Forging a new consensus: NUMSA and ANC hegemony in flux in South Africa

Benjamin Alexander Hale

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Forging a new consensus:
NUMSA and ANC hegemony in flux in South Africa

This thesis is presented for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy of Politics and International Relations

Benjamin Alexander Hale

Edith Cowan University
School of Arts and Humanities
2019
Abstract

This thesis examines the extent to which the ANC is hegemonic within South Africa, the degree to which this hegemonic project is neoliberal, and how resistance to this project is articulated within civil society. Drawing on the work of authors such as Patrick Bond, Ashwin Desai, and Sagie Narsiah this thesis applies a Gramscian theoretical framework to examine ways in which neoliberalism is manifested through ANC economic policies and the ANC’s bid for hegemony within South Africa. It also explores the role of unions and social movements as sites of counter-hegemonic resistance, with an emphasis on the activities of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) after 2014. This study employs an interpretative methodological approach combining analyses of electoral data, newspapers and interview transcripts of ‘organic intellectuals’ to critique power and dominance in post-Apartheid South Africa. This is keenly informed by Gramscian understandings of hegemony and ‘common sense’ which emphasise the importance of ‘organic intellectuals’ in contesting and forming the structures of the historic bloc. This thesis finds that the hegemonic project centred on the ANC is limited or fractured, with the failure of the ANC’s broadly neoliberal economic policies fostering division within the Tripartite Alliance. Further, although neoliberalism has deeply penetrated ‘common sense’ understandings, growing criticism of the ANC has fundamentally undermined the state’s ability to mobilise consent and build consensus. However, this hegemonic project is highly elastic, with the ANC tempering its neoliberal policies with state interventions in the form of state housing, public-works programmes, and social grants. Thus, despite being perceived by ‘organic intellectuals’ as lacking hegemony, the ANC still has electoral hegemony and has succeeded thus far in preventing the emergence of an alternative hegemonic project. Further, NUMSA’s attempt to bring together unions, social movements and community organisations within a United Front are of limited significance in challenging the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project.
Declaration

I certify that this thesis does not, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

- incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education;
- contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text of this thesis; or
- contain any defamatory material.

[Signature]

Name
Acknowledgements

The production of this thesis has been a challenging and rewarding task, though it has felt arduous and overwhelming at times. I would like to thank those who have supported and assisted me throughout this long process, especially my family, friends, and long-suffering partner Leah, who has been a pillar of support when writing this thesis has felt Sisyphean.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASGISA</td>
<td>Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEE</td>
<td>Black Economic Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFF</td>
<td>Economic Freedom Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGP</td>
<td>New Growth Path</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMSA</td>
<td>National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACTU</td>
<td>South African Congress of Trade Unions</td>
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1. Introduction

This thesis has three main aims: Firstly, to examine the extent to which the ANC (African National Congress) was, currently is, and strives to continue to be, hegemonic in SA; secondly, to determine the degree to which this hegemonic project is linked to the discourse of neoliberalism in South Africa, particularly how this manifests through ANC economic policy; and lastly, to understand how resistance to this neoliberal project is articulated within civil society by unions, social movements and other sites of counter-hegemonic resistance.

Within this examination a special emphasis is placed on the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), and the significance of its actions in the context of ongoing tensions between and within members of the Tripartite Alliance; namely the ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the South African Communist Party (SACP).

Given the aforementioned thesis statement, this dissertation will be guided by the following primary research questions:

- To what extent is the ANC neoliberal project hegemonic in post-Apartheid South Africa?
- How do ‘organic’ intellectuals understand contestations of the hegemony of the ANC and the associated discourse of neoliberalism in post-Apartheid South Africa?
- How is NUMSA understood within South African civil society, and to what extent are its actions ideologically and/or politically significant?
- To what extent does NUMSA pose a threat to the ANC-led Tripartite Alliance?

This thesis employs a number of concepts such as ‘hegemony’, ‘organic’ intellectuals, world-system’, ‘core–periphery relations’, and ‘neoliberalism’. These are derived from an understanding of both Worlds-Systems Theory and Gramscian modes of analysis (Arrighi, 2005a; Gramsci, 1971). The term ‘hegemony’ follows from Gramsci (Jones, 2006, p. 52-53), and is used to describe the power inflation that accrues to a dominant group by virtue of its capacity to lead society in a direction which not only benefits itself but is also seen as generally beneficial by its subordinates (Arrighi & Silver, 1999, p. 26). This conception of hegemony is tightly connected with the Gramscian notion of ‘common sense’ – as Frédérick Dufour explains, “hegemony… depends on the capacity to articulate and orient common sense at the national and global levels through powerful international institutions and material capabilities” (2008, p. 245). Further, according to Gramscian thought (Crehan, 2002, p. 137-138) common sense must be transcended for the formation of coherent counter-hegemonic
ideology, a role which only ‘organic’ intellectuals can perform. Although Gramsci viewed all individuals as inherently ‘intellectual’, he defined ‘organic’ intellectuals as those involved in contesting and/or forming the structures of the historic bloc, and often included members beyond the traditional intelligentsia (Morton, 2007, p. 90-91).

The term ‘world-system’ refers to a socioeconomic system with “a single division of labor and multiple cultural systems” (Wallerstein, 1974, p. 390). The division of labour within this system divides the world into three groupings of countries – the economically dynamic industrialised ‘core’ countries, the economically dependent ‘peripheral’ countries, and the transitional ‘semi-peripheral’ countries, to which South Africa belongs. This asymmetrical relationship between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ countries functions in such a way as to economically disadvantage peripheral countries. This occurs through asymmetric trade relations between the African continent and core countries such as the US and members of the EU (Arrighi, 2005a; Bond, 2006). South Africa, in its role as regional hegemon and through its leadership of regional trade frameworks, facilitates this exploitation, whilst also being exploited by these core countries as it is increasingly drawn into uneven trade relations which undermine economic growth.

Described by Chomsky as “capitalism with the gloves off” (cited in Ngwane, 2007, p. 180), neoliberalism refers to the ideological doctrine of the “self-regulating free market” which stresses the importance of economic liberalisation and the limited role of the state in the economy (Ngwane, 2007, p. 180). Neoliberal economic policies, including the removal of tariffs and trade protections, have accompanied the expansion of capital accumulation into hitherto unreachable spaces (Ngwane, 2007, p. 180). This thesis will, however, also refer to neoliberalism as a “blend of ideology, policies and practices” which involves the consolidation and deepening of the logic of capitalism in the socio-economic sphere through the “systematic use of state power” (Marais, 2011, p. 134).

This thesis contends that neoliberalism has influenced ANC economic policies outlined in economic frameworks including its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) framework, Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) and National Development Plan (NDP). However, the ANC’s pursuit of neoliberal economic policies has resulted in a number of deleterious socio-economic consequences, including grossly uneven economic growth, inadequate service provision, endemic poverty, staggering wage inequality, and widespread unemployment (Bond, 2004; Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012; Gibson, 2005). Given the failures of ANC economic
policy, its continuing adherence to neoliberalism is provoking growing levels of unrest and increasingly undermining the ANC hegemonic project. As such, this thesis sought to determine the extent to which the ANC neoliberal project is hegemonic in post-Apartheid South Africa, through an examination of its electoral performance and how it was understood within South African civil society. However, understanding the development of ANC economic policies requires an appreciation of a number of internal and external factors, ranging from its origins and development as a National Liberation Movement (NLM), the influence of international capital and institutions, the limitations of the negotiated settlement with the Apartheid government, to internal schisms and factionalism within the ANC-led Tripartite Alliance. As such, this thesis will delve into the historical and cultural background informing policymaking and popular consciousness in post-Apartheid South Africa.

In determining the extent to which the ANC’s policy of neoliberalism is hegemonic in South Africa, this thesis will also examine how ‘organic’ intellectuals understand and contest the hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism in post-Apartheid South Africa. ‘Organic’ intellectuals play a seminal role in contesting the structures of the hegemonic state, articulating the worldview of subaltern classes and developing alternative hegemonic ideologies (Crehan, 2002, p. 137-139). As such, how ‘organic’ intellectuals understand contestations of neoliberalism and ANC hegemony in South Africa is crucial in establishing the extent to which the ANC is hegemonic. Thus, this thesis engages with a small sample of organic intellectuals to determine: a) the extent to which the ANC is hegemonic; and, b) the significance of subaltern class organisations in contesting the ANC neoliberal project.

In examining the extent to which neoliberalism is hegemonic in South Africa, this dissertation details the factors generating friction within the ANC-led Tripartite Alliance and how this is vocalised through forms of social protest and struggle. This thesis contends that these forms of struggle – both organised and disorganised – by unions and post-Apartheid social movements (often acting in concert) are a response to the local manifestations and contradictions of neoliberalism (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012). Further, the ideological and political tensions between the members of the Tripartite Alliance and their members often reflect struggles against neoliberalism. Of particular note was the expulsion of NUMSA, a COSATU affiliate representing over 338,000 members, in 2015. Formed in 1987, the Marxist–Leninist union NUMSA has been a constant critic of the ANC-led Tripartite Alliance during the post-Apartheid period. It is particularly notable for its vocal opposition to neoliberalism and economic policies such as privatisation and liberalisation, as well as its criticism of the ANC’s failure to reduce poverty.
The suspension of left-leaning COSATU General Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi in 2013 provoked the ire of both NUMSA and sympathetic leftist groups that had become increasingly discontent with the ANC and COSATU’s neoliberal trajectory. Soon thereafter NUMSA held a special congress to voice concerns about COSATU’s ongoing support for the ANC despite economically harmful neoliberal policies which undermined the membership of the unions themselves. NUMSA subsequently resolved to withdraw support for the ANC in the 2014 general elections, demanded that COSATU break away from the ruling Tripartite Alliance, and began work on the formation of an alternative political party, the socialist United Front. This created a rift along ideological fault lines within the ANC-led Tripartite Alliance (Ashman & Pons-Vignon, 2014) and led to NUMSA’s expulsion from COSATU in 2015 after it withdrew its support from the ANC and began recruiting workers across sectors. Since that time, NUMSA has increasingly reached out to other unions, forming the NUMSA Nine Plus Unions, and social movements by holding demonstrations and strengthening criticism of the ANC government through the United Front. This thesis examines how NUMSA’s actions are understood within South African civil society, and the extent to which they are ideologically and/or politically significant.

As a corollary to the third research question, this study also examines the extent to which NUMSA poses a threat to the ANC-led Tripartite Alliance. NUMSA’s departure from the Tripartite Alliance must be understood within the context of resistance to neoliberalism within South Africa. However, given that the hegemonic project centred on the ANC is based on neoliberal policy prescriptions, NUMSA’s resistance to both neoliberalism and the ANC suggests that it is a counter-hegemonic movement. As such, in order to assess the extent to which the ANC is hegemonic, it is necessary to gauge not only its ideological and political significance, but also the degree to which NUMSA poses a threat to the ANC-Alliance. This will be evaluated by assessing its impact on the ANC’s electoral performance and the dominance of the Tripartite Alliance as understood by the media and organic intellectuals within South African civil society.

In the following chapters this thesis will discuss in greater detail the research questions raised in this introduction. Chapter 2 is dedicated to a comprehensive overview of the relevant literature, detailing the primary literary contributors in the areas of late-Apartheid era and post-Apartheid era South Africa, African economic performance, and African social movements. This includes a discussion of South African historiography, neoliberalism, and the deleterious state of African economic performance, of which South Africa is integrally linked as a semi-peripheral state. Further, this chapter highlights the various arguments and
nuances of arguments on subjects ranging from the unravelling of Apartheid, the transitional framework, and the ANC’s shift to the right, to labour unions, social movements and NUMSA.

In Chapter 3 and 4 the theoretical framework and methodology which informs this thesis will be elaborated in further detail. This section will provide an overview of World-Systems Theory and Gramscian thought, detail key concepts within these ideologies, and attempt to bridge the theoretical gaps between these modes of analysis. The methodology will also be explained in full, outlining the ways in which interpretative inquiry will be used to combine electoral statistics with textual analysis of semi-structured interviews, newspaper clippings and secondary resources.

Chapter 5 will provide the background to this study, detailing the evolution of the ANC, COSATU and SACP, the state of South Africa’s economy prior to 1994, and the transition to democratic governance between 1990 and 1994. This chapter will also provide a background to South Africa’s position in the global world-system, detailing South Africa’s entry into the world-system in the pre-Apartheid era, continuities throughout the Apartheid period and the impacts of its ongoing role as a semi-peripheral country. Further it will also discuss the deleterious role of the IMF and World Bank in Sub-Saharan Africa in undermining African economic growth generally and retarding South African growth by extension.

Chapter 6 details the political situation in post-Apartheid South Africa, drawing attention to the growing ideological and political tensions within and between the ANC, COSATU and SACP. Specific emphasis is placed on the ANC’s embrace of neoliberal economic rationalities, the impacts of this, and the consequent growth of popular organised – and unorganised – forms of resistance to ANC policies. This analysis is supported by an examination of ANC economic policies and the current state of the South African economy.

In Chapters 7 and 8 the focus will change from contextual issues to an analysis of primary and secondary sources, ranging from electoral statistics to newspapers and interviews. This will include an analysis of the electoral and political dominance of the ANC, and how it is perceived within civil society by both sections of the media and organic intellectuals. This chapter will also analyse the significance of NUMSA’s actions following its special congress in 2013 and contend that the neoliberal hegemonic project centred on the ANC is limited or fractured. Finally, the findings presented in these chapters will be summarised in Chapter 9 with reference to the contextual background information and theoretical background.
2. Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Since the collapse of Apartheid in 1994, numerous studies (Adler & Webster, 2012; Alexander, 2013; Gumede, 2007; Southall, 2013; Murwirapachena & Sibanda, 2014; Bond, 2000; Narsiah, 2002; Segatti & Pons-Vignon, 2013) have examined the ANC’s shift towards neoliberal economic orthodoxy, and the subsequent growth of oppositional politics within the Tripartite Alliance and throughout civil society. However, the ANC-led Alliance continues to be subjected to criticisms by various new and resurgent civil society formations, from community organisations and social movements to labour unions and political parties. Key among these dissenting voices is the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) whose departure from COSATU in 2014, radical opposition to ANC policies, and formation of a United Front threaten to divide the ANC-led Alliance and undermine the hegemony of the ANC class project.

This literature review explores five key areas to better understand how struggles for hegemony in South Africa fit within the context of wider African economic trends, anti-/post-Apartheid struggles, and resistance to the dominant discourse of neoliberalism. Firstly, it analyses the literature surrounding traditional historical representations in South Africa, between the early 1900s and the collapse of Apartheid in 1994. This is followed by an examination of subsequent texts analysing the unravelling of the Apartheid system and the transition to constitutional democracy. Secondly, this literature review considers the body of texts surrounding global neoliberalism as a political–economic class project and an ideological doctrine from the mid-1940s to the present. As such, it identifies its foundational texts, impacts, the schism between theory and reality, the seminal texts of the reformed neoliberal consensus, and the emerging body of literature challenging neoliberal assumptions. Thirdly, this chapter examines the body of literature surrounding African economic and political development, starting with an analysis of African economic performance from 1970 to the present. It then turns to focus on relations between African countries and global financial institutions during this period, and the deleterious impacts of this relationship on Africa’s economic performance. The fourth section is dedicated to analysing the literature on post-Apartheid South African politics, economics and society from 1994 to the present, examining the ANC as a ruling party, the emergence of a neoliberal South Africa, the increasingly strained relationship between and within the members of the Tripartite Alliance, and the legacy of socialism in South Africa. Finally, this review considers how African social
movements are understood in the wider literature, with specific emphasis on the divisions and linkages between which emerged between organised labour and social movements in South Africa as part of the protest movement.

This review identifies the merits and limitations of the primary sources most relevant to this study of hegemony and resistance in post-Apartheid South Africa. Further, this chapter offers an overview of the academic and policy literature in the five areas relevant to the thesis and identifies and critiques any gaps within it. The goal of this chapter is to identify the key themes, strengths and weaknesses of the body of literature surrounding this area. This chapter demonstrates that the literature surrounding South African politics, social movements, unions and the ANC’s economic policies is heavily influenced by the ideological, cultural and/or political affiliations of the authors. As such, many texts by Western authors and institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are rooted in the neoliberal or ‘post-neoliberal’ economic consensus, and are subsequently far less critical of ANC economic policies than South African authors. Further, there is a wide divergence of opinions on the ANC, economic policy, NUMSA, unions, social struggle and social movements even between South African authors. These differences are the result of the ideological, cultural and/or political context in which these authors are embedded, and requires an approach, informed by a suitable theoretical framework, which situates these arguments in relation to their contexts. As such, this literature review provides the overall backdrop to this thesis by outlining the shortcomings and gaps in the existing literature. Further, it is argued that, given South Africa’s historical context, a Marxist political economy drawing on Gramscian and World Systems Theory is the best way to address these shortcomings.

2.2. Historical Representations in South Africa

Apartheid-era South Africa (1948 to 1994) has been the subject of many African scholars (Rhoddie, 1972; Cohen, 1986; Lapping, 1987; Murray, 1987; Cobbet & Cohen, 1988; Johnson, 1988; Suckling & White, 1988) seeking to understand the origins of Apartheid, the slow erosion of minority rule, and the lasting legacies of unequal income distribution, racial divides and poverty. Given the continuities with post-Apartheid South Africa, much of the scholarship that emerged prior to the collapse of the Apartheid system also provides valuable insights into contemporary South African social movements, labour unions, and the inner
workings and ideology of the ANC. This section will explore this body of literature whilst also considering more recent scholarship devoted to analyses of the Apartheid state which sheds light on the trajectory of the post-Apartheid dispensation.

2.2.1. Early Representations

South African historiography has a long history of racial exclusion and marginalisation, with many of the early histories of South Africa focused purely on the experiences of white settlers and their descendants (Hamilton, Mbenga and Ross, 2010, p. 23-25). For example, during the early 1900s, South African history was contested between Afrikaner nationalist writers, who emphasised the role of the trekkers, and English-speaking historians, who focused on the role played by the British government and settlers. Despite efforts by black intellectuals and writers such as Sol Plaatje and Tiyo Soga to draw attention to the struggles and hardships of black communities, these perspectives were largely ignored in the white-centric historiography of the period (Worden, 1994, p. 2). A focus on politics and the ‘making of the nation state’ pervaded much of this early academic scholarship and remained to a lesser extent until as late as the 1980s (Dhupelia-Mesthrie, 2000). However, by the mid-20th century liberal historians were beginning to question the limits of such an approach, given the pre-eminence of racial issues in South African society, and began to shift the emphasis towards Apartheid’s economic and social origins (Saunders, 1988). Authoritative texts such as the Oxford history of South Africa (Wilson & Thompson, 1971) for example argued that Apartheid was the result of the transportation of a virulent strain of (mostly Afrikaner) racism from the early Cape colony frontier inland by the ‘Great Trek’ (Worden, 1994).

It was only in the late 1960s and 1970s, with the de-colonisation of Africa, that black African history began to be seen as a sub-discipline in its own right. Under such conditions “it was no longer possible to view South African history as the story of British and Afrikaner settlers and their conflicts” (Worden, 1994, p. 2). This emergent sub-discipline shifted the focus from colonial policy and the nation–state to the internal operation of African societies and people. Furthermore, the spread of Marxist ideas and theories influenced a new generation of South African historians who argued that the origins of Apartheid lay in South Africa’s specific form of industrialisation. Revisionists such as Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone argued that segregation was developed in such a way as to “nurture” early industries such as mining and agriculture by providing cheap labour (Marks & Rathbone, 1985). These revisionist approaches were influential in shifting the focus away from the
British colonies and trekker republics of the early 19th century towards the period of industrialisation after the 1880s (Worden, 1994).

The reliance amongst revisionist South African scholars on the largely discredited ‘dual economies’ approach has led many modern South African intellectuals to develop more sophisticated modes of analysis. For example, in formulating an explanation for regional growth and class differences, Mhone and Bond (2002) resurrected the theory of uneven and combined development which argues that, whilst economies of different societies grow unevenly, they are increasingly becoming interwoven. Bond has further expanded on this notion of uneven development in South Africa, noting the formation of discrete pockets of sectoral growth which further reinforce enclavity throughout South Africa (Bond, 2007c). Seekings and Nattras (2005) have also developed their own approach, arguing that the distribution of wealth under the Apartheid economic model gradually became less reliant on racial discrimination as the mechanisms for the upward distribution of wealth became more sophisticated. As such, the collapse of Apartheid signalled the demise of a racialised political system which had achieved its objectives and was no longer necessary. However, these authors argue that the economic structures of the Apartheid system remained intact. Further, they maintain that post-Apartheid economic restructuring has increased class stratification, resulting in a growing “marginal working class” which is increasingly impoverished (Seekings & Nattras, 2005, p. 337).

2.2.2. Apartheid Unravelling: The Road to Democracy

One of the most significant texts to emerge during the 1970s was South African dialogue: contrasts in South African thinking on basic race issues (Rhoodie, 1972) which brought together a range of academics to discuss the nature of the Apartheid system – issues ranged from historiography to racial discrimination. The widely differing views of these authors drew attention to the internal tensions and contradictions within the racial policies of the Apartheid state. Further, it also exposed the limitations of the policy of limited self-governance and the contradictions within the formation of racial nationalism upon which Apartheid relied. Later texts such as Endgame in South Africa?: The changing structures and ideology of Apartheid (Cohen, 1986), Popular struggles in South Africa (Cobbet & Cohen, 1988), South Africa: No turning back (Johnson, 1988) and South Africa: time of agony, time of destiny: the upsurge of popular protest (Murray, 1987) were concerned with the Apartheid’s regime loss of social control during 1980s amidst growing challenges both within and outside of the South African state. These texts provide valuable insights into the slow collapse of Apartheid rule, the rise of
powerful unions and movements, the increased politicisation of the masses, and the inability of the Apartheid state to quell popular dissent. Indeed, Cohen (1986) and Cobbet and Cohen (1988) devote significant attention to the rise of popular struggles in South Africa detailing the re-emergence of political unionism and student movements, the subsequent growth of labour protests and strikes, and the prospects for socialism in Apartheid era South Africa. These authors also detail the origins and development of the migrant system on the mines, and the formation of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). Further, their examination of the theoretical divide between the ANC and the SACP, as well as the situation of SACP’s doctrine within the context of Soviet era communism, provides a damning critique of the SACP which is still relevant today.

Murray (1987) and Johnson (1988) are, like Cobbet and Cohen (1988), very interested in the forms and expressions of popular protest in Apartheid South Africa although they spend much more time detailing the reactions, policies and strategies of the Apartheid state. However, whilst Murray (1987) argues that Pretoria had a long-term plan for maintaining Apartheid rule through destabilisation, Johnson (1988) maintains that the Apartheid regime was merely reactive, lacking any coherent strategic vision beyond indefinitely prolonging the “endgame”. In addition, whereas Murray (1987) argues, in line with Saul and Gelb (1986), that the Apartheid regime entered a period of “organic crisis” from 1984 onwards, Johnson (1988) hesitates to apply this title, instead noting the emergence of an “oppressive stalemate” between reformists and reactionaries. However, these authors, alongside Cobbet and Cohen (1988), also identify the 1976 Soweto uprising as the turning point in the Apartheid regime’s loss of social control. Further, they detail the qualitative change in popular resistance movements thereafter, from student-led radicalism to unrest among broad layers of the oppressed masses, culminating in a “virtually undeclared civil war” by 1985 (Cobbett & Cohen, 1988).

More generalised histories of Apartheid which emerged prior to its dissolution such as Apartheid: A history (Lapping, 1987) and The making of modern South Africa: Conquest, segregation and Apartheid (Worden, 1994) also reflected upon the upsurge of popular struggle in the mid- to late 1980s and early 1990s. Both authors detail the emergence of the Apartheid state in South Africa, the rise of unions and nationalist and resistance movements against the government, and discuss reform under the Apartheid era regime. Further, expanding on the research of previous authors such as Cohen (1986) and Cobbet and Cohen (1988), these authors stress the significance of the Soweto uprising in undermining the legitimacy of the Apartheid regime and re-energising the union and civil society movements.
Worden (1994) even goes further, labelling it a “break event” which made it clear to governing bodies that black rights could not be withheld indefinitely. By contrast, Friedman’s 1987 study of independent trade unions situates the early 1980s as the turning point of the Apartheid struggle, noting the government’s shift from a strategy of coercion to one of containment. Friedman argues that this is evident in the industrial relations reforms of the 1980s which were aimed at building consensus among a sector of the black population for the first time, unionized workers.

Analysis of the South African economy during this period, such as Apartheid, growth and income distribution in South Africa: Past history and future prospects (Corker & Bayoumi, 1991) and The South African economy, 1652-1997 (Iliffe, 1999), provide further valuable insights into the unequal distribution of income and the inherent flaws within this system which have continuities into the present. Corker and Bayoumi (1991) also detail the key characteristics of the Apartheid system through an analysis of the falling income differential between white and non-white workers between 1970 and 1990. The authors argue that the small (14 percent) gap between whites and non-whites in 1990 implies that the advancement of economically marginalised groups depends on their ability to take up skilled labour (Corker & Bayoumi, 1991). As such, it is argued that the elimination of Apartheid would have relatively small economic gains for blacks, a prediction which Iliffe (1999) confirmed following the collapse of the regime. Meanwhile, Iliffe’s (1991) analysis of the rise, and later decline, of the South African economy under Apartheid and critique of the “gradual, complex, incomplete, and yet traumatic” process of industrialisation provide useful insights into the processes of industrialisation, urbanisation and globalisation in South Africa.

More recent analyses of the economy, politics and society of Apartheid era South Africa have been conducted by authors such as Beinart & Dubow (1995), Guelke (2005), Suttner (2012) and Friedman (2014). Beinart and Dubow (1995), drawing on the tradition of Corker and Bayoumi (1991), bring together a number of authors to examine the troubling legacy of economic inequality and racial division in South Africa. More recent scholars such as Guelke (2005) and Suttner (2012) draw on this body of literature to examine the transfer of power from the National Party to the ANC and the continuities between the new and old regime. In his examination of the ANC from its inception to the post-Apartheid period, Suttner (2012) argues that the ANC played a peripheral role in the anti-Apartheid struggle, but was more effective in positioning itself as the champion of the people. Guelke (2005) also draws on this scholarship to discuss the importance of international institutions, as opposed to internal contradictions in the Apartheid economy, in ending Apartheid. Meanwhile, Friedman’s (2014)
analysis of the revitalisation of the union movement in the 1970s notes the important role played by Marxist and Leftist-leaning unions in overturning Apartheid. Further, he also stresses the significance of radical intellectuals in infusing these radical ideas in the union movement, and the significant impact on the development of SACTU and later COSATU.

Although dated, *Breaking story: The South African press* (Jackson, 1993) is also an important text in understanding the development of the press and its significance during late-Apartheid and modern South Africa. This study is particularly notable for its early identification of the ANC’s intolerance of media criticism, and condemnation of the Apartheid era culture of secrecy, which have only increased since 1994. More recently, Angelopulo & Potgieter (2007) and Duncan (2009) have noted the impact of Apartheid and post-Apartheid continuities in the consolidation of the media complex and the privileging and dissemination of a (mostly white) elite consensus. Mayher & McDonald (2007) have also criticised print media’s “façade of objectivity”, arguing that the press has perpetuated the neoliberal discourse on privatisation. The impacts of this are raised by Leonard (2014) in his study of media contestation in Durban, and by Wasserman and Garman (2014) who detail the poor media coverage of local communities and the deleterious state of local media. Further, Fray (2007) has raised concerns about the superficial coverage of gender, race and xenophobia in South African media, noting the lack of diversity in both subject and staff employed. Some of these authors have also raised the issue of the ANC’s growing hostility to the media and its attempts to stifle media freedom (Duncan, 2009; Leonard, 2014) and have traced this back to its development in exile during the Apartheid years and subsequent character as a National Liberation Movement (NLM).

2.3. **Global Neoliberalism**

The impact of neoliberal discourse on the political trajectory of the ANC cannot be overemphasised as the ANC’s interpretation of neoliberal dogma has come to define its policymaking agenda. This section aims to outline the history of neoliberalism, the body of texts which constitute a neoliberal consensus, the seminal texts of the later reformed neoliberal consensus, and the emerging body of literature challenging neoliberal assumptions.

The seminal texts which define the classical neoliberal consensus include *The road to serfdom* (Hayek, 1944), *Capitalism and freedom* (Friedman, 1962), *Accelerated development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An agenda for action* (Berg, 1981) and *What Washington means by policy reform* (Williamson, 1990). In particular, Friedrich von Hayek’s *The road to serfdom* (1944)
has played a significant role in shaping the core neoliberal concept of economic liberalisation. In this text Hayek (1944) argues that centralised state control of economic decision-making will inexorably lead to tyranny, emphasising absolute economic freedom as the basis for modern democracy. Friedman (1962) echoes this sentiment but goes further, noting that the government should play a very nominal role in the economy as the free market is self-regulating. However, although these arguments form the core of the neoliberal belief in the self-regulation of the free market, as a set of policies neoliberalism “nevertheless remains quite perplexingly elusive” (Peck, 2018, p. xxii). Indeed, despite an identifiable “family of context-specific ‘neoliberalisms’ emerging from the 1970s onwards, in places such as Chile, New Zealand, the UK and the US, neoliberalism in theory remains very different from the contextually sensitive hybrid which emerged in these regions. As such, it is necessary to establish neoliberalism as a “deeply entrenched and normalized policy paradigm-cum-ideological commonsense” (Peck, 2018, p. xxii).

Although the study of neoliberalism began in the 1970s, the definition of what constitutes neoliberalism still remains hotly debated. In his landmark study of neoliberalism, Harvey (2005) uses the term to denote an “ensemble of regimes and policy styles defined… by their reaction to the Fordist industrial regime of the post-war era” (Cahill, Cooper, Konings, Primrose, 2018, p. xxv). Indeed, Harvey’s neoliberalism is defined by its hostility to “strong collective institutions” and “political parties with the aim of forcing the state to intervene in or eliminate the market” (Harvey, 2005, p. 69-70). Further, in line with historical materialism, Harvey (2005) argues that neoliberalism is a class-based project designed to “re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites” (2005, p. 19). As such, the conflicts between neoliberalism in theory and in practice are related to the primary function of neoliberalism as a project to restore class power. By contrast, Mirowski (2009) argues that neoliberalism is both an intellectual movement and a political project which is bound to transform in response to its context. Further, Mirowski argues that neoliberalism does not “entail advocacy of small states and free markets”, rather that this is simply “the neoliberal thought collective’s own esoteric propaganda about themselves” (Cahill, Cooper, Konings, Primrose, 2018, p. xxviii). Thus, while neoliberal intellectuals may advocate for a free market with minimal government oversight, the function of neoliberalism is to “enforce competition and market rule even if this entails suppressing democracy or expanding the size and scope of government” (Cahill, Cooper, Konings, Primrose, 2018, p. xxviii). However, a real accounting of the nature of neoliberalism requires a combining
historical materialist perspective of neoliberalism as a class project with an analysis of neoliberalism as an intellectual movement.

Neoliberalism as a theory and practice cannot be understood without reference to the Mont-Pelerin Society and the ‘thought collective’ which coalesced around it. The Mont-Pelerin Society was founded in 1947 by a group of liberal intellectuals (including both Hayek and Friedman) opposed to “fascist ‘totalitarianism’ [and communism] and its supposed twin welfare state capitalism” (Cahill, Cooper, Konings, Primrose, 2018, p. xxx). These intellectuals developed a critique of the welfare state based on a “utilitarian conception of market rationality and competitive individualism” which harboured “deep antipathies to social redistribution and solidarity” (Cahill, Cooper, Konings, Primrose, 2018, p. 6). These ideas attracted various groupings of people driven by the desire to learn how to effectively oppose collectivism and socialism, resulting in the emergence of neoliberal partisan think tanks (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009, p. 5). These think tanks formed the basis for neoliberalism as an intellectual movement, integrating “various types of specialist knowledge within and across the confines of philosophy, academic research… and applied policy knowledge” (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009, p. 5). Further, these thought collectives also constituted a “complex and efficient knowledge machinery” with its members actively disseminating neoliberal ideology by sharing their ‘expertise’ with “a select group of journalists, corporate leaders, and politicians” (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009, p. 6). Although the relationship between ideas and political change is difficult to trace, with members employing various modes of diffusion, the public manifestations of neoliberal ideas were always subject to “processes of mediation and contestation that rendered them irrevocably transformed” (Burgin cited in Cahill, Cooper, Konings, Primrose, 2018, p. xxviii). From a historical materialist perspective this transformation was the result of the inculcation of neoliberal ideas into class-based projects, as leading groups translated neoliberalism into specific policies designed to restore power to the leading group.

The dissemination of neoliberal ideas from a complex of think tanks to policy and its subsequent transformations in practice reflect its role as an adaptive rationale for projects of class renewal. This has led authors such as Cahill, Cooper, Konings, Primrose (2018) and Peck (2010) to argue that neoliberalism only exists as an “ideological matrix” and rationale for “ongoing projects of state and societal restructuring” (Cahill, Cooper, Konings, Primrose, 2018, p. 4). As such, neoliberalism cannot exist in “‘pure’, uncut, or unmediated form” only as messy hybrids marked by an uneasy tension between idealised “free-market narratives” and “checkered, uneven and variegated realities” (Cahill, Cooper, Konings, Primrose, 2018, p. 3).
As such, neoliberalism in practice can only exist in polycentric and plural forms (‘neoliberalisms’) forged in dialectical tension with “inherited social and institutional landscapes” inseparable from historical and geographical realities (Cahill, Cooper, Konings, Primrose, 2018, p. 5). Understanding neoliberalism as a class-based project for renewal also explains the growth of neoliberalism in the 1970s following the collapse of the post-war regime of accumulation. Further, it wasn’t until the 1980s when stagflation “broke the back” of Keynesian orthodoxy that the necessary political conditions prevailed for a project of class renewal built around neoliberal understandings took hold in the US and UK (Peck, 2010, p.5). Further, the adoption of neoliberalism by the World Bank and IMF, must be situated within the context of declining US hegemony and the rolling back of the power of the Third World, and the normalisation of neoliberal understandings during the Reagan years, evident in the ‘Berg report’ (Cahill, Cooper, Konings, Primrose, 2018, p. 19).

Berg’s (1981) analysis of the causes behind the 1970s economic crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa, otherwise known as the ‘Berg report’, is based on a neoliberal belief in free market fundamentalism. It argues that the 1970s economic crisis was the result of failed policies by African governments – including mismanagement of the public sector, “excessive” state subsidies and bureaucracies, and overvalued exchange rates. Further, it maintains that these policies must be reformed through extensive privatisation of state assets, a shift towards export-based economies, and the removal of inefficient barriers to trade. As such, Berg’s (1981) report marks the definitive shift in World Bank policy towards neoliberalism through the recommendation of neoliberal ‘structural adjustment’ conditionalities attached to bank loans. However, Williamson’s (1990) text critiques this shift in World Bank and IMF policy prescriptions, analysing the concrete ways in which neoliberalism is enforced through US-based institutions under the auspices of assistance. Williamson (1990) argues that the standard economic ‘reform’ package offered to crisis/debt ridden third-world countries by the IMF and the World Bank constitutes a “Washington Consensus”. Further, he argues that this consensus is defined by ten policy recommendations based on classical mainstream economic theorists, such as Hayek and Friedman, which focus on opening countries to global markets at the expense of institution building and social welfare.

Later authors such as Krueger (1997) and Fajgenbaum, Bingham, Doyle, Gold, Shirai and Wolfe (1996) defend this consensus, stressing the importance of trade liberalisation for economic development. The former argues that the growth in living standards and economic development throughout the ‘third’ world was the result of the reforming economic policy by removing tariffs and trade protections and shifting towards export-led growth. Meanwhile, the
latter praises the ANC’s “prudent financial and structural policies” (1996, p. 1), including the government’s adoption of a program of trade liberalisation, commitment to eliminating capital controls, and the independence of the reserve bank. During this period the ANC itself pursued the macroeconomic policy framework GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) (South African Department of Finance, 1996) which focused on economic liberalisation as the keystone to promoting economic growth. The ANC’s shift towards neoliberal doctrine is particularly marked in the resolutions outlined in the report from its 50th national conference in 1997 (African National Congress, 1997) which stressed the importance of opening up the economy and reducing state expenditure in tackling poverty.

However, from the mid-1990s onwards, as it became increasingly clear that IMF and World Bank policy prescriptions were mixed at best, often creating devastating consequences for local economies, a reformist neoliberal consensus began to emerge. A seminal theorist within this school of thought is Joseph Stiglitz whose texts included *An agenda for development for the twenty-first century* (1997) and *Towards a new paradigm for development: Strategies, policies and processes* (1998). In the former, Stiglitz acknowledges that a “cookie cutter” approach to policy prescriptions are flawed, noting that the neoliberal policies of trade liberalisation and export-based economies failed to account for market imperfections in developing countries (1997, p. 28). However, Stiglitz does not discount the core economic theory underlying these policies, he merely notes that these policies failed in many developing countries because they “lacked markets for many economies” which was further exacerbated by more limited competition and imperfect information (1997, p. 21). In the latter text, Stiglitz (1998) further downplays the weaknesses of the consensus, maintaining that the key tenants of the consensus – privatisation and trade liberalisation – were well conceived. Instead he argues that it merely confused the means of economic growth with the ends, and focused too much on privatisation and stabilising prices and too little on institutional infrastructure essential for economic growth. In addition, Stiglitz (1998) claims that Africa’s slow growth and the cross-country differences in economic growth can be explained by the psychology of Africans, noting that they are peoples “wedded to traditional ways of thinking” in opposition to the “scientific ways of thinking” of Western society (Stiglitz, 1998, p. 6). This argument is popular among World Bank economists such as Easterly and Levine (1997), Dollar and Svensson (1998) and Burnside and Dollar (1997), who shift the blame from the World Bank’s own deeply flawed Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) to the African state itself. These authors emphasise the detrimental impact of “traditional ways of thinking” (Easterly &
Levine, 1997), ethnic fractionalisation (Dollar & Svensson, 1998), and inherent incapacibilities (Burnside & Dollar, 1997) on African economic growth.

In regard to South Africa, more recent texts by Harris and Lauderdale (2002), Speed (2007), Segal and Brawley (2009), the South African National Planning Commission (2011) and the IMF (2013) show more guarded criticism of free-market fundamentalism, stressing the importance of the National Development Plan (NDP) in creating jobs. However, these texts remain critical of rising wage demands and blame the failure of small and medium enterprises’ on “burdensome regulation, and to a lesser extent access to finance” (International Monetary Fund, 2013, p. 7). Although these texts identify a number of external factors which have led to South Africa’s low economic growth – such as weak trading partner growth and a fall in commodity prices – they largely focus on internal factors such as corruption, poor public service delivery and education. Segal and Brawley (2009) also blame the legacy of Apartheid for the failure of trade liberalisation and widespread unemployment, arguing that the ANC must introduce policies favouring greater labour flexibility.

Furthermore, the IMF’s (2013) recommendations are overtly neoliberal when advising on trade and finance liberalisation, increasing labour market flexibility and wage restraint – this is reflected in the National Planning Commission’s outline of ANC economic policy and the ANC economic transformation policy discussion document (Speed, 2007). As such, although the ANC has recently become more guardedly critical of neoliberal doctrine, its understandings of the South African economy – and that of reformist neoliberal critics such as Segal and Brawley – remain rooted in neoliberal understandings which stress fiscal restraint, minimum governance and economic liberalisation.

However, Africa’s sustained development impasse has led authors such as Sender (1999) and Klein (2007) to critique these analyses of Africa as over simplified, often blaming Africa’s unique history for policy failures whilst failing to account for the unique socio-political realities of African nations. Further, Sender (1999) argues that the World Bank’s New Development Strategy constitutes a post Washington Consensus which fails to acknowledge the deep analytic inadequacies and flaws of the old consensus. In addition, authors such as Peet (2002, 2007) and Peck (2010) not only detail the inception of neoliberalism, the spread of its influence within America and abroad, and its various mutations under President Bush and later Obama, but also challenge the assumptions underlying neoliberal understandings of how the free market functions. Further, Peet (2002, 2007) also develops a sustained critique of the way in which neoliberal hegemonic ideology formed in the industrialised West is transmitted to international organisations through interlocking Academic-Industrial-Media
(AIM) complexes. More recently, critics such as Kneller, Morgan and Kanchanahatakij (2008) and Lo (2012) have interrogated the long-held belief in a fundamental connection between economic growth and increased trade, and the subsequent connection between economic growth and economic liberalisation. Engaging with the works of neoliberal economists, these critics note that the open economy which has been promoted by these authors is based on flawed research and biased interpretations of economic trends (Kneller, Morgan and Kanchanahatakij, 2008; Lo, 2012).

2.4. **African Economic and Political Development: 1994 onwards**

This section examines African economic and political development with an emphasis on the post-1994 period. The aim of this section is to establish the body of literature surrounding the relationship between African countries and Western financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, and the deleterious impacts of this relationship on Africa’s economic performance. Although this discussion is largely focused on Africa in general, understandings of Africa’s poor economic performance also extend to that of South Africa, especially given its willing adoption of neoliberal economic reforms after 1994 and poor economic performance thereafter. As such, the section begins with an overview of African economic performance from 1970 to the present.

2.4.1. **African Economic Performance: 1970-present**

Africa’s strong economic performance from the 1950s to the 1970s, and underwhelming growth thereafter, has incited much debate within African studies and international relations. This has been particularly evident in the deep divide between scholars and economists over the causes of African poverty and the continued failure of economic reforms. World Bank economists such as Berg (1981) and Easterly and Levine (1997) and IMF analysts such as Lienert and Modi (1997) often trace the causes of Africa’s economic decline to the failures of African governments. By comparison, independent scholars such as Sender (1999), Harbeson and Rothchild (2009) and Andreasson (2010) are critical of the role of both the IMF and the World Bank in Africa, tracing Africa’s development impasse to the undue financial influence exerted by these institutions on African countries from the 1970s onwards.

The 1981 World Bank report *Accelerated development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An agenda for action* (Berg, 1981) is an influential text in the debate surrounding Africa’s economic development. As previously noted, this document analyses the causes behind the 1970s economic crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa and offers a number of policy prescriptions to
accelerate growth in the region. However, this report overlooks many of the external factors inhibiting African economic growth, such as falling terms of trade for primary African exports and the failure of past aid policies by international institutions such as the World Bank. As such, the policy prescriptions which this report outlines – and which were subsequently adopted by the World Bank – are based on a deeply flawed analysis of the 1970s African crisis which still continues to distort bank policy and affect African economies.

The subsequent failure of these SAPs to evenly boost African economic growth has been further addressed by World Bank economists Easterly and Levine (1997) as well as Lienert and Modi (1997), members of the fiscal affairs department of the IMF. The text *Africa’s growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic divisions* shifts the blame from the World Bank’s own deeply flawed SAPs to the low levels of education, high levels of government indebtedness, poor infrastructure and financial systems, and political instability throughout Africa (Easterly & Levine, 1997). Lienert and Modi (1997) extend this argument further, noting that for more macroeconomic stabilisation to occur “excessive” staffing levels in the civil service and the nominal wage bill must be slashed even further. This argument, based on an examination of civil service reform in 32 Sub-Saharan countries between 1987 and 1997, reflects the IMF doctrine of slashing state expenditures and rolling back the power of the state which is markedly neoliberal in character. These texts provide the basis for the World Bank’s own account of its involvement in Africa in more recent reports such as *World development report 2002: Building institutions for markets* (2002), *World development report 2013: Jobs* (2012) and *World development report 2014: Risk and opportunity: Managing risk for development* (2013). These reports draw on the same critiques as the previous authors to present the World Bank’s involvement in Africa as beneficial, and shifts the focus away from the detrimental impacts of neoliberal policy prescriptions to the African state.

In recent years, scholars unaffiliated with the IMF and the World Bank such as Sender (1999), Andreasson (2010) and Harbeson and Rothchild (2009) have highlighted the complicity of Western financial institutions in weakening African economic growth. In *Africa’s economic performance: Limitations of the current consensus* (1999), Sender argues that authors affiliated with Western financial institutions present an over simplistic analysis, often blaming Africa’s unique history for policy failures, whilst failing to account for the socio-political realities of African nations. Meanwhile, recent texts such as *Africa’s development impasse: Rethinking the political economy of transformation* (Andreasson, 2010) and *Africa in world politics: Reforming world order* (Harbeson & Rothchild, 2009) present a far more complex picture of the factors contributing to Africa’s development impasse. These texts argue that the
legacy left by the IMF and World Bank’s flawed neoliberal policy prescriptions is one of the most significant factors inhibiting African economic growth. However, these authors also represent very different schools of thought surrounding Africa’s economic future and the relationship between Africa and Western financial institutions. Whilst Andreasson (2010) is confident in the capacity of African governments to play a positive transformational role away from neoliberalism, Harbeson and Rothchild (2009) emphasise the positive role that the US could play.

Although the consequences of Africa’s developmental impasse have been briefly explored in a wide variety of literature, a systemic analysis of local, regional and systemic problems associated with this is provided by texts such as *The African city: A history* (Freund, 2007) and *The state of African cities: Governance, inequality and urban land markets* (UN-Habitat, 2010). These texts investigate issues related to inequality, poor governance and climate change through an analysis of cities throughout Africa. Freund (2007) examines cities all over the African continent from antiquity to the present, noting that the economic factors driving urbanisation and crime in modern-day cities as resulting from neoliberal reforms. Further, the latter’s contention that African cities are an inherent part of African society and culture in which key issues affecting the region are played out, is further reflected in the text by UN-Habitat (2010). This explores the symbiotic yet problematic relationship between urbanisation and industrialisation throughout these cities and the growing problems associated with slums and the working poor resulting from uneven economic growth.

2.4.2. Relations with Global Financial Institutions

The body of literature on Africa and global financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF is deeply divisive and can be broadly sorted into two categories -the World Bank, the IMF and affiliated scholars who that argue that its involvement in Africa had, or intended to have, positive or, at worse, mixed consequences; and those who argue that Africa was the victim of systemic neoliberal policies by global financial institutions. This section will be primarily concerned with exploring the latter given the former has been examined in depth in the preceding sections.

The World Bank’s claim that the policies it endorses are favourable to African economic growth and that regional poverty is the result of specific African conditions has been highly contentious. One of the seminal texts that interrogates this issue is Gibbon’s *The World Bank and African poverty* (1992), which details how relations between the World Bank, the IMF and less-developed African countries between 1973 and 1991 resulted in widespread poverty
and economic stagnation. The impact of this text has been profoundly influential, largely as a result of Gibbon’s (1992) use of reports by western institutions such as the World Bank, alongside African government reports and other secondary sources, to prove that global financial organisations had been systematically under-developing Africa.

The policies of economic and financial liberalisation have been key facets of the IMF and World Bank’s approach to Africa. This led to growing criticism of these institutions’ neoliberal agenda, as evident in texts such as *Africa: The next liberation struggle* (Saul, 2003) and *Neoliberalism and globalization in Africa: Contestations from the embattled continent* (Mensah, 2008). These texts provide damning critiques of the World Bank and IMF’s involvement in Africa, arguing that Western financial institutions’ forced neoliberal economic policies on African nations came under the guise of debt relief and reform packages. Saul (2003) not only criticises the “economic fundamentalism” of these institutions but also the deepening obedience of African leaders to the logic of a “neo-liberalising, structural-adjusting global capitalism” (Saul, 2003, p. 191). Drawing on a host of authors such as Bond, Prempeh and Sahle, Mensah (2008) is also critical of these neoliberal global financial institutions, but is primarily concerned with detailing the deleterious economic impacts of neoliberal globalisation on the African continent, ranging from unemployment to debt peonage, and its consequent social impacts.

Building on these critiques, Hahn (2008) argues that neoliberalism is a hegemonic project concerned with concentrating wealth in the hands of local and trans-national economic elites through the privatisation and financialisation of African economies, a theme elaborated further by Bond (2000). Hahn notes that neoliberalism has been shaped by US imperialism and post-colonialism in Africa, with resistance to neoliberalism intrinsically linked to resistance to neo-colonialism in the West African region. In addition, Sadaram’s endnote address to the CODESRIA general assembly, *Economic liberalisation and development in Africa* (2008), examines the economic liberalisation of Africa from the 1980s onwards, the subsequent impacts on African agriculture, and the withdrawal of the state from the economic sphere. Drawing on the World Bank and economists such as Stiglitz (1997), as well as Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) alongside a host of other sources, Sadaram argues that economic liberalisation along neoliberal lines has resulted in deindustrialisation, inequality, poverty, conflict, and the decline of agricultural exports throughout Africa.

As previously mentioned, Patrick Bond is another key contributor in the discussion surrounding neoliberalism and African economic performance. In texts such as *Looting*
Africa: The economics of exploitation (2006) and Global uneven development, primitive accumulation and political-economic conflict in Africa: The return of the theory of imperialism (2008), Bond develops a scathing critique of neoliberalism and the IMF’s SAPs. In both these texts, Bond utilises primary sources but relies mainly on secondary sources from a diverse range of origins, including human rights organisations and statements from South African cabinet meetings. In the former, Bond (2006) argues that the World Bank and the IMF, with the assistance of “junior partners” in developing countries such as South Africa, are effectively “looting” Africa, resulting in wealth depletion, stagnation, financial volatility, capital flight, phantom aid and “debt peonage”. In the latter text, Bond (2008) draws on Marxist thought to critique foreign involvement in contemporary Africa, examining how the often predatory expansion of capital into the region alongside US attempts to project power manifests in capital flight, debt repayment, resource extraction, and trade and investment liberalisation. This can be seen as a logical extension of his earlier (2006) argument surrounding the role of South Africa as a sub-imperial power, and of the IMF and the World Bank as enforcing the re-accumulation of the wealth of local and trans-national elites.

In addition, the World Bank’s own annual reports contribute greatly to the discussion surrounding the IMF, the World Bank and African economic performance – these are frequently cited to both support as well as criticise IMF and World Bank policies. The World Bank’s emphasis on reducing poverty in theory has been particularly notable in reports such as Poverty reduction and the World Bank: Progress and challenges in the 1990s (1996) and World development report 2000/2001: Attacking poverty (2001). Authors reliant on research conducted by the World Bank, the IMF and affiliated scholars such as Fowowe (2013) often argue that financial liberalisation has had an overall positive effect on investment. However, even Fowowe concedes that IMF and World Bank policies have had mixed effects throughout the region, proving ineffective in improving overall “financial and macro-economic variables” (Fowowe, 2013, p. 1).

2.5. Post-Apartheid Era: 1994 onwards

The transition from minority rule to democratic governance in South Africa transformed the ANC from a liberation movement to a governing body. This transition and the subsequent transformation of the institutions of the Apartheid state under ANC rule has attracted a host of scholarship (Alexander, 2013; Bond, 2004, 2007, 2010; Freidman, 2012, 2014; Hart, 2014; Marais, 1998, 2011; Padayachee, 2006; Pillay, 2008; Southall, 2008, 2013, 2014). However, the ANC’s economic policies and domestic actions have created internal tensions – both
within the ANC-led Tripartite Alliance and between COSATU and the ANC, and later between supporters and critics of South African President Jacob Zuma – which have been the subject of much interest. These economic policies, alongside the ANC’s increasingly repressive actions, have also elicited growing opposition by social movements and labour unions, although this has only been explored by a relatively limited number of academic texts. As such, this section is dedicated to detailing the body of literature surrounding post-Apartheid South Africa, identifying the key debates and highlighting any gaps in the literature.

2.5.1. **The ANC in Power**

Although there is a large body of literature about the ANC in power, texts such as *Comrades in business: Post-liberation politics in South Africa* (Adam, Slabbert & Moodley, 1998), *South Africa: Limits to change* (Marais, 1998), *Liberation movements in power: Party and state in Southern Africa* (Southall, 2013) and *The new South Africa* (Guy, 2000) are especially significant in regard to the transition of the ANC from liberation movement to governing body. Adam, Slabbert and Moodley (1998) and Marais (1998) are mostly concerned with the state of the economy, economic policy and civil society and are especially critical of the influence exerted by trade institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World Trade Organisation). The latter’s commentary on the growth of investment companies linked to unions such as COSATU and SACTU (alongside the SACP) is also a searing indictment of the widespread acceptance of neoliberal logic. Guy’s (2000) highly ambitious text attempts to outline all the various aspects of the ‘new’ post-Apartheid South Africa, ranging from politics and the economy to labour, unemployment, crime and foreign policy. In doing so he explores key themes such as South Africa’s economic vulnerability, the strong historical tradition of organised labour, and the transition of the ANC towards centrist in government. Meanwhile, Southall (2013) examines the inception and development of liberation movements in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe – from popular struggles against hostile governments to hegemonic parties representing wealthy capitalist class interests. Southall (2013) is acutely aware of the ideological transformation of the ANC towards free market orthodoxy and its alignment with capitalist interests. By contrast, Guy’s (2000) analysis remains markedly uncritical, ignoring the power ambitions of former South African president Thabo Mbeki and focusing largely on racial tensions as the challenge for South African society.
The internal transformation within the ANC as it moved from a liberation movement to a ruling party has also led to a focus on ANC policy changes by academics such as Nattras (1994), Lazar (1996), Horwitz (1997), K. Johnson (2003) and Padayachee (2006). Nattras (1994) and Lazar (1996) are primarily concerned with ANC policy shifts between 1990 and 1994, detailing the ANC’s shift toward business friendly economic policy and grassroots resistance to this. Further, both Horwitz’s (1997) critique of National Party and ANC telecommunications policy and K. Johnson’s (2003) critique of the ANC leadership draw attention to several key changes in ANC behaviour during this transition, namely an increasingly aloof yet not openly hostile attitude towards unions and sectoral forums, a willingness to co-operate with capital, and an increasingly statist approach to democratic governance. Padayachee (2006) engages with this academic and policy debate surrounding ANC economic policy from 1994-2004, noting the merging of capital–state interests during this period, an argument later reflected in Southall (2013).

The ANC has also faced criticism from texts concerned with black economic and political empowerment such as The limits of black political empowerment: Fanon, Marx, ‘the poors’, and the ‘new reality of the nation’ in South Africa (Gibson, 2005) and Black economic empowerment: The South African social formation (Gentle, 2007). Both authors argue that the end of Apartheid has merely seen the replacement of state-enforced racial discrimination and economically determined racism. However, whilst Gibson (2005) stresses the importance of black economic empowerment, Gentle (2007) notes that the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) initiative stands in opposition to new struggles for social equality as part of South African crony capitalism.

Analyses of crime and governance in contemporary South Africa such as Transformation and trouble: Crime, justice, and participation in democratic South Africa (Gordon, 2006) and Cape Town after Apartheid: Crime and governance in the divided city (Samara, 2011) also provide valuable insights into the impacts of the ANC’s economic policies. Both authors provide damning accounts of corruption in South Africa under the ANC, and the government’s failure to curb the excesses of the police. In his analysis of the South African criminal justice system, Gordon (2006) argues that the liberal institutions that are meant to respect human rights, foster integrity and constrain the police, courts and executive zeal are subject to frequent lapses. Samara’s (2011) examination of the relationship between crime and governance in Cape Town extends this argument further, paying specific attention to how neoliberalism is recreating Apartheid era divisions in post-Apartheid South Africa through high unemployment, poor education and systemic corruption.
Meanwhile other authors such as De Jager (2009) and Friedman (2012) emphasise the continuities between the ANC prior to and after Apartheid. De Jager’s (2009) critique of the ANC is centred on analysing its various historical strands and remains critical of the ANC’s behaviour during and after the transition. De Jager (2009) is especially critical of the ANC’s policy of cadre deployment which it pursues under the guise of seizing the levers of power and achieving socialism as per the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), noting that this only reinforces elite control and state centralisation. By contrast, Friedman’s (2012) criticism of the ANC is centred around the examination of the expulsion of a group of leftist academics and activists from the ANC in the 1980s. This reflects elements of both K. Johnson (2003) and Padayachee’s (2006) analysis, with Friedman (2012) criticising the ANC’s organisational inclination towards statism and elitism, and the leadership’s distaste for far-left thought prior to the democratic transition.

The rampant levels of corruption in South Africa, and within the ANC especially, have also attracted the attention of authors such as Southall (2008, 2014), Feinstein (2009), Duncan (2009), Reddy (2010) and Suttner (2014). Southall’s (2008) analysis is invaluable as it argues that the corruption of the ANC is in part due to its perceived need for funding and subsequent willingness to tap into corporate largesse and public monies. Building on Jackson (1993), Duncan (2009) has noted that the ANC’s corrupt practices and excessive use of force have brought it increasingly into tension with the media, thereby resulting in attempts to curb media freedoms. Reddy (2010) is far more interested in South African political culture and the way in which social movements, unions and political parties employ violence as a legitimate tool and the effect of this on society. He notes that South Africa is seemingly unable to “institutionalize democracy beyond the absence of open violence and the mere existence of democratic institutions that function imperfectly” (Reddy, 2010, p. 185). More recently, Johnson (2016), Southall (2014), and Suttner (2014) have drawn attention to the impacts of violence, lawlessness, corruption and the predatory behaviour of national, provincial and local elites on South Africa’s constitutional democracy. These authors are highly critical of the ANC, especially the system of cadre deployment, patronage networks and deep systemic corruption which have emerged since 1994. Further, although Southall (2014) is more preoccupied with continuities between the Apartheid and post-Apartheid economies, these authors generally agree that cadre deployment under the auspice of the NDR has contributed greatly towards the erosion of democratic institutions and the declawing of anti-corruption bodies such as the Hawks, South Africa's Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation.
2.5.2. Neoliberal South Africa

In particular, within the body of literature on post-Apartheid South Africa, critiques of contemporary South Africa as a neoliberal state are plentiful. A key proponent of this school of thought is Patrick Bond as embodied in works such as *Elite transition: From Apartheid to neoliberalism in South Africa* (2000), *South Africa’s frustrating decade of freedom: From racial to class Apartheid* (2004), *South Africa between neoliberalism and social democracy?: Respecting balance while sharpening differences* (2007a) and *South African subimperial accumulation* (2007b). In these texts Bond traces the transition of the ANC from a popular nationalist movement to an agent of neoliberalism, noting that capitalist crises combined with the emergence and adoption of neoliberal ideas further increased this uneven development. Bond details the impacts of the ANC’s rightward trajectory, ranging from the inept, market-oriented delivery of housing and public services to the ineffectual economic crisis management, engaging with debates surrounding Trotsky’s notion of uneven and combined development in South Africa. Bond (2007a) is also highly critical of South African academic Bill Freund’s views on socialism and class orientation in post-colonial states, criticising Freund’s (2006) lack of theoretical support. Furthermore, Bond’s (2007b) notion of South Africa as a regional sub-hegemonic power involved in facilitating the accumulation of wealth by neoliberal forces and expanding the Washington Consensus within Southern Africa is highly significant and has been drawn on by numerous authors (Marais, 2011; Klein, 2007).

Authors such as Narsiah (2002), Desai (2003), Schneider (2003), Koelble (2004) and Klein (2007) have expanded upon Bond’s arguments, arguing that the ANC internalised the discourse of neoliberalism following the end of Apartheid. Narsiah (2002), Desai (2003) and Schneider (2003) flesh out Bond’s analysis by detailing the ideological shift away from socialist development policy among ANC’s leaders, how neoliberalism has manifested in ANC economic policies, and the resulting impacts of privatisation on the general populace. In *Neoliberalism and resistance in South Africa*, Desai (2003) is most interested in examining the impacts of GEAR on the South African populace, ranging from water and electricity disconnections to unemployment and growing debt, the subsequent rise of community movements, and the failure of the organised working class through COSATU to seriously contest government policy. In *Neoliberalism and economic justice in South Africa: Revisiting the debate on economic Apartheid*, Schneider (2003) further analyses why the neoliberal policies installed by the ANC through GEAR were doomed to exacerbate the already widespread inequality and unemployment. Schneider’s (2003) analysis of the overwhelmingly negative impact of neoliberal theory on the South African economy in regard to distribution
of assets, land and income also supports Desai’s assertion that the “transition to democracy… was trumped by the transition to neoliberalism” (2003, p. 16).

Drawing on Gramsci and Foucault, Peet (2002, 2007) nuances the arguments put forward by Narsiah (2002), Desai (2003), Schneider (2003) and Klein (2007), noting that “ANC policy was disciplined by a neoliberal economic discourse formulated by an academic-industrial-media complex” (Peet, 2002). Further, whilst Koelble (2004) agrees that South Africa has embraced neoliberalism under a combination of economic threats and incentives, he is critical of “ultra-leftist critics” such as Bond. Koelble instead espouses the policy cocktail of Giddens’ ‘Third Way’ (1998) as the best option available to policy makers in post-colonial spaces such as South Africa. Oldfield and Stokke (2007) are similarly critical of “radical anti-neoliberal critics” in their study of political polemic and the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign. Finally, the concept of neoliberalism in South Africa is itself problematic for Oldfield and Stokke (2007) who see community-based movements as adopting multiple positions which sometimes “resonate” with critiques of neoliberalism but which often articulate specific local grievances.

The notion of South Africa as neoliberal has also been problematised by authors such as Ferguson (2009), Marais (2011) and Hart (2008, 2014) who argue that neoliberalism is not a homogenous phenomenon nor a series of policy decisions steeped in free market fundamentalism. Drawing on Gramsci, Ferguson (2009) makes a crucial distinction between the modes of reasoning frequently associated with neoliberalism and the “class-based ideological ‘project’ of neoliberalism”. Further, Ferguson argues that the logic of capital is much more intractable than the class-based project of neoliberalism associated with economic liberalisation. Making connections with work by Collier (2005) in Russia, Ferguson (2009) also argues that the technical mechanisms of neoliberal policy are becoming increasingly normalised in economic theory, and subsequently dissociated from the “neoliberal political–economic project”. Drawing on Ferguson, Marais is also critical of applying the term neoliberalism to describe a blueprint or set of policies (such as GEAR), noting instead that neoliberalism provides the “organising framework and ethical compass points for South Africa’s transition” (Marais, 2011, p. 139).

Drawing on both Lefebvre and a Gramscian reading of Fanon, Hart (2008, 2014) challenges the application of the concept of neoliberalism to South Africa, noting that “specifically racialized forms of dispossession” and struggles over the meaning of nationhood and liberation exceed understandings of neoliberalism as “class project, governmentally, or
hegemony” (Hart, 2008, p. 4). As such, Hart argues that while neoliberalism is important it is inadequate to the task of critical analysis and as an oppositional strategy has lost “much of the traction it once had” (Hart, 2014, p. 22, 123). Instead, Hart (2008, 2014) understands the post-Apartheid dispensation in relation to simultaneous processes of de-nationalisation and re-nationalisation. The latter draws attention to the “historical and geographical specificities of southern African racial capitalism” and the role of concentrated corporate capital alongside the dynamics of financialisation in impacting ANC economic policy (Hart, 2014, p. 22). These factors influence and are influenced by re-nationalising practices including the discourse of the non-racial ‘rainbow nation’, the government’s “bounding of the nation” through immigration policy, and its commitment to the NDR, and provide justification and a rationale to the actions of the ANC (Hart, 2014, p. 23). Crucially, whereas many Marxian scholars view the ANC’s hegemony as bound up with a neoliberal project, Hart rejects the notion of neoliberalism and instead argues that the hegemony of the ANC hinges on its capacity to articulate these modes of de-/re-nationalisation (Hart, 2014, p. 23).

Recent literature by Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013) and Mabugu and Mabugu (2014) has also presented a complex and varied account of ANC economic policy. Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013) examine the ANC’s sustained commitment to neoliberal economic orthodoxy despite growing domestic dissatisfaction and unrest, noting that South Africa is a poster child of neoliberal “deepening”. This, they argue, is the result of the processes of ideological conversion, a stated commitment to development and alleviating poverty combined with neoliberal macro-economic policies, and the reconstruction of the state involving the creation and consolidation of a hegemonic national treasury insulated from democratic controls. However, whereas Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013) are fundamentally critical of ANC economic policies, Mabugu and Mabugu (2014) present a far more optimistic account of the ANC’s policy of trade liberalisation. They argue that although South Africa’s economic performance has been unimpressive since embarking on the policies of trade liberalisation, these policies have “very minimal short-run macroeconomic consequence” but positive long-term results (Mabugu & Mabugu, 2014, p. 257). Thus, despite acknowledging that South Africa is experiencing limited growth, rising poverty and record-level unemployment, they argue that trade liberalisation is progressive, claim there has been no significant impact on poverty and dismiss tariffs as inefficient. However, whereas Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013) support their argument with a wide variety of literature in combination with interviews, Mabugu and Mabugu (2014) are largely reliant on literature produced by the World Trade
Organisation, the South African Reserve Bank and the CIA, all of whom are overtly sympathetic to neoliberalisation and trade liberalisation.

South Africa’s foreign policy under the ANC government has also drawn criticism from authors such as Williams (2000) and Bond (2005) for its role as a junior partner to Western neoliberal states. Williams (2000) examines South Africa’s post-Apartheid foreign policy both in theory and practice, detailing the ways in which the ANC has attempted to pursue the strategic objectives of wealth creation and security through its regional and international foreign policy. In doing so, he argues that the ANC’s foreign policy is dictated by its domestic neoliberal programme which is deeply flawed and provides some policy recommendations which are dubious at best. Bond (2005) extends the argument that South African foreign policy is conditioned by its commitment to neoliberalism by noting the role of South Africa as a proxy of the IMF in the 2005 conflict between Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe and the IMF. Further, Bond (2005) argues that the Bretton Woods institutions, alongside South Africa, exerted pressure on Zimbabwe to apply neoliberal reform across a number of sectors in an attempt to expose Zimbabwean assets to South African capital at fire-sale prices.

2.5.3. **The Tripartite Alliance and the Legacy of Socialism**

The Tripartite Alliance between the ANC, the SACP and COSATU is a critical component of the ANC’s ability to mobilise consent and lead society. However, the ANC’s adoption of neoliberal economic policies has created internal tensions within the Alliance and COSATU itself which threatens to undermine ANC rule. One of the earliest significant examinations of these tensions was by Gall (1997) who detailed the compromisingly close relationship between the leadership of the ANC-led Alliance, the ANC’s increasingly autocratic approach to labour policy, and the schism between radical workers and moderate union leadership. Over time, the economic, political and social changes wrought on South African society by the collapse of Apartheid and the subsequent internal tensions within the ANC-led Alliance have also attracted commentary by a host of authors. This includes Webster and Adler (1999), Von Holdt (2003), Buhlungu (2006), Silke (2006), Mwalima (2007), Webster, Lambert, and Bezuidenhout (2008), Bolsmann (2010) and Plaut (2010).

In the post-Apartheid period, Webster and Adler (1999) argue that South Africa is undergoing a “double transition” – an economic transition from inward-looking isolationism to trade liberalisation, and a political transition from an authoritarian system to liberal democracy. Building on this concept, Von Holdt (2003) suggests a “triple transition”, implying a “transition from below” and a “deeper and broader process of social transformation” (2003, p.
Faced with these broad processes of social transformation, Von Holdt (2003) argues that labour was faced with a number of new challenges which it was ill-equipped to combat. Von Holdt (2003) largely views this as a result of the institutionalisation of the ANC's neoliberal policies, ranging from union rivalries to worker insecurity. More recently, Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout (2008), drawing on Polanyi (2001) and Munck (2002), have expanded upon this theme, detailing the decline of union activism into inertia as the processes of new class formation unleashed by the ANC undermine worker solidarity and the ability of unions to effectively mobilise support and exert pressure. Bolsmann (2010), in his study of the 2000 Uitenhage Volkswagen strike, draws on Von Holdt’s notion of “transition from below” when detailing the struggle of shop-floor activists against their own union. He contrasts it further with attempts to forge internationalism, as identified by Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, in discussing links between German and South African activists. Mwilima (2007) similarly draws on these forms of internationalism, stressing their importance in strengthening the hands of labour unions in the face of globalised capital, albeit somewhat less problematically. These authors contrast old and new forms of labour internationalism, noting the former’s primary focus on white, Northern male workers and their trade unions and the latter’s focus on forging links between African, Asian and Latino workers and new social movements and NGOs.

Authors such as Buhlungu (2006), Buhlungu, Brookes and Wood (2008) and Wood and Dibben (2006) have also investigated the impacts of divisive tendencies within the Alliance on the capability of COSATU to mobilise support. These authors maintain that the ANC-led Alliance retains high levels of support among members despite the difficulties COSATU faces in “coping with—and contesting—neoliberal reforms, retaining and re-energizing rank and file in the post-Apartheid era” (2008, p. 439). However, they also note that COSATU’s continued support for the ANC has created internal discord, resulting in a crisis of shop-floor diplomacy and the emasculation of internal participatory diplomacy within its affiliates. Buhlungu (2006) suggests that the “double transition” has heralded new challenges for unions and created inter/intra-Alliance tensions resulting in, among other things, increasingly ambivalent attitudes towards the ANC and the Alliance by COSATU members. However, although Beresford (2012) also recognises the internal discord between COSATU members, he argues that the COSATU member unions are becoming increasingly divided along pro-Zuma and anti-Zuma lines. Furthermore, he notes that COSATU does not merely face difficulties in coping with and contesting neoliberal reforms but is becoming increasingly irrelevant as its strategies for mobilising and recruiting new members are becoming
increasingly untenable. This, he argues, is the result of affirmative action and increased social mobility among select union members which has undermined union solidarity and created divisions which threaten to render their membership inert.

The massive ideological shift within the ANC and the ANC-led Alliance away from the left and towards neoliberal orthodoxy has also been the subject of several notable texts including *Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC* (Gumede, 2007) and *Lessons from South Africa: Unions, democracy, and economic liberalization* (Alder & Webster, 2012). Gumede’s examination of the ANC’s transformation from liberation movement to governing party sheds light on the internal tensions between centrist tendencies and its mass support base, and the subsequent opposition growing against the ANC from both within the Alliance and outside. This argument is reflected by Adler and Webster (2012) who contend that the ANC’s economic policies, especially GEAR, pose a fundamental threat to COSATU’s support base as they create dissent from within the union. Adler and Webster (2012) extend this argument, further noting that whilst the collapse of the USSR undermined leftist economic policies and contributed to the shift within the ANC-led Alliance towards free market orthodoxy, the recent excesses of neoliberalism has created growing resistance among both unions and social movements. However, in contrast to Gumede (2007), Adler and Webster (2012) are also critical of the left and COSATU itself, noting the instrumental role of the union in facilitating class compromise. Other authors such as Pillay (2008) have expanded upon this critique, noting that COSATU and the SACP’s unwillingness to leave the Alliance has constrained their ability to build a legitimate left alternative among the working class, forcing them to instead focus on peripheral issues such as ousting the Mbeki leadership. As such, Pillay (2008) argues that the mounting tensions within the Alliance are the result of the failure of the working class to develop an independent political body.

Given the significance of the ANC’s shift to the right on South African politics, society and economy, several texts have also emerged which examine the development and legacy of leftist politics and Marxism in South Africa including *Has socialism failed?* (Slovo, 1989), *The moment of Western Marxism in South Africa* (Nash, 2003), *Explaining uneven and combined development in South Africa* (Bond & Desai, 2006) and *Liberalism vs. Marxism-Leninism and the future of education in South Africa* (Letseka, 2013). Writing after the collapse of communist Eastern Europe, Slovo (then General Secretary of the South African Communist Party) is guardedly hopeful about the prospects of a socialist democracy, stressing the need for a resurgent and inwardly reflective socialism by the SACP. However, the SACP was seemingly unable to achieve this, as Nash (2003) argues in his analysis of Marxism, trade
unions and the SACP from the 1970s to present. Nash (2003) finds that the moment of third-
world internationalism was conclusively lost in South Africa in 1994, resulting in an
increasingly neoliberal ANC and a long-defeated Marxist tradition among the left. Bond and
Desai (2006) are much more critical of the SACP’s own complicity in undermining the
Marxist tradition, but similarly note that the theory of colonialism of a special type (CST)
espoused by the SACP was deeply flawed and failed to clarify the nature of accumulation and
class formation in South Africa.

By contrast, Letseka (2013) makes no distinction between neo-Marxist and SACP's
understandings, instead focusing on the tensions between liberalism on the one hand and on
the ‘radical left’ on the other. This includes the radical Black Consciousness Movement
(BCM) of the ’70s and “hard-line Marxism Leninism inclined” organisations such as the
SACP and COSATU (Letseka, 2013). However, whereas Bond and Desai (2006) argue that
the South African neo-Marxism of the SACP and COSATU are deeply flawed, Letseka
(2013) is far less critical, noting instead that the ANC has “hegemonised the alliance”, and
therefore the ideologies of the SACP and COSATU pose no threat to liberalism. Both authors
do agree that the ideologies of the SACP and COSATU lack sufficient force to threaten the
neoliberal discourse of the ANC; however, only Bond and Desai stress the importance of new
left-leaning social movements and labour unions in challenging the ANC.

