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From Impartial Objectivity to Responsible Affectivity: Some Ethical Implications of the 9/11 Attacks on America and the War on Terror

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From impartial objectivity to responsible affectivity

Some ethical implications of the 9/11 attacks on America and the war on terror

Lelia Green and Steven Maras

ABSTRACT
In this paper we trace some of the ways a responsibility to affect might be thought of in the wake of the events of 9/11, and examine what it might mean to shift the orientation of journalistic ethics away from an ethics based on objectivity to an ethics of affectivity.

THE SEARCH FOR PERSPECTIVE AT GROUND ZERO

When BBC correspondent Stephen Evans described as 'pornographic' the repeated use of images of the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) twin towers, other members of the November 2001 Newsworld Conference of TV Executives took notice. Evans's views carried particular authority, however: he had been in the WTC on September 11. 'As a viewer, and as someone on the ground in New York, I found the hourly repetition of images pornographic', he said, referring to the continuing use of the footage to trail news updates and as a background to interviews (Wells, 2001). In this matter, Evans was acting not only as 'a journalist', but also as a survivor (see Scraton, 1999). In such a situation, an emotional response may become confused with emotional responsibilities.

In his Vauxhall Lecture to the Centre for Journalism Studies at Cardiff University, Scraton spoke about 'reporting disaster'. His material was drawn from case studies in the UK—Lockerbie, Dunblane, and Hillsborough. 'The first phase response... is both unpredictable and volatile. In reality the first rescuers, often putting themselves in considerable
danger, are themselves survivors or witnesses. Occasionally journalists are caught up in the disaster, or are soon to the scene' (Scraton, 1999). The death tolls from the terrorist bombing of a PanAm flight over Lockerbie, Scotland; the murderous gun attack on a class of primary-school children and their teacher in Dunblane; and the deaths by crushing of scores of people in an F.A. Cup semi-final at the Hillsborough Stadium together would not have exceeded 400 souls: one-eighth of the 3,216 (Smith, 2002, p. 194) who died in the 9/11 atrocities. Yet Scraton’s study of disaster reporting was extensive enough for him to make a recommendation: ‘Some form of detachment is important if the story told is not to be overburdened with the emotion of the moment, stripped of context and, therefore, meaning’.

Detachment in western coverage of 9/11 has been little in evidence. According to Wells (2001), broadcasting executives ‘admitted that the scale of the story on September 11 meant they sometimes had to struggle to find the correct tone’. It’s arguable as to whether that has yet to be achieved with the attacks on America, the war on terror, or the fulminations against the axis of evil.

In the wake of 9/11, much has been made of the symbolic aspect of the attack on the twin towers—the twin towers as a symbol of American capitalism. Indeed, the symbolics of the twin towers has dominated accounts of 9/11, such that the events at the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania have received relatively less discussion (Smith, 2002, p. 197). One reason for this privileging is that the twin towers tragedy evolved in a way that amplified the particular characteristics of broadcast-media coverage. It was a narrative that started out as a potential horrific accident (Willcox, 2001, p. 10) and revealed itself with the second plane’s impact to be instead an act of murderous deliberation. Having attracted worldwide horror and attention at that point, the tragic events crescendoed with the shockingly unexpected annihilation of all those people still in the buildings at the time of the towers’ collapse, and the deaths of bystanders and rescuers too close to the scene to reach cover as the debris descended.

The gratuitous repetition of these images continued as the world waited in vain for a ‘miracle rescue’ angle that never eventuated. Feeding the hunger of an audience seeking some resolution to the tension, the images that did exist may have been used in place of the rescues that never happened. Even journalists that tried to move on to coverage of other events found that their audiences did not want to leave ‘ground zero’: ‘the readers and the newsagents reported back very quickly that
the readers still wanted to keep reading about it on their front pages' (Greg Swain, Australian Provincial Newspapers group editorial coordinator, cited in Wilcox, 2001, p. 12).

