning (2004), who found that “‘terrorism’ [was] accepted as a defining term for Palestinian resistance, whereas a ‘military campaign’ [had] legitimacy” (p. 21), as published in Sydney newspapers, the *SMH* and *The Daily Telegraph*. Similarly, the use of resistance was avoided by Australian media in this study. Consequently, Palestinians and Hamas were delegitimised, and their right to struggle for their self-determination was ignored or downplayed. Nevertheless, this aspect was referred to only occasionally. In other words, the suffering of Palestinian was highlighted occasionally and in a decontextualized and depoliticised way that allowed Palestinians themselves and Hamas to be blamed.

In addition, the findings revealed that legitimising Israeli actions and delegitimising Palestinian actions were relevant to the retaliation discourse that Australian media followed in their coverage of the conflict. In most cases, Palestinians were portrayed as the initiators of the attacks or violence and Israelis were represented as responders or retaliators. In the same manner, Amer (2008) concludes that legitimising Israel’s actions was due to portraying Palestinians as attackers, and Israelis as retaliators. This was supported by foregrounding Palestinian negative or violent actions, and backgrounding or suppressing Israeli negative actions. The same way of portraying Israeli and Palestinian actions was found in Australian media coverage, in which no context was given. These various forms of legitimising Israeli actions and delegitimising Palestinian actions occurred either individually or in combination. In this context, van Leeuwen (2007) argues that the same forms “can be used to legitimize, but also to de-legitimize” (p. 92).
7.6 Inclusions and Exclusions

Inclusions and exclusions were one of the main aspects of the analyses in this thesis. The findings revealed that excluding or downplaying contexts, events and issues shaped Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Australian media coverage lacked the contexts necessary for readers to fully understand events and issues. Both the findings of corpus analysis and the CDA show that when these events and issues were covered by Australian media, the full context was frequently missing. For example, while the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 was emphasised, the ongoing blockade that Israel has imposed on the Gaza Strip since 2006 was downplayed. Simultaneously, while some of these media referred to Egypt’s blockade of Gaza by closing the Rafah Crossing Border, they either ignored or did not sufficiently highlight the main blockade imposed by Israel on the tiny strip, and the outcome of the blockade on Gazans’ lives. Despite this, there was no in-depth coverage of the Gaza blockade that has continued since 2006, through which Israel has been “causing electricity blackouts; laying sieges; bombing and shelling; assassinating and imprisoning; killing and wounding civilians, including children and babies, in horrifying numbers” (Levy, 2010, p. 19). Overall, Australian media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict usually lacks some contexts necessary to understand the reality of this conflict. According to Lyons (2017a), and I support this view, “Australians have not heard a genuine debate about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (p. 288).

Many issues within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were either ignored or downplayed in Australian media coverage. For example, this study found that Australian media downplayed the occupation and lacked the historical context that refers to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian Territories. This was due to the focus on day-to-day events rather than issues within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The corpus-based analysis findings in Chapter 4 showed the occasional use of some words in the coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, the use of words such as occupation, occupied and resistance was rare in Australian media coverage of the conflict. This finding supports previous research that show “there was very little reference [in British media] to the military nature of the occupation and its social consequences for
Palestinians or to the large number of United Nations resolution condemning the occupation” (Philo & Berry, 2010, p. 202). Philo and Berry (2011) state that “although the Israeli army was reported as firing live ammunition into crowds, words such as ‘murder’ and ‘atrocity’ were not used” (p. 225) in British television coverage of Palestinian deaths. Philo and Berry (2011) also suggest that British television coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict “does not explain the ‘military’ nature of the occupation and the consequences of this for the Palestinians” (p. 197). At the same time, their research revealed a similar finding to my study, in that “there is no comparable inclusion of discussion of the reasons for Palestinian actions” (p. 398), although “this does not mean that the Israelis escape without criticism” (p. 398).

The findings of my study also support previous studies that have shown that media generally ignore the contexts of Palestinian violence. For example, clashes between Palestinians and Israeli police in Jerusalem after the kidnapping and killing of Palestinian teenager Abu Khdeir were covered by media, but without highlighting the reason for the anger among Palestinians in Jerusalem. Conversely, Israeli actions, including the events in which Palestinian civilians were killed or UN schools were shelled during the Israeli war on Gaza 2014, were justified (see Chapter 5). In a similar manner, Barkho (2007) found that while CNN’s reporting of the conflict gave clear and justified explanations of Israeli violence, it lacked the context of Palestinian violence.