2.6.  **African Social Movements**

Social movements can be defined as “interlocking networks of groups, social networks and
individuals, and the connection between them is a shared collective identity that tries to
prevent [or enact] societal change by non-institutionalized tactics” (van Stekelenburg &
Klandermans cited in Brandes & Engels, 2011, p. 9). Thus, social movements can range from
spontaneous protests to larger, more disciplined and better organised groups such as trade
unions. As such, this section will not only outline the body of literature surrounding African
social movements but also that concerning protest, especially that focused on South Africa.
The study of African social movements remains a largely under-researched and under-
theorised field of research within African studies. This section aims to outline the key
contributors to this field of study and identify any gaps in the existing literature.

2.6.1.  **African Social Movements: A Brief Literary History**

Since the democratisation of Sub-Saharan Africa between 1989-1994 scientific interest in
African social movements and political parties has steadily increased (Bratton & Van de
Walle (1997). Although analyses of the organisational structure of these movements have been largely absent, recent authors such as Darracq (2008) and De Waal and Ibreck (2013) have challenged this by shifting the focus back to African social movements and organisations and situating them in long historical traditions. Whereas Darracq (2008) focuses on the ANC at the grassroots level and the influence of branches at the leadership level, De Waal and Ibreck (2013) are primarily concerned with the character of the oft-neglected non-violent social movements in sub-Saharan Africa. One of the most influential texts on social movements in Africa is a volume edited by Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba and published by CODESRIA in 1995 titled *African studies in social movements and democracy*. This text argues that, as a result of the notion of ‘civil society’ which emerged from modernisation theory dominating scholarship on African civil society, social movements have remained largely absent from the theories and debates of African studies (Mamdani & Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1995). This argument has exerted a strong influence on social movement studies in Africa, with texts such as *Solidarity and Africa in the new century* (Sachikonye, 2004) emphasising the key role of social movements in fostering solidarity and resisting neoliberal reforms.

More contemporary studies such as *Movers and shakers: Social movements in Africa* (Ellis & van Kessel, 2009) and *Social movement struggles in Africa* (Larmer, 2010) have challenged the Western conception of social movements as part of a civil society which helps stabilise the state. The text edited by Ellis and van Kessel (2009) includes case studies on social movements in eight African states, comparing empirical findings with existing social theory to test whether African social movements are fundamentally different to their Western counterparts. However, despite finding that African states fit the theoretical framework developed in Europe and America, this study has inherent limitations as a result of its emphasis on Anglophone states such as Nigeria, Malawi, South Africa, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The 2010 *Review of African Political Economy* (ROAPE) special issue titled *Social movement struggles in Africa* provides a fitting companion to Ellis and van Kessel’s study as it brings together a number of case studies on social movements from predominantly French speaking countries such as Burkina Faso, Senegal and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. ROAPE editor, Larmer (2010), extends the argument initially put forward by Ellis and van Kessel (2009) that financial dependency on external donors is characteristic of numerous African social movements. As such, they argue that Western actors, norms and ideas exert a profound influence over African social movements. However, the exclusion of organised labour as a form of social movement by authors such as Sachikonye (2004) and Larmer
(2010) is symptomatic of this field of study, reinforcing the ontological barrier between social movements and unions.

Other more recent authors such as Brandes and Engels (2011) and Dwyer and Zeilig (2012) present much more nuanced argument about the relationship between the West and African social movements. Although Brandes and Engels (2011) agree with Larmer (2010) that Western actors, norms and ideas do hold sway over African social movements they stress that two main ideas. Firstly, that there are social movements which do not reflect Western ideas and do not fit within the theoretical framework surrounding social movements, such as ethno-nationalist movements. Secondly that African movements and the West are marked by intertwined histories and inseparable social constructions influencing the ways in which social movements are seen, behave and organise themselves. This nuanced relationship between African social movements and the West is implicit in texts such as *African struggles today* (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012) which details the struggles of a number of social movements since 1945. Dwyer and Zeilig (2012) also emphasise the importance of social movements, such as the ethno-nationalist South African Democratic Students Movement (SADSM), in resisting imperialism and neoliberal reforms, but also its limitations in enacting social change resulting from its relative size and undisciplined structure.

### 2.6.2. South African Social Movements: A History of Protest

Despite increased interest in South African social studies, there remains a dearth of literature dedicated to the analysis of post-Apartheid social movements and labour unions in South Africa. *Rethinking the labour movement in the ‘New South Africa’* (Bramble & Barchiesi, 2003) contributes significantly to this body of literature by drawing together a host of texts by international authors to examine how the labour movement has responded to the challenges of post-Apartheid South Africa. Two chapters of particular significance to this debate are *Social movement unionism since the fall of Apartheid: The case of NUMSA on the East Rand* (Bramble, 2003) and *Pressing challenges facing the South African labour movement: An interview with John Appolis and Dinga Sikwetu* (Barchiesi, 2003). Bramble’s chapter examines social movement unionism (SMU) in the post-Apartheid era with a focus on the transformation of NUMSA and COSATU from leading forces in the liberation struggle to relatively loyal partners of the ANC. He argues that the traditions of SMU which characterised COSATU in the 1980s are fading away as the moving force of SMU is slowly retreating within both NUMSA and COSATU. Similarly, Barchiesi’s (2003) chapter further expands on this argument, detailing the pressing challenges behind this decline, such as
inadequate mobilisation strategies, hostile labour laws, and the loss of strategic flexibility resulting from their institutionalisation within the law-making system. However, whereas Barchiesi (2003) views these challenges as too large to overcome without restructuring the whole system, Bramble (2003) argues mass movements from below could reverse the institutionalisation of labour unions.

Barchiesi further articulates his scepticism about the radical potential for trade unions to lead progressive change in his 2007 study of municipal workers in Johannesburg. In the latter, Barchiesi (2007c) contrasts the success of SMU in the anti-Apartheid struggle with the failure of the South African Municipal Workers’ Union (SAMWU) to reforge SMU in the current liberalised economic climate. Further, Barchiesi (2007c) argues that union-community alliances are under increasing strain due to a range of factors from a declining capacity to mobilise, the constraining influence of COSATU, and a context of “democratization and liberalization” (Barchiesi, 2007c, p. 65). This scepticism of the radical potential of trade unions is evident among a number of South African left-leaning scholars such as Lier and Stokke (2006), Wood & Dibben (2006), Forrest (2007) and Bond and Mottiar (2013). Wood and Dibben’s (2006) critique is particularly notable for its identification of the five stages of development of the South African labour movement. Wood and Dibben (2006) trace union development from late 19th century white craft unions to diminishing formal employment after 1994 and finally to 1998 when union members’ interests were definitively compromised by their role in the Tripartite Alliance. Forrest’s (2007) analysis of NUMSA’s failed attempt to rearticulate workers’ power between 1989 and 1995 is likewise critical of the labour movement, but especially of NUMSA’s partial somewhat haphazard attempt to restructure employee–employer relations. Ruiters (2014) is, however, acutely critical of most of these authors, noting that the left’s “misplaced criticism” of trade unions has inadvertently helped the neoliberal agenda. He also notes that in the “post-alliance landscape” (i.e. after Marikana and NUMSA’s expulsion from COSATU) new modes of protest and participation are assisting trade unions and social movements to attract support and create a united approach (Ruiters, 2014).

A recent event, the murder of 34 miners and injury of 78 others by police forces during a strike in Marikana on the 16th August 2012, known as the Marikana massacre, has resulted in the emergence of a number of recent texts studying unions in the post-Apartheid period which are notably critical of the ANC-led Alliance. These texts include Marikana, turning point in South African history (Alexander, 2013), Marikana and the post-Apartheid workplace order (Chinguno, 2013), Exploring the incidents of strikes in post-Apartheid South Africa
(Murwirapachena & Sibanda, 2014), The Marikana massacre: South Africa’s post-Apartheid dissensus (Pillay, 2013) and Movements, protests and a massacre in South Africa (Bond & Mottiar, 2013). Alexander (2013) argues that the massacre constitutes a rupture in South African society that has transformed the structures of people’s lives and mobilised the masses against the ANC, with drastic impacts. These include an escalation of strikes and union action, the rise of the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU), the division of COSATU along pro- and anti-ANC lines, and the development of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).

Analyses by Chinguno (2013) and Murwirapachena and Sibanda (2014) of incidents of strikes in post-Apartheid South Africa also support the argument that the main causes of strikes include inequality, unemployment and union rivalries, all of which were exacerbated following the Marikana massacre. Chinguno (2013) notably argues that Marikana was the result of the persistent problems of worker fragmentation and precariousness which it situates within the context of neoliberal globalisation. Bond and Mottiar (2013) likewise support this approach, whilst also focusing on the failure to create a sustained national revolt prior to and in the wake of the massacre. Meanwhile, Pillay (2013) focuses on the violence at Marikana between NUM and AMCU which he argues signalled a post-Apartheid dissensus characterised by a breakdown in the social contract between state, labour and capital, and the unravelling of the dominant strategy of union organising in South Africa. Although each of these authors focused on various different aspects of the Marikana miners strikes, they generally agreed that the fundamental breakdown in intra-union relations which led to the massacre sprang from the increasingly cosy relationship between ANC elites and big business, tensions between unions, and the poor condition of mine workers.

In addition, various authors have emerged which highlight the importance of social movements in challenging the ANC, including Ballard, Habib, Valodia & Zuern (2005), Lier & Stokke (2006), Zikode (2007), Celik (2010), Bond and McInnes (2007) and Ngwane (2007). Ballard, Habib, Valodia and Zuern (2005) examine the impact of globalisation, the interaction between social movements, labour power and the state in post-Apartheid South Africa, and the previous frameworks for studying social movements. These authors argue that South Africa’s sudden and increasing economic, social and political engagement with the world after 1994 has created massive unemployment, poverty and inequality, which is reflected in the actions and makeup of South African social movements and struggles (Ballard, Habib, Valodia & Zuern, 2005). Furthermore, they argue that the failure of South Africa’s post-Apartheid political system to create a genuine leftist alternative to the ANC has
made social movements essential in highlighting the needs of the poor. Lier and Stokke (2006), in their study of the Anti-Privatisation Forum (AFP), are far less optimistic about the prospects of re-empowering unions and forging SMU, noting that fragile internal unity, internal organisational differences and sectoral interests have undermined attempts to confront the ANC’s hegemonic position. Zikode (2007) and Celik (2010) discuss the rise and growth of shack dwellers’ and street traders’ organisations in the city of Durban, respectively, with the latter stressing the capacity of street traders to re-empower organised labour through “rearticulating” labour power with social activism and movement. Meanwhile, Bond and McInnes’ (2007) study of the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) and Ngwane’s (2007) Marxist critique of ANC municipal policies and global capital are far more critical of informal organisations such as the SECC and shack dwellers movement, respectively, noting the growth of internal ideological and organisational problems and the formation of sub-classes among slum and shack dwellers.

Recent actions taken by NUMSA at its special national congress in December 2013 – including its decision to not support the ANC in the 2014 elections and resolution to form a United Front – challenged the legitimacy of COSATU and the leadership of the ANC-led Alliance. Further, given NUMSA member’s widespread support for these actions and its Marxist pedigree, it has the radical potential to lead a revival of SMU along the lines described by Bramble (2003). However, due to the contemporary nature of these events, there is a lack of academic literature surrounding this topic. As such, Bond’s article *South Africa’s resource curses and growing social resistance* (2010) is particularly significant in that it examines the failure of the ANC to lead South Africa towards “genuine freedom and a new society”. Further, Bond (2014) places the subsequent rise of organisations such as NUMSA and the EFF within the context of a growing political schism between pro-ANC and anti-ANC, and pro-Zuma and anti-Zuma, forces. Further, given the lack of academic literature surrounding the topic, more recent scholarship by authors such as Ruiters (2014) and Southall (2014) and resources such as *Africa Research Bulletin*, allafrica.com, news24.com, and BBC news Africa provide invaluable commentary on the ongoing struggle between NUMSA and COSATU. South African newspapers such as the *Mail & Guardian Africa*, *Cape Times*, and the *Sowetan* also provide detailed accounts of NUMSA’s actions and its reception throughout South Africa. Further, texts produced by organisations such as the International Labour Research and Information Group (ILRIG), the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), and the Society for Work and Development institute (SWOP),
provide informed, current information about NUMSA and the development of the United Front.

One of the most significant interrogations of protest and citizenship in South Africa in recent years is the seminal study *The smoke that calls: Insurgent citizenship, collective violence and the struggle for a place in the new South Africa* (2011) by the Centre for the CSVR and the SWOP. This body of work brings together seven different case studies of xenophobic violence and community protests in rural and urban, formal and informal townships throughout South Africa to evaluate the origins and trajectories of xenophobic violence. The CSVR and SWOP found that xenophobic attacks in post-Apartheid South Africa are often linked to community protests and divisions within the local ANC and are frequently organised by a combination of “formal organisational leadership and informal groups and networks” (2011, p. 17). Building on Reddy (2010), this text argues that this violence is the result of collective trauma resulting from Apartheid rule and the violent forces of class formation unleashed by the transition to democracy. Further, it argues that these forces shaped social life in formal and informal townships creating dislocation and a “precarious society” (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2011).

The seminal analysis of protest and violence by CSRV and SWOP (2011) is complemented by the work of Booysen (2010, 2012) in tracking changes in voter turnout and participation in municipal, provincial and national elections since 1994. The latter text includes contributions from numerous South African commentators and academics, providing critiques of the failures of local government, ranging from nepotism, patronage and corruption to the failure of national government to meaningfully effect working systems of local government (Booysen, 2012). However, it also demonstrated the unambiguous capacity of the ANC to mobilise consent by maintaining a “continuous trend of high levels of electoral support”, although this was serially in decline by 2011 (Booysen, 2012, p. 353). As a result, Booysen (2012) argues that development issues are increasingly shifting from the terrain of local elections to that of civil society through community organisations, social movements and other modes of protest.

2.7. **Theoretical Shortcomings in the Literature**

The body of literature surrounding Africa, South Africa and neoliberalism is complex and embraces a multitude of different views and theoretical perspectives. However, as previously noted, literature is also heavily influenced by the ideological, cultural and/or political context
in which it is written. As a result, many Western authors and institutions present ideas and arguments which are deeply rooted in neoliberal ‘common sense’ understandings, and are subsequently generally far less critical of ANC economic policies, the ANC and neoliberalism than South African authors. Further, there is a wide divergence of opinions on the ANC, hegemony, neoliberalism, and social protest even between progressive South African authors, such as Bond (2007b) and Marais (2011), who share similar theoretical underpinnings. As such, it is crucial to adopt a Gramscian perspective when engaging with these texts, to not only situate these arguments within respect to their historical context, but also to identify the theoretical context of the concepts forwarded by these authors, and their suitability to the study of South Africa.

As previously noted, the spread of Marxist ideas in South Africa deeply influenced the development of critical theory, especially within the social sciences. Perhaps because of the history of slavery, colonialism and Apartheid, and the unique mixture of “market and non-market coercion” (Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 1), Marxist ideas had a pronounced impact and relevance to the South African context. As a result, Marxist theory flourished, developing from the unreformed Leninism of the SACP, to a reformist approach by the 1970s (Wolpe, 1972), a revisionist approach by the 1980s (Marks & Rathbone, 1985), and ultimately resurrecting the concept of uneven development by the early 2000s (Mhone & Bond, 2002; Bond, 2007c; Seekings and Nattras, 2005). Since then, numerous South African scholars (Bond & Mortiar, 2013; Bramble, 2003; Narsiah, 2002; Ngwane, 2007; Pillay, 2013) have employed Marxist theory to the examination of capitalist development in South Africa. Within the school of Marxist thought on post-Apartheid South Africa, Gramscian thought has emerged as a small but particularly apt approach to the study of the ANC and neoliberalism. Numerous authors (Bond, 2005; Hart, 2008; Ferguson, 2009; Marais, 1998, 2011; Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013) have drawn on Gramsci in their critique of neoliberalism in South Africa. In contrast to the vulgar deterministic base-superstructure model touted by Marxists such as the South African Communist Party, a Gramscian approach acknowledges a degree of reciprocity between the “social relations of production and ideas within the realm of state–civil society relations” (Morton, 2007, p. 77).

Despite the growing popularity of Gramscian analysis within Marxist modes of thought in the post-Apartheid era, it has been problematicised by both black studies and post-colonial scholars. Drawing on both these traditions, Wilderson (2003) and Willoughby-Herard (2013, 2014) argue against the use of hegemony in the colonial and post-colonial landscape as the relationship between black subjects and the state is one of terror, not hegemony (Wilderson,
Further, they argue that “neither Gramsci nor Marx” are attentive to the ‘afterlife’ of slavery that is capital’s original and enduring desire (Wilderson, 2003, p. 22). Willoughby-Herard goes further, noting that the “‘after-life of apartheid’ [is] paradigmatically haunting the after-life of slavery” (2013, p. 74). This assumed incompatibility between hegemony and Apartheid is implicit in many critiques of Apartheid-era South Africa, including Friedman’s 1987 study on independent trade unions. The latter argued that the industrial relations reforms of the 1980s were aimed at building consensus among a sector of the black population, unionized workers before which “nearly all Africans were faceless and voiceless” (Friedman, 1987, p. 1). However, this argument has been criticised by Gramscian authors such as Comaroff and Comaroff (1991; 1997) and Hart (2014) who argue that hegemony involves the “dialectical integration of… consent with coercion” (Hart, 2014, p. 143-144). As such, a Gramscian reading of the latter suggests that there was indeed a hegemonic project operating during Apartheid, albeit built upon a system of racialised domination.

However, the Gramscian approach espoused by Comaroff and Comaroff (1991; 1997) and Hart (2014) is also attentive to the issues raised by postcolonial (Coetzee, 1997; White, 2015) and critical race theorists (Wilderson, 2003; Willoughby-Herard, 2013). The rise of ethno-nationalism and national-populism in South Africa, as elsewhere, cannot be ignored, and as such, requires closer attention to the relationship between neoliberalism, nationalism and ethnicity. These authors are hostile to the emergence of the post-racial discourse which accompanied the shift to democratic rule in South Africa, and its tendency to flatten “all identities, ways of being, and histories of rejecting domination” (Willoughby-Herard, 2013, p. 83). Despite a commitment to inclusive politics, the South African state has been unable to “produce a unified nation” (White, 2015, p. 1107). Further, the ANC’s attempts to build a unified state through a commitment to liberal pluralism only served to reinforce the ‘politics of difference’ created during the colonial and Apartheid eras, bolstering an emergent “counter-politics of ethnic assertion against the jurisdiction of the state” (Coetzee, 1997; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2003, p. 446). In addition, the effects of neoliberalism have reinforced this ‘politics of difference’ and created inherent tensions between the concept of liberal citizenship and that of ethnic identity (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2003, p. 448). Further, the failure of the ANC to “resist, remove, or repudiate the affective appeal of cultural difference” has lead it to instead provide support for traditional leadership including powerful chiefs (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2005, p. 301).
However, White argues that ethnic identities developed over the 19th and 20th century in opposition to colonialism and Apartheid are being transformed due to the impacts of neoliberalism. Thus, while the Zulu identity was deeply rooted in resistance to the state during the Apartheid and colonial period, it was transformed into a political tool by the ANC under Zuma as a way of bridging or mediating the relationship between ANC supporters and the state (White, 2012, p. 399). This is particularly relevant in the context of growing social exclusion amidst “mass unemployment and personal insecurity” (White, 2012, p. 399). Thus, in contrast to the Comaroffs (2005), who see entanglements of ethnic identity as legacies of the past, White suggests instead that it is instead situated in the radical present. As such, rather than seeing the ANC’s relationship with citizens as mediated through traditional leaders, White argues that in the neoliberal South Africa “the whole regime of indirect ethnic rule…[has] to be pushed aside” (White, 2012, p. 410-411). This is useful from a Gramscian lens as it illustrates the success of the ANC in forging a national consensus built on, not in spite of, the legacies of ethnic fragmentation and neoliberalism, despite the deep contradictions this entails.

By drawing upon Gramscian thought, authors such as Hart (2008), Ferguson (2009) and Marais (1998, 2011) have developed nuanced understandings of neoliberalism in South Africa which see the ‘logic’ of capital as intrinsically linked to, but much more intractable than, the class-based project of neoliberalism. As such, rather than viewing the ANC neoliberal project as monolithic, these authors view it as “tentative and unsteady… highly improvised and in constant need of adaptation and repair” (Marais, 2011, p. 390). Further, by drawing on Gramscian understandings of common sense authors such as Marais can differentiate between neoliberalism as a project to cobble together a “tentative and prickly ‘unity of classes’” and as “an arrangement of principles, values, avowals and activities”, providing critical force to their understandings of the post-apartheid dissensus (Marais, 2011, p. 390-391). However, though these authors employ understandings rooted in Marxist modes of thought, often drawing upon uneven development, they frequently present conflicting arguments and understandings of neoliberalism and hegemony. Further, although Bond (2006; 2007b) implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, employs understandings consistent with World Systems Theory, the lack of a comprehensive overarching framework rooted in World-Systems Theory undermines attempts to build a critique which is simultaneously national and international, specific and overarching.

Thus, the legacy of Marxism in South Africa creates both opportunities and complexities with respect to studying the hegemony of the ANC and neoliberalism. As a result of the historical
context of South Africa, Marxist modes of thought, especially those drawing on Gramsci remain highly prescient. However, as a result of this legacy there exists a multitude of Marxisms which are crucially important but often conflicting, inchoate or irreconcilable. As such, adopting a Gramscian perspective which acknowledges the historical, theoretical and cultural context of these approaches as embedded within hegemonic modes of struggle is essential in critically engaging with and evaluating these texts. Further, by building on the concept of uneven and combined development and employing a Gramscian reading of World Systems Theory, this thesis attempts to bridge the differences between approaches rooted in uneven development (Bond, 2007b) and those rooted in Gramsci (Marais, 2011).

3. Theoretical Framework

[Each man] carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, he is a ‘philosopher’, an artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular conception of the world… and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or... to bring into being new modes of thought. (Gramsci, 1971, p. 9)

3.1 Marx, Gramsci and Arrighi

This dissertation employs a theoretical framework informed by the writings of Antonio Gramsci and Giovanni Arrighi’s understandings of World-Systems Theory. These approaches to political economy are deeply rooted in Marxian modes of analysis, adopting a historical materialist position which focuses on the “decisive nucleus of economic activity” (Gramsci cited in Morton, 2007, p. 129). This focus on “class relationships, monetary systems, and [the] international division of labour” (Morton, 2007, p. 202) is supported by Gramsci’s adoption of a Marxist dialectic characterised by “fluidity, flux and flow” (Narsiah, 2002, p. 4). Further, Gramsci is indebted to the Marxist concept of ‘uneven development’ for his critique of the international division of labour. World Systems Theory is built upon Gramscian understandings of ‘uneven development’ and hegemony, broadening the latter to encompass the international dimension. This chapter delineates the key theoretical concepts of Gramsci and World System Theory that inform the political economy of this study of post-Apartheid South Africa.

World Systems Theory as understood by Arrighi (1994, 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2007) interacts with Gramscian thought in numerous ways, drawing heavily upon the Gramscian notions of
‘uneven development’ and hegemony. The concept of ‘uneven development’ can be traced to Marx’s understanding of unevenness is a fundamental part of capitalism stating, “the same relations in which wealth is produced, poverty is produced also” (Marx, 2008, p. 134). Further, Marx noted that the development of the forces of production drove capitalist states to expand and draw new lands into the capitalist mode of production through colonisation (Marx, 1976, p. 931-940). This allowed capital to “play one local or regional or national class configuration off against others” further amplifying unevenness (Bond & Desai. 2006, p. 4).

Drawing on Marx’s ideas, Gramsci advanced the concept of uneven development to describe the way in which various regions of the world are inducted into capitalism. According to this theory, the development of capitalism resulted in the systematic creation of regions with uneven levels of economic development (Morton, 2007, p. 70). By the early 20th century, this uneven development led to the domination and underdevelopment of states and regions at the periphery of the capitalist world, by developed Western states such as Britain, France, Germany and the United States (Morton, 2007). Within this system, Gramsci argued that colonial populations in peripheral regions were the “the foundation on which the whole edifice of capitalist exploitation is erected” (Gramsci in Morton, 2007, p. 70). Further, Gramsci argued that systematic underdevelopment of peripheral regions would remain as the world market became increasingly “mindful of politics than of economics”, attaching increasingly greater value to the goods of industrialised nations (Gramsci in Murphy, 1998, p. 422).

The theory of uneven development is also accompanied by the notion of ‘combined development,” forming the theory of combined and uneven development. The theory of combined development emerged from the realisation that varied regions of the global economy, each at their own different developmental stages, were forced by market forces to interact with one-another. This cross-pollination led to the emergence of new ‘combined’ social formations in the developing world that adopted capitalist dynamics, albeit in a fragmentary and frequently unstable way (Davidson, 2006, p. 23). World Systems theorists built upon these ideas to develop a theory of the international hierarchy of states under capitalism. This hierarchy consisted of: the advanced, dominant core; the systematically underdeveloped and dependent periphery; and the industrialising semi-periphery. According to this school of thought, the dynamism of economies in core regions is the result of its dominant position within a global capitalist system which systematically marginalises, politically and economically, the dependent periphery, with the assistance of semi-peripheral countries (Arrighi & Silver, 1999; Isaak, 1991, p. 23).
The economic dependence of peripheral regions is reproduced systemically through the imbalances and structures of global and regional economies. In the first instance, peripheral regions are co-opted into the capitalist world economy as providers of “labour, raw materials, investment opportunities and markets” for the industrialised core (Akaha and Stiles, 1991, p. 2). As a result, whilst power blocs in core countries are “based on an alliance between manufacturing and commercial interests”, peripheral power blocs are characterised by complimentary economic interests (Chase-Dunn & Rubinson, 1991, p. 38). As such, peripheral power blocs tend to be export-oriented, “based on an economic elite whose predominant interests have been tied to the needs of core capital”, and subsequently tend to produce weaker states (Chase-Dunn & Rubinson, 1991, p. 38). As a result, the dependent economic elites that rise to power in peripheral and semi-peripheral states are largely beholden to the interests of core capital, facilitating the exploitation of their nation by core states for their mutual benefit (Hahn, 2008, p. 148).

The difference in traded commodities between the periphery and core also perpetuates the dependence of the former on the latter by limiting the forms of production, and the value of produced goods. The world-system is characterised by asymmetrical trade systems wherein demand for industrialised goods produced in the core is much greater than demand for the agricultural and mineral commodities of the periphery (Chase-Dunn & Rubinson, 1991, p. 43). These unequal terms of trade are systematically structured against developing countries, resulting in the transfer economic surplus from the periphery to the core through relatively “noncoercive market transactions”, though “political coercion is still essential to maintaining the conditions for unequal exchange” (Chase-Dunn & Rubinson, 1991, p. 43). This system was reinforced as the value of primary products declined relative to the value of the manufactured products, which was worsened by productivity increases in industrialised economies putting “continual upward pressure on wages and other input costs, keeping prices constant or pushing them up” (Isaak, 1991, p. 88). In contrast, productivity increases in developing economies translate into declining prices as savings are passed on to consumers and large multinational corporations located in developed core regions (Isaak, 1991, p. 89).

3.2. Hegemony

Alongside the theory of uneven and combined development, the Gramscian notion of hegemony is a crucial component of World Systems Theory, and deeply informs this thesis. Hegemony in Gramsci refers to a position of supremacy within a social system through which the leading group can pursue its interests without “force predominating excessively over
consent” (Gramsci cited in Morton, 2007, p. 95). As such it involves the “consent – spontaneous and cultivated – given by large parts of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental class” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12). Though Gramsci’s critique of hegemony is largely focused on the articulation and contestation of class projects at a national level, it also acknowledges the international dimension (Francese, 2009, p. 155). As such, it recognizes the complex interplay between hegemonic projects at a national and international level, and the “international conditions and effects” which “contribute to defining the possible” (Francese, 2009, p. 155). As such, the way in which hegemony is translated and/or contested at a local, national, and regional level is an important aspect of the transnational ‘logic’ of hegemony. Further, according to Gramsci international relations follow fundamental social relations, meaning that “the more the economic life of a nation is beholden to international relations”, through political dependence or alliances of power, the more a party will “come to represent this situation and to exploit it” for political gains (Gramsci, 1971, p. 176).

Building upon the international dimensions of hegemony, World System theorists such as Arrighi (2005a) extend the Gramscian theory of coercion and consent to the regional and global level. Though Gramsci was primarily interested in studying social relations within the nation-state, World Systems Theory examines the reproduction of systems of power and domination between states. Drawing on Gramsci, Arrighi (2005a) argues that hegemony is:

The additional power that accrues to a dominant group by virtue of its capacity to lead society in a direction that not only serves the dominant group’s interests but is also perceived by subordinate groups as serving a more general interest… If subordinate groups have confidence in their rulers, systems of domination can be run without resort to coercion. (Arrighi, 2005a, p. 32)

As such, hegemony can be understood as the power inflation that accrues to a group as a result of its capacity to subjugate and lead groups in a direction which benefits the hegemon (Jones, 2006). This is crucial in the maintenance of systems of domination at a national and international level, as the hegemonic country or countries in the international system impact upon the development of hegemony within nation-states.

For Gramsci, hegemony also designates the historical phase wherein the leading class can rely on the “spontaneous” and actively given consent of the masses without resort to coercion and repression. To achieve this kind of ‘expansive’ hegemony, the leading group must move
beyond a position of “corporate existence and defence of its economic position” to one of leadership in the “political and social arena” (Gramsci, 1971, xiv). As such, the aspirant hegemonic group must make sacrifices of an “economic-corporate” kind “by appealing to general interests to ensure the expansion of their activity” (Morton, 2007, p. 94). Thus, the aspirant leading group presents itself as the champion of the general interests of subaltern classes to gain support for its own hegemonic project. By adopting the interests of subaltern classes, the hegemonic group is able to assert authority over “a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims… on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world” (Mercer in Jones, 2006, p. 53).

Aspirant hegemonic groups also seek to establish themselves as hegemonic within both political and civil society at a national level (what Gramsci termed the ‘integral state’). For Gramsci, political society includes the government, the judiciary and the military, whilst civil society encompassed all other aspects of society through which hegemony functions ranging from political parties to the media and education (Bieler & Morton, 2004, p. 91-92). In order to establish hegemony throughout the integral state, the leading group must gain exclusive control over the coercive apparatus of political society and exert influence over the production of knowledge throughout civil society. Once hegemony has been established throughout the integral state, the leading group is said to have achieved expansive hegemony, resulting in the emergence of a “historic bloc” (Morton, 2007, p. 96-97). The ‘historic bloc’ encompasses the economy, culture and politics of a nation-state, intertwining the economic base with the ideological superstructure (Gramsci, 1971, p. 336). In contrast to the parochial interests of groupings in the ‘economic corporate’ phase of maturity and the limited class solidarity characteristic of the ‘class corporate’ phase, the ‘historic bloc’ is characterised by “the integration of a variety of different class interests and forms of identity within a ‘national–popular’ alliance” (Morton, 2007, p. 97). However, though hegemony is a precondition for the establishment of a historic bloc, the relationship between the two is “constantly constructed and contested” as transformations in the alliance of social class forces change the composition and structure of the historic bloc (Morton, 2007, p. 97). This is complicated by the complex social configuration of the historic bloc, in which the leading elements “may be only one fraction of the dominant economic class” supported by a range of subaltern and dominated classes “won over by specific concessions and compromises” (Hall cited in Marais, 2011, p. 393-394).

Despite the profound influence of a hegemonic group within a historic bloc, the hegemony of the former, much like the structures of the latter, are under constant transformation.
Hegemonic ideology articulates different subjects, identities, projects and aspirations into a semi-stable configuration; however, elements do not fit together ‘seamlessly’ and invariably tensions and contradictions emerge (Marais, 2011, p. 395). As such, the hegemonic project must maintain an elasticity which allows the ruling and subaltern classes to align themselves to, and benefit from, the project (Marais, 2011, 391). This project must also be capable of neutralising the capacity of an alternative hegemonic project to emerge and therefore operates in the ‘national-popular dimension’ accounting for ‘popular values, demands and struggles of people’ (Marais, 2011, 391-392). As such, hegemonic structures are in a continual process of transformation, as the integral state co-opts and contains counter-hegemonic struggles in an effort to ensure the continuation of the dominant classes (Bieler & Morton, 2004).

The integral state plays a key role in the dissemination and transformation of hegemonic structures and the co-option of counter-hegemonic projects (Hobsbawm, 2011, p. 324). In Gramscian thought the integral state is an equilibrium between political and civil society wherein the hegemony of a social grouping is exercised over the whole of society, through institutions such as “the Church, the trade unions, the schools, etc.” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 56). Further, Gramsci saw the state as crucial in establishing and re-establishing stable class alliances which promote the interests of the dominant group whilst “stopping short of narrowly corporate economic interests” (Marais, 2011, p. 392). The state’s role as mediator between dominant and subaltern groups is essential in disorganising the alliances of subaltern groups and shifting the balance in favour of the former. In addition, the state is also crucial in the development of a population to “which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes” (Gramsci, p. 258 cited in Marais, 2011, p. 393). Thus, through the rule of law the state inculcates a homogenous sense of morality and custom, and creates a social conformism which is useful to the leading group’s developmental needs (Gramsci, 1971, p. 195). As such, the state is the “point of condensation” from which consent is manufactured, and hegemony is justified and exercised over society through the translation of societal relations and practices into systems of rules (Marais, 2011, p. 393).

However, although both Arrighi and Gramsci acknowledge the role of the state in the reproduction of hegemony, their approaches are somewhat contradictory. Whereas Arrighi and Gramsci similarly extend the analysis of hegemony to the international level, the former views the state as the locus of the hegemonic project, whilst the latter locates this in the transnational ruling class constituting the ‘historic bloc’ (Morton, 2007, p. 96-97). This aspect of World Systems Theory has been extensively critiqued by Bieler and Morton (2018), who
argue that “the spatial analysis of ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ geographies is highly state-centric” and overly emphasises the role of “geopolitical rivalry” in the emergence of capitalism (2018, p. 84, 93). As a consequence, Bieler and Morton argue that in contrast to Gramsci, World Systems Theory fails to “grasp the spatio-temporal dynamics and causal effects of state and class agents” (2018, p. 84, 93). However, Gramsci’s analysis of hegemony is also rooted in a conception of capitalism as a “world-historical phenomenon, within which states and groups of states with different levels of development were inserted” (Morton, 2007, p. 202). These varying levels of development created vastly “different political requirements and demands of these types of production”, with strong states coalescing around the industrial-commercial block, and weaker ones around export-oriented blocks (Chase-Dunn & Rubinson, 1991, p. 40). As a result, whilst a transnational ruling class has emerged as a distinct entity from developed countries, power blocs in less developed, peripheral countries are fragmented and national. In contrast to the transnational “historic bloc”, power blocs in peripheral countries are “based on an economic elite whose predominant interests have been tied to the needs of core capital” (Chase-Dunn & Rubinson, 1991, p. 40). As such, whilst Gramsci and Arrighi apply the concept of hegemony differently they are not mutually exclusive, and a combination of both these approaches is necessary for critiquing hegemony, especially in semi-peripheral countries such as South Africa which are marked by a degree of hybridity.

In addition, applying Gramscian concepts such as hegemony in postcolonial contexts has been problematicised by black studies scholars such as Wilderson (2003) and Willoughby-Herard (2013, 2014). Drawing on Fanon, these authors argue that capital was “kick-started by the rape of the African continent”, and as such “slavery is closer to capital’s primal desire than is exploitation” (Wilderson, 2003, p. 22). Consequently, the relation between black subjects and the colonial capitalist state is one of terror (the policeman and soldier”) not hegemony (Wilderson, 2003, p. 20). Further, given that “slavery has an afterlife of enduring gratuitous violence at its heart” which dictates the practices and policies of the modern state, “blackness… cannot establish itself, or be established, through hegemonic interventions” in post-colonial states (Willoughby-Herard, 2014, p. 506; Wilderson, 2003, p. 18). In addition, Willoughby-Herard argues that the relationship between black subjects and the post-Apartheid state in South Africa echoes that of its predecessor, with global capitalism adding another dimension to this expropriation through the “the privatization of public services and the criminalization of protest” (Willoughby-Herard, 2013, p.82). However, this argument revolves around a very strict definition of hegemony as consent as “opposed to coercion and domination”, which does not reflect Gramscian understandings of hegemony as “the
dialectical integration of... consent with coercion, united in their distinction” (Hart, 2014, p. 143-144). Thus, hegemonic projects can exist, though unstable and faltering, in societies marked by domination and antiblack violence, given the establishment of an orthodoxy that is both “historically true” and “concretely ‘universal’” (Gramsci cited in Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 18).

In contrast to black studies scholars, Gramscians such as Comaroff and Comaroff (1991) argue that hegemony is capable of existing in both a colonial and post-colonial (or post-Apartheid) context. Drawing on Gramsci, these authors argue that “subaltern groups are always subject to the activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up” (Gramsci cited in Morton, 2007, p. 174). As such, the Comaroffs argue that hegemony is “more a spiraling, many-layered conversation” between oppressed peoples and oppressors, than a process of domination (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997, p. xvi). Thus, the reactions of subaltern classes subjected to subordination and dehumanization consist of both “diverse expressions of symbolic and practical resistance” and “tacit (even uncomprehending) accommodation to the hegemonic order” thereby “re-producing, the hidden signs and structures of domination” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 26). As such, whilst the black campaigns of defiance “repeatedly contested the everyday vehicles... that naturalized racial inequality”, they were accompanied by the appropriation of the “the images, ideologies, and aesthetics of the post-enlightenment West” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 28, 32). As such, the Apartheid period can be characterised by an unstable and racially exclusive political project, underpinned by a hegemonic order which “authoritatively inscribed [the European worldview] on the African landscape” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 23). In the post-apartheid context, this resulted in the adoption of orthodox styles of political discourse and protest by political elites as part of a new hegemonic project built around radical racial inclusiveness.

The concept of hegemony is connected with the Gramscian notion of ‘common sense’, as the strength of a hegemonic project is tightly bound together with its capacity to foster consent and build consensus. The exercise of hegemony through the modern state requires the articulation and reorientation of common sense “at the national and global levels through powerful international institutions and material capabilities” (Dufour, 2008, p. 245).

However, from a Gramscian perspective common sense is neither universal nor static but rather the “most widespread conception of life and morality” of a fundamental social class (Gramsci cited in Francese, 2009, p. 124). Further, common sense is constantly changing as it incorporates the “fragmentary, incoherent sedimentation [left behind by the] specific cultural environments” of previous historical discourses (Augelli and Murphy, 1988, p. 19-20).
However, whereas the common sense of the hegemonic group is somewhat “conscious, disciplined”, that of subaltern classes is characterised by “fragmentation, disaggregation, incoherence” and disjointed modes of understanding (Francese, 2009, p. 85). Further, Crehan argues that “the cultural worlds of subalterns are anything but systematic. … [rather] an incoherent jumble that had piled up over time in a piecemeal fashion” (2002, p. 66). Within this jumble of ideas, hegemonic discourse is disseminated through the “habitualisation and internalisation of social practices – organising and dividing subjectivities” (Morton, 2001, p. 171). As such, common sense can be seen as a synthesis of “all the prior social relationships that have bound people together”, permeated by the current hegemonic ideology, but not dominated by it in any systematic way (Augelli and Murphy, 1988, p. 19-20).

In addition, the components of hegemonic ideology are not created anew but are informed by past ideas, social practices and the specific regional and national context in which they emerge. Though the hegemony of one social bloc may be displaced by the emergence of an alternative hegemonic project, the ideas of the current bloc are informed by those which preceded it, as Gramsci notes “every historical phase leaves traces of itself in succeeding phases” (cited in Morton, 2007, p. 32). Further, Gramsci recognises the impact of the international dimension on the development of national hegemony, noting that international developments can “transmit their ideological currents to the periphery – currents born of the productive development of the more advanced countries” (cited in Morton, 2007, p. 69). This has been further explored by Peet (2002) who argues that hegemonic ideology formed in the industrialised West is being transmitted to the periphery through international organisations and the ‘peripheral intellectual stratum’ (Peet, 2002, 56). Thus, the economic discourse of industrialised core nations is interpolated by semi-peripheral and peripheral nations, legitimising the norms facilitating the former’s domination over the latter, whilst also transferring counter-hegemonic ideology from the periphery to the core (Peet, 2002, p. 56).

Elaborating on this, Peet argues that the “organized, systematized ideas” behind economic discourses are often thought up by academics in universities with links to sections of capital or researchers in think tanks and rephrased into “universalistic value formats” by “business federations, chambers of commerce, and similar elite organisations” (Peet, 2002, p. 58). These ideas then move among “business, academic, and quasi academic institutions and the higher reaches of government bureaucracies” and are propagated by “academic and industrial agents and processed into policies” before ultimately being disseminated by the media (Peet, 2002, p. 58). These academic-institutional-media (AIM) complexes spread this discourse through policy prescriptions, reports, articles, press releases and other documents. Although AIM
complexes are geographically bound they often overlap and interlock, transmitting hegemonic discourse from the core to the periphery whilst modifying and translating it to relate to regional experience (Peet, 2002, p. 60). These interlinked complexes form regional centres of influence that “produce, project, and protect a linked series of discourses that constitute the entire hegemonic ideological formation of a geographic bloc” (Peet, 2002, p. 59).

Intellectuals play a crucial role in delineating, disseminating, and contesting hegemonic discourse in the Gramscian mode of analysis. Although Gramsci saw all individuals as ‘intellectuals’, he recognised that not all men have the social function of ‘intellectuals’; “thus, because it can happen that everyone at some time fries a couple of eggs or sews up a tear in a jacket, we do not necessarily say that everyone is a cook or a tailor” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 9; Gramsci in Crehan, 2002, p.132). As such, intellectuals in Gramscian thought are not simply great thinkers but instead those members of the social stratum which “exercises an organisational function in the wide sense”, and have a “responsibility to produce knowledge and/or to instill that knowledge into others” (Crehan, 2002, p. 131-132). As the functionaries of the “whole fabric of society”, intellectuals play an essential mediating function in class struggles as instruments for hegemony or counter-hegemony (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12). Further, as representatives of specific social classes formations, intellectuals play a crucial role in transforming the fragmentary and disorganised understandings of fundamental social classes into “a coherent and reasoned account of the world as it appears from that position” (Crehan, 2002, p. 129-130).

Gramsci also makes a crucial distinction between intellectuals as a “traditional category” and intellectuals as “an organic category of every fundamental social group” (Gramsci cited in Hoare & Smith, 2014, p. 15). Whereas organic intellectuals are the “thinking and organisational” component of a fundamental social class, traditional intellectuals represent a historical continuity “uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and social form” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 6-7). Thus, traditional intellectuals conceal an attachment to “various historical class formations” leading them to support existing socio-economic and political forms (Gramsci, 1971, p. 6-7). Gramsci saw the traditional intellectuals as playing the role of the leading group’s deputies “exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 11). Given the importance of traditional intellectuals in garnering consent and legitimating coercive power, the “struggle to assimilate and conquer ideologically” these intellectuals are an essential prerequisite for any aspirational hegemonic group (Gramsci, 1971, p. 10). The assimilation of these intellectuals is made more efficacious by the successful advancement of the ideas and
aspirations of the aspirational group’s class through the development of their own organic intellectuals.

Organic intellectuals are defined by their role in contesting and/or forming the structures of the historic bloc and often include members beyond the traditional intelligentsia (Morton, 2007, p. 90-91). Unlike traditional intellectuals, these ‘new’ intellectuals could have any job characteristic of their class so long as it is compatible with a class leadership position, from union representative to school teacher (Hoare and Smith, 2014; Crehan, 2002). In fact, Gramsci saw technical education “closely bound to industrial labour even at the most primitive and unqualified level” as the essential foundation of the new intellectual (Gramsci, 1971, p. 9-10). Further, Gramsci emphasised the importance of participation in practical life in forming intellectuals who are a combination of “constructor, organiser, ‘permanent persuader’” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 9-10).

For Gramsci the inability of subaltern classes to organise is the most fundamental obstacle to overthrowing their subordination, and can only be overcome through the organisational capabilities of organic intellectuals. In contrast to the historical unity of the ruling classes, subaltern tendencies to unification even at the provisional level are “continually interrupted by the activity of ruling groups” through subversion, coercion and co-option (Gramsci, 1971, p. 54-55). Gramsci saw organic intellectuals as crucial to overcoming the passivity of the masses by helping them not only achieve class consciousness, but also make their conception of the world hegemonic (Crehan, 2002, p. 132). Thus, ‘organic’ intellectuals perform the crucial function of organising subaltern classes by transcending common sense understandings and forming a coherent counter-hegemonic ideology. Further, though there may be disagreements within subaltern social classes, the theory produced by these intellectuals could not be in opposition to the feelings of the fundamental social class they represent as there is only a “quantitative difference of degree, not one of quality” (Crehan, 2002, p. 130).

Within counter-hegemonic movements Gramsci argues that there are essentially two overarching strategy positions available in opposing the hegemonic group: 1) those based on a ‘war of manoeuvre’, and 2) those located within a ‘war of position’. The former refers to a targeted campaign against institutions of state power and powerful individuals and groups of which capture would be brief. Meanwhile, the latter refers to the ideological and cultural struggle to upturn the “powerful system of fortresses and earthworks” of civil society and thereby establish a degree of hegemony prior to becoming politically dominant (Gramsci cited
in Morton, 2007, p. 190). Indeed, though the state is the point of condensation from which the hegemonic group maintains its ascendancy, capture of the state itself without first winning over the institutions of civil society creates conditions for dominance rather than hegemony. As such, the war of position entails a concerted effort by subaltern groups to undermine the authority of the hegemonic group by capturing the institutions of civil society, thereby transforming themselves into a potential ruling class before, during and after the “rise to power” (Morton, 2007, p. 190). A successful war of position is essential in fundamentally transforming the aspirant hegemonic group and ushering in the creation of a new social bloc as the leading group (Jones, 2006, p. 45). Though Gramsci advocated the latter strategy\(^1\) he is also keenly aware of its limitations in conditions of ‘passive revolution’ wherein a country has modernised the state through “a series of reforms or national wars without undergoing a political revolution of a radical Jacobin-type” (Gramsci cited in Morton, 2007, p. 67). Under such conditions a limited or fractured hegemony operates “based on an unstable equilibrium of compromises between social classes and the greater prevalence of fraud and corruption, if not bare coercion” (Morton, 2007, p. 202).

The concept of ‘passive revolution’ is highly relevant to the South African context, and indeed, is crucial to understanding the ANC hegemonic project. In contrast to a fully realised hegemonic project, ‘passive revolution’ refers to an attempt by the leading group to refurbish its waning hegemony by leading a struggle of renewal in which the state “replaces the local social groups” (Bieler & Morton, 2018, p. 101-102). As a result, a ‘passive revolution’ constitutes a “blocked dialectic” wherein the socio-political requirements of transforming the hegemonic bloc are “at once partially fulfilled and displaced” (Bieler & Morton, 2018, p. 101). As such, ‘passive revolution’ refers to a “revolution without mass participation” involving “elite-engineered social and political reform that draws on foreign capital and associated ideas” (Bieler & Morton, 2018, p. 102). However, this conservative project must also consider popular demands and crucially involves making limited concessions to subordinate classes, though these are restricted so that “changes in the world of production are accommodated within the current social formation” (Sassoon in Bieler & Morton, 2018, p. 102). This concept is highly relevant to the post-colonial (and post-Apartheid) context as Morton intimates “Imitative behaviour within such states… entailed attempts to create a modern state… [through] state-led attempts at developmental catch-up” (Morton, 2007, p.

\(^1\) “A realistic politics must not concern itself solely with immediate success . . . it must also create and safeguard those conditions that are necessary for future activity” (Gramsci cited in Morton, 2007, p. 198).
By applying ‘passive revolution’ to the South African context, it provides a crucial rationale for understanding how the hegemonic project centred on the ANC managed to reconcile the population to an elitist neoliberal project through limited material and ideological concessions.

However, the application of the concept of ‘passive revolution’ to the South African context is hotly contested among Marxist scholars such as Basset (2008), Satgar (2008), Marais (2011), and Hart (2014). Basset argues that the theory of ‘passive revolution’ within the South African context refers to changes “imposed from above designed to maintain the economic and political system”, and therefore characterises the ANC as dominant not hegemonic (2008, p. 185). Drawing on a similar understanding, Satgar (2008) argues that the neoliberal class project centred on the ANC constitutes a ‘non-hegemonic’ form of class rule. However, neither of these analyses pay sufficient attention to the enduring capacity of the ANC to mobilise consent among its constituency. This has led authors such as Marais (2011) to contest the application of ‘passive revolution’ to this context given the significance of “popular energies and organisations” in shaping the “terms of the political settlement and bring[ing] about key new arrangements” (Marais, 2011, p. 399). By contrast, Hart (2014) argues, in line with Morton (2007), that ‘passive revolution’ involves not only a top-down process of class rule but also the “deliberate and structural pacification of subaltern classes”, and as such requires the maintenance of certain social forms, the “overthrow of some older social forms and the institution of new ones” (Hart, 2014, p. 24). This is readily apparent in the South African context, wherein the ANC has managed to forestall more radical change through limited concessions whilst simultaneously preserving many of the structures of the Apartheid economy and accommodating a shift to an increasingly sophisticated highly financialised economy.

Within Gramscian thought political parties also play a pivotal role in disseminating hegemonic and counter-hegemonic struggles. Gramsci saw political parties as performing the same functions in civil society as the state in political society, albeit to a lesser degree, i.e. fusing together traditional intellectuals and the organic intellectuals of the leading group (Gramsci, 1971, p. 15). However, Gramsci also saw political parties as instrumental in winning the long war of position through the development of subaltern class-consciousness beyond the ‘economic-corporative’ phase. The organic development of subaltern classes is “linked to and depends on movements among the intellectuals” and the party, through its organisational and directive functions, and plays a key role in advancing the development of organic intellectuals (Gramsci, 1971, p. 14-15, 16). The role of political parties is particularly
significant given the emphasis Gramsci places on the “counting of votes” as a measure of the “expansive and persuasive capacity” of the ideas and opinions of the leading group (Gramsci, 1971, p. 192-193). For Gramsci, the opinions of individuals are not equally weighted because they are developed and presented by a group of individuals “in the political form of current reality” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 192-193). As such, democratic elections are the process wherein the groups “who devote their best energies to the State and the nation… carry the greatest weight’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 192-193). Thus, elections are not only illustrative of the relative strength of political parties but also that of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourse.

Alongside political parties, subaltern groups produce a variety of political formations to contest hegemonic practices. These formations range from trade unions and community organisations to social movements and are primarily “organise[d] to contest developments within the sphere of production” (Morton, 2007, p. 174). These kinds of formations swell during periods of hegemonic crisis when the leading group has failed in a key political enterprise such as war for which it “requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses”, or because the masses have moved from political passivity to activity “and put forward demands which taken together… add up to a revolution” (Jones, 2006, p. 96-97). This crisis of authority can last for decades, resulting in the exposure of “incurable structural contradictions” which the leading group, aligned with the state, persistently and incessantly struggles to conceal (Gramsci, 1971, p. 178). During this period of crisis, subaltern groups organise themselves into political formations ranging from organic movements to conjunctural phenomena. Organic movements are relatively permanent constructs which emerge organically out of the history of subaltern class struggles and are invariable engaged in a war of position against the historic bloc as a whole (Morton, 2007, p. 175). By contrast, conjunctural phenomena remain engaged in a war of manoeuvre, focusing their efforts on political criticisms of a minor day-to-day nature. As such, they often struggle to move beyond representing the interests of specific subaltern classes, remaining firmly in the ‘economico-corporative’ phase of development (Morton, 2007, p. 175).

3.3. **World Systems Theory and neoliberalism**

Arrighi argues that the capitalist world-system (circa 1492) has been dominated by a succession of hegemons ranging from the Netherlands, to Britain and, more recently, the United States, marking successive phases of capitalist development, (Arrighi, 1994). During these phases, the power relations of this system facilitated the development of dominant countries and fundamentally handicapped others (Harris and Lauderdale, 2002, p. 429). In the
The current world system, the post-war financial structures established in 1944 in Bretton Woods by the allied nations institutionalised American hegemony. This took the form of US-friendly transnational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), along with the gold-dollar exchange standard and fixed exchange rates with the US dollar. America’s privileged position was also underpinned by Western predominance in the United Nations security council and through control of the powerful global economic institutions, such as the World Bank (Silver & Slater, 1999, p. 210). Meanwhile, the US practiced and advocated a specific form of free trade targeted at opening up other states while protecting US “commodities and enterprise” (Arrighi, 2010, p. 72). In addition, the promotion of Keynesian macroeconomic measures backed-up by US power and prestige, “in the form of military governments in the defeated countries and Marshall Plan aid for the Allies”, pushed Third World countries to undertake nation-building programmes along American lines (Silver & Slater, 1999, p. 205).

However, America entered a hegemonic crisis from the late 1960s as failure in the Vietnam War, widespread anti-systemic politics, and growing financial crisis undermined America’s ability to either lead or coerce other states (Arrighi, 2005; Arrighi, 2010). As this crisis worsened, developing states in peripheral regions such as Africa improved their economic and diplomatic power relative to the West creating “simultaneously a crisis of profitability and of legitimacy” (Arrighi, 2002, p. 17). In 1979 the United States responded by introducing neoliberal policies in American and global financial institutions, thereby redirecting capital flows back into America. The consequences of these policies included “a severe contraction in money supply, higher interest rates, lower taxes for the wealthy, and virtually unrestricted freedom of action for capitalist enterprise” (Arrighi, Silver & Brewer, 2003, p. 20). However, whilst this stalled the decline of US hegemony it produced a global recession by increasing interest rates, thus raising the debt-burden on loan-dependant developing states (Arrighi, 2002, p. 33). These policies culminated in a debt crisis among many third world countries, who subsequently took out IMF loans with new neo-liberal conditions which ranged from dismantling industrial protections and replacing public with private enterprises to devaluing local currency (Arrighi, 2002, p. 7). The impacts of these IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were deleterious, resulting in declining economic growth, widespread unplanned urbanisation, increased corruption, escalating social and economic inequality, and loss of domestic industries in African countries (Elhadary & Samat, 2012).
Neoliberal ideology became a key ideological support of the US hegemonic project from the late 1970s onwards with lasting impacts on national struggles over hegemony throughout peripheral and semi-peripheral regions. Gramsci included in hegemony certain “types of economic behaviour” (Peet, 2002, p. 56), noting that the laissez-faire free trade movement was a “deliberate policy, conscious of its own ends, and not the spontaneous, automatic expression of economic facts” (Gramsci cited in Crehan, 2002, p. 104). Further, given that the economic life of subordinate regions is affected by hegemonic ideas originating in the centre, the ideology of neoliberalism can be seen as the discursive expression of the US hegemonic project at an international level. However, although the ideology of neoliberalism has deeply penetrated the periphery, the cultural norms, customs and political traditions which constitute common sense play a key role in determining its politically acceptability. Thus, the degree to which neoliberalism is incorporated within common sense understandings varies depending on numerous variables including “belief in the power of social solidarities and the importance of traditions of collective social responsibility and provision” (Harvey, 2005, p. 116-117). The proliferation of non-governmental and grassroots organisations throughout the periphery, even those Gramsci termed conjunctural, arise out of the failure of neoliberalism to orient common sense understandings of economic realities in the face of growing uncertainty over the faltering US hegemonic project.

The policies pursued by the US treasury, World Bank and IMF were instrumental in re-establishing the conditions for capital accumulation, and consequently restoring American wealth, power and prestige, whilst rolling back Third World power (Arrighi, 2005, p. 20; Hahn, 2008, p. 144). However, Arrighi argues that this revival in US wealth and power resulted from the ‘financialisation’ of capital through a “systemwide shift away from investment in trade and production and toward financial speculation and intermediation” (Silver & Arrighi, 2011, p. 54). As such the 1980s and 1990s are characterised as an American ‘belle époque’, in which the US refurbished its image among developed countries whilst drawing capital speculation back into US industries (Arrighi & Silver, 1999, p. 272; Arrighi, 2005). However, the financialisation of the US economy during this period signalled a mounting crisis in American hegemony, accompanied by a decisive shift in the global economy’s ‘centre of gravity’ from North America to East Asia (Arrighi, 2001, p. 273).

Faced with a mounting crisis of authority, the US embarked on the project for a new American century, through the installation of US friendly regimes in the Middle East in an attempt to coercively enforce American economic hegemony. However, the US failure to overcome local resistance in Iraq - despite the US military’s significant restructuring and
technological improvements since the Vietnam War - was particularly damaging to US military credibility. As a result, the Iraq war “definitively confirmed the earlier verdict of the Vietnam War- that is, that the Western superiority of force has reached its limits and shows strong tendencies towards implosion” (Arrighi, 2007, p. 9; Arrighi, 2005). Further, the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan by the US demonstrated the bankruptcy of US hegemony regionally and internationally, and its inability to impose its interests and values on the world through either coercion or leadership. However, Arrighi maintains that the replacement of one hegemonic project with another requires “a new complex of governmental and business agencies endowed with greater system-level organizational capabilities” (Arrighi, 2001, p. 272). Thus, whilst China has emerged as a viable alternative to US leadership in East Asia and beyond, the prolonged slowdown of the Chinese economy in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis has resulted in a protracted hegemonic crisis with no clear direction forward.

The prolonged crisis of US hegemony is also symptomatic of a broader crisis of capitalism. This crisis resulted from the tendency for the rate of profit to fall according to the law of capital accumulation, as Arrighi notes “successful capital accumulation [tends] to drive incessantly towards the reduction, if not the elimination, of spatial barriers… unwittingly undermining the monopolistic privileges attached to specific locations” (2005, p. 36). As a result, capital accumulated in excess of what can be profitably reinvested “in the production and exchange of commodities within existing territorial systems” (Arrighi, 2005, p. 36). This is reflected in the fall in the average rate of growth of GDP from 3.6% in the 1960s to around 1% by the early 2000s (Harvey, 2005). This “crisis of overaccumulation” was temporarily overcome through the devaluation of capital and the incorporation of new spaces for profitable reinvestment. Drawing on the Marxist concept of primitive accumulation, Harvey refers to this process of devaluation as “accumulation by dispossession”, wherein a set of assets is released at a massively reduced cost which overaccumulated capital can seize and immediately put to profitable use (Arrighi, 2005, p. 44). Unevenness is amplified as the costs and burden of crises of devaluation are visited on the “weakest and most vulnerable territories and populations” whilst resources flow to the regional and global hubs of “greatest power and profitability” (Harvey, 2003, p. 185; Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 5).

From a Gramscian and World Systems approach to political economy, neoliberal ideology with its emphasis on financialisation and privatisation represent the latest innovation in accumulation by dispossession. Neoliberalism as a flexible and responsive economic rationale functions discursively through trade treaties and legislation “policed and facilitated by [powerful] organisations” (Narsiah, 2002, p. 4). In the process, the discourse of
neoliberalism is constantly “re-formulated and regurgitated” to adapt to national and regional characteristics, thereby “(re)colonising places and spaces” (Narsiah, 2002, p. 4). This hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism is mediated by the whole fabric of societies, “throughout the corporations, the media, and the numerous institutions that constitute civil society” (Harvey cited in Francese, 2009, p. 121). The resulting national hegemonic projects which emerge among the periphery are deeply linked to the interests of core capital and constrained by an economic climate punctuated by “massive devaluations… financial liberalization, and IMF-facilitated recovery” (Arrighi, 2005, p. 45).

3.4. **Rationale: Why historical materialism matters**

This thesis adopts a Marxian political economy drawing on Arrighi’s understandings of World Systems Theory and Gramscian modes of thought to critique the hegemony of the ANC and neoliberalism in South Africa. Given the centrality of the historical materialist position to World Systems Theory and Gramscian analyses, both focus on the “decisive nucleus of economic activity” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 161). As such, both Gramscian theory and World Systems Theory understand the world as a global system with a “single division of labour and multiple cultural systems forming an international hierarchy in the ceaseless struggling of states and classes” (Isaak, 1991, p. 23). Further, World Systems Theory and Gramscian thought constitute rich traditions of Marxist analysis with various linkages and shared concepts that can be integrated to form a single expansive political economy. Whilst Gramscian analysis focuses largely on hegemonic struggles within the historic bloc, World Systems Theory extends this analysis onto the international stage, critiquing instead geospatial shifts in capital accumulation and movements globally over a period of hundreds of years. However, there is a significant and growing body of literature engaging with the contradictions of post-Apartheid South Africa rooted in alternative theoretical approaches, notably liberal pluralism and social movement studies. This section engages with the debates surrounding these approaches and Marxian modes of analysis and argues that a historical materialist approach is better suited to this study.

A liberal pluralist approach to understanding hegemonic struggles in South Africa is deeply problematic given the character of South African liberal pluralism. The liberal pluralist approach argues that “cultural differences are a source of critical force” and emphasises the need to recognise and affirm diversity within the political body (Coetzee, 1997, p. 385).
However, a liberal pluralist approach is really only applicable if the public sphere is an “unconstrained space” where a variety of identity struggles can be brought into “comparative relation” without the threat of “assimilation and marginalisation” (Coetzee, 1997, p. 385-386). Unfortunately, the South African state’s adoption of liberal pluralism was aimed at fostering a “‘one-nation-one-people-one culture’ idea of democracy” in the wake of the racialised system of Apartheid (Coetzee, ’1997, p. 386). The focus on creating a singular “monocultural politics” resulted in the pursuit of “difference-blind, assimilationist political programmes aimed at nation building” (Coetzee, ’1997, p. 383). As such, a liberalism pluralist approach to studying South Africa ignores the “assimilationist mode of operation” of the South African state and the way in which “exploitation and domination… is made possible by a social organization geared to the demands of capital accumulation” (Coetzee, 1997, p. 386). Further, as Coetzee notes, South African liberal pluralism “assumes Euro-American value terms and working conditions”, consequently “screen[ing] out the diversity of cultural viewpoints and conflicts” (1997, p. 383). As a result, civic community is conceived as something that is homogenous and monocultural, and thereby cannot accommodate a range of cultural categories, fostering a politics of difference which runs counter to multicultural affirmations.

The fostering of a politics of difference is especially problematic in South Africa, given the discourse of cultural difference which emerged during Apartheid and the effects of neoliberalism. Among postcolonial states the politics of difference emerged from the histories of colonisation and the “legacies of ethnic diversity invented or exacerbated in the cause of imperial governance” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2003, p. 454). Coetzee goes further, noting that “categories of cultural difference which existed within the framework of liberalism aided a discourse of domination during the colonial epoch” (Coetzee, 1997, p. 385-386). However, this politics of difference has been further reinforced by the effects of neoliberal capitalism, which make polities “ever more diverse, ever more prone to a politics of difference that, in the end, is likely to run up against the limits of liberal citizenship” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2003, p. 448). As such, given the role of liberal pluralism in the “assimilationist mode of operation” of the South African state and reinforcing, alongside neoliberalism, the politics of difference, it is ill equipped to the study of hegemony and neoliberalism in South Africa.

Social movement studies are another alternative approach to analysing hegemony in South Africa which could provide useful insights but is also unsuited to this study for a number of reasons. The study of African social movements remains a largely under-researched and under-theorised field of research within African studies, though interest in African social movements and political parties has steadily increased since 1989 (Bratton & Van de Walle,
Studies of African social movements examine their role in challenging the state, their impact on politics and culture and the relationship between the social movements and Western actors, norms and ideas. As such, they have been crucially significant in emphasising the key role of African social movements in fostering solidarity and resisting neoliberal reforms (Ballard, Habib, Valodia & Zuern, 2005; Bond & McInnes, 2007; Sachikonye, 2004; Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012), and challenging the Western conception of social movements as part of a civil society which helps stabilise the state (Ellis & van Kessel, 2009: Larmer, 2010). However, the focus on strictly defined social movements within social movement studies tends to overlook relations between social movements and trade unions and community organisations, which are crucially important in challenging the state and developing a counter-hegemonic project.

In contrast to the latter two approaches, a historical materialist approach offers novel new insights by approaching the state and civil society as deeply inter-related parts of a whole. Whereas liberal pluralist and social movement approaches view elements of civil society (cultural identities and social movements, respectively) as separate from, and indeed often in conflict with the state, Gramsci views political and civil society as elements of dialectical unity (Bieler & Morton, 2018, p. 15-16). This is significant, as it maintains the “the inner connections that are constitutive of social relations”, in contrast with an ‘atomistic’ approach where “the elements may only, again at best, then come to relate as interdependent” (Bieler & Morton, 2018, p. 7). This is consistent with the methodological approach of this thesis which adopts an interpretivist approach “seeing the part in terms of the whole and the whole with reference to each of its parts” (Morehouse, 2012, p. 6). Further, an historical materialist approach cuts to the foundational elements of society by examining the internal relations between production and state-civil society and the “internally related causes and conditions” (Bieler & Morton, 2018, p. 9). This allows for a comprehension of the historical specificity of capitalism in South Africa, thereby “de-reifying capitalism and its various forms of appearance”, such as neoliberalism (Rupert, 2000, p. 2). As such, this approach acknowledges the role played by the structures of capitalism itself in the making and maintenance of the modern state by profoundly limiting “possibilities for communal self-determination” (Rupert, 2000, p. 2). This approach viewing democracy as the “unfulfilled promise of liberal capitalism” is particularly prescient in South Africa, where liberal capitalism has seen the evacuation from the “explicitly political sphere [of] any real capacity for democratic deliberation and communal self-determination” (Rupert, 2000, p. 5).
Modes of Marxian analysis are useful tools for examining the evolution of the state and the development of capitalism in emerging countries such as South Africa. These modes of analysis have crucially informed analysis of capitalist development during the Apartheid regime by numerous authors (Cohen, 1986; Koelble, 2004; Marais, 1998; Murray, 1987; Saul & Gelb, 1986). According to this approach, the development of capitalism in South Africa was characterised by regimes of racial domination through slavery, colonialism, and Apartheid. The resulting system can best be characterised as that of “racialised, gendered” primitive accumulation\(^2\) wherein the economy is fundamentally based on the intense exploitation of (primarily) unskilled black workers (Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 1). The coercive policies of imperialism and, later, Apartheid were crucial in creating the vast reservoirs of unskilled labour necessary for labour-intensive work in plantations, transport infrastructure, diamond and gold mines and associated industries. These ‘native reserves’. were underpinned by a mix of “market and non-market coercion” (Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 1), which rested upon the creation of landlessness and regulation of movement through poll taxes, pass laws and other means of dispossession (Bond, 2010, p. 11-12).

Marxist critiques of South Africa remain highly relevant, providing vital insights into the contradictions and shortcomings of the post-apartheid economy. Numerous South African social commentators (Bond, 2007b; Bond & Mortiar, 2013; Bramble, 2003; Bond, 2003; Narsiah, 2002; Ngwane, 2007; Pillay, 2013) found an approach rooted in Marxist modes of thought useful for examining the adoption of neoliberal policies. For these authors, the post-Apartheid landscape is the product of the interaction between the extreme, racialised form of capitalism which developed during colonialism and Apartheid, and a neoliberal global system. As such, widespread unemployment in South Africa is symptomatic of the failure of the South African economy to soak up the huge, historically entrenched ‘reserve army’ of unskilled labour amid changing modes of production. Meanwhile, the extreme imbalance in investment between “consumer goods production and production of heavy machinery” fundamentally undermines economic growth (Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 5). In the post-apartheid period this

\(^2\) Primitive accumulation includes a wide range of processes such as the “commodification and privatisation of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; conversion of various forms of property rights… into exclusive private property rights; suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neocolonial and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources); monetisation of exchange and taxation (particularly of land); slave trade; and usury, the national debt and ultimately the credit system” (Harvey cited in Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 8). Although this was often interpreted as a one-off phenomenon, Marxists such as Harvey (2003) have suggested that this mode of “accumulation by dispossession” is an ongoing process.
has resulted in periods of local economic crisis typified by “excessive debt and financial speculation, geopolitical machinations and overaccumulation” (Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 5). The overaccumulation of capital alongside the process of financialisation has left the South African economy exposed to price bubbles in commodities such as “petroleum, minerals, cash crops, [and] land” (Bond, 2010, p. 3). Further, these structural weaknesses have also made it more responsive to crises in the capitalist system, particularly between 1917 to 1948 and 1974 to present (Bond, 2010, p. 3).

Within the school of Marxist thought on post-Apartheid South Africa, Gramsci remains particularly relevant to the study of the ANC and neoliberalism. Gramsci’s understandings of hegemonic crisis and transition provide crucial insights into the collapse of Apartheid and the economic trajectory of post-Apartheid South Africa. From a Gramscian perspective, the slow decline of the Apartheid state was the result of a prolonged hegemonic crisis brought on by the loss of the political and social conditions necessary for sustained economic growth (Marais, 1998, p. 84-85). As the fractured hegemony of the Apartheid regime gave way to domination in the 1980s groupings of South African capital, previously aligned to the state, began agitating for a negotiated settlement. These groupings of capital required the radical reorganisation of the hegemonic project to provide for the “continued development of the forces of production” (Bottomore in Marais, 1998, p. 84). In Gramscian terms, the hegemony of the ruling bloc needed to be radically overhauled in order to build a new national consensus. As such the negotiated compromise can be seen as a process in which the dominant group in South Africa sought and succeeded to “shape the terms in which it is incorporated into the state as a new ruling group” (Marais, 1998, p. 86). The compromise that emerged emphasised inclusive principles and the need to address the inequalities of Apartheid, whilst also emphasising fiscal responsibility and the necessity of economic growth. Thus, the former dominant bloc of South African capital and wealthy Afrikaners succeeded in forging a new national consensus in which they still played a leading role.

The framework of Gramscian thought is crucial in determining whether neoliberalism and/or the ANC is hegemonic or dominant in South Africa. The collapse of Apartheid and the emergence of a new national consensus were made possible by the integration of racially excluded subaltern classes into the leading group within South Africa. This emergent hegemonic project centred on the ANC was overwhelmingly influenced by key groupings of capital, specifically “financial capital and conglomerates anchored in the minerals-energy complex” (Marais, 2011, p. 395). As a result, the new consensus was characterised by: 1) active state support for international expansion; 2) fiscally conservative monetary policies;
and 3) policies of economic liberalisation and privatisation. In addition, the ANC took for
granted key neoliberal precepts including the assumptions that economic growth would raise
living standards and that market liberalisation, positive monetary policy and privatisation
were key drivers for economic growth. The hegemonic project centred on the ANC initially
managed to achieve the co-operation of a range of classes and social strata. However, slow
economic growth, widespread poverty and unemployment and deep inequality increasingly
undermined ANC hegemony. Meanwhile the hegemonic project is imposing punishing costs
on the poorest sections of the population, resulting in the exposure of internal conflicts and
contradictions from the dysfunction of state institutions to the failures of public servants. As
such, Marais characterises this project as wavering between the class-corporate and
hegemonic stages, “with a spasmodic capacity to foster consent and social unity among
subaltern classes through state activities” (2011, p. 397).

Gramsci’s understandings of hegemony as functioning throughout both civil and political
society, highlights the complicated role of actors within civil society (including social
movements and unions) in both upholding and/or contesting neoliberalism (Jones, 2006, p.
79). Social movements, unions and organisations exist on a continually transforming terrain
as the state co-opts and contains counter-hegemonic struggles. This problematises
organisation resulting in the creation of short-lived single-issue campaigns such as the Soweto
Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) and apolitical unions such as AMCU. Further, although
unions such as NUMSA (and occasionally COSATU) and movements such as the Abahlali
baseMjondolo Shackdwellers Movement of Durban have maintained to sustain themselves in
opposition to the ANC they are limited in scope and size, with the latter beset by internal
conflict and pressures. In addition, Gramsci’s emphasis on the hegemonic project as
maintaining an elasticity fundamental in mobilising support and co-opting counter-hegemonic
movements highlights the dubious value of the focus of the South African left on
“highlighting the contradictions of the ANC policies and affirmations” (Maris, 2011, p. 395).
Thus, whilst the left is perplexed by the incongruity between the ANC’s frequent and loud
condemnations of poverty, racism and corruption and its actions, the ANC co-opts and
contains anti-hegemonic struggles and embeds neoliberal rationalities through public-works
programmes, granting cash grants and expanding the social wage (Marais, 2011 p. 390).