This demand for information and news detail was strong. Bogle (cited in Wilcox, 2001, p. 12) notes that ‘News Limited’s site news.com.au recorded traffic after the terror attack 239% higher than the daily average for August’, while ‘CNN.com, which typically recorded 11 million daily page views, clocked 9 million an hour’ (Koentges cited in Wilcox, 2001, p. 12). Newspapers also reported dramatic increases in circulation—Wilcox gives 45% as the increase for News Limited’s papers (2001, p. 13)—but it was the television images that dominated everyday conversation. This is not to suggest that the journalists were unquestioning of this public desire for saturation coverage of 9/11. Wells (2001) quotes Max Uechtritz, director of Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) news and current affairs, as pointing out that many fewer people (in fact, less than half) ‘died in New York than perished in Srebrenica, when “people were taken out and shot” in an even more horrific manner than the instant deaths on September 11’. Michael Carey, Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) executive, commented in similar vein: ‘We heard the use of terms such as “unprecedented”. It was only unprecedented because television cameras were there. Are we overreacting?’ (cited in Wells, 2001).

In these quotations, we see a full range of journalistic responses to the reporting of disasters and tragic events. These include the appeal to detachment so that the story is not ‘stripped of context’ and ‘overburdened with the emotion of the moment’; the appeal to tasteful and not pornographic coverage; the search for perspective by comparing the event to other tragedies; acknowledgement that journalists are also human and caught up in the events they report; and, finally, the recognition of commercial imperatives. We want to suggest, however, that there is more to the search for perspective at ground zero than these things. The intensity of feeling surrounding the events of 9/11 and the subsequent battle over affect, constructed between the twin poles of war and terror, brings affectivity directly into the realm of responsibility for journalists, beyond issues of over-emotional involvement or the trauma of events. These events bring issues to do with affectivity directly into the ethical frameworks of journalists in a unique manner, exposing the limitations of professional principles of objectivity and involvement. In this paper, we want to trace some of the ways a responsibility to affect
might be thought in the wake of the events of 9/11, and examine what it might mean to shift the orientation of journalistic ethics away from an ethics based on objectivity to an ethics of affectivity.

THE EMOTIONAL COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION AND THE COMMUNICATION OF EMOTIONAL INFORMATION

It is a feature of the events of 9/11 that the medium that monopolised viewers' attention in the hours (and days) that followed the attacks is the mass-communication medium most identified with the emotional communication of information and the communication of emotional information. Both of these emotional aspects of television come to the fore with the communication of affect: feeling or emotion. Events such as 9/11 prompt us as scholars of media and communications to go beyond the consideration of messages, and foreground the affective dimension of communication.

Communication theory has long been interested in the structuring and controlling of information: the process of separating contexts from messages, both linking and distancing senders and receivers. But there is an affective dimension to these processes that is not always sufficiently foregrounded. For instance, Baudrillard (1985) comments upon television's capacity to create an overburdening cacophony of emotional arousal coupled with incessant claims upon the viewer's attention. He alleges that television sucks energy and activity from the room (p. 129). The continuing flow of television sweeps the viewer with it, and becomes all the more compelling when a real-life drama is being acted/recorded/replayed on the screen. News coverage routinely offers such drama to the audience—arguably even more dramatic that the scripted set pieces designed to engage viewers emotionally. The segmentation and compartmentalisation of news messages as 'reporting the news' helps compromise an understanding of affect as one of the products of journalism: it camouflages the ambition of colonising attention and affect.

The importance of the emotional clout, of the 'emotion bite', has always been recognised in advertising where the 'emotional selling proposition' (ESP) has far more televisual impact than the more rationally grounded 'unique selling proposition' (USP) or product advantage. Where emotion is optional, everyday communication practice adds it to the information mix. Where emotion is implicit in every frame, in a medium famed for its emotive effects, the interplay of experience and anticipation help amplify the emotional content. However, from the
Vietnam War onwards, Governments have recognised the wisdom of controlling the affective weight of much sensitive foreign-policy reporting.