One of the exclusions in Australian media coverage of the conflict is the collective punishment that Israel uses against Palestinians and Gazans in particular. In coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza, this collective punishment was not mentioned, although “it is illegitimate and it does not have a smidgeon of intelligence” (Levy, 2010). Thus, Australian media coverage lacked the contexts necessary to give readers a clearer picture of the conflict.

Apart from the exclusions of contexts or aspects of issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Australian media excluded some contexts or backgrounds related to the conflict, while they highlighted others. For instance, in their coverage of the shelling of UN schools during the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014, there was no reference
to the Israeli shelling of UN schools during the Israeli military operation in Gaza in 2008–2009. In contrast, Australian media highlighted Israeli accusations that Hamas was using civilians as human shields. Thus, the media excluded the fact that civilians in Gaza, including children, were not killed due to using them as human shields, but due to the Israeli shelling of these children while they were sleeping or playing. The same Israeli claims were made during its military operation, Cast Lead, in 2008–2009; however, children in Gaza were killed because the Israeli military “bombed, shelled or fired at them, their families or their apartment buildings” (Levy, 2010, p. 104).

Overall, since Australian media focused on covering events related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there are many issues that media either excluded or downplayed. These issues include Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, the separation barrier and check points in the West Bank, restrictions on Palestinians’ movement either in the West Bank or Gaza Strip, Palestinian detainees in Israeli jails without charge or trial, and detention of Palestinian children. In this context, Boyce (2014) argues that discussion in Australian media “seldom canvasses the root sources of conflict or its ongoing social and economic costs” (para. 4).

7.7 Contexts and Power in Media Representations

Journalists and correspondents who report on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the ground are usually able to reflect the reality of the conflict. The best examples in this study are Lyons, The Australian correspondent, and Pollard, Fairfax correspondent, who both extensively covered events from Gaza during the 2014 war. However, editors and producers are under pressure due to media policy and the pressure that emanates from numerous sources, including pro-Israeli sources in Australia and official Israeli sources (Loewenstein, 2009). In the case of Australian media, the pressure is from the Zionist lobby and pro-Israel Jewish organisations in Australia, such as the AIJAC. The Melbourne-based AIJAC is the most effective organisation in the Jewish community, and “has strong ties [to the Liberal Party and the ALP]” (Loewenstein, 2009, Chapter 10, Section 6, para. 1). The analysis in my study shows to what extent senior analyst editors at the AIJAC were active in writing articles that showed a pro-Israel position. One reason for this is that the AIJAC attempts to “get
their stories and preferred commentators published in the broader media” (Lyons, 2017a, p. 254) considering the limited audience of the website of the AIJAC.

According to the analysis, AIJAC staff articles were published in Australian print and online media. One evident example of the pressure of the Zionist Lobby on Australian media was when Fairfax Media had to apologise for publishing a cartoon during the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014, that was described by the Jewish organisations in Australian as ‘anti-Semitic’. The same accusations of anti-Semitism targeted SMH columnist, Mike Carlton, and an academic from the University of Sydney, Jake Lynch, for their anti-Israel position. Radio broadcaster and newspaper columnist Terry Lane states that “any criticism of Israel is interpreted as anti-Semitism” (as cited in Loewenstein, 2009, Chapter 10, Section 6, para. 3). Hence, the influence of these organisations in Australia over politicians and journalists is substantial (Loewenstein, 2009).

Such pressure practised by the Zionist Lobby on Australian media is not recent and it has also been shown in previous studies. Bloch (2003) mentions that in September 2001, the executive director of the AIJAC wrote to ABC board member Michael Kroger in September 2001 regarding the AIJAC’s “concerns about anti-Israel bias” (p. 168). Later, in 2003, the AIJAC along with some Jewish organisations in Australia, opposed, through news media the awarding of the Sydney Peace Prize to Palestinian politician and academic Hanan Ashrawi and pressured to stop Carr, the Premier of NSW from presenting the prize to Ashrawi. The AIJAC also “lobbied political leaders to reconsider the choice of Ashrawi” (Benjamin, 2003, para. 1).