The Gramscian concept of the organic intellectual is also useful in examining the articulation
and contestation of hegemony in South Africa. The focus on organic intellectuals as
representative of the interests of subaltern social classes draws attention to those progressive
intellectuals contesting neoliberalism in South Africa, ranging from academics such as Patrick
Bond to NUMSA president Irvin Jim and populist leaders such as Julius Malema. How these intellectuals understand the hegemony of the ANC, neoliberalism and contestations of hegemony sheds significant light on how subaltern groups perceive and are perceived by hegemonic and counter-hegemonic class formations. This understanding of organic intellectuals is crucial to this thesis, as an analysis of interviews of these intellectuals supports conclusions about how NUMSA and the ANC are understood by subaltern groups. Further, it also informs understandings of the relationship between the ANC hegemonic project and the ideology of neoliberalism and the significance of counter-hegemonic organisations.

Gramsci’s emphasis on establishing the preconditions for an alternative hegemonic project before seizing control of the state apparatus is also a useful theoretically tool for critiquing counter-hegemonic projects in South Africa (Morton, 2007, p. 190). The failure to move beyond conjunctural politics is evident in the behaviour of COSATU who, despite a stated interest in “looking at alternatives…[which] accurately reflect the interests of the working class” became increasingly co-opted by the ANC before and after 1994 (Naidoo cited by Saul in Cobbet & Cohen, 1988, p. 222). Similarly, political movements such as COPE and the EFF - with its focus on Zuma, corruption in the ANC and organisation around one individual - remain conjunctural phenomena concerned with issues of a minor day-to-day nature. By contrast, the departure of NUMSA from this group and its sustained efforts to engage in a meaningful discussion of the possibilities for Marxism in South Africa, develop an alternative to COSATU and enlist workers from various sectors suggests that it is consciously engaged in a ‘war of position’. Further, among the many groups and organisations opposed to the ANC and neoliberalism, NUMSA is uniquely introspective, building inroads into communities and civil society before building a political support base. This appreciation of Gramsci also provides valuable insights into the interminable decline of the South African Communist Party, whose commitment to Colonialism of a Special Type (CST) with its emphasis on “democracy first, socialism later”, left it ideologically and politically unprepared for the post-transition climate (Southall, 2008, p. 105).

Gramsci’s acknowledgment of the importance of factoring the ‘national-popular dimension’ into hegemonic projects is also highly significant in understanding contemporary South Africa (Marais, 2011, 391-392). The revolutionary upsurges of the 1970s and 1980s were informed by particular ideologies of protest, many of which have become embedded in national consciousness and the ‘common sense’ understandings of subaltern classes (Ngwane, 2007, p. 192). Consequently, while many traditional intellectuals (economists, academics, and financial specialists) remain staunchly critical of the idea of socialism, and many South
Africans remain dismayed by the behaviour of the SACP, the notion of Marxism remains “alive among the masses, perhaps not properly elaborated and worked out, but still alive” (Ngwane, 2007, p. 192). This reflects the Gramscian assertion that past ideas are rooted in a “dead past that is, at the same time, a long time dying leaving residues which have “moments of renewal” (Gramsci cited in Morton, 2007, p. 31). Meanwhile the building blocks of hegemony in South Africa remain “eclectic, even contradictory” encompassing a disparate range of elements including: profound criticism of the Apartheid system; recognition that the ANC “channels and embodies the values and aspirations of liberation”; consensus that economic growth is in everybody’s best interests; that the pursuit of growth is best facilitated by a relatively free market; the need for a (temporary) welfare system; and that dependency on the state should be avoided (Marais, 2011, p. 395). The reliance of the ANC on these eclectic elements to mobilise consent informs inconsistently elaborated and operationalised economic programmes such as the RDP and GEAR. However, the failure to realise a development strategy that addresses the needs of subaltern classes illustrates the weakness of emergent counter-hegemonic movements and the relative strength of the leading group (Marais, 2011, p. 390).

Gramsci’s concept of the ‘national-popular dimension’ is also useful in framing the continued electoral success of the ANC despite successive corruption scandals, poor economic growth and an abject failure to uphold its mandate of racial equality and job creation (Marais, 2011, 391-392). If elections are indeed illustrative of the “expansive and persuasive capacity” of subaltern and leading groups, as Gramsci notes, the ANC’s continued success in presidential elections demonstrates a profound capacity to mobilise consent (Gramsci, 1971, p. 192-193). This may in part be explained by the ANC’s willingness to employ the discourse of national liberation which has great ‘moral weight’ and is deeply connected to “specific histories, memories, embodied experiences and meanings” developed during the struggle against apartheid’ (Hart, 2008, p. 691). Further, it is also related to the ANC’s employment of re-nationalisation practices, including: appealing to the racially inclusive discourse of the ‘rainbow nation’; tightening immigration policies and practices; and reiterating the promises of the National Democratic Revolution (Hart, 2014, p. 22-23). However, despite the success of the ANC in interpolating “popular values, demands and struggles of people”, voting turnout has dwindled since 1994, largely as a result of the failure of the ANC to make meaningful inroads into socio-economic and racial inequality (Marais, 2011, 391-392). Loud condemnations of poverty and racism by unions and social movements are accompanied by
stopgap measures and ineffectual policies such as Black Economic Empowerment, whilst corruption continues to run rampant.

Gramscian thought also provides important insights into the role played by key non-economic domestic elements of the ANC hegemonic project, including post-1994 social programs. These programs are not only a crucial aspect of the ‘national-popular dimension’ of ANC hegemony by mobilising consent and discouraging opposition, but also embed this hegemony by inculcating ‘common sense’ understandings of neoliberalism. As noted by Barchiesi (2007a), post-1994 social policies saw “social inclusion as... depending on labour market participation” frequently praising “work ethics and wage labour discipline while stigmatising welfare ‘dependency’” (2007a, p. 561). As a result, policy paradigms are far more interested in inducing the type of economic subjectivity desired by neoliberalism, than providing relief to the unemployed: the social benefits of ‘workfare’ schemes are temporally limited and conditional upon the recipient’s success in finding employment (Barchiesi, 2007a, p. 563); and, welfare entitlements “usually have criteria and stigma attached to encourage labour market participation and work discipline” (Barchiesi, 2007b, p. 43). As such, these policies are not simply stop-gap measures constituting a break with neoliberalism, but rather pedagogical tools deployed to support job-seeking behaviours and work ethics consistent with the needs of capital under neoliberalism. This is consistent with neoliberal policy paradigms elsewhere which emphasise the role of “market relations in disciplining individuals” in contrast to the “increasingly residual, ‘enabling and supportive role’ of public provisions (Barchiesi, 2007a, p. 563).

However, the success of post-1994 social policy paradigms in supporting the ANC hegemonic project is also a consequence of its specific historic continuity with the ‘national-popular dimension’ in South Africa. Racially exploitative and oppressive employment conditions during the Apartheid period were the subject of a rhetorics of the “dignity of labour” which served to reproduce “waged work among racially subjugated populations as a constitutively precarious experience” (Barchiesi, 2016, p. 877). This glorification of wage labour was further inculcated in the national consciousness through the key role played by unions in the anti-Apartheid struggle, and the emergence of a political discourse among trade unions which emphasised the wage labourer which intrinsically linked “wage labour, its struggles and solidarity” (Barchiesi, 2007b, p. 40). These elements combined to provide wage labour with “powerful normative meanings” in the post-Apartheid period as the path to “social recognition, empowerment, and rights for the country’s black majority” (Barchiesi, 2007b, p. 40). These meanings have been strengthened by the ANC government’s attempts to displace
grievances rooted in massive poverty and social inequality by “continuously praising wage labour as the cornerstone of social discipline and inclusion” (Barchiesi, 2007a, p. 575). From a Gramscian perspective, the deep resonance of this discourse among the South African populace, and the “substantial continuity” of ANC social policy with the Apartheid regime, has resulted in the displacement of inclusive common sense understandings of citizenship with those of “individual responsibility” and “labour market participation” (Barchiesi, 2007a, p. 561-562). Thus, ANC social policies since 1994 have not simply been attempts to satiate demands for the “universal entitlements contained in the post-apartheid constitution”, but rather to redefine the role of citizen and its relation to the state (Barchiesi, 2007b, p. 46). As such, to become actual citizens, capable of claiming rights, people must first embrace the “ethics of self-sufficiency and productive contribution to society” (Barchiesi, 2007b, p. 46).

Gramscian analysis also provides a crucial foreground for the internal factionalism within the ANC that climaxed in the Mbeki-Zuma struggle. From this perspective the removal of Mbeki and ascendency of Zuma was a response by the ANC to growing unease over perceived increased detachment between the leadership and its electorate. This was signified by the growth of social movements and organisations critical of skyrocketing inequality, the feeble pace of government housing and the government’s responses to the AIDS and TB epidemics. Thus, the ANC acted to pre-empt a situation where they were “no longer recognised by their class […] as its expression” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 210). More importantly, this “reconfiguration of elite dominance” was framed within the discourse of the “national democratic revolution”, granting it a degree of legitimacy because of the historical situation of this discourse in the national liberation struggle (Marais, 2011, p. 405). Similarly, the removal of Zuma as the president and his replacement by Ramaphosa in 2018, occurred within the context of poor election results (outside of KwaZulu Natal) and ongoing accusations of corruption and nepotism which resulted in the ANC’s poor performance in the 2016 municipal elections.

Gramsci also forwards the argument that the development of capitalism fundamentally restructured the state-capital relationship. This restructuring took the form of institutionally separating economics from politics and thereby naturalising the logic of neoliberalism as the “automatic expression of economic facts” (Gramsci cited in Crehan, 2002, p. 104; Teschke and Lacher, 2010). This restructured relationship between the state and capital also took the form of active state support for the conditions of capital accumulation, namely: 1) promoting conditions necessary for economic growth; and 2) promoting the interests of national capital in relation to other states (Chase-Dunn & Rubinson, 1991, p. 29). Thus, although state decisions may disadvantage certain elements of the capitalist class, the state generally
promotes the interests of capital-as-a-class. Further, the needs of the state remain aligned with
those of capital-as-a-class because of the state’s dependency on taxation revenue, the
naturalisation of capitalist ideological discourse, and the institutional fostering of class
consciousness through education, professional networks, and leisure (Callinicos, 2010, p. 22;
Davidson, 2010, p. 84). Yet, in fledgling states such as South Africa, capitalism has not yet
fully restructured the state-capital relationship resulting in shared personnel and significant
interpenetration of state/capital interests. This is evident in the cosy relationship between the
main South African owner of the Lonmin mining company (and ANC deputy president) Cyril
Ramaphosa and the state apparatus, which resulted in the 2012 Marikana massacre (Bond,
2014).

Gramscian thought and World Systems Theory are also useful for understanding the
limitations of hegemonic ideology within and without the historic bloc. According to
Gramsci, hegemony functions through permeating common sense without systematically
dominating it, and further the components of hegemonic ideology are developed in regard to
specific geographic spaces and historical contexts (Augelli and Murphy, 1988, p. 19-20). A
Gramscian reading of Arrighi builds on this by arguing that the dissemination of hegemonic
ideology occurs from core to periphery, facilitated by international organisations and semi-
peripheral states. As such, the development of national hegemonic projects in peripheral and
semi-peripheral regions is subject to the discursive influence of hegemony at a global level.
This approach recognises the regional bias of neoliberal discourse towards the industrialised
West, whilst also acknowledging the need to consider local cultures, traditions and sense-
making in peripheral regions. This provides a useful explanation for the partial, haphazard
way neoliberal prescriptions have been adopted into ANC economic policy. Further, this
approach recognises that counter-hegemonic discourse which emerges from the periphery
articulates resistance to both national and international hegemonic projects, within a specific
cultural and historical context. Consequently, resistance to the ANC hegemonic project in
South Africa is integrally linked to resistance to the discourse of neoliberalism, underpinned
by the development of African-nationalist subaltern consciousness during Apartheid.

Arrighi’s approach provides the foreground to my study, highlighting South Africa’s role as a
semi-peripheral power and regional hegemon that facilitates the exploitation of the African
continent by core countries, such as the US (Arrighi, 2005a; Bond, 2006). In contrast to
Gramscian thought, World Systems theory is focussed on the world-system as a whole and is
therefore little used in studying the hegemony of groupings of capital within the nation state.
However, understandings of global and regional hegemony crucially inform the development
of hegemonic projects within peripheral and semi-peripheral states, as they are necessarily fragmented and national (Chase-Dunn & Rubinson, 1991, p. 40). The relative absence of scholarship on World Systems Theory in South Africa, presents a serious shortcoming in the literature which must be resolved for an indepth understanding the hegemony of the ANC and neoliberalism as a political-cultural project in South Africa.

World Systems Theory provides crucial insights into hegemony through its characterisation of US global hegemony as maintained through US co-operation with regional hegemons such as Japan and South Africa. These lesser hegemons act like sub-imperial powers, mollifying political opposition to the hegemonic order, and opening up markets to financial liberation and capital exploitation. International policies pursued by the South African government since 1994 - such as Mbeki’s New partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) - and their legitimisation of global establishment institutions, have been particularly crucial in supporting American neoliberalism in the region. Whereas the Apartheid state pursued a strategy of regional destabilisation in neighbouring countries, post-Apartheid South African foreign policy is largely directed towards enhancing accumulation through the “Pretoria-Johannesburg state-capitalist nexus” (Bond, 2007b, p. 92). Further, as Bond (2006) notes, Pretoria’s emphasis on developing African economic ties to accumulate capital at the expense of other Southern African countries, actually constitutes a return to the Apartheid-era constellation of Southern African states’ strategy, which was designed to codify regional hegemonic status. Further, a World Systems Theory approach also highlights the structural dependency of surrounding African countries on South Africa, and the latter on the developed world. This structural dependency reinforces South Africa’s role as a regional centre of influence, mediating and disseminating hegemonic ideology. The concept of academic-institutional-media complexes is useful here as a tool for understanding how neoliberalism is interpreted and modified through interlocking nodes of influence (Peet, 2002).

World Systems Theory also highlights the role of neoliberalism, as the economic discourse of the hegemonic power, in undermining challenges to US hegemony. This approach emphasises the function of neoliberalism in fostering dependency and creating crises of devaluation throughout the periphery. The emergence and development of power blocs in peripheral countries with complimentary types of economic interests to those of the core resulted in the emergence of an economic elite tied to the interests of core capital. These elites facilitate the exploitation of their own economy by core countries for their mutual benefit by transferring economic surplus to core countries. This is a useful lens for viewing the ANC hegemonic project in South Africa as a collaboration between state elites and big business, in which
South African elites facilitate the exploitation of their own nation. Further, it provides a rationale for understanding the opening up of the South African economy since 1994 along neoliberal lines and the resulting economic impacts, from the concentration of wealth to increased poverty, inequality and unemployment (Bond, 2007).

3.5. Conclusion

Gramscian thought provides an essential foundation for the way in which societies function through coercion and the manufacture of consent, and highlights the roles of civil society, political society and the state in contesting and disseminating hegemony. Gramsci’s understanding of civil society is a particularly rich concept for understanding the way in which hegemony is negotiated through a “battle of ideas” (Duncan, 2009, p. 4). Gramsci remains so relevant to analyses of the state and dominance, because of the shared similarities between the time of his authorship and the present. This is elaborated by Murphy who notes that “as an Italian faced with the problem of the emancipatory transformation of his own society… [he] developed concepts that ‘fit’ with some of the characteristics of the current age at a more ‘global’ level” (1998, p. 420). By applying key Gramscian concepts, such as uneven development and hegemony, to the study of South Africa this thesis provides a contemporary critique of power, dominance and resistance in the post-Apartheid state. Further, applying the concept of hegemony to the international hierarchy of states also provides insights into the way neoliberal discourse developed in the West is disseminated and internalised throughout the periphery.

The framework of Gramscian thought and Arrighi’s understandings of World Systems Theory informs my analysis of the ANC, NUMSA, and how hegemony and resistance function in South Africa. World Systems theory provides the broader framework for understanding the role of the South African state-capital nexus in facilitating the regional exploitation of the periphery and in legitimising the neoliberal discourse of the US hegemonic project. A Gramscian approach to discourse and ideology deepens this critique by treating neoliberalism as a highly flexibility and malleable discourse disseminated from the centre. Further, this approach understands that discourse is mediated by the fabric of society within South African in a way which fits with subaltern common sense. Gramsci also provides a way to critique of the success of this hegemonic project and ideology in penetrating common sense through the concept of organic intellectuals. The application of the concept to ‘organic intellectuals’ and the study of a select few are instrumental to this thesis in determining the degree to which neoliberalism is hegemonic in South Africa. As such, both Gramsci and World Systems
Theory are essential theoretical foundations for the examination of hegemony, dominance and capitalism in the modern world-system, and are particularly useful in examining post-Apartheid South Africa.
4. Methodology

4.1. Introduction

This dissertation employs a qualitative methodological design to examine the hegemony of, and resistance to, the ANC neoliberal project in South Africa. Through the use of an interpretative methodological approach, social actors and political events are historically and theoretically situated within a specific national and global configuration of power. This configuration of power is understood from an historically-informed Gramscian perspective which emphasises disparities in power and wealth. Further, by adopting an interpretivist approach, this thesis includes detailed textual analyses of mediums ranging from interview transcripts and newspaper articles to electoral data. Following this interpretivist approach, I employ the method of interpretative, or critical, textual analysis associated with critical discourse analysis (CDA) to examine the meaning of texts. This allows for a more thorough interrogation of the roles “that discourse plays in reproducing (or resisting) social inequalities” (Richardson, 2007, p. 6) which is crucial to understanding hegemony in South Africa.

This chapter outlines the qualitative methodological design informing this study, beginning with a brief overview of the interpretative inquiry model and its relationship to the theoretical framework of Gramscian thought and World-Systems Theory. Following this is an outline of CDA, including a discussion of the suitability of CDA textual analysis for this thesis, the importance of historical research methods, and the relationship between CDA and Gramscian theory. Proceeding this is an overview of the data collection methods, their relevance and the way in which information was analysed. Thereafter, the process of interviewing is discussed, including a discussion on the interview as a qualitative research method, the choice of participants, the structure of the interviews, the interview guide, and the analysis of interview data and organisation around central themes. Finally, this is followed by an overview of the limitations to this methodological approach and a brief aside on ethical considerations.

4.2. On Qualitative Methods

This thesis draws on a qualitative methodology rooted in interpretative inquiry. An interpretative methodology can employ qualitative and/or quantitative methods as long as it recognises the interplay between the parts and the whole, and “support[s] an answer to the
research question that shares a common thread” (Morehouse, 2012, p. 17-18). However, interpretative inquiry is, by its nature, inclined to qualitative methods of analysis, as it is concerned with understanding human experience rather than quantifying it, namely ‘how’ not ‘how many’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p. 11; Silverman, 2010, p. 118). Further, it is unclear whether quantitative procedures guarantee immunity from reliability and subjectivity, and in fact, the determination of categories for quantitative research requires qualitative judgments “in the first instance” (Brenner, Brown, & Canter, 1985, p. 3). Qualitative research is itself a rich field of inquiry crosscutting “disciplines, fields and subject matters” and incorporating many methods and approaches (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p. 3). A qualitative approach to the analysis of hegemony and resistance in South Africa was selected for its ability to “get close to the data”, allowing for the development of the “analytic, conceptual and categorical components of explanation from the data itself” (Brenner, Brown, & Canter, 1985, p. 148). Further, the Gramscian examination of hegemony and common sense in South Africa lends itself to modes of analysis that acknowledge and highlight cultural differences in sense-making and attempt to negotiate differences in interpretation.

4.3. The Interpretative Inquiry Approach

This project employs an interpretative inquiry approach rooted in hermeneutic and phenomenological traditions which draws on both historical and theoretical reasoning. In contrast to the positivist paradigm which views the production of knowledge as relatively unproblematic or ‘value-free’, an interpretivist approach is informed by “seeing the part in terms of the whole and the whole with reference to each of its parts in an ongoing interplay that increases understanding” (Morehouse, 2012, p. 6). This is a commonly employed, though under-acknowledged, approach within the social sciences which provides a more detailed examination of the issues with reference to society as a whole and the application of theory. This is well suited to answering this thesis’ research questions which require in-depth research of social issues from various perspectives with reference to South Africa’s historical, political and economic context.

The study of hermeneutics involves the interpretation of a text “within the specific framework of whole–part relationships”, that is, with reference to both the whole and parts of the whole (Morehouse, 2012, p. 1). This interpretation of a text is characterised by a “hermeneutic circle” wherein the meaning of the text as a whole is established through an interpretation of its separate passages which acquire a different meaning in relation to the “anticipated global meaning” of the text (Kvale, 2007, p. 10). Throughout this thesis, the hermeneutic emphasis
on these whole–part relationships is evident in the use of historical reasoning which situates texts within a wider historical and/or cultural context. Given the post-Apartheid era dissensus over the ANC hegemonic project, for example ANC economic policy and the degree to which this is neoliberal, this approach is useful in establishing a viable interpretation of the information. For example, given the wealth of information on the ANC, this thesis argues that the hegemonic project in South Africa is centred on the ANC and is supported by the discourse of neoliberalism. In addition, this dissertation also applies theoretical reasoning based on World Systems Theory and Gramscian understandings to the study of hegemony in South Africa. This supports the thesis’ goal of exploring hegemony, domination and social issues in South Africa whilst also drawing attention to the interconnected relationship between South Africa and the world and between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic groups (Wallerstein, 2004).

Phenomenology is rooted in the relativist understanding of the world as a “social construction by human actors” (Walsham, 1993, p. 5). As such, this tradition sees humans as “born into history… embodied and embedded in a complex world” situated within a living culture, “a practice or activity within a lived world… in medias res” (Morehouse, 2012, p. 23, 2). This approach is often employed, though rarely acknowledged, within politics and international relations by those applying Marxist and/or post-Marxist theories to the developing world. A phenomenological approach is invaluable because it allows for the treatment of social action and human activity as ‘text’ whose meaning can be interpreted in various ways (Berg, 2001, p. 239). This has led authors such as Walsham to argue that hermeneutics is itself a key strand of phenomenology as the “interpretation of texts is an important part of the search for meaning” (1993, p. 9). As such, it resists oversimplification or reductionism by acknowledging the complex relationship between people and culture as a living entity under constant transformation. Similarly, Gramsci argues that societies are “fields of struggle” (Crehan, 2002, p. 146) in which various cultures strive for primacy, whilst the leading group attempts to impose their world view on subaltern class consciousness. The relationship is highly fluid as subaltern groups develop challenges to the leading group which in turn attempts to subvert and/or co-opt in various ways. As a result of these “ever-shifting, highly protean relationships of power” (Crehan, 2002, p. 101), people, societies and cultures are therefore constantly evolving.

This thesis attempts to create a meaningful account of hegemony and resistance in South Africa by linking its research questions to both the methodology of interpretative inquiry and the theoretical framework of Gramscian thought. This is consistent with understandings of
interpretative inquiry which argue that these elements must “work [together] in a reasonably coherent manner… [to] form meaningful and interpretable accounts” (Yanch & Williams quoted in Morehouse, 2012, p. 19). Further, given that the meaning of texts are created through interpretative practices, interpretative modes of analysis are also important in tethering the meaning of texts to historical, social and cultural discourses. This is critical in analysing official documents and the writings of South African authors as these texts are produced within a national context in which neoliberal understandings have penetrated common sense to a significant degree.

4.4. **Critical Discourse Analysis of Texts**

This dissertation employs an interpretative textual analysis of primary and secondary sources, including newspapers, interviews and other secondary sources informed by CDA. Textual analysis is an attempt to “guess at some of the most likely interpretations” of a text to determine how “in particular cultures at particular times, people make sense of the world around them” (McKee, 2003, p. 1). As such, it is particularly well suited to the study of hegemony which is embedded within the norms, social practices and ideology developed within a specific regional and national context. Indeed, reorienting common sense understandings and limiting textual interpretations are essential components of a hegemonic project. This hegemonic project is examined through the textual analysis of documents ranging from journal articles and books to newspapers, government and NGO reports, policy documents, discussion documents and interviews. In addition, textual analysis is concerned as much with how an event is conveyed as to what is being conveyed, with an emphasis on gathering information about sense-making practices over numerically measuring the accuracy of texts. Thus, this method entails the examination of the elements of texts such as interview transcripts and written texts for meaning which are not “fixed or static” but embedded both culturally and historically (Prior, 2004, p. 91). It is precisely this historical and cultural bedrock in employing textual analysis uncovered by the researcher that is crucial in examining hegemony and counter-hegemonic projects. That is, by employing a CDA textual analysis, this thesis aims to ‘make sense’ of many aspects of neoliberalism and ANC hegemony – including ANC economic policy, ongoing tensions in the Tripartite Alliance and NUMSA’s expulsion from COSATU – by situating them within the national cultural bounds of South Africa during the post-Apartheid period.

Textual analysis acknowledges that although words are the “determinants of knowledge”, language is both “complex and inexact” (Brenner, Brown, & Canter, 1985, p. 118, 116). By
recognising that there is no objectively true record of events, this approach emphasises the importance of thoroughly interrogating text for meaning. Gordon describes this as a four-step procedure: 1) “read critically”; 2) “ask probing questions of the data”; 3) “look for meaningful relationships”; and 4) “synthesize, arrive at some sort of solution about the data” (in Brenner, Brown, & Canter, 1985, p. 116). This approach also raises the issue of selectivity, or why we choose to ask some questions or utilise some sources and not others (Fairclough, 2003, p. 14). Given the limited scope of this thesis, the textual reading employed is both historically and culturally situated and focuses around answering the overarching question about whether the ANC is hegemonic in South Africa. The sources selected are therefore those which best support an interrogation of the presupposed dominance of the ANC and neoliberalism in South Africa. Secondary sources which focus on the technical problems of the ANC’s economic policy and/or uncritically accept the internal logic of neoliberalism are de-emphasised in favour of those which present a more nuanced interpretation of events.

Although textual analysis is useful when looking for interpretations of texts, authors such as Fairclough highlight its ability to further enhance analysis when “used in conjunction with other methods of analysis”, noting that “by itself, textual analysis is limited” (2003, p. 218). Thus, although I was able to find sufficient evidence of a neoliberal hegemonic project centred on the ANC after 1994, determining the extent to which it is currently hegemonic required a further analysis of electoral trends over the last 24 years. As such, the initial textual analysis was complemented by historical research methods, including a survey of historiographical discussion and a critical examination and careful interpretation of source documents to ensure authenticity and provenance (Berg, 2001). Historiography entails the close reading of records, accounts and other texts to “systematically recapture the complex nuances, the people, meanings, events, and even ideas of the past that have influence and shaped the present” (Berg, 2001, p. 210-211), that is to situate them in their historical context and thereby exhume the ‘original’ meanings of these texts. This is particularly significant to this study as hegemony is historically entrenched, permeating a common sense that is shaped by the fragmentary sedimentation left behind by specific cultural environments (Augelli & Murphy, 1988). This historical sedimentation is evident in the lasting significance of the symbols and concepts developed during the liberation struggle, such as the National Democratic revolution (NDR), and the success of the ANC in using them to foster consent. The advantage of the historical research method is that it provides historically informed understandings of the relationship among issues which “influenced the past, [and] continue to influence the present” (Berg, 2001, p. 210-211). As such, this approach situates support for,
and popular and organised resistance to, the ANC hegemonic project within the history of South Africa, Africa and within the broader context of anti-hegemonic struggles.

The usefulness of interpretative textual analysis for evaluating information has been established by numerous authors (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; McKee, 2003; Morris, 2015), particularly in relation to determining the validity of information and illuminating alternative interpretations of events (Morris, 2015, p. 9). Further, interpretative textual analysis is not only concerned with what is present but “what could have been but is not present”, assuming that every aspect of a text “is the result of a choice” (Richardson, 2007, p. 38). This approach is useful as it highlights how the construction of texts and the omission or inclusion of information in sources – ranging from newspapers to official government documents and even interviews – interpret, challenge or reinforce the ideas of the hegemonic group. CDA was chosen for this thesis as it is explicitly focused on “social problems, and especially the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination” (van Dijk cited in Richardson, 2007, p. 1). This approach to textual analysis is ideally suited to this thesis which is concerned with determining the extent to which the ANC and the discourse of neoliberalism is hegemonic in South Africa. Further, given the often “extremely subtle ways” dominant groups stifle the emergence of alternative world views (Crehan, 2002, p. 146), this approach was seen as the most effective way to gather and analyse information about South African organic intellectuals, common sense understandings and hegemony.

A CDA approach to textual analysis is a useful method for examining hegemony and discourse given its connectedness to Gramscian understandings of power and domination. This link between Gramsci and CDA is evident in the latter’s focus on “social problems, and especially the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination” (van Dijk, as cited in Richardson, 2007, p. 1). Further, Richardson adopts a Gramscian interpretation of CDA in which he argues that all texts are socio-politically situated, and it is therefore necessary to take a “moral and political position with regard to the social problem analysed” (Richardson, 2007, p. 2). This thesis is primarily concerned with the social problems of inequality, poverty and unemployment from a Gramscian perspective. As such these issues are seen as stemming from the creation and maintenance of a hegemonic project centred on the ANC underwritten by neoliberal economic policies. A CDA approach centred on power relations and social inequalities is therefore a useful tool for analysing the extent to which this project is hegemonic and how neoliberal and ANC dominance is maintained.
CDA inherently lends itself to interpretative modes of examination such as textual analysis as it is concerned with the latent meanings of texts. Thus, whilst quantitative forms of analysis derive meaning from quantifying textual features, CDA is more interested in the interpretations of texts and the wider context in which it is written (Richardson, 2007, p. 21). Thus, CDA focuses on the composition of the text as a whole and with reference to the wider historical context, deriving meaning from what is written alongside textual absences, and emphasising the agency of social action, that is who is doing what to whom (Richardson, 2007, p. 18). As such, the CDA approach employed in this thesis takes a radical Gramscian view of sense-making which treats language as a “medium of power that can be used to sediment inequalities of power and legitimate iniquitous social relations” (Richardson, 2007, p. 13-14). As such, the critical and uncritical use of neoliberal phrases and/or language in South African texts are seen as indicators of the extent to which neoliberalism has penetrated common sense understandings and is thereby considered to be hegemonic.

The CDA approach to language and meaning-making is particularly evident in the discussion of journalism and analysis of South African newspapers in the findings chapter. Similar to Gramsci, CDA theory argues that the “sourcing and construct of the news is intimately linked with the actions and opinions of (usually powerful) social groups” (Richardson, 2007, p. 1). Further, given that journalism can shape agendas, public discourse, beliefs, and even people’s world views, the language employed in newspapers is crucial in shaping common sense understandings through the “naturalisation of inequality and neutralisation of dissent” (Richardson, 2007, p. 5). As such, a CDA approach attempts to expose the ways in which hegemonic discourse is reproduced through language by interrogating this language with reference to the wider situational, historical and cultural context. Further, mainstream journalists have largely internalised commonsensical notions of neoliberalism in South Africa, and in fact play a pivotal role in naturalising the discourse of neoliberalism and marginalising voices of dissent (Richardson, 2007, p. 36). However, hegemony is “always a partial, precarious and fragile state of affairs” characterised by aspirational struggles for dominance by subaltern groups (Richardson, 2007, p. 36). As such, a CDA approach to textual analysis not only looks at the ways in which hegemonic or dominant ideas are reproduced but also how these are challenged through the latent meanings of texts.

4.5 Data Collection Methods

When conducting my preliminary research, I utilised online search databases such as Library OneSearch alongside those oriented towards the social sciences such as Proquest Central,
Academic Onefile, Project Muse, CIAO (Columbia International Affairs Online), JSTOR and Cambridge Journals Online. I also searched for books and journal articles at the ECU library, libraries with reciprocal borrowing rights and the West Australian State Library. My searches utilised specific combinations of keywords, including NUMSA, COSATU, SACP, ANC, South Africa, resistance and social movements, hegemony, neoliberalism, economics and foreign policy. Further, I employed the citation search engine Scopus to identify key authors in the field of South African studies and thereby identify key primary and secondary references. This thesis also draws upon non-academic sources detailing current developments in South Africa such as online organisations and news sites like Pambazuka News, BBC News Africa and AllAfrica which provided informed commentary on events as they unfold.

This thesis draws on a wide range of texts, from journal articles and books to newspapers, electoral reports, government and NGO reports, official ANC communiqués available to the general public, and other texts pertaining to ANC economic theory and policy. Further, this thesis utilises a range of South African newspapers including The Sowetan, the Sunday Times, Business Day, The Times, The Citizen, Cape Times, The Star, Business Report, The Sunday Independent, The New Age, Mail and Guardian, The Atlantic Sun and Independent Thinking. These newspapers were chosen as being broadly representative of the media complex in South Africa and as acknowledging the highly-concentrated ownership structure, with the majority owned by large media conglomerates including the Tiso Blackstar group, Independent Media and Caxton/CTP. However, this selection also includes the relatively independent Mail and Guardian, community papers such as The Atlantic Sun and Independent Thinking, and the staunchly pro-ANC The New Age.

In analysing the above texts I collected data regarding key aspects of neoliberalism, hegemony and resistance in South Africa, and aggregated information to detail key themes. This involved a close reading of primary and secondary documents to establish the historical background of these texts and situate their interpretation within the historical and cultural context of South Africa. The data collected includes that specifically dealing with the dominance of, and resistance to, the ANC and neoliberalism including ANC economic policy, the current economic situation in South Africa, and the causes behind this. ANC reports and communiqués, newspaper articles, and other texts pertaining to ANC economic theory and domestic and foreign policy are treated as important sources of information about the ANC and contain embedded neoliberal logic. Evaluating this required identifying key phrases and concepts which either reiterated or challenged neoliberal rationalities including public–private partnerships, fiscal responsibility, the criminalisation of anti-privatisation groups and the
notion that “there is no alternative to privatisation” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 451). Further, neoliberal rationalities were evident in repeated ANC calls for wage restraint, a growing preoccupation with labour productivity by business commentators, the stigmatisation of social protections as handouts, and the privatisation of personal security and basic commodities such as water and electricity (Hart, 2006, p. 26). By looking for instances of key phrases and concepts which contain embedded neoliberalism rationalities this thesis aims to

4.6. Semi-structured Interviews

Although this thesis employs a CDA approach to textual analysis, semi-structured interviews are also employed to provide additional insights into the subject matter grounded in lived experience. The process of interviewing is discussed, including a discussion on the interview as a qualitative research method, the choice of participants, the structure of the interviews, the analysis of interview data, and its organisation around central themes.

4.6.1. The Interview as a Qualitative Research Method

There is a wealth of literature on the various advantages, disadvantages and limitations of the interview as a form of evidence (Brenner, Brown, & Canter, 1985; Holstein & Gubrium, 2004; Keats, 2000; Kvale, 2007; Merton & Kendall, 1946; Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell, & Alexander, 1995; Morris, 2015). The interview has been described as a “universal mode of systemic inquiry” (Holstein & Gubrium, as cited in Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p. 63), which allows the interviewer to expose the “lived everyday world” of the interviewee (Kvale & Brinkman in Morris, 2015, p. 8). As such, the use of the interview belies the assumption that people talk about their experiences and feelings in everyday life, and that the interview can tap into these veins of experience through harnessing “the daily occurring activity of talk” (Brenner, Brown & Canter, 1985, p. 7). Thus, the interview fits well with Gramscian theoretical understandings of hegemony and common sense as it allows me to access the lived everyday world of South African intellectuals and attempt to understand their experiences of neoliberalism. Further, unlike quantitative research, qualitative interviews are not expected to be random and indeed their use in this thesis is premised on selective recruitment of organic intellectuals (Morris, 2015).

Qualitative interviews are especially useful for acquiring rich personal data and, through allowing the interviewee to talk about what they think is significant, highlight alternative accounts of why an event has occurred which might otherwise have remained unknown.
Indeed, one of the greatest strengths of interviewing is the capacity to “access self-reflexivity among interviewees”… [encouraging the] telling of collective stories” (Miller & Glassner, 2004, p. 130). These collective stories often challenge popular stereotypes by providing lived experiences and can thereby “resist the cultural narratives about groups of people and tell alternative stories” (Richardson in Miller & Glassner, 2004, p. 130). These alternative accounts of events can challenge long-held assumptions and, as Rubin and Rubin recognise, can “help recast ineffective public policies” (in Morris, 2015, p. 6). Further, resisting cultural narratives and telling alternative stories are integral functions of organic intellectuals as champions of specific class positions who “bring into being new modes of thought” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 9). Thus, the interview is well suited to the examination of organic intellectuals to which this thesis is concerned.

4.6.2. Choice of Participants

Prior to travelling to South Africa I underwent training in interview techniques by ECU staff and also conducted several trial interviews of colleagues, friends and family. This was useful in practising my interview technique and identifying both redundant and significant lines of questioning. Further, prior to conducting interviews, potential interviewees were identified and contacted by the researcher, then a snowball sampling method was employed to recruit additional interviewees. These individuals were then contacted in advance, sent an information letter and asked whether they wished to participate. In order to secure participation, the importance of the prospective interviewees’ input to my research was emphasised. This is line with authors such as Richards who argues you should “[f]atter the prospective interviewee by emphasising that his or her input would be beneficial” (cited in Morris, 2015, p. 57).

Whilst in South Africa I conducted 15 semi-structured interviews of South African organic intellectuals including academics, union officials and political commentators. As previously mentioned, organic intellectuals can have any job characteristic of their class compatible with a class leadership position, from union representative to school teacher, but are crucially defined by their role in contesting and/or forming the structures of the ‘historic bloc’ (Hoare and Smith, 2014; Crehan, 2002). Significantly, the ‘historic bloc’ encompasses economy, culture and politics, submerging the economic base with the ideological superstructure (Gramsci, 1971, p. 336). As such, the crucial function of the organic intellectual is not to build a political party or movement and engage in the war of manoeuvre, but rather to engage the historic bloc as a whole though a war of position (Morton, 2007, p. 175). This involves the
challenging the hegemony of the leading group by reorienting or rearticulating common sense understandings, thereby contributing towards a counter-hegemonic ideology (Crehan, 2002, p. 137-138). However, Gramsci also argued that organic intellectuals should ideally be a combination of “constructor, organiser, ‘permanent persuader’” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 9-10). As such, interviewees were initially chosen based on their vocal opposition to the ANC and/or neoliberalism, and their advocacy for alternative political formations. Within this subset, individuals who were or had been involved with unions, social movements and community organisations were specifically sought out. However, this was not an essential prerequisite as by engaging in public debate and forwarding views which undermine ANC hegemony and/or the legitimacy of neoliberalism, these intellectuals became active participants in hegemonic struggle.

In addition, further interviewees were recruited through the snowball sampling method (Morris, 2015). This method involves asking interviewees at the conclusion of the interview if they know anyone else who might be interested in participating. This is consistent with Gramscian theory which argues that between organic intellectuals representing subaltern classes, there is a “quantitative difference of degree, not one of quality” (Crehan, 2002, p. 130). Further, although an over-reliance on this method of recruitment has been criticised for its failure to recruit a diverse sample, the group being studied is relatively homogenous and specialised, and as such is perfect for this mode of recruitment (Morris, 2015, p. 58). This method – and the small sampling size – were selected as appropriate for this thesis given its limited scope and the emphasis placed on individuals contesting the hegemony of the ANC and/or neoliberalism, as organic intellectuals.

Interviews were conducted in an appropriate space such as a coffee shop or office, recorded and transcribed, and a copy was sent to the subjects for approval. An audio recorder was chosen over field notes to get exact wording of responses and situate utterances in relation to other utterances (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p. 355). The interview subjects were asked four questions as well as whether or not they wished to be de-identified (Galletta, 2013; Kvale, 2007). The interviews were conducted in English for clarity of expression and ease of transcription, and were 30-60 minutes in duration. The data gathered from these interviews is used in concert with information gathered from other sources in order to answer the research questions. The purpose of these interviews is threefold: to examine how organic intellectuals understand the ANC and neoliberalism in South Africa; how they understand contestations of the ANC neoliberal project; and, the significance of NUMSA’s recent combative actions towards COSATU, the ANC and the SACP. The information from this analysis will be used
in conjunction with my electoral and textual analysis of newspapers to assess the extent of ANC and/or neooliberal hegemony and resistance to global neoliberalism in South Africa.

4.6.3. The Structure of the Interviews

Although the qualitative interview paradigm encompasses a range of forms (structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews), this thesis adopts the semi-structured approach. The semi-structured interview involves an interviewer questioning and “following up on the responses of the interviewee in an endeavour to extract as much information as possible from a person… who has expertise on the topic’s the interviewer is interested in” (Morris, 2015, p. 3). This approach attempts to reach a compromise between the free flow of the unstructured interview and the interrogative rigidity of the structured interview characterised by the discretionary use of questions and extensive use of follow-up probes. As such, this semi-structured form encourages the telling of alternative stories within a broad topic – to facilitate this I developed the interview guide around a list of topics “without fixed wording or fixed ordering of questions” (Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell and Alexander, 1995, p. 65). Further, relevant questions and follow up probes were generated and developed from “interactions during the interview itself” (Berg, 2001, p. 70) and the interviewee was allowed to ‘ramble’ and digress, although was also guided by the interviewer to answer key topics in the interview guide. In conducting these interviews this thesis also found that information gathering is dependent on interviewer–interviewee relations, supporting Wengraf’s assertion that semi-structured interviews are “high-preparation, high-risk, high-gain, and high-analysis operations” (Seale, 2004, p. 187).

One of the key advantages of the semi-structured interview is that it allows “both parties to explore the meaning of the questions and answers involved” (Brenner, Brown & Canter, 1985, p. 3). Unlike written texts, interviews provide information immediately, which can be clarified, examined and questioned in relation to its context and author. However, this view of interview data as a resource has been increasingly problematised by authors such as Brenner, Brown and Canter (1985, p. 3) who recognise “an implicit, or explicit sharing and/or negotiation of understanding”. From this perspective, interviewing is an interpretative practice in which answers and questions are “socially embedded” (Prior, 2004, p. 87), with interviewees constructing knowledge alongside interviewers. Thus, the interview data may more accurately reflect the social interaction between interviewer and interviewee than the actual reality of the latter (Seale, Gobo, Gubrium & Silverman, 2004). To counter this, this thesis adopts the compromise position charted by Miller & Glassner (2004) who argue that
“information about social worlds is achievable” through interviewing by approaching the material “reflexively” (p. 126-127), that is, by attempting to represent the interviewee’s answers fairly, being consistent with their meanings, and to contextualise their responses within the structures of the interview.

The problematisation of the interview data as a resource school of thought has also raised issues relating to reliability, bias and interviewer neutrality. As the interviewee is a co-researcher on the topic of research, it is important to “let the interviewee in” on what the interviewer wants to understand (Morehouse, 2012, p. 80). However, bias must also be avoided – information provided must be as impartial as possible and questions should be non-directive, that is “not asked in a leading or directive manner” (Brenner, Brown, & Canter, 1985, p. 151). I found during my interviews that neutrality was impossible – as others have noted, interviewers have “overarching control, they guide the talk, they promote it through questions, silence and response tokens … and chiefly they decide which particular part of the answer to follow up” (Rapley in Seale, Gobo, Gubrium & Silverman, 2004, p. 20). Reliability is equally problematic in qualitative interviews as variability among interviewees and among the responses of particular interviewees are commonplace and may be pervasive (Brenner, Brown & Canter, 1985, p. 250). Even excluding cases where interviewees may be disinterested or ‘negativistically’ motivated, interviewees frequently “exaggerate certain aspects, omit important information and distort ‘reality’” (Morris, 2015, p. 125). Indeed, this is an important limitation, as interviewees construct versions of reality which reflect their realities to greater or lesser extents, the verification of which is often neither possible nor practical (Morris, 2015).

The inability to detect and remove undesirable influences has led some to criticise the applicability of concepts of reliability and validity to interviewing in general (Brenner, Brown & Canter, 1985, p. 155). A practical solution to these problems is to scrutinise material for any instances of ‘rule breaching’ such as leading or directive questioning and to build interviewee–interviewer rapport so “they will endeavour to give what they consider is an accurate portrayal” (Morris, 2015, p. 125). As such, whenever possible, I strove to build rapport with interviewees prior to and during the interview, while also keeping my questions as neutral as possible and rewording them concisely and accurately when required.

Unlike structured interviews, semi-structured interviews are not bound to the guide as an “interviewing strait jacket” (Merton & Kendall, 1946, p. 548). That is, although the interviewer is expected to cover all topics in the guide and collect the necessary data to
answer the research questions, the wording and ordering of questions is often variable, with an emphasis on the “unanticipated implications of the subject’s remarks” (Merton & Kendall, 1946, p. 548). That is, talk is not limited to the predetermined agenda, and the interviewer is expected to intervene when appropriate. The central rationale of the interview in this study is that the same broad themes would emerge across different interviews regardless of who raised it as a subject. One of the strengths of this approach for my study is that it allows for the development, and emergence of, research questions throughout the interviewing process. This is reflected in my interview questions which were adjusted in line with interviewee feedback over the course of conducting interviews.

4.6.4. Interview Guide

Prior to the collection of information, an interview guide was developed. This included determining questions and offering prompts to guide conversation. Morris (2015) argues that the development of an effective interview guide is crucial to the success of the semi-structured interview. This guide includes four questions to determine three main concepts: the interviewees’ understandings of NUMSA’s actions and whether they are perceived to be ideologically and/or politically significant; whether they believe the ANC and/or neoliberalism is hegemonic in South Africa and, if so, to what extent; and how they are contesting and/or challenging the ANC and/or COSATU. These questions and follow-up probes can be found in Appendix A. This guide was developed around the categories of questions identified by Berg (2001) as essential to interviews, namely: essential questions which are “geared towards eliciting specific desired information” central to the study; extra questions “roughly equivalent to certain essential ones but worded slightly differently”; rapport building throw-away questions; and probing questions designed to “provide detailed stories or additional information from subjects” (Berg, 2001, p. 76-77). Each of these question archetypes perform crucial functions – extra questions check response reliability and the significance of wording, throw-away questions build rapport and can be used to ‘cool out’ the interviewee or change subject, and probing questions provide anecdotes and secondary information.

The structure of the guide was also influenced by Frey and Oishi (1995), Keats (2000) and Morehouse (2012) who argue that the interview should begin with non-threatening questions as it “builds trust and enhances willingness to participate fully in the interview” (Frey & Oishi, 1995, p 100). As such, the opening phase of the interviews was used to gather background information on respondents including name, profession and links to the ANC
and/or NUMSA, as well as to develop a rapport between interviewee and interviewer. Further, interview questions were structured to move from least threatening and more general to more specific, with each question followed by a series of probes. These probes encompass those recognised by Gordon (1969), including the “silent probe, encouragement, immediate clarification, retrospective clarification, immediate elaboration, retrospective elaboration and mutation” (cited in Keats, 2000, p. 64). At the close of the interview, in line with Morehouse’s (2012) recommendations, interviewees were asked whether there were any questions which should have been asked in order to expand the scope of inquiry and gauge the efficacy of the questions.

4.6.5. **Interview Analysis**

Whilst textual analyses of primary and secondary texts are crucial to this thesis, analysis of the interview transcripts provides additional and vital understandings of hegemony and resistance in South Africa. Although Seidman (2013, p. 116) advocates completing all interviews before starting in-depth analysis to avoid imposing the meanings of one interviewee on the next, this study agrees with Morris’ view (2015) that this is an “ultra-cautious” approach. Similarly, this thesis adopts the five-stage approach for the analysis of interview transcripts identified by Morris: “careful read-through and note-taking”; extracting “notable quotes”; “coding/finding the themes”; “selecting the themes you are going to focus on”; and “interpreting and writing up the interview data” (2015, pp. 126-133). This approach is significant as it involves re-contextualising statements, exploring the latent meanings of the interview transcripts beyond what is said, and getting at the common sense understandings of interviewees. This qualitative approach is chosen due to the importance of theoretical knowledge to the subject matter and interview questioning, thereby making “recourse to specific analytic tools… less paramount” (Kvale, 2007, p. 18).

This approach is rooted in what Glaser and Strauss (1967) label the “constant comparison method”, that is, “searching for similarities and differences by making systemic comparisons across units of data” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010, p. 58). In practical terms, this process begins with discovery wherein potentially important concepts or ideas thought to be in the transcripts are listed. The transcripts are then carefully examined and informal methods such as highlighting, underlining and comparing are used to divide the texts into actually existing units of meaning within the transcripts. Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell and Alexander (1995, p. 258) warn against superimposing codes on the data during this process, noting that
discrepancies between presupposed and actually existing ideas and concepts often broaden thinking on the issue.

Figure 1. The constant comparative method (adapted from Morris, 2015).

4.6.6. **Themes**

As the interviews were progressing, recurring ideas and concepts were placed into broader themes which reflected important topics and associated data relevant to the research questions (Morris, 2015). Placing units of meaning into themes is the crux of the constant-comparative method and an essential part of making sense of the interviews as a whole and developing a “meaningful, coherent analysis” (Morris, 2015, p. 127-128). Powerful interview material invariably repeats itself (Morris, 2015), and the identification of these repetitions between and among interviewees was crucial in finding themes which spring from the data itself. Further, by comparing units of meaning across all categories, themes were refined, rules were developed for inclusion and exclusion, and cross-category patterns and relationships between categories were identified (Morehouse, 2012, p. 88). In practical terms, this can be done in a number of ways, from manipulating Word documents to using “scissors, glue, index cards and filing boxes” to sift through data (Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell and Alexander, 1995, p. 260). This thesis chose the former method of developing themes, supporting them with a number of direct quotes which best illustrated the associated concepts and ideas. The emergence of “negative instances”, that is, deviant cases of data contrary to the overall consensus, was also useful in refining and reframing the analysis (Seale, Gobo, Gubrium & Silverman, 2004). Where discrepancies occurred in the interview data from this research, they were highlighted to emphasise the difference in how hegemony and neoliberal discourse is interpreted between representatives of subaltern groups, and the significance of this divergence of opinion.
4.7. **Limitations**

This thesis is constrained by a number of factors, including: the inherent bias of texts on South Africa; the limits of the interpretative methodological model; the ephemeral nature of the research topic itself; and the specific focus on NUMSA within this thesis’ analysis of hegemonic struggles in South Africa.

To begin, bias is evident in texts which are “embedded within social and ideological systems” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p. 157), and the literature surrounding South African social movements, unions and politics is deeply influenced by the ideological, cultural and/or political affiliations of the authors. Thus, authors such as Patrick Bond and Ashwin Desai are far more critical of ANC domestic and macro-economic policies than many Western authors and institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. By contrast, the latter often support ANC policies whilst lambasting strikes and protests as undermining economic growth. I have attempted to mitigate this bias by engaging with a wide range of both primary and secondary sources affiliated with Western and South African institutions, including South African national news agencies, government and anti-government news sites and Western and African journal articles. Further, given that meanings are socially embedded (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003), I have approached textual analysis with both historical and theoretical understandings in mind. As such, I have also mitigated the existing bias by placing interpretations of texts within the context of post-Apartheid South Africa and the ANC neoliberal project and interrogating the extent to which they challenge or contest these common sense understandings.

Secondly, the interpretative methodological approach is inherently limited within this thesis by its reliance upon interpretations of texts and the small size of the relatively homogenous sample group. However, although authors such as May (cited in Brenner, Brown & Canter, 1985, p. 122) have warned against substituting the “word for the numbers game”, interpretative research is inherently inclined towards a qualitative approach, such as that taken by this thesis, as it is concerned with how, not how many (Silverman, 2010, p. 118). Further, the small size of the sample group of interviewees is acceptable, even desirable, for this thesis as it is concerned with the understandings of this group of organic intellectuals. In addition, whilst interviewees may be unreliable, I attempted to check the external validity of information where possible, although this was neither practical nor feasible for interview subjects beyond a perfunctory examination of known facts (Brenner, Brown & Canter, 1985, p. 156).
Thirdly, given that NUMSA only withdrew its support from the ANC-led alliance and begun challenging the hegemony of the ANC in 2014, there is a dearth of literature on the topic. As a result, I utilise a host of non-academic media such as newspapers, websites, government and NGO releases and other commentary. Furthermore, the significance of NUMSA’s actions and the threat it poses to the ANC are subject to constant change depending on the success of NUMSA’s United Front initiative, and as such has fluctuated throughout this project and will likely continue to do so in the future. Finally, given the limited scope of this thesis, it necessarily has a specific focus on NUMSA within discussions of counter-hegemonic struggles in South Africa even though this detracts from other counter-hegemonic groups within society. However, the inability of these other groups to meaningfully oppose the ANC largely limits their impact – this is in contrast to the impact of NUMSA’s resolutions which have heavily impacted the legitimacy of the ANC-Alliance.

4.8. Ethics

This project adheres to the ECU guidelines for the ethical treatment of human subjects. As such, interviewees received both information sheets and consent forms before interviews were conducted in line with the requirements of informed consent outlined by Kelly and Ali in Seale (2004). Audio recordings of the interviews were transcribed and the original recordings will be erased once the project is completed. In line with ethical considerations of safe storage of recordings and transcripts (Morris, 2015, p. 124), the information collected during this research (with the exception of the audio recordings) will remain stored on the hard-drive of researcher Benjamin Hale’s home computer and associate supervisor David Robinson’s password protected computer for 5 years after the completion of the project and will be destroyed after that time.

However, it should be noted that there are also a number of risks and ethical issues associated with conducting interviews. Participants who voice controversial opinions without anonymity may face social and political consequences. Nevertheless, the individuals selected as organic intellectuals for interview are public figures opposed to the current political situation who are likely to be already identified as dissenters by the South African government. Regardless, risk was minimised further by offering participants the choice to be de-identified, and I endeavoured to mitigate potential risks to myself by establishing contacts beforehand and using caution when appropriate. Furthermore, participants maintain the right to alter transcripts and/or withdraw consent at any time.
5. Historical Background

*The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation... It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e. to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.*

(Marx and Engels, 1998, p. 55)

5.1. Introduction

The exercise, and contestation, of hegemony in the post-Apartheid period is informed by the history of colonialism and Apartheid in South Africa. This chapter provides an overview of the history of South Africa, focusing on five key areas: 1) the period of internal capitalist development in South Africa prior to 1948; 2) the development and decline of the Apartheid system between 1948 and 1994; 3) the emergence and evolution of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP prior to 1994; 4) the transition to democratic governance in 1994; and, 5) the development of NUMSA from 1987 to the present. The focus on these five areas informs the character of the Tripartite Alliance and struggles over hegemony in the post-Apartheid state.

Firstly, the development of capitalism in pre-Apartheid South Africa and its reliance on cheap migrant labour power profoundly influenced the evolution of capitalism during Apartheid and thereafter. Further, South Africa’s position in the world-system during the pre-Apartheid period, resulted in a regional economy with South Africa at the centre, that has remained largely unchanged to the present (Wolpe, 1995). Secondly, Apartheid codified, reinforced and extended the racialised structures of the economy of segregation-era South Africa and extended it throughout the regional economy using both economic and military warfare. This was complemented by the expansion of the coercive apparatus of the state, clamping down on civil society from political parties to the media, and creating an atmosphere of secrecy and paranoia among resistance groups. As such, the development and decline of Apartheid had a profound impact on Southern African economic, political and social structures with lasting legacies in the post-Apartheid period. Thirdly, the emergence and development of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP in a profoundly unequal, segregationist society in a climate of violence, fear and persecution fundamentally defined the character of these movements. The
vanguardist, statist approach adopted by the ANC in government, the subservience of the SACP (and to a lesser degree COSATU) to the ANC agenda, and the paranoia of the ANC and SACP leadership are symptomatic of this climate.

Fourth, the negotiated transition from Apartheid to democratic governance in 1994 was a defining moment for the ANC leadership, which profoundly affected the balance of power in the Tripartite Alliance and economic policy in the post-Apartheid period. The gains and concessions involved in a negotiated settlement effectively transferred control of key financial institutions outside the sphere of ANC influence and fostered dependence on Western financial institutions, constraining ANC economic policy. Finally, this chapter will discuss the development of the radical former affiliate of COSATU, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) from the late Apartheid period onwards. The internal tensions within COSATU and NUMSA itself created a simmering discontent which erupted with its departure from COSATU in 2014. Further, the failure of NUMSA’s strategy to co-opt capital to the advantage of workers affected its development in the post-Apartheid period, manifesting in high responsiveness to its membership and, ultimately, the decision to establish a United Front.

5.2. Pre-Apartheid South Africa

From 1870 onwards, South Africa was increasingly drawn into the capitalist world system as a provider of minerals, raw materials and goods (Wolpe, 1994). The discovery of diamond mines in the Kimberley in 1867 created a huge demand for labourers which only increased further upon the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand reef in 1884 (Cohen, 1986, p. 40). Thereafter, dependency on secondary modes of production (such as gold/diamond mining) created mounting demand for cheap, unskilled labour. As a result of these escalating demands for labour, the colonial administration became heavily involved in regulating “the conditions of the production and reproduction of that labour power” (Wolpe, 1995, p. 63). Through a combination of taxation, policies of land reappropriation and the offer of wages, black pastoralists from surrounding areas were increasing forced into wage labour, resulting in just under 100,000 labourers working in the Witwatersrand mines by 1899 (Cohen, 1986). The disruption of the labour force during the Boer War of 1899-1902 created a new problem for the state as the vast majority of workers returned to rural areas where mines were closed. Although this labour supply shortage was temporarily averted by enlisting 66,000 Chinese
indentured workers, this collapse in the labour supply made it clear to the South African government that a more sustainable solution was necessary (Cohen, 1986, p. 40).

By the 1920s a rigid migrant labour system had been developed to regulate the movement of black workers from the ‘native reserves’ to the mines and throughout the country (Murray, 1987, p. 18-19). Early segregationist policy developed by Hertzeg in the 1930s attempted to fix the labour supply shortage and exert greater control over these ‘reserves’ by converting them into subsistence enclaves. However, the sheer gap between labour supply and demand, and the collapse of the “carrying capacity of the Native Reserves”, amid deteriorating economic and social conditions, made this policy increasingly untenable (Murray, 1987, p. 18). The decline of the reserves was a consequence of the destruction of pre-capitalist modes of production among African communities in the reserves, which had formed the economic basis of the reproduction of cheap migrant labour (Wolpe, 1995, p. 62). By the mid-1940s, the state’s attempts to regulate labour were clearly failing: ‘reserves’ were deteriorating; shantytowns were popping up around urban industrial areas; increasingly politically aware squatters challenged state authorities; and African trade unionism was gaining ground, culminating in the strike of 1946. Faced with these new challenges to its hegemony the ruling United Party vacillated, and became increasingly paralysed by political turmoil and internecine strife. Seizing on this infirmity during the 1948 elections, the National Party campaigned on a populist (within the white-community) platform of Apartheid placing “an hysterical and racialist emphasis on the ‘colour question’ and the threatened erosion of white privilege” (Murray, 1987, p. 20-21).

Although the motive behind the policy of Apartheid has been hotly debated (Lapping, 1987; Murray, 1987; Wolpe, 1995) it was clearly intended to appeal to both the Afrikaner intellectual elite and the National Party’s core constituency- poor whites and farmers (i.e. the bulk of the Afrikaner population). Although it was unclear how Apartheid policy would be implemented in practice it offered whites a popular solution to the “colour question” (Lapping, 1987). Further, Apartheid appealed to Afrikaners as the “poorest white group” as it promised to insulate them further from competition over the cost of labour with blacks, by enforcing existing pre-Apartheid labour legislation (Beinart & Dubow, 1995, p. 194-196). However, Apartheid was also conceived as a solution to the “British problem”, promising to uplift the relatively poor bulk of the Afrikaner population to equal footing with the economically prosperous British (Lapping, 1987; Beinart & Dubow, 1995). As such, the
National Party emphasised the need for “full equality between the two white groups” encouraging Afrikaners to unite “as an interest group to close the gap between Afrikaner and English wealth” (Beinart & Dubow, 1995, p. 197). The National Party’s emphasis on Afrikaner cultural, economic and political unity not only attracted the support of the Afrikaner working class but “professionals, educators and civil servants” who saw the project as a way of “getting our country back” and “feeling at home once again in our country” (Beinart & Dubow, 1995, p. 199). As such, the success of the National Party in the 1948 elections can be attributed to Apartheid’s widespread appeal to a range of (predominantly) Afrikaner whites with divergent class interests. In Gramscian terms, the National Party was successful because it was able to merge the interests of white capital and the white population and mobilise “a variety of different class interests and forms of identity within a ‘national–popular’ alliance” (Morton, 2007, p. 97). This new “national-popular” alliance refurbished and re legitimised the ruling bloc by creating a national consensus around racial exclusivity and the need to economically empower poor-Afrikaners.

The electoral triumph of the National Party not only gave it a mandate to enact Apartheid but made it economically and politically imperative to do so. As Murray notes, the victory of the National Party passed “political power into the hands of a dedicated group of South African… whites with the most extreme commitment to perpetuating white supremacy and racial segregation” (1987, p. 20-21). However, there are numerous continuities between the policies of segregation and “the racist ideological foundations” of Apartheid, with many of the laws that defined Apartheid existing for decades earlier (Wolpe, 1995, p. 61). Indeed, the cornerstones of segregationist policy identified by Legassick are not dissimilar from those of Apartheid, namely: “restrictions on permanent urbanization, territorial separation of land ownership, and the use of traditional institutions as providers of ‘social services’ and means of social control… along with other mechanisms of labour coercion” (Legassick in Wolpe, 1995, p. 62).

In many ways Apartheid was developed as a means of regulating the labour market to both maintain and extend the system of migrant labour developed on the mines during the industrialisation period of the Union of South Africa. As such, Apartheid can be seen as a modernised and rationalised extension of the pre-1948 segregationist attempts to control the production, reproduction and movement of labour. Thus, Apartheid was intended to ensure the continuation of the supply of cheap unspecialised labour whilst sheltering non-propertied
white workers from unemployment. However, under Apartheid the informalities, ambiguities and evasions of segregationist policy were “ironed-out” (Wolpe, 1995, p. 61).

5.3. **Apartheid-Era South Africa**

This section details the emergence and development of the Apartheid state between 1948 and 1994, its regional implications and the subsequent emergence of the anti-Apartheid movement. Firstly, this section examines the development of Apartheid from the period of grand Apartheid to reform Apartheid and its eventual decline. This includes commentary on the development of capitalism under Apartheid, the migrant labour system on the mines, and the relationship between labour and the Apartheid regime. Further, it considers the significance of anti-Apartheid groups including the ANC, COSATU and the SACP in the collapse of Apartheid and the profound impact of Apartheid society on these groups. Finally, this section examines the relationship between capitalism in South Africa, its position in the world-system, and its pre-eminence in the regional economy.

5.3.1. **Grand Apartheid**

As previously mentioned, the regulation of the conditions for the production and reproduction of labour power was a characteristic function of the Apartheid state. Through its restriction of the franchise and capture the state, the National Party (and by extension Afrikaners) had essentially monopolised centralised state power, with its “repressive and regulatory apparatuses” (i.e. the army, police, bureaucracy) (Cohen, 1986, p. 8). The Apartheid state employed these apparatuses to divide the labour market into racialised segments through coercion supported by both legislature and administrative practice. Further, it employed centralised state power to impose social control in weak points within the structure, such as urban areas (Cohen, 1986, p. 8). This is intimately related to the enforcement of the racial geography of Apartheid through the imposition of spatial segregation on the residential, social and commercial choices of racial groups. The use of the repressive state apparatus to coerce labour and enforce laws which are favourable to capitalism are features that are shared with the Union of South Africa: the use of excessive force to crush the 1972 Ovambo workers’ strike mirrored the smashing of the 1914 White mineworkers’ strike and the 1922 Rand Revolt; and the Natives Land Act of 1913 and the Native (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act of 1952 largely fulfil the same function (Wolpe, 1995, p. 65).
The South African economy under Apartheid was structured around the extraction of minerals and agriculture, relying on a steady flow of cheap migrant labour to maintain economic growth. Supported by the introduction and enforcement of Apartheid policies, labour flowed from the Bantustan reserve areas to the cities, mines and plantations with brutal efficiency in the initial year of National Party rule. The spatial planning of Apartheid, alongside draconian laws and violent police repression ensured the compliance of the black exploited working class. The labour force was divided between a mainly male urban workforce for the mines and supporting industries and a largely female rural workforce for agriculture and the homelands (Koelble, 2004, p. 62). Above ground organisations and mass political campaigns were crushed and either forced into exile or underground. Under these conditions, and as a result of the post-war boom, South Africa’s economy grew at a phenomenal rate, experiencing the second highest rates of growth between 1948 and 1970 of any capitalist country (Murray, 1987, p. 23).

Despite phenomenal growth during the late 1950s and 1960s, from the early 1970s onwards the South African economy began to experience a downturn as the Apartheid state grappled with an embedded systemic crisis. The continuous decline of agricultural prices from the early 1970s onwards and the collapse of the gold standard in 1973 deeply affected exports (Koelble, 2004, p. 62). This economic downturn contributed to increased unrest culminating in the 1973 Durban strikes and Soweto student uprising of 1976-7. The post-war accumulation strategy with its emphasis on extractive industries, primary exports and inward industrialisation was beginning to breakdown. The mode of labour control under Apartheid placed inherent limitations on the economy including an overabundance of unskilled labour, a shortage of skilled labour, and severely restricted domestic demand (Marais, 1998, 100-101). Further, the contraction of the capital goods sector after the early 1970s created chronic balance of payments problems and encumbered the “the development of skills, and the generation and diffusion of more productive technologies through the wider economy” (Kaplan in Marais, 1998, p. 101). These economic difficulties were compounded by the
persistence of exceedingly high unemployment, escalating capital flight, weak GDP growth\(^3\) and declining rates of gross fixed investment\(^4\).

By the mid-1970s, the rigid Verwoerdian model of Apartheid, which had hitherto been effective in creating economic growth, was crumbling as an escalating spiral of resistance and repression gripped the countryside. The violent regimentation of the labour supply under Apartheid provoked progressively more powerful and violent convulsions from the mass of the labour force and began to undermine the economy itself. This escalating spiral of violence led the capitalist class in South Africa to increasingly question the viability of the system as a whole. Thus, in the wake of the 1976-77 Soweto uprising powerful business associations placed increasing pressure on the National Party to adopt policies “in line with the changing requirements of capital accumulation” (Worden, 1994, p. 122). This included advocating partial reforming of the labour market and the repair and upgrading of essential infrastructure in urban townships, signalling the beginning of the period of reform Apartheid.

5.3.2. Reform Apartheid

The period of reform Apartheid began with the replacement of Prime Minister John Vorster with Pieter Willem Botha in 1978. Under the latter, the National Party attempted to reform the Apartheid system to make it compatible with the needs of capital by making limited concessions to blacks. Further, the reforms were intended to give the National Party a free hand to deal with the collapse of the minority governments in neighbouring Mozambique, Angola, and Rhodesia. Reform was limited at first but eventually included the introduction of limited residential rights for urban blacks in 1988 and the right to form trade unions by 1989. Although the fundamental features of Apartheid rule remained, these structural changes in the spatial and commercial features of Apartheid gave fresh impetus to the anti-Apartheid struggle.

The change in Apartheid policy in the late 1970s was the result of a number of factors, key among which was South Africa's changed economic circumstances and subsequent social

\(^3\) South Africa's GDP growth rate fell from around 6 percent in the 1960s to less than zero in the early 1990s (Gelb, 1991; Marais, p. 100)

\(^4\) Fixed investment levels fell from 26.5 percent of GDP in 1983 to around zero percent by 1990, and remained negative from 1990 to 1993. (Marais, 1998, p. 100, 101)
repercussions. The National Party’s increasing awareness of the deleterious consequences of Apartheid labour and education policies was underscored by economic and civil crisis. Widespread joblessness among blacks, increasing unemployment among whites, and the inability of the Apartheid system to employ this labour reserve made political reform imperative to economic revival (Worden, 1994, p. 137). Further, whereas the manufacturing industry had previously required a constant supply of cheap unskilled labour, it now needed “semi-skilled permanent workers” capable of operating complex machinery (Worden, 1994, p. 121-122). This was reflected in the 1981 de Lange report on education, which called for not only compulsory primary education but technical training at a secondary and tertiary level for blacks (Worden, 1994, p. 124). Further, attempts at reform were also an integral component of the National Party’s attempt to recapture the initiative among white working class and blue-collar workers who were becoming increasingly marginalised under Apartheid. Dissatisfaction with the Apartheid project was particularly evident after the formation of the Conservative Party in 1982, which split the National Party’s former support base and exposed the increasingly precipitous situation of the frail cross-class Afrikaner-nationalist project (Worden, 1994).

The National Party’s willingness to reform the most economically harmful aspects of Apartheid was also informed by the success of the “historical project of Afrikaner uplift” which meant that the “natural workings of the market could be trusted to safeguard white security and effective dominance” (Horwitz, 1997, p. 508). As such, reform Apartheid represented a halting, yet sincere, embrace of the free market as the interests of the ruling elites within the National Party became increasingly aligned with those of the business community (Horwitz, 1997, p. 508). Consequently, political reforms were accompanied by the rolling back the state in the economic sphere and the application of severe deflationary measures in line with International Monetary Fund policy prescriptions. However, these policies had unintended consequences including declining levels of personal savings and falling living standards, which only provoked increased resistance ultimately culminating in the 1984-7 uprisings (Marais, 1998, p. 101).

Widespread condemnation of the Apartheid regime and the threat, and realisation of, sanctions in the wake of the Soweto uprising also played a significant role in the government's move toward reform. P.W. Botha's reforms were intended to mitigate international political fallout and the effects of economic isolation, and thereby restore
investor confidence in the stability of South Africa. However, they were ineffective to these ends, as spiralling inflation and rising unemployment fuelled cycles of growing resistance, creating further economic instability and mobilising international sanctions (Cobbet & Cohen, 1988, p. 212). Further, sanctions limited the capability of South African businesses to export or move capital freely, exacerbating the decline of South Africa's already struggling primary exports sector. This in turn led to an increased emphasis on local “consumption and production shifts... in future economic planning scenarios” and the emergence of a coalition of capital across industrial sectors opposed to the Apartheid system (Koelble, 2001, p. 63).

By the early 1980s the government's attempt to reform the Apartheid system had exposed rather than eliminated the economy's structural flaws. The National Party's attempts to roll back the state from the economic sphere was hamstrung by bureaucratic inefficiencies and growing civil unrest, which translated into an expansion of the state sector and security forces. Further, the government's attempts to co-opt the black struggle through limited concessions had only served to galvanise the fragmented black opposition movements. This resulted in the creation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983, a loosely organised community-based resistance movement, crucial in the anti-Apartheid struggle (Horwitz, 1997, p. 507). Further, attempts to contain and control the threat of independent black trade unions through limited reforms and divisive privileges for registered unions backfired, bolstering their capacity to “win new power in the factories...[and] rights outside it” (Friedman, 1987, p. 228). By the mid-1980s community resistance had escalated into broad insurrectionism with many parts of the country effectively in a state of civil war. The declaration of martial law under the 1985 State of Emergency signalled the beginning of a period of increased repression; wherein state control became increasingly dependent on the military and police apparatus (Worden, 1994, p. 121). The legalisation of black unions only made this situation worse for the National Party, as they imposed an organisational structure on the resistance movement and increasingly undermined economic output, especially after the establishment of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1986.

Despite an enduring image of international isolation, South Africa had a relatively open economy prior to the early 1980s. Prior to this period, sectors such as agriculture and mining were geared towards exports, with foreign trade representing around sixty percent of GDP (Marais, 1998, p. 121). This was underpinned by extensive trade between South Africa and the US and Britain, which were some of its largest foreign investors. Under the Nixon
administration's policy of “constructive engagement” U.S. foreign policy, reflecting paranoia over a socialist takeover of South Africa, became increasingly favourable to the Apartheid regime⁵. This covert support became increasingly overt during the 1970s as the US provided loans, arms and military assistance to South Africa and allied southern African groups, despite a United Nations arms embargo on South Africa⁶. Further, despite a decline in US bank loans to South African governmental agencies between 1978 and 1982, from $794 million to $285.5 million, loans to South Africa's private sector ballooned from $1.5 billion in 1978 to $3.4 billion in 1982 and $4.7 billion in 1984 (Murray, 1987, p. 28). Similarly, US and British investments in South Africa grew drastically until the mid-1980s, as cheap labour and a readily available market made it possible to garner much higher rates of return than elsewhere⁷. This is particularly evident with regards to US investment in the mining industry which was estimated at around $8.1 billion in 1984, accounting for around 25% of total mining investments (Murray, 1987, p. 28).