As a young journalist at the time of the Falklands War, Lelia Green was a research assistant with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). She was working in news and current affairs programming when guidelines were issued instructing journalists to avoid directly communicating the grief of bereaved families mourning the loss of their sons, fathers, and brothers. Extensive debate also followed the denouncement of the BBC in the UK Houses of Parliament when the BBC transmitted Argentinean news footage of the war because embargoes placed on British material meant it was no longer timely when it arrived cleared for broadcast. This ‘very long-shot’ approach to the families whose soldier sons died in combat stood in stark contrast to the BBC’s then treatment of victims of terrorism, such as Irish Republican Army bombings, where the unspoken journalistic and political policy was to bring home the atrocity of the event, and the nature of the loss suffered, in as graphic a manner as was acceptable to the audience. This frequently involved close-up coverage of the grief of families affected by the war in Ulster.

Simpson and Suiter have raised issues that also go back to how journalism or journalists deal with affect. Simpson (2001) has looked at the ethical aspects of reporting on the Port Arthur massacre in Tasmania, Australia. Her focus is mainly on the exploitation of victims in grief, and the way the journalistic code of ethics provides little comfort for journalists in this area. Her concerns clearly have to do with managing affective attachments, and respect for the affect of the wounded lives of those in grief, in the context of an ethical code that is restricted in the way it deals with affect. Suiter (2001) looks at the way journalists handle trauma when confronted with death and destruction at a level equivalent to that encountered by emergency workers. Her report mainly looks at issues of affectivity in the context of a professional ‘care of the self’, and how educators and managers can increase awareness of these issues.

The gratuitous emotional grab is well known in Australian current affairs, despite statements in the Australian Journalists’ Association Code of Ethics concerning the need to respect private grief and personal privacy (Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance [MEAA], n.d.). Debate also surrounds showing the impact of violence, or the results of war. As journalist Martin Bell (1999) notes, ‘during 93/94 [civil war in the former Yugoslavia] we were allowed to show almost nothing of the effects of the war and even grief was cut out at one time, the mourning of the
relatives of the victims’. Often these arguments about what is in the public interest, what is in the report, and what is cut out take place in the context of how war should be presented as a messy affair. Nonetheless, a review of journalistic responsibility for affect can go beyond a small-picture representation of the facts to include a big-picture honouring of the context in both personal and policy terms.

Two decades after the Falklands, and ten years on from Croatia, the world is a more media-rich, message-dense, emotion-heavy place, and news and current affairs compete with advertisements for audience attention and affect. To date we have been poorly placed to examine the ways in which the atomisation of audiences in the mass media—the targeting and stratifying of viewers, listeners, and readers—creates a context in which consumers of news material are primed to respond to emotional issues. Such audience members/readers turn to media coverage for guidance on ways of feeling, seeking out collective, accessible positions from which to read and respond to significant issues. Having had their bodily existence altered by the media and modernity, we suggest that the population seeks ‘ways of feeling’ in the media.

If it is the case that a central aspect of our engagement with the developing big media story is a search for ways of feeling, then another question becomes important: to what extent should journalists be responsible for the affective aspects of news communication? What does journalistic responsibility mean when the paradigm shifts away from impartial objectivity to responsible affectivity? What would happen if we regarded the ‘public right to feel’ as equivalent to ‘the public right to know’? We have progressed towards an understanding of the public interest in terms of rights to information: do we have any conception of the public’s right to be ‘emotionally captured’ by a particularly affecting story? Or would the public instead have a right to an unemotional representation of the same material (the USP approach)?

Truth, accuracy, honesty, independence, and fairness of reporting are all values underpinning the conventional ethical frameworks of journalists. However, this framework delimits affective aspects of communication in particular ways, and is a hostage to the dynamics of the newsroom. Where stories are short in length and fight for attention with the advertisements, and with each other, journalists who tell a story well gain notice and appreciation. The ‘good’ telling of a story here is more than accuracy; it is memorability: it is the delivery of emotional impact.