Along with the pressure by pro-Israel organisations in Australia, Israeli officials have their roles in adding more pressure on Australian journalists. For instance Lyons, who was based in Jerusalem for six years, asked for a meeting with Israeli military spokesman Arye Shalicar, and received a threat of banning by the Israeli military afterwards. This was after publishing a report in 2011 about the Israeli treatment of Palestinian children. In this context, Lyons (2017b) states:

Frequently in the Israeli media I’d read stories about various abuses by the Israeli Army, but the moment I reported them in Australia I was attacked.
When Jewish leaders in Australia complained, I asked them: “Are you saying Australians should not be able to read what Israelis read?” I resented the pressure not to report what I saw; I was covering the Middle East as an Australian journalist in the belief that events should be reported as you find them. (para. 25)

Another critique targeting Lyons was made by Israel’s Embassy in Australia in 2013. Lyons (2017a) mentions that the spokesperson of the Israeli Embassy told various editors of The Australian that the embassy was “not happy with [him]” because of his stories about Palestinian children detainees (p. 251).

Lyons (2017b) also refers to the criticism he received from Jewish leaders and Israeli activists in Australia because of his articles published in The Australian and his television report for ABC’s Four Corners, in 2014. He asserts that throughout his experience as a correspondent in Jerusalem, he was “under constant pressure from Israeli lobby groups to pull [his] punches. [He] realised from many discussions with other foreign journalists that this pressure was applied in many countries” (Lyons, 2017b, para. 44). In his book, Balcony Over Jerusalem: A Middle East Memoir, Lyons (2017a) states that the most “sustained criticism of [his] article had come from AIJAC” (p. 252). Lyons also accuses AIJAC of being “behind much of the backlash against [his] reporting” (p. 253), and contends that “the head of AIJAC, Colin Rubenstein, seemed to have the sort of access to The Australian that [Lyons] could only dream” (2017a, p. 253). The kind of pressure that Rubenstein imposes on the Australian media (The Australian newspaper in particular) is described by (Lyons, 2017a) who quoted The Australian’s then editor-in-chief, Chris Mitchell:

Sometimes with Colin Rubenstein I’d say, “Send a letter or write a column”, but other times if I wouldn’t take his call he’d go behind my back to Nick Cater [then editor of The Weekend Australian]. I got upset with Colin when he rang me and attacked [Australian reporter] Elisabeth Wynhausen as a “self-loathing Jew”. I thought it was inappropriate for him to be making that kind of comment about one of my staff. For some time after that I stopped taking his calls’. (pp. 254–255)

In his review of Lyons’s book, Australian journalist David Leser, asserts that “the Australian Jewish lobby didn’t much like Lyons’s reporting when he was based in the Middle East, and will certainly not like what he unleashes now” (2017, para. 28),
referring to the new book, and warns that “Lyons should brace himself for the storm that’s coming” (para. 42).

Additionally, a recent news report asserts that pro-Israel advocacy groups in Australia targeted the Middle East correspondent of *The Australian* newspaper, John Lyons, and two ABC reporters: Sophie McNeil and Peter Cave (Meade, 2017). The AIJAC was mainly named in this report. In the same context, Lyons (2017a) asserts that McNeil was targeted and attacked by the AIJAC “from the moment her appointment was announced [by the ABC]” (p. 282). The latter was sent a letter by the AIJAC questioning a video in which McNeil “was ‘speaking alongside’ two people who had supported” BDS (Lyons, 2017a, p. 283).

Apart from the pressure on journalists in their reporting of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, other studies have revealed that Israel has a very strong public relations and propaganda machine that affects the representations of the conflict and its actors in media, including Australian media. Philo and Berry (2011) point out that the “differences between the coverage of the two sides are partly a result of Israel’s very developed public relations output and its practised ability to supply information and speakers to the media” (p. 255). Furthermore, Lyons (2017b) asserts that Israel “operates one of the most effective public relations machines in the world” and refers to the name of a government unit, which is called *hasbara* (propaganda) (para. 32). He also states that “because Israel so brilliantly manages its reality, many people . . . are shocked when they come to Israel and see the occupation up close” (para. 33). Consequently, Israel’s strong abilities in public relations and propaganda, and the pressure on Australian journalists by the Zionist lobby in Australia, results in the dominance of a one-sided representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Australian media. In this regard, Kuntsman (2010) identifies a need “for a ‘balanced, two-sided’ representation, often voiced by Israelis” (p. 310).