Widespread resistance to the Apartheid regime within South Africa was accompanied by a shift in international trade away from the country from the early 1980s onwards. South African manufacturing industries relied on foreign investment and trade, the loss of which after 1985 - as US firms quietly reduced or divested holdings and international sanctions limited exports - adversely affected the South African economy. Economic turbulence fed into civil unrest as South Africa's share of world exports fell by 0.6% between 1980 and 1989 (Marais, 1998, p. 121). The mining sector lost around 30% of its workforce between 1987 and 1995 as employment levels shrank from 752,460 to 512,722 (Marais, 1998, p. 106). The

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⁵ ‘Option Two’ of the secret 1969 study of policy options towards Southern Africa made the recommendation to “maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states” (Murray, 1987, p. 31).

⁶ In an unprecedented shift, the US Export-Import Bank reversed its policy to allow South Africa to take out long-term loans. (Murray, 1987, p. 31)

⁷ UK investment in South Africa ballooned from $12 billion in 1978 to $15.7 billion by 1985. Similarly, US direct investment in South Africa skyrocketed between 1950 and 1982 from $140 million to $2.63 billion. Although this nominally fell to $2.3 billion by late 1984, real US investment is obfuscated by the use of European subsidiaries by parent corporations and informed experts place real investment at over $15 billion (Murray, 1987, p. 28).
lack of welfare provisions, rampant inflation, stagnant wages\textsuperscript{8} and falling standards of living fuelled mass unrest, repression of which increased international condemnation, consequently increasing economic instability in a manner similar to a feedback loop. By 1989, foreign sanctions had taken their toll, leading the governor of the South African Reserve Bank to remark that without “political and constitutional reform… South Africa will probably remain a capital-exporting and debt-repaying country for years” (Worden, 1994, p. 137). This impasse was only broken by the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-African Congress (PAC) in 1990 following the installation of Frederick Willem de Klerk as Prime Minister in September 1989 (Worden, 1994, p. 121).

The prolonged economic, social and political crisis of Apartheid South Africa and the inability of the state to meaningfully intervene can best be understood as a period of hegemonic crisis. Due to its extreme emphasis on racial exclusivity, the Apartheid state was never able to elicit the spontaneous and actively given consent of the masses, instead resorting to coercion and repression. As a result, the ruling bloc was never able to move from a “position of corporate existence and defence of its economic position… to a position of leadership in the political and social arena” (Gramsci, 1971, xiv). Consequently, the Apartheid period was characterised by a limited or fractured hegemony “based on an unstable equilibrium of compromises between social classes and… bare coercion” (Morton, 2007, p. 202). From the early 1970s onwards, systemic economic crisis, growing political isolation and civil unrest, began to undermine the alliance of class interests underpinning the Apartheid project. As such, business leaders began looking askance at the Apartheid system and increasingly sought an accommodation with the national liberation movement. The National Party attempted to halt this crisis through the introduction of limited political and economic reforms. However, due to its emphasis on racial exclusion the Apartheid project was unable to operate in the wider “national-popular dimension” without resorting to coercion or violence (Marais, 2011, 391-392). This inability to consider “popular values, demands and struggles of people” left it fundamentally incapable of co-opting or neutralising the counter-hegemonic national liberation movement (Marais, 2011, 391-392) As a result, the prolonged

\textsuperscript{8} Between 1975 and 1991 the mean income of the lowest earning 40 percent of households fell by 40 percent, whilst that of the richest 20 percent rose by the same amount. (Marais, 1998, p. 106)
collapse of Apartheid was accompanied by episodic violence, repression, divisions, economic decline.

5.3.3. **South Africa: Regional Hegemon?**

The historic development of capitalism within South Africa has implications for the legacy of colonialism and development of capitalism throughout the Southern African region. South Africa’s integration into the regional and global economy as the central node of regional accumulation fundamentally structured the regional economy. Further, South Africa's involvement in the region both economically and militarily during Apartheid, exacerbated the economic underdevelopment of these states and entrenched dependency on the South African state. The result of these developments was the emergence of South Africa as the regional hegemon among Southern African states.

The expansion and consolidation of capitalism within the Southern African region is deeply intertwined with legacies of colonialism and regional domination under South Africa. As Olukoshi notes, the accumulation of capital within the region was shaped first by “being former colonies of Britain or Portugal, and second, by being subordinated to South Africa, to the logic of South African capital within Southern Africa” (cited in Bond, 2006, p. 32). The colonial domination of these peripheral economies by European powers integrated them into the world economy as suppliers of cheap labour and primary goods on deeply unequal terms. Further, as the leading provider of mining, agriculture, manufacturing and service industries, South Africa emerged as the central pole of capital accumulation within the region (Marais, 1998). As a result, the economies of surrounding Southern African countries were subordinated to the needs of South African capital by providing cheap labour, raw materials and a developing market to fuel South African economic growth.

The development of capitalism within the Southern African region is marked by domination at both a global and regional level. South Africa dominates the regional economy and performs “sub-imperial” functions by facilitating the exploitation of the region by core countries (Bond, 2006, p. 32). As a result, the accumulation of wealth and centralisation of political power by powerful blocs of capital within South Africa is accompanied by the diffusion of poverty, unemployment, and economic stagnation and marginalisation in ever-widening strata of the regional economy. In this sense, regional capital accumulation resembles a zero-sum game wherein “the development of accumulation and of infrastructure
in South Africa was at the expense of the rest of the countries of Southern Africa” (Olukoshi cited in Bond, 2006, p. 32). This trend was further exacerbated during the Apartheid period, wherein the National Party made conscious efforts to suppress the economies of neighbouring countries by transforming them into vast labour reserves, providers of raw materials and services, and markets for manufactured goods. However, following the collapse of Portuguese colonialist regimes in Mozambique and Angola in 1974, and the independence of Rhodesia in 1979, South African regional economic dominance became increasingly dependent on military force (Murray, 1987, p. 16).

The development of infrastructure in South Africa has had a significant, and frequently deleterious, effect on the economic development of Southern African countries. The development of infrastructure in colonial Southern Africa was intimately connected to wealth creation and labour control, with the first railway service constructed 6 years after the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand (Pirie, 1993, p. 716). From the beginning of the twentieth century tens of thousands of migrants travelled to the Rand by train each year, mainly from southern Mozambique and the Cape (Pirie, 1993, p. 717). Despite a number of constraints⁹, railways contributed “massively to shuttling migrants between the countryside and the Rand” creating a solution to the labour question by offering “relatively inexpensive, quick, long-distance mass transport” (Pirie, 1993, p. 728, 713). Under Apartheid this assumed new importance in the National Party’s attempt to achieve regional hegemony with the six landlocked states of Southern Africa almost entirely dependent on South African sub-continental railways and roads for access to the sea (Griffiths, 1989, p. 387).

South African dominance over the regional railway network lapsed as colonial rivalries and economic considerations resulted in the creation of several “direct lateral routes to the sea” by the mid-1960s (Pirie, 1991, p. 345). However, these alternative transport networks began to unravel from the mid-1960s onwards following the closure of Rhodesia’s borders with

⁹ Colonial and republican railways were largely “consumed with their own interests” limiting the ability to negotiate fares and tariffs with multiple competing railways (Pirie, 1993, p. 722). This was exacerbated by the misalignment of the interest of mining companies and railways and the absence of special purpose migrant labour railways. As a result, even where rail transport was a viable option, “impoverishment obliged some migrants to walk”, with 90 percent of Nyasaland migrants walking South as late as 1935. (Pirie, 1993, p. 717, 726)
Zambia and Mozambique in 1965, which “removed the need to maintain transit routes in Mozambique” (Pirie, 1991, p. 345). Soon thereafter, regional instability, often indirectly or directly provoked by South Africa, resulted in the closure of most alternative transport routes (Pirie, 1991, p. 345). As a result, whereas only twenty percent of regional trade was routed through South African ports in 1965, by 1980 this had increased to seventy percent as most companies opted for the more expensive but more reliable South African railway network (Pirie, 1991, p. 345).

South Africa’s dominance over the railway network and policy of regional destabilisation was crucial in fostering regional economic dependence within Southern Africa. Until the mid-1970s South African regional dominance was based upon economic domination of compliant colonialist and settler regimes in the surrounding “buffer states”. However, the collapse of the Portuguese colonialist regimes and acceleration of increasingly threatening guerrilla insurgencies in Rhodesia and Namibia, left South African regional policy in tatters and brought its dominance into question (Murray, 1987, p. 16-17). These developments, in concert with the Soweto uprising within South Africa, led leading figures within the white-minority regime, such as General Magnus Malan, to conclude that it was the target of a “total onslaught” orchestrated by the USSR. The minority-regime responded with what became known as “total strategy”, a flexible counter-strategy to this ‘onslaught’ which constituted an escalation of both overt and covert efforts to undercut the political stability of the region. Although P.W. Botha initially attempted to defuse opposition by forging a “constellation of states” economically linked to, and dependent upon, the Apartheid regime, the failure of this strategy heralded a full-scale military campaign of destabilisation. Between 1979 and 1984 Pretoria employed military force and economic and political pressures in concert to undermine those regimes potentially hostile to South Africa (Murray, 1987, p. 48-49).

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10 This was later reinforced by P.W. Botha in a House of Assembly address in February 1982 when he stated, “the onslaught is the result of the expansionist policy of Soviet Russia… The rationale lies in the strategic position and mineral wealth of the republic of South Africa” (Murray, 1987, p. 14).

11 The origins of the ‘Total Strategy’ doctrine can be seen in the Department of Defence’s 1977 White Paper which stated that “we [the Pretorian regime] are today involved in a war, whether we wish to accept it or not” and that a “total national strategy” was needed. (cited in Murray, 1987, p. 13)
Under the rubric of destabilisation, the Apartheid regime complimented its guerrilla war against SWAPO in Namibia with numerous armed incursions in Southern Africa. In Mozambique and Angola this was underpinned by South African support for insurrectionist movements such as RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), respectively (Worden, 1994, p. 125). The policy of regional destabilisation involved the violent disruption of alternate traffic routes, such as the sabotaging of bridges and railway lines, including the important Benguela line, by the South African backed UNITA movement (Reichardt & Duncan, 1990, p. 105). South Africa interference in Southern states was often motivated by retaliation for the loss of transit traffic, the anti-Apartheid stance of the Frontline states or “to underline their dependence to the Republic” (Pirie, 1991, p. 347). Military intervention was backed by economic warfare, with the Apartheid regime interrupting railway transportation by withdrawing technical assistance, recalling wagons, undercutting agreed tariffs, and impounding the wagons of rival railways (Pirie, 1991, p. 347). This was reinforced by the imposition of a permit scheme for road transportation which ensured South Africa benefitted from road haulage in its own trucks (Pirie, 1991, p. 347).

By fostering this regional dependency on the Apartheid state, South Africa diminished the threat of sanctions whilst applying pressure on neighbours to deny sanctuary to the ANC (Griffiths, 1989, p. 387). Further, the railway system was a significant source of income for South Africa with the leasing of expensive South African railway equipment compliment by “payments made to South Africa for spare parts, and the charges for maintaining and repairing railway lines, rolling stock, locomotives and aircraft” (Pirie, 1991, p. 348). This also imposed onerous costs on dependent neighbours with Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe spending around 40, 25 and twenty percent, respectively, of their foreign exchange earnings on transport to and from South African ports (Pirie, 1991, p. 347). The creation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 by the nine southern African Frontline states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) was specifically aimed at lessening economic dependence (Pirie, 1991, p. 346). Transport and communications were one of 11 spheres of co-operation singled out by the SADCC with around sixty percent of its multi-billion-dollar budget spent on transport projects (Pirie, 1991, p. 347). However, despite the creation of alternate transportation networks under the SADCC, Southern African regional dependence

The policies of reform Apartheid were deeply intertwined with, and indeed dependent upon, the politics of “Total Strategy” which had the ulterior motive of “removing the grievances that revolutionaries could exploit” (Swilling & Philips cited in Worden, 1994, p. 123). The failure of the latter to quell domestic resistance to Apartheid became increasingly problematic in the late-1980s as the country became increasingly ungovernable, undermining the minority-regime’s capacity to wage foreign interventions. By 1983 domestic uprisings made the involvement of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in invasions abroad increasingly untenable. Following the failure of the December 1983 invasion of Angola - in the face of organised joint Angolan/SWAPO resistance and the resulting alarmingly high casualties - South Africa signed the 1984 Lusaka agreement hastily withdrawing its forces (Murray, 1987, p. 55). However, Pretoria secured a diplomatic victory with the signing of the Nkomati Accord on Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness with Mozambique in the same year, which held Mozambique accountable for suppressing the ANC within its borders. This agreement served as a stepping-stone for South African dominance in the region allowing it to employ diplomatic and economic pressure against Botswana and Lesotho (Murray, 1987, p. 55-57).

Although the attempt to reform Apartheid failed, the objectives of the “Total Strategy” doctrine were largely met with lasting implications for the region. The National Party’s destabilisation strategies accelerated the already spasmodic and schizophrenic development of the regional economy, posing a great hindrance to any integration project aimed at “actively promoting economic growth of a type that brings benefits to all members of society” (ICFTU cited by Marais, 1998, p. 134). Further, the economic and social repercussions of “Total Strategy” were immense, with UNICEF estimating losses of around US$60 billion, and casualties at over one million people (Marais, 1998, p. 134). As such, these policies not underpinned the development of South Africa as regional hegemon, but fundamentally underdeveloped the Southern African region.

5.4. **The Anti-Apartheid Movement**

The character of the movements involved in the liberation struggle directly affected the transition to democratic governance in South Africa, and the democratic dispensation
thereafter. However, the ideological complexity of the ANC and its very importance to the liberation movement during much of Apartheid are hotly contested. Further, the relative balance of forces between and within the ANC, COSATU and the SACP during Apartheid and the inherent tensions between these associations would later define struggles over hegemony in the post-Apartheid state. This section establishes the history, character and actions of these associations during the Apartheid period, and their role in the national liberation struggle

5.4.1. The ANC, SACP and SACTU

The complex ideological baggage of the ANC is the result of three distinct ideological influences on its makeup and development, namely constitutional liberalism, pan-Africanism and communism. The ANC was founded in 1912 by a loose assemblage of moderate blacks, who sought to attain citizenship through the use of petitions and delegations. The ANC’s founding leaders were missionary-education constitutional liberals, whose demands for citizenship were informed by “Christian and liberal conceptions of justice and humanity” (Dubow cited in De Jager, 2009, p. 276). As a result, the ANC’s calls for inclusiveness within the South African body politic were framed within the context of constitutional rights, and largely idealised the Cape qualified franchise (Walshe in Johnson, 2003, p. 330). During the 1920s the tradition of black African-nationalism and Pan-Africanism - i.e. Africa for (black) Africans - began to significantly penetrate ANC thought, emphasising the need for African self-reliance and racial solidarity against segregation. With the formation of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) in 1921 the ANC also became increasingly influenced by communist ideology, with a tentative relationship established after the CPSA’s call for “an independent native republic” in 1928 (Dubow, 2000, p. 14). Unlike the pan-Africanist tradition, communism stressed non-racialism and working class solidarity, with the CPSA becoming the first South African political organisation to recruit members from all racial groups (Thompson, 2001, p. 177).

By the early 1940s the heterogeneous mix of different ideologies and traditions which constituted the ‘broad church’ of the ANC became increasingly dominated by the pan-Africanist movement. This manifested in the formation of the ANC Youth League in 1943 under Anton Lembede, whose philosophies indicated “a move towards revolutionary militancy and racial exclusivism” (De Jager, 2009, p. 277). Following the tightening of racial laws under Apartheid the ANC adopted the Youth League’s “Programme of Action” in 1949,
committing itself to a campaign of mass action, strikes and protests (Darracq, 2008, p. 591). During the 1950s, under the African Nationalist leadership of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo, the ANC sought out alliances with trade unions and working-class communities. This was supported by the CPSA, which, following orders from Moscow, dropped its earlier critiques of nationalism in favour of a people’s front. As a consequence, the ANC was granted access to “a bigger and broader social group of poorer Africans and Workers” (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 103-104). Although the campaigns of mass action and union recruitment during the 1950s arguably solidified class-consciousness among disenfranchised blacks, they provided little challenge to National Party rule, and were essentially interred with the banning of the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1960.

The 1964 Rivonia Trial was a watershed moment in Apartheid history as the imprisonment or exile of the ANC leadership made the ANC effectively a non-entity in South Africa for many years (De Waal & Ibreck, 2013, p. 312-313). Further, it signalled the organisational restructuring of the ANC along three distinct spheres of activity: 1) the imprisoned Robben Island leadership; 2) the leadership-in-exile in Europe and Africa; and, 3) the domestic struggle run by organisations such as COSATU and the United Democratic Front (UDF) (De Jager, 2009, p. 278-279). The development of vast structural and ideological differences between these spheres of ANC activity had profound impacts on the character of the ANC. Whereas the Robben Islanders were hierarchical and disciplined yet somewhat democratic, the ANC-in-exile was vanguardist with highly centralised decision making (de Jager, 2009, p. 278-279). The constraints of being a movement-in-exile constantly pursued by security forces with camps spread across numerous countries forced the latter to transform itself into a “top-down and secretive organization, made up of a small number of conscious militants and professional revolutionaries” (Darracq, 2008, p. 591). Under these conditions, the exiles exhibited tendencies towards vanguardist democratic centralism and the Stalinist view of “the party as paramount and loyalty as the crucial currency” (Feinstein cited in de Jager, 2009, p. 278-279). By contrast the UDF and its affiliates fostered a culture of openness, discussion and tolerance, adopting a non-racial democratic discourse to mobilise support among black and white communities (de Jager, 2009, p. 278-279).

The banning of the ANC in the wake of the Sharpeville massacre, also had the unintended consequence of turning it towards a strategy of armed struggle. Under these conditions the
ANC developed a guerrilla wing *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) in 1960, transforming itself from a mass nationalist movement to a liberation movement aimed at the seizure of state power (Southall, 2014, p. 52). However, after the 1985 escalation to a “people’s war” in 1985, it became increasingly clear to the ANC leadership that violent confrontation was not as effective as mass protests, strikes and boycotts in undermining Apartheid and garnering international support. This has led some authors (De Jager, 2009) to label The MK’s campaign of guerrilla warfare as a “fruitless” endeavour. However, the “theatrical deployment” of guerrilla strikes against selective targets continued to play a key role in telegraphing the ANC’s presence and enhancing its anti-Apartheid credentials by “animating the non-violent movement” (de Waal & Ibreck, 2013, p. 313).

The formation of MK in 1960 also marked a period of ideological change within the ANC as it became increasingly reliant upon and influenced by the South African Communist Party (SACP), the reconfigured CPSA. The ANC’s difficulty in translating its mass organisation structure into underground activity made it heavily dependent on the organisational capabilities of the SACP. In turn this marked a decisive shift from “non-violence into armed struggle” (Gevisser, 2007, p. 149). The SACP’s links with the USSR were essential to the ANC’s armed resistance, providing much-needed material, military resources and training, whilst the SACP imbued the ANC with organisational discipline and revolutionary theory (De Jager, 2009, p. 277). The SACP’s dominant role within MK increasingly translated into influence within the ANC and was instrumental in swaying the ANC away from a pan-Africanist viewpoint. However, the ANC also progressively adopted vanguardist Leninist attitudes to organisation and “communist-style bureaucratic methods of work” (Johnson, 2003, p. 328). Further, from the 1950s the theory of ‘Colonialism of a Special Type’ (CST), the SACP’s two-stage theory of revolution, became increasingly influential within the ANC. This theory argued that the specific form of racial capitalist oppression under Apartheid demanded first a “national democratic revolution” led by the ANC, then a socialist revolution led by the SACP. This was a useful ideological frame for attracting the support of unions and the working class more broadly and is still employed today to elicit support (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012).

Although much of the ANC’s legitimacy in the post-Apartheid period rests on its ‘liberation movement’ credentials it had minimal involvement in mobilising popular protest during the 1970s and 1980s. Instead the ANC focused on persuading resistance organisations to accept
its leadership of the “people’s struggle”, applying pressure on the growing labour movement to accept ANC leadership through SACTU (Friedman, 2012, p. 25). Further, the ANC’s most significant achievement during this period may have been merely its survival. While the PAC was being torn apart by internecine squabbles, the ANC interposed itself within the anti-Apartheid movement, underscoring its presence by acts of “armed propaganda” (Saul in Cobbet & Cohen, 1988, p. 216). Meanwhile, the ANC focused on developing a network of international contacts willing to intervene politically or militarily (in the case of Eastern Bloc countries). Increasingly the ANC situated itself as the South African equivalent of the victorious liberation movements of surrounding countries, underlining its historic centrality to the movement (Cobbett & Cohen, 1988, p. 216).

However, the ANC’s assumption of the leadership of the liberation struggle supported its internal ideological tendencies towards elitism and monopolisation of the political space. Thus, the ANC remained somewhat ambivalent about the role of its mass base in the capture of the state, envisaging an army-led seizure of power even after the mass protests of the 1970s (Legassick, 2003). It was only in the mid-to-late 1980s as the townships became ungovernable that the ANC began to advocate negotiations with the government, advocating a “peoples democracy” in line with the freedom charter in which the “commanding heights of the economy” would be seized and nationalised (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 105). Further, the ANC itself did not launch mass campaigns and rallies until 1992 after the failed Convention for a Democratic South Africa negotiations, which culminated in the death of 28 protestors during the disastrous march on the Ciskei homeland (Darracq, 2008, p. 593).

5.4.2. The UDF and COSATU

The ANC was not the only civil society group involved in the liberation struggle and other actors such as the UDF and COSATU played far more significant roles in mobilising anti-Apartheid support. Prior to being banned the ANC’s membership peaked at around 100,000 in the 1950s, a marginal amount of its ideal constituency, with many of its 1950 campaigns failing to attract mass support due to their focus on elite concerns (Friedman, 2012, p. 25). Although never entirely removed from the South African body politic after 1960, the ANC played a relatively marginal role in the mass campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s. The two key events of the 1970s, the 1972-1973 labour strikes and the 1976-1977 Soweto uprising, were organised by trade union and Black Consciousness activists on the ground, not the ANC or the allied South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) (Cobbett & Cohen, 1988, p.
However, the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 aligned these groups with the ANC historical tradition. Although the ANC did not “establish or control either the UDF or its affiliates” (Fredman, 2012, p. 25), ANC involvement in the UDF was useful in making inroads into communities at the grassroots level “so as not to be seen as ‘coming from outside in a putschist way with our arms and army’ by average black South Africans” (Darracq, 2008, p. 592).

Alongside the UDF, the union movement was arguably the most significant contributor to the collapse of Apartheid. After the steady decline of strike activity during the 1960s, the trade union movement re-emerged as a powerful political actor amid the economic downturn of the 1970s. This manifested most notably in the 1973 Durban strikes in which black dockworkers and bus drivers, responding to a declining standard of living, staged a massive strike in Durban (Bolsmann, 2010, p. 522-523). This strike involved over 100,000 workers at over a hundred factories and ended with the concession of significant wage increases. The legalisation of black unions which followed in the wake of this victory saw an explosion of union activity. This included the formation of sizable unions such as: the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) in 1973; the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) and the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) in 1974. Further the growth of union activity emboldened these unions to form the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in 1979 and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985. The resurgence of unionism was accompanied by an upsurge of popular protests culminating in the 1976-1977 Soweto uprising. The white-minority regime was unprepared for this unprecedented level of resistance to Apartheid rule and ill-equipped to co-opt or contain the increasingly well-organized labour and popular movements (Worden, 1994, p. 122).

Meanwhile, the political re-awakening of harshly exploited mineworkers presented a recurring challenge to white-minority rule.

The mobilisation and unionisation of mineworkers from the late 1970s onwards created economic distortions which made it increasingly difficult for the National Party to retain the semblance of control. Although initially under-reported by the South African Press, the growing unrest in the mines became increasingly apparent amid the violent and forceful struggles of the early 1980s\textsuperscript{12}. As a consequence, the Chamber of Mines was forced to make

\textsuperscript{12} An estimated 70,000 men went on strike in 1982, an action unparalleled in the mines since 1946. (Cohen, 1986, p. 54-55)
a growing number of wage and organisational concessions\textsuperscript{13}. Labour unrest in the mines escalated further in 1984 as legal strikes led by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) were followed by boycotts of “taxis, sports events, liquor outlets and concession stores” (Cohen, 1986, p. 55). The ferocity and depth of labour unrest following the dismissal of 17,000 workers from the Transvaal in April 1985, was such that Anglo-American reluctantly agreed to rehire nearly all the dismissed workers (Cohen, 1986, p. 55). The ongoing social grievances which fuelled growing unrest among mineworkers also gave rise to countrywide protests between 1984 and 1986 on a monumental scale\textsuperscript{14}. Further, the imposition and re-imposition of a state of emergency during this period only brought increased international scrutiny to bear on the Apartheid regime, undermined investor confidence in National Party leadership, and increasingly radicalised public opinion against the system of minority-rule (Murray, 1987, p. 436).

The launch of COSATU in December 1985, with 35 affiliates and a membership of over 500,000 workers was another watershed moment for the anti-Apartheid struggle. The formation of COSATU signalled a distinct shift among unions from a ‘workerist’ focus on workplace issues towards engagement with broader social issues such as Apartheid (Cobbett & Cohen, 1988, p. 31). The leadership of COSATU’s predecessor FOSATU viewed itself as a safeguard against ANC nationalism and a bastion of worker power independent of politics. COSATU also viewed itself as independent though inextricably linked to the ANC in the national struggle, or in its own words “an independent organization and… an essential component of the democratic forces in our country” (ANC-SACP-COSATU joint statement cited in Cobbett & Cohen, 1988, p. 31). However, COSATU’s identification with the national liberation struggle in 1986 crystallised the alliance between the various movements aligned to the ANC and organised labour. Further, the degree to which this independence was a fallacy is “best illustrated by the fact that some of the most vociferous advocates of union independence later became ANC public officials” (Friedman 2012, p. 25).

\textsuperscript{13} As a result of wage concessions by the Chamber of Mines the average black wage rose from 5.47 percent of that of a white worker in 1972 to 17.79 percent by 1982. (Cohen, 1986, p. 55)

\textsuperscript{14} Despite brutal repression by the white-minority government, and the detention of around 26,000 people by March 1986, strikes had increased to around 793 by the end of 1986, a 43 percent increase on the previous year, and now involved around 42,340 workers. (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 106)
5.5. The ANC: 1990 to 1994

*South Africa is on fire from end to end. The horrifying catalogue of assaults and killings must be brought to an end if we are not to sink into a state of self-perpetuating violence in which all our hopes of reform and social progress will be destroyed.* (Anon cited in Marais, 1998, p. 83)

Following its unbanning in 1990, the ANC became the presumptive government-in-waiting, entering into a series of negotiations with the National Party over the future democratic dispensation. The outcome of these negotiations ultimately shaped the society that emerged from the democratic elections of 1994. Among the concessions made with the National Party, those relating to the South African economy played a crucial role in the structures of the post-Apartheid economy and created latent tensions within the Tripartite Alliance. This was a formative period for the ANC leadership, with a variety of pressures and internal transformations resulting in a shift from a quasi-socialist Keynesian economic policy to one of fiscal conservatism. This section will examine these negotiations, the pressures accompanying them, and the internal shifts within ANC policy between 1990 and 1994.

5.5.1. Pyrrhic Victory (The Negotiated Settlement)

In the late 1980s the National Party found itself under immense pressure to reach a satisfactory compromise with the anti-Apartheid movement, as a result of unprecedented civil unrest throughout the country, ongoing economic sanctions, capital flight, recession and endemic strikes. Further, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989 and the removal of the international communist threat linked to the liberation movement conclusively undermined the rational for ‘total war’. Under these conditions, the Apartheid regime adopted a more conciliatory approach, releasing eight high-ranking political prisoners and unbanning the ANC and PAC in 1990. South African capital played a key role in these developments as a loss of confidence in white minority rule translated into increased pressure on the National Party to reach an accommodation with the ANC, which presented itself as a partner for large capital (Southall, 2008, p. 283).

Although both the ANC and PAC were champions of the liberation struggle, the ANC was largely left to negotiate with the National Party on its own as the PAC was effectively in the process of self-imploding. The negotiations between the ANC and National party took place against the backdrop of a country “on fire” as paroxysms of violence flared up across the
country often incited or tacitly encouraged by the Apartheid regime (Marais, 1998, p. 83). The spectre of violence also played a crucial role in pushing both parties to agree to a compromise as the National Party and ANC found themselves with an increasingly tenuous hold over the more radical elements within their ranks.

By mid-1992, the ANC had withdrawn from negotiations amid growing pressure from grassroots members over the ongoing killing of residents in the townships. Despite the National Party’s appointment of a commission to investigate the causes of the killings - which strongly implicated and criticised the role of state security forces - violence continued to simmer throughout the country (Worden, 1994, p. 139). Although negotiations had recommenced by 1993, the assassination of SACP and Umkhonto we Sizwe leader Chris Hani motivated an upsurge of protests across the country. This was underpinned by the atmosphere of disaffected and angry South African youths, who were critical of the “lack of any meaningful change since 1990” (Worden, 1994, p. 140-141). The ANC attempt to moderate the violence including Mandela’s call for calm was largely ignored by the impoverished population who demanded more radical policies and made tentative moves towards the PAC. Faced with a crisis of legitimacy the ANC consequently became increasingly willing to make concessions. Meanwhile, the National Party was similarly growing uneasy at the escalation of violence in the townships and the ANC’s increasing inability to curb its supporter’s radical demands. These developments brought both parties to the negotiating table in earnest and led them to agree to hold democratic elections in 1994 for a Government of National Unity (GNU), which would hold joint power during the transitional period (Worden, 1994, p. 140-141).

The negotiated outcome of a liberal democratic constitution was the result of a deal struck between elites, which neither F.W. de Klerk nor Nelson Mandela had seriously believed in or wanted. Both sides had led their followers to believe that the conflict could only be resolved on their own terms resulting in a stalemate which became increasingly untenable once it became clear that a compromise would have to be reached. As such they were “progressively forced to deceive the expectations of their constituents through negotiations”, bargaining away policy positions which had been previously held to be non-negotiable\(^\text{15}\) (Adam, Slabbert & Moodley, 1998, p. 61). This was especially true of the ANC which compromised

\(^\text{15}\) As Cyril Ramaphosa noted “sufficient consensus means, if we and the NP [National Party] agree, everyone else can get stuffed” (Adam, Slabbert & Moodley, 1998, p. 61).
on a range of economic issues with adverse and far-reaching repercussions for the fledgling democracy. Similarly, the National Party, representing the interests of the white bourgeoisie, “sold out” the poorer Afrikaners because they “felt more confident about their ability to either survive in, or leave ‘the new South Africa’” (Adam, Slabbert & Moodley, 1998, p. 57). Whereas many working-class Afrikaners wanted to maintain white-minority control the instruments they needed to sustain this system were being negotiated away by the National Party. However, the democratic dispensation was also, to a limited degree, the result of a series of strategic miscalculations by National Party negotiators, whose frequent replacement left them ill-equipped to deal with the ANC negotiating team (Adam, Slabbert & Moodley, 1998).

The interim constitution of 1994 provided for a constitutional democracy with all the features of a modern non-racial democratic state, including: a Bill of Rights protecting basic human rights and private property; a constitutional court with an independent judiciary; the separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judiciary; and a commitment to redress the legacies of Apartheid (Southall, 2014). However, the economic concessions made by the ANC during the negotiation process and as part of the Government of National Unity (1994-1997) left white domination of the economy virtually untouched. These concessions ranged from agreeing to retain the finance minister and the central bank governor and repay Apartheid-era debt, to acknowledging the formal independence of the central bank and agreeing to ‘responsible’ management of the economy in a secret letter of intent with the IMF (Peet, 2002, p. 73). Further, the ANC’s assumption of power entailed the “embrace, participation and legitimisation of globalising economic institutions” through membership in the World Trade Organisation, taking-out a condition-laden IMF loan, and reliance on the advice of World Bank teams in regard to development policies (Bond, 2007, p. 128). The end result of these concessions was the creation of an impoverished newly independent nation ruled by a liberation party with, at best, partial control over financial policy, deeply influenced by and intertwined with neoliberal global economic institutions.

ANC technocratic Mac Maharaj, who played a key role in overseeing the transition process, was himself confronted by these compromises noting that “at times I had to ask myself whether the compromises were not going too far. However… Any compromise became tolerable if it did not block majority rule” (Adam, Slabbert & Moodley, 1998, p. 61).
5.5.2. The ANC Turns Right

Despite a public commitment to ‘state-interventionist redistributive strategy’ the ANC adopted a series of economic policy reversals between 1990 and 1994 entirely inconsistent with the needs of their constituents. Following the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, the redistributive policies of the ANC faced intense pressure from international and South African capital and global financial institutions. The collapse of the PAC left the ANC as the presumptive “government-in-waiting” desperate to reach a political solution that ensured long-term stability for itself (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 109). A crucial element of this approach was courting South African capital, which led the ANC to adopt “positions increasingly consistent with neoliberal orthodoxy” (Webster, Lambert & Bezuidenhout, 2008, p. 165-166). Further, statements made by ANC leaders faced intense scrutiny from speculative capital with the value of the Rand fluctuating with confidence in the negotiated settlement and the incoming ANC-government (Peet, 2002, p. 71). However, the ANC’s internal policy shifts during this period reflect not only the disciplining of the liberation movement by speculative capital but are also indicative of a wider discursive struggle. This struggle took place on fundamentally uneven terrain with the collapse of the Soviet Union denying the ANC material and ideological support and dividing the independent left. Further, as the negative aspects of ‘socialist planning’ elsewhere in Africa and East-central Europe were becoming well known, nationalisation and the idea of an economy with a central role for the state came under growing criticism (Lazar, 1996, p. 614). The result was a shift to the right as the ANC became increasingly critical of nationalisation and redistribution, and a willingness to accept economic compromises which would have been unthinkable only years earlier (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 109-110).

Though the ability of global financial institutions and international capital speculation to punish economic unorthodoxy is undeniable, the ANC’s shift to the right cannot be attributed solely to these coercive financial instruments. Firstly, although entry into the World Trade Organisation required South Africa to drop import restrictions and trade barriers, the ANC did this much more quickly than it was obliged to, essentially throwing away the “instruments by which it could have pursued a Keynesian, even socialist, economic policy” (Koelble, 2004, p. 61, 67). Secondly, South Africa’s political and economic isolation from the rest of the globe during the final years of Apartheid meant that its economy was “not burdened with obligations to repay its loans and, as a result, not subject to the dictates of international agencies” (Koelble, 2004, p. 61, 67). As such, the normal instruments of
financial coercion employed by the World Bank and IMF to force developing countries into enforcing neoliberal economic orthodoxy, such as structural adjustment programmes (SAP), were ineffective. This has led authors such as Hart (2014) to argue that whilst foreign governments and Western financial institutions influenced ANC policy, “the dominant role [was] played by representatives of the MEC [Minerals Industrial Complex]” (Hart, 2014, p. 125). As such, the ANC’s embrace of economic orthodoxy was heavily influenced by South African conglomerates were “straining at the leash” to re-engage with an increasingly financialised global economy (Hart, 2014, p. 22). Thus, the ANC’s shift to the right must be understood within the context of the disciplining of internal discursive processes by “external discursive, political and financial pressures” (Peet, 2007, p. 130).

Throughout the negotiation period the ANC, and South Africa more widely, was subject to intense discursive pressure to adopt neoliberal economic policies. The ANC policies of nationalisation and growth through redistribution were heavily criticised by international institutions, businesses, and the media as inefficient and out-dated. Statements made by ANC leaders, especially those relating to redistributive economic policy, came under intense scrutiny by South African business organisations, the media and from the World Bank and IMF (Peet, 2007, p. 137). Nationalisation came under particular fire from conservative think tanks aligned with the government and/or South African capital, global economic institutions, and economists often linked to those institutions. These organisations and individuals maligned the efficiency and profitability of nationalised firms, the cost of nationalisation, and the potential loss of growth through capital flight (Lazar, 1996, p. 614). In bringing its discursive power to bear on the ANC the World Bank also sent numerous missions to South Africa to inculcate economic orthodoxy in ANC researchers and policy advisors, whilst ANC leaders were sent for training to World Bank and IMF headquarters in Washington and feted with private “orientation sessions” at exclusive game resorts (Narsiah, 2002, p. 4). These efforts were highly effective, translating into significant changes in ANC policy documents between 1992 and 1993 towards World Bank prescriptions (Narsiah, 2002). This subsequently led to a softening of the ANC leadership’s position, leading them to circulate a workshop package to its branches “warning of the costs and inefficiencies of nationalization” (Nattras, 1994, p. 345).

A key aspect of the discursive struggle was the emergence of formal discourses on development written by ‘expert’ policy groups consisting of liberal academics, but
increasingly dominated by economists, businessmen, academics, the World Bank and the IMF (Peet, 2007, p. 130). The emergence of this neoliberal academic-industrial-media (AIM) complex internalised and disseminated the hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism through policy prescriptions, reports, articles, press releases and other forms of dispersion (Peet, 2002, p. 58-60). Examples of this include policy recommendations by the Ministry of Finance which noted that “participants in market systems do better when their freedom of decision is not directly curtailed, but at most indirectly guided” (cited in Lazar, 1996, p. 618), and the IMF which stressed “sound monetary and fiscal policies” and ‘more flexibility in employment’ (cited in Peet, 2007, p. 145). Meanwhile, Conservative think-tanks and institutions elevated the fundamentalist free-market ideas of Milton Friedman and Von Hayek into policy positions and implanted these conventional neoliberal ideas about growth and development into the thinking of ANC leaders (Peet, 2002, p. 72-73). This was supported by reports by the South African Chamber of Business, insurance conglomerate Sanlam and the Mont Fleur conglomerate that emphasised the need for economic freedom and an outward focus for growth and limited state intervention, concepts which subsequently began to gain currency in development policy discussions (Peet, 2002, p. 73). The media also played a significant role in this ideological barrage by entrenching these ideas in the popular consciousness and attacking any “heterodoxy and dissonance in ANC thinking” (Peet, 2007, p. 140).

The speed of the ANC’s turn to economic orthodoxy also reflects division among the independent left in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse and its thorough unpreparedness to combat the “neoliberal discursive prescriptions of the global economic powers” (Peet, 2002, p. 66). The ANC’s theoretical conceptions were heavily influenced by the SACP’s Colonialism of a Special Type (CST) which equated the overthrow of racial oppression with the downfall of capitalism in South Africa. However, as Harold Wolpe notes, this position submerges the “economic into the political” resulting in analysis which does not substantially explain “the consequences of the balance of payments, the search for export markets… [or how] such changes are politically defined” (1980, p. 16). This theoretical weakness was exacerbated by the ANC’s lack of a research department, undermining the ANC’s capacity to articulate policy positions in contrast to big business and Apartheid regime bureaucrats. As a result, the economic debate shifted decisively “from the ideological to the technical terrain” in which representatives of national and multinational capital could readily articulate proposals for attracting foreign investment and capital at a technical level the ANC and its
leftist allies could not (Marais, 1998, p. 158). The World Bank further divided the left by embarking on a trust-building campaign with ANC leftists which attempted to reduce poverty through “private sector expansion in labour-intensive industries” (World Bank in Peet, 207, p. 141).

The ANC’s internal policy shifts during this period must be understood with reference to the material influence of speculative capital and the discursive influence of international institutions. From a Gramscian perspective, hegemony depends on the ability to re-orient common sense both nationally and internationally through “powerful international institutions and material capabilities” (Dufour, 2008, p. 245). As such, the negotiation period is marked by the transfer of the economic discourse of neoliberalism, formed in the West, into South Africa through international organisations and the semi-peripheral-intellectual stratum (Peet, 2002, 56). Thus, the ANC’s policy shifts during this period are the result of the reorientation of the ANC’s ‘common sense’ understandings about how economies function, leading to reversals and uncertainty surrounding nationalisation and redistribution. This discursive offensive was supported by significant financial levers including loans and agreements with the IMF and World Bank, leaving the fragmented independent left increasingly isolated. Accordingly, the ANC began moving towards a position compatible with the IMF inspired export-oriented program of the National Party embodied by the Normative Economic Model (NEM) of 1993 (Narsiah, 2002, p. 4-5).

5.5.3. **ANC Economic Policy 1990-1994**

Although the ANC ostensibly had no “substantial economic policies until 1990” (Nattras, 1994, p. 344) the ANC had come to represent a broad set of policies for its constituency. The ANC has been linked to demands for redistribution and nationalisation since the 1940s, adopting nationalisation as a core principal in the Freedom Charter in 1955 (Peet, 2002, p. 67). Further organisations centred on the ANC such as the Economic Trends Group (ET) and the Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG), articulated an alternative policy discourse in a series of documents which were supported to varying degrees by the ANC. However, despite the influence of these organisations in the early 1990s, ANC policy came increasingly under the influence of neoliberal discourse articulated by representatives of national and international capital. This section will detail these shifts in economic policy, the extent to which ANC policy had been ‘captured’ by neoliberal discourse by 1994, and the degree to
which free market understandings are evident in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).

Officially adopted by the ANC in June 1955, the Freedom Charter was the first definitive statement of the liberation movement’s vision for a post-Apartheid South Africa. The Freedom Charter was based upon lists of “freedom demands” submitted over hundreds of meetings and written by a committee of the Congress of Democrats, a “white, liberal-left alliance associated with the ANC” (Peet, 2002, p. 67). As such, it emphasised human rights, racial equality, equal education, redistribution and land reform. Subsequently, the charter was seen by many as a “radical eco-nomic statement about development, social control over resources, and human liberation” combining liberal democratic ideals with nationalist principles, albeit with a socialist gloss (Peet, 2002, p. 68). Further, although many Africanists left the ANC after the its adoption - instead forming the PAC - as signatories to the charter it also gave the ANC credibility as a black nationalist movement. However, despite the Freedom Charter’s emphasis on working class demands for equality and redistribution it was far from an “operational blue-print grounded upon or compatible with only one mechanism or form of economic organization” (Nattras, 1994, p. 344). Much of the document was left deliberately vague in an effort to (successfully) reconcile business and working class interests. However, in discussing economic rights and land reform the charter does specifically demand that the wealth of mining, financial and monopoly industries “be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole” (African National Congress, 1955). This was later reflected in the Constitutional Guidelines of the ANC which envisaged a “rapid and irreversible redistribution of wealth and opening up of facilities to all” under a mixed economy “with a public sector, a private sector and a small-scale family sector” (Peet, 2002, p. 68).

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of left-leaning research networks emerged with an aim to guide ANC economic policy, prominent among them was ET and MERG. The former was created in 1986 by progressive union-oriented academics from the universities of Johannesburg, Natal and Cape Town, whilst the latter was formed in 1991 by progressive economists and academics from the University of Witwatersrand. These research groups emphasised a ‘growth through redistribution’ approach to economic policy, stressing the need for a developmental state to meet the basic needs of its constituents through a mixed economy. Although the ANC reaffirmed its support for a “basic needs” approach in its 1992
national conference, this proposal was heavily criticised by conventional economists, South African businesses and the media as “inflationary” (Marais, 1998, p. 149-151; Peet, 2002, p. 69-70). MERG similarly proposed a “post-Keynesian” policy framework in 1993 advocating state-led investment in a “physical and social infrastructure” program which also faced heavy criticism (Narsiah, 2002, p. 5). The rejection of this proposal by the ANC signalled the decline of the influence of these groups and the ‘growth through redistribution’ faction within the ANC.

Following its unbanning in 1990, ANC economic policy was marked by a prolonged period of policy indecision accompanied by schisms along factional lines within the ANC-led Alliance. The ANC’s initial suggestions were reminiscent of development policy documents produced by the Economic Trends Group, emphasising growth through redistribution (Nattras, 1994, p. 344). The earliest systematic document on economic policy, which emerged out of economic policy conferences held in Harare in March-April 1990, affirmed the “leading role” of the state in “the reconstruction of the economy in order to facilitate the realisation of its developmental objectives” (Lazar, 1996, p. 615). However, this approach was criticised by some factions of the ANC-alliance, resulting in the reproduction of neoliberal economic ideas about ‘redistribution through growth’ in the 1990 Discussion Document on Economic Policies (DDEP). This document provoked the ire of grassroots activists and trade unionists and was swiftly followed by other economic policy documents emphasising the prominence of the state in South African economic development (Lazar, 1996, p. 614). However, the DDEP illustrates the concerns of the more moderate leadership and ANC economists whose views were becoming increasingly tempered by “technical economic arguments and political considerations”, and whose influence would continue to reassert itself (Nattras, 1994, p. 350).

The shifting balance within the ANC-led alliance was reflected in the increasing influence of the orthodox economic modes of thinking among the national leadership. This can be seen in the shifting economic understandings in economic policy documents between April 1990 and 1994. These policies were initially informed by an implicit understanding that the existing economy “ignored or was unable to meet the basic needs of millions” and, further, that state intervention would be necessary to meet these needs (Lazar, 1996). However, the degree to which ANC policymakers envisioned state intervention in the economy drastically changed
over this period from that of central actor to co-ordinating partner. Further, the tone of ANC economic policy documents became markedly less threatening towards financial institutions and businesses, instead focusing on encouraging private-sector partnership and investment. The threatening stance towards the private sector evident in policy documents from 1990 is softened substantially in the 1991 draft resolution, and is notably absent from the 1992 document which instead emphasises “mechanisms to encourage private-sector financial institutions” participation (Lazar, 1996, p. 615). The 1991 and 1992 draft resolutions presented economic policy as highly flexible and pragmatic and consciously made no mention of COSATU’s goal of a ‘high wage, low cost’ economy. Although these policy shifts may have been formulated with a business audience in mind, they also reflect the growing influence of the neoliberal economic rationalities within the ANC and the leadership’s conscious attempt to distance itself from the trade union agenda.

The shift towards economic orthodoxy in ANC economic policy during the 1990 to 1994 period remained highly inconsistent and contradictory as a result of growing resistance within the Alliance. The ANC’s moves to appease business provoked stiff opposition by trade unionists and grassroots activists who were becoming increasingly disturbed by the ANC’s top-down approach and unwillingness to consult Alliance members over negotiations (Nattras, 1994, p. 351). As such, ANC policy was also tempered by COSATU, whose importance in mobilising support and involvement in economic policy making institutions such as NEDLAC gave it significant leverage. Whereas ANC leaders and economists largely wrote the draft resolutions of 1991 and 1992, the final 1992 economic policy resolutions were heavily influenced by trade unionists and populists. This is reflected in the latter resolution’s extended acknowledgement of the need to “restructure and rationalize the financial sector” and heavily tax corporations (Nattras, 1994, p. 355). By contrast, the ANC economist-written 1992 Draft Policy Guidelines (DPG) made no mention of restructuring the financial sector. Instead it emphasised the flexibility of ANC economic policy, the ANC’s commitment to property rights, and the need for a “dynamic private sector”, even suggesting openness to privatisation of the public sector (Nattras, 1994, p. 353-354). However, despite the success of trade unionists and grassroots activists in tempering aspects of ANC economic policy, the

17 Whereas the March-April 1990 economic policy document assumed the state would play a “leading role in the reconstruction of the economy” (Lazar, 1996, p. 615-616) the 1992 document only noted its “ultimate responsibility- in co-ordination with the trade union movement, business and other organs of civil society- for coordinating, planning and guiding the development of the economy” (African National Congress, 1992).
failure to develop a sustained and detailed critique of economic liberalisation translated into an uncritical embrace of economic liberalisation by the ANC leadership. This is evident in the unproblematised acceptance of the need for a liberalised “mixed economy” in the ANC’s 1992 economic policy document (African National Congress, 1992). The ‘growth through redistribution’ faction decisively lost the battle of ideas within the ANC in December 1993 when the interim government signed an agreement for an $850 million condition-laden loan from the IMF\(^\text{18}\) (Peet, 2002, p. 73). This loan committed the ANC to classic neoliberal policies including cutting state spending, public sector wages and tariff barriers, and placed pressure on the ANC leadership to retain the former National Party finance minister and central bank governor (Bond, 2004, p. 1).

Between 1990 and 1994, ANC economic policy became increasingly orthodox as a result of the pervasive influence of local and international capital and international financial institutions. However, by 1994 the ANC had not yet embraced neoliberalism, with the degree of economic orthodoxy in policy documents often changing to reflect the balance of power within the ANC-led alliance. The ANC responsiveness to its alliance partners translated into a changeable economic policy which remained highly inconsistent and contradictory throughout the negotiation period. However, the ANC had agreed to a number of intractable deals with global financial institutes which compromised its responsiveness to its partners and civil society in the post-Apartheid Period.

5.5.4. The RDP: Between Reconstruction and Redistribution

In the lead up to the 1994 election the ANC articulated a policy framework which could appease both business interests and its alliance partners whilst also appealing to the bulk of the population. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was born out of the ANC’s need to attract capital without jeopardising stability, and thereby accommodate the conflicting interests of a host of social and economic forces. As such, the RDP was able to give voice to the aspirations of the left whilst simultaneously allowing the ANC to pursue an

\(^{18}\) The ANC had earlier signed a secret “letter of intent” committing itself to ‘responsible’ economic management in the wake of an IMF issued report stressing the need for an “outward-looking macroeconomic strategy” and how wealth would be redistributed through the ‘trickle down’ effect. (Peet, 2002, p. 73)
economic policy which was business friendly with huge implications for the post-Apartheid
economy.

The product of leftist intellectuals from ET and MERG and representatives of NGOs and
social movements, the RDP was a political chameleon. As such it was seen as both a radical
programme for change by the left and a fiscally responsible policy by conservative
commentators19 (Marais, 2011, p. 403-404). The RDP married Keynesian commitments to
build a million new homes and expand the provision of electricity, water and sewage systems
with conservative fiscal policies aimed at attracting foreign capital. Thus, despite noting that
the public sector must play a “major enabling role” in the economy, it also emphasised
flexibility, noting that policy may extend or reduce the public sector in “strategic areas”
according to the “balance of evidence” (Lazar, 1996, p. 617). Further, whereas redistribution
was popular among the dispossessed majority who hungered for reparations, the ANC was
afraid of undermining its economic credentials and convinced of the long-term economic
benefits of restructuring. The RDP was developed as a means to unite the populace behind an
economic policy which could reconcile the interests of business and the populace. This
manifested in a linking of reconstruction with development and a focus on expanding basic
services such as water, electricity, transportation and telephone lines which would, according
to the logic of the RDP, stimulate economic activity and facilitate further growth (Horwitz,

As the election manifesto of the ANC the RDP was designed to appeal to the widest audience
possible and rally civil society organisations, mass movements and unions. Consequently, the
RDP was less interested with boosting investor confidence than official ANC economic
policy. Instead it gave preference to mass-based organisations, which had been voicing
growing concerns over the ANC’s lack of consultation over policy formulation. As such it
emphasised “rural development, housing issues and affirmative action to a far greater extent”
than fiscal restraint (Nattras, 1994, p. 358). Further, the RDP goes above and beyond to
demonstrate the ANC’s embrace of community organisation, even defining democracy as not
just an electoral system but an “active process enabling everybody to contribute to

19 Conservative commentators went so far as to note that “all signs are that our policy makers
see that the objectives of the RDP are wholly compatible with the three words [privatisation,
liberalisation and convertibility] which so interest the money men” (Marais, 2011, p. 403-404).
reconstruction and development” (Nattras, 1994, p. 358). Consequently, demands for community control over and access to government resources such as housing, water, sanitation, electricity, transport, health care and social welfare through the devolution of state functions to new mass-based organisational structures are recurring themes throughout the RDP (Nattras, 1994, p. 359). The interests of unions are also represented by the RDP’s warning to foreign investors that they must abide by South African laws and labour standards and a commitment to fostering worker knowledge, technical education and participation in decision making. Further, although the nationalisation of the mines was no longer an option, the RDP made a token gesture towards the SACP by suggesting that mineral rights be returned to the state. However, whether the ANC ever intended to implement these policies is dubious at best given that “many of the RDP's demands are impractical and unaffordable goes without saying” (Nattras, 1994, p. 359).

Although the RDP accepted the major tenants of ANC economic policy, it is far more sympathetic to the demands of the ANC’s constituency, unions, and community organisations. However, despite some strong (qualified) statements on mineral rights and the public sector it adopts a cautious attitude towards business interests. As such, it merely hints at a prescribed assets policy (whereby fund managers would have to place a minimum number of new investments in a certain class of investments) should “co-operation not be forthcoming” (Lazar, 1996, p. 615). Further, after the RDP’s demand for state mineral rights led to a decline in the gold index the RDP was revised, with the section on private mineral rights noticeably toned down. In addition, when the RDP was translated into policy in November 1994 a much greater emphasis was placed on fiscal discipline, stressing the necessity of “establishment of an economic environment conducive to economic growth”, and “trade and industry policies designed to foster a greater outward orientation” (Peet, 2002, p. 70-71; Narsiah, 2002).

Although leftist intellectuals and union and community organisation representatives conceived the RDP as an attempt to regain the initiative, ANC economists’ perceived need to accommodate business interests increasingly dominated its character. Thus, the result was a vague contradictory document with popular appeal “beset by enough fragmented voices, multiple identities and competing discourses to leave even postmodern analysts confused” (Bond cited in Marais, 2011, p. 404). As such, although many saw it as a vaguely radical document embodying the ideas of the freedom charter, the ANC could feasibly say it was
pursuing the objectives of the RDP while implementing a series of fiscally conservative economic policies.

5.6. **NUMSA: 1987-Present**

Among COSATU’s affiliates, one of the most vociferous advocates of trade union independence was MAWU’s successor the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). NUMSA was a proudly workerist union which maintained the importance of protecting the “independent political interests of the working class” (Ruiters, 2014, p. 430). In 1993, NUMSA tabled a resolution to reinstate COSATU’s independence and look at new forms of working class organisation, though this came under heavy fire from the SACP and other affiliates and was ultimately unsuccessful. In the post-Apartheid period, NUMSA became increasingly disgruntled with the ANC’s neoliberal agenda and the growing entanglement of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP. Ultimately this led NUMSA to hold a special congress in which it resolved to uphold many of its 1993 resolutions, resulting in its departure from COSATU in 2014 and development of a United Front. This section will detail the development of NUMSA between 1987 and 1994, the internal tensions within both the union and COSATU, and the consequences for NUMSA’s trajectory in the post-Apartheid period.

Founded in May 1987, NUMSA resulted from the merger of four different unions from the engineering, motor, auto/tyre and electronics sectors, including: The Motor Industry Combined Workers Union (MICWU); the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU); the United Metal, Mining and Allied Workers of South Africa (UMMAWOSA); and MAWU. The latter had been one of the most radical members of FOSATU and its successor quickly became seen as the “hard-line workerist” union within COSATU, adopting MAWU’s formal resolution “that socialism should be built and that the unions should work with organisations that accept socialism as the goal” (Baskin in Ruiters, 2014, p.430). Unhappy with the ANC’s bureaucratic style of operating with workers, supposedly ‘populist’ approach, and support for weak unions, NUMSA adopted the Alliance’s Freedom Charter as a set of “minimum political demands” which would be reassessed in the future (Forrest, 2007, p. 365). By 1988 NUSMA had built a considerable power base in the metalworking industry’s national centralised forums through its combative behaviour toward employers (Forrest, 2007, p. 365). In the late-1980s NUMSA leadership began to re-evaluate this approach, establishing a number of Research and Development Groups (RDGs) to seriously
consider its role in the industry and its capacity to shape working class conditions on a systemic level. Although these RDGs were defunct by the early 1990s, the union leadership would return to the ideas forwarded by these groups especially after the colossal failure of the 1992 strikes (Forrest, 2007, p. 365-6).

NUMSA’s new approach drew heavily on the findings of RDGs, emphasising the need to build workers’ power through education and up-skilling and engage proactively with employers. This strategy borrowed heavily from the “strategic unionism” of the Australian Congress of Trade Unions, which stressed: “proactive rather than reactive unionism; participation through bipartite and tripartite institutions; and a high level of union capacity, education and research” (Forrest, 2007, p. 370). As such, NUMSA sought to make education and training open to all workers and link training to pay in an industry-wide grading system. However, the low-level of literacy and education among many black workers made this impossible in the South African context. As a result, NUMSA adopted a resolution in 1991 that Adult Basic Education (ABE) would be integrated with NUMSA’s vocational training system. NUMSA also began engaging with the government and employers in numerous local, regional and national forums, and by 1993 was negotiating the formulation of a policy of “bargained corporatism”, i.e. mutual “co-operation for mutual gain” (Forrest, 2007, p. 371). Under this new approach NUMSA sought to replace the annual militant mobilisation of workers around wage demands with a three-year plan negotiated between the union and employer, in which “wage demands would be linked to industry growth and job creation” (Forrest, 2007, p. 372). This ambitious strategy aimed to fundamentally restructure the workplace by flattening company structures, allowing for greater worker management over their own labour.

By 1992, NUMSA was faced with an internal crisis as the leadership had increasingly fallen out of sync with the aspirations of its membership. Despite the leadership’s commitment to bargaining with the National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry (NICISEMI), deadlocked negotiations nearly every year since 1988 fuelled member unrest (Forrest, 2007, p 366-367). Further, the leadership’s shift away from adversarial relations to constructive engagement with employers was poorly understood by NUMSA’s membership who were emboldened by the heady optimism of the early 1990s and

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20 At the time, only 34 percent of black people had received more than five years of public education. (Forrest, 2007, p. 371)
militaristic opposition to Apartheid. However, the leadership was opposed to confrontational strikes in a recessionary and shrinking economy as the risk of retrenchments associated with striking was very high. Ultimately responding to the mood of its members NUMSA waged a prolonged industry wide strike in 1992, involving around 100,000 workers in 782 factories primarily focused on reducing the wage disparity between black workers and white artisans (Forrest, 2007, p. 368-369). However, the failure of this strike and the consequent dismissal of workers made it clear to the union membership that an adversarial approach to relations would be untenable. This was a watershed moment for NUMSA’s leadership, who now insisted on the necessity of pursuing its new agenda of restructuring in a declining economic climate where “global competition further threatened jobs and working conditions” (Forrest, 2007, p. 369).

By 1994 it became clear to NUMSA leadership that its demands were still not understood by much of the membership. Largely, this is the result of adopting a highly complex strategy which required forging “links between training, career-pathing, reducing wage-gaps and the restructuring of work organisation” (Forrest, 2007, p. 375). Further, NUMSA was operating in a low trust situation with a history of management/labour conflict where workers had learned that militant resistance delivered gains and “employers had a history of providing minimal information about their companies’ operations” (Forrest, 2007, p. 372). The focus on immediate “money gains” among the vast majority of union members and the long timeframe between negotiation, implementation and gains translated into growing member dissatisfaction with union negotiations (Forrest, 2007, p. 372). As such, it became increasingly clear that NUMSA and their members’ employers had vastly different objectives. This was only problematized further by industry wide confusion over how to restructure and differentiate between employers who required a multi-skilled workforce and those that did not. Further, whilst NUMSA sought to increase worker skills, limit management’s control over production and create systemic change, most employers simply wanted less strikes, less wage concessions and to extract more productivity from workers. The tensions between the different strategic objectives of employers and NUMSA were exposed during negotiations over wage increases and the skill development programmes during the 1994 bargaining round. The failure to reach an agreement quickly escalated into an industry-wide strike lasting five weeks, which undermined the strategy of the NUMSA leadership and led it to reconsider its position (Forrest, 2007, p. 375).
The 1994 democratic election and NUMSA’s engagement with numerous bipartite and tripartite forums further complicated the union’s new strategy. The leadership who understood the complexities of the new strategy were deeply involved in these forums leaving union negotiations in the hands of less well-versed negotiators. Further, many NUMSA members were largely unaware of the union’s participation in these forums and would not necessarily have grasped their significance or that of the issues discussed (Forrest, 2007, p. 377). This was further problematised by the mobilisation of workers solely around winning the vote for the ANC in the months prior to the 1994 election. The loss of many experienced unionists between 1993 and 1995, as positions opened up in the post-Apartheid government and new policy institutions, not only drained NUMSA’s leadership structure but also removed those people who best understood its new agenda. Further, the opening up of management structures was followed by the departure of many senior shop-stewards meaning “good national agreements were not being implemented at plant level” (Forrest, 2007, p. 378). Finally, the new leadership lacked the knowledge to navigate the range of complex issues embedded in this strategy and tended to negotiate the programme on an issue-by-issue basis.

NUMSA’s hugely ambitious project of restructuring the metalworking industry was poorly implemented from the start and became increasingly derailed as employers pushed their own agendas. Restructuring initiatives were often instituted as a result of faddish interest by management, and the expansion and development of workers’ skills was seen as a way of making the workforce more flexible, and thereby lowering labour costs (Forrest, 2007, p. 376). Further, it became evident to both employers and NUMSA that the post-Fordist teamwork “did not necessarily improve productivity or retain jobs” with many of the most-productive companies operating in a classically Fordist manner (Forrest, 2007, p. 376). Despite success in the homogenous auto industry, NUMSA’s strategic vision was thwarted in the engineering industry by employers’ unwillingness to find common ground and reluctance to instituting elements of the programmes. Overall implementation was also hamstrung by lower-level management who often resisted management’s attempts to restructure labour. Seizing on the perceived weakness of NUMSA, many employers began restoring the control they had lost in the late 1980s, which often involved a “reversion to the former apartheid workplace regime” (Forrest, 2007, p. 378-379).
By 1995 NUMSA’s strategy had manifestly failed to increase worker control over the means of production or democratise the workplace. Further, NUMSA’s strategy of co-determination had increasingly divided the union between a hard-line workerist faction and a reformist faction pursuing increasingly nebulous objectives. This culminated in NUMSA’s participation in the mass dismissal of striking workers from Volkswagen’ Uitenhage plant in 2000 followed by “a restriction of debate, centralization of decision making, and a limited focus on the workplace” (Bolsmann, 2010, p. 534-535). However, during the 2000s NUMSA began to re-evaluate this approach, abandoning its strategy of co-development, and developing relationships with social actors and consolidating links between the membership and leadership.

NUMSA was also deeply involved in escalating tensions within COSATU over the trajectory of the economy. This was fuelled by the sentiment among the left that “Mbeki’s neoliberalism had far too generously rewarded white business interests” (Bond, 2014, p. 10). However, though unions and communists presented a united front during the ousting of Thabo Mbeki as president of the ANC in 2007, the ANC’s continuation of the neoliberal economic trajectory under Zuma, left NUMSA increasingly disillusioned. Ultimately this led to a prolonged split within COSATU between “Zuma/Ramaphosa loyalists and those with working class interests at heart led by NUMSA” (Bond, 2014, p. 10). This split was eventually breached in 2012 with the first post-apartheid massacre of striking mineworkers in Marikana, in which the ANC was heavily implicated, leading NUMSA to declare that “the working class cannot any longer see the ANC or the SACP as its class allies” (cited in Ruiters, 2014, p. 421-422).

Following a special congress in 2013, NUMSA pledged to organise not only mineworkers but any workers and “reconstruct a new South African left from below” (Bond, 2014, p. 1). NUMSA delegates supported a shift farther left than NUMSA’s leadership including Irvin Jim and Zwelinzima Vavi had anticipated, including: condemnation of ANC policies; a withdrawal of support for the ANC; demands for the resignation of President Zuma; support for a showdown and likely separation from COSATU; authorisation to recruit across the value chain; the establishment of a United Front to co-ordinate community and workplace struggles; and the development of a movement towards socialism (Bond, 2014, p. 15). Accordingly, NUMSA recruited likeminded unions into the Nine Plus Unions, including the South African Catering Commercial and Allied Workers Union, the Communication Workers
Union, the Public and Allied Workers Union of South Africa, the Food and Allied Workers Union, the South African Municipal Workers Union, the Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa, the South African Domestic Service and Allied Workers Union, the Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union and the Commercial Stevedoring Agriculture and Allied Workers Union (Ruiters, 2014, p. 439). These unions are far more organised and well-resourced than community groups and social movements and have played a “strident role in helping to lead and coordinate protests by the dozens of groups… that have been surfacing all over SA” (Ruiters, 2014, p. 438). However, NUMSA’s attempt to bolster ties between unions, community organisations and unions through the United Front has been slow, creating the perception of inertia among commentators (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015).

NUMSA’s experiences in the Apartheid and early post-Apartheid period has impacted its development into a socially progressive union and champion of the independent left. The failure of NUMSA’s attempt to adopt strategies which reached an accommodation with capital have encouraged the development of an unabashedly anti-neoliberal orientation, backed by support at the grassroots and branch levels. As such, NUMSA’s development in the post-Apartheid period has emphasised the need to co-ordinate resistance throughout civil society, evident in its focus on creating a United Front, rather than simply new forms of working class organisation. Further, NUMSA’s criticism of the ANC-led alliance, and COSATU’s support thereof, is historically informed, with its 2013 resolutions at its special congress echoing those made in 1993. As a result, NUMSA has emerged as a key critic of the ANC and champion of the left, capable of bringing the disparate elements of the independent left together and undermining the hegemony of the ANC.

5.7. Conclusion

Contestations over hegemony in post-Apartheid South Africa are deeply informed by the legacies of colonialism and Apartheid. The current configuration of the South African economy around agriculture, mining and extractive industries is a direct result of its entry into the modern capitalist world system as a semi-peripheral country. Further, the development of capitalism in South Africa is intertwined with the racialised legacy of colonialism, which was enshrined during segregation, and solidified and codified under the Apartheid System. Further, its position as the central node of capital accumulation in the region, deeply impacted the development of surrounding countries whilst creating the preconditions of regional hegemony during the Apartheid and post-Apartheid period (Wolpe,
In addition, the development of the system of Apartheid and its slow decline and collapse had profound impacts on the post-Apartheid state. These range from the racialised, unequal structure of the economy to the militarism of unions, the suppression of civil society and the character of civil society organisations. In addition, the conditions of the anti-Apartheid struggle defined the character of the movements that emerged from it, including the ANC, COSATU and the SACP. As such, the ANC’s vanguardist, statist approach to development, its tendency to monopolise the terrain of civil society and hostility to alternative political or social movements must be understood with reference to the legacies of Apartheid. Similarly, these legacies inform the subservience of the SACP (and to a lesser degree COSATU) to the ANC agenda and use of the discourse of national liberation to attack critics.

In addition to the legacies of Apartheid, the concessions made during the negotiated transition and the ANC’s shift towards ‘redistribution through growth’ deeply inform struggles over hegemony in the post-Apartheid period. This chapter argues that the concessions made during the negotiated settlement effectively hamstrung ANC economic policy by transferring control of key financial institutions outside the sphere of ANC influence and fostering dependence on Western financial institutions. In addition, the ANC’s shift from ‘growth through redistribution’ and halting embrace of conservative fiscal policies, reflected a broader discursive struggle. Though incomplete by 1994, the ANC’s embrace of capital was an essential precondition for the emergence of an alternative hegemonic project centred on the ANC based on a neoliberal consensus between local and regional elites. In addition, the development of NUMSA between 1987 and the present deeply informed its character, resulting in a shift from a workerist perspective to an embrace of social movement unionism. Consequently, NUMSA re-examined itself in the post-Apartheid period adopting a ready responsiveness to its membership and view of struggle based on the ‘battle of ideas’. Thus, although NUMSA has been a continual detractor of the ANC-led alliance, its current struggle against the ANC and neoliberalism is characterised by a conscious attempt to build a viable counter-hegemonic project, rather than engage with conjunctural politics. Thus, the history of Apartheid deeply informs current struggles over hegemony and the character of those groups contesting and enforcing the dominance of the ANC hegemonic project.
6. **Post-Apartheid South Africa**

The winning formula to seal the victory of the market is not to attack, but to preserve the placebo of a compassionate public authority, extolling the compatibility of competition with solidarity. (Anderson cited in Marais, 2011, p. 139)

6.1. **Introduction**

This chapter extends the historical analysis of the previous chapter to the economy and politics of the ANC in the post-Apartheid period focusing on four key areas relevant to this study: 1) ANC post-1994 economic policy; 2) the performance of South Africa’s post-Apartheid economy; 3) applying the rationale of ‘passive revolution’ to understanding ANC hegemony; and, 4) the unravelling relationship between the ANC and popular forms of resistance. These are crucial areas for understanding the post-Apartheid state’s contradictory character, and the broad waves of resistance to it.

In government, ANC economic policy remains constrained by commitments made during the negotiated settlement, including: repayment of Apartheid-era debt; condition-laden IMF loans; World Trade Organisation membership; and “responsible” (read neoliberal) economic management (Bond, 2007, p. 128; Peet, 2002, p. 73). These constraints are reinforced by foreign currency speculation, which forced the ANC to adopt deflationary economic policies. The result was a growing distance between the ANC and civil society, and ongoing tensions within the Tripartite Alliance. This chapter begins by outlining the shifts in ANC economic policy from the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) to Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), the New Growth Plan (NGP), and the National Development Plan (NDP). This is followed by an examination of the ANC policies of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and land reform, and a critique of the performance of South Africa’s post-Apartheid economy. Further, it explores the ANC’s shift toward neoliberal orthodoxy through the lens of ‘passive revolution’, detailing the shifting balance of power within the ANC-led Alliance, and the ANC’s use of national, ethnic, historical and cultural ideas to mobilise consent. This chapter concludes with an exploration of the waning capacity of the ANC to mobilise consent, amidst increasingly antagonistic relationships with social movements, community organisations and labour unions.
6.2. ANC Economic Policy post-1994

Despite great hopes, South Africa’s economy declined after Apartheid: with official unemployment increasing from 19.1% in 1994 to 26.1% by 2010 (Murwirapachena & Sibanda, 2014, p. 556); declining real wages shown by the real unit cost of labour falling approximately 2 percent per annum (Bond and Desai, 2006, p. 22); and the United Nations Development program (UNDP) finding in 2003 that poverty and inequality had actually “increased, not decreased, since 1994” (Gibson, 2005, p. 94). These problems are often attributed to the legacy of Apartheid and the compromises made during the negotiated settlement, however this chapter maintains that while these origins are true, South Africa’s economic malaise and failures of national and local governance have been structured by the ANC’s embrace of neoliberalism. This section will examine the ANC’s various economic policy frameworks since 1994, the drivers behind these policies, their failures, and their repercussions for the ANC-led Alliance.


The clash of economic rationalities between Keynesian state intervention and the “allegedly sound criteria” of neoliberalism is most vividly illustrated in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (Lazar, 1996, p. 602). Conceived by leftist intellectuals and union and community organisation representatives, the RDP was a widely popular, though often vague and contradictory document, which reflected leftist demands for wealth redistribution and social uplift of black communities. Subsequently, the RDP increasingly came to reflect the perceived needs of national and international capital. It emphasised the need for fiscal discipline to encourage foreign capital investment, and sought to establish institutions such as NEDLAC (the National Economic Development and Labour Council) to mediate the interests of capitalists and workers (Bond, 2007a, p. 140). This attempt to balance the interests of the people and capital brought incongruent ideas together, resulting in the creation of a modern political Frankenstein’s monster. The RDP was economically neoliberal, centrist in its emphasis on “corporatist pactung systems like Nedlac”, and socialist in its aim of providing the masses’ basic needs. (Bond, 2007a, p. 140)

The RDP is notable for its capacity to appeal to wide sections of society by portraying the interests of capital and subaltern classes as contingent on one another (Marais, 2011, p. 404).
The reconstruction and development of the South African economy was premised upon achieving sustainable economic growth through “the leading and enabling role of the state, a thriving public sector, and active involvement by all sectors of civil society” (African National Congress, 1994, p. 4.2.1). This conflation of divergent interests was also facilitated by the RDP’s commitment to the vaguely defined ideals of the Freedom Charter, the rallying cry of subaltern classes during the Apartheid struggle. As such, the RDP functioned as an ideological mechanism to rationalise a “continuity between Freedom Charter ideals and post-apartheid realities” (Marais, 2012, p. 404). However, the programme’s ambitious commitment to public works, such as building a million houses within five years, were impossible to achieve. This was also undercut by making economic growth a precondition of wealth redistribution, as “the government must do this in a way that maintains macro-economic stability” (African National Congress, 1997a). The tethering of the RDP’s Keynesian-inspired development projects to macroeconomic stability and sustainable growth was a key argument the ANC would use in numerous ANC documents (African National Congress, 2007; African National Congress, 2012) and economic policy frameworks (Republic of South Africa, 2004; Republic of South Africa, 2011c), blaming poor economic growth for woeful resource redistribution, high unemployment and poverty.