The affective dimension of communication is inadequately handled through notions of ‘distorting emphasis’ versus objective reporting, or unnecessary decoration or garnish to the story. Current provisions in the
Australian journalists’ Association Code of Ethics to do with intrusive journalism, namely ‘resisting the compulsion to intrude’, are admirable in their attempt to respect individual grief and personal privacy. But they also foster a ‘hands-off’ approach to affect that can leave journalists caught out in relation to thinking through the affective aspects of their own practice (see MEAA, n.d.; Simpson, 2001). An ethical response to affectivity would require journalists to consciously weigh the emotional lode of a story, downplaying or highlighting the affective dimension according to accepted and accountable guidelines. At the moment, the affect in news reporting—especially the reporting of war and terror—is largely unspoken, with journalists as the more or less willing participants of a culture that constructs civilian casualties in Afghanistan as collateral damage, while providing a (heartbreaking) biography for every person lost on the 9/11 planes and in the collapse of the twin towers.

It could be argued that affectivity represents a key challenge for the fourth estate, not only in relation to the representation of public opinion (Schultz, 1997, p. 26), but also in terms of the sentiment that has built up regarding the media itself. While journalists continue to discuss the changing role of the press and its fourth-estate role, there is a sense that the fourth-estate framework restricts investigation of the way communities relate to the press as affective enterprises, dealing in ways of feeling. While public or community journalism admirably seeks new forms of public involvement in the media, and questions the linking of media with elites (see Hippocrates, 1999), the affective aspect of journalism is all too often dismissed as belonging to the realm of the tabloid.

The attempt to give the affective dimension of communication greater airing in the news-reporting process has a key place in Bell’s (1999) concept of a ‘journalism of attachment’:

I would describe objective journalism as a sort of bystanders’ journalism, unequal to the challenges of modern times... In proposing an alternative journalism—one that is both balanced and principled—I am not so much calling for a change as describing one that has already taken place. It had to, how else, for instance, were we to report on genocide? Were we to observe it from afar, pass by on the other side, and declare that it was none of our business? It was all of our business, perhaps especially ours because we were the independent witnesses. And if genocide would not move us, nothing would move us, and what would that then say of us?

Being moved, of course, is a key aspect of affect. Part of the politics of attachment—and the recognition of affect—is an acknowledgement that facts are imbricated in a range of complex social, political, and affective dynamics. For Bell, the journalism of attachment is a journalism
that cares as well as knows. Bell put emotions at the centrepiece of the way he wanted to bring people his stories (Horrocks, 2000). In a key point, Bell argues that there is 'nothing object-like about the relationship between the reporter and the event' (Turner and Cunningham, 1997, p. 7) make a related point when they suggest that 'in principle objectivity seems fair enough, as a rule of practice its pursuit is illusory. As an analytical stance objectivity actually becomes more difficult to maintain the more we know about something'.

Our interest here is in affect, and it is from this perspective we consider some criticism of the journalism of attachment from Hume (1998). He writes:

we know that it would be naïve to imagine that there is a tradition of absolute neutrality. However, the idea of objectivity was always in part at least, seen as something people aspired to, but what this new generation of reporters is saying is not only is it impossible to be an objective observer, it is undesirable anyway. That is a sea change in journalistic attitudes, and one that has important implications for journalistic standards, because it seems to me the key shift that has taken place here as far as the self-defined job of a war correspondent is concerned, is one that moves away from analysing or reporting towards one of moralising, and it is that shift from analysing to moralising that really worries me. I think this is a dangerous strand in the 'journalism of attachment,' because what is happening is that these reporters are really acting as self-appointed 'Solomon's [sic] of the cyber age,' who turn up in a war zone anywhere in the world, decree instantaneously which are the forces of good and which are the forces of evil in that conflict. They make instant judgments about good and evil. They helicopter in, make those judgments, take their pictures, and often helicopter straight back out again. Now that, I think, is a journalistic minefield. When you start approaching a conflict from that point of view, you are really wandering into a journalistic minefield. (para. 9)