**7.8 Summary**

The findings of this study have been outlined in this chapter, drawing on Butler’s perspective of recognition and non-recognition of lives to explain Australian media
representations of actors and casualties related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The findings of this research in relation to the theoretical framework and existing literature have been discussed, along with the contexts in which Australian media represented the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The study showed that the humanistic aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was downplayed due to the dominance of the conflict frame in Australian media coverage. This conflict frame was associated with media reliance on officials’ voices and the avoidance of specific words. This research supports previous findings that word choice reflected Australian media’s position towards the conflict and affected the frames used to portray related events and issues.

The findings of my study support the previous studies, which found that media relied on Israeli voices more than Palestinian voices in general, and Israeli officials more than Palestinian officials in particular. This finding indicated a pro-Israel bias, as the Israeli point of view was more prominent in Australian media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014. The coverage was widely one-sided due to the greater media access of Israeli voices, particularly officials, compared to their Palestinian counterparts. Conversely, the use of Israeli residents’ voices was less evident compared to Palestinian residents’ voices because the incidents in which Israeli civilians were killed or injured during the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014 were limited compared to the number of Palestinian civilians who were killed or injured.

Another factor that resulted in media bias was the pro-Israel nature of Australian mainstream media. There was a consistency between Australian media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Australian foreign policy that tends to be pro-Israel, especially when Liberals are in power or lead coalition governments (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1). However, this varied between Australian outlets, according to individual positions on the conflict.

The findings of this study support the findings of previous studies that showed that the position of media towards Israeli and Palestinian actors and their actions affected the language used to portray these actors and their actions. Consequently, the way in
which Australian media suppressed, backgrounded or foregrounded Israelis and Palestinians reflected these media positions towards actors and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general.

My study also indicated that the human interest frame was only used to portray casualties when the events and use of particular voices forced it. Therefore, the use of the human interest frame in portraying Palestinian casualties by Australian media does not necessarily indicate a full recognition of Palestinians’ lives. In a related context, this study found that both Israeli and Palestinian casualties were represented in terms of numbers or statistics, and occasionally individualised. This finding disagrees with the findings of previous studies in terms of the prominence of Israeli casualties over Palestinian casualties. Palestinian casualties were covered more because there was a greater number of Palestinian casualties than Israeli casualties during the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014. Although Palestinian casualties were more prominent than Israeli casualties, this cannot be considered a pro-Palestinian bias.

Another aspect of the study discussed in this chapter is legitimising Israeli actions and delegitimising Palestinian and Hamas’s actions. Both legitimisation and delegitimisation were evident in Australian media representations due to the reliance on Israeli voices and pro-Israel sources and voices, including the pro-Israel lobby in Australia. Drawing on Butler’s notion of recognition and non-recognition of lives, the justification and legitimisation of the Israeli military operation in Gaza in Australian media coverage was based on Israel’s right of defence and demolishing Hamas rockets and tunnels. This conclusion is supported by the findings of CDA in Chapter 6. Further, legitimising Israeli actions related to Palestinian civilian killings and delegitimising Palestinian and Hamas’s actions in relation to rocket and tunnels were relevant to acknowledging Israel as a state, Palestinians as stateless people, and Hamas as a non-state actor. The findings of this study also support the findings of previous research, in which legitimising Israeli actions and delegitimising Palestinian actions were relevant to representing Palestinians as the instigators and Israelis as the responders. These forms of legitimisation were used at the same time in Australia.
media coverage to delegitimise Palestinian actions, including their launching of rockets that targeted Israel during the 2014 war.

This study concluded that Australian media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lacked the contexts necessary for readers to understand events and issues related to this conflict. Consequently, inclusions and exclusions made by the media shaped the representations of the conflict. Australian media coverage focused more on events than issues. Therefore, the main issues within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were ignored or downplayed.