Despite widespread popularity and a comprehensive mandate, the RDP ministry was hamstrung from the beginning, with its capacity to deliver housing, education reforms, health provisions, and generate jobs was severely curtailed by the legacies of Apartheid (Koelble, 2004, p. 68). Foremost among these were the lack of skilled labour, poor and uneven infrastructure and development, and the lack of co-ordination between municipal, provincial and central government. The latter was particularly problematic for the RDP, as poor co-ordination gave rise to significant misallocation of resources, and delivery blockages that undermined the government’s attempt to build a million houses between 1994 and 1997 (Koelble, 2004, p. 68). However, RDP transformation policies also faced considerable resistance from ANC government ministers who often exerted control over scarce resources. This was compounded by hostility from deputy president Thabo Mbeki, who sought to shutter the project, and the inadequate use of funding resulting in “huge roll-overs” and (Narsiah, 2002, p. 5). Faced with internal resistance and an economic growth rate of only 3.3 percent in 1995, the government’s poverty alleviation program became increasingly conditional upon “redistribution through growth”, focusing instead on attracting foreign direct investment. (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 114)
The RDP was highly ambitious given Apartheid legacies of inadequate housing, services and education, and alarming unemployment rates, promising affordable housing, education reform, basic service provision and employment yet failing to achieve these goals. Rather than building 1 million houses in five years, by December 1997 only 385,000 houses had been built or were under construction, and many were of inadequate standard due to corruption in the tendering process (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 115). Likewise, by 1999 the Ministry of Water had provided only 3 million people, out of the planned 21 million, with “safe drinking water from taps within 200m of their houses” by 1999 (Peet, 2002, p. 71) (Peet, 2002, p. 71). Meanwhile, state expenditure on education was successively slashed between 1995 and 2002, undermining the economically necessary development of a semi-skilled workforce. (Bond, 2007, p. 130; Murwirapachena & Sibanda, 2014, p. 556)

Though initially conceived by leftist intellectuals, the RDP had undergone several mutations, and by March 1996 the government decisively seized the initiative. A crucial milestone in the ANC’s adoption of neoliberal policies was the financial crash of 1996, in which the Rand lost a quarter of its value within days (Koelble, 2004, p. 70). This provided a pretext for the government to drop “most of its exchange controls,” abandon the financial Rand, and impose neoliberal macroeconomic policies that encouraged “privatisation, inflation control, budget deficit reductions and fiscal discipline” (Koelble, 2004, p. 70). In March 1996, the office overseeing the RDP was suspended and control transferred to fierce critic Thabo Mbeki. During the interregnum COSATU and the SACP advocated new strategies based on “worker empowerment and public-sector spending” (Peet, 2002, p. 73-74), with COSATU advocating an expansion of the social wage, social security, healthcare and job creation. However, the ANC ignored these proposals in favour of implementing the fiscally conservative GEAR strategy from June 1996, without consulting the SACP, COSATU, parliamentary representatives, or its own party structures. (Ngwane, 2007, p. 181)

6.2.2. **Stuck in GEAR: 1996- 2005**

The adoption of the GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) economic framework and its unilateral imposition by the ANC government marked a decisive shift in economic policy. Whereas the RDP combined neoliberal and Keynesian economic rationalities, GEAR fundamentally enshrined neoliberal economic policies, such as “fiscal discipline, tax concessions, moves towards scrapping exchange controls, sale of state assets and increasing flexibility in the labor market”. (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 114). These policies contrasted
starkly against the RDP’s basic needs approach and contradicted the “ANC’s aims for social equity proposals” (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 114). However, though GEAR is often treated as the apotheosis of the ANC’s “neoliberal metamorphosis”, the extent to which it harkens back to fiscally conservative economic understandings in ANC documents, including the RDP, is often underemphasised (Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 28). As such, GEAR must be understood within the context of the ANC’s increasing capture by capital and subsequent internalisation of neoliberal rationalities.

Whereas the RDP attempted to reconcile economic orthodoxy with a basic needs approach, the GEAR macroeconomic framework glibly distilled neoliberal ideology. GEAR aimed to address debt, inflation and budget deficit by reducing government spending below revenue, attracting foreign direct investment and encouraging the growth of an export-oriented economy (Hall, 2004, p. 220). Economic growth was underpinned by fiscal deficit reduction, reducing tariffs, lowering corporate taxes, relaxing exchange controls, deregulating finance, reducing government spending and privatising public enterprises (Webster, Lambert & Bezuidenhout, 2008, p. 166). Further, GEAR discouraged state intervention in the economy, shifting responsibility for job creation to the private sector through public work programmes and public-private partnerships (Koelble, 2004, p. 65). A fiscally conservative budget from ANC shadow finance minister Trevor Manuel further consolidated these neoliberal policies in 1997 (Peet, 2002, p. 74).

Though apparently very different, Thabo Mbeki was correct that the RDP and GEAR were “not inconsistent” (Narsiah, 2002, p. 6), as GEAR reiterated the link between economic growth and wealth redistribution found in the RDP, and contending that that higher growth rates were necessary to achieve social objectives (Peet, 2002, p. 74). To that end, it argued increasing FDI was necessary for the 6.1% growth needed to lower the 30% unemployment rate and generate 833,000 jobs by 2000 (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 114). GEAR thus attempted to create a “competitive platform for a powerful expansion” of foreign investment with a “profitable surge in private investment” (Republic of South Africa, 1996, p. 2). Thus, the ANC could legitimately claim at its 50th national conference in 1997 that GEAR aimed to create the economic environment necessary for “the realisation of the RDP” (African National Congress, 1997a). The ANC also supported GEAR policies with RDP clauses such as 6.5.3, that government financing of the plan could only redirect funds, rather than increasing state spending as a proportion of GDP (cited in African National Congress,
 However, whereas the RDP called for a “balance of evidence” to guide economic decisions, GEAR conclusively decided in the interest of capital (African National Congress, 1994, 4.2.5). Thus, although GEAR represents a form of “self-imposed structural adjustment” it was also result of the “aggregate of drifts” since the ANC’s unbanning. (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 115).

GEAR was also a decisive shift by the ANC to the political centre, as they abandoned the concessions they had made to the left and organised labour in 1994, and consolidated by 1996 as a traditional social-democratic party and head of the Tripartite Alliance (Reddy, 2010). As a result, the ANC felt comfortable introducing policies that “alienated the organized working class, the rural and urban poor, the lumpen elements, and the unemployed” (Reddy, 2010, p. 191). The introduction of GEAR against the wishes of its coalition partners and many grassroots members was facilitated by a narrow “coalition of modernising groups”, including “the nationalist elite… established white business, the broad black middle class, and ethnic elites” (Reddy, 2010, p. 191). This is evident in praise for the policy by business leaders and conservative economic organisations as “investor friendly”. (cited in Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 114).

The ANC’s 1996 constitution further consolidated a coalition of capital around its hegemonic project by introducing a “property clause” that had been lobbied for extractive industries, despite previous promises of national economic transformation (Hall, 2004, p. 214). This clause protected existing property rights, leading some to comment that, “in effect, colonial land theft is now preserved by constitutional sanction” (Hendricks and Ntsebeza cited in Hall, 2004, p. 214). Further, though the Bill of Rights enshrines rights of “access to adequate housing” and “sufficient water”, these rights have been “systematically undermined and violated at the grassroots level” (Narsiah, 2002, p. 8). Uncharitable interpretation of the word “access” allowed the ANC to privatise services and provide the bare minimum (an RDP house and 6 kilolitres of free water) whilst claiming to uphold the constitution.

Though the ANC had succeeded in forming a new hegemonic project underpinned by neoliberal rationalities, it had increasingly distanced itself from the members of the Tripartite Alliance. COSATU and the SACP, alongside the independent left, were deeply critical of the RDP’s successor, characterising it as a “homegrown neoliberal structural adjustment programme” (Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 28; Narsiah, 2002, p. 6). Their criticism of the GEAR framework even led President Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki to publicly rebuke both
organisations in 1998, with Mandela even accusing trade unions of being “sectoral” and “selfish”, “bent on protecting their interests at the expense of the nation” (Southall, 2001, p. 261). Meanwhile, opposition parties were surprisingly reticent to confront the ANC: the IFP supported the policy despite their supporters being “rural, mostly impoverished, peasants and urban migrant workers”; and the New National Party did not voice opposition even though its electoral base was strongest in the “coloured and unionised workforce of the Western Cape” devastated by trade liberalisation (Koelble, 2004, p. 65).

The introduction of GEAR’s neoliberal macroeconomics was a decisive shift in ANC policy, though it’s subsequent failures led to numerous changes and ultimately its abandonment by 2005. Regardless of GEAR’s ‘business-friendly’ policies, the value of the rand continued to slip to its lowest point of R13:US$1 in 2002 (Koelble, 2004, p. 70), and South Africa failed to attract expected investment flows, despite reducing inflation and government deficit between 1996 and 2000 (Koelble, 2004, p. 60). Growth was impeded by currency crashes ranging from 30% to 50% in 1996, 1998 and 2001. The Reserve Banks’ attempts to make corrections through corporate tax cuts and interest rate increases were largely unsuccessful, resulting in a trade deficit by 2004 as South African products became uncompetitive and imports flooded the market (Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 21). In this volatile environment of currency devaluation and interest rate increases economic growth was slow, resulting in growing unemployment and worsening poverty. Meanwhile, privatisation schemes sparked widespread grassroots resistance, with highly publicised campaigns led by social movements, such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC). These movements successfully derailed the ANC’s privatisation agenda, with only 9 of 300 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) being privatised by 2005. (Southall, 2014, p. 67)

As the failure of GEAR was becoming increasingly apparent, the ANC government became openly hostile towards external criticism and internal dissent. Primed from many years of persecution and paranoia, the ANC began to loudly decry the “motley ‘sinister forces’ bent on scuttling the democratic revolution” and spread the noxious notion that “if you are not with us, you are against us” (Marais, 2011, p. 405). Targets ranged from COSATU member unions and factions within the ANC to “undisciplined teachers; corrupt bureaucrats and businesspeople; [and] elitist black business ventures” (Marais, 2011, p. 405). The ANC emphasised patriotism and loyalty to the ideals of the National Democratic Revolution, and quickly co-opted the support of the theoretically inept and rudderless SACP. The SACP was
crucial to the ANC’s attempt to contain criticism and maintain its left-inclined activist base, often employing the language of the old left to rebuke wayward members and critics as “class traitors” and “enemies of the NDR” (Marais, 2011, p. 405).

6.2.3. **ASGISA, NGP, NDP: 2005-2016**

During the early 2000s South African economic policy began to change as the ANC made a tactical shift towards greater state investment in the economy. Fine (2007) and Mohammed (2009) identify a shift towards “infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion, redrawn industrial policy, a more generous social-protection package and a revamped public-works programme” (Marais, 2011, p. 137). These changes were promoted as a break with GEAR’s deeply unpopular policies, now it had “done its job of pegging back government debt, establishing macroeconomic stability and restoring investor confidence” (Marais, 2011, p. 137). GEAR was replaced in 2005 by the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South (ASGISA), effectively acknowledging GEAR’s failure to create jobs and alleviate poverty. With the launch of ASGISA, the ANC officially sanctioned the tactical policy shifts of the previous several years. ASGISA sought to halve poverty and unemployment by 2014, but required an annual growth rate of 4.5% or higher between 2005 and 2009 and at least 6% from 2010 to 2014 (Republic of South Africa, 2004, p. 2-3). However, these growth rates were overtly hopeful at best, and pegging inequality and poverty alleviation to such unrealistic goals made improvement impossible.

ASGISA was framed as a spiritual successor to the RDP, and a fundamental revision of GEAR, harkening back to the Freedom Charter’s vision of a multi-racial, united, democratic society, with Trevor Manuel stating in 2006 that, “the fiscal consolidation of the late 1990s has provided the resources to accelerate the implementation of the RDP” (Marais, 2011, p. 213). However, ASGISA was primarily responding to growing popular unrest at the failure of neoliberal policies to generate growth or employment – evident in the ANC’s criticism of the ‘invisible hand of the market’ in favour of renewed government intervention in the economy (ANC, 2007c). As such, the state was expected to play a “strategic role in shaping the contours of economic development” under ASGISA. This included continued state management of SOE’s in “the energy complex and the national transport and logistics system” (ANC, 2007c); absorbing the surplus of primarily black unskilled and semi-skilled workers through public works programmes; and, the promotion of “labour intensive
technologies, active labour market policies and intensive programmes of skills transfer” (ANC, 2007c).

ASGISA was deeply informed by the theory of ‘two economies’ first elaborated in South African President Thabo Mbeki’s 2003 address to the National Council of Provinces, in which he argued: there is a first (formal) economy and second (informal) economy operating side-by-side. The latter is characterised by underdevelopment, overpopulation and poverty and, crucially, is “structurally disconnected from both the first and the global economy” and thereby “incapable of self-generated growth and development” (Skinner & Valodia, 2007, p 107). Thus, the informal second economy “populated by the unemployed and… unemployable” is caught in a “poverty trap” wherein it cannot “attain rates of growth that would ultimately end its condition of underdevelopment” (ANC Today, November 2004). This theory supported the government narrative that GEAR succeeded for the first economy, and justified state intervention to spread these gains to the disconnected second economy. Thus, whilst the first economy continued to integrate with the global economy, “becoming increasingly capital intensive, with high technology and high skills,” the second economy became a target for government intervention (Bond & Desai, 2010, p. 23-24). Mbeki utilised the two-economies rationale to mobilise support for the ASGISA framework by making dubious claims about job creation and unemployment. For example, the claim that 2.1 million new jobs were created between 1994 and 2004 was an exercise in reclassification which barely concealed the hidden joblessness of many ‘workers’ who were often unpaid, underpaid or underutilised. (Bond & Desai, 2010, p. 26)

However, contrary to the claims made by Mbeki and his administration, authors such as Skinner and Valodia (2007) argue that there are “multiple forward and backward linkages between the formal and informal activities” with “many of South Africa’s biggest companies rely[ing] on informal workers” (p. 114-115). Further the ANC’s economic policies have only deepened these links and increased the numbers of those engaged in “insecure, often part-time and disorganized low-paid labour” (Harvey cited in Ruiters, 2014, p. 428). The deregulation of the economy under GEAR and ASGISA only compounded issues of job precariousness, unemployment and poverty, suppressing wage gains and creating an ever-expanding pool of surplus labour (Mwrirapachena & Sibanda, 2014, p. 556; Gibson, 2005, p. 94).
Much like the RDP, ASGISA attempted to reconcile the interests of the leading group with those of subaltern classes, whilst deciding firmly in favour of the former. This strategy was doomed to failure as the ANC’s emphasis on lowering protections, transferring speculative capital, and increasing profitability brought it into conflict with the interests of the general populace. ASGISA ignored the reality that the “priorities of a people driven development and the priorities of [transnational and speculative] capital are different” (Narsiah, 2002, p. 6). Dissatisfaction with the ANC’s neoliberal trajectory encouraged the emergence of inter-factional disputes within the party, which eventually resulted in Mbeki’s resignation in 2008, his succession by Kgalema Motlanthe, and Jacob Zuma’s election in 2009. Amid internal pressures for reform, ASGISA was quickly replaced in 2010 with the New Growth Path (NGP) framework, which laid a development gloss over the policy prescriptions of the former.

The New Growth Path (NGP) framework was announced during President Zuma’s 2010 State of the Union Address and, like ASGISA, acknowledged “deep inequalities…[and] extraordinarily high levels of joblessness” and poverty, and sought to overcome these problems by encouraging job-creating economic growth. (Republic of South Africa, 2011c, p. 10). Further, the NGP called for massive investment in infrastructure and identified energy, transport, communication, water and housing as five key areas for investment. Like ASGISA, the NGP emphasised the need for public-private partnerships to create jobs, slash red tape, improve competition, and promote skill-transfer programmes (Republic of South Africa, 2011c). However, built-in assumptions of economic growth were quickly dispelled with job-creation policies hamstrung from the start. Meanwhile, cadre-deployment, nepotism and corruption continued to deplete state coffers, with Corruption Watch claiming public sector fraud cost the government almost 1 billion rand in the 2011/2012 financial year (Corruption Watch, 2012).

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\(22\) The actual cost of corruption may be much higher as the South African Police Service reports corruption under the broad designation of ‘commercial crimes’. This category includes “white-collar crimes such as insider trading; banking crimes such as cheque fraud, deposit slip scams and credit card fraud; as well as public procurement fraud and private sector corruption” (Corruption Watch, 2012).
growth in labour-absorbing parts of the economy, mostly evidently in the mining industry which stagnated at around 510-525,000 workers between 2011 and 2013\textsuperscript{23} (Chamber of Mines of South Africa, 2014, p. 14). The NGP trusted that the nation could remain a bastion of free trade while meaningfully intervening in the economy to encourage employment and reduce poverty. However, governments following a neoliberal line can’t force private enterprise to employ people, as finance minister Trevor Manuel noted that: “governments around the world are impotent when it comes to creating jobs” (Bond, 2007a, p. 132). As such, South Africa’s economic prospects remain “highly dependent on global trade and investment patterns”, with market demands for South African goods, not the government, driving economic growth. (Republic of South Africa, 2011a, p. 16)

The NGP was officially superseded in early 2013 by the National Development Plan (NDP), which sought to reduce inequality and eliminate poverty by 2030. The NDP set concrete social objectives including reducing the poverty rate (i.e. those with a monthly income below R418) from 39 to 0 percent and reducing the Gini coefficient (the indicator of inequality) from 0.7 in 2009 to 0.6 by 2030 (Republic of South Africa, 2011b, p. 28). Additionally, the NDP aimed to increase the proportion of income earned by the bottom 40% from 6% to 10% by 2030, and reduce unemployment from 27 percent in 2011 to 14 percent by 2020 and 6 percent by 2030 (Republic of South Africa, 2011b, p. 28). Meeting these deadlines would require an almost doubling of total employment from 13 million to 24 million by 2030, export increases of 6 percent per annum, 10 percent increases in savings rates, a 2.7-times increase in GDP, and a reversal of the concentration of wealth in South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 2011b, p. 28). These goals were highly ambitious, requiring deep and systematic government interventions and economic transformation. However, the NDP sought to achieve these goals through increased, but still limited, state involvement including infrastructure investment, microeconomic reforms “in the areas of food, transport and telecommunications”, the simplification of dismissal procedures, and boosting private-public partnerships (Republic of South Africa, 2011b, p. 29-30). The unrealistic nature of the programme is best illustrated by the fact that between 2011 and 2015, rather than achieving the required 5.4% annual GDP growth, South African growth actually declined from 3.284%\textsuperscript{23}.

\textsuperscript{23} Between 2011 and 2012 the average number of people in the mining industry increased from 512,878 to 524,632 only to fall to 510,099 by 2013 (Chamber of Mines of South Africa, 2014, p. 14).
The National Development Plan attempted to differentiate itself from the New Growth Plan by emphasising building state capacities, and “improving education, promoting employment and building houses close to jobs” (National Planning Commission, 2011, p. 5), in contrast to the previous focus on providing basic social services (National Planning Commission, 2011, p. 5). However, the South African state’s inability to provide even basic services effectively has undermined attempts to boost economic growth, and increased the “scale and intensity of protests” on issues including water and electricity disconnections (International Labour Research and Information Group, 2014, p. 1). As such, though the NDP acknowledges the “implications for wages” resulting from capital mobility, ongoing systemic risks “such as financial, banking, debt and currency crises” and growing “inequality within most countries,” it fails to offer a viable solution in an increasingly competitive globalised marketplace (National Planning Commission, 2011, p. 8). In many ways, the NDP uncritically reiterates the key tenants of previous economic frameworks, emphasising the need to become more competitive, with a focus on outward export-oriented growth.

6.2.4. **Black Economic Empowerment**

Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) has remained a cornerstone of ANC economic policy since 1994, featuring in all five economic frameworks, despite limited success in promoting the economic empowerment of the black majority. In addition, the BEE program remains focused on deeply enriching beneficiaries who are often affiliated with the ANC through non-transparent transactions mired in rent-seeking. This has led commentators to argue that transactions under BEE “do not make a dent in the established patterns of ownership in the national economy” (Reddy, 2010, p. 192). Further, where it has been successful in launching the careers of black business figures, beneficiaries remain tethered to “large, long-term loans,” impeding any actual influence over the economy (Marais, 2011, p. 143). This section examines BEE to better understand the high degree of cadre deployment and state-capital interpenetration which characterises the ANC post-Apartheid government.

Although Black Economic Empowerment is often seen as an attempt by a triumphant black state to de-racialise the economy, its origins lie in the 1970s during the period of reform Apartheid, wherein the government sought to “cultivate a non-white middle class whose
political moderation would undermine opposition to continued white rule” (Horwitz, 1997 p. 507). The National Party Reform wing was keen to develop a black collaborationist “ownership class… nurturing businesses [and black businessmen] within the confines of Apartheid” (Gentle, 2007, p. 128-129). Large-scale capital also attempted to encourage the development of a nascent black middle class by providing “increased opportunities for blacks within corporate structures” (Southall, 2008, p. 283). Though business enthusiasm waxed following the 1976 Soweto uprising, by the 1980s large capital quickly realised the importance of de-aligning itself from the racial policies of Apartheid and de-racialising corporate structures (Southall, 208, p. 283). By the early 1990s corporations began proactively courting the ANC, including both Sanlam and Anglo American: Metropolitan Life, a subsidiary of Sanlam, set a 10 percent shareholding for Motlana “prompting the formation of New Africa Investments Limited”; whereas Anglo American unbundled its industrial wing, JCI, to Mzi Khumalo and co. after initially attempting to involve “a consortium of trade unions and aspirant black businessmen” (Gentle, 2007, p. 129). The political objective of white monopoly capital in creating vehicles for black ownership of shares was to create “a black bourgeoisie with a stake in the system in the context of the high risks involved in the transition from reformed apartheid” (Gentle, 2007, p. 129). In this context, though the BEE deals of the Mbeki Presidency included state interventions such as the Mining Charter and Banking Charter, “these state interventions built on what had been already initiated by white capital before the state formulated its policies” (Gentle, 2007, p. 129).

Pre-1994 interventions ostensibly designed to economically empower blacks also took a very specific form as a result of an international shift towards financialisation, including a change in focus by investment capital from physical assets towards complex financial instruments in the corporate sector. This was reflected in deals emphasising corporate restructuring with a focus on those entities which would profit most from higher share prices (Gentle, 2007). As such, the unbundling of Anglo American’s industrial wing, JCI, was not only politically expedient for Anglo-American but allowed it to create “shareholder value” by restructuring itself to meet the demands of international share markets (Gentle, 2007, p 130). The first BEE deals followed this pattern, featuring as “corporate unbundling schemes” allowing firms to refocus operations around “core” (i.e. profitable) activities (Marais, 2011, p. 141). Further, BEE deals were “precariously engineered and… highly leveraged” to allow beneficiaries to buy shares without financial capital, resulting in members of ANC-Alliance affiliates cornering the first generation of BEE deals (Marais, 2011, p. 141). The ANC also attempted
to involve BEE in the privatisation of SOEs, by transferring ownership to blacks at discounted prices, though this was ineffective due to the inability of aspirant black capitalists to raise sufficient capital to purchase ‘core’ assets. As a result, the state sector remained a training ground for aspirant blacks to accumulate the skills, contacts and wealth necessary to launch themselves into the private sector. (Southall, 2008, p. 284)

Whilst the narrow, elitist form of BEE met with strong public disapproval from its inception, the ANC-led Alliance was able to justify it in terms of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). As such, the SACP suggested that BEE embodied the growth of a progressive “patriotic bourgeoisie” capable of underpinning a “developmental state” in readiness for the NDR (Gentle, 2007, p. 127). However, the development of a black class dependent upon the ANC and the smooth operation of capital was always suspect in terms of the NDR, because of the likelihood of degenerating into a corrupt “parasitic bureaucratic bourgeoisie” (Southall, 2008, p. 284). Former SACP Deputy General Secretary, Jeremy Cronin shared this view in later years recording his disappointment that BEE beneficiaries had become a “compradorist fraction tied to traditional Big Business” (Gentle, 2007, p. 131). The structure of BEE share deals also affected the formation of this new class by forcing them into a compromised position at the nexus of state-capital interpenetration. Share deals often included high “debt-to-equity ratios, non-voting shares” and a lending system based on corporate subsidies which lent black investors money to “buy shares created in new investment companies created as empowerment vehicles” (Gentle, 2007, p. 130). As a result, the influence of BEE beneficiaries over corporations was limited at best, whilst the new black elite remained “tethered to large, long-term loans issued by the dominant source of finance” (Marais, 2011, p. 143). Further, the de-racialisation of wealth in South Africa has been very limited, with black share ownership peaking at 12 percent on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1998 before receding to less than 1 percent by 2002 (Gentle, 2007, p. 30).

By the early 2000s, an overhaul of BEE became necessary amid increasing dissatisfaction with the progress of economic transformation. The ANC government adopting a new approach involving “official and voluntary sectoral charters that included steps to boost black ownership… black management control and skills development” (Marais, 2011, p. 141). However, the BEE initiative was the result of a mutual agreement between businesses and the business-savvy ANC elite, and any renegotiation of the terms of the agreement elicited “creative and defensive” responses from capital (Southall, 2008, p. 284-285). Initially
conglomerates were highly responsive to the ANC’s deployment of senior personnel to corporate positions, which provided corporations with valuable political capital. However, as the ANC’s approach to BEE became increasingly assertive from the early 2000 onwards, conglomerates responded by “pre-emptively negotiating ‘transformation charters’ which established targets for black share ownership, management, employment, and skills training” (Southall, 2008, p. 284-285). These changes resulted in the adoption of individual industrial sector charters subordinated to the 2003 Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act. However, de-racialisation of the private sector has continued to lag behind the public sector, as a result of constitutional protections and the closer scrutiny placed on economic policies which affect companies traded on the global market (Southall, 2008, p. 291).

Though BEE policies failed to radically transform business ownership patterns they effectively lay the groundwork for a rush for private wealth from within the ANC. The ANC leadership were initially desperately lacking both the capital and the skills required to effectively penetrate the corporate sector. However, after years of experience in the public service, increasing numbers of senior officials transferred to the private sector, which welcomed their “political connectivity” (Southall, 2008, p. 294-295). Former public servants brought valuable insights into forthcoming policy decisions providing potentially unfair advantages to companies. Though solutions were adopted including “cooling off periods” wherein public servants cannot seek private employment, “they can be difficult to prevent if officials are determined to circumvent them” (Southall, 2008, p. 295). Further, large capital has proven willing to employ talented blacks whose political credibility can be employed for economic gain (Southall, 2008, p. 293). As a result, 40 percent of ANC MPs either owned or were directors of companies by 2008 (Southall, 2008, p. 293). Similarly, ANC politicians and loyalists have directly participated in business ventures with established financial and industrial interests, including: the 2005 sale of 10 percent of Standard Bank shares to black partners; and the purchase of 50.1 percent of ABSA shares by Barclays in collaboration with the Batho Bonke and Ubuntu Batho consortiums (Southall, 2008, p. 293).

The deep state-capital interpenetration of the post-Apartheid economy is evident in a BEE policy that is deeply entangled with cadre deployment and corruption, resulting in the privileging of ANC elites through key government contracts, tenders, and special under-the-table deals (Silke, 2006, p. 6). Alongside the emergence of a black bourgeoisie aligned with corporate capital, BEE has fostered a black-black class cleavage, diametrically opposed to the
struggles over race, culture and language that are a “vital part of new struggles of social movements” (Gentle, 2007, p. 136). Further, the focus of BEE on enriching black elites has occurred at the expense of the majority, demonstrating how “the language of apartheid [sic] has been replaced by the colour of money, the language of corporate capitalism and markets” (Gibson, 2005, p. 96). Thus, despite the stated objective of redressing historical wrongs BEE has provided a vehicle for South African elites to enrich themselves, forging an alliance between “a small class of unproductive but wealthy black crony capitalists made up of ANC politicians, some retired and others not…[and the incumbent] economic oligarchy” (Mbeki cited in Marais, 2011, p. 144). The result has been the creation a powerful political lobby within and surrounding the ANC diametrically opposed to radical economic change, and the undermining of legitimate struggles for economic racial representation and black unity.

6.2.5. Land Reform

Though redistribution of agricultural land is essential in de-racialisation ownership patterns in South Africa ANC neoliberal macroeconomic policies have stymied attempts at land reform. The constitution of the Republic of South Africa not only empowers the state to pursue land reform including expropriation of property, but also “obliges it to do so” (Hall, 2004, p. 215). As such, the RDP committed the ANC to redistribution of 30 percent of agricultural land to the poor and landless over five years through “willing buyer, willing seller” market transactions (Hall, 2004, p. 215). Between 1995 and 1999 land reform took the form of Settlement/Land Acquisition Grants (SLAG) which were made available to poor households for land purchases. However, the small size of the grants compared to the price of land required large groups to pool grants reproducing overcrowding. Further, the grants failed to link land acquisition to “support and resources to enable people to generate a livelihood off it” (Hall, 2004, p. 215). In addition, the reliance on willing sellers and the market to make land available for redistribution failed to confront “entrenched forms of exclusion and exclusion”. As such, SLAG made the transferring of assets to the poor anomalous as “they lack the means to engage in capital accumulation in commercial agriculture” (Hall, 2004, p. 225). Indeed, the notion that Black South Africans could buy out white privilege with minimal state support is deeply flawed, given the limited availability of public resources in a hostile macroeconomic policy environment that emphasises fiscal discipline and limited state involvement. (Hall, 2004, p. 220, 225)
The failure of SLAG to meaningfully impact on land reform led to the unveiling of a new policy direction in 2000 under the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme. Though the 30 percent target of the RDP was confirmed over a longer period of 15 years, land reform was brought in line with GEAR’s emphasis on entrepreneurship and the creation of a black middle class (Hall, 2004, 220). Unlike its predecessor, LRAD was designed for people with investment capital and, preferably, agricultural diplomas, and though the requirement of a minimum cash contribution was later scrapped applicants still had to meet commercial criteria (Hall, 2001, p. 216). However, this programme, still suffered from the limitations of a neoliberal macroeconomic policy environment which struggled to secure suitable land and failed to provide “post-transfer support… training, infrastructure development and access to credit and markets” (Hall, 2004, p. 217). Further, despite the adoption of ambitious land policies and a commitment to restitution, the state lacks adequate institutional and financial resources; the budget for land reform has remained at or below 0.5 percent of the national budget, with responsible agencies dependent on the cooperation and contribution of other overburdened, underfunded institutions (Hall, 2004, p. 219).

The shift from SLAG to LRAD also represented a shift in policy direction from a fundamental restructuring of the agrarian structure to limited deracialisation of the commercial farming sector (Hall, 2004, p. 213). This was driven by the macro-economic imperatives of GEAR which undervalued land uses of the poor, such as low-input agriculture, in favour of commercial farming. This is especially problematic given the need to reform South Africa’s dualistic agrarian structure which is comprised of a ‘white’ capital-intensive commercial farming sector and an impoverished ‘black’ sector centred on the former homelands. In the latter, nearly a third of the national population is crowded into less than 13 percent of the land, including almost one million farm workers and dependents, and is characterised by “low-input, labour intensive forms of subsistence production… along with migrant remittances and state pensions” (Hall, 2004, p. 213).

The restructuring of South African agriculture that has occurred is largely a response to the neoliberal policies of the ANC, often at the expense of the poor. Neoliberal economic frameworks such as GEAR heralded not only the removal of tariffs but the “removal of direct state support in the form of soft loans, tax breaks, state-run cooperatives and single channel marketing” (Hall, 2004, p. 220). As a result, rates of bankruptcy increased and agricultural
landholdings have been concentrated into fewer hands, a trend seemingly at odds with the state’s support of black commercial farmers, who are facing a “uniquely hostile environment” with fewer subsidies or other supports (Hall, 2004, p. 220). In addition, BEE has increasingly turned to joint ventures and value adding industries in secondary agriculture to pursue black empowerment opportunities, using business planning to control land use, and promoting joint ventures and inverse rental markets whereby black people might own land, but not directly farm it (Hall, 2004, p. 221). Thus, the ANC’s attempts to meet demands for deracialisation of land ownership patterns without restructuring property relations promotes the capital-intensive commercial farming and secondary industries. Father, the outcome of these developments was significant job shedding in the agriculture sector resulting in the loss of the livelihoods of many of the rural poor (Hall, 2004, p. 221).

The establishment of the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) in 1994, to investigate land claims and prepare them for adjudication committed the ANC to providing restitution for dispossession under Apartheid. However, efforts were hamstrung by neoliberal macroeconomic and microeconomic policies which placed heavy limitations on the agencies responsible for land restitution. As such, although a total of 63,455 claims were lodged with the CRLR in 1998 only 36,488 were settled by March 2003 the majority of which were individual household claims in urban areas (Hall, 2004, p. 217-218). The difficulty of resolving complex and expensive rural claims involving many people over vast tracts of land left many claims unresolved, as reflected in the precipitous decline of the number of households per claim settled from 432 in 1998 to 2 in 2002, (Hall, 2004, p. 218). Further, redistribution has disproportionately eschewed apportioning black people access to profitable white owned agricultural land in favour of relatively low-value land. As a consequence, over half of all land marked for restitution and redistribution in 2002 was located in semi-arid rural regions in the Northern Cape (Hall, 2004, p. 218). This inability to resolve rural claims is informed by shifts in macroeconomic policy from a focus on restructuring and redistribution to accommodating the needs of capital-as-a-class.

6.3. The Post-Apartheid Economy

The ANC was ushered into power in 1994 with a mandate to redress the socio-economic inequalities of Apartheid. However, over two decades later the “fundamental features of the apartheid economy remain” including the impoverishment of a “significant section of the population” (Southall, 2014, p. 48). Attempts to reduce poverty and inequality, boost
employment, and increase social wage provisions have ran aground amidst inadequate policymaking, corruption and international capitalist crises. This section discusses the impacts and consequences of ANC economic policy under successive economic frameworks from the RDP to the NDP. Further, it critiques the reasons behind the ongoing failure of ANC economic policy to deliver sufficient economic growth and overcome the historical legacies of Apartheid, addressing issues such as unemployment, poverty and inequality with reference to privatisation, tensions between local government and economic policy, and the failure of land reform.

Despite a stated commitment to overcoming the legacies of Apartheid, ANC economic policymaking has fundamentally failed to address the racialised class structure of the South African economy. The pursuit of neoliberal economic policies, including lowering protections and tariffs protecting South African industries, has fundamentally undermined the economic growth (Bond, 2010, p. 3). This is compounded by the weak and uneven growth of the South African economy amidst crises of devaluation, instability, inflation, and soaring account deficits. Meanwhile, the minimal growth rate of the South African economy has resulted in the ANC maintaining fiscal discipline albeit with minor politically expedient interventions such as social grants, which were granted to over 16.1 million people by 2013 (Suttner, 2014, p. 15). As a result of these factors, the post-Apartheid period is characterised by endemic poverty, racial inequality and growing unemployment.

Post-Apartheid South Africa is characterised by increased racial and class stratification and inequality (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 119). Thus, whilst the richest 10 percent of black people experienced a 17 percent income increase between 1991 and 1996, the poorest 40 percent experienced an income decline of 20 percent (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 119.). Similarly, between 1995 and 2000 average white household income rose by 15 percent, to $22,600, whilst black income fell by 19 percent, to $3,714, during that same period (Bond, 2004, p. 3). This has led authors such as Marais to conclude that the redistribution of wealth in South Africa has occurred at the “expense of the poorest 40 per cent of the population” (Marais, 1998, p. 107). Rising income inequality is also reflected at the corporate level with the average annual wage for directors increasing by 29 percent per annum between 1994 and 2004, compared to 6.5 percent for workers (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 121). This is particularly disconcerting given that labour productivity steadily increased after 1994, with
the cost of post-Apartheid labour falling by 2 percent per annum (Bond and Desai, 2006, p. 22)

Poverty is also an endemic issue in South Africa with 32 percent of households below the poverty line in 1999, and 3 million South Africans were living on less than US$1 a day, and 10 million on less than US$2, in 2003 (Murwirapachena & Sibanda, 2014, p. 556). Similarly, the official unemployment rate rose from 19.1 percent in 1994 to 26.1 percent by 2010, averaging at 24.8 percent throughout the period (Murwirapachena & Sibanda, 2014, p. 556). However, the ANC has continually misrepresented poverty and unemployment throughout this period, with official employment statistics often including the “vast army of the barely hidden jobless” and definitions of poverty far below the international norm (Bond & Desai, 2010, p. 26). As a result, the ANC is able to grossly misrepresent employment statistics and point to the decline of poverty from 53 percent in 1995 to 48 in 2005 as proof of successful economic policies (Reddy, 2010, p. 190). This contrasts wildly with independent studies such as the 2003 United Nations Development Report (UNDP) which found that poverty and income inequalities had increased since 1994 (Gibson, 2005, p. 94).

The growth of poverty and intensification of absolute poverty directly relate to ANC neoliberal policies and the growing informalisation of labour. Though South Africa emerged from the Apartheid struggle with a strong network of unions allied to the ruling party, the ANC’s adoption of neoliberalism has resulted in labour policies markedly biased towards capital. Thus, whilst legislation such as the 1995 Labour Relations Act, 1995 Basic Conditions of Employment Act, and 1998 Employment Equity Act set out basic workers’ rights such as the 45-hour working week and the right to strike, they also affirmed “the right of employers to hire ‘scab’ labor, [and] the sanctity of capitalist social relations, and private property” (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 116). As a consequence, labour has become increasingly informalised, with people reported working in informal enterprises almost doubling from 1,161,300 in 1997 to 2,340,984 by 2005, though some estimates place the number of informal workers in 2005 as high as 3.7 million (Skinner & Valodia, 2007, p. 112-113). In South Africa, as elsewhere, the informalisation of labour is closely correlated with poverty with 69 percent of informal enterprise workers reporting a monthly income below R1000 (Skinner & Valodia, 2007, p. 113). Further, there is a growing informalisation of previously formal jobs with over 45 percent of workers employed in the formal sector displaying characteristics of
informality\(^{24}\) (Skinner & Valodia, 2007, p. 115). As a result, economic growth is premised upon the ready availability of poor informalised labour, with informal enterprises contributing 8 to 10 percent of South Africa’s GDP and informal labour constituting around a third of the labour force (Skinner & Valodia, 2007, p. 112, 113-114). This has problematised ANC economic policy, as the interconnectedness of informal and formal labour, the growth of the latter and the correlation between poverty and informalisation, has made meaningful poverty relief without strong state interference all but impossible.

Issues of inequality in South Africa are inextricably linked to the neoliberal policies pursued by the ANC since 1994. Social spending in particular has been grossly inadequate to counter the vast inherited gaps in racial equality and property ownership, and actually retarded economic growth, a fact implicitly acknowledged by the ANC’s shift towards increased (though still limited) state investment in the economy from the mid-2000s onwards. This is informed by the ANC’s emphasis on fiscal restraint over social expenditure as Business Day noted, “although the ANC commits itself to increased social expenditure in the manifesto, the government has given no indication of reviewing its fiscal deficit upwards” (cited in Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 118). Further, according to state figures the percentage of the state budget allocated to social spending actually rose from 46.7 to 499.2 percent between 1995/1996 and 1998/1999 before dropping to 47.7 percent in 2001/2002 (Bond, 2007, p. 130). However, this increase in social spending is countered by the decline of the state budget in relation to the GDP by 3.1 percent during this same period. In addition, spending in social infrastructure and economic infrastructure fell by 5.3 and 1.7 percent, respectively, between 1995 and 2002, during a period in which capital investments benefitting businesses rose by 7 percent (Bond & Desai, 2006, p 23).

Declining spending in social infrastructure has also had lasting impacts on education, healthcare and housing which in turn affected the long-term performance of the South African economy. The ANC’s failure to tackle the “appalling education deficit among the majority population” has translated into a shortage of “appropriately trained and equipped personnel available for recruitment into the public sector” fuelling unemployment and state dysfunction (Southall, 2014, p. 66). Further, attempts by the ANC to build up a welfare

\(^{24}\) Kenny (2005) found that on average only 35 percent of formal employees in retail stores had permanent contracts, whilst Clarke (2000) found that 70 percent of workers for South African retail giant Woolworths were informal (Skinner & Valodia, 2007, p. 115)
system beyond social grants and basic social security have been minimal, leading some to conclude that “the ANC has clearly abandoned… the idea of building up… a universal welfare state” (Koelbe, 2004, p. 72). Though the ANC did increase social spending from the mid-2000s onwards, it remains deeply insufficient given the huge “inherited gaps in race-based inequality between state recipients”, perpetuating patterns of poverty, unemployment and racial inequality (Bond, 2007, p. 130).

The ANC’s neoliberal GEAR framework also profoundly impacted the development of the post-Apartheid economy, resulting in economic contraction and entrenching high unemployment. GEAR policies of trade liberalisation had a devastating impact on the most vulnerable sections of the population, resulting in the loss of over a million jobs (Ngwane, 2007, p. 181). With the removal of tariffs protecting the clothing and textile industry, local industries unable to compete against the flood of cheap textiles began shedding jobs, resulting in the closure of around 300 factories and a 30 percent decline in South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU) membership by 2002 (Narsiah, 2002, p. 10). This was exacerbated by the presence of eight dependents for every employed individual in South Africa. Thus, the shrinkage of the mining industry deeply impoverished those rural and already poor areas of the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo province dependent on remittances from miners (Koelble, 2004, p. 60-61). Though the government has attempted to curb unemployment in later policy frameworks through the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), it has been thoroughly inadequate to support rural livelihoods. This is impacted by the EPWP’s lack of real emphasis on rural populations and “ad hoc collection of existing and new projects” and (McCutcheon & Parkins, 2009, p. 202). Further, low wages combined with a focus on creating temporary job opportunities that can last as little as “a single day” prevented any real impact on rural livelihoods beyond the end of the projects. (McCutcheon & Parkins, 2009, p. 207)

The neoliberal GEAR framework also fundamentally undermined access to basic services such as water, sanitation and electricity, which proceeding policy frameworks have failed to address. The commodification of basic services under the aegis of privatisation, resulted in skyrocketing costs, higher non-payment rates, higher disconnection levels and lower consumption levels. As a result, between 1994 and 2001 between 5.5 million and 9.8 million people “were affected by water cut-offs” (Marais, 2011, p. 214), with 275,000 households disconnected because of non-payment in 2003 alone, with severe implications for public
health in “the context of renewed cholera, diarrhoea and later typhoid” (Bond, 2007a, p. 131). Further, despite a free water policy covering 6,000 litres per household per month in 2000, the price of water in Durban doubled between 1998 and 2004, forcing the poorest third of residents to drop consumption to only 15,000 litres a month (Bond, 2010, p. 1). The degeneration of service delivery under GEAR is best illustrated by surveys done by the Human Sciences Research Council in which the vast majority of respondents argued that conditions had not improved or actually got worse between 1994 and 1999 (Bond, 2007a, p. 142-143). Service delivery is especially underwhelming for those living in low socioeconomic areas, as Makgetla notes “there was little or no improvement in the share of households with access to most services in the poorest district-council areas” between 1996 and 2006 (cited in Marais, 2011, p. 215).

The neoliberal policies of GEAR also had a lasting impact on the institutional capacities of local and municipal government. The period 1996 to 2005 is characterised by institutional decline among local governments and a declining capacity to “manage, maintain, and sustain boosted service delivery” (Marais, 2011, p. 214). The aggressive implementation of neoliberal microeconomic policy in local government, including cost-recovery policies, the commodification of basic needs, and reduced spending undermined socioeconomic improvements and fed into local government dysfunction (Marais, 2011, p. 214). Meanwhile, the allocation of financing support from central government towards capital expenses left many municipalities “overburdened, under-capacitated and under-funded” and preoccupied with “generating much-needed revenue and prohibiting poor households from using ‘too much’ water” (Centre for Applied Legal Studies cited in Marais, 2011, p. 214). As a result, by the early 2000s many local governments were left with “outdated service-delivery tools and systems… deteriorating infrastructure and major backlogs” (Marais, 2011, p. 214).

Though the issue of service delivery is often blamed on corrupt or inept local government, in actuality they reflect the failure of neoliberal policies in South Africa. The local state lies at the nexus of contradictions in neoliberal South Africa, tasked with securing the conditions of accumulation whilst simultaneously confronted with immense “redistributive pressure” and “minimal resources” (Webster, Lambert & Bezuidenhout, 2008, p. 125). As such, local municipalities have found themselves caught in the “growing tension between infrastructure provision and low employment and income levels” (Everatt, Smith & Solanki cited in Marais, 211, p. 214). Thus, while municipalities are responsible for the roll out of service subsidies
many lack the institutional capacity to do so. Despite this, the ANC and many commentators locate the problem as primarily one of inept even corrupt local government, evident in the ANC’s ‘Project Consolidate’ programme which aimed to assist those local municipalities struggling to deliver basic services. Though there are serious problems with corruption at the local level, corruption is endemic to the South African political system, reaching “deep into the state, with provincial and municipal governments in the mining belt… rife with corruption” (Bond, 2014, p. 11). Further, the ANC’s characterisation of service delivery problems as related to corruption or ineptitude serves to distance the failures of service delivery from the ‘good’ institutional policies of the ANC government. Further, Ruiters suggests that the South African state’s “control over and methods of providing basic services… serve both a practical and ideological purpose” namely ensuring water and electricity payment “while restricting the poor’s consumption and, ideologically educating the masses in the virtues of the market system” (cited in Ngwane, 2007, p. 207).

Although the ANC’s adoption of neoliberalism contributed greatly to the current economic malaise, the South African economy must also be contextualised within the current world-system. Southern Africa entered into the global world system on deeply unequal terms as a supplier of primary goods and cheap labour, with South Africa emerging as the central pole of capital accumulation within the region (Marais, 1998). As a semi-peripheral country, the South African economy was geared towards the accumulation of capital at the expense of other Southern African states, with the latter subordinated to the needs of South African capital (Bond, 2006). During the colonial and Apartheid period this regional dependency was supported by the development of regional infrastructure such as the sub-continental railway. This was crucial in tapping the labour reservoirs of neighbouring countries, providing cheap labour for the South African economy and “exporting the bulky agricultural and mineral riches of the subcontinental interior” (Pirie, 1991, p. 345). During the Apartheid period, these railways were a prominent aspect of “South Africa’s attempt to achieve hegemony over the subcontinent” and promote regional economic dependence (Griffiths, 1989, p. 387). This was achieved by fomenting “economic and political turmoil” in neighbouring states “during which the disruption of trade and transport patterns diverted traffic to the costlier but more reliable South African network” (Pirie, 1991, p, 345). Along with fostering economic and infrastructural dependency, these railways were also a source of revenue with Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe spending approximately 40, 25 and 20 percent of their annual foreign
exchange earnings, respectively, on transport to and from South African ports. (Pirie, 1991, p. 347)

The South African economy is also dogged by a series of long-standing problems that reflect the ANC’s inability to address the lasting legacy of Apartheid. Despite deep political changes the post-Apartheid economy shares many similarities with its predecessor, including: a regime of accumulation premised upon cheap (overwhelmingly black) labour; and, an overwhelmingly white bourgeoisie and white collar, professional and managerial strata (Gentle, 2007, p. 132). This is largely the result of two factors: firstly, ANC economic policies which ensured the preservation of white domination of the economy; and secondly, South Africa’s strategic position and mineral wealth, which left it “inextricably linked as a peripheral capitalist power to the metropolitan and industrial world” (Cohen, 1986, p. 94). As a result, the migrant system remains intact with many of “the same processes by which urban capital is subsidised in the reproduction of labour… with only a slightly expanded social wage” (Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 26). However, under the new neoliberal regime, cheap labour power is based on labour laws which encourage precarity, informalisation, increased labour flexibilization and fragmentation, and the externalisation of labour contracts. (Gentle, 2007, p. 132; Chinguno, 2013, p. 33)

South Africa has also failed to overcome the geography of Apartheid, reinforcing the inequalities of apartheid spatial planning in, and between, urban developments and townships (Ruiters, 2014, p 429). The inequities of urban development are also reflected at a municipal level by disparities in local government financing which are reminiscent of the racially biased “spatial order under apartheid” (Marais, 2011, p. 216). The scope of infrastructure improvement has also largely been limited to improving transport networks between former colonial spaces, connecting pockets of affluence with little impact on poorer spaces (Ruiters, 2014, p. 429). The ANC has itself noted these failings, observing that “infrastructure is poorly located, under-maintained and insufficient… [whilst] spatial patterns exclude the poor from the fruits of development” (Republic of South Africa, 20011, p. 3).

ANC economic strategies for growth and redistribution were hamstrung from the beginning by the financialisation of the South African economy. During the late Apartheid period, decreasing opportunities for productive investment led capital to increasingly favour financial, or speculative, investment. This is evident in declining rates of new domestic fixed investment from the 1980s onwards and the decline of profit dividends in manufacturing
during the late 1990s in favour of “commerce… finance, insurance and real estate” (Bond & Desai, 2010, p. 22). Consequently, drivers of capital accumulation became increasingly based upon “financial/speculative functions that are potentially unsustainable and even parasitical” (Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 21). The opening up of the South African economy after 1994 accelerated trends towards financialisation and rationalisation within the private sector, supported by state policies of privatisation. Thus, the negotiated transition allowed the economy to restructure itself on the terms of conglomerate capital “wriggle free of a thicket of constraints, restructure and globalise its operations and embark on a fresh round of accumulation” (Marais, 211, p. 389).

Meanwhile, the deeper integration of the South African economy into the global economy as a semi-peripheral country left it vulnerable to international instability such as the Russian and East Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis (Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 5). These economic crises created monetary volatility, which in turn motivated speculative capital to withdraw from the periphery into core countries. Further, the tendency for large firms to channel economic surpluses into speculative investments overseas created a skyrocketing account deficit. This resulted in capital outflow exceeding FDI inflow by R9 billion between 1994 and 2000 as capital fled the country through debt service payments, interest on loans, shareholder dividends and profit repatriated by foreign investors (Mwalimi, 2007, p. 161). Where corporate profits were inwardly invested, over 60 percent took the form of Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) rather than greenfield investment, that is, it was invested in existing assets rather than new ones (Bond, 2010, p. 3). Though the risks of M&As are higher and the benefits more limited, nearly all M&A FDI investments in sub-Saharan Africa occur in South Africa, which has established itself as the regional hub of financial speculation (Mwalimi, 2007, p. 160-161).

6.4. Passive Revolution & Neoliberalism

The ANC’s economic trajectory after 1994 is characterised by a growing acceptance of neoliberal rationalities with dire implications for the poorest sections of the population. This is informed by the Gramscian concept of passive revolution which refers to an attempt by the leading group to refurbish its waning hegemony by instituting “elite-engineered social and political reform” alongside material and ideological concessions to the population in order to secure its consent for the hegemonic project (Bieler & Morton, 2018, p. 102). As such, the concessions made during the negotiated transition and the ANC’s shift to the right thereafter
are understood in relation to a neoliberal project of class-based renewal, within the context of
global trends towards financialisation. This section surveys the ANC’s embrace of
neoliberalism prior to and after 1994, examining the influence of groups of large national and
international capital, and global financial institutions. Further, it discusses the impact of
resulting trends, such as the decline of unions and the collapse of a unified or independent left
after 1994, on the post-apartheid neoliberal consensus.

The compromises made in reaching negotiated settlement with the Apartheid state, including
on previously non-negotiable issues such as land and mine ownership, were essential in the
creation of a new consensus built around neoliberal economic policies. As previously
established in Chapter 3.2, in situations of ‘passive revolution’ the socio-political
requirements of transforming the hegemonic bloc are “at once partially fulfilled and
displaced” (Bieler & Morton, 2018, p. 101). As such, in states marked by ‘passive revolution’
there are elements of both continuity and discontinuity, requiring the maintenance of certain
social forms, the “overthrow of some older social forms, and the institution of new ones”
(Hart, 2014, p. 24). In South Africa, the negotiated compromise can be seen as an
incongruous process in which the former ruling bloc of South African capital and wealthy
Afrikaners was refurbished and re legitimized, playing an integral role in this new national
consensus (Marais, 1998, p. 86). Consequently, the new dispensation was overwhelmingly
biased towards the interests of key groupings of capital, specifically “financial capital and
conglomerates anchored in the minerals-energy complex” (Marais, 2011, p. 395). This bias
took the form of fiscally conservative monetary policies and policies of economic
liberalisation and privatisation, evident in South Africa’s WTO membership, and acceptance
of “profuse” World Bank advice on development policies, including GEAR (Bond, 2007, p.
128).

Further, although the terms of the negotiated transition made certain concessions to demands
for greater racial equality, including removing the formal racialised practices of the Apartheid
regime, the structures of the Apartheid economy were conversely maintained. Thus, whilst
the Apartheid project made certain concessions to the subordinate classes, these were heavily
restricted to ensure that “changes in the world of production are accommodated within the
current social formation” (Sassoon in Bieler & Morton, 2018, p. 102). As such, the negotiated
settlement essentially “eliminate[d] further nationalisation” (Horwitz, 1997, p. 504), a
position Mandela maintained was “the policy of the ANC” (Nat tras, 1994, p. 344-345).
Further, the numerous economic concessions also constrained the ANC’s ability to pursue state-led development by granting it, at best, partial control over financial policy, and deeply intertwinning the South African state with neoliberal global economic institutions (Bond, 2007). Thus, although the ANC gained political control in South Africa in 1994, “white domination of the economy [and]…White domination of corporate structures would be largely maintained” (Southall, 2004, p. 50-51). Meanwhile, the ANC’s economic policies faced intense pressure from international investors and global financial institutions at an economic and discursive level. As a result, the ANC increasingly adopted ideologically acceptable economic policies, shifting from an emphasis on wealth redistribution through state intervention to a neoliberal approach, performing “one of the biggest political and ideological somersaults in history” (Ngwane, 2007, p. 173).

The immensely powerful role of South African capital in shaping ANC economic policy was complimented by the financialisation of the South African economy, and the subsequent influence of global financial institutions and international capital speculation. Following Apartheid’s collapse, the ANC faced the dilemma of balancing their commitment to redressing historical inequities with the need to attract capital in a highly competitive globalised economy (Williams, 2000, p. 73). However, in contrast to developed economies in Europe and America, “post-colonial spaces are subject to far greater limits and constraints in terms of their domestic policy choices” (Koelble, 2004, p. 58). Thus international “influences, determinants and controls” can impact the domestic sphere such that ANC policy is often a “response to global pressures that [can] bring about a severe worsening of the South African political economy” (Koelble, 2004, p. 58-59). International capital and financial institutions have means to penalise governments defying global expectations, such as: “currency fluctuations, higher interest rates on loans or capital outflow and refusal of investments” (Adam, Slabbert & Moodley, 1998, p. 161-162). This was illustrated by the stock market plunge and currency devaluation that accompanied Nelson Mandela’s statement that: “The nationalization of the mines, banks and monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC” (cited in Nattrass, 1994, p. 344-345).

Global financialisation has also driven the ANC’s rightwards economic trajectory, as they have little meaningful control over the value of the rand, which is largely determined by derivates markets (Koelble, 2004, p. 69). JP Morgan Chase alone holds more than US$400 billion in Rand at any given time, which “is a sum larger than the annual gross domestic
product of the country” (Koelble, 2004, p. 69). In 1996 when rumours circulated that President Mandela was ill, the rand lost a quarter of its value due to dumping by financiers like Morgan Chase and Deutsche Bank. The rand continued to devalue until 2002 despite ANC adoption of neoliberal macroeconomy policies, and interventions by the Reserve Bank (Koelble, 2004, p. 70). The impact of such currency speculation is twofold: firstly, countries are coerced into adopting neoliberal policies; and secondly, the threat of speculative attack encourages policy makers in the periphery and semi-periphery to maintain substantial dollar and euro holdings, diverting funds from social and economic development. (Koelble, 2004, p. 70)

The ANC’s post-1994 shift towards neoliberal orthodoxy must also be situated in the context of a weakened left, “riven by suspicion and jealousy” following the collapse of the United Democratic Front (Peet, 2002, p. 78). This prevented the ANC from sustaining a detailed economic programme during the transition negotiations, so that “any compromise became tolerable if it did not block majority rule” (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 109-110). The independent left’s failure to develop organisational structures amongst the working class in workplaces and townships prevented them from countering the “general direction of COSATU and the transition led by the ANC” (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 111). In addition, the failure to develop better links with trade unions crippled the development of a radical left in South Africa25 (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 123). As a result, instead of developing a viable alternative to the ANC, the independent left has coalesced around single-issue grassroots campaigns over a range of issues from anti-retroviral drugs to water and electricity. (Bond, 2004, p. 7)

The ANC’s embrace of neoliberal policy prescriptions after 1994 were also the product of the shifting balance of power within the Tripartite Alliance. From a critical perspective, the ANC’s Cold War-era embrace of socialism was highly pragmatic, facilitating its alliance with the SACP and thus Soviet military aid (Southall, 2008, p. 283). This also boosted the ANC’s appeal amongst the pro-socialist Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) and its successor COSATU. However, this association was born out of historical necessity and convenience, thus while the SACP and COSATU clung to radical socialist interpretations of

25 It should be noted that COSATU’s role in the ANC-led Alliance led many leftist activists to conclude that there was little role for the working class and resurrected the 1970s notion of a “labour aristocracy” (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 12).
the NDR after Apartheid, the ANC began asserting the need to attract investment and create growth – with Thabo Mbeki noting that “The ANC is not a socialist party” (Cited in Cobbett & Cohen, 1988, p. 217). Further, Mbeki signalled that the ANC would never be socialist, and that BEE would be the NDR’s endpoint (Southall, 2008, p. 284). As such, the ANC’s embrace of neoliberalism was both ideological and pragmatic, “as the commitment to socialism was never entrenched in the wider ANC movement” (Koelble, 2004, p. 57).

Given COSATU’s historical relationship with the ANC it was assumed they would substantially influence ANC policies regarding workers’ rights and conditions, but significant tensions quickly developed over “industrial relations, strikes and wages”, and organised labour’s relative weakness prevented meaningful intervention (Gall, 1997, p. 203). With the introduction of GEAR, COSATU began more vocal condemnations of ANC economic policy, though complaints from the left focused on “GEAR not being discussed first in Alliance structures” (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 114-115). However, COSATU’s capacity to oppose the ANC’s trajectory was muted after many of its most able leaders were made ANC members of parliament or given comfortable government jobs (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 115). Further, in the interests of presenting a unified front, both COSATU and the SACP campaigned for the ANC before the 1999 election, subsequently “agreeing to mute their objections to the GEAR macroeconomic policy” (Peet, 2002, p. 75). Meanwhile, COSATU’s capacity (and that of organised labour generally) to oppose neoliberal policy prescriptions was being compromised by the prevailing economic conditions, which were segmenting the labour market and eroding the organisational base of its affiliates (Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 2008, p. 167). COSATU formally acknowledged its incapacity in 2009, after a three-day weekend retreat with the Alliance members, when it abandoned its claim for equal status with the ANC in “setting government policy and making appointments to office” (Plaut, 2010, p. 208).

As a result of conditions of ‘passive revolution’, the ANC’s hegemonic project is unstable and fluctuating, premised upon limited concessions whilst simultaneously preserving many of the structures of the Apartheid economy and accommodating a shift to an increasingly sophisticated highly financialised economy. Further, the ANC’s steadfast commitment to the core tenants of neoliberalism, despite the high social and political costs, is rooted not only in the conservative nature of South Africa’s ‘passive revolution’, but also the number of influences and global trends, including: the influence of South African capital, global
financial markets and international financial institutions on the ability of policy makers to formulate policy; and, the failure of unions, the SACP and the independent left to mount an effective counter-offensive. In summary, the ANC was subject to a range of ideological, political, and economic pressures that favoured a neoliberal economic consensus, placing increasing internal pressure on the ANC to prove that “the lights should not be switched off” (Adam, Slabbert & Moodley, 1998, p. 163).

6.4.1. Mobilising Consent

Amidst the overwhelmingly negative consequences of neoliberal policies in South Africa, the ANC has managed to retain a degree of consent by drawing upon a range of national, ethnic, cultural and historic legacies to make the neoliberal project acceptable to the population. Although ‘passive revolution’ is often characterised as a top-down process of class rule it must also consider popular demands and make limited concessions to subordinate classes. Thus, whilst already adopting fiscally conservative economic policies by 1994 the ANC’s embrace of neoliberalism remained incomplete, as shown by the vaguely populist yet business-friendly RDP, which was heavily influenced by its Alliance partners, the SACP and COSATU (Marais, 2011, p. 404). This willingness to compromise on policy reflected the necessity of the ANC neoliberal project to mobilise consent, and thereby forestall more radical change.

However, the ANC’s relationship to civil society changed dramatically in the mid-to-late 1990s as the forces of globalisation and financialisation led to the demobilisation of social activism, grass roots movements and the decline of the workers’ movement. In the new neoliberal climate, the ANC shifted from a strategy of building consensus among its Alliance partners to providing limited material and ideological concessions to the populace. This resulted in the undermining and cessation of the RDP, and development of the broadly neoliberal frameworks of GEAR, the NDP and ASGISA. However, the economic constraints of the negotiated transition and the neoliberal macro-economic paradigm greatly limited the government’s capacity to “use state expenditures and social grants to address massive poverty and social inequality” (Barchiesi, 2007a, p. 575). As a result the ANC has opted for “symbolic compensation” by drawing on the discourse of national liberation which has great ‘moral weight’ and is deeply connected to “specific histories, memories, embodied experiences and meanings” (Barchiesi, 2007a, p. 575; Hart, 2008, p. 691).
The ANC strategy of building consent hinges around appealing to national, ethnic, historic, and cultural forms of identity to reconcile the population to an elitist neoliberal project. In the first instance this involves official articulations of nationalism through: 1) appealing to the racially inclusive discourse of the ‘rainbow nation’; 2) tightening immigration policies and practices; and, 3) reiterating the promises of the National Democratic Revolution (Hart, 2014, p. 22-23). However, ANC attempts to build consensus through an appeal to the non-racial values of liberal pluralism “papered over historical geographies of racial oppression, exploitation and racialised dispossession” (Hart, 2014, p. 23). As a result, this only served to reinforce the ‘politics of difference’ established during Apartheid giving rise to a “counter-politics of ethnic assertion” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2003, p. 446). The tightening of immigration policies has also run into problems resulting in the repeal of the The Aliens Control Act in 2002, and ramping up and feeding into xenophobic violence, though it has enforced a sense of national identity (Hart, 2014, p. 23). However, though both these strategies have run into the problem of ethnicity, the ANC has also shown itself to be shrewdly capable of employing ethnicity to mobilise consent. This is evident in the ANC’s capture of the KwaZulu-Natal voter base by appealing to Zulu ethnic identity under Zuma as a way of bridging or mediating the relationship between ANC supporters and the state (White, 2012, p. 399). This is particularly relevant in the context of growing social exclusion amidst the “mass unemployment and personal insecurity” created by neoliberalism (White, 2012, p. 399).

The discourse of the national democratic revolution (NDR) is also a crucial component of the ANC’s ability to mobilise consent in conditions of passive revolution. Though the SACP was initially critical of the ANC’s neoliberal shift, the SACP now plays an important ideological role justifying ANC policies using its two-stage theory of national democratic revolution (NDR): “liberal democracy first, ‘socialism’ later” (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 110). This theoretical perspective allows the SACP to justify any ANC behaviour as historically necessary steps prior to later socialist revolution, including attacking independent opposition and marginalising the independent left (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 114). The SACP also provides a thin sheen of socialist legitimacy to the ANC-led Alliance, with regular calls within the SACP to hasten the NDR “without yet identifying what socialist content is appropriate” (Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 13). As a result, the SACP now plays a “conservatizing role” within civil society, alienating “genuine radical activists” (Bond, 2014, p. 16). The degree to which the SACP is beholden to the ANC is evident in the claim by ANC secretary
general and SACP chairman Gwede Mantashe, that “the Communist Party has accepted the leadership of the ANC during the National Democratic Revolution phase of our revolution” (Plaut, 2010, p. 205).

The final component of the ANC’s apparatus for generating consent for neoliberalism is the state’s symbolic support for struggles over representivity and ownership combined with social programs which inscribe neoliberal norms. As is detailed above, the policy of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) was developed as both a way to enrich a small black elite and meet the demands for greater racial representivity in businesses. Despite its manifest failure to achieve the latter, BEE is a valuable tool for constructing consent, especially when it is framed in terms of the NDR. Similarly, the establishment of the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) in 1994, to investigate land claims and prepare them for adjudication was significant in mobilising consent behind the ANC, despite the heavy limitations placed on those agencies responsible by neoliberal macroeconomic policy. These policies crucially demonstrate the schism between what was promised to the populace and what was implemented, or “talking left while walking right”, which was crucial to the ANC’s capacity to mobilise support for its nation-building project (Bond, 2007a, p. 128). These policies were supported by the ANC’s provision of limited material support through post-1994 social programs, such as welfare entitlements, social grants, and ‘workfare’ schemes. However, as previously noted, these policies are not simply stop-gap measures incongruous with neoliberalism, but rather pedagogical tools deployed to support job-seeking behaviours and work ethics consistent with the needs of capital under neoliberalism. By invoking the historic and cultural rhetoric of the ‘dignity of labour’ and the crucial role of the wage labourer in the national liberation struggle, the ANC embeds neoliberal understandings of citizenship as based upon the “ethics of self-sufficiency and productive contribution to society” (Barchiesi, 2007b, p. 46).

6.5. **The ANC and Civil Society**

Social movements, community organisations and unions are an expression of subaltern class consciousness in contesting hegemonic practices. As such, analysing the relationship between the ANC and civil society is crucially important in understanding the degree to which the ANC is hegemonic. In South Africa, post-Apartheid social movements and community organisations emerged as a direct result of the failure of the ANC’s economic policies and increased detachment between the leadership and its electorate. These movements were
diverse including campaigns for free anti-retroviral drugs and land, but generally coalesced around demands for employment, housing and affordable water and electricity. As such, these movements are highly critical of the ANC government’s responses to the AIDS and TB epidemics, skyrocketing inequality, and inadequate housing and service provision (Bond, 2007a, p. 144). Alongside unions, these groups have begun to challenge the ANC “in terms of political hegemony in particular locations and on particular issues” (Bond, 2007a, p. 144). As such, the growth of these organisations, the failure of the ANC to co-opt them, and the growing hostility of the ANC to social movements and striking workers has direct implications for the hegemony of the ANC and neoliberalism in South Africa.

The legacy of social protest and organised local and political movements in South Africa has cast a long shadow over social movements in post-Apartheid South Africa. Throughout most of its existence the ANC was “neither a nationalist movement nor a hegemonic force within the liberation struggle”, existing alongside a range of other anti-Apartheid organisations (Suttner, 2014, p. 11). It was only in the 1950s that the ANC began to simultaneously advance “an inclusive African nationalism and a popular political subjectivity that embraced people of all races” (Suttner, 2014, p. 11). Though this political renaissance was crushed during the 1960s, the racially inclusive popular subject re-emerged during the 1980s with the expansion of the democratic terrain to include “a range of other actors representing sizeable sections of the white community and business… [with] a broad commitment to achieving a democratic order” (Suttner, 2014, p. 10). The creation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 brought together over 600 community organisations into a body that both opposed Apartheid and negotiated the Apartheid environment, managing crime control, recreational activities, cleaning townships and “other interventions aimed at improving and managing their habitat” (Suttner, 2014, p. 9). The role of ‘the people’ expanded from formal political rights to citizenship, understood as an “activity based on collective processes where individuals get together to discuss, debate and act on collective matters in public” (Ruiters, 2014, p. 428). Thus, many who helped make the negotiated settlement possible “did not intend their political activities to be restricted to elections” (Suttner, 2014, p. 8).

However, the period of democratic transition weakened the capacity of many organisations, including the UDF, to fulfil the ambitions of its members. Multiple states of emergency throughout the 1980s and 1990s eroded the organisational capacity and radical participatory orientation of the UDF (Suttner, 2014, p. 12). Though new organisations were established to
advance the broad inclusivity of the UDF, such as the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), the structure between the grassroots and the leadership had been dismantled (Suttner, 2014, p. 12). However, between 1990 and 1994 the relationship between governed and governing remained relatively healthy due to the proliferation of public forums to consult on “almost every crucial government function” working as “broadly consultative policy discussion bodies” which brought together a wide range of stakeholders from throughout civil society (Horwitz, 1997, p. 509, 510). These forums held a promise of a wider public participation in state structures, with the ANC noting that “the democratic order we envisage must foster a wide range of institutions of participatory democracy in partnership with civil society” (cited in Horwitz, 1997, p. 511). However, in the post-Apartheid period, the ANC government abandoned the notion of a “people’s government” in favour of a “people-driven government” (Suttner, 2014, p. 12). The power of the public forums was severely curtailed as the ANC began to regard the stakeholder process as “treading upon, even compromising, government's policy-making authority” (Horwitz, 1997, p. 524-525). Meanwhile, those remaining popular organisations such as the UDF began to dissolve themselves on the understanding that the Tripartite Alliance “would promote the interests of the people and represent them in the best way possible” (Suttner, 2014, p. 13). As such, the transition period also inculcated a sense of entitlement to direct participation in South African political life which re-emerged in the late-1990s.

As the tremendous social costs of the ANC’s neoliberal project became increasingly transparent, the ANC faced resistance from a host of social movements across the country. From the late 1990s onwards, a host of community-based organisations formed to articulate the struggles of subaltern groups including the Concerned Citizens Forum, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), the Soweto electricity Crisis Committee, the Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC) and the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 120). These organisations emerged as a response to the ANC’s neoliberal economic policies under GEAR and the “relentless commodification and privatization of basic services” (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 120). Further, these new organisations often harkened back to the patterns of associations of the 1980s with continuities in “cultural expression and practices—slogans, songs, dance, posters and style of speeches” (Reddy, 2010, p. 189). However, these organisations also tended to be narrowly focused and were often exhausted after achieving their objectives. Thus, there has been successive waves of social movements in South Africa with each expending their momentum within a number of years with few exceptions (Ruiters,
Further, many poorer communities are unable to muster such organised forms of resistance, such as the Ladysmith/Ezakheni area, in which semi-formal community-based organisations (CBOs) emerged as a response to the social, political and economic malaise (Swilling & Russell, 2002, iv). However, though these informal community-based networks provide a crucial pillar of support to some neighbourhoods, “they are not seen as having the capacity to solve community problems” (Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 2008, p. 124).

Though social movements and CBOs generally involve unemployed and informal workers, the links between unions and social movements crucially inform civil society struggles. As a result of the prevalence of unions in South Africa, union members are often involved in social movements and local community organisations “if not always leading the community-based struggles, as organized trade unionists” (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 122). This bridging of social movements, community organisations and unions is extremely important in imposing an organisational structure on these small, often spontaneous, articulations of dissent. Further, it is especially significant given that the left has often been accused of being “bedevilled by an all-consuming fetishism of organizational form” (Harvey cited in Ruiters, 2014, p. 425). Though many unions and many of the earlier post-Apartheid movements were characterised by institutional fetishism, the 2012 Marikana strike “shattered the myth” of the labour aristocracy (Ruiters, 2014, p. 425-426). The Marikana strike itself involved many sectors of the community including “women, the unemployed and youth”, and was followed by the creation of new organisations linking social movements, community organisations and unions, such as the United Front (UF) (Ruiters, 2014, p. 426). However, social activist unionism still faces a number of challenges, such as balancing radically inclusive politics with obligations to improve employee welfare. This is further problematised by the highly competitive post-Apartheid landscape, where strikes are employed to “mobilise and increase membership” and “giving a particular union a political edge” (Murwirapachena & Sibanda, 2014, p. 554).

The hegemony of the ANC is also undermined by the upsurge of spontaneous protests in the post-Apartheid period from 2008 onwards (International Labour Research and Information Group, 2014, p. 1). Between 2005 and 2010, the police recorded an annual average of over 8,000 public demonstrations, or “Gatherings Act” incidents, with the majority of incidents in most provinces related to the “the rising cost of (and declining access to) water, sanitation, and electricity” (Bond, 2010, p. 1). These protests are usually attributed to resistance to the
commercialisation of municipal services, and the slow provision of housing and services (Bond, 2010, p. 1). However, these protests are also the product of interfactional and intra-party conflict within and often involving the ANC, as councillors stoke the concerns of local communities to gain lucrative seats, contracts and/or displace rivals (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation & Society Work and Development Institute, 2011). Further, they are a response to “poor quality and uneven provision of services, the lack of democratic participation in local development, indifference towards citizens’ complaints and a brash culture of self-enrichment among local officials” (Marais, 2011, p. 216). Thus, although the motivations behind these spontaneous protests and relationship with unions, social movements and community organisations varies enormously, ‘service delivery’ protests share the same root causes; slow and uneven service delivery, state failure, widening class inequalities, lack of participation in decision making and the unresponsiveness of the ANC (Reddy, 2010, p. 203).