In terms of a response, we suggest, first, that affect is intrinsically tied to the conditions of journalistic practice. As such, journalists relate to affect not simply in terms of moral absolutes, but pragmatically and professionally. Affectivity arises out of the responsibility of journalists as communicators rather than as self-proclaimed judges. Second, the notion of a responsibility to affect works against the idea of parachuting into a conflict zone, passing judgement, and getting out. A responsibility to affect in this context involves exploring the deeply held convictions of the parties to a conflict, aiming to see and communicate not both, but all aspects of the story. A journalism of affect would thus seek to bring out the complexity implicit in existence: it would recognise
celebration on the streets of Palestine as New York was rocked to its foundations, and would ask the effective and affecting questions of 'Why?' with a preparedness to listen to the answers (no matter how hard).

A responsibility to affect is not necessarily dismissive of concerns that could traditionally be grouped under the heading of 'detachment'. An affective journalism should be able to explore the implications of the continuing reporting of the 9/11 tragedy as a day that changed the world while ignoring legitimate comment on, and comparisons with, Srebrenica, Rwanda, and Bhopal—all communicated much more briefly, with less affective weight, and without an invitation to the news audience to identify with the victims' loss and suffering.

Regarding Hume's (1998) concern over the tendency towards moralisation in the journalism of attachment, we can suggest that an understanding and exploration of the notion of affect has a key role to play both in practice and in the debates upon an appropriate ethical framework for news reporting. Indeed, an orientation towards affect could usefully contribute to a re-thinking of such basic notions as 'coverage' and 'emotional involvement in a story'. Viewed from the perspective of affect, the metaphor of coverage reveals an intolerance or suppressive attitude towards issues of feeling and the affective dimensions of existence. At the same time, an affective viewpoint shows the notion of 'emotional involvement' to be limited, given that stories are by their very nature part of an affective domain. We are always, already, affectively involved.

In recent years, journalism has engaged with a number of competing communications practices or forms, and successfully manned the barricades against them. As a result, some journalists are keen to distance the work they do from, say, public relations practitioners, and are sceptical of sensationalism or tabloid journalism. Problematic here is the way that the affective dimension of communication is often linked to the public's basest interests, or at least to the 'more commercial' news operations (see Lumby, 2002, p. 322). Journalism seeks to exorcise these (demeaning) affective practices, and yet in doing so it risks failing to see its own involvement in the generation of public feeling. A scientific-rationalist conception of objective reporting has contributed to a marginalisation of issues of affect, evident in notions that construct reporters as behaving like a camera, a neutral recording surface (Barnes cited in Lumby, 2002, p. 322). Continued refusal to acknowledge the affective aspect of journalistic practice can lead to issues in the workplace. Suiter (2001) reports the reluctance of journalists suffering trauma to accept coun-

From impartial objectivity to responsible affectivity

25
selling, and also examines the emotional minefield of a workplace where an outburst can mark a journalist ‘soft’. She describes how some journalists lie so as to not have to re-visit their trauma by covering a similar story. Clearly, there are basic issues to do with the relationship between rationality and emotionality, and the feminisation of emotion in workplaces, which need to be examined in this context.

**RATIONALITY, THERAPY, AND EMOTION**

In a personal perspective on September 11, Aufderheide (2002) looks at the relationship between public emotion and journalism. She notes that, following two days of re-runs of the disaster footage, by day three the story had become a therapeutic one about picking up the pieces. This phase of the developing human-interest story implied that ‘empathetic participation in grief and trauma was the road to recovery’ (p. 9). For Aufderheide, the fact that television is an ‘emotion-soaked’ medium made it particularly open to this use. ‘In the US in this crisis, network newsmakers assumed a therapeutic role as grief counsellor for the nation’s inner child, nurturing insecure viewers who had been stripped of their adult self assurance by the shock of the attacks’ (p. 9). Sentimental