The last section of this chapter explored the political contexts in which Australian journalists work and produce their reports on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These contexts reflected the power of the pro-Israeli lobby in media discourse and representations, and were relevant to the pressure on media by the pro-Israel lobby in Australia, and Israel’s professional abilities in public relations compared to Palestinian abilities.

The next chapter presents a summary of the thesis, outlines the implications of this research, discusses limitations of this study and proposes future research.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

8.1 Thesis Summary

This study attempted to bridge a gap in the existing literature, in which Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been rarely investigated. Hence, it aimed to identify how Australian media portrayed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during 2014–2015. Framing theory was employed to achieve this aim and answer the main research question: ‘How did the Australian media represent the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?’ I combined corpus-based analysis with CDA to answer this question. Thus, this thesis not only contributes to the field of media studies, it also contributes partially to the field of conflict studies and framing research. This study combined two analyses, corpus and CDA, which are regularly used in linguistics, to examine media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In its use of both analyses, the study discussed the Australian media portrayal of the conflict and factors that shaped these representations.

The findings of my study support the findings of previous research in that the voices used by the media affected the frames used to portray related events and issues. Thus, the conflict frame was prominent since it was associated with media reliance on officials’ voices. Consequently, due to the dominance of the conflict frame, the humanistic aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was downplayed in Australian media coverage. Based on Butler’s (2009) notion of recognition and non-recognition of lives, this study also found that the occasional use of the human interest frame and individualisation in media portrayals of Palestinian casualties reflected that Palestinian lives were not fully recognised by the Australian media. Similar to previous studies, this study identified a media bias that resulted from relying on particular sources and voices, and on the inclusions and exclusions made. However, this bias varied between the media outlets selected for this study.

In answering the main research question, the study discussed Australian media portrayals of Israeli and Palestinian actors and their actions. The study showed that Israel was portrayed more positively in Australian media and its actions were
legitimised. This was due to the reliance on Israeli voices and pro-Israel sources and voices, including the pro-Israel lobby in Australia. Delegitimising Palestinian actions, particular Hamas’s, by Australian media was relevant to acknowledging Israel as a state, Palestinians as stateless people, and Hamas as a terrorist organisation and a non-state actor.

8.2 Research Implications

8.2.1 Implications for media and journalistic practices

Although the main focus of this study was the analysis of Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the findings have implications for media coverage of conflicts and wars. The study has shown that the media focus on day-to-day events resulted in detaching the coverage from the history, and ignoring the contexts needed for readers to gain a full understanding of the conflict. In other words, the historical and political contexts were widely ignored in the media reporting of the conflict. The absence of these contexts also contributed to the media bias shown in this study. The complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires the Australian media to pay more attention to their reporting of events related to this conflict and other conflicts. Therefore, journalists need to take more responsibility for the message conveyed by exerting greater effort to include contextual information relevant to conflicts, especially when such conflicts are sensitive and complex, like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By doing so, thematic frames would emerge more rather than episodic frame that result from the focus on day-to-day events and decontextualised coverage.

The study has shown the need for a more humanistic coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Australian media, and the same need might apply to the media coverage of other conflicts. Throughout this thesis, it was clear that Australian media relied on the voices of officials in their representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which resulted in downplaying the humanistic aspects in Australian media coverage of this conflict. In a related context, the findings of the study also showed that the reporting by Australian media correspondents on the ground made a difference in terms of the emergence of the humanistic aspect in the coverage of the Gaza War 2014.
Consequently, the study recommends that Australian media requires more correspondents in conflict and war zones, so that coverage can be more in-depth and can include other contexts including humanistic frames.

Media bias was clearly revealed in this study. The main reason for this bias was media reliance on Israeli official voices. The study has shown that when media used a variety of voices including witnesses and international organisations, such as human rights organisations, the coverage of the actual events was more comprehensive. However, this was occasional and mostly relevant to the presence of correspondents on the ground, where they are more able to interview witnesses and gather accurate information about related events.