Popular protest in South Africa must also be placed within the context of the enduring legitimacy of the ANC in the eyes of the rural black populace. Thus, despite the upsurge of unrest since 2008, “there is no automatic translation of social protest into organized oppositional politics” with protest regularly transforming itself “into a vote for the ANC at election times” (Southall, 2014, p. 67). Further, in a study of local politics in Meadowlands, Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell found that “Many local leaders are still respected in Meadowlands because of their role in the struggle despite the people’s disillusionment with delivery” (Ngwane, 2007, p. 192). Further, the relationship between the ruling Tripartite Alliance and local township and community protests is complex with protests “often, but not solely, organized by SACP and ANC militants” (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 122). However, from a Gramscian perspective, the significance of these ‘service delivery’ protests lies in their ‘spontaneous’ nature which “indicates that they are organic, arising from the depths of working class experience” (Ngwane, 2007, p. 188). Further, the prevalence of these protests throughout the country suggests that different communities are facing “the same problems and [reaching the same] conclusions”, namely that ANC policies are not working. (Ngwane, 2007, p. 188)

The rise of these new phenomena has been accompanied by growing hostility by the ANC and the rise of “repressive local state apparatuses” which play a “much bigger role in policing everyday life in cities and townships” (Ruiters, 2014, p. 429). This has been supported by the
ANC’s increased willingness to employ coercion, with police employing force as a “first resort” resulting in “multiple shootings of often unarmed or scantily armed protesters” (Suttner, 2014, p. 24-25). Further, the ANC employed gratuitous violence against social movements such as the shack dwellers’ movement Abahlali baseMjondolo, which has been subjected to illegal evictions, assassinations and gang violence organised and led by “the KZN ANC and eThekwini municipal government” (Suttner, 2014, p. 15-16). This escalation of violence has been accompanied by a de-politicisation of grievances, with police sent out to meet crowds without “mediation or intervention from the political authorities at any level” (Suttner, 2014, p. 24-25). Those responsible for the provoking the protests, such as employers or local politicians, also either refuse to address the crowds, or do so “later and often not at the level requested” (Suttner, 2014, p. 24-25). This has the consequent effect of stifling legitimate grievances and reducing highly politicised issues to “questions of law and order” (Suttner, 2014, p. 24-25). The ANC’s reliance on coercion and repression to stifle dissent suggests a crisis of confidence in the ANC’s ability to lead, as Arrighi notes “if subordinate groups have confidence in their rulers, systems of domination can be run without resort to coercion” (Arrighi, 2005a, p. 32).

Although the ANC’s response to these movements is indicative of a declining capacity to mobilise consent, it is also tightly wound up with its history as a National Liberation Movement (NLM). The ANC was deeply impacted by the experience of the ANC leadership-in-exile which became dominant within the organisation following its unbanning in 1990. Subsequently, the ANC adopted a “vanguard Leninist strategy that emphasised democratic centralism and top-down command” over the “decentralised and more spontaneous actions of the masses” (Johnson, 2003, p. 311, 324). This not only created a “hierarchical, oligarchic relationship between rulers and ruled” (Johnson, 2003, p. 329) but left the ANC to understand its role “in relation to independent organisations as one where it monopolised the political space” (Suttner, 2014, p. 14). As a consequence, in the post-Apartheid period the ANC saw itself as the “‘sole and authentic’ bearer of the democratic and nation-building project… responsible for covering the entire terrain of political activities” (Suttner, 2014, p. 14). Thus, like many NLM throughout the African continent the ANC was hostile to the formation of “independent organs of civil society, sectoral organisations or social movements” which it saw as a direct challenge to its authority (Suttner, 2014, p. 14). As a result, these new social actors encountered considerable hostility from the ANC, evident in the “ANC's open attack on a civil society conference called by COSATU in 2010” (Suttner, 2014, p. 15).
The relationship between the ANC and social movements, community organisations, social movement-unions and spontaneous protests is often characterised by coercion. The growth of these organisations and movements within South Africa impacts on the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project, highlighting its failures and proposing new possibilities for systemic anti-hegemonic movements. The fragility of ANC hegemony is further reinforced by the upsurge of popular ‘spontaneous’ protests after 1995 which attempt, but often fail, to articulate the experiences of subaltern classes. The failure of the ANC to co-opt these organisations and stifle dissent manifests in an increased willingness to employ coercion and repression. This is indicative of an increasingly fractured hegemonic project centred on the ANC unable to create the necessary conditions for economic growth or stifle the growing voices of dissent in civil society. As a result, the ANC hegemonic project is left in an increasingly perilous position, creating the conditions for the emergence of new anti-hegemonic movements.

6.6. Conclusion

The post-Apartheid political landscape is characterised by the emergence of a hegemonic project centred on the ANC based on neoliberal economic rationalities. However, as a result of the conditions of ‘passive revolution’, the ANC’s hegemonic project is unstable and fluctuating, involving concessions which maintained the structures of the Apartheid economy whilst accommodating a shift to an increasingly sophisticated highly financialised economy. This project is also constrained by a number of factors including the position of South Africa in the world-system, the legacies of Apartheid, the processes of trade liberalisation and financialisation, the influence of civil society actors and the shifting relationship between the members of the Tripartite Alliance. As a result, the ANC’s adoption of neoliberal economic policies varied widely throughout the post-Apartheid period, ranging from the vaguely populist yet business friendly RDP, to the overtly neoliberal GEAR and later policy frameworks, such as ASGISA, the NGP and the NDP, which attempted to mediate the harmful impacts of neoliberalism through limited state involvement in the economy. These neoliberal economic frameworks were supported by ANC appeals to nationalism and ethnicity, and through ideological and material concessions including social programs, and policies aimed at redistribution, such as BEE and attempts at land reform. However, despite the stated objective of deracialising the economy the poor construction and elitist nature these policies resulted in the privileging of a small black capitalist class at the expense of the
poorest sections of the population. Further, BEE encouraged the development of a small but wealthy black capitalist class tied to the interests of large capital which has acted as a bulwark against radical economic change.

ANC neoliberal economic policy has also entrenched widespread poverty, unemployment and deep inequalities in the post-Apartheid period. Further, the privatisation and/or commodification of basic services alongside the underfinancing of local government has reinforced the spatial and economic inequalities of Apartheid. Subsequently, these issues have provoked increasing levels of unrest and protest throughout society, and led to the emergence of numerous community organisations, social movements and unions opposed to the ANC neoliberal order. Though the ANC has had some success in co-opting and containing these movements in the past, in recent years it has increasingly resorted to violence as a means of shutting down opposition. This reliance on coercion suggests that the hegemonic project centred on the ANC is becoming increasingly fractured, as it is no longer capable of mobilising consent outside elections. Further, the use of coercion has resulted in the growth of links between various civil society groups, bolstering organisational capacity and producing the conditions necessary for the emergence of an alternative hegemonic project.
7. Findings (Part 1)

So I go down to this municipality in the Southern part of Gauteng where... protesters had burnt down a library... I spoke to an elderly man who... said to me 'do you know when this library was built comrade Steve? ... Three and a half years ago... do you know how many books were in the library? ... None.' Not a single book was in that library. Do you know how many tables and chairs were in that library? ... None. (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015)

7.1. Introduction

The following chapters examine the hegemony of the ANC and the discourse of neoliberalism in South Africa, and how contestations of the ANC neoliberal project are understood by members of civil society. In addition, they engage with contestations of the ANC by NUMSA, including how the latter is understood by the media and organic intellectuals, the extent to which NUMSA’s actions are ideologically and/or politically significant and the threat it poses to the Tripartite Alliance. This is supported by an analysis of three sources of data relevant from a theoretical and practical standpoint: 1) electoral results from South African national, provincial and municipal elections after 1994; 2) newspaper clippings from 2011 to 2015; and, 3) transcripts from interviews conducted with organic intellectuals in 2015. These sources of data are readily accessible and well suited to the application of Gramscian theory that informs this analysis.

This chapter begins with an analysis of South African national, provincial, and municipal elections since 1994. The importance of elections in gauging hegemony is established by Gramsci who argues that the “counting of votes” is the fundamental measure of the “expansive and persuasive capacity” of the ideas and opinions of the leading group in a democratic state (Gramsci, 1971, p. 192-193). As such, election analysis is useful for establishing the relative strength of the ANC hegemonic project and the “expansive and persuasive capacity” of neoliberal discourse (Gramsci, 1971, p. 192-193). This is followed by a Critical Discourse Analysis of a variety of South African newspapers between 2012 and 2015. These newspapers were chosen as broadly representative of the media complex in South Africa and were useful in establishing the following: a) the degree to which neoliberal rationalities had penetrated common sense ideas; b) the extent to which the media contested ANC understanding and policy; and c) how NUMSA’s actions were understood and portrayed by the media. As such, newspaper analysis provides useful information about the
extent to which the media interpret, challenge or reinforce the ideas of the hegemonic group. Finally, the second findings chapter will complement these analyses with an examination of fifteen semi-structured interviews of South African organic intellectuals conducted between during the same period newspapers were analysed; July to October 2015. The perspectives of these intellectuals are highly relevant to this thesis’ analysis of hegemony given the crucial role played by organic intellectuals in contesting hegemonic projects and articulating subaltern interests. As such, their understandings of contestations of hegemony in South Africa provide useful insights into the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project and the significance of counter-hegemonic formations such as NUMSA.

7.2. **Analysing Elections**

Elections are not only illustrative of the relative strength of parties but also that of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourse. As such, by analysing national, provincial and municipal election trends between 1994 and 2016, this section aims to establish the relative strength of the ANC hegemonic project. However, this analysis is constrained by a number of institutional and technical factors arising from the post-Apartheid landscape. Firstly, it should be noted that the names of four provinces were later changed, from the Eastern Transvaal, Northern Transvaal, Orange Free State and Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging to Mpumalanga, Northern Province, Free State and Gauteng, respectively. Further, due to rezoning and adjustments to district boundaries, municipality membership has varied slightly between 1996 and 2016, creating minor inconsistencies in voting registration and turnout. In addition, as a result of the immediate political necessity of a negotiated settlement, the 1994 elections was run by a temporary electoral commission unrelated to the current Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC). As a result, national results for the 1994 election are limited to total valid votes, spoilt votes, and seat allocation of each political party in each province. Lastly, the IEC does not provide access to the results of the 1995/6 municipal election and only provides information on the 2006 municipal election on a district by district basis. As such, this study draws upon the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) for information relating to the 1995/6 and 2006 municipal elections.

7.2.1. **National Elections**

The 1994 national election ushered the ANC into office with 62.65% of the popular vote and a popular mandate to redress the racial and economic legacies of Apartheid (Electoral Commission of South Africa, n.d.). 20 years later, despite the abject failure to make
meaningful inroads into poverty, inequality and unemployment, the ANC was re-elected with 62.15% of the vote (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2014b). The disconnect between the actions of the ANC and the behaviour of its electorate can in part be explained by the Gramscian concept of the ‘national-popular dimension’. This concept refers to the capacity of the leading party to build consensus by appealing to the values, norms and attitudes of subaltern classes (Marais, 2011, 391-392). In South Africa, the ANC achieves this by employing the discourse of national liberation with its great “moral weight” and connection to “specific histories, memories, embodied experiences and meanings of racial oppression, racialised dispossession, and struggles against apartheid” (Hart, 2008, p. 691). Further, the ANC holds regular rallies and speeches where its leaders make loud condemnations of poverty and racism, whilst supporting policies which deeply entrench socioeconomic inequalities (Marais, 2011, 391-392). The ANC also uses stop-gap economic measures such as social grants and the public works systems to co-opt the formation of alternative hegemonic projects. Further, the ANC’s continuing electoral dominance is also the result of the “cushioning effect” of party politics on popular engagement, which results in “dissatisfaction on the ground” translating into a vote for the ANC at election time (Booysen, 2012, p. 2). However, a closer examination of national election results reveals some alarming trends for the ongoing dominance of the ANC neoliberal project.

Though the ANC has maintained the overwhelming majority of the popular vote, there are some notable indicators of ANC electoral decline. As illustrated in figure 2, the ANC’s performance at national elections actually improved between 1994 and 2004, reaching an all-time high of 69.69% before subsequently declining just below 1994 levels by 2014. However, the significance of this decline is even more noticeable when the ANC’s electoral performance in national elections is expressed as a percentage of the total voting age population (VAP). As such, whereas the ANC’s share of the vote rose and fell between 1994 and 2014, the percentage of the eligible voting population that voted for the ANC serially declined by 19% over the same period. Thus, although the ANC’s share of the popular vote only declined by half a percentage between 1994 and 2014, whereas in 1994 it commanded a majority of the voting age population, it now attracts little over a third. Further, the current electoral trend for the ANC is to continue to decline in relation to voters and VAP, and is unlikely to change despite a change in president. Thus, the ANC’s declining electoral support and inability to mobilise the vast majority of the VAP suggests a declining capacity to appeal
to “popular values, demands and struggles of people” to mobilise support for the ANC hegemonic project (Marais, 2011, 391-392).

![Votes cast for ANC as percentage of total votes and VAP in national elections, 1994-2014. Data for ANC’s percentage of votes from the Electoral Commission of South Africa (n.d., 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b) and ANC’s share of VAP from Schultz-Herzenberg (2014).](image)

The ANC’s ability to draw a large share of the popular vote despite a declining capacity to mobilise the vast majority of potential voters is supported by declining levels of participation at national elections. As illustrated in figure 3, the growth of the VAP has vastly outpaced the number of people voting for the ANC or voting at all in national elections, with the number of votes cast as a proportion of VAP falling from just under 84% in 1994 to 58.54% in 2014. In addition, there is a strong correlation between the VAP and registration, with the latter remaining between 75% and 80% of the VAP between 1999 and 2014 (there was no voter registration in 1994). However, the continued decline of voter participation in national elections is disguised by the emphasis of organisations such as the Electoral Commission of South Africa (2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014b) on voter registration and, crucially, votes cast as a percent of registered voters as a gauge of electoral participation. Thus, although the percentage of the registered population which voted in 2014 was as high as 73.48% (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2014b), only 58.54% of the voting age population actually elected to vote. However, whereas this declining participation bodes poorly for the capacity of the ANC to mobilise support for the hegemonic project, the increasing reluctance of the
South African population to vote at all may actually be an indicator of ANC hegemony, as Marais notes, the notion that “one does not makes a difference” and “there is no alternative” are powerful facets of a dominant ideology (Marais, 2011, p. 391). As such, the ANC’s capacity to attract 62% of the popular vote despite widespread unrest and protest is evidence of the success of the ANC neoliberal project in monopolising the political arena and neutralising the emergence of counter-hegemonic projects.


The decline of the ANC’s share of the votes in national elections after 2004 must also be understood in relation to wider electoral trends within the nine provinces of South Africa. As illustrated in table 1, the ANC traditionally performed better in largely rural areas, attracting its largest share of the votes in 1994 in Limpopo, the Eastern Cape, North West province, Mpumalanga and the Free State. This is the result of a number of factors, including the strong association of the ANC with the Anti-Apartheid struggle in rural areas and the strength of opposition parties in the more urban regions. This includes the predominance of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in KwaZulu-Natal and the National Party (NP), and its successor the New National Party (NNP), and the Democratic Party (DP), and its successor the Democratic Alliance (DA) in the Northern Cape, Western Cape and Gauteng. As shown in table 1, between 1994 and 2004 the ANC strengthened its position in nearly every province except Limpopo, North West, and the Eastern Cape, which had only slightly decreased.
### Table 1. Votes cast for the ANC as a percentage of total valid votes, 1994-2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Eastern Cape</th>
<th>Free State</th>
<th>Gauteng</th>
<th>KwaZulu-Natal</th>
<th>Limpopo</th>
<th>Mpumalanga</th>
<th>North West</th>
<th>Northern Cape</th>
<th>Western Cape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>84.39</td>
<td>77.42</td>
<td>59.09</td>
<td>30.16</td>
<td>92.73</td>
<td>81.87</td>
<td>83.46</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>73.91</td>
<td>81.03</td>
<td>68.14</td>
<td>39.77</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>85.29</td>
<td>80.53</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>42.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>79.31</td>
<td>82.05</td>
<td>68.74</td>
<td>47.47</td>
<td>89.72</td>
<td>86.34</td>
<td>81.83</td>
<td>68.75</td>
<td>46.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>69.70</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>64.76</td>
<td>63.97</td>
<td>85.27</td>
<td>85.81</td>
<td>73.84</td>
<td>61.10</td>
<td>32.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>70.75</td>
<td>69.72</td>
<td>54.92</td>
<td>65.31</td>
<td>78.97</td>
<td>78.80</td>
<td>67.79</td>
<td>63.88</td>
<td>34.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, between 2004 and 2014 the ANC performed poorly throughout many of the provinces, taking a battering from increasing oppositional politics. In 2009 the ANC faced fierce competition from ANC offshoot the Congress of the People (COPE), resulting in losses in nearly every province, with the exception of KwaZulu-Natal. These losses were particularly acute in the COPE strongholds of the Eastern Cape, Free State, Northern Cape and Western Cape, where it attracted 13.31%, 11.11%, 15.94% and 9.06% of the vote respectively (see table 2). The implosion of COPE in the 2014 election bolstered the ANC in those areas where it had been strongest, resulting in marginal gains and losses. However, this was likely the result of a withdrawal of voter engagement rather than a transferal of support to the ANC. Indeed, as table 3 illustrates, the collapse of COPE largely translated into increased support for the DA in its former strongholds as supporters “often moved on to, or returned to, the DA” (Booysen, 2012, p. 8). In addition, the ANC’s marginal decline in Free State and outright decline in Gauteng, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and North West must be understood with reference to the Economic Freedom Fighters who attracted 7.89%, 10.26%, 10.27%, 6.15% and 12.53% of the vote, respectively (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2014b). Thus, overall there seems to have been a decline in the ANC’s rural support base (with the exception of KwaZulu-Natal), with the largest losses between 1994 and 2014 in Limpopo, the Eastern Cape, North West Province and Free State (see Table 2). Further, given both the prominence of ANC electoral campaigning in rural areas and higher rates of non-voting among rural voters (Schultz-Herzenberg, 2014, p. 3), the ANC’s decline in those areas suggests that the ANC hegemonic project is failing to mobilise the rural populace. However, these trends also suggest that the disillusioned ANC rural voters lack alternative options and as such there is no sustained challenge to the ANC from voters in these areas.
Table 2. Votes cast for COPE as a percentage of total valid votes, 2009-2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Eastern Cape</th>
<th>Free State</th>
<th>Gauteng</th>
<th>KwaZulu-Natal</th>
<th>Limpopo</th>
<th>Mpumalanga</th>
<th>North West</th>
<th>Northern Cape</th>
<th>Western Cape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>13.31</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>7.68</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>8.43</td>
<td>15.94</td>
<td>9.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3. Votes cast for the DP/DA as a percentage of total valid votes, 1994-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Eastern Cape</th>
<th>Free State</th>
<th>Gauteng</th>
<th>KwaZulu-Natal</th>
<th>Limpopo</th>
<th>Mpumalanga</th>
<th>North West</th>
<th>Northern Cape</th>
<th>Western Cape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>4.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>17.71</td>
<td>9.76</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>14.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>20.33</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>26.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9.97</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>21.27</td>
<td>10.33</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>13.08</td>
<td>48.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite suffering tremendous losses between 2004 and 2014 in nearly every province, support for the ANC only fell a relatively small 7.54% at a national level. This is largely a result of the collapse of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC’s subsequent expansion in the populous former IFP stronghold of KwaZulu-Natal. As shown in table 4, support for the IFP is concentrated in KwaZulu-Natal which fell from 48.59% to 10.17% of the vote between 1994 and 2014. This contrasts starkly with ANC electoral support in the province which more than doubled from 30.16% to 65.31% over the same period (see table 2). This trend is particularly evident from 2009 onwards, with support for the IFP falling 24.7% between 2004 and 2014, whilst ANC support rose by 17.84%. This is supported by Roland Henwood who notes that “the IFP kept the ANC alive in the last election because the number of people who left the IFP… made up what the ANC lost in support due to people leaving the party or people not participating” (personal communication, August 7, 2015).

However, though the ANC’s expansion in KwaZulu-Natal can be explained by the ongoing decline of the IFP, it was also the result of political machinations within the ANC following the removal of South African President Mbeki in 2008. The replacement of the unpopular Xhosa speaking ANC leader Mbeki with Zuma, who was a Zulu, greatly contributed to its popularity in the predominantly ethnically Zulu KwaZulu-Natal province (Johnson, 2016). In Gramscian terms the replacement of Mbeki with Jakob Zuma allowed the ANC to refurbish its hegemonic project. That is, the ANC responded to growing unease over perceived
increased detachment between the leadership and its electorate by reconfiguring the leadership to adopt the interests of a subaltern group (Marais, 2011, p. 405). This was highly significant in bolstering support for the ANC, as KwaZulu-Natal is a highly populous province with over 6 million people of voting age in 2014, and the highest voter turnout as a percentage of VAP at 63.57%, over five percent higher than the national average (see table 5).

Table 4. Votes cast for the IFP as a percentage of total valid votes, 1994-2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Eastern Cape</th>
<th>Free State</th>
<th>Gauteng</th>
<th>KwaZulu-Natal</th>
<th>Limpopo</th>
<th>Mpumalanga</th>
<th>North West</th>
<th>Northern Cape</th>
<th>Western Cape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>48.59</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>40.45</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>34.87</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>20.52</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>10.17</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5. Percentage registration and total votes in the 2014 national election against VAP by province.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Voting Age Population (VAP)</th>
<th>Valid votes cast in 2014 national election</th>
<th>Voter Turnout as a % VAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>3,794,352</td>
<td>2,243,497</td>
<td>59.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>1,685,198</td>
<td>1,034,337</td>
<td>61.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>7,860,280</td>
<td>4,592,219</td>
<td>58.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>6,096,509</td>
<td>3,874,833</td>
<td>63.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>3,004,795</td>
<td>1,523,169</td>
<td>50.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>2,389,406</td>
<td>1,385,407</td>
<td>57.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>2,120,381</td>
<td>1,126,691</td>
<td>53.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>711,843</td>
<td>436,065</td>
<td>61.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>3,771,271</td>
<td>2,168,147</td>
<td>57.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out of country</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18,132</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31,434,035</td>
<td>18,402,497</td>
<td>58.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data from the Electoral Commission of South Africa (2013c, 2014b).

Despite declining voter turnout at a national level, the growth of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the proliferation of smaller parties registering to contest elections indicates growing contestations of the ANC hegemonic project. The Democratic Party and its successor the DA have attracted increasing support in national elections, growing from only 1.73% of the national vote in 1994 to 22.23% by 2014 (Electoral Commission of South Africa, n.d., 2014b). The Democratic Party/Alliance established itself as a multi-racial white-friendly alternative to the ANC in the strongholds of the National Party, namely Gauteng, the
Northern Cape and the Western Cape. As table 6 demonstrates, the DP/DA benefitted greatly from the decline of the National Party and its successor the New National Party (NNP), making its strongest gains in its former strongholds. This was particularly evident in 1999 following the rebranding of the National Party as the NNP and again in 2004 and 2009 following the terminal decline of the latter. Further, as previously noted, its strong showing in 2014 was also impacted by the implosion of COPE as voters returned or migrated to the DA.

Table 6. Votes cast as a percentage of total valid votes: Gauteng, Northern Cape and Western Cape, 1994-2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP/DA</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>17.71</td>
<td>20.33</td>
<td>21.27</td>
<td>28.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>27.58</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP/DA</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>13.08</td>
<td>23.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>41.93</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22.49</td>
<td>7.16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP/DA</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>14.18</td>
<td>26.92</td>
<td>48.78</td>
<td>57.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>56.24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34.38</td>
<td>9.44</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The DA’s near constant growth at a provincial and national level since 1994 stands in stark contrast to the proliferation of smaller parties contesting national elections, which tended to wither away or completely crumble between elections, such as COPE. However, despite the instability and size of these alternative parties, they have attracted an increasingly larger share of the vote, from 4.7% in 1994 to 13.21% in 2014 (Electoral Commission of South Africa, n.d., 2014b). However, from a Gramscian perspective these smaller parties are ‘conjunctural’ phenomena representing the interests of a specific subaltern class beyond which they cannot move, although often engaging in minor interventions and political criticism (Morton, 2007, p. 175). This is especially true of the EFF which remains organised around Julius Malema and is primarily concerned with searing criticism of Zuma and corruption in the ANC (Modjadji, 2015a; Sosibo, 2015). By contrast organic movements are relatively permanent constructs which represent the interests of a range of subaltern actors and are engaged in a war of position against the historic bloc as a whole. Further, although the DA has increasingly made inroads into provinces outside of Gauteng, the Northern Cape and the Western Cape, it is unable to meaningfully penetrate “in any significant way the black-African ANC constituency” (Booysen, 2012, p. 354). As such, the DA is likewise a
conjunctural phenomenon, unable to represent the interests of a broader range of subaltern groups.

The demographic constraints of political parties also place constraints on their potential to attract and organise subaltern masses. This is evident in the low rates of registration among those aged between 18 and 29, in contrast to people aged 30 years and over. The reluctance of people aged 18 to 29 to vote has a marked impact on electoral trends, especially given that they account for over a third of the population but only around a quarter of total registered voters (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2013c). This is especially evident in Gauteng, North West province and the Western Cape, which had the lowest percentage registration for those aged between 19 and 39 (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2013c). This is aggravated by the high youth unemployment rate which was 36.1% in 2014 by conservative estimates, with 36.4%, 38.4%, and 31% youth unemployment in Gauteng, North West province and the Western Cape (Statistics South Africa, 2014, p. 4). As a result, people aged between 18 and 29 nationally and 18 and 39 in the aforementioned provinces are much less likely to participate in electoral processes. Thus, the ANC’s ongoing success in garnering a majority of the popular vote must also be understood within the context of the failure of opposition political parties to adopt the interests of subaltern classes within this demographic group.

7.2.2. **Provincial Elections**

Provincial elections are conducted in South Africa alongside National elections, with members of the provincial legislatures elected from party lists in proportion to each political party’s share of the vote. As a result, there is a relatively slim margin of difference between the performance of the main parties in national and provincial elections. The variance in voters between national and provincial elections remains relatively small, though expanding, from 100,073 in 1994 to 588,719 in 2014 (Electoral Commission of South Africa, n.d., 2013a, 2013b, 2013d, 2013e, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d). Further, the difference in voting patterns for main parties remains very limited between national and provincial elections especially after 1994 where variance drops to less than a percentage (see table 7). In addition, by contrasting the national election results shown in table 2 with the 2014 provincial election results (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2014d) it is evident that there is very little variation between the two results at a provincial level.
Table 7. Variance between the results of major parties in provincial and national elections, 1994-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP/NNP</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP/DA</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These findings suggest a strong correlation between provincial and national voting patterns. However, in contrast to national elections significantly more small parties are active in provincial elections: whereas 19 parties contested national and provincial elections in 1994, by 2014, 29 parties contested national elections and 42 were active in provincial elections by 2014. The increasing number of parties contesting national and provincial elections, especially from 2004 onwards, suggests a crisis of confidence in government as the political landscape becomes increasingly heterogenous (Electoral Commission of South Africa, n.d., 2013d, 2013e, 2014c, 2014d). Further, the upsurge of parties contesting provincial elections is also a consequence of the additional space at a provincial level for small parties representing the interests of specific subaltern groups to operate. However, the relatively small size and focus of these groups limits their capacity to articulate the interests of other subaltern groups and effectively compete at a national level. This is evident in the close correlation in turnout between national and provincial election, which suggests that these alternative parties remain marginal to wider electoral trends.

7.2.3. Municipal Elections

As the “interface between citizen and government” municipal elections provide significant insights into the hegemony of the ANC (Booysen, 2012, p. 1). Unlike national and provincial elections which employ the proportional representation (PR) system, municipal elections attempt to balance local and municipal governance and include a number of compromises. As such, there are three categories of municipalities in South Africa, metropolitan, local and district, which are elected through a system of mixed-member proportional representation, with each having slightly different electoral systems. Metropolitan municipalities comprise the six largest South African cities: Johannesburg, Cape Town, Ethekweni (Durban), Tshwane (Pretoria), Nelson Mandela (Port Elizabeth) and the Ekhuruleni (East Rand). The
areas outside of these areas are divided into local municipalities. Metropolitan and local Municipalities are broken up into wards with half the councillors elected through a proportional representation (PR) ballot and the other half elected in a first-past-the-post system by ward residents. However, in some very small councils with few councillors there may be no wards and only a PR vote. District councils are comprised of a number of local municipalities (usually 4-6) within a district, elected by a combination of local council voters and councillors representing local municipalities. Low population areas such as game reserves do not fall under local municipalities but instead vote directly for district council. For the purposes of this thesis municipal election data will deal exclusively with PR votes rather than Ward votes, council seats, or a combination thereof, as they are a direct representation of the will of voters, and thereby useful for examining the extent to which the ANC is hegemonic. By contrast, ward votes discount smaller councils who may not have any wards and District Council votes only apply to certain areas outside of metropolitan municipalities.

The ANC’s performance in the 1995/6, 2000, 2006, 2011, and 2016 municipal elections and national and provincial elections share a number of similarities and differences. Similar to national and provincial trends, the ANC performed best at its third election, with 65.67% of PR votes in 2006, before performing progressively worse in subsequent elections. However, unlike the national elections wherein the ANC still garnered 62.15% of the popular vote in 2014, the ANC won only 54.48% of votes in 2016, down 3.52% from 1995/6 (see table 8). This drop can be attributed to a number of factors including: overall trends favouring the slow incremental growth of the DA; the resurgence of the IFP in 2016; and, the EFF’s capture of 8.24% of the vote. Further, whereas the ANC was buoyed by the collapse of COPE in the 2014 national elections, by the 2011 municipal elections COPE was already spent attracting only 2.22% of the vote before receding to 0.45% in 2016. By contrast, the DP/DA experienced near constant growth with the exception of 2006, which was the result of a withdrawal of support from former NNP supporters, which had voted for the DP in 2000 after the NNP’s decision not to contest the elections.

Table 8. PR votes cast for major parties in municipal elections as a percentage of total valid votes, 1995/6-2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>58.02</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>64.10</td>
<td>62.93</td>
<td>54.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP/NNP</td>
<td>18.02</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP/DA</td>
<td>13.48</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>16.20</td>
<td>24.08</td>
<td>27.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>COPE</td>
<td>EFF</td>
<td>Other parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/6</td>
<td>8.73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The poor performance of the ANC at the 2016 municipal election must also be understood in the context of increased competition from smaller alternative parties. As illustrated by table 8, alternative parties increased their share of the vote from 1.75% in 1995/6 to 14.25% (including the EFF and COPE) in 2016. However, the increase of support for alternative parties in 2006 was largely a result of former NNP voters trying to find a new party, whilst the decline in support for these parties in 2011 was the result of many of these voters, among others, switching their support to the DA and, to a lesser extent, COPE. Further, the increasing strength of these alternative parties is a consequence of their situation at the local level where the contradictions of neoliberalism are fought out, resulting in “higher visibility of weaknesses in government” (Booysen, 2012, p. 2). The growth of “ideologically diverse and geographically scattered” alternative parties is significant as they express discontent with the ANC which the DA has “fallen far short of capturing” (Booysen, 2012, p. 3). As such, the dramatic growth of these parties in contrast to national or even provincial parties is indicative of the ANC’s declining capacity to represent a broad range of subaltern classes, which are instead coalescing around a host of conjunctural movements.

In addition, there are both similarities and differences between ANC performance at the provincial level in national and municipal elections. As demonstrated in table 9, ANC electoral support rose steadily between 1995/6 and 2000 throughout the provinces except in the Eastern Cape, North West and Limpopo where it experienced declining shares of the vote. However, in 2006 the ANC increased its share of votes in all provinces with the greatest gains in KwaZulu-Natal. Though the ANC declined overall between 2006 and 2011 with successive losses in nearly all provinces, it continued to make steady inroads into KwaZulu-Natal at the expense of the IFP, echoing the performance of the ANC and IFP in the 2009 and 2011 national elections (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2013b, 2014b). These trends continued through 2016 where the ANC was buoyed by the collapse of IFP breakaway the National Freedom Party resulting in slightly increased shares for both the ANC and IFP. However, the entry of the EFF onto the electoral scene in 2016, changed the political
landscape, resulting in large ANC losses in North West, Gauteng and Limpopo where support for the EFF was strongest. Further, although the DA made gains throughout the provinces support fell in North West and Mpumalanga where it struggled against civic parties and the emergent EFF (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2016c-k).

Table 9: Votes cast for the ANC as a percentage of total valid PR votes 1995/6-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Eastern Cape</th>
<th>Free State</th>
<th>Gauteng</th>
<th>KwaZulu-Natal</th>
<th>Limpopo</th>
<th>Mpumalanga</th>
<th>North West</th>
<th>Northern Cape</th>
<th>Western Cape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995/6</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>81.23</td>
<td>77.04</td>
<td>62.26</td>
<td>48.28</td>
<td>84.64</td>
<td>81.34</td>
<td>77.53</td>
<td>70.12</td>
<td>40.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>72.35</td>
<td>71.58</td>
<td>60.48</td>
<td>57.82</td>
<td>82.67</td>
<td>79.19</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>63.78</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>65.87</td>
<td>61.85</td>
<td>46.09</td>
<td>58.95</td>
<td>69.39</td>
<td>71.03</td>
<td>59.27</td>
<td>58.68</td>
<td>26.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Overall between 1995/6 and 2016 the ANC lost support in seven of nine provinces, with the greatest losses in Limpopo (16.81), the Eastern Cape (15.03), North West (15.03), and the Western Cape (10.62) (Table 10). By contrast support for the ANC actually increased substantially in KwaZulu-Natal (26.35) and the Northern Cape (9.68). As such, the ANC’s performance in the municipal elections is largely similar to the national and provincial elections, albeit with a much greater fall in support throughout the provinces. Much like the national election, the ANC’s declining share of the vote in Gauteng, and its former rural strongholds was propped up the ANC’s increasing share of PR votes in the populous KwaZulu-Natal (see table 9). However, unlike the former elections, the sheer scale of ANC losses throughout the provinces in 2016 led to a dramatic fall in electoral support nationwide. Within this context, the replacement of scandal-ridden South African President Zuma in 2018 with Cyril Ramapahosa must be understood as another attempt by the ANC to refurbish its hegemonic project, providing it with a greater sheen of legitimacy prior to the 2019 elections.

Although there were similar trends between national, provincial and municipal elections in electoral support for the ANC, there was a noticeable difference in voter registration and turnout in relation to VAP. As illustrated by table 10, whilst voter registration dropped precipitously from 79.92% to 69.9% between 1995 and 2000, it rose steadily after 2006 reaching 78.14% in 2016. This trend is mirrored in voter turnout as a percent of total VAP which increased from a low of 33.56% in 2000 to 44.23% in 2016. Contrasting these figures with those of national elections (figure 3) it is evident that voter registration as a percentage
of the VAP is slightly lower for municipal elections, remaining between 69% and 79% in contrast to 75% to 80%. However, in contrast to the national and provincial elections, votes cast as a proportion of VAP actually increased in municipal elections after 2000 from 33.56% to 44.23% in 2016. This low but increasing level of voter participation contrasts sharply with the higher but morbidly declining voter participation of the national elections which fell from just under 84% in 1994 to 58.54% in 2014 (see figure 3). This increase can largely be attributed to the proliferation of alternative political parties organised around local issues and the increased capacity of these organisations to operate at a municipal level “less constrained by central party hegemony, ideology and sanction” (Booysen, 2012, p. 2). In addition, although the ANC has fared increasingly poorly since 2006, it actually increased its share of eligible voters in 2011 to 26.74% before declining to 24.1% in 2016. Thus, although the ANC remains electorally dominant, it emerged as “serially in decline” from the 2009 and 2011 elections, with a declining share of the popular vote and the voting age population.

Table 10: PR votes for the ANC as a percentage of the VAP in municipal elections, 1995/6 to 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VAP</td>
<td>22,307,511</td>
<td>26,466,498</td>
<td>29,056,208</td>
<td>31,342,194</td>
<td>33,637,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered voters</td>
<td>17,782,694</td>
<td>18,477,932</td>
<td>21,054,954</td>
<td>23,654,347</td>
<td>26,333,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% VAP registered</td>
<td>79.92</td>
<td>69.90</td>
<td>72.40</td>
<td>75.47</td>
<td>78.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR votes cast</td>
<td>8,675,567</td>
<td>8,882,734</td>
<td>9,851,880</td>
<td>13,357,511</td>
<td>14,906,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes cast as % VAP</td>
<td>38.89</td>
<td>33.56</td>
<td>33.90</td>
<td>42.62</td>
<td>44.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR Votes for ANC</td>
<td>5,033,855</td>
<td>5,216,390</td>
<td>6,469,420</td>
<td>8,405,429</td>
<td>8,121,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR Votes for ANC % VAP</td>
<td>22.57</td>
<td>19.71</td>
<td>22.65</td>
<td>26.82</td>
<td>24.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 2011 municipal elections offer a unique opportunity to study the ANC’s performance at the electoral level, as the completion of a census in 2011 provides detailed information at a provincial level. As shown in table 11, whilst the ANC performed best in rural areas such as Limpopo, Mpumalanga and North West, voter turnout as a percentage of VAP was also lowest in those regions, with the exception of Gauteng where the ANC has performed poorly since a peak in 2006 (see table 9). As such, the data shows that the ANC’s good performance
in those rural areas is premised upon large amounts of the VAP opting out of the electoral process. This suggests that whilst many people in those areas may be dissatisfied with the ANC, there is no viable alternative hegemonic project which they can identify with. Further, whereas alternative parties may dilute the ANC’s share of the vote they remain relatively small and also detract from that of other political actors. Thus, while there may be 61 parties other than the ANC in the Western Cape, only 4 parties hold over one percent of the vote, with the DA and ANC accounting for 58.11% and 34.11% of the vote, respectively (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2011k). In addition, the ANC’s poor performance in Gauteng in and KwaZulu-Natal can be attributed to the relative strength of existing parties such as the DA and IFP and the rise of IFP offshoot National Freedom Party in KZN (although it was disbarred from the 2016 municipal election after failing to pay the fee to the IEC) (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2011e, 2011f). Thus, although alternative parties remain relatively peripheral in rural areas, they present a challenge to the ANC at a local level by encouraging increased voter participation.

Table 11. 2011 municipal elections: Votes for ANC as a percentage of VAP at the provincial level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>VAP</th>
<th>Registered Voters</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
<th>Voter turnout % VAP</th>
<th>Votes for ANC</th>
<th>ANC % share of PR votes</th>
<th>ANC % share of VAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>3,794,352</td>
<td>3,111,535</td>
<td>1,813,802</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>1,269,021</td>
<td>72.35</td>
<td>33.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>1,685,198</td>
<td>1,386,521</td>
<td>767,321</td>
<td>45.53</td>
<td>537,948</td>
<td>71.58</td>
<td>31.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>7,860,280</td>
<td>5,592,676</td>
<td>3,127,671</td>
<td>39.79</td>
<td>1,855,613</td>
<td>60.48</td>
<td>23.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>6,096,509</td>
<td>4,648,733</td>
<td>2,865,855</td>
<td>47.01</td>
<td>1,622,553</td>
<td>57.82</td>
<td>26.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>3,004,795</td>
<td>2,340,799</td>
<td>1,172,855</td>
<td>39.03</td>
<td>944,929</td>
<td>82.67</td>
<td>31.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>2,389,406</td>
<td>1,718,309</td>
<td>960,748</td>
<td>40.21</td>
<td>744,729</td>
<td>79.19</td>
<td>31.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>2,120,381</td>
<td>1,576,898</td>
<td>845,093</td>
<td>39.86</td>
<td>617,313</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>29.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>711,843</td>
<td>572,140</td>
<td>363,361</td>
<td>51.05</td>
<td>227,075</td>
<td>63.78</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>3,771,271</td>
<td>2,706,736</td>
<td>1,719,010</td>
<td>45.58</td>
<td>586,248</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>15.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The data for VAP from the Electoral Commission of South Africa (2013c) and registered voters from Booysen (2012). Data for voter turnout, PR votes cast and votes for the ANC from the Electoral Commission of South Africa (2011c-k).

In addition, the 2011 census figures provide valuable information about the ANC’s electoral performance in the metropolitan municipalities and provinces (Electoral Commission of
South Africa, 2013c). The urban population of South Africa is largely divided up between the eight metropolitan municipalities, located in Gauteng, the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape and Free State. By comparing the registered voters in metropolitan municipalities with those in the provinces we can identify those provinces which have a high proportion of urban registered voters, such as Gauteng and the Western Cape (see table 12). Further, contrasting this with 2011 election data reveals that the ANC performed poorly in those provinces with high levels of urban registered voters, such as Gauteng and the Western Cape. Further, the ANC had a mixed performance in semi-rural provinces, performing middlingly in KwaZulu-Natal but well in the Eastern Cape and Free State with 72.35% and 71.58% of the PR vote. As shown in table 11, the ANC performed best in largely rural provinces such as Limpopo, Mpumalanga and North West, with the exception of the Northern Cape where it has always had a lacklustre performance. This supports the argument that the ANC project is reliant upon rural and semi-rural voters (with the exception of KwaZulu-Natal where it was starting from a low base) who have a lower level of voter participation, and poorly among urban voters who increasingly voted for alternative parties.

Table 12. Metropolitan municipalities 2011: Registered voters as a percentage of the VAP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Metropolitan Municipality</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
<th>Registered voters as a % of all registered voters in the province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>City of Johannesburg</td>
<td>2,010,121</td>
<td>85.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ekurhuleni</td>
<td>1,424,392</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City of Tshwane</td>
<td>1,326,427</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>City of Cape Town</td>
<td>1,745,853</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>eThekwini</td>
<td>1,666,549</td>
<td>35.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>Nelson Mandela Bay</td>
<td>569,470</td>
<td>30.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Buffalo City</td>
<td>384,910</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>Mangaung</td>
<td>372,692</td>
<td>26.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Data for registered voters from Booysen (2012)*

Municipal election statistics give the impression of declining ANC electoral dominance marked by increasing contestations from alternative and opposition parties, especially among metropolitan municipalities. The ANC’s share of votes in metropolitan municipalities noticeably declined between 2011 and 2016 with a 13% to 14% drop in support in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni, and a nearly 14% drop province-wide (Laterza & Van Wyk, 2016). Similarly, the ANC faced fierce competition in other metropolitan municipalities, with a drop in support of 11% in Nelson Mandela Bay and Buffalo City, 10% in Mangaung, 5% in eThekwini and 8.4% in Cape Town (Laterza & Van Wyk, 2016). This
can be explained by growing public dissatisfaction translating into declining electoral support from 2006 onwards, especially after 2011. As a consequence, the ANC lost its outright majority in 4 of the 8 metropolitan municipalities, with the DA gaining control of Nelson Mandela Bay, and forming minority governments in Johannesburg and Tshwane. In addition, the ANC lost control of 13 and 2/3 (due to merged municipalities) of local municipalities overall, whilst the DA made gains of 7 and 2/3 and the Inkatha Freedom Party regained its foothold in KwaZulu Natal, gaining a majority in 6, and a minority in 5, of the local municipalities (Laterza & Van Wyk, 2016). As such, the ANC’s performance at municipal elections reveals that the ANC hegemonic project is faced with increasing contestations, challenges and lapses in capacity at the local level.

7.2.4. Conclusions

Electoral data suggest that the ANC succeeded in forging a new national consensus in the post-Apartheid period based on neoliberal economic rationalities. This is illustrated by the ANC’s electoral support in the 1994, 1999 and 2004 national elections wherein the ANC garnered 62.65, 66.35 and 69.69% of the popular vote, respectively (figure 2). At a provincial level, the ANC also performed exceeding well, making successive gains between 1994 and 2004 in most provinces, with only small losses in the Eastern Cape, Limpopo and North-West province (table 2). Similarly, the ANC enjoyed growing levels of support in the 1996, 2000 and 2006 municipal elections with 58.02%, 59.40%, and 65.67% of proportional representative votes, respectively (table 8). Further, though the National Party won the Western Cape in 1994 and the Inkatha freedom party won KwaZulu-natal in the 1994 and 1999 elections, by 2004 the ANC had gained control over every province. However, despite electoral hegemony throughout this period, the South African electoral system was characterised by growing numbers of alternative parties and increasing amounts of the voting age population (VAP) opting-out of voting altogether. As such, whilst the ANC achieved electoral hegemony immediately after the transition to democratic governance, from the late 1990s onwards it was already showing symptoms of decline.

In addition to declining voter participation, after 2006 the ANC faced a declining share of the vote at successive national, provincial, and municipal elections. This was a symptom of a crisis of confidence in the leadership of the ANC government which manifested in increasing numbers of alternative parties and declining voter turnout at the national and provincial level. Conversely, whilst the ANC has fared increasingly poorly in municipal elections since 2006,
it actually increased its share of eligible voters in 2011 to 26.74% before declining to 24.1% in 2016. However, these trends are informed by the ANC’s tactical manoeuvre of rebranding its hegemonic project to appeal to ethnic Zulus, especially after 2009 under the Zuma presidency. As a result, though electoral support for the ANC was in serial decline throughout most of the provinces from 2006 onwards, ANC decline at a national level was arrested by the influx of an increasing number of voters from the populous semi-rural KwaZulu-Natal.

In addition, the ANC hegemonic project is reliant upon voter absenteeism at national, provincial and municipal elections. The ANC’s strong voter turnout in rural and semi-rural provinces is maintained by declining levels of voter participation, as alternative parties struggle to operate in those areas (Booysen, 2012, 354). However, the growth of the DA and alternative parties in semi-rural and urban areas in national, provincial and especially municipal elections has contributed to the ANC’s declining share of the vote. Further, the dramatic increase of alternative parties in municipal elections between 1995/6 and 2016 has resulted in increasing levels of voter turnout, undermining the ANC’s electoral performance. However, these parties have struggled to meaningfully penetrate the black-African ANC constituency, especially in rural areas, with the exception of the EFF which made notable gains in 2016. As such, despite declining support the ANC still retained 62.15%, 61.41% and 54.48% of the vote at the last national, provincial and municipal elections, respectively (IEC, 2018). Thus, if elections are indeed illustrative of the “expansive and persuasive capacity” of subaltern and leading groups, as Gramsci notes, the ANC’s continued dominance demonstrates a profound, though declining, capacity to mobilise consent (Gramsci, 1971, p. 192-193). As such, this study argues that the ANC neoliberal project is characterised by an unstable or limited hegemony, with declining yet entrenched electoral dominance at a national and provincial level, and dominance at the local level beset by increasing “contests, challenges, lapses and even defeats” (Booysen, 2012, p. 2).
7.3. **Newspapers and the Media**

The media plays a crucial role in interpreting and disseminating the hegemonic ideology of the leading group within the national bloc. Marxist scholars have long argued that the “media plays a key role in shaping public opinion in favour of the interests of capital” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 445). Indeed, Marx argues that “the class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production” (cited in Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 445). This argument is implicit in Gramscian understandings of hegemony as established within both civil and political society, with the latter including the government, the judiciary and military, and the former encompassing all other aspects of society (Bieler & Morton, 2004, p. 91-92). Crucially this includes the media, which disseminates hegemonic ideology through the “habitualisation and internalisation of social practices” presented as ‘common sense’ (Morton, 2001, p. 171).

Further, Peet (2002) argues that the media are a crucial aspect of the Academic-Industrial-Media (AIM) complexes that develop, interpret and disseminate hegemonic ideology. According to his analysis, the “organized, systematized ideas” behind economic discourses are developed by academics or researchers with links or associations to fractions of capital, then rephrased into “universalistic value formats” by “business federations, chambers of commerce, and similar elite organisations” (Peet, 2002, p. 58). These ideas penetrate the “higher reaches of government bureaucracies” and are propagated by “academic and industrial agents” through policy prescriptions, reports, articles, press releases and other forms of dispersion (Peet, 2002, p. 58). Finally, these ideas are interpolated by the media who interpret these ideas and disseminate them throughout civil society. However, the media does not uncritically accept the logic of hegemonic discourse, as hegemonic ideology only permeates common sense understandings rather than dominating them (Augelli & Murphy, 1988, p. 19-20). As such, the extent to which a leading group is hegemonic can be gleaned from an examination of the degree to which the ideas of the leading group are accepted by the media.

This section begins by outlining the contours of the media landscape in post-Apartheid South Africa, the way in which neoliberal understandings are reproduced, and the relationship between the ANC and the media. This is followed by a Critical Discourse Analysis of a range of South African newspapers between 2012 and 2015. These newspapers were analysed to examine the extent to which: a) neoliberal rationalities had penetrated common sense ideas;
b) the media contested ANC understandings and policy; and c) how NUMSA’s actions were understood by the media. As such, this section establishes the extent to which the media interpret, challenge or reinforce the ideas of the hegemonic group and understand contestations of hegemony in South Africa.

7.3.1. The Media in South Africa

Within South Africa, the hegemonic project centred on the ANC is based upon the widespread acceptance of neoliberal economic rationalities. However, these rationalities were not established in isolation but rather developed and disseminated as part of the international US hegemonic project (Narsiah, 2002, p. 4). As such, neoliberalism in South Africa was interpolated and mediated through AIM complexes that overlap and interlock, transmitting hegemonic discourse from the core to the periphery whilst translating it to account for regional experience (Peet, 2002, p. 60). As a result, the ANC neoliberal project is responsive to local conditions, retreating from widely unpopular initiatives such as privatisation of state utilities, and providing minimal state intervention through social grants and state work programmes. However, the internalisation of neoliberal rationalities is evident in repeated ANC calls for wage restraint; a growing preoccupation with labour productivity by business commentators; the stigmatisation of social protections as handouts; privatisation of personal security and basic commodities such as water and electricity; and the expansion of a public works system with “points of leverage for instilling in its recipients the ‘correct’ attitudes and aspirations” (Hart, 2006, p. 26). Neoliberal discourse is also evident in the growth of micro-finance and micro-enterprise schemes, which have become integral to government understandings of the economy, notably under the ASGISA economic framework.

Whereas international organisations and the “peripheral intellectual stratum” played a key role in transmitting neoliberalism from the core to periphery, the media were crucial in giving legitimacy to these ideas (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 446). As such, the media played a crucial role in disseminating neoliberal rationalities through the positive portrayal of public-private partnerships and fiscal responsibility, the criminalisation of anti-privatisation groups, such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum, and the pervasive notion that “there is no alternative to privatisation” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 451). Further, the media has played a prominent role in limiting the scope of anti-privatisation debates by “lauding the more politically acceptable activism of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), while vilifying the more politically radical Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF)” (Duncan, 2009, p. 8-9).
The media’s embrace of neoliberal rationalities and vilification of radical anti-systemic movements is interconnected with wider trends of media consolidation and corporatisation in South Africa (Duncan, 2009, p. 8-9). In Gramscian terms the ownership of the media, increasingly co-opted by the “capitalist classes” and benefiting “indirectly from their success”, helped establish hegemony “through the world of ideas rather than through (mere) force” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 446). Although the mid-1990s has been described by some as the “golden season of media diversification in South Africa”, the adoption of GEAR and broader economic trends resulted in class continuities in media ownership and increasing consolidation (Duncan, 2009, p. 8). The adoption of GEAR in 1996 led to rising interest rates which, in combination with economic crisis and volatile foreign speculation, made credit unsustainable ultimately resulting in the collapse of many black empowerment deals (Duncan, 2009, p. 3). Meanwhile, commercial media reconsolidated into four main conglomerates: Independent Newspapers (now Independent Media), Media (now Media24), Johnnic (now Tiso Blackstar Media Group) and Caxton and Media (now Caxton/CTP) (Duncan, 2009, p. 8). As a consequence, whilst South Africa’s media landscape may be “characterised by a multitude of competing titles, publishers, stations and channels”, ownership is much more concentrated with “between one and at most four companies dominating every media sector” (Angelopulo & Potgieter, 2007, 16). Further, the restructuring of corporations during the popular transition and later in GEAR resulted in the emergence of a highly consolidated media ownership committed to “producing an elite consensus based on the ideology of neoliberalism” (Leonard, 2014, p. 970).

Within the media, the significance of print media in disseminating neoliberal ideology in South Africa is immense, given its capacity to reach a wide range of audiences. Despite the muzzling of press freedoms during Apartheid, the media is a highly trusted institution in South Africa. Indeed, while only 15% of South Africans trusted the government according to the 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer (the lowest percentage of any government globally), 56% trusted traditional media (Edelman, 2017, p. 61-62). In addition, print media is the “largest section of media in South Africa” and is “more easily accessible than broadcasting media for vulnerable communities to highlight local concerns” (Leonard, 2014, p. 968). However, like other sectors of the media it is “unevenly controlled and dominated” by four main corporations, namely Tiso Blackstar Media Group, Caxton/CTP, Independent Media, and Media24. Within print media, newspapers constitute a significant market with a total of around “about 940 million copies of commercial, local and community newspapers”
circulating South Africa per annum (Leonard, 2014, p. 969). Further, despite stagnant growth among traditional newspapers, tabloid and local newspaper sections have achieved significant growth, bolstered by “swift population growth, greater disposable income, increasing literacy and improved access to newspapers” (Angelopulo & Potgieter, 2007, 12). However, although there are a broad range of newspaper titles with around 100 “authentic community-run newspapers around the country” (Leonard, 2014, p. 969) ranging from weekly papers to sporadic newsletters, advertising revenue remains consolidated around the big four media companies (Angelopulo & Potgieter, 2007, 12).

The consolidation of the media and its acceptance of neoliberal rationalities are not disparate elements but deeply interconnected processes. The handful of corporations that control most of the media share the same general interests as other groupings of capital, namely “securing the conditions for rapid market growth through neo-liberal policy reforms such as liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 446). Further, given the potential for media revenue generation in South Africa, and the fact that “advertising is typically the largest source of revenue for print and electronic media companies” the media has become “a vehicle for capital in general in promoting itself” through advertising (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 446). As such, print and electronic media are bound by the dictates of capital to produce “market-friendly content within which advertisers would want to promote their products and services” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 446). Further, Mayher and McDonald identify privatisation as a key component of the media’s promotion of neoliberal discourse, which supports the “larger [capital] accumulation strategy in South Africa” (2007, p. 458). Thus, South African media corporations “generate and perpetuate a neo-liberal discourse on privatisation” that harshly constrains the “possibilities for alternative opinions to be heard or policies to be developed” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 443, 445). This is supported by organisations such as the World Bank, USAID, and the South African state itself, which put “considerable efforts into promoting privatisation and corporatisation via official websites, public information sessions, and advertisements in newspapers” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 444).

The influence of capital over the media, and indeed over ‘common sense’ understandings throughout society, is profound in South Africa. Alongside internal pressures to optimise profits the influence of powerful sections of capital places discursive limits on the possibility of anti-neoliberal discourse from alternate media sources. Leonard describes the South
African media as “weak in placing pressure on industry” because of the power of these companies to “silence, intimidate or threaten local or regional journalists or outlets” (Leonard, 2014, p. 974). Further, local community organisations are also threatened with the loss of advertising revenue if negative stories are printed, fostering dependence between capital and the media, as noted by the editor of local community newspaper The Rising Sun: “our alliance will actually lie with the client, because our livelihood is money from advertising” (cited in Leonard, 2014, p. 974-975). Further, the profound disparity in power between corporations and civil society organisations means that they exert a far greater influence over the media; as Lakhani notes, “we [civil society] don’t have money for full page adverts like … industry does” (cited in Leonard, 2014, p. 974). An additional consequence of this is the media’s inability to adequately express the experiences of youth, who suffer from much higher rates of unemployment as a result of neoliberal policies (Statistics South Africa, 2014, p. 4). This reinforces ANCC electoral dominance by contributing to the sense of “disengagement and powerlessness that these young citizens already experience in their relation to the state” and thereby encouraging voter absenteeism among the youth (Wasserman & Garman, 2014, p. 393).

The media’s appearance of impartiality plays a crucial role in its perpetuation of the neoliberal discourse of privatisation. Whilst the press perpetuates neoliberal understandings of the economy, coverage is “neither omnipotent nor monolithic”, instead giving the appearance of a “relatively balanced coverage of privatisation debates” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 445). In a four-and-a-half-year study of neoliberalism in South African print media Mayher and McDonald found an “almost equal number of pro- and anti-privatisation articles” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 445). However, they argued that the press generally perpetuated neoliberal understandings of privatisation by uncritically employing the language of neoliberalism developed by the World Bank and South African government (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 457). Terms such as privatisation and ‘corporatisation’ were rarely employed in pro-privatisation articles, in favour of “softer euphemisms such as ‘partnerships’ and ‘restructuring’… [and] ‘business unit’” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 456). This new terminology was also reproduced in anti-privatisation articles, alongside the use of unreconstructed neoliberal language that “blames and/or criminalises the poor” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 457). Thus, by appearing impartial whilst adopting the language of neoliberalism, the media plays a crucial role in both disseminating and de-politicising the discourse of neoliberalism.
The superficial way in which the South African media frequently reports on issues also tends to privilege the reproduction of neoliberal understandings. The South African media frequently covers complex issues in simplistic ways, without reference to their context and “without analysing their impact on… communities” (Fray, 2007, p. 35). Complex domestic issues such as racism and xenophobia are often covered in a “simplistic, non-analytical fashion”, while events in Africa are reported in “particularly limited and stereotypical ways, focusing on disasters, conflict, wars and poverty” (Fray, 2007, p. 35). Similarly, journalists tend to uncritically reproduce neoliberal understandings of privatisation, commercialisation and the economy in general. For example, Mayher and McDonald found that journalists tended to reproduce the government’s portrayal of “anti-privatisation groups and individuals as immoral and unlawful and as intentionally misrepresenting facts…without questioning their validity or providing context” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 453). Further, articles (especially those backing privatisation) frequently presented the argument that, given an inherently corrupt and inefficient public sector, “there is no alternative to privatisation” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 451). Indeed, the prevalence of this line of argument, and the neutrality ascribed to it, led Mayher and McDonald to argue that it was a “major contributor to a public perception that privatisation is ‘common sense’” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 452).

The media’s superficial coverage is also a consequence of falling journalistic standards as experienced journalists chasing higher wages enter into “government communications or industry communications” (Leonard, 2014, p. 974). However, it also reflects the “ingrained ideological bias amongst journalists and editors towards the marketisation of municipal services” and the consequent “willingness to allow unproblematised assumptions and positions on the topic to be published” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 449). This is supported in a study by Mayher and McDonald which found that more than two-thirds of articles were unanalytical, and further that a much larger proportion of pro-privatisation articles were unanalytical (2007, p. 449). In addition, many of the anti-privatisation articles were written by people unaffiliated with the newspaper, suggesting that journalists were not only less analytical due to their “unproblematised assumptions”, but also their association with media organisations which are overtly market friendly (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 449).
Despite the concentration of media ownership and its dissemination of neoliberal understandings, the relationship between the media and the ruling elite in South Africa has often been combative. Indeed, the print media have frequently “exercised relative autonomy from the ruling elite, and broken some significant stories about elite misconduct” including government corruption and mismanagement (Duncan, 2009, p. 8). However, the media has largely confined its “watchdog role to the black elite” investigating “state corruption, anti-democratic practices, and sometimes racist practices”, while generally ignoring the white economic elite (Duncan, 2009, p. 8). Thus, although the media questions the exercise of political power and even the integrity of senior ANC leaders from time to time, it does so within a framework that assumes “the normative nature of ANC rule within a post-apartheid capitalist framework” (Duncan, 2009, p. 8). As such, the media has constructed an elite consensus that assumes the success of post-Apartheid transformation under the ANC (Duncan, 2009, p. 8).

The ANC’s increasingly hostile attitude towards the media in the post-Apartheid period is informed by its development during Apartheid. The ANC’s 1988 constitutional guidelines guaranteed basic rights and freedoms “such as freedom of association, expression, thought, worship and the press” (Jackson, 1993, p. 189). However, even prior to the collapse of Apartheid, the ANC’s hostile attitude towards the media was already being questioned, “even by those sympathetic to the political left” (Jackson, 1993, p. 91). Writing in 1993, Jackson was also wary of the ANC’s willingness to employ intimidation and violence and the “expectation that loyal followers of the ‘struggle’ must accept uncritically some nebulous defined will of the people” (1993, p. 91). Further, Ruth Teer-Tomaselli (1994) argued that the need for establishing independent media institutions was never a given in the ANC, but rather had to be argued for (cited in Duncan, 2009, p. 3). However, the end the state of emergency, and unbanning of political groups in the early 1990s and repeal of “some press-related legislation… set in motion rising expectations about freedom of expression” which the ANC had to be responsive towards, including freedom of the press in its 1994 election manifesto (Jackson, 1993, p. 187). The ANC’s interest in media policy waned throughout the mid-to-late 1990s with no pronouncements being made in official conferences (Duncan, 2009, p. 3). Though there were some occasional tensions with black journalists, the lack of interest in media policy was primarily because of the ANC’s immensely popularity throughout the 1990s, which insulated it from criticism.
However, by 2002 the ANC was facing increasing criticism amid allegations of corruption and the government’s inability to curb growing unemployment, inequality and poverty. Between 2002 and 2007, the ANC became increasingly hostile towards the media in its conferences, accusing black editors of undermining the ANC and the media of portraying it as pursuing a “neo-conservative/neo-liberal” agenda (Duncan, 2009, p. 12-13). However, whilst the media were acutely critical of the failures of the ANC leadership, they were broadly supportive of the ANC’s neoliberal economic policies during this period (Duncan, 2009, p. 13). The ANC’s hostility to the media during this period can be attributed to a conflict between how the ANC saw itself and how the media saw the ANC in the public arena. Thus, although the ANC argued that the neoliberal GEAR was “objectively necessary to achieve longer term, sustainable, job-creating growth” it also maintained that it represented the “will of the people” (Duncan, 2009, p. 13). As such, the media’s characterisation of the ANC as corrupt and committed to neoliberalism conflicted with how the leadership wanted it to be seen (and how many members saw it), leading the ANC to “portray the media as being to the right of the party” (Duncan, 2009, p. 13).

From the early 2000s onwards, the ANC’s criticism of the media was focused on the limitations of popular access to the media amid growing consolidation and commercialisation. The ANC argued that the media’s heavy dependence on advertising revenue placed “direct limitations on the ability of media to expand and reach the majority of South Africans”, distorting “the democratic process and debate” by skewing “their attention towards well-off South Africans” (Duncan, 2009, p. 10). This argument is not unfounded as, although consumer choice rapidly expanded for South Africans in the country’s formal economy, “the growing layer of underemployed and unemployed still remain grossly underserved by media” (Duncan, 2009, p. 19). Further, urban and semi-urban provinces including Gauteng, the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal comprised the wide majority of the newspapers readership and circulation, whilst rural communities were underserved and underrepresented (Leonard, 2014, p. 969). However, this focus on the “economic determinants of the media” allowed the ANC to “paint the market as the primary threat to media freedom, and not the government or the ANC” (Duncan, 2009, p. 11). However, the ANC’s criticisms were deeply problematic, even on its own terms, as the lack of media diversity was largely a consequence of the ANC’s fostering of conditions which “allowed media globalisation and consolidation to flourish” through neoliberal policies such as GEAR (Duncan, 2009, p. 11).
By 2007 ANC media policy shifted from a focus on the limitations of the media in reaching and representing the majority of South Africans to the coverage of ANC leaders and the national elite. Amid near continuous leadership corruption scandals the ANC leadership became progressively more concerned about how it was being represented and became “preoccupied with controlling media content rather than with crafting measures to promote diversity” (Duncan, 2009, p. 20). As such, the ANC argued that the media was an “unreconstructed apartheid force” engaged in a hostile ideological struggle with the ANC that should therefore be brought under ANC control through state intervention (Duncan, 2009, p. 14). This rhetorical shift to media owners as the enemies of the ANC was followed by increasing attempts to stifle media freedoms and delegitimise the media. This included an attempted takeover bid of Avusa Communications (formerly Johnnie) in November 2007 by Koni Media Holdings, a group “with close links to the Presidency” (Duncan, 2009, p. 16). Further, the resolution of the 2007 ANC policy conference in Polokwane stated that, “freedom of expression shall not be elevated above other equally important rights such as the right to privacy and more important rights and values such as human dignity” (ANC cited in Duncan, 2009, p. 17). Soon thereafter the ANC sought to make a “constitutional argument for the limitation of media freedom” on the basis that the Sunday Times was a “‘white supremacist paper’ intent on violating the rights of democratically-elected ANC leaders for commercial gain” (Duncan, 2009, p. 16). More recently, the ANC government has been engaged in intimidation of journalists in a number of ways, from “arbitrary imprisonment to wasteful lawsuits” (Leonard, 2014, p. 968). Meanwhile, the Protection of Information bill “profoundly limits the media’s capacity to expose corruption”, whilst the media tribunal handling complaints against the media is held accountable to a parliament that is dominated by the ANC (Leonard, 2014, p. 968). As a consequence, South Africa fell from 31st in the World Press Freedom Index in 2005 to 52nd by 2013 (Leonard, 2014, p. 968).

In summary, the media in South Africa plays a crucial role in the production and dissemination of neoliberal ideology throughout civil society. Whilst the media does provide “significant opportunities for marginalized political actors” to be heard, the consolidation and commercialisation of the media, and especially newspapers, has resulted in a deep bias towards neoliberal policies and the internalisation of neoliberal rationalities among journalists and editors (Leonard, 2014, p. 967). In addition, despite the media’s role in spreading and embedding neoliberalism in popular consciousness, neoliberalism is not wholly unopposed within the media. However, the large extent to which it has permeated ‘common sense’
means that this opposition is frequently couched in neoliberal terms, giving the media the appearance of impartiality without actually presenting a balance of evidence. Further, despite the media’s general support for neoliberal economic policy, the ruling elite generally regard the media as “an enemy to be constrained, limited and co-opted” (Leonard, 2014, p. 967). In addition, criticism of the ANC in the media remains largely limited to questions of corruption and the effectiveness and legitimacy of the ANC leadership, rather than the systemic failures of the ANC neoliberal project.

7.3.2. Newspaper Analysis

This section investigates the extent to which South African newspapers interpret, challenge or reinforce the ideology of neoliberalism and the hegemony of the ANC in South Africa. Further, this section examines how contestations of hegemony in South Africa are understood by the media with a specific focus on NUMSA. In examining the hegemony of the ANC and the ideology of neoliberalism in South Africa, this study surveys the following newspapers between August and October 2015: The Sowetan, Sunday Times, Business Day, the Times, The Citizen, Cape Times, The Star, Business Report, The Sunday Independent, Mail and Guardian, The New Age, The Atlantic Sun, and Independent Thinking. This is also the same period in which the interviews of organic intellectuals were conducted, and therefore provides a detailed account of the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project within this bounded time period. These newspapers are broadly representative of the media complex in South Africa, including the highly-concentrated ownership structure, with The Sowetan, Sunday Times, Business Day, and the Times owned by Tiso Blackstar group; Cape Times, The Star, Business Report, and The Sunday Independent owned by Independent Media; and The Citizen owned by Caxton/CTP. By contrast, Mail and Guardian remains fiercely independent, whilst community newspapers the Atlantic Sun and Independent Thinking are nominally independent. However, The New Age is a staunchly pro-ANC newspaper owned by TNA media, which in turn is owned by the Gupta family, a powerful Indian business family with strong ties to former South African president Zuma (Johnson, 2016, p. 132). Though the ownership structure is quite consolidated, newspapers owned by the same companies often expressed a range of views, reflecting their need to cover demand in the market by speaking to different audiences.

This study employs a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach to textual analysis to interrogate the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project, and the degree to which neoliberal
understandings are internalised and reproduced in these newspapers. CDA was chosen for this study as it is explicitly focused on “social problems, and especially the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination” (van Dijk cited in Richardson, 2007, p. 1). The CDA approach to textual analysis is inherently inclined towards qualitative methods as it is more interested in interpretations of texts, rather than quantifying textual features. As such, the analysis employed by this study focuses on the composition of the text and its latent meanings, deriving meaning from what is written alongside textual absences. This includes a consideration of what arguments were presented, how they were presented, what sources were included, and where this text was situated with reference to the whole. In practical terms, this involved listing potentially important ideas or concepts, carefully reading the texts, extracting notable quotes and sorting these into themes before interpreting and writing up the findings (Morris, 2015). Given the focus of this study on the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project, I focused on identifying those instances where authors either challenged and/or repeated neoliberal economic understandings. Further, I also looked for instances of criticism or support for the ANC identifying both limited critiques of a minor day-to-day nature and systemic critiques of the economic and/or socio-political system. This study assessed the content of those arguments to determine the extent to which they expressed neoliberal rationalities and/or the hegemony of the ANC.

In identifying those texts which either supported or challenged neoliberal ideas this study also paid close attention to a number of key phrases and representations associated with neoliberalism. As previously noted, Mayher and McDonald found that the perpetuation of neoliberal understandings of the economy by the press are “neither omnipotent nor monolithic” and give the appearance of “relatively balanced coverage of privatisation debates” (2007, p. 445). Further, by uncritically employing the language of neoliberalism, and allowing “unproblematised assumptions and positions on the topic to be published”, newspapers play a critical role in reproducing and de-politicising neoliberal understandings of privatisation, commercialisation and the economy in general (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 449). As such, it was important to look not only for terms such as ‘privatisation’ and ‘corporatisation’, but softer euphemisms such as ‘partnerships’ and ‘restructuring’. Further, in line with Mayher & McDonald, I identified instances where journalists reproduced the government’s portrayal of anti-privatisation groups and individuals as “immoral and unlawful and as intentionally misrepresenting facts”, and used unreconstructed neoliberal language that “blames and/or criminalises the poor” (2007, p. 457). Also, attention was placed on
identifying articles which argued that “there is no alternative to privatisation” - as Mayher and McDonald saw this as “a major contributor to a public perception that privatisation is ‘common sense’” (2007, p. 451). As such, this analysis searched for instances of both overt neoliberal ideas and unanalytic acceptance of neoliberal rationalities.

This section proceeds with an analysis of the newspapers belonging to three of the four largest newspaper media conglomerates, namely Tiso Blackstar Media Group, Caxton/CTP, and Independent Media. This is followed by an analysis of the independent national newspaper, the *Mail and Guardian*, before moving onto the pro-ANC newspaper *The New Age*, and community newspapers *The Atlantic Sun* and *Independent Thinking*.

### 7.3.2.1. Tiso Blackstar Group

*The Sowetan* is one of four newspapers owned by the Tiso Blackstar group which are the subject of this study. Despite the overall appearance of balance, articles in *The Sowetan* uncritically reproduced neoliberal ideas around wealth creation and management. This is particularly evident in the ongoing section “Money Psychology with Winnie Kunene”, which in one column claimed that “very rarely does a person lose his/her job and it is a complete and unwelcome surprise”, and variously instructed the unemployed to “revisit your budget and organise your finances” and “consider finding ways to supplement your income” (Kunene, 2015). In the context of the high unemployment and poverty rate in South Africa, and the structural inability of the South African economy to create sufficient growth to remedy this problem, these recommendations reaffirm the neoliberal logic that unemployment and/or poverty is a choice that can be managed. Further, in the opinion piece “Minimum wage will leave many jobless”, the author reproduces the unreconstructed free-market logic (or “business logic”) of “supply and demand” to unemployment (Mashaba, 2015). As such, he argues that a minimum wage would limit the “freedom [of workers] to negotiate and agree the terms of their employment with their prospective employers” and thus increase unemployment (Mashaba, 2015). Further, Mashaba (2015) reiterates the myth of the ‘labour aristocracy’ (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 12), noting that “it is no secret that unions are incentivised to limit access to the labour market”.

In addition, despite a preoccupation with poverty and inequality *The Sowetan* is broadly uncritical of the ANC government. Whereas articles such as “Spread the wealth fairly” (2015) and “EFF helps community stop mining company” (Mahopo, 2015) were critical of the poor economic situation of many South Africans, neither author addressed the complicity
of ANC neoliberal policy. As such, the latter situated the poor involvement of mining companies as a technical legal issue, whilst the former argued that while something must be done about inequality, it is “not wrong” for industry to be “ever concerned about their profits and mining operations” (“Spread the wealth”, 2015). Thus, these articles manage to apportion blame to bureaucratic processes or factors beyond the state’s control, such as “the [labour] department’s failure to enforce regulations” (“Spread the wealth”, 2015). Further, despite criticism of the various organs of the state, the newspaper is broadly supportive of the ANC. This is evident in the uncritical reproduction of ANC statements in articles such as “ANC in plea to save jobs”, in which ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe argues that the ANC is primarily concerned with saving jobs (Malefane, 2015). As such, The Sowetan is broadly uncritical of both the ANC and neoliberalism and, where ANC policy clashed with neoliberal proponents, the Sowetan supported neoliberalism whilst deflecting criticism from the ANC generally. Thus, The Sowetan not only reproduces the logic of neoliberalism but its focus on critiques of a minor day-to-day nature assumes the success of post-Apartheid transformation under the ANC (Duncan, 2009, p. 8).