### 8.2.2 Implications for media and journalism research

This study attempted to examine a representative sample of Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, there is still a need to continue to investigate and unveil Australian media representations of this conflict more broadly. It is also crucial to study these representations using a more comparative and comprehensive approach since this could offer additional explanations of how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is represented by the Australian media. This would definitely require expanding the examination of these portrayals to analysing visual representations, and interviewing media producers including correspondents and editors.

As shown in Chapter 7, this study has also revealed the effect of Zionist lobby groups on Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the pressure that these groups and organisations impose on media and journalists. It is pertinent that further research develops a full picture of the influence of these groups on Australian media policy and their workers in general, and towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular.

### 8.3 Limitations

There are three main limitations related to this study: time, focus and methods. Regarding time limitations, this study analysed Australian media representations of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over a period of 18 months, from January 2014 to June 2015. Thus, the data analysed did not include later events that might be significant, such as the escalation of violence between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem and the West Bank. In addition, the limited duration of this study meant that examining the change of media frames over time was beyond its scope. Studying frames employed by Australian media in their portrayal of Israeli and Palestinian actors, for example, would have been a further addition in terms of comparing these representations over time.

Another limitation of this thesis is related to its focus, which was on analysing print and online media. The analysis did not include audio and visual coverage, or social media. Thus, including more types of Australian media could be beneficial for a comprehensive examination of Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although the focus of this study on analysing media texts only was justified, my study lacks an examination of visual media representations of this conflict. Analysing photographs would have added to the study in terms of both examining frames and representations. In addition, I did not interview journalists or conduct audience surveys. Hence, it was beyond the scope and focus of this study to examine important aspects related to media representations and news production, as well as media audiences. Readers’ letters were included in the corpus-based analysis but excluded in the CDA. Therefore, the data in this study offer an opportunity for more investigation of readers’ responses to what was published about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Australian media.

The focus of this study on media representations of Israeli and Palestinian actors allowed an in-depth analysis. Nevertheless, the study did not address media representations of other actors of the conflict such as the US, the UN and Arab countries such as Egypt. The study would have benefitted from expanding the research question to other actors in addition to Israeli and Palestinian actors, but this was beyond the scope of this research.

There were also limitations in relation to the methods used in this study. When conducting corpus-based analysis, the corpora analysed were only Australian media
and particular words were examined. However, a reference corpus to compare the findings with, and expanding the analysis to include more words or terms, would have added further data and findings to this study. Moreover, the study drew mainly on van Leeuwen’s approach to analyse media representations of Israeli and Palestinian actors and their actions. Nevertheless, using transitivity analysis to analyse how the Australian media portrayed actions of Israeli and Palestinian actors would have provided further findings in terms of the actions of these actors.

8.4 Suggestions for Future Research

Since this research has revealed some significant questions and aspects in need of further investigation, I propose a few areas for future research. One of the limitations of my study was its focus on analysing media texts to examine Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, further studies are needed to examine processes of media production related to international news coverage in Australian media institutions. One suggestion is to study news rooms in these institutions in terms of decision-making and power behind the production of discourse on particular events or issues within international news coverage. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict might be a good case study in this regard, and interviewing media correspondents, editors and producers would be beneficial to determine the factors that shape media representations of this conflict. It would also be useful to investigate the restrictions imposed on media workers, such as correspondents and editors in their coverage of events related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Experiences of war correspondents could be an important topic that might be interesting to investigate in the Australian context.

Since any media product targets an audience, effects of media representations of the conflict on audience perceptions are another possible area of study, particularly in the Australian context. The audience responses to what they receive from media about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is another area that requires more investigation. My study partially examined readers’ letters to Australian newspapers. However, this area needs a more in-depth analysis in terms of identifying how readers reflect on articles about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to what extent the frames in which the media
portray the conflict affect the frames for readers. Future research could also explore the extent to which the frames in readers’ letters and online comments are similar to or different from media frames.

The scope of my study was to analyse samples of news articles published in Australian newspapers and news websites related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, further research could usefully explore representations of various Australian media, including audio and visual, and social media (Facebook, Twitter and blogs for example). In this regard, analysing readers’ or viewers’ arguments about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on social media, including their comments on posts or tweets, would be an interesting topic to investigate, since social media are important platforms for political debates.