Though it has now been discontinued, The Times like The Sowetan was also owned by Times Media Group (now Tiso Blackstar) and shared similar economic and social sensibilities. Articles such as “Get off the mines’ backs” (2015) reproduced neoliberal economic understandings, including the assumption that the government does not understand “the economic realities of running a business”, but if they did would “do the right thing” (“Get off the mines”, 2015). Further, it reiterates the government paradigm of redistribution through growth by insisting that “without our operations, there really is no transformation”, whilst also displaying a hostility to unions- describing relations as “adversarial” (“Get off the mines”, 2015). Further, whereas The Sowetan is broadly uncritical of the government, The Times was unequivocally critical of the ANC leadership, especially former President Zuma, who is described as “ignorant” and “evasive” (Hosken, Joubert & Ndenze, 2015), “corrupt” and “jeopardised” (Masombuka, 2015) and “disgraceful” and “irrational” (Joubert, 2015). However, though the newspaper was critical of state-owned enterprises such as Eskom (“Get off the mines”, 2015) the persistent focus on Zuma detracted from systemic critiques of wider problems within South Africa resulting from ANC policies.

Similar to the previous newspapers, Business Day reproduces numerous neoliberal ideas about economics. The article “Investment in state-owned firms beckons” (Paton, 2015) is
uncritical in its support for privatisation, noting the “successful turnaround” of state-owned Denel and China’s success in listing “portions of their state-owned companies on the stock exchange”. Further, it argues that privatisation is a desirable and inevitable process that “has been somewhat stalled” simply because it “remains a difficult issue in the ANC alliance” (Paton, 2015). Meanwhile, Bisseker (2015) emphasises the need for prudent fiscal policy and “further belt-tightening”, citing a “2% VAT increase” as an “obvious solution”, despite widespread poverty, unemployment and inequality. Further, Maswanyisi (2015) reiterates the neoliberal notion that the solution to South Africa’s woes is simply to create more entrepreneurs and follow “the right policies in terms of ease of doing business and the cost of doing business”.

In addition, Business Day is relatively uncritical of the ANC-Alliance, with Gernetzky (2015) treating the ideological splits within COSATU as “affiliates’ problems” that “the federation’s leadership” must intervene in. Meanwhile, Marrian and Mashego (2015) uncritically reproduce ANC statements, noting that the ANC’s attempt to reduce media freedom through “a proposed media appeals tribunal would not contravene the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression”, and accepting Zuma’s argument that violent protests are a societal issue stemming from Apartheid. However, articles published in ‘review and opinion’ and ‘letters to the editor’ were markedly more critical of the ANC, describing it as dependent on patronage-enriching networks (Hagedorn, 2015), disdainful of the rule of law (Kane-Bergman, 2015), and increasingly irrelevant as “a new form of protest politics… is replacing the party’s hegemony” (Zibi, 2015). This difference of opinion between newspaper journalists and affiliated commentators largely reflects the “ingrained ideological bias amongst journalists and editors” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 449). Further, the newspaper’s decision to print these articles suggests that dissent with the ANC alliance is largely peripheral, limited to opinion pieces, which the newspaper can distance itself from. As such, Business Day is able to present the appearance of balanced or informed discussion whilst granting greater legitimacy to uncritical commentary on the ANC-Alliance informed by neoliberal rationalities.

The analysis of the Sunday Times, the final member of Tiso Blackstar, is split between the newspaper proper, opinion and/or ‘letters to the editor’, and the Business Times, as each is primarily written by separate authors. Articles in the newspaper proper were uncritically supportive of neoliberal ideas, such as “How a clean and efficient state could deliver on SA’s
promise” (Katz, 2015), which argued for redistribution through growth. Further, Katz (2015) openly advocated privatisation, noting that “we must recognise that some functions are more efficiently handled through the private sector” given the lack of “an efficient and competent state”. In addition, the newspaper’s coverage of both Zuma and the ANC varied from blistering criticisms to uncritical or even sympathetic treatment. Zuma attracted criticism for his unwillingness to “properly answer the questions put to him” (Leon, 2015) and his use of taxpayer money on his Nklanda homestead, dubbed a “monument of corruption” (“Inside Zuma’s monument”, 2015). However, some articles were sympathetic to Zuma, shifting the blame for Nklanda to “contractors that were not vetted by the state” (“Inside Zuma’s monument”, 2015) and “his architect… and other private operators”,- even describing “President Zuma and his staff as victims” (Msomi, 2015). Further criticism of the ANC was limited to the ANC leadership (Hofstatter, Afrika & Rampedi, 2015) and ANC policymakers (Joubert & Capazorio, 2015; Leon, 2015; Mthethwa, 2015). Similarly, student protests are stripped of their radical politics and instead treated as primarily “driven by financial factors” (Govender, 2015). As such, although the Sunday Times gives the appearance of objectivity its critiques are largely limited to the ANC leadership and policymakers, underplay the emergence of new movements, and assume the norms of ANC dominance.

By contrast with articles by newspaper journalists, opinion pieces and ‘letters to the editor’ published in the Sunday Times were more critical of the ANC government. Authors such as Mostart (2015) argued that the ANC was on a downward spiral and to “expect desperate tactics from the ruling party to retain votes”. Whilst other authors were unapologetic in their criticism of Zuma, arguing that “Zuma has to be held accountable” (“Only one way for Zuma”, 2015) and “our president is nothing but putty in nefarious hands” (Mthombothi, 2015). However, the Sunday Times also published commentary that uncritically reiterated government statements, including: “What of the police” (2015) which reiterated the ANC’s view of the Marikana massacre by blaming the miners for starting the conflict (“What of the police”, 2015); and, an article written by police chief Riah Phiyega that describes the massacre only as a “tragedy”, and criticised the use of “widespread violence, intimidation and a high degree of intolerance” in protests (Phiyega, 2015). Although the edition also included a piece critical of the “mindless thuggery and incompetence” of the police (“Phiyega will demur”, 2015), the decision to run multiple pieces, one written by the chief of police, which supported the ANC’s narrative of events, demonstrates the large extent to which the Sunday Times is uncritical of the ANC. As such, although the opinion pieces and ‘letters to the editor’
published in the *Sunday Times* included criticism of the ANC, the focus on Zuma and reiteration of statements from government officials demonstrates its implicit support for the ANC hegemonic project.

The ‘Business Times’ section of the *Sunday Times* is noticeably neoliberal in content, often uncritically reproducing neoliberal understandings whilst providing minor, conditional criticism of the ANC. Articles frequently reiterated neoliberal policy prescriptions, such as “increased private sector provision in electricity… pragmatic trade negotiations and much lower public expenditure” (Moola, 2015), “a more flexible labour structure in the country” (Prinsloo, 2015), and removing “legislative, compliance and red-tape burdens” (Biyase, 2015). Further, poor service delivery was blamed on overly bureaucratic, “dysfunctional municipalities” which needed to be “restructured” at an operational level (Barrow, 2015). These arguments contain unreconstructed neoliberal ideas that ignore the fundamental weaknesses of the South African economy and the systemic underfunding of municipalities created by neoliberal economic policies. Further, Payi (2015) even discloses that “my discussion may be unacceptable to some who despise neoliberalism” before suggesting that only an “open and free economy… can breed equality and justice”. In addition, in contrast to the rest of the newspaper, criticism of Zuma is largely absent, with criticism of the government limited to the obstructionist role played by “legislative muddling, corruption and stifling policies” (Barron, 2015) and nepotism (“Nepotism is a problem”, 2015). Further, even articles critical of the Black Economic Empowerment Programme, financial institutions and mines ownership, were broadly supportive of ANC mining legislation (S. Dube, 2015). As such, ‘Business Times’ not only reiterates neoliberal understandings about the economy and municipal government, but also assumes the political predominance of the ANC.

Newspapers from the Tiso Blackstar group including *The Sowetan, The Times, Business Day* and *Sunday Times* generally reproduced neoliberal economic ideas. This included neoliberal ideas around wealth creation and management, privatisation and the government paradigm of redistribution through growth. This is especially evident in the ‘Business Times’ which was uncritically neoliberal. The newspapers took varying stances on the ANC from broadly supportive titles such as *The Sowetan and Business Day*, which uncritically reproduced ANC statements, to *The Times* which was more critical of the ANC leadership, and *Sunday Times* whose treatment of the ANC varied from negative to uncritical or even sympathetic. In addition, the opinion and ‘letters to the editor’ section of both *Business Day* and *Sunday*
Times were, on balance, more critical of the ANC than the main text. However, criticism of the ANC was mostly limited to municipal governments, Zuma, the ANC leadership and policy makers. Further, the relegation of criticism of the ANC to the opinion sections, gives the appearance of objectivity whilst privileging the ANC consensus and demonstrates the “ingrained ideological bias amongst journalists and editors” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 449). Thus, overall these newspapers both reproduced the neoliberal economic consensus and focused their attention on conjunctural criticisms, thereby affirming “the normative nature of ANC rule” (Duncan, 2009, p. 8).

7.3.2.2. Caxton/CTP

Articles in The Citizen frequently contain unreconstructed neoliberal ideas and criticism of the ANC which is largely focused on Zuma and the ANC leadership. Neoliberal thinking is embedded in articles such as “Anglo CEO hits at iron rivals” (2015), which extols the virtue of “market discipline”, and “New trade deal in home straight” (2015), which argues that “it’s important” that companies “feel secure their investments will be free of excessive regulation or interference”. Further, in the article “Only 6% of SA save enough for retirement” Lamprecht (2015) argues that “South Africa has to foster and incentivise entrepreneurship”, and suggests that the lack of savings is simply the result of “the absence of planning” rather than systemic unemployment and poverty. Meanwhile, criticism of the ANC is centred on Zuma, who is roundly criticised for “gross mismanagement of public funds” (“Nklanda: turning up”, 2015), and signing off on “the excessive inflating costs of the security upgrades” at Nklanda (“JZ confounds”, 2015). These upgrades are also described as “nonsecurity features” by Mabona and Williams (2015), with Ndou (2015) stating that he “should be hauled before parliament’s ad hoc committee”. Further, the poor state of South Africa’s “damaged and ill-prepared police force” is also blamed on Zuma’s failure to hire “the best people for the respective jobs” (“Police failings are JZ’s”, 2015). Further, though the article “Weak leadership breeds anarchy” (2015) was critical of the leadership vacuum, it then proceeded to suggest protesters were engaged in “blatant criminality”, adopting the ANC narrative of blaming social unrest on “general lawlessness”. Thus, although some articles such as “Cadres, unions in dodgy deal” (2015) are critical of “trade unions, politicians and other ANC-allied structures”, the overwhelming focus on Zuma detracts from systemic critiques of the ANC. Further, the uncritical reiteration of neoliberal rationalities alongside narrow criticism of the ANC demonstrates the deep penetration of neoliberal ideas and the profound influence of the ANC.
Articles in *The Citizen* were also highly critical of radical alternative parties, and attributed South Africa’s economic woes to corruption rather than systemic economic problems. In “‘Let Mandela Rest’ – EFF”, Modjadji (2015a) squarely blames “greedy politicians” for the electricity crisis whilst Brown (2015) notes that “the influence of this juggernaut is not assured anymore”. Further, *The Citizen* was also highly critical of anti-ANC organisations such as the EFF, running a cover which read, “bloody anarchy as Economic Freedom Fighters create mayhem countrywide” (“EFF Chaos”, 2015), with both authors also describing the EFF as threatening and “corrupt” (Modjadji, 2015a), and chaotic and “stupid” (Brown, 2015). In another article, Modjadji (2015b) also smears NUMSA by suggesting that NUMSA, the AMCU and the EFF were working together, based solely on the testimony of COSATU president S’dumo Dlamini. Further, whilst ‘letters to the editor’ included more pointed criticism of the ANC ranging from the use of public money to enrich private individuals (Kilroy, 2015), to the “wasteful misuse of public resources” and corruption of the “administration of criminal and civil justice” (Johnston, 2015), they remain focused on conjunctural rather than systemic criticism. The focus on elite corruption and unanalytical criticism of the organised left is indicative of common sense understandings that assume the predominance of the ANC in post-Apartheid South Africa. Further, by suggesting that the EFF is deeply corrupt and chaotic, and lumping both NUMSA and the AMCU in with the EFF as partners, *The Citizen* presents NUMSA’s actions as flawed and downplays its political significance.

### 7.3.2.3. Independent Media

Among the newspapers owned by the Independent Media group the *Cape Times* is perhaps the most uncritical of the ANC, presenting ANC statements with little to no counter-arguments or critical distance. This is evident in articles such as “‘Fertile ground’ for ANC to take on city” (2015), which only cites ANC assertions, and “Zuma affirms commitment to media freedom” (2015), which solely quotes Zuma and treats the ANC media tribunal as unproblematic, despite its potential for stifling criticism of the ANC. Meanwhile, *The Star*, also owned by Independent Media, is more critical of the ANC but reproduces neoliberal understanding uncritically. Thus, while *The Star* reporter Molosankwe (2015) presents a complex picture of the mining industry, joblessness and homelessness, mining companies were presented as neutral, if not benign, in contrast to more militant unions. Similarly, “Beware the drug Peril” (2015) reiterated the link between poverty and criminality, a neoliberal trope identified by Mayher and McDonald (2007, p. 457). In addition, whereas
Hans and Mkhwanazi (2015) were intensely critical of Zuma and the ANC’s role in “attacking Madonsela in order to protect Zuma”, Gibson (2015) was overtly critical of the organisation itself, arguing that “the ANC is not a liberal democratic party”. However, these assertions were not based on systemic criticisms of neoliberal policy, instead focusing on corruption among the ANC elite and the influence of Marxist-Leninism (Gibson, 2015). Further, Gibson was openly hostile to the organised left, describing the EFF as “pseudo-leftist” and “policyless”, and the threat of a “trade union sponsored labour party” as irrelevant to the ANC. Thus, whilst The Star is less uncritically supportive of the ANC than the Cape Times, this criticism is conjunctural, focused on the leadership or supported by neoliberal reasoning.

Similar to other Independent Media publications The Sunday Independent also centred its criticisms of the ANC on corruption amongst ANC elites, thereby normalising ANC dominance. Thus, although authors such as M. Dube (2015), Magome (2015) and Maromo (2015) were critical of corruption within the ANC, the latter two authors were quick to distance the corrupt members from the ANC as an organisation, noting “the party is looking to clamp down on those accused of corruption” (Magome, 2015) and “frustration” with “senior party office-bearers who were accused of corruption” (Maromo, 2015). Further, authors remained uncritical about the failures of ANC economic policy, attributing this to obstructionism by the treasury (Musgrave, 2015) and the lack of “capacity at the organisational level” (Hlophe, 2015). Meanwhile, guest columns and articles were mixed, with Buccus (2015) decrying the lack of a developmental state and the creation of a “private substate”, whilst Ka Plaatjie (2015) described criticism of the ANC as “slander” and urged others to “join the ranks of the masses of the ANC”.

Thus, criticism of the ANC in The Sunday Independent remained largely focused on conjunctural issues such as corruption and organisational capacity, ignored systemic failures caused by neoliberal policies, and assumed that the ANC was necessary to “effect fundamental socio-economic change” (Musgrave, 2015). Where criticism extended beyond the leadership and institutional obstructions, such as Buccus’ (2015) call for a developmental state, the ANC remained a key component which simply needed “greater speed, political will and urgency”.

The Business Report also reiterated unreconstructed neoliberal ideas and was only critical of the ANC insofar as its economic agenda was seen as anti-business. This acceptance of neoliberal rationalities manifested in many forms ranging from the assumption that lowering
tariffs is economically beneficial (Miles, 2015) to the need to privatise (Ka’Nkosi, 2015). However, this was also evident in a marked hostility to “union and government interference” (Faku, 2015b) especially unions “who loudly boast their militant and revolutionary ideologies” (Faku, 2015a), and the need for “improvements on labour laws” which discourage investors (Ginindza, 2015). Further, criticism of the ANC, though not centred on Zuma, was focused on “fiscal management” (Ginindza, 2015), corruption and inefficiency (Ka’Nkosi, 2015). This was also evident in opinion pieces, which were focused on criticism of “mismanagement and even corruption” in the state and private sector (Tredoux, 2015) and the ANC (Griffiths, 2015). In addition, many opinion piece authors were overtly neoliberal, such as Sedibe (2015), who noted the “important role [of the private sector] in driving investment and partnering with the government”, and praised “prudent fiscal management and monetary policies” which “promoted competitiveness”. Meanwhile, Qubeka (2015) argued that the Black Business Council represented the “the aspirations of the majority of the economically marginalised” despite a narrow focus on creating “100 big black industrialists”. Thus, Business Report not only perpetuated unreconstructed neoliberal ideas throughout but limited its criticism of the ANC to issues where ANC policy conflicted with neoliberal economic rationalities.

The Independent Media group of newspapers largely uncritically reproduced neoliberal understandings whilst avoiding systemic criticisms in their coverage on the ANC. Whilst the extent to which the Cape Times reiterated neoliberal thought was unclear, The Sunday Independent was uncritical of the failings of ANC neoliberal policy, The Star reiterated the neoliberal association between poverty and criminality, and the Business Report positively presented privatisation and negatively cast unions. Further, while Cape Times was mostly uncritical of the ANC, the other newspapers centred their criticisms of the ANC on the leadership, corruption, fiscal mismanagement and inefficiency, with the business report couching its criticism of the ANC in neoliberal terms. The narrow focus on management or leadership issues rather than systemic economic failings, reproduces neoliberal ideas surrounding competition, state inefficiency and fiscal restraint. Further, it affirms the normality and even necessity of the ANC as the dominant power in the post-Apartheid political order.

7.3.2.4. Mail and Guardian
As the only independent national newspaper the *Mail and Guardian* is more pointedly critical of the ANC and the ideology of neoliberalism. This section is divided between the body of the newspaper, the business section and the opinion section, as well as discussing advertisements. Articles in the main body of the newspaper contain many of the same neoliberal understandings prevalent throughout the newspaper industry, including: the linking of crime and poverty (Wild, 2015); and the notion that the public sector is inefficient and needs to be run as a business (Mabugu & Dawood, 2015). However, it also includes open criticism of the neoliberal consensus as “Eurocentric” (Zwane, 2015) and the free market as “inegalitarian”, and maintains that the government must play “a pivotal part in redistributing income and stabilising society” (Valodia, 2015). In addition, criticism of the ANC is largely limited to national elites, including condemnation of the conduct of Zuma (De Wet, 2015a), Ramaphosa (McKune & Turner, 2015), and the cosy relationship between the Zuma administration and the Gupta family (Kings, 2015b; “New mines minister plays into Guptas”’, 2015; “New minister of mines tainted”, 2015; “Zuma Inc mines patronage”, 2015).

Further, despite criticism of the government’s lack of responsiveness to the independent left (Kingsa, 2015), the *Mail and Guardian*’s treatment of the organised left is overtly critical. This is evident in the inclusion of a former EFF member’s characterisation of the EFF as “beyond redemption” and the United Front as having “no support” (Sosibo, 2015). Further, De Wet (2015b ) repeated unsubstantiated rumours of Vavi’s corruption by COSATU president Sdumo Dlamini in an article where he described union struggles as “battles around investments”.

The business section of *Mail and Guardian* is also nuanced, including both unreconstructed neoliberal logic and informed systemic criticisms of the ANC and neoliberal economic policy. Regarding the ANC, criticism was tied to both the failure of the implementation and management of land reform projects (Cronje, 2015), and the government’s “prevaricating statements” on land reform (Donnelly, 2015). However, both authors criticism of the ANC was narrowly focused on the impact on commercial farming and the economy in general. Meanwhile, Donnelly (2015) overtly criticised neoliberal precepts such as “market deregulation and trade liberalisation” and the “integration of South African producers into global food value chains”. Similarly, other articles were critical of ANC policies with neoliberal underpinnings, such as new draft credit regulations that privileged credit providers but would have “devastating effects on low income consumers” (Campbell, 2015), and the criminalisation of unlawful mining communities, or *zama zamas* (Love & Kariuki, 2015).
Further, authors such as Landman (2015) and Kanbur (2015) argued that “changes in regulation had no positive impact at all on productivity” and “competing in the world economy on low real wages is not feasible or desirable”, respectively. However, Landman (2015) also argues that “the emerging new consensus on the harmful effects of inequality is as likely to mislead as the old one”, whilst Kanbur (2015) emphasises the need for “fiscal rectitude… the nonexpansion of the public-sector wage bill” and reducing “regulatory constraints”. Thus although, authors presented ideas which ran contrary to the South African neoliberal consensus that labour market reform is necessary and wages must be competitive internationally, they did so with hesitation and conditions attached. Further, other authors argued in line with neoliberal economic understandings against increasing the national minimum wage, (Steyn, 2015) and in favour of the trickledown effect of increased productivity (Jordan & Wilse-Samson, 2015). Thus, whilst articles in the business section of *Mail and Guardian* are more critical of the ANC and neoliberal economic policy than other business sections such as *Business Times*, they do so within the constraints of the neoliberal consensus and often repeat the same ‘common sense’ logic of neoliberalism.

In contrast to both the body of the newspaper and the business section, opinion pieces in ‘comment and analysis’ were much more critical of the ANC and neoliberal economic policy. These articles were not only critical of Zuma and factionalism in the ANC (“ANC infighting retards delivery”, 2015), but also the internal democracy of the ANC (Gunguluzi, 2015) and its policies of economic liberalisation (“Tax loopholes impoverish SA”, 2015). Additionally, this criticism extended beyond critiques of “poor corporate governance and political meddling” to the ANC’s adoption of the neoliberal rationalities of privatisation and trade liberalisation (“Power and greed derail parastatals”, 2015), and the need for a “functional, regionally integrated economy for all” (Osmanovic, 2015). Thus, while authors acknowledge the inherited structural problems of the post-Apartheid economy, they also argue that its failings are “perpetuated by the current hegemonic economic model” (Sefalafala, 2015).

However, despite this pronounced systemic criticism of the ANC and neoliberalism, authors also expressed scepticism with regards to the organised left, such as Makgotho (2015) who viewed the EFF as an undemocratic youth party. Meanwhile, Harvey (2015) questioned whether the NUMSA-backed United Front would “turn out fundamentally differently from the sad factionalist legacy of the left in South Africa”. However, dissenting voices are also given their say, with the Mail and Guardian running a full-age spread critical of the newspaper’s coverage of the United Front by the national secretary of the United Front
Mazibuko Jara (2015). Thus, whilst the remainder of the magazine is somewhat critical of the ANC, with mixed opinions regarding neoliberalism, the opinion section is much more overtly critical of both. Further, alternative movements such as NUMSA’s United Front are presented in conflicting ways, and despite the newspaper’s willingness to let the left ‘speak for itself’ positive analysis of the United Front was relegated to the opinion section.

However, while the *Mail and Guardian* may be nominally independent, like most newspapers for whom advertising “is typically the largest source of revenue”, it is also a “a vehicle for capital in general in promoting itself” through advertising (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 446). This is evident in the creation of advertising supplements or ‘advertisials’ such as “Navigating choppy financial waters” (Haynes, 2015) and the “Dig Report”, which are paid for and written by industry professionals. The former article, written by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, supports the government policy of loosening financial regulation by arguing that strict regulation of financial markets can “have a hampering effect” on the entire national economy (Haynes, 2015). Meanwhile, articles in the “Dig Report” repeat neoliberal rationalities surrounding state “inefficiencies”, the need to rationalise and modernise the mining sector (Oxford, 2015), and the destabilising effect of unions (Haggard, 2015). Thus, although the *Mail and Guardian* may be the most nominally independent South African newspaper, the necessity of advertising revenue has resulted in the incorporation of advertising supplements which are informed by neoliberal economic rationalities.

7.3.2.5. TNA Media

*The New Age* is a subsidiary of TNA media, which is owned by the Gupta family, a powerful Indian business family with strong ties to former President Zuma (Johnson, 2016, p. 132). As such, it is staunchly pro-ANC and overtly critical of those seen as ANC-opponents, as evident in the discussion of Nklanda by D. Dube (2015) which focused on criticism of public prosecutor Madonsela. Meanwhile, those seen as anti-ANC are frequently ridiculed, including the EFF (Ramothwala, 2015), and NUMSA and Zwelinzima Vavi (Dlelanga, 2015). Further, the newspaper criticised the upsurge of popular protest by characterising them as “violent” convulsions emerging from “the broken social fabric of our society”, and criticising those organisations which say otherwise, such as “the little known” Africa Check (Seekoei, 2015). Meanwhile, the newspaper is also broadly supportive of the ANC’s economic agenda and frequently reiterates neoliberal ideas and language, including: the characterisation of poor populations as a criminal “scourge” engaged in “illegal activities”
the argument that economic failings are the result of private sector failings (Ramothwala, 2015) and technical issues such as “poor maintenance and lack of capacity” (Saunders, 2015); and the view that social grants are a “long-time burden” on the state which foster dependency (Memela, 2015). Thus, although *The New Age* is unsurprisingly uncritical of the ANC, it is also informed by unreconstructed neoliberal logic, which simplistically reproduces the government consensus on economic growth. However, where this is brought into tension with ANC policies and/or understandings of the economy, the newspaper conclusively supports the ANC.

7.3.2.6. Community Newspapers

Although community newspapers are nominally independent, they frequently publish articles by national newspapers, and are also subject to hostile economic conditions in which attracting advertising revenue is paramount. As a result, these newspapers tend to reproduce the same consensus surrounding the ANC and the South African economy. Like many national papers, *The Atlantic Sun* reiterates the neoliberal discourse surrounding poverty and criminality (Hirsch, 2015). However, whilst it is also critical of corruption in South Africa, its focus is instead on community organisations such as the Right2Know campaign (“Cape Town joins nation-wide”, 2015), which are presented positively. Meanwhile, the small community newspaper *Independent Thinking* is critical of “the levels of violence” at university protests, describing them as a result of the “heightened party political” and “underlying historical social tensions” (“President meets with chairs”, 2015), and “an emphatic statement of disapproval on the lack of transformation in the sector” (Maimela, 2015). Thus, despite being nominally independent, these community newspapers either reproduce ANC conceptions of the economy or fail to systemically address the causes behind protest. However, they do offer more complex understandings of the factors behind protest, and a more positive conception of community organisations than many national newspapers, though this is a response to the need to market to local audiences.

7.3.3. Conclusions

Through their unique capacity to reach huge parts of the population, especially in rural and poorer areas, the South African newspaper industry plays a profound role in mediating and disseminating the ideology of neoliberalism. However, despite the high degree of consolidation of ownership in the media industry, there are significant variations in the extent
to which the logic of neoliberalism is accepted or disseminated between those newspapers analysed. This can in part be explained by the nature of hegemonic discourse which Permeates ‘common sense’ understandings rather than dominating them in any systemic way (Augelli & Murphy, 1988, p. 19-20). As such, although the logic of neoliberalism is widely repeated in the South African media, it is not universally accepted and often contested, albeit within historical and/or social limitations. However, contestations are also incorporated within the hegemonic discourse, as the appearance of impartiality within the media largely disguises the institutional and organisational embrace of neoliberal discourse in South Africa. Within this context, the extent to which the media contest, incorporate or reproduce “unproblematised assumptions and positions” that reflect neoliberal ‘common sense’ understandings are an indicator of the extent to which the ANC is hegemonic (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 449).

This study sought to establish the extent to which the ANC and the associated ideology of neoliberalism were hegemonic in South Africa in 2015 by examining the extent to which newspapers reproduced and contested neoliberal discourse. Further, it also sought to examine how the media contested and reproduced ANC understandings and policy and understood contestations of the ANC neoliberal project by groups such as NUMSA. As such, this study analysed 11 national newspaper and 2 community newspapers looking for unproblematised neoliberal assumptions. This included the assumption that privatisation, fiscal responsibility, deregulation, lower-tariffs, increased competition and lower wages are desirable and the uncritical use of neoliberal phrases including ‘partnerships’, ‘restructuring’ and ‘business unit’ and language that ‘blames and/or criminalises the poor’ (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 456-7). Further, it looked for neoliberal understandings of privatisation, commercialisation and the economy which characterised the public sector as inefficient and corrupt and/or reproduced the government’s negative portrayal of anti-ANC groups as immoral, unlawful or insignificant. In addition, given the importance of neoliberal discourse to the ANC hegemonic project, I also examined the extent to which the newspapers limited themselves to the “watchdog role to the black elite”, focusing on the leadership, corruption and “anti-democratic practices” of the ANC rather than criticising the systemic socio-economic failings of ANC policy (Duncan, 2009, p. 8).

This study found that newspapers from the Tiso Blackstar group including The Sowetan, The Times, Business Day and Sunday Times generally reproduced neoliberal economic ideas.
Further, despite differences between the newspapers treatment of the ANC, criticism of the ANC was mostly limited to municipal governments, Zuma, the ANC leadership and policy makers. *The Citizen* also reiterated unreconstructed neoliberal ideas whilst focusing its criticism of the ANC on the Zuma administration and corruption, and subjecting anti-ANC organisations, such as NUMSA and the EFF, to unanalytical criticism. The Independent Media group of newspapers including the *Cape Times*, *The Sunday Independent*, *The Star* and the *Business Report*, also largely reproduced neoliberal understandings whilst avoiding systemic criticisms in their coverage on the ANC through a narrow focus on management or leadership issues. Thus, overall the newspapers owned by large media conglomerates uncritically reproduced the neoliberal economic consensus and focused their attention on conjunctural criticisms, thereby affirming “the normative nature of ANC rule” (Duncan, 2009, p. 8). Further, by limiting most informed criticism of the ANC to opinion sections, these newspapers gave the appearance of objectivity whilst privileging the ANC consensus and demonstrated the “ingrained ideological bias amongst journalists and editors” (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 449). As such these newspapers not only affirm the large extent to which neoliberalism has penetrated common sense understandings in the media, which are disseminated throughout the populace, but also the success of the ANC in establishing itself as politically and economically dominant.

By contrast, the independent *Mail and Guardian* presented a far more nuanced picture of the ANC and neoliberalism. Although it reiterates some of the same neoliberal understandings, including the criminalisation of poverty, it also incorporates more open criticism of neoliberal discourse. This is also reflected in the business section which, while containing neoliberal logic, is much more critical of the ANC and neoliberal economic policy than other business newspapers or sections such as *Business Day* or ‘Business Times’. Further, whilst the ‘comment and analysis’ section included much more systemic criticisms of the ANC and neoliberal economic policy, and nuanced portrayals of alternative organisations, this was undermined by the presence of regular ‘advertorials’ commissioned by industry which were informed by neoliberal economic rationalities. By contrast, *The New Age* is staunchly pro-ANC, overtly critical of those seen as ANC-opponents, including the EFF and NUMSA, and reiterates unreconstructed neoliberal ideas and language concerning poverty and crime. Meanwhile, despite their nominal independence community newspapers either reproduce the neoliberal discourse surrounding poverty and criminality (*The Atlantic Sun*) or are overtly critical of ‘violent and unorganised’ protests (*Independent Thinking*). However, both of these
newspapers were much more sympathetic to community organisations than many national newspapers as a result of their situation at a local level. As such, although the ‘independent’ media in South Africa present far more nuanced understandings of neoliberalism and often contest ANC policy and understandings (with the exception of *The New Age*), they are also constrained by neoliberal rationalities. This is informed by a competitive and highly consolidated media landscape in which attracting advertising revenue is crucial to survival.

To summarise, South African newspapers generally reproduced neoliberal understandings when discussing the economic situation, ANC governance and social issues such as poverty or unemployment. Further, newspapers either uncritically reproduced the arguments of the ANC government or focused on conjunctural issues such as corrupt elites and poor municipal governance when criticising the ANC, and often negatively presented anti-ANC organisations. This is a particularly noticeable trend among those newspapers owned by large conglomerates such as Tiso Blackstar, Independent Media, and Caxton/CTP and the Gupta owned *TNA Media*. However, this is also evident in the nominally independent *Mail and Guardian*, and community newspapers such as *The Atlantic Sun* and *Independent Thinking*. Further, opinion and ‘letters to the editor’ sections also tended to be more critical of the ANC and neoliberalism, especially in *Mail and Guardian*. This affirms the influence of powerful sections of capital in placing discursive limits on the possibility of anti-neoliberal discourse and the profound disparity in power between independent media and civil society organisations, on one hand, and corporations, on the other. However, the general willingness of the newspaper media to publish ‘unproblematised assumptions and positions’ (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 449) which reflect neoliberal ‘common sense’ suggests that neoliberalism has deeply penetrated common sense understandings in South Africa. This underscores the profound capacity of the ANC hegemonic project to both penetrate and reorient common sense understandings as late as 2015, suggesting that the ANC neoliberal project was hegemonic to a large extent during this period. Further, alternative parties such as NUMSA and the United Front were largely either ignored by the press or presented as either lacking support or inherently flawed, though there was some mixed press coverage. As such, NUMSA’s actions were understood as politically and ideologically insignificant by the South African media.
8. **Findings (Part 2)**

8.1 **Introduction**

This section examines the extent to which the ANC neoliberal project is hegemonic within South Africa by analysing the responses from fifteen semi-structured interviews of South African ‘organic’ intellectuals conducted in 2015, including academics, union officials, and political commentators. Selection of these ‘organic’ intellectuals was based on their involvement in subaltern social formations, such as social movements and unions, their opposition to the ANC, and thereafter through a snowball sampling method. This study employed semi-structured interviews including the discretionary use of questions and extensive use of follow-up probes (see Appendix A) to “extract as much information as possible from a person” with specific subject expertise (Morris, 2015, p. 3). Relevant questions and follow up probes were generated and developed throughout the interview process, emerging from “interactions during the interview itself” (Berg, 2001, p. 70). Interviews were conducted on an individual basis, and were between 30 and 60 minutes in duration, with interviewees given a chance to review their responses after transcription.

The purpose of these interviews was to determine: a) the extent to which they believe the ANC and/or neoliberalism is hegemonic; b) how they understand contestations of neoliberalism in South Africa; and, c) their understandings of NUMSA’s actions and whether their ideologically and politically significance. As such, these interviews range from a discussion of ANC hegemony, the economic situation in South Africa, and ANC economic policy to subaltern social formations including social movements, unions and political parties. Further, this content addresses understandings of NUMSA’s removal from COSATU, commitment to organising a United Front, and the political and ideological significance of these actions.

The choice of ‘organic’ intellectuals as interview subjects is important in establishing the extent to which the ANC and neoliberalism are hegemonic, and how contestations of this hegemony by subaltern social formations, such as NUMSA, are perceived by civil society. For Gramsci, organic intellectuals were the “thinking and organisational” component of a social class, and played a crucial role in contesting the structures of the historic bloc and articulating counter-hegemonic ideology (Gramsci, 1971, p. 6, 9). Further, organic intellectuals could have any job characteristic of their class compatible with a class leadership position, and often concealed an attachment to participation in practical life (Gramsci, 1971,
As such, they are simultaneously in-touch with the masses, involved with their political mobilisation, and have higher analytical levels of understanding. Thus, organic intellectuals are ideal interview participants for this study as they are uniquely placed to assess the hegemony, and contestations, of the ANC neoliberal project.

The organic intellectuals interviewed for this study came from a range of professions with various levels of participation in civil society. Many of these were involved with analysing or organising unions and social movements, such as: Terry Bell, a writer, columnist, and political economic analyst specialising in labour; Stephen Faulkner, a trade unionist and the national co-ordinator of the Nine Plus Unions spearheaded by NUMSA; Leonard Gentle, a director at the International Labour Research and Information Group (ILRIG), former organiser for the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (SACCAWU) and NUMSA and educator for the International Federation of Workers' Educational Associations (IFWEA); Trevor Ngwane, a member of the Democratic Left Front, the socialist group and the United Front and founder of the Anti-Privatisation Forum and Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee; and, Sahra Ryklief, the general secretary of the International Federation of Workers Education Associations and former Director of the Labour Research Service (LRS). In addition, a number of interviewees also had the function of intellectuals in society, with many also linked at an organisational and/or educational level to unions and social movements, including: Steven Friedman, a South African academic, newspaper columnist, public intellectual activist, former trade unionist and journalist; Roland Henwood, a lecturer in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria; Nicola de Jager, a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Stellenbosch University; Dirk Kotze, a lecturer in the department of political science at the University of South Africa; Syeda Lubna Bano Nadvi, a lecturer in Political Sciences and International Relations at the University of KwaZulu-Natal; Sagie Narsiah, an associate professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the University of KwaZulu-Natal; Devan Pillay, an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of the Witswatersrand; Vishwas Satgar, a senior lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand; Roger Southall, Professor Emeritus in the Department of Sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand; and, Edward Webster, professor, founder and former director of the Society, Work and Development Institute (SWOP) at the University of the Witwatersrand.
This chapter analyses the information gathered from interviewees and aggregates it into a number of key themes. As such, it begins with an analysis of interview data relating to ANC hegemony, the South African economy and ANC economic policy. This is followed by an analysis of interviewees’ understandings of social movements, unions, ‘service delivery’ protests, and alternative political parties. Finally, this chapter explores how NUMSA and the United Front are understood by these organic intellectuals and the extent to which they are politically and/or ideologically significant.

8.2. **ANC Hegemony**

The organic intellectuals interviewed in this study have widely different understandings of ANC hegemony in South Africa, with only three claiming that the ANC is hegemonic, three stating that the ANC was hegemonic at one time, four maintaining that it is a dominant political actor, and two denying that it was or is hegemonic. The variation between the opinions of interviewees reflects the role of organic intellectuals in articulating the understandings of various subalteran groups. However, though there is a “quantitative’ difference of degree” of understandings between these different groups, organic intellectuals are also informed by wider understandings across subalteran classes (Crehan, 2002, p. 130). As such, the majority of interviewees noted the immense economic challenges facing the ANC and its increasingly tenuous legitimacy, with eight interviewees arguing that ANC dominance is in decline. Further, interviewees also highlighted issues surrounding ANC hegemony including the ANC’s increasing reliance on coercion, the ANC’s regional dominance, the role played by alternative centres of power, the ANC’s aspirations for hegemony, and the significance of the Zuma-Mbeki split.

Interviewees were split between those who saw the ANC as dominant and/or lacking hegemony, and those who saw the ANC as having been or being hegemonic. However, there were differences of opinions even between those who saw the ANC as hegemonic, such as Narsiah, Ngwane and Pillay. Ngwane argues that “there is no doubt” that the ANC Alliance is hegemonic, noting that “on the ground they try and maintain their hegemony right to the grassroots level” (T. Ngwane, October 24, 2015). However, he also notes that the ANC organisation has increasingly become an “electoral machine”. Similarly, Narsiah argues that the ANC is hegemonic because they have produced “dominant ideas and they have fostered consensus”, though he differentiates between the Apartheid and democratic era, arguing that
“it’s contentious whether during the liberation struggle they enjoyed any kind of hegemony in that liberation space” (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015). Further, Narsiah notes that the ANC has been “rewriting history for their own purposes” and “spinning [the truth] all the time”, increasingly deploying the discourse of race to “foster consent” and promote “black dominance”. As such, Narsiah maintains that the success of the ANC in reorientating “common sense” has led to the notion that “everything is fine so be calm, so forget about, put away your activism” (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015). Meanwhile Pillay, argues that while people have become “cautiously disillusioned” with the ANC as a result of its economic trajectory, “no real alternatives…. have presented themselves” (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015). As such, the ANC remains “for many people the only solution to our problems” in the absence of which “the country might fragment” (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015). This supports the argument that the ANC is hegemonic, as Marais notes that the belief that “nothing one does makes a difference” and “there is no alternative” are powerful facets of hegemonic ideology (Marais, 2011, p. 391).

Interviewees also saw the ANC as having been hegemonic but now wielding a declining capacity to foster consent amidst increasing opposition, including Bell, Nadvi and Satgar. Bell argues that the ANC achieved hegemony at a class level “during the beautiful honeymoon period when… The ANC embodied… the aspirations of everyone”, but could not capture the “political elite, the more educated people” (T. Bell, September 27, 2015). Further, Bell notes that whilst people have become “very disillusioned” as a result of economic conditions, “ordinary people on the ground who are politically aware” still see it as a “radical and almost socialist movement” (T. Bell, September 27, 2015). Similarly, Nadvi defines the ANC as a “hegemonic body” between 1990 and 1998, attracting “the public’s support, the public’s adulation almost” whilst also drawing in “large amounts of investments to the country because of their good relationship with business” (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015). Further, Nadvi argues that the ANC’s hegemonic status was obtained by aligning itself with the needs of capital, by “privatising and opening up the economy to direct foreign investment”. However, she also notes that the ANC’s adherence to neoliberal ideas resulted in a “huge shift in terms of how the majority of South Africans began to view it” (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015). Further, Nadvi argues that the ANC has struggled to represent sectors of the community such as the urban literate classes and “minority communities”, such as Indians, which have coalesced around the DA (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015).
Similar to Bell and Nadvi, Satgar notes the emergence of an “historical national liberation bloc of forces led by the ANC” during the early 1990s that was hegemonic “maybe up until 1996” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). Thereafter, Satgar argues this hegemony “mutates into a technocratic dominance and an increasing unravelling of the national liberation project” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). However, Satgar argues that the emergence of this technocratic layer within the ANC was essential to the hegemonic project, as it undermined, co-opted and neutralised the “militant mass participatory democratic impulse”. Further, Satgar argues that this resulted in the “neutering, the evisceration of civil society”, echoing Narsiah who notes that civil society was “defanged… emasculated systematically” (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015). In addition, Satgar argues that after 2007 civil society became increasingly disarticulated from the ANC-led bloc, with resistance “spurred on by service delivery protests” clearly challenging the “ANC-led state at a local level” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015).

However, though Satgar, Bell and Nadvi argue that the ANC is no longer hegemonic, they also agree that the ANC remains a dominant and socially necessary actor within South Africa. Thus, while Nadvi is highly critical of the ANC she also acknowledges that reformists within the ANC “are really the only perhaps possibility for us to rescue the country”, echoing the sentiments of Pillay who argues “there's still people within the ANC, within the government that are trying to keep to a developmental vision” (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015). However, whereas Pillay argues that the ANC has not been completely “derailed” from its pathway, Nadvi sees the ANC as “so far gone that…[change] is not going to come from the inside”. However, Nadvi argues that “it is very unlikely” that the ANC will be removed through elections due to its extensive support in rural areas, instead advocating a “gathering or revolution of sorts” to exert pressure on the ANC from the outside’ (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015). In addition, both Pillay and Nadvi view the Zuma-Mbeki split as a failed attempt by the left within the Alliance to shift the economic trajectory of the ANC, which was effectively co-opted to refurbish the legitimacy of the ANC. Thus, whilst these interviewees are highly critical of the ANC, they also view it as the dominant force within South Africa, and argue that any meaningful change will need to come from increased pressure on the ANC.

The ANC was also perceived to be a dominant actor by those interviewees who outright criticised the ANC and rejected or did not engage with the notion of ANC hegemony, such as Gentle, Southall, Faulkner and Henwood. These interviewees maintained the continued
legitimacy and/or electoral dominance of the ANC despite increasing levels of unrest and resistance throughout civil society. As such, whilst Gentle acknowledges that “localised, self-organised protest” have unevenly “undermined the legitimacy of the ANC”, he argues that the questioning of its legitimacy is “a matter of practice” (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015). Meanwhile, Southall argues that there is an abundance of criticism and disillusionment with the ANC, especially among intellectuals, and even “hope for an overarching [opposition] political party”- though it would take several elections to have a “credible alternative” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015). Erstwhile, Faulkner and Henwood are critical of the capacity of the ANC government, with the former noting that the ANC alliance is “in a state of paralysis” unable to “respond to the real core crisis issues of jobs, poverty, inequality”. Further, Henwood describes the ANC government and leadership as “very weak”, corrupt and in a state of “crisis”, and argues that “the anger is building” throughout civil society (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015). However, Henwood also maintains that the ANC “still has a lot of legitimacy as the pre-eminent liberation movement… it still holds a lot of their hopes despite all the disappointments”. Further, while increasingly influential people have started to “criticise and distance, and even become antagonistic” towards the ANC, Henwood argues that division within the movement has “not yet [reached] the heart of the ANC” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015). Meanwhile, Faulkner notes the ANC’s success in closing down debates through leadership of the Tripartite Alliance and building a “Laager mentality amongst its own supporters” to distance themselves from community campaigns for service delivery (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015). Thus, whilst these interviewees argue that the ANC is beset by deep structural flaws and increasing unrest, they all maintain that the ANC remains a dominant (though increasingly embattled) actor within South Africa.

Interviewees also criticised the ANC’s strengthening hold over the coercive instruments of the state apparatus amid declining electoral dominance. Southall argues that the ANC has increasingly been “abusing and reducing the independence of state institutions”, stating “hopefully we don’t go the Zim[babwe] route and just cancel elections” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015). Further, Southall argues that “I have absolutely no doubt that the ANC will start moving into the electoral commission”, citing the lack of police restraint in crushing the mineworkers at Marikana (R. Southall, July 29, 2015). Both Henwood and Faulkner also note the increased willingness of the ANC government to employ coercion, with the former citing the ANC’s “use of police to very violently curtail these strikes”, while the latter argues that the ANC government’s response to xenophobic violence under Operation Fiela amounts
to “attacking and arresting migrant communities” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015; S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015). Thus, given the perception among several interviewees that the ANC is increasingly paralysed and/or declining, its increased willingness to resort to coercion to maintain dominance in South Africa suggests that the ANC neoliberal project is increasingly unable to manufacture the spontaneous and actively given consent of the masses “without resort to coercion” (Arrighi, 2005a, p. 32).

Although most interviewees agreed that the ANC remains a dominant force with some measure of legitimacy in South Africa, only a few argue that it was hegemonic. In contrast, both Friedman and De Jager argue that the ANC is not hegemonic, though they disagree about its dominance. Friedman argues that “there isn’t hegemony”, noting that whilst the ANC “looks electorally dominant” the “middle class”, the “entire academic community, the entire media, the entire suburbs… [are] loudly and roundly and sometimes largely irrationally opposed” to the ANC government (S. Friedman, August 3, 2015). Similarly, whilst De Jager agrees with Ngwane that there is “definite dominance and there are aspirations for hegemony”, she contests that the ANC is hegemonic, citing alternative centres of power such as the judiciary and independent bodies such as the auditor general, civil society organisations, and the media. Further, De Jager argues that ANC aspirations for hegemony manifest in hostility towards these alternative centres of power, including “disdain” and “disregard” for the judiciary and public protector, and attempts to “close down debates” and delegitimise the media (N. De Jager, October 12, 2015). Thus, both Friedman and De Jager argue that the ANC is facing increasing resistance from civil society, though they both contest the ANC’s effectiveness in responding to these challenges.

Though most interviewees responded to the question of ANC hegemony with an assessment of its domestic dominance, some chose to engage with the issue of South Africa’s regional dominance. The synonymous nature of the ANC and the South African government, and the interconnectedness of populations throughout southern Africa, make this directly relevant to the questioning of ANC hegemony nationally. However, whilst those interviewees generally saw South Africa as dominant economically throughout the region, they were critical of the ways in which this dominance manifested, and the limited extent to which this translated into political dominance. Thus, whilst Kotze argued that South Africa was the dominant Southern African economy and the leading member of economic organisations such as the South Africa Customs Union, he also acknowledged increased competition from potential
challengers such as Angola. However, Kotze maintained the pre-eminence of South Africa in the region, noting the massive scale in which “South African businesses have really moved into other African countries”, its “very important economic presence”, and how the latter has translated into membership in the G20 and BRICS (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015). Further, whilst Friedman argues that South Africa is the dominant economic power, he argues that South Africa is not the regional hegemon as its foreign policy is incoherent and “the [most] ubiquitous form of South African engagement with the rest of the continent is private companies making huge amounts of money since 1994” (S. Friedman, August 3, 2015).

Similarly to Friedman, Bell argues that South Africa’s engagement with the rest of the continent is “deeply resented”, noting that “resentment is more against South African capital and the more the ANC is seen as related to South African capital… that will have an adverse effect on the ANC's image” (T. Bell, September 27, 2015). By contrast, Gentle argues that South Africa is a regional hegemon as its status as the “largest foreign investor in the rest of the continent” translates into soft power throughout the region and imbues it with “the moral authority to speak on behalf of Africa” in international organisations. However, Gentle notes that this regional hegemony is set within the constraints of global hegemonic struggle, with “South Africa's ambitions are not backed up with real capacity to withstand US power” (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015). As such, although interviewees saw South Africa as economically dominant within Southern Africa, this did not necessarily translate into regional political dominance, and its economic engagement with the rest of Africa was viewed as deeply problematic.

To summarise, Interviewees generally saw the ANC as a dominant political actor within South Africa, though this was seen as increasingly undermined by ANC economic policy and corruption and cronyism. Although some interviewees saw the ANC as having been or being hegemonic - and two saw it as not hegemonic - most agreed that it was a dominant actor within South Africa and would remain so for the foreseeable future. Further, while many interviewees noted the upsurge of resistance to the ANC and growing challenges to its dominance, they were also critical of the capacity of these alternative movements to challenge the dominance of the ANC, and several maintained the centrality of the ANC to socioeconomic reform within South Africa. Interviewees also noted the growing willingness of the ANC government to use the coercive apparatus of the state and expressed concern about the ANC’s hostility towards independent centres of power such as the judiciary and
media, though these institutions were generally seen as both strong and independent. In addition, interviewees also found that the ANC was dominant economically within Southern Africa and Africa generally, though they disagreed whether and to what extent it was politically dominant. Thus, interviewees generally agreed that the ANC was both electorally and politically dominant within South Africa in 2015, though most agreed that the ANC was not hegemonic in South Africa.

8.3. **The South African Economy**

The hegemony of the ANC is crucially linked to the neoliberal project that it adopted in the post-Apartheid period. As such, resistance to ANC economic policy is intimately connected to contestations of neoliberalism in South Africa and the economic consequences of the ANC’s neoliberal trajectory. Thus, analysing how organic intellectuals understand the South African economy and ANC economic policy provides crucial insights into the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project. Of the 15 organic intellectuals interviewed, 13 argued that the economic situation was negative and three saw it as a crisis, with epithets ranging from “disappointing” and “concerning” to “stagnant”, “dire”, and a “mess” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015; N. De Jager, October 12, 2015; S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015; S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015; T. Bell, September 27, 2015). Interviewees also presented a number of different arguments concerning the causes of this negative economic situation, ranging from
globalisation, trade liberalisation and neoliberalism, to corruption, business-state relations, the role of labour and structural Apartheid-era continuities. Further, interviewees demonstrated complex understandings of these issues, frequently presenting several interconnected arguments as to the root cause of South Africa’s economic malaise.

Although interviewees generally agreed that the economic situation was negative, they disagreed about which sections of the economy were worst afflicted and the extent of this malaise. The decline of the mining industry was a recurring theme among interviewees including Southall, Kotze, Pillay and Faulkner, who connected the decline of this industry with broader trends of rising inequality, poverty and unemployment and the decline of the manufacturing industry. Southall and Pillay argued that the decline of the mining industry was symptomatic of a broader crisis, noting “we're running out of money, mining is facing commodity downturn, gold is running out basically”; whilst the latter cited a colleague stating “we are already living in barbarism” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015; D. Pillay, August 11, 2015). These interviewees also emphasised the failure of the South African economy to counter
growing inequality, poverty and unemployment, with Southall emphasising the lack of a “growth sector in jobs”, whilst Pillay noted “how much worse can it get?” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015; D. Pillay, August 11, 2015). Similarly, Faulkner characterised the South African economy as stagnant, but poverty, inequality and unemployment as increasing, arguing that South African “capital and capitalist society is incapable… of meeting the needs of [the] people” (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015).

Interviewees also characterised the South African economy in terms of its inability to generate employment, systemic inequality and rising poverty. Kotze, Nadvi and Ryklief were highly critical of the level of inequality in South Africa, describing it as “one of the most unequal societies in the world”, and arguing that “the gap between the rich and the poor actually became bigger” after Apartheid (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015; D. Kotze, August 6, 2015). Further, Kotze argued that if not for South Africa’s sluggish growth “the gap between rich and poor would have been even bigger”, whilst Ngwane argued that the problem of increasing inequality meant that whether “the economy's growing or slowing down… things get worse” (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015; T. Ngwane, October 24, 2015). In contrast, Narsiah argued that low growth rates were primarily responsible for unemployment and inequality, placing South Africa on a “dire and downward spiral for a number of years” (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015).

In addition, most interviewees also saw inequality as intrinsically linked to poverty and unemployment, including Satgar who argued that worsening unemployment increased income inequality and “high levels of inequality” led to increased “instability” and “a very volatile situation” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015; N. De Jager, October 12, 2015). Further, Gentle argues that “widening wealth disparities” and the “restructuring of the working class towards various forms of precariousness” has resulted in worsening levels of poverty and appalling rates of infant mortality and diarrhoea (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015). Widespread and increasing unemployment was a recurring theme among interviewees though they disagreed over its extent, with estimates ranging from 33% (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015) to 50% (T. Bell, September 27, 2015). Both Ngwane and Nadvi saw this as a consequence of the lack of redistribution of resources, arguing that “the best hope that we have for South Africa is for our resources to be redistributed and reallocated” (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015). However, Henwood disputes this argument, stating that redistribution
will have little effect on poverty, and instead emphasising the need to “start addressing the fundamentals” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015).

The arguments made by interviewees surrounding poverty, inequality and unemployment are highly complex, often acknowledging both positives and negatives. Interviewees such as Ryklief, Gentle, Faulkner, and Nadvi argue that pockets of wealth have been created, such as the emerging black middle class and black elite, but at a great social cost and with little benefit for the majority of the population. Further, both Ryklief and Gentle argue that the ANC’s model has been successful in creating stability and enforcing severe economic reform, with South African corporations becoming global players within 20 short years and the wealthy becoming” enormously wealthier” (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015). However, they both agree that it has been a disastrous failure in regard to providing “some kind of level of equality between those who have and those who have not” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015). As such, ANC policy is seen as generating wealth for a very, very small minority aligned with the ruling party, “at the cost of a huge swathe of the poor population” (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015). Further, Nadvi argues that although economic conditions have created an emerging black middle class, they overwhelmingly favour white-owned capital whilst also pushing the majority of South Africans into the informal economy (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015).

This is supported by a number of interviewees including Gentle, Satgar, Narsiah and Ngwane who argue that the ANC is “part of the elite and it’s the sort of ruling party of big capital” (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015). As such, the ANC is seen as the vehicle to “insert that small black elite into this bigger structure that was existing under Apartheid… by creating the conditions for elite rule” (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015). This class compromise not only facilitated “the looting of the state and state resources”, but was inherently exclusive, leading Satgar to conclude that despite “some kind of distribution around housing… indigent water resources and electricity… it does not include everybody, and that is beginning to take its toll” (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015; V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). However, though Friedman agrees that the economy is not working for the poor he also notes that government interventions such as social grants mitigate this impact by creating “platforms for people to do all sorts of interesting things with very little resources” (S. Friedman, August 3, 2015). As such, although there is a variety of opinions regarding South Africa’s economic situation,
Interviewees generally agreed that it was negative, characterised by poverty, inequality and unemployment and the consequence of a class compromise between elites and the ANC.

Many interviewees also noted the profound impacts of trade liberalisation on South Africa’s negative economic performance. The opening up of the South African economy in 1996 was singled out as disastrous by interviewees such as Narsiah, Bell, Nadvi, Pillay, and Satgar. Narsiah argued that South Africa’s insertion into the global economy was done “very haphazardly and too quickly”, whilst Bell described it as “totally ludicrous” and “virtually annihilating our garment and textile industry with a flood of exports from China” (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015; T. Bell, September 27, 2015). Similarly, Nadvi and Pillay argue that the rapid liberalisation of the economy alongside privatisation, was “hugely problematic”, resulting in job losses through downsizing, “right-sizing” and the “gradual de-industrialisation” of the economy (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015; D. Pillay, August 11, 2015). Meanwhile, Webster emphasises the inability of the ANC government to staunch the outflow of capital, noting “instead of capturing capital, holding it, working with it, we allowed it to exit, relocate to London” (E. Webster, August 13, 2015). Other interviewees, such as Southall, Faulkner, Kotze, and Henwood also noted the impacts of an open market in a globalised economy, including increased competition from subsidised overseas exports and greater responsiveness to global economic trends. In addition, Southall argues that the ANC is likely to continue attempting to create growth in the immediate term by moving in a “more market-oriented direction” without solving the “long term issues of unemployment” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015).

Interviewees were also divided on the significance of the legacies of the Apartheid regime, including Faulkner, Nadvi, Narsiah, Gentle, Ryklief, Webster, and Kotze, who agreed that “the historical legacy of super-exploitation from Apartheid” continues to impact unemployment, inequality and poor service delivery in post-Apartheid South (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015). Further, Narsiah and Nadvi argue that poor service delivery is deeply informed by the legacy of Apartheid spatial planning, as “people who lived in particular small towns or small areas were never properly serviced in the first place” (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015). However, Narsiah argues that the ANC has not made “much of an effort” to “address the spatial issue”, instead adopting a neoliberal approach that “accentuated the Apartheid spatial model” (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015). Further, Narsiah and Faulkner argue that the ANC-government has failed to “address the structures that give rise to these
protests, disquiet in communities”, including the deep inequalities that were the “cornerstone” of Apartheid society (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015; S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015). Similarly, Gentle notes that the adoption of neoliberal economic policy has worsened the structural continuities of the Apartheid economy, noting that South Africa’s “specific history as emerging from Apartheid flavours that in a racialised way” (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015).

Interviewees including Nadvi, Ryklief, Kotze, Webster, and Freidman also acknowledged the failure of the ANC to systematically address the “fundamental failures of the [Apartheid] economy in any rational way” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015). As a consequence, Ryklief argues that there is not “really very much difference globally and regionally from what has been”, including an “economy which is structurally unable to employ all its people” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015). Further, Webster and Kotze note that the post-Apartheid economy remains based “around extractive industries, [and] the export of commodities based on cheap [black] labour”, despite falling global demand and a globalised workforce (E. Webster, August 13, 2015). In addition, the transition to an economy focusing on “services, the financial sector, [and] the manufacturing sector” has fuelled unemployment, creating a “disconnect” between the emerging “post-industrial” economy and the socioeconomic nature of South Africa’s populace (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015). Nadvi also argues that much of the labour poor were “largely unskilled before” and remain “unskilled with a few exceptions” as a result of the ANC’s failure to address these issues (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015). Friedman also notes the continuities between the Apartheid economy and South Africa’s post-Apartheid trajectory, describing the economy as “path dependent” (S. Friedman, August 3, 2015). Thus, these organic intellectuals generally agreed that, whilst the legacies of Apartheid inform the post-Apartheid economic trajectory, the ANC has played a significant role in reinforcing Apartheid-era continuities.

Interviewees also generally agreed that the current economic situation in South Africa was primarily the result of neoliberal ANC policies. Interviewees such as Faulkner, Kotze, Ryklief, Satgar, Gentle, Southall, and Bell, argue that the economic framework embraced by the ANC was neoliberal, and further that “neoliberal orthodoxy is not working” (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015). Kotze is critical of the neoliberal ANC economic framework GEAR in fostering unemployment, noting that “the expectation that it would have a trickle-down effect on job creation… didn't happen, it was jobless growth” (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015).
Meanwhile, Ryklief argues that this framework is “not at all dissimilar from the economic framework which the national party was unable to actually implement” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015). In addition, Gentle argues that “South Africa is neoliberal to the core”, with many of the features of neoliberal countries, including “widening wealth disparities, a shift of the main corporation to financialisation, the outsourcing and commercialisation of public utilities, [and] the restructuring of the working class towards various forms of precariousness” (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015). Similarly, Satgar argues that by opening up the economy South Africa “locked itself into… neoliberal globalisation” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). Further, the shift towards financialisation, from productive investment in fixed capital to financial markets, is a key feature of neoliberalism and a recurring subject among interviewees such as Kotze and Southall.

However, although most interviewees argued that the ANC was neoliberal, several disagreed with this characterisation. Thus, whilst both Bell and Pillay were critical of the ANC’s “naïve trust” in global investors, Bell argued that the ANC adhered to neoliberal orthodoxy, whilst Pillay noted that it was “not just an ideological issue of embracing neoliberalism”, but instead the outcome of the “globalisation of the economy” and “massive capital flight” (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015). Friedman was similarly sceptical of the term neoliberalism, arguing that “this constant resort to the phrase neoliberalism … doesn’t really explain what we're experiencing” (S. Friedman, August 3, 2015). Further, some interviewees saw South Africa’s negative economic situation as the result of poor business-state relations and policy uncertainty, corruption and the role played by labour. Southall and De Jager argue that the negative economic situation was partially the result of a “serious breakdown in business-state relations”, noting the failure to attract capital and the large extent to which the “government is screwing up on the parastatals” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015). De Jager also links government engagement with the economy to client-patron relations and argues that ANC members are exploiting the economy to get the resources needed to maintain their position (N. De Jager, October 12, 2015). Meanwhile, Henwood argues that South Africa’s poor economic performance is largely “self-inflicted”, as policy uncertainty over the long-term outlook and objectives of the ANC-government have “severely impacted investments and developments in the mining … agriculture and agro-industries” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015).
In addition, both Henwood and De Jager argue that powerful unions also impact on economic growth, with the former arguing that the “labour elite” are “hell-bent on protecting the rights of its people… excluding many people from the labour environment” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015). Further, De Jager argues that the strong influence of trade unions such as COSATU has led to “very high labour costs …and very strong labour regulations… [harming] the development of small businesses, [and] small-medium enterprises” (N. De Jager, October 12, 2015). However, this is contested by numerous interviewees including Ryklief, who argues that labour legislation does not provide enough protections, is being constantly undercut (due to informalisation and regulating flexibility) and no longer applies to a “greater and greater proportion of the work force” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015).

Several interviewees also saw corruption as contributing to South Africa’s economic woes, such as De Jager who argued that “accountability is declining… we have a state which is inefficient, which is corrupt” (N. De Jager, October 12, 2015). Further, Nadvi and Southall argue that “webs of patronage and so forth have become embedded in our system” and note the “emergence of what is called the tenderpreneur kind of dynamic” (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015; R. Southall, July 29, 2015). In addition, Southall also describes “horrendous” level of corruption alongside intense jockeying for position among ANC councillors to secure positions with access to resources (R. Southall, July 29, 2015). Although Gentle also acknowledges the deep corruption within the South African government, he argues that attributing ANC failings to “local corruption and local mismanagement” essentially “lets the ANC off the hook”, as it suggests that the problem lies with local authorities rather than the “treasury and the commanding heights of government” (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015).

To summarise, interviewees overwhelmingly understood the economic situation in South Africa as negative, with some even suggesting a state of crisis. Further, interviewees tended to focus on structural economic issues and the failure of the ANC to stem rising levels of unemployment, inequality and poverty. Understandings of the reasons behind South Africa’s economic trajectory were complex and overlapping, including a range of issues such as neoliberalism, the legacies of Apartheid, to corruption, incompetence, the role of unions, policy uncertainty, and poor business-state relations. However, interviewees generally agreed that the current economic malaise was the result of the ANC’s government’s failure to address the structural continuities of Apartheid and the rapid removal of trade barriers after 1994. Further, interviewees also generally viewed these failures as stemming from the ANC’s
embraced neoliberalism, and the attendant processes of financialisation and trade liberalisation.

8.4. **ANC Economic Policy**

The poor economic performance of the South African economy, with its attendant social issues, is the result of a number of complex interconnected factors, paramount among which is the ANC’s adoption of neoliberal economic policies. Discussions of these policies among interviewees included criticism of ANC economic frameworks (including RDP, GEAR, and NDP), policy incoherence, policy failure, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), and the extent of redistribution. However, interviewees disagreed as to the extent to which ANC economic policies were rooted in neoliberalism or developmental ideology. This section weighs the discussion of these topics and argues that organic intellectuals generally agreed that ANC policy was neoliberal, albeit with several socially necessary state interventions.

As previously noted, interviewees including Nadvi, Kotze, Gentle, Ryklief, Narsiah, Faulkner, Satgar and Bell generally agreed that South Africa’s negative economic trajectory was impacted by the ANC’s adoption of neoliberalism. These interviewees argued that ANC “economic policy is very strongly neoliberal”, noting the privatisation of the mines and large sections of the public infrastructure, (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015) the weakening of labour regulation, “the level of obedience to market forces” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015) and the adoption of “a neoliberal economic orthodoxy which is heavily reliant upon attraction of foreign direct investment” (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015). Further, Bell argues that neoliberalism has become the “overriding factor economically” and is “hegemonic in South Africa” (T. Bell, September 27, 2015). However, this is contested by interviewees such as De Jager, Webster, Southall, Henwood, Friedman and Pillay, who are critical of applying the phrase neoliberalism to the ANC, instead citing ANC policy failure, policy incoherence and state interventions such as social grants. Further, several of these interviewees were also critical of the government’s economic “orthodoxy”, such as de Jager who argued that the treasury “operates fairly independently [and] tends to be more on the neoliberal side” (N. De Jager, October 12, 2015).

The extent to which the ANC is understood as neoliberal also varied greatly among organic intellectuals, with most interviewees noting increased state intervention in the economy ranging from social grants to housing schemes. This led Kotze, Webster, Southall and Henwood to argue that ANC policy includes features of the developmental state, including
“state responsibilities, public sector responsibilities, private-public partnerships” (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015). However, whilst these interviewees mostly argued against the prevalence of neoliberal ideas in ANC policy, Kotze notes that there are “still strong neoliberal elements in it” (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015). Similarly, though Webster states that the state is increasingly intervening in the economy through “innovative responses to the poor” such as “the expanded public works programme, the community work programme… [and the] massive expansion of social grants”, he also notes that “a very powerful battle of ideas that has been won by those in that broadly liberal camp” (E. Webster, August 13, 2015). Similarly, Pillay argues that the Department of Trade and Industry was “trying to pursue more of a developmental path” within the ANC government, though this was derailed after the Marikana strike (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015).

In contrast to the former interviewees, Ryklief, Gentle, Ngwane and Bell argue that ANC policy remains staunchly neoliberal despite increasing interventions in the economy. As such, Ryklief argues that attempts to “look at some kind of role for the state again in housing, education and poverty alleviation” remain “very marginal” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015). Meanwhile, Gentle, Ngwane and Bell argue that increasing interventions (such as social grants) are a response to growing resistance, “because no bourgeois government can do what they like, there must be some concessions otherwise the system wouldn’t work” (T. Ngwane, October 24, 2015). Further, Gentle is specifically critical of the notion of ANC developmentalism, arguing that there is “not a single element of a welfare state” such as state housing or high employment, and noting the role of social grants in insulating the ANC political project from political consequences (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015). As such these interviewees saw these state interventions as socially necessary manoeuvres to maintain the ANC hegemonic project rather than departures from neoliberal ‘common sense’.

Amongst those interviewees who saw the ANC as neoliberal, ANC economic policies were viewed as becoming progressively more neoliberal with the adoption of GEAR. Both Satgar and Kotze agree that the Reconstruction and Development Program was “to a large extent” social democratic, evoking “the freedom charter, notions of people's power and a radical conception of democracy” (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015; V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). Further, Faulkner argues that neoliberalism was not institutionalised within ANC policy until the adoption of GEAR in 1996, “when the really committed neoliberals took over the economic reigns of South Africa” (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015). Further, these interviewees argued
that this policy committed the ANC to neoliberal policies such as privatisation, the reduction of social spending, and fiscally conservative monetary policies. This resulted in the withdrawal of the state from the economy and the emasculation of mass forces by “re-making of state-civil society relations in the context of neoliberalisation” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015).

In addition, although Interviewees generally agreed that the failure of GEAR led to increasing state intervention in the economy enshrined in the National Development Plan (NDP), they saw the NDP in contradictory ways. Most interviewees saw the NDP as a conflicting document, with Pillay, Kotze, Friedman and Webster highly critical of the economics chapter, describing it as “very orthodox”, and “a pretty good way of making sure we remain path dependent for a long time” (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015; S. Friedman, August 3, 2015). Further, Kotze situates the NDP within neoliberal ‘common sense’ arguing that, whilst it does not overtly support state withdrawal from the economy or privatisation, the NDP has a very strong “managerial culture that is built into it” including ideas about “monitoring evaluation, performance management”. However, he also recognises that the NDP does not necessarily reflect what is happening on the ground, such as the expansion of the public grants system to 16 million people (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015). Similarly, Webster, Southall, Friedman and De Jager agree that the NDP is “such a mix of things, of common sense, of good ideas, and of limited ideas” that to dismiss it as neoliberal is “absurd” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015). Further, the lack of consistency and overall coherency has left the NDP as “an often internally contradictory document” and “[in]coherent plan of action for the future” (S. Friedman, August 3, 2015). In addition, De Jager and Webster argue that the lack of a clear economic policy undermines economic growth in South Africa, as “all these different economic policies and ideas and ideologies...[creates] paralysis” as we’re not “going decisively in a neoliberal… or development state direction” (N. De Jager, October 12, 2015; E. Webster, August 13, 2015). Henwood and Gentle also blame economic shortcomings on “short-sighted, uncoordinated, and plain impossible policy issues”, though Gentle argues that this lack of consistency is the result of “a neoliberal project… fraught with so many contradictions” (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015).

Interviewees also attributed the failure of ANC economic policy to poor management and the inability of the ANC’s lack of capacity to effectively govern. As such, Henwood argues that the NDP is deeply flawed not because it makes the same unrealistic assumptions of “an
economic growth rate of 7% per annum for many years” and the ANC lacks the “political will” to even partially put it into effect (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015). Similarly, Ryklief and Southall argue that the ANC lacks the “political motivation” to “bestow a reasonable livelihood to all our population” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015) and is much more interested in “cutting up the existing cake than actually growing the cake” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015). Further, Faulkner argues that the ANC is unwilling and unable to deal with the real issues, noting that state interventions such as “community works program[s] and the accelerated public works program, [and the] extended social works program… adds zero to the economy in terms of buying power, consumer power, etc.” (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015). Similarly, Satgar argues that attempts at redistribution through Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) have “proceeded very unevenly…in a very shallow way…in a disastrous way” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015).

To summarise, interviewees understood ANC economic policy in a number of different and often conflicting ways. Though interviewees generally agreed that ANC economic policy had been a disaster for the South African economy, the failures of ANC policy was seen as the result of numerous factors including neoliberal understandings, policy incoherence and failure, government incapacity, and the lack of political will. Further, though some interviewees maintained that ANC policy was developmental, pointing to state intervention in the economy and social grants, the majority argued that ANC policy was neoliberal. Thus, organic intellectuals generally understood the ANC hegemonic project as underwritten by neoliberal economic policies which were harmful to the interests of the majority of South Africans.

8.5. Social Movements, Unions and ‘Service Delivery’ Protests

NUMSA’s departure from COSATU and attempt to build a United Front occurred within the South African context of growing dissent throughout civil society with widespread poverty, unemployment, inequality and the overall direction of the ANC. Although civil society was relatively demobilised in the mid-late 1990s after the collapse of the United Democratic Front, from the early 2000s onwards the ANC faced a growing challenge to its hegemony from social movements such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), the Landless People’s Movement and the shack-dwellers movement Abahlali baseMjondolo. Whilst the ANC initially succeeded in co-opting or marginalising these movements through generally non-violent means, in recent years it has demonstrated a faltering capability to coerce or
contain these movements. As such it has resorted to barefaced coercion, including
assassinating key figures within social movements such as Abahlali baseMjondolo, and
relying on the police to crush protests (Suttner, 2014, p. 15-16). Further, the ANC has been
manifestly incapable of quelling the rise of so-called ‘service delivery’ protests and union
marches after 2007. This section examines how organic intellectuals understand social
movements, unions, and service delivery protests in South Africa within the context of
resistance to the ANC-led alliance and neoliberalism

8.5.1. Social Movements

Interviewees had various opinions regarding the strength and relative significance of social
movements in challenging the leadership of the ANC. However, most interviewees agreed
that South African social movements were hostile to the ANC leadership and the ANC’s
economic trajectory. Of the eleven interviewees that chose to discuss social movements, eight
argued that social movements were challenging the ANC in one way or another, with
Friedman noting that, “the leadership of social movements are almost invariably hostile to the
ANC” (S. Friedman, August 3, 2015). Further, the ANC was seen as hostile to these
movements, as Bell notes, “there are a number of very strong social movements that have
substantial support among ordinary communities” which are “resented very deeply” by the
ANC (T. Bell, September 27, 2015). However, the relationship between these movements
and the ANC is complex, as Friedman notes, social movements often represent disaffected
people who will nonetheless vote for the ANC at election time (S. Friedman, August 3,
2015). In addition, whilst Faulkner maintains that social movement are crucial in mobilising
and organising civil society, he argues that mutual hostility between the ANC-led Alliance
and social movements has undermined their organisational capacity (S. Faulkner, August 13,
2015).