More research is needed to fully understand and explain why lawful frames are rarely used in Australian media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Further studies need to investigate whether this rare use of lawful frames is related to bias, or a lack of sources, information or knowledge that journalists have about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. My study has shown that Australian media coverage lacked the humanistic and lawful aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hence, further research is required to establish how media frames shape the actions of international organisations and the international community in general.

8.5 Concluding Remarks

The findings of this study have indicated that the media usually does not reflect the full picture and contexts of this conflict; there are always more stories and aspects that media neglect or ignore. The study also referred to the factors that contribute to the shaping of Australian media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It showed that the sources used by media, and the voices used (particularly official voices) shaped these representations. Overall, the portrayal of the conflict in Australian media indicates that even with other conflicts and wars in the world, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still one of the most complicated conflicts for media to report on.
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## Appendix A: Key events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (1917–2017)

Sources: (Dowty, 2012; Meital, 2006; “Historical timeline,”, 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balfour Declaration</td>
<td>November 2, 1917</td>
<td>First peace conference with all parties represented convenes in Madrid</td>
<td>October 30, 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA passes Resolution 181 calling for partition</td>
<td>November 29, 1947</td>
<td>Signing of Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO</td>
<td>September 13, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Security Council adopts Resolution 242</td>
<td>November 22, 1967</td>
<td>Assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin</td>
<td>November 4, 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab states in summit meeting recognise PLO as sole legitimate representative of Palestinians</td>
<td>November 1974</td>
<td>Peacemaker’s summit in Sharm El-Sheikh</td>
<td>March 13, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel invades Lebanon to eliminate PLO presence</td>
<td>June 1982</td>
<td>Agreement concerning a temporary international presence in Hebron</td>
<td>January 21, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp massacres</td>
<td>September 1982</td>
<td>Wye River Memorandum</td>
<td>October 23, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada</td>
<td>December 8, 1987</td>
<td>Camp David summit</td>
<td>July 11–25, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO accepts UN resolution 242 and calls for Palestinian state</td>
<td>November 1988</td>
<td>Outbreak of Al-Aqsa Intifada (Second Intifada) and collapse of peace process</td>
<td>September 28, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel launches Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank</td>
<td>March 2002</td>
<td>Israel stops flotilla of ship challenging naval blockade of Gaza</td>
<td>May 31, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel speeds construction of Separation Barrier in West Bank</td>
<td>August 2003</td>
<td>PA pushes for UN recognition of Palestinian statehood</td>
<td>September 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel assassinates two top Hamas leaders</td>
<td>March–April 2004</td>
<td>Israel launches operation Pillar of Defence</td>
<td>November 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel evacuates Jewish settlements in Gaza</td>
<td>August 2005</td>
<td>Israeli war on Gaza</td>
<td>July–August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas wins the Palestinian legislative elections</td>
<td>January 25, 2006</td>
<td>Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu says “no” to two-state solution</td>
<td>March 16, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit captured at Gaza border</td>
<td>June 25, 2006</td>
<td>The Vatican recognises State of Palestine</td>
<td>October 23, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas takes control of Gaza and Israel increases blockade on the strip</td>
<td>June 14, 2007</td>
<td>Escalating violence between Palestinians and Israelis</td>
<td>September–October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel launches Operation Cast Lead on Gaza</td>
<td>December 27, 2008</td>
<td>Escalating violence in the West Bank</td>
<td>January–October 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Cast Lead ends with a ceasefire</td>
<td>January 18, 2009</td>
<td>Work begins on the first new Jewish settlement in occupied West Bank in 25 years</td>
<td>June 2017</td>
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</table>
Appendix B: Summary timeline of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014 events