The significance of more recent developments among social movements is also a contested
topic among respondents. Satgar suggests that the current wave of social movements,
including the Right to Know campaign, the Rural Movement for Democracy, and the Food
Sovereignty campaign, are are “not just about protest and resistance… it’s about articulating
alternatives for the society… [during] a conjunctural crisis of the neoliberal project” (V.
Satgar, August 14, 2015). Meanwhile, Nadvi, Henwood and Narsiah emphasise the
importance of protest movements at a community and local level, with the latter lauding the
uptake in civil society “at a local scale” (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015). Similarly, Henwood
notes the increased involvement of social movements at a community level following the leadership style of the Treatment Action Campaign, whilst Nadvi emphasises the effectiveness of localised groupings such as the Bayview Residents Association in contesting local government policy (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015: S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015). However, Henwood is also sceptical of the capacity of these organisations to fix the deep structural problems of the South African economy, stating that “South Africa needs effective governance, because what we need to address is a huge problem on a grand scale” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015).

Though organic intellectuals generally viewed social movements as capable of challenging ANC policy at a local level, several interviewees also expressed concern regarding the relative strength and singular focus of these movements. Interviewees such as Bell, Kotze, Nadvi, Ngwane and Friedman emphasised the “narrow” focus of South African social movements in articulating the interests of subaltern groups (T. Bell, September 27, 2015). Further, Kotze argued that the list of social movements focused on “one particular issue” was “endless”, whilst Nadvi and Ngwane cited the success and limitations of singular focus movements such as the TAC and Abhalali BaseMhondolo (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015: S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015: T. Ngwane, October 24, 2015). Similarly, Friedman is critical of the capacity of these single-issue organisations to extend beyond localised areas and change “actual patterns in the society” (S. Friedman, August 3, 2015). Further, Ryklief describes these movements as “campaign pressure groups” that fail to “consolidate civil society and build something” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015). Similarly, Gentle and Nadvi express concerns regarding the capacity of these movements to sustain themselves and build momentum “beyond a certain point”, with the former arguing that “none of them have been really able to articulate and express and act as an organising vehicle for protest in the country” (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015: S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015).

Many interviewees were also highly critical of the declining trajectory of social movements in recent years. As such, Gentle argues that while levels of protest have increased social movements as “named social actors” have declined over the “last five to six years” (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015). Similarly, Bell and Ngwane argue that social movements are either weak or in decline, noting the fragmentation of civil society and community protests. However, whereas the former focuses on the “deep seated animosities” between civil society organisations, specifically the “NGO business”, the latter authors emphasise the lack of
national co-ordination and weakness of these movements (T. Bell, September 27, 2015). However, Ngwane suggests that “the lack of national co-ordination also reflects the strength of grassroots movements because there's thousands of them” (T. Ngwane, October 24, 2015). In addition, Faulkner attributes the weakness of civil society to the delinking of union struggles and social movements in the late 2000s. Further, he argues that this was the result of the ANC’s neoliberal trajectory and COSATU’s withdrawal of support for civil society organisations (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015).

Social movements in South Africa are largely seen as relatively ineffective in challenging the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project in South Africa. Whilst most interviewees agreed that South African social movements were hostile to the ANC leadership and economic trajectory, they were also critical of the capacity of these movements to mount a concerted challenge to ANC hegemony. Many interviewees emphasised the focus on issue-based campaigns and relative weakness of social movements in relation to the ANC, with most critical of the current state of civil society. Interviewees also noted the fragmentation of civil society and movements and the delinking of community and labour struggles. However, interviewees were also optimistic about the effectiveness of new movements and community organisations in challenging the ANC on a local or community level. Thus, those organic intellectuals interviewed in this study generally understood existing social movements as significant in challenging the ANC government at a local level, but relatively ineffective in contesting the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project at a national level.

8.5.2. Unions

Alongside social movements, unions play a significant role in organising subaltern groups and contesting the hegemony of the ANC. However, the capacity of unions to challenge ANC policy has been crippled by ANC’s co-option of COSATU, the segmentation of the labour market and the erosion of the organisational base of labour unions (Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 2008, p. 167). Nevertheless, the links between unions, social movements and community organisations are significant, with union members “active in these movements, if not always leading the community-based struggles, as organized trade unionists” (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 122). In the wake of Marikana, the formation of the AMCU, the departure of NUMSA from COSATU and the creation of a United Front represent a new challenge to the Tripartite Alliance and a rekindling of social movement unionism. Although interviewees offered varied views on the state of trade unions, they generally agreed that the strength of
unions was waning, attributing this to a number of factors, such as prevailing economic conditions, increased distance between the membership and leadership, and the influence of COSATU.

Although unions played a crucial role in organising subaltern groups during the Apartheid struggle, some interviewees were critical of the role of social movement unionism in the post-Apartheid period. Henwood and Ryklief were acutely critical of the social activist role played by unions, accusing them of being trapped “in a time warp”, and pointing to new union movements such as the AMCU which “engage in hard-nosed demands for workers’ rights” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015). Further, Ryklief was critical of “the whole notion of social movement unionism”, noting the failure of those unions to “keep abreast” of major threats, innovate and maintain their “usefulness to workers as a whole” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015). Meanwhile, though most interviewees perceived the strength of unions as being eroded, De Jager argued that trade unions are still “too powerful in South Africa to the detriment of those who are unemployed” (N. De Jager, October 12, 2015). Henwood similarly viewed unions as a problem in South Africa, reiterating the myth of the “labour aristocracy” remarked upon by Dwyer & Zeilig (2012, p. 12). Although Faulkner also identifies an issue of representation among workers, noting that “there are 7 million workers who are organised, who are not in any union” (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015), in contrast to the former, he advocates increasing the power of unions.

Interviewees including Southall, Satgar, Henwood, Friedman, Bell and Ngwane also argue that the trade union movement is facing a crisis of leadership, as the distance between members and the leadership widens. Henwood and Friedman argue that the union leadership have become “part of a very small elite in a cosy environment” and want to stay in a “club which their members can’t join” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015: S. Friedman, August 3, 2015). Similarly, Satgar notes that the distance between leaders, shop stewards and members “is so wide that workers start looking for new forms of representivity” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). Further, Southall notes that the trade union movement has become increasingly institutionalised, following the “classic Moscow principal of elites and social upward mobility” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015). Bell and Ngwane are acutely critical of these trends along with union involvement with investor companies rather than pension funds or various companies, which inculcates within them the logic of neoliberalism (T. Bell, September 27, 2015: T. Ngwane, October 24, 2015). From a Gramscian perspective unions increasing
involvement in investment funds, is resulting in their co-option by the hegemonic group into the national bloc.

Many interviewees were critical of the state of unions in South Africa including Nadvi, Kotze, Ryklief, Satgar, Narsiah, Ngwane, and Faulkner who variously describe the state of unions as “in crisis”, “eroding”, “morbid”, and “pathetic” (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015: S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015: V. Satgar, August 14, 2015: S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015: T. Ngwane, October 24, 2015). However, whilst Kotze was critical of the fragmentation of the labour movement following the departure of NUMSA from COSATU, Nadvi and Narsiah support this development, and note the negative role played by the ANC in injecting the “micro-party politics of factionalism” into COSATU (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015). Further, Narsiah adds that the politicisation of the trade union movement after the Zuma-Mbeki split was so detrimental COSATU had “basically been torn apart” (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015). Similarly, Satgar argues that despite attempts by COSATU to resist key elements of the neoliberal agenda, its co-option by the ANC resulted in its capture and the fragmentation of civil society (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). Further, Satgar, Ryklief and Ngwane argue that the economic conditions in South Africa are eroding the working class and “leading to problems of organisation and identification” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015). Satgar specifically criticises the subsequent loss of the “strategic initiative around politics”, and its corruption by “Black Economic Empowerment, business unionism” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). Meanwhile, Ngwane is critical of the lack of confidence in a “working class solution”, citing NUMSA’s membership concerns (T. Ngwane, October 24, 2015).

Organic intellectuals also had varied understandings surrounding the prevalence of strikes in South Africa. Henwood argued that the high incidence of strikes were a symptom of union overreach, which cost money, undermines political trust and compromises the role of unions “in the eyes of many” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015). However, Friedman and Satgar refute this interpretation, with the former criticising the “very conservative view that strikes are entirely abnormal and some kind of dramatic reflection on the ills of society”, arguing that they are “routine events… in countries where you have a significant union movement” (S. Friedman, August 3, 2015). Satgar similarly notes that “strike action is not just a mindless militancy for labour”, although he concedes that as the impacts of “liberalising and externalising of the economy” sank in, labour lost the strategic initiative and began to “express itself increasingly in militant action” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015).
The way in which organic intellectuals understood the trajectory, significance, and role of unions in South Africa varied widely. However, several intellectuals argued that unions were important in organising and mobilising subaltern resistance to the hegemony of the ANC. However, most interviewees agreed that unions were in decline nationally, despite the growth of the AMCU after Marikana, and had a limited and declining capacity to challenge the hegemony of the ANC or neoliberal policies.

8.5.3. ‘Service Delivery’ Protests

Service delivery protests were a recurring theme amongst interviewees, with most noting their prevalence but disagreeing about their significance. Of the twelve interviewees who discussed service delivery protests the overwhelming majority agreed that the protests were, in some measure, a response to “the tempo of government services being rolled out, or not being maintained, or not being rolled back” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015). Further, interviewees acknowledged the complex interplay of forces behind these protests, noting the lack of government accountability and responsiveness, high unemployment, ANC politicking and factionalism, and the legacies of Apartheid. However, these protests were also seen as new repertoires of political expression wherein people are attempting to forge a new civics politics.

The factors driving the upsurge of protests since 2007 are complex and interconnected, but were generally understood by interviewees as a response to issues surrounding service delivery. Interviewees such as Kotze, Webster, Faulkner, Henwood, Satgar, Faulkner, Gentle and Webster argued that the upsurge of protests was integrally linked to the incapacity of local government to deliver and maintain services in townships, whilst Nadvi emphasised the lack of affordability of those services. However, whilst Friedman recognised issues with service delivery, he argued that the protests were the result of the unresponsiveness of local government, which is “an extraordinarily different issue from saying you don't deliver to me” (S. Friedman, August 3, 2015). Similarly, Henwood, Southall, Satgar, and Faulkner argue that service delivery protests are motivated by unresponsive and unaccountable local government and councillors, especially the lack of access to and visibility of local government, as Satgar notes “it’s really a politics of desperation, a politics of ending invisibility, it’s a politics of being audible” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). Similarly, Southall and Faulkner note a “chronic crisis of representation” among local communities, with the

Interviewees also traced the reasons behind the failures of local government to the incapacity of local authorities to satisfy constituent expectations within a neoliberal policy framework. As such, Gentle argues that “the ANC does respond” but is unable to do anything at a municipal level as a result of the scarce local government resources, noting a ninety percent cut in “inter-government transfers” between 1994 and 1996 and the subsequent emphasis on “cost recovery” and bonds (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015). Faulkner also agrees that the “central government is sending diminishing amounts of real money in terms of inflation and so on to municipalities”, but attributes this to the neoliberal framework of the ANC, which is being resolved at a local level “at the expense of poorer communities” (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015). Similarly, Narsiah argues that the “neoliberalisation of space, of basically everything” is commodifying, and undermining the quality and provision of, basic services affecting affordability and stigmatising poverty (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015). Conversely, Kotze attributes the incapacity of local government to the compromises made during negotiations, noting the disparity between the model of the federal state laid out in the constitution and the centralised financial system in practice. As a result, the “provinces and local government don’t have the power of taxation”, limiting their income capacity and ultimately impacting the services that are provided (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015). Meanwhile, Nadvi argues that the inability of local governments to provide adequate services is the result of the “huge gap” and “unequal structures” inherited from the Apartheid regime, which made it impossible to meet demand (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015).

Interviewees also saw the service delivery protests as related to the politicking and factionalism surrounding the ANC, with Webster noting “it’s linked in some way to the politics of the ANC and contestations around positions, and clientelism” (E. Webster, August 13, 2015). Likewise, De Jager, Henwood, Satgar and Friedman agree that “a lot of these delivery protests are related to intra-party conflict”, with ANC politicians mobilising protestors to get on election lists, become councillors, and gain “control of the party structure” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015). Further, Henwood argues that the ANC also use these protests to “marginalise opposition parties” in the media and co-opt alternative movements that are becoming “a voice against the ANC” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015).
Southall and De Jager also support the idea of “relative deprivation” put forward by President Zuma (International Labour Research and Information group, 2014, p. 1), with the former noting that “a lot of these service delivery protests are motivated by people wanting what they see some people have already got” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015). Further, De Jager points to the prevalence of service delivery protests in those areas “where there has been the most delivery” such as Gauteng and the Western Cape (N. De Jager, October 12, 2015). However, both authors also acknowledge the complex nature of these events, with Southall acknowledging unemployment and community anger around the “lack of accountability of councillors”; whilst de Jager notes the significance of ANC politicking and asserts that “underlying it are genuine grievances” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015: N. De Jager, October 12, 2015).

Further, De Jager also sees the rise of service delivery protests as the result of a failure of political representation, with constituents “transferring their political behaviour… out of what you would call your key democratic procedures, into… service delivery protests” (N. De Jager, October 12, 2015). However, whereas De Jager sees this as inherently problematic for political stability, Friedman argues that protests are an inherent part of South African society, stating “we've had protests for the last 40 years” (N. De Jager, October 12, 2015: S. Friedman, August 3, 2015). Meanwhile, Satgar and Gentle argue that the rise of service delivery protests are also the result of the vacuum left by the collapse of the UDF and the inability to “strategically and politically articulate a civic politics that’s much more coherent” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). Further, Gentle argues that the failure of these protests to find expression “in some political form” is the outcome of the “rise of neoliberalism” and the subsequent restructuring of the working class and de-legitimisation of “the old parties of the left” (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015).

The upsurge of service delivery protests since 2007 were understood by interviewees as the result of a number of interconnected processes. Interviewees attributed service delivery protests to a number of immediate causes from lack of government accountability to ANC politicking, factionalism, and high unemployment. However, interviewees overwhelmingly agreed that these protests were underpinned by genuine grievances over the tempo, quality and content of services being delivered. Further, although these protests were understood as new repertoires of political expression at a local level, they were overwhelmingly seen as
disorganised and unable to present a challenge to the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project.

8.6. Alternative Political Parties

Alternative political parties are highly significant in challenging the electoral dominance of the ANC and are important avenues of hegemonic contestation. Although NUMSA has flirted with the prospect of entering electoral politics and forming a workers’ party, political opposition is largely dominated by the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Although there are increasing numbers of other smaller parties they are largely limited in scope and geographically bound, such as the Inkatha Freedom party (IFP) in KwaZulu Natal, and often struggle to contest multiple elections, evidenced by the collapse of support for the Congress of the People (COPE) in the 2011 municipal election. This section details how organic intellectuals understand the two main opposition parties, the DA and EFF, and assesses the extent to which they are seen as counter-hegemonic movements.

When organic intellectuals discussed the DA, most saw it as slowly gaining momentum but were critical of its ability to represent a broad base of subaltern classes. Three of the five interviewees who discussed the DA as an alternative to the ANC saw it as either unable or unwilling to represent the interests of the black working class. While Southall noted that there was a racial “barrier for many black people in moving to the DA”, Nadvi argued that “its seen as the sort of party that services the interests of white people” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015; S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015). Similarly, Faulkner criticised the conservative image of the DA among traditional ANC supporters, noting that “workers are never going to support the DA” as its “seen as being a conservative force” (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015). In addition, Pillay argued that although the DA had an important role to play in reducing the ANC’s majority, its economic policies were “virtually identical” to the ANC, demonstrating that “the hegemony of our particular economic trajectory is quite deep” (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015).

Further, though interviewees also noted the DA’s increasing electoral support they tended to characterise its support base as primarily white, Indian and coloured. As such, Faulkner and Henwood noted that “the established minorities have now basically congregated around the DA”(S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015; R. Henwood, August 7, 2015). However, Nadvi argued that the DA “has grown its black support”, whilst Southall noted that it has continued to “slice away steadily…accumulating more of the African vote” at the expense of the “fairly visceral far-right wing in the DA” (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015; R. Southall, July 29, 2015).
Thus, although organic intellectuals saw it as increasing its electoral significance, they did not agree on which subaltern groups it represented, with most sceptical about its capacity to articulate an alternative to the ANC and represent the black working class. As such, although the DA is important in contesting the policies and electoral dominance of the ANC, it is not seen as a viable counter-hegemonic project in the immediate future.

In contrast to the DA, organic intellectuals were overwhelmingly critical of the growth and character of the EFF. Narsiah and Gentle argue that the EFF is unable to represent the interests of subaltern classes, with the former describing them as “demagogues”, “rabble rousers” and “part of the elite” (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015; L. Gentle, September 25, 2015). However, the latter argues that whilst they are “ill-equipped to be the voice of the voiceless in the country”, they did “sometimes articulate that kind of militancy of people in these community protests” (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015; L. Gentle, September 25, 2015). Meanwhile, Henwood argues that the EFF undermines governance structures, the institution of democracy and procedural development (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015). Further, Ngwane, Kotze and Satgar are critical of its ideology, describing it as a “beautiful fake”, an ideological “mixed bag”, and “a political disaster for the left… [and] an expression of an authoritarian, populist, lumpen element”, respectively (T. Ngwane, October 24, 2015; D. Kotze, August 6, 2015; V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). Satgar is also critical of the organisational structure, labelling it “internally regimented and militarised, not democratic”, whilst Southall is critical of its “much more dubious political agenda” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015; R. Southall, July 29, 2015).

Interviewees generally understood the EFF in relation to its membership and inception, characterising it as a youth movement and a reaction to internal ANC politics. As such, Ryklief sees it as an expression of the anger of the black youth, related to both the black consciousness movement and a “general heating up of consciousness about inequalities and elitism”, and argues that the EFF is an important vehicle for injecting “new life and new perspectives” into organisations (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015). Similarly, Kotze sees the EFF as a vehicle for black youth who “feel alienated” from mainstream political parties (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015). Narsiah and Nadvi also note that the EFF has been successful in recruiting the black youth, noting that “they have found fertile ground for their ideas amongst the youth” and describing them as “the most prominent voice for the young black African community”, respectively (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015; S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015).
However, Satgar argues that the EFF is only “one expression of one sector of that youth” as many young people do not vote, and challenges the “narrative that sees the EFF as analogous to the rising forces of 1976” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015).

Meanwhile, Pillay and Henwood see the EFF as both positive and problematic, noting that although it introduces a “new dynamic” into South African politics, pressures the ANC leadership and raises important questions forcefully, it is really unclear what they represent (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015; R. Henwood, August 7, 2015). In addition, Southall views the EFF as a competitor of the United Front arguing that both are “in many ways striving to attract the support of the same audience”, and further that Julius Malema is likely to be “more successful in attracting this audience” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015). Further, Kotze, Henwood, Satgar and Narsiah situate the EFF within the context of internal ANC politics and a “personality split” between Malema and Zuma, with Satgar arguing that the EFF has not moved beyond “a kind of opposition that's just centred around Zuma… because of Malema's own disquiet and unhappiness with him” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015).

Thus, interviewees generally saw the EFF as a conjunctural phenomenon concerned with criticism of aspects of a minor day-to-day nature, noting its focus on Zuma, corruption in the ANC and organisational structure around Julius Malema. Further, though some interviewees saw the EFF as emerging from unhappiness among the black youth, there is a general consensus that it is unable and unsuited to represent the interests of a broader range of subaltern classes. As such, though political parties play an important role in undermining ANC electoral dominance and broader hegemony within civil society, neither the DA nor EFF are viewed as counter-hegemonic projects.

8.7. **NUMSA and the United Front**

The departure of NUMSA from COSATU, was accompanied by its recruitment of likeminded unions into the Nine Plus Unions, and the formation of the United Front, bringing together community organisations, social movements and unions. However, the subject of NUMSA, the United front, and the NUMSA/COSATU split was highly divisive among interviewees. NUMSA was seen variously by interviewees as either worker-focused or ideologically driven, internally divided or unitary, and either doing more of the same or pursuing a new strategy. Further, interviewees saw the motivations behind NUMSA’s split from COSATU in various ways ranging from disillusionment with the ANC, SACP and COSATU, to responsiveness to pressure from below, factionalism, and the emergence of a
new left politics. Similarly, interviewees were also divided over the significance of NUMSA in challenging the ANC between those who saw it as very significant, of limited significance, potentially significant, and of unclear significance. This section outlines, compares and contrasts the opinions of those interviewed organic intellectuals regarding NUMSA and the United Front.

NUMSA’s decision to withdraw financial and political support from the ANC and pursue a United Front, exacerbated already growing tensions within COSATU, resulting in its expulsion from the trade federation in 2015. However, interviewees situated the motivations behind NUMSA’s actions and the split with COSATU within a number of contexts. Of the thirteen interviewees who chose to discuss NUMSA, nine situated NUMSA’s departure within the context of growing disillusionment and tensions with the ANC, SACP and/or COSATU. However, seven of these also acknowledged the significance of other events in motivating NUMSA’s withdrawal including factionalism, financial constraints, an independent tradition, the upsurge of pressure from below, and the emergence of a new left politics. By contrast, the remaining three respondents emphasised the role of personality-based conflict in NUMSA’s departure from COSATU.

Disillusionment with the SACP was largely understood a response to their co-option by the ANC government, with Pillay, Kotze, Southall, Satgar and Bell emphasising NUMSA’s disappointment and demoralisation with “what they saw as treachery on the part of the communist party going into the ANC” (T. Bell, September 27, 2015). Similarly, those who emphasised NUMSA’s disillusionment with COSATU in its decision-making, such as Southall, Nadvi, Faulkner and Bell, attributed this to the co-option of COSATU by the ANC and its resulting incapacity and paralysis. As such, Nadvi notes that “issues that were central to workers and that being brought onto the agenda time and time again by NUMSA…[were] simply pushed aside by a faction which was sympathetic to the government” (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015). However, Southall also emphasises the role of finance in the tensions between NUMSA and the Tripartite Alliance as the SACP is “hugely dependent on COSATU funding”, which was greatly reduced by NUMSA’s refusal to financially support COSATU (R. Southall, July 29, 2015).

Growing hostility between NUMSA and the ANC was also seen within the wider context of the neoliberal trajectory of ANC economic policy and its failure to address Apartheid-era inequalities. Pillay argues that there is growing worker awareness that, “the Apartheid
workplace regime was still intact to a large extent, and the conditions - working conditions - had not changed substantially” (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015). Webster, Friedman and Bell similarly situate NUMSA’s actions within the context of growing disillusionment with the ANC in the post-Apartheid period, with Webster emphasising the persistence of issues around race, redistribution and “our relationship to foreign capital” (E. Webster, August 13, 2015); whilst Friedman and Bell emphasise disillusionment under Zuma and neoliberal economic policies, respectively.

NUMSA’s adoption of resolutions hostile to the ANC in 2014, was also understood by interviewees within the context of NUMSA’s independent socialist tradition, growing grassroots pressure and renewed activist vigour among the political left. Webster and Freidman locate NUMSA’s resolutions within an independent socialist tradition among metalworkers going back to the pre-COSATU period, as Friedman notes: “NUMSA has always been the union within COSATU… which has been most dubious about the ANC” (S. Friedman, August 3, 2015). Meanwhile Pillay, Ngwane and Satgar place NUMSA’s decisions after the 2013 congress within the context of mounting pressure from the resurgent left-wing grassroots after Marikana. Further, Pillay argues that the leadership was “pushed into this from below”, with the movement for a United Front emerging after workers were reluctant to form a party (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015). However, by contrast, Ngwane discusses the united front as emerging from the leadership, noting that, “it’s kind of leadership driven, it’s a bit top down, although when it comes to union democracy they might be the most democratic because they’ve got structures” (T. Ngwane, October 24, 2015). Satgar melds these positions by arguing that the United Front emerged out of joint recognition by the NUMSA leadership “in solidarity with those workers [who] recognised the need for a new bloc of popular and working-class forces in South Africa” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). Similarly, Faulkner and Nadvi see the United Front as emerging from the intersection between union groups such as NUMSA and the masses, “in order to mobilise the vast majority of the poor against the continuing manifestations of neoliberal policy” (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015).

However, some respondents understood the NUMSA-COSATU split as the result of a conflict of personality, Zulu factionalism, or financial disagreement. Despite describing the United Front as an attempt to “find an alternate social movement voice for the masses”, Nadvi is dismissive of the reasons behind NUMSA’s dismissal, regarding it as “some kind of
infighting or what have you” (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015). Similarly, Ryklief and Henwood argue that NUMSA’s departure was a personality-based split, with the former noting the pivotal role played by Zwelinzima Vavi, whilst the latter emphasises the political context of unions. Further, though Kotze also locates the NUMSA-COSATU split within internal COSATU politics between Pro-Zuma and independent factions, he argues that it is also related to factionalism along ethnic-nationalist lines. As such, the drive to eliminate Vavi (which would inevitably result in NUMSA’s expulsion) was driven by a resurgent ethnic Zulu nationalism among the Alliance leadership which saw Vavi as a stumbling block to co-opting COSATU. However, Narsiah is critical of this interpretation noting that, “it’s just the build-up of forces over a period of time. It wasn’t just about support for the now former general secretary of COSATU” (S. Narsiah, September 3, 2015).

Among those interviewees who chose to respond to questions about the character of NUMSA, it was largely understood as driven by an orthodox Marxist-Socialist ideology. All responses regarding NUMSA described it as Marxist and/or socialist, with four of the nine interviewees describing its leadership as vanguardist, and another three referring to it as “Stalinist”. Respondents were overwhelmingly critical of these Leninist and/or Stalinist leanings with the exception of Nadvi who described the “classic intellectual vanguard” of the NUMSA leadership as that “which drives the leadership of any socialist left movement” (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015). Just under half of respondents also compared the ideology underpinning NUMSA with that of the South African Communist Party, noting the links between the NUMSA leadership and the SACP and criticising the lack of an independent socialist position. These respondents generally agreed that “there certainly is typical communist party commandist ideas… which exists [sic] within NUMSA” (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015). One respondent even noted that “some of the analyses and statements that are made are just unreconstructed analyses almost indistinguishable from what the communist party would come up with” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015).

The association with the vanguardist Marxist-Leninism of the communist party is particularly problematic because these politics were seen by interviewees as largely irrelevant in a contemporary context, as Ryklief notes, NUMSA has “left all strategy and analysis in the early 20th century. Nothing of what has happened since then has penetrated in the public statements that are made” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015). In addition, Satgar argues that the focus on replacing the “corrupted vanguardist elite” of the ANC and the communist party is
overly simplistic, demonstrating a “very shallow understanding of what the problem is” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). Further, Satgar notes that the emphasis on top-down change amongst the NUMSA leadership contrasts with the undercurrent of building organic links through “grassroots bottom-up organising” being articulated through the United Front. This led Satgar to conclude that there are contradictions “expressing itself inside the NUMSA process, inside NUMSA, inside the United Front” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015).

Some respondents also perceived NUMSA as being internally divided between different factions, with dire consequences for NUMSA’s Nine Plus Unions and the United Front. Satgar and Ngwane argue that NUMSA is divided between the two currents of leadership driven Marxist-Leninism and grassroots bottom-up organising. Meanwhile, Dirk Kotze emphasises the division between the workerist, union orientated faction and social unionist perspective within NUMSA. Further, he argues that NUMSA mainly operates within the workerist tradition placing a focus on industrial workers, which “may be one of their weaknesses also if they want to become politically involved in say electoral politics” (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015). Similarly, Faulkner argues that despite NUMSA’s “very noble intentions”, its focus on a relatively narrow worker base has meant that the “United Front has not found a single instance of resonance with any community struggle, any spontaneous struggle” (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015). However, he also emphasises that the United Front has been popularising a non-sectarian approach to poor communities that appeals to both ANC and non-ANC supporters to improve service delivery. Unlike Faulkner, Kotze is explicitly critical of the inability of NUMSA to attract the support of the broader political left, noting that “in the end [they] incorporated some of the really small, esoteric, peripheral groups” (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015). However, he also recognises this as a consequence of the “highly fragmented” left which is “very much… based on personalities” (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015).

NUMSA is also seen by several respondents as pursuing a somewhat nebulous agenda through its engagement with the United Front. Interviewees including Webster and Bell describe the United Front initiative as beset by “ambiguity”, “division” and “contradiction[s]” (T. Bell, September 27, 2015; E. Webster, August 13, 2015). Further, Bell notes that “we have a growing opposition to neoliberalism and I don’t think any clear alternative about what they want in its place” (T. Bell, September 27, 2015; E. Webster, August 13, 2015). Ryklief goes further, noting that “I’m not sure NUMSA is really attempting to form a United Front”,

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describing it as “just idealism plain and simple” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015). Further, despite supporting NUMSA’s decision to withdraw support from the ANC, Ryklief raises concerns about NUMSA’s organisational strategy, noting that “I’m not seeing strategically anything coming out of NUMSA which is any different from the very, very narrow bargaining unit organising strategy they have had since their formation” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015). However, both Faulkner and Nadvi defend NUMSA’s attempt to form a United Front, with the latter remarking that, “the common enemy that it’s uniting around, so to speak, is poverty, basically all of the social ills that face South Africa… [the legacy of Apartheid] is now the common unifying force that is bringing all these people together” (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015). As such, NUMSA is understood very differently between organic intellectuals, resulting in the overall impression that NUMSA is an ideologically and structurally problematic union struggling to unite a divided left in a counter-hegemonic project with unclear objectives. As such, it is generally seen by these interviewees as having a limited political significance and posing a minimal, if any, threat to the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project.

The extent to which NUMSA poses a threat to the ANC-led alliance in the immediate future is largely determined by the success of the United Front in mounting a concerted challenge to the ANC hegemonic project. Indeed, the implicit mission of the United Front is to undermine this hegemony by bringing together unions, community organisations and social movements under one banner in the struggle against “poverty, inequality and corruption” (United Front, 2018). However, the consensus among the fifteen organic intellectuals interviewed was that the United Front was of very limited significance in challenging ANC hegemony, though it had the potential to organise the fractional and divided political left. Of the 15 interviewees, only one respondent saw the United Front as highly significant, whilst 12 others claimed it was of limited significance, and the remaining two saw it as potentially significant. However, several of those who saw it as of limited significance also stated that it had the potential to be significant. Further, interviewees tended to emphasise the difficulties faced by the United Front, though some were generally supportive of its attempt to bridge the gap between community organisations, social movements, and unions. A small number of respondents also argued that the significance of NUMSA’s actions lay in undermining the ANC at an electoral level, though several also expressed scepticism about NUMSA’s significance if it should enter electoral politics.
Thus, Interviewees generally agreed that the significance of NUMSA’s actions in forming a United Front were limited, though the reasons behind these understandings differed greatly. Nadvi and Webster emphasised the limitations placed on the United Front by the current economic conditions in South Africa, noting that “our manufacturing sector is in crisis so workers are being dismissed out of work”, and “it’s much more difficult now, partially because of massive unemployment”, respectively (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015; E. Webster, August 13, 2015). Further, they both also noted the challenges of opposing the ANC given “deep-seated support for the ANC”, and its hostility to “anyone who challenges its authority” (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015; E. Webster, August 13, 2015). Similarly, Southall noted that bringing poor communities together is especially difficult given the ANC’s role in “empowering the traditional leaders and making the conditions in rural areas highly oppressive” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015). Further, Southall emphasises the challenge of cross class “cross rural-urban” cleavages, especially “when the ANC will go out and dangle various advantages to some of them, and so on” (R. Southall, July 29, 2015).

Meanwhile, other respondents such as Bell and Ryklief are acutely critical of NUMSA’s direction in forming a United Front and question its immediate significance. The former describes the United Front as a “bad tactic” that was “not clearly thought out”, with the focus on “what unites us” distracting the organisation from addressing divisions (T. Bell, September 27, 2015). Meanwhile, Ryklief is acutely critical of what she views as NUMSA’s failure to tackle “actual protections”, and the nebulous aims of the United Front, which she describes as “just strategically dead ends” (S. Ryklief, October 12, 2015). In contrast, despite pessimism about the prospects for the United Front, Henwood sees the formation as a “necessary step” to ensure “short-to-medium term success or survival even in South Africa as a movement” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015). However, even respondents who were supportive of the United Front expressed concern regarding its immediate future, such as Pillay who argued that, “It would have been significant except that it’s imploding, potentially imploding” (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015). He largely attributes this failure to decisively launch to internal divisions between shop stewards and the “traditional Marxist-Leninist communist party perspective in NUMSA”, noting that “you can’t rely on one big trade union for funding etcetera, you’ve got to have a different strategy” (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015). However, whereas Pillay supported the United Front’s approach of “play[ing] the long game” and building from below, Ryklief instead advocated forming a political party and contesting elections (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015).
The notion of electoralism was a divisive topic amongst interviewees, even those who were generally critical of the United Front process. In contrast to Pillay, who is wary of the United Front becoming “a little tiny sect”, Ryklief and De Jager argue that the significance of NUMSA’s departure from COSATU lies in its potential to “create a viable alternative for the ANC in the political spectrum” (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015; N. De Jager, October 12, 2015). Further, despite acknowledging its success in bringing sections of communities together, Nadvi argues that the United Front must enter electoral politics if it is to create any real significance as “economic policy in our country is not decided by the trade unions its decided by our economic ministry” (S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015). However, Satgar, and Southall are highly sceptical of the significance of the United Front should it enter electoral politics, stating that “electoralism could spell disaster for the UF if it’s reduced to that”, and “Electorally I think the united front is going to suffer, it’s going to have very limited funding”, respectively (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015; R. Southall, July 29, 2015). Henwood is similarly sceptical of the significance of the UF as a political party, noting the short-lived success of previous ANC breakaways. However, he also suggests that it may get “substantial support” as the ANC’s loss of control has created an environment that is “more supportive of a breakaway movement than it’s been since 94” (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015).

The majority of interviewees were also critical of the United Front’s capacity to reach out to communities and organisations and forge lasting connections, though they were generally supportive of its efforts. Interviewees including Friedman, Webster, Gentle and Ngwane generally agreed that NUMSA’s failure to attract wider support was inhibited by organisational and structural differences between unions, community organisations and social movements; as Gentle notes, “the United Front has failed to find large instances of common struggle with community protests” (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015). Further, Webster and Gentle emphasise the difference between NUMSA’s membership and the rest of the working class, and note NUMSA’s underestimations of the differences between the two, the reluctance of NUMSA members to link up with the unemployed, and NUMSA’s inability to “articulate and express those struggles” (L. Gentle, September 25, 2015). Further, though Friedman and Ngwane emphasise the importance of NUMSA’s attempt to remove the barrier between trade unions and social movements, both are critical of the organising patterns that have emerged in the trade union movement, with the latter criticising NUMSA’s narrow demands and poor community outreach (T. Ngwane, October 24, 2015). Faulkner similarly notes the poor capacity of the United Front as a platform for organising, mobilising and
melding social movements and community organisations. However, he attributes this, in part, to the depletion of social movements over the past five years, with those that still exist “weakened at a time when NUMSA’s reaching out to them” (S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015). Further, whilst Southall, Pillay and Nadvi acknowledge the immense difficulties faced by NUMSA in forming a United Front, the latter two express optimism about its aims and/or prospects, with Pillay noting “the idea is absolutely correct”, and Nadvi acknowledging “it has managed to do is to bring elements of communities together interestingly enough” (D. Pillay, August 11, 2015: S. Nadvi, September 2, 2015).

The significance of NUMSA’s United Front initiative is hotly contested among organic intellectuals, who nonetheless agree that it remains relatively peripheral to contestations of hegemony and faces a number of difficult challenges. However, most respondents also acknowledged that it was potentially significant, whilst Webster, Ngwane, Nadvi, and Narsiah insisted that it was “too soon to tell” and “early days”, though the latter two expressed concerns about the inclusiveness and direction of its overall strategy (Webster, August 13, 2015: T. Ngwane, October 24, 2015). Meanwhile Pillay, Southall, De Jager and Satgar viewed the United Front as potentially significant, with Southall and De Jager stressing its potential electoral significance, whilst Satgar emphasised its potential to organise and mobilise powerful class and popular forces. Further, Satgar suggested that it had the potential to be a “very dynamic left project” that could build “unites and solidarities around service delivery struggles… win over anti-systemic movements and forces… [and create] a new expression of working class solidarity” (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). In addition, Kotze suggested that NUMSA’s withdrawal from COSATU was highly significant in symbolic terms, suggesting that it contributed to the ANC’s poor performance in Gauteng in 2014 (D. Kotze, August 6, 2015).

To summarise, understandings of NUMSA, its departure from COSATU in 2014, and its spearheading of the United Front initiative varied widely between organic intellectuals. NUMSA’s actions were understood as the result of a combination of factors including financial constraints, NUMSA’s independent tradition, pressure from below, the emergence of a new left politics, factionalism and personality conflicts. However, most respondents situated NUMSA’s actions within the context of growing disillusionment with the ANC, SACP and COSATU, as a result of the ANC’s economic trajectory and co-option of the Alliance partners. Further, despite a disparity of opinion between interviewees, their overall
impression of NUMSA was that of an ideologically and structurally problematic union struggling to unite a divided left in a counter-hegemonic project with nebulous objectives. However, interviewees also saw NUMSA’s spearheading of the United Front initiative as a positive development, though many emphasised the inherent difficulties and challenges of such a broad approach. In addition, the failure of NUMSA’s Nine Plus Unions to decisively launch its united front initiative, alongside job-shedding in the steel and manufacturing industries, and ongoing consternation within the union over whether it should enter national politics, created an impression of inertia among interviewees. As such, interviewees generally agreed NUMSA’s actions since 2014 were of limited significance in undermining ANC hegemony. However, interviewees also acknowledged that NUMSA’s actions since 2014 have been ideologically and politically significant, to a limited degree, in reinforcing the perception of the Tripartite Alliance and COSATU as internally divided, undermining the bargaining strength of COSATU, and reducing support for the ANC in the 2014 and 2016 elections. Further, the formation of the United Front has been significant in bringing together unions, social movements and unions, thereby creating the potential for “a new form of working class and left strategic expression” within a new cycle of counter-hegemonic resistance (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). However, given the generally pessimistic understandings of the significance of NUMSA and the United Front in challenging the hegemony of the ANC, its lack of electoral presence, and its relatively constant membership, the threat it poses to the Tripartite Alliance is minimal.

8.8. Conclusions

Understandings of hegemony vary widely between organic intellectuals, with those I interviewed presenting a range of arguments as to the hegemony of the ANC and neoliberalism, and the significance of contestations. Interviewees argued that South Africa’s poor economic performance was the result of a host of factors including rapid trade liberalisation, the structural legacies of Apartheid, poor business-state relations and corruption. However, they generally agreed that ANC economic policies were the most significant factor, with most agreeing that they were either the root cause or greatly worsened their impacts. Interviewees also criticised the intellectual capacity of the ANC and its ability to rule, with some locating its failures as the result of poorly designed policies, and a lack of coherency and management, rather than the ANC’s continued adherence to neoliberal ideology. However, many interviewees did not limit themselves to this kind of ‘conjunctural’ criticism of the ANC, instead focusing on the ANC’s failings, including the adoption of
neoliberal economic rationalities. Further, the ongoing failure of these policies to curb unemployment, poverty and inequality has undermined public confidence in the ANC in the eyes of these organic intellectuals. The perception of the ANC as incapable or captured by capital, and the high degree of criticism of the ideology of neoliberalism associated with the ANC hegemonic project, suggests hegemonic crisis. However, the ANC is still seen as electorally and politically dominant, and interviewees generally agreed that the ANC was either hegemonic, dominant or seen as aspiring to hegemony, though many saw its dominance as declining. This is supported by the body of literature surrounding the ANC which characterises the hegemonic project as unstable, faltering, wavering between the “class corporate” and “hegemonic” stages (Marais, 2011, p. 397).

Further, the ANC was seen by organic intellectuals as having a diminished capacity to foster consent and social unity among subaltern classes. As a result, interviewees argued that the ANC government was increasingly willing to use the coercive apparatus of the state, and expressed concern about the ANC’s hostility towards independent centres of power such as the judiciary and media. In addition, interviewees also found that the ANC was dominant economically within Southern Africa, though most agreed that the ANC was not hegemonic in South Africa in 2015, and that South Africa was not hegemonic regionally. Interviewees also generally agreed that the ANC’s electoral dominance was in decline, but that the capacity of political parties, unions, social movements and spontaneous protests to contest the ANC hegemonic project was severely limited. Political parties such as the DA and EFF were seen as unable and unsuitable to represent the interests of a broader range of subaltern classes, and were thereby not considered viable counter-hegemonic projects. Further, though social movements linked with community organisations were seen as contesting ANC hegemony at a local level, they were also seen as either weak, weakening or lacking the capacity to challenge the ANC on broader social issues due to their specific focus. Similarly, unions were generally viewed as constituting only a minor challenge to the ANC, as they were seen as in decline and unable to effectively reach out to community organisations, with some interviewees viewing the leadership as distant and compromised. In addition, Service delivery protests were generally understood as articulations of anger around service delivery and the lack of accountability of the local government - undermining ANC dominance at a local level but unable to articulate a concerted anti-hegemonic challenge.
Interviewees understood NUMSA’s resolutions and the United Front initiative within the context of growing dissatisfaction with the ANC over its economic trajectory, and resistance to the ANC dominated alliance. However, the failure of NUMSA’s Nine Plus Unions and the slow progress of the United Front initiative, alongside job-shedding in the steel and manufacturing industries, created an impression of inertia among interviewees, undermining its potential significance. Further, NUMSA was seen as an ideologically and structurally problematic union struggling to unite a fractured left in an alternate hegemonic project with unclear objectives. As such, interviewees generally saw NUMSA and the United Front as of limited significance in challenging the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project. However, NUMSA’s actions since 2014 were understood as ideologically and politically significant, to a limited degree, in reinforcing the perception of the Tripartite Alliance and COSATU as internally divided, undermining the bargaining strength of COSATU, and withdrawing support for the ANC in the 2014 and 2016 elections. Further, the formation of the United Front was understood as a significant development in bringing together unions, social movements and unions. However, given the generally negative understandings of the significance of NUMSA and the United Front in challenging the hegemony of the ANC, its lack of electoral presence, and its relatively large (but static) membership, the threat it poses to the Tripartite Alliance is minimal.

In Gramscian terms the declining capacity of the ANC to foster consent or co-opt subaltern groups without resorting to coercion suggests a ‘crisis of authority’. As such, the ANC neoliberal project is characterised by a limited or “fractured hegemony” as it is no longer capable of mobilising consent outside elections. Further, it is persistently and incessantly struggling to conceal the “incurable structural contradictions” of neoliberalism within South Africa (Gramsci, 1971, p. 178). As a result, whilst the understandings of organic intellectuals are interpenetrated by neoliberal ideas, they are also markedly critical of the ANC neoliberal project. However, whilst they are generally supportive of contestations of ANC hegemony, the ANC remains a significant presence within the popular imagination, evident in pessimistic understandings of the significance of alternative hegemonic projects. As such, the ANC neoliberal project is characterised by a limited hegemony, with its limited and spasmodic capacity to mobilise consent within South African civil society and co-opt and contain counter-hegemonic movements.
9. Conclusion

This thesis fits within an emerging tradition of applying Gramscian analysis to contemporary contexts, as demonstrated by authors such as Augelli and Murphy (1988), Bieler and Morton (2004), Morton (2007), and McNally (2015). However, it also fits within the body of literature surrounding post-Apartheid South African trade movements, unions, and protest, and the corruption and denigration of National Liberation Movements. Specifically, within the school of thought that sees the post-Apartheid period as defined by a neoliberal hegemonic project centred on the ANC. This thesis contributes to these varied bodies of scholarship by applying and operationalising Gramscian theory to the study of neoliberalism, hegemony, and counter-hegemonic struggles in South Africa.

This thesis employed several different methods rooted in Gramscian theory to determine the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project in South Africa, and the significance of resistance to this project. These methods included analysing national, provincial and municipal election results and a Critical Discourse Analysis of texts including South African newspapers and interviews conducted with organic intellectuals. However, many possibilities exist for future research into contestations of hegemony in post-Apartheid South Africa and the application of Gramscian theory. Though this interpretative synthesis reached mutually reinforcing conclusions, a more narrowly focused application of this framework on either newspaper analysis, electoral statistics or the opinions of organic intellectuals could provide valuable insights into hegemony in South Africa. In addition, though this thesis is informed by understandings of World Systems Theory, it is largely focused on questions of hegemony within the nation-state, leaving space for more detailed analyses of South Africa’s role as a sub-regional hegemon.

This thesis examines the extent to which the ANC neoliberal project is hegemonic in South Africa, and how contestations of this hegemony and resistance to neoliberalism are understood within civil society. The collapse of white-minority rule in South Africa was accompanied by the victory of a popular national liberation movement with a stated commitment to freedom, democracy, equality and reversing the legacy of Apartheid. However, over twenty years later South Africa remains marred by high and increasing levels of inequality, poverty and unemployment, with the once-celebrated ANC riddled with corruption, patronage networks and increasingly hostile to voices of dissent. These failures are overdetermined by various interconnected factors, and inextricably linked to the
development of capitalism in South Africa and its position in the world-system. However, the emergence of a hegemonic project in the post-1994 period, centred on the ANC and embracing neoliberal economic rationalities, played a crucial role in the continuation of these systemic problems. The post-Apartheid upsurge of protest, community organisations, social movements, union strikes and criticisms of the ANC throughout civil society are the consequences of this project’s inability to accommodate the interests of subaltern classes and contain or co-opt dissent. However, despite these symptoms of morbid hegemonic decline, no alternate hegemonic project has emerged that can displace the ANC, signalling in a period of hegemonic crisis. This thesis examines the extent to which the ANC and neoliberalism are hegemonic within this context, and the relative significance of subaltern political formations, such as NUMSA and the United Front.

The development of capitalism in Southern Africa had a profound and lasting effect on the structure of the South African economy and development of civil society. This was shaped by the emergence of South Africa as the central node of capital accumulation within Southern Africa during the pre-Apartheid period. Existing on the periphery of the world-system, Southern African states were providers of “labour, raw materials, investment opportunities and markets” for the Western industrialised core (Akaha and Stiles, 1991, p. 2). The period of capitalist development in South Africa began with the discovery of the Kimberley diamond mines in 1870, which led to growing dependency on secondary modes of industrialisation (such as gold/diamond mining) and mounting demand for cheap, unskilled labour (Cohen, 1986, p. 40). This increasingly led the state into regulating the conditions under which labour power was produced and reproduced, resulting in a rigid migrant-labour system and ultimately segregation (Murray, 1987, p. 18-19). The breakdown of the segregationist system of migrant labour developed on the mines resulted in the radical refurbishment of the hegemony of the leading group through the adoption of the policies of Apartheid led by the National Party. Thus, the Apartheid state emerged from South African elites’ needs to manage the supply of cheap unspecialised labour whilst sheltering non-propertied white workers from unemployment (Wolpe, 1995, p. 61).

The South African economy under Apartheid concentrated on mineral and agricultural resource extraction, relying on abundant, cheap migrant labour to maintain economic growth. The Apartheid state consequently enforced draconian laws backed by brutal repression, which ensured compliance from the exploited black working class. These limited black
Africans’ capacity to organise, earn livelihoods, and own property, and spatially segregated vast reserves of impoverished labourers (Koelble, 2004, p. 62). Further, the National Party made conscious efforts to suppress the economies of neighbouring countries through both military and economic warfare, transforming them into vast labour reserves, providers of raw materials and services, and markets for manufactured goods (Griffiths, 1989, p. 387; Murray, 1987, p. 48-49; Worden, 1994, p. 125). As a result, the development of infrastructure and the accumulation of wealth in South Africa was accompanied by the diffusion of poverty, unemployment, and economic stagnation throughout Southern Africa (Bond, 2006, p. 32).

However, Apartheid placed limitations on the economy by creating an overabundance of unskilled labour, a shortage of skilled labour, and limited domestic demand (Marais, 1998, p. 101; Worden, 1994, p. 137).

The violent regimentation of the labour supply under Apartheid also progressively provoked more powerful and violent convulsions from oppressed black workers and began to undermine the economy itself. Thus, when the post-war accumulation strategy began to breakdown in the early 1970s, the rigid Verwoerdian model of Apartheid began to crumple, resulting in an escalating spiral of resistance and repression throughout the country (Worden, 1994, p. 122). Despite the National Party’s attempt to regain the initiative, the frail cross-class Afrikaner-nationalist project started to fray as spiralling inflation and rising unemployment fuelled cycles of resistance, international condemnation, economic instability and sanctions (Cobbet & Cohen, 1988; Koelble, 2001; Marais, 1998; Koelble, 2001). This impasse was only broken by the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-African Congress (PAC) in 1990 following the installation of Frederick Willem de Klerk as Prime Minister in September 1989 (Worden, 1994, p. 121).

The character of the ANC was profoundly impacted by the development of segregation and Apartheid in South Africa, transforming itself from a loose assemblage of moderate blacks to a National Liberation Movement (NLM). The escalating levels of violence and repression increasingly drew the ANC towards a strategy of armed insurgency, which led to the imprisonment or exile of their leadership and the organisation (Gevisser, 2007, p. 149; Southall, 2014, p. 52; De Waal & Ibreck, 2013, p. 312-313). As a result, the leadership of the ANC was split between the hierarchical and disciplined - yet somewhat democratic - Robben Islanders, and the vanguardist ANC-in-exile with its highly centralised decision-making. Conditions of exile had a lasting impact on the external ANC leadership, manifesting in
resistance to accountability, hostility to criticism, and opposition to rival centres of power – including social movements and civil society (de Jager, 2009, p. 278-280; N. De Jager, October 12, 2015). As a result, the ANC’s post-Apartheid response to community organisations, and the upsurge of protests, strikes and social movements, was confrontation and often violence from repressive state apparatuses (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015; S. Faulkner, August 13, 2015).

The transition to democracy in South Africa required the radical refurbishment of the leading group’s hegemony, from a limited or fractured hegemony “based on an unstable equilibrium of compromises between social classes and… bare coercion” (Morton, 2007, p. 202). However, the new consensus not only entailed an embrace of non-racial values, but an overhaul of the South African economic system in line with neoliberal economic policy prescriptions. The negotiated outcome required elite factions to bargain away policy positions previously held non-negotiable, creating a compromise deal that no side believed in or wanted (Adam, Slabbert & Moodley, 1998, p. 57-61). Thus, although the interim constitution of 1994 provided for a modern constitutional democracy, the concessions made by the ANC left white domination of the economy virtually untouched. These concessions included agreeing to retain the finance minister and the central bank governor, to repay Apartheid-era debt, to maintain the independence of the central bank, and to uphold ‘responsible’ management of the economy (Bond, 2007, p. 128; Peet, 2002, p. 73). Meanwhile, the Government of National Unity embraced neoliberal global economic institutions through membership in the World Trade Organisation, agreeing to a condition-laden IMF loan, and following World Bank advice regarding development policies (Bond, 2007, p. 128). As such, the ANC bargained away the tools it could have used to pursue radical redistributive financial policies (Adam, Slabbert & Moodley, 1998). As a consequence, the economy of the new democratic South Africa was fundamentally similar to its predecessor, including high levels of inequality and poverty, and a structural inability to employ all its population (Bond, 2004; Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012; Gibson, 2005).

Though the ANC did not become intertwined with global neoliberal economic institutions until the negotiated transition, it was subject to increasing pressure to adopt neoliberal rationalities from the late 1980s onwards. Following its unbanning in 1990, the ANC faced intense economic and discursive pressure from international and South African capital and global financial institutions to drop its redistributive policies. Statements made by ANC
leaders relating to redistribution and nationalisation came under intense scrutiny by South African business organisations, the media, conservative think tanks aligned with the government and/or South African capital, global financial institutions, and economists often linked to those institutions (Lazar, 1996, p. 614-618; Narsiah, 2002, p. 4-5; Peet, 2002. p. 56-73; Peet, 2007, p. 130-145). Despite opposition from the grassroots and within the ANC-led Alliance, the ANC increasingly shifted toward neoliberal economic orthodoxy. However, its incomplete embrace of neoliberalism was evident in its 1994 launch of the vaguely populist, yet often business-friendly, RDP (Marais, 2011, p. 403-404; Nattras, 1994, p. 358-359; Peet, 2002, p. 70-71). However, as the ANC came to dominate the Tripartite Alliance from the mid-late 1990s, ANC economic policy became increasingly neoliberal in character. This led to the undermining and eventual cessation of the broadly Keynesian RDP, and the development of neoliberal economic frameworks such as GEAR, the NDP and ASGISA (Peet, 2002, p. 73-74). These frameworks emphasised key neoliberal precepts such as the need for fiscal discipline, labour flexibility, tariff reductions and privatisation (though the latter is de-emphasised in the NDP and ASGISA) (Dwyer & Zeitig, 2012, p. 114; Koelble, 2004, p. 65; Webster, Lambert & Bezuidenhout, 2008, p. 166; Republic of South Africa, 2011c). However, neoliberalism is less a strictly defined ideology than a malleable discourse, mediated by popular common-sense understandings. As a result, the neoliberal discourse in South Africa still allows a limited role for the state as a provider of social-grants, employment opportunities and poverty mitigation (McCutcheon & Parkins, 2009, p. 196; Republic of South Africa, 2011b, p. 29-30).

Though the high level of poverty, inequality and unemployment in South Africa is often attributed to the legacy of Apartheid, these can also be traced to the negotiated settlement and the ANC’s embrace of neoliberalism. Indeed, the ANC’s post-1994 adherence to neoliberalism has been the framework ensuring South Africa’s economic malaise, failures of local and national governance, and the ANC government’s inability to provide meaningfully for South Africa’s poorest. Further, the ANC’s continued commitment to neoliberalism actually undermines struggles for economic racial representation and black unity, and weakens the capacity of the state (Bond, 2010, p. 3; Gentle, 2007, p. 136). However, the ANC’s continued commitment to neoliberal policies despite the tremendous social costs inflicted on the population - and the ANC’s unresponsiveness to these impacts - has led to increasing levels of social unrest and opposition within civil society (International Labour Research and Information Group, 2014, p. 1). The continuing capacity of the ANC to win
elections in this context demonstrates its capacity to garner the “spontaneous and cultivated” consent of the masses on the “general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental class” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12). This is due to the legacy of widespread popularity the ANC enjoys from the national liberation struggle, and its capacity to speak the language of subaltern classes and neoliberalism simultaneously (“talking left while walking right”) (Bond, 2007a, p. 128). However, this behaviour has increasingly undermined economic growth in the post-Apartheid period, as policy uncertainty has contributed to declining levels of investment and stagnant growth (R. Henwood, August 7, 2015).

Within this context, the ideological and political tensions between NUMSA, and the Tripartite Alliance largely reflected the hegemony of, and resistance to, neoliberalism in South Africa. Though the SACP, COSATU and leftist activists were deeply critical of the ANC’s embrace of neoliberalism, they were increasingly disciplined or co-opted by the ANC from the mid-1990s onwards (Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 114-115). The collapse of the Soviet Union and the SACP’s adherence to the theoretically defunct theory of Colonialism of a Special Type and the National Democratic Revolution greatly weakened its capacity to oppose the ANC. Indeed, these ideas led the SACP to simultaneously attack independent opposition and marginalise the independent left while providing the ANC with a sheen of socialist legitimacy (Bond, 2014, p. 16; Bond & Desai, 2006, p. 13; Dwyer & Zeilig, 2012, p. 110-4). Thus, despite strongly opposing GEAR, from the early 2000s onwards the SACP increasingly supported the ANC’s neoliberal direction and attacked any dissension within COSATU. Though COSATU opposed the general direction of ANC policy, its willingness to compromise with the ANC, and the loss of many leaders to comfortable government positions, muted its criticisms. Meanwhile, COSATU’s organisational base was increasingly sapped as neoliberal policies eroded the strength of its constituent unions, leading it to accept the role of a junior partner in the Alliance (Plaut, 2010, p. 208; Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 2008, p. 167).

However, the ANC’s dogged commitment to neoliberal economic policies perpetuates political and ideological tensions among the affiliates of the Tripartite Alliance. One of the most vociferous advocates of trade union independence was the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). In the post-Apartheid period, the ANC’s neoliberal economic trajectory resulted in a division within COSATU between “Zuma/Ramaphosa loyalists and those with working class interests at heart led by Numsa” (Bond, 2014, p. 10).
This division was breached when, following the removal of Zwelinzima Vavi and the massacre of mineworkers at Marikana, NUMSA adopted resolutions at a special congress including: a commitment to recruit across the value chain; the withdrawal of support from the ANC; the establishment of a United Front to co-ordinate community and workplace struggles; and, to explore the possibilities for a new South African left (National Union of metalworkers of South Africa, 2014). As a result, COSATU expelled NUMSA, which then proceeded to establish and spearhead a United Front organising communities and social organisations against the ANC and neoliberalism (Bond, 2014, p. 15). As such, the ideological and political tensions between NUMSA and the ANC Alliance not only reflect NUMSA’s long-held belief in union independence but also, to a large extent, resistance to the ANC’s neoliberal trajectory. Further, the co-option of the leadership of both COSATU and the SACP by the ANC, their vocal criticism of anti-neoliberal and anti-ANC groups such as NUMSA, and the ANC’s assertion of its leading role within the Alliance, demonstrate both the ANC’s capacity to coerce and lead, and the large extent to which neoliberalism is hegemonic in South Africa.

In examining the extent to which the ANC is hegemonic in South Africa, and the threat posed by NUMSA, this study analyses how the ANC neoliberal project is understood by various actors within a Gramscian conception of hegemony. As such, it engages with sources that are useful in gauging hegemony such as electoral statistics, organic intellectuals, and the media, applying a methodology rooted in Gramscian theory. Given that elections are illustrative of the relative strength of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourse, the support enjoyed by the ANC in national, provincial and municipal elections between 1994 and 2006 indicates that the ANC was successful in forging a new national consensus based on neoliberal economic rationalities (Gramsci, 1971, p. 192-193). Further, the continuing capacity of the ANC to consistently win elections by a large margin indicates that the ANC remains largely hegemonic within South Africa.

However, a closer analysis reveals a much more complex picture of the strength of the ANC hegemonic project. Though the ANC has retained a majority of the popular vote, since 2006 the ANC has faced a declining share of the vote at successive national, provincial, and municipal elections. Further, its share of votes in relation to the voting age population (VAP) has deteriorated since 1994 to little over a third (Schultz-Herzenberg, 2014). Meanwhile, the South African electoral system has become characterised by growing numbers of alternative
parties and declining voter turnout at the national and provincial level. As such, whilst the ANC might have achieved hegemony immediately after the transition to democratic governance, from the late 1990s onwards it was already showing symptoms of decline. However, this also demonstrates the lack of a viable counter-hegemonic project, and the ongoing capacity of the ANC-neoliberal project to neutralise the emergence of counter-hegemonic movements.

The ongoing hegemony of the ANC is also evident in its successful co-option of parties such as the Congress of the People (COPE) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the short life-spans of smaller parties contesting national and provincial elections. These smaller parties are conjunctural phenomena, representing the interests of specific subaltern classes engaged in a war of manoeuvre through minor political interventions and political criticism. Further, there are huge constraints on their capacity to articulate the interests of other subaltern groups and effectively compete at a national level. Similarly, though the DA has lasted many elections, and made significant inroads among subaltern groups, its inability to meaningfully attract support in rural areas limits its capacity to meaningfully challenge the ANC. The ANC has also benefitted from the Inkatha Freedom Party’s collapse in KwaZulu Natal, and its growing support there since 2009 assisted in slowing the ANC’s national electoral decline. This can in part be attributed to the replacement of Mbeki with Jakob Zuma, a reconfiguring of leadership and refurbishment of its hegemonic project in response to perceived detachment between ANC elites and the electorate.

In addition, the ANC hegemonic project has become increasingly reliant upon voter absenteeism at national, provincial and municipal elections. The ANC’s strong voter turnout in rural and semi-rural provinces is supported by declining levels of voter participation, as alternative parties struggle to operate in those areas (Booysen, 2012, 354). However, in contrast to national elections, the dramatic increase of alternative parties in municipal elections between 1995/6 and 2016 has coincided with increasing levels of voter turnout, suggesting that the ANC government is increasingly unable to represent a broad range of subaltern classes. Further, though these parties are incapable of posing a counter-hegemonic challenge to the ANC neoliberal project at a national level, they do represent increasing levels of awareness and resistance at the local level. However, these parties have struggled to meaningfully penetrate the black-African ANC constituency, especially in rural areas, with the exception of the EFF which made notable gains in 2016.
In addition, the ANC’s strong performance among rural and semi-rural voters, in contrast to urban voters, is an ominous sign for ANC electoral dominance given the rapid growth of the urban population. Further, though election statistics indicate a project in terminal decline, the ANC did enjoy widespread support until the 2004 national, 2004 provincial, and 2006 municipal elections. Thus, overall election statistics show that the ANC had achieved a high degree of consensus in the immediate post-Apartheid period, though this deteriorated after 1999 amid growing economic woes and growing criticism of the ANC neoliberal project. Further, the ANC’s continued electoral dominance, and the lack of an emergent counter-hegemonic project, suggests an “expansive and persuasive capacity” to mobilise consent (Gramsci, 1971, p. 192-193). As such, this analysis argues that the ANC neoliberal project is characterised by an unstable or limited hegemony, with declining yet entrenched electoral dominance at a national and provincial level, and dominance at the local level beset by increasing “contests, challenges, lapses and even defeats” (Booysen, 2012, p. 2).

Electoral analysis was supported by a survey of South African newspapers between July 2015 and October 2015 to evaluate the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project and establish how contestations of this hegemony were understood by the media. This analysis involved examining eleven national and two community newspapers for instances of unproblematised neoliberal assumptions or understandings, and the reproduction or contestation of ANC understandings of the economy and society. This study found most South African newspapers tended to uncritically reproduce neoliberal understandings of the economy, wealth generation, poverty and crime, suggesting that neoliberalism has deeply penetrated commonsense understandings in South Africa. Further, even those newspapers, such as the independent Mail and Guardian, that were critical of the ANC were bound by the necessity of attracting advertising revenue to include sections which embraced neoliberal rationalities. Further, although the logic of neoliberalism is widely repeated in the South African media, it is not universally accepted and often contested, albeit within historical and/or social limitations. However, the appearance of impartiality within newspapers was frequently illusionary, with criticism of neoliberalism largely limited to opinion pieces. This affirms the influence of the ANC hegemonic project in placing discursive limits on the possibility of anti-neoliberal discourse, and the “ingrained ideological bias amongst journalists and editors” towards neoliberal rationalities (Mayher & McDonald, 2007, p. 449).
In addition, newspapers either uncritically reproduced the arguments of the ANC government or focused on conjunctural issues such as corrupt elites and poor municipal governance when criticising the ANC, and often negatively presented anti-ANC organisations. As such, they largely limited their “watchdog role to the black elite”, focusing on the leadership, corruption and “anti-democratic practices” of the ANC within a broader conception of South Africa that assumes “the normative nature of ANC rule” (Duncan, 2009, p. 8). Further, by limiting most informed criticism of the ANC to opinion sections, these newspapers gave the appearance of objectivity whilst privileging the ANC consensus. In addition, alternative organisations such as NUMSA and the United Front were largely either ignored by the press or presented as either lacking support or inherently flawed, though there was some mixed press coverage especially among opinion pieces. However, NUMSA’s actions were understood as politically and ideologically insignificant by the South African media. Thus, the ANC neoliberal project demonstrated a profound capacity to both penetrate and reorient common sense understandings, within certain limits, as late as 2015. As such, this analysis suggests that the ANC and the discourse of neoliberalism were hegemonic to a large extent during this period.

In gauging the extent to which the ANC is hegemonic, this thesis also interviewed organic intellectual to examine their understandings of the ANC, neoliberalism and counter-hegemonic organisations. Organic intellectuals are the “thinking and organisational” component of a fundamental social class, and their understandings are therefore crucial in understanding how the hegemony of the ANC and contestations of it are understood by subaltern groups (Gramsci, 1971, p. 6-7). Understandings of the hegemony of the ANC and neoliberalism varied widely between organic intellectuals, with interviewees attributing South Africa’s poor economic performance to a host of factors including rapid trade liberalisation, the structural legacies of Apartheid, poor business-state relations and corruption. However, they generally agreed that ANC economic policies were the most significant factor, with most agreeing that they either caused or worsened other elements. Further, though some interviewees focused on ‘conjunctural’ criticisms of the ANC, many were also critical of the neoliberal rationalities associated with the ANC-hegemonic project. In addition, although the ANC was also perceived as incapable and captured by capital, it was still seen as electorally and politically dominant and interviewees variously argued that the ANC was either hegemonic, dominant or seen as aspiring to hegemony. However, many saw its dominance as declining and were openly critical of neoliberal ideology, suggesting a
declining capacity for the ANC to reorient common sense understandings among subaltern groups.

Interviewees also expressed concern about the ANC’s hostility towards independent centres of power such as the judiciary and media, and its increased willingness to use the coercive state apparatus. The ANC was also understood as having a limited capacity to foster consent and social unity among subaltern classes through state activities. In addition, the ANC was not seen as regionally hegemonic throughout Southern Africa despite a high degree of economic dominance. However, though community organisations were seen as a significant challenge to ANC dominance at a local level, they were also seen as relatively weak and/or representing marginal interests and thus unable to contest the hegemony of the ANC neoliberal project. Thus, from the perspective of these representatives of subaltern groups South Africa has entered a period of hegemonic crisis, wherein the ANC can no longer meaningfully rule through consent, but no alternative hegemonic project has emerged.

Within this context of systemic hegemonic crisis, the extent to which NUMSA poses a threat to the ANC neoliberal project is severely limited. Interviewees generally agreed that the capacity of unions, social movements and spontaneous protests to contest the ANC hegemonic project is constrained. Further, NUMSA was seen as an ideologically and structurally problematic union struggling to unite a divided left in a counter-hegemonic project with unclear objectives. As such, interviewees generally saw NUMSA and the United Front as of limited significance in challenging ANC hegemony. However, in contrast to the media, organic intellectuals understood NUMSA’s actions as ideologically and politically significant, to a limited degree, in reinforcing the perception of the Tripartite Alliance and COSATU as internally divided, undermining the bargaining strength of COSATU, and undermining support for the ANC in the 2014 and 2016 elections. Further, the formation of the United Front was understood as a significant development in bringing together unions, social movements and unions, thereby creating the potential for “a new form of working class and left strategic expression” within a new cycle of counter-hegemonic resistance (V. Satgar, August 14, 2015). However, the failure of the NUMSA Nine Plus Unions to decisively launch its united front initiative, alongside job-shedding in the steel and manufacturing industries, created an impression of inertia among interviewees, constraining its potential significance. Further, given its lack of electoral presence and its relatively small but constant membership, the threat it posed to the Tripartite Alliance was seen as very limited.
Despite varied understandings of the hegemony of, and contestations, of the ANC, neoliberalism and contestations of hegemony, the ANC was generally seen as having a substantial, but declining capacity to foster consent. As such, this study characterises the ANC neoliberal project as having a limited hegemony, underscored by the permeation of neoliberal understandings throughout common-sense making practices, as represented by the media, and the continued capacity to attract a large, but declining, share of the popular vote. However, this hegemony is constrained by the ANC’s inability to co-opt or contain the upsurge of conjunctural formations emerging from the loss of the political and social conditions necessary for sustained economic growth. Further, the ANC is unable to represent the interests of a broad range of subaltern groups, as demonstrated by declining voter turnout at national and provincial elections, and the hostility of organic intellectuals to the ANC neoliberal project. However, sections of civil society – including organic intellectuals and newspapers - were also critical of the significance of organisations and movements contesting the hegemony of the ANC, such as NUMSA and the United Front. Further, the lack of a viable alternative political party or organisation in the context of the ANC’s declining capacity to foster consent or co-opt subaltern groups, without resorting to coercion, suggests a ‘crisis of authority’. In Gramscian terms, the ANC is operating a limited or fractured hegemony, “based on an unstable equilibrium of compromises between social classes and the greater prevalence of fraud and corruption, if not bare coercion” (Morton, 2007, p. 202). Thus, it is wavering between the “class corporate” and “hegemonic” stages, persistently and incessantly struggling to conceal the “incurable structural contradictions” of neoliberalism within the South African economy (Gramsci, 1971, p. 178).
10. References

10.1. Books, journal articles & reports


Willoughby-Herard, T. (2013). “The only one who was thought to know the pulse of the people”: Black women’s politics in the era of post-racial discourse. *Cultural Dynamics, 26*(1), 73-90.


contemporary relevance (pp. 163-165). Johannesburg, South Africa: The Rosa Luxemberg Foundation.
10.2. **Newspapers**


Nepotism is a problem, even if blood is thicker than water. (2015, August 2). *Sunday Times*. p. 6.


11. Appendices

11.1. Appendix A: Interview Questions

Question 1:

What are your thoughts on the economic situation in South Africa?

Prompts:

- How do you think the South African economy has performed over the last decade? Why do you think this is?
- What are your thoughts on the government’s national development plan (NDP)?
- Do you think that ANC economic policies benefit all sectors of society equally?
  - If not, why do you think certain groups benefit more or less than others?

Question 2:

What do you think about the ANC government?

Prompts:

- In regards to foreign policy, do you think the ANC government has emphasised or de-emphasised inter-African relations in recent years?
- What can you tell me about recent ‘service delivery’ protests? What about union strikes?
- What have been the ANC responses to these protests and strikes? Do you think they have been appropriate?
- What are your thoughts on the 2012 Marikana massacre?

Question 3:

Are you aware of any unions, political parties or post-apartheid social movements which have contested ANC leadership or policies? If so, how have they done so?

Prompts:

- How are these social movements different from ANC grassroots initiatives?
- Do you think these movements are undermining the ANC’s legitimacy as a mass movement?
- Do you think these social movements, unions and/or political parties represent interests which the ANC cannot represent? If so, why?
• What can you tell me about the Economic Freedom Fighters?

**Question 4:**

What can you tell me about the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA)?

**Prompts:**

• What do you think motivated NUMSA to withdraw its support for the ANC in the lead up to the 2014 elections?
• What can you tell me about the relationship between NUMSA and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)?
• Do you think NUMSA’s development of a United Front can bridge the gap between grassroots social movements and trade unions?
• How significant do you think NUMSA’s actions are politically or ideologically?

**Closing Remarks**

• Is there anything else you would like to add before we end this interview?
• Are there any other questions or topics I should have asked you or inquired into?
• Do you know of anybody, including yourself, who is engaged in any work or activity which challenges the ANC, the SACP and/or COSATU? If so, how?
### Appendix B: Calculating the Voting Age Population 2016

#### Table 13. Voting Age Population as a percentage of South African Population, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>South African Population</th>
<th>Voting Age population (VAP)</th>
<th>VAP as % of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>41,218,901</td>
<td>23,000,000*</td>
<td>55.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>42,898,520</td>
<td>22,307,511**</td>
<td>52.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>45,058,775</td>
<td>25,200,000*</td>
<td>55.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>45,728,315</td>
<td>26,466,498^^</td>
<td>57.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>48,247,395</td>
<td>27,400,000*</td>
<td>56.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>49,364,582</td>
<td>29,056,208^^</td>
<td>58.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>50,970,818</td>
<td>30,000,000*</td>
<td>58.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>52,263,516</td>
<td>31,434,035^^</td>
<td>60.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>54,539,571</td>
<td>32,700,000*</td>
<td>59.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From this table we can see that the population of South Africa steadily increased from 41,218,901 in 1994 to 54,539,571 in 2014, whilst the voting age population grew from 23,000,000 to 32,700,000 in the same time period. Further, the percentage of the total population who are of voting age fluctuated throughout this period, plateauing at around 60% by 2014. Given that there is less than 0.18% variation in population and VAP between 2011 and 2014, we can make an informed estimate of the percentage of the population of voting age in 2016 by averaging these two figures to reach 60.05. Thus, given a population of 56,015,473 in South Africa in 2016 (World Bank, 2018), we can estimate that the VAP in 2016 will be around 33,637,291.