Source: based on data collected

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Three Israeli teenagers kidnapped in Hebron</td>
<td>June 12</td>
<td>Israel launches a ground operation in Shujaiya</td>
<td>July 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corpses of the teenagers are found and Israel blames Hamas</td>
<td>June 30</td>
<td>Number of displaced Palestinians reach 118,300 people</td>
<td>July 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Palestinian teenager is found burnt alive in a Jerusalem forest</td>
<td>July 2</td>
<td>Khuza’a massacre</td>
<td>July 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel launches its military operation in Gaza</td>
<td>July 8</td>
<td>Israeli shelling of a UN school in Beit Hanoun</td>
<td>July 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with airstrikes killing at least six Palestinians</td>
<td></td>
<td>Israeli shelling of school in Jabalia Camp</td>
<td>July 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets from Gaza are fired at Israel</td>
<td>July 10</td>
<td>Nine children are killed in an Israeli shelling of a playground in Shati Refugee Camp in Gaza City</td>
<td>July 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Israeli missile hit a centre for disabled people in northern Gaza, killing two residents</td>
<td>July 12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas claims responsibility for 10 rockets that targeted Tel Aviv, with no casualties</td>
<td>July 12</td>
<td>Israel announces the killing of soldier Hadar Goldin, and Hamas claims kidnapping</td>
<td>August 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Egyptian government proposes a ceasefire agreement</td>
<td>July 15</td>
<td>Israeli shelling of a UN school in Rafah</td>
<td>August 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Four children are killed in an Israeli shelling on a Gaza beach</td>
<td>July 16</td>
<td>An Israeli airstrike in Rafah kills three of Hamas’s top commanders</td>
<td>August 21</td>
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<td>Israel announces it was entering phase two of its Gaza military operation</td>
<td>July 17</td>
<td>Egyptian-brokered ceasefire ends the war</td>
<td>August 26</td>
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</table>
Appendix C: Sources of news articles in selected Australian media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>The Australian</th>
<th>Herald Sun</th>
<th>News.com.au</th>
<th>The Age</th>
<th>SMH</th>
<th>ABC</th>
<th>Crikey</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>%</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>8.4</td>
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</table>

*Other includes other media sources such as the BBC, New York Times and New York Post

**Total of news sources are more than the number of news articles that were analysed, because some news items were taken from more than one source
Appendix D: Voices in Australian media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voice</th>
<th>The Australian</th>
<th>Herald Sun</th>
<th>News.com.au</th>
<th>The Age</th>
<th>SMH</th>
<th>ABC</th>
<th>Crikey</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>$F$</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>%</td>
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*Other includes Holocaust survivors and undefined voices
Appendix E: Israeli and Palestinian voices in Australian media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014

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<th>Resident</th>
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</table>

*Israeli officials include government (Netanyahu, ministers and Cabinet), military, police, party, health and former Israeli officials, while Palestinian officials include Hamas, PA, other Palestinian factions' officials, such as Fatah and Islamic Jihad’s, health officials.

**I= Israeli, P= Palestinian

***Other includes medics and religious figures
Appendix F: Frames used in Australian media coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>The Australian</th>
<th>Herald Sun</th>
<th>News.com.au</th>
<th>The Age</th>
<th>SMH</th>
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</table>

*Other includes urging for Israel to stop its operation in Gaza and calling for an end to the conflict in Gaza, warning and lawful frames.
Appendix G: Word sketches of *Israeli* in the ABC corpus
Appendix H: Frequencies of *Palestinian* in the news.com.au corpus

<table>
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<tr>
<th>word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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<tr>
<td>PALESTINIAN</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I: Concordances of Israel when settlement is a collocate in The Australian corpus

Query Israel 2,955 > Positive filter (excluding KWIC) settlement-n 56 > Random sample 10 (35.78 per million)

file248730... varies from 50,000 to 90,000. Aspects of Israel’s settlement policy have been very ill-advised
file248731... agreement or settlement between Palestine and Israel has been derailed by an attack from Palestine
file248731... relating to the Geneva Conventions, under which Israel’s settlements are widely considered illegal
file248736... Bureau of Statistics reported that in 2013 Israel began construction of 2527 settlement housing
file248736... greater threat to the peace process than Israel’s settlement activity and home demolitions
file248739... factions who seek to justify the greater Israel settlement and expansionist view such as
file250388... occupation ending. In fact, the exact opposite — Israel’s continuing settlement growth is entrenching
file250390... extortionist lobby of the extreme right wing”. Israel’s settlements are clearly the main factor
file250450... peace settlement and would have required Israel to withdraw from the Palestinian territories
file250451... descendants have the right of settlement in Israel. This is an impractical idea. Tenth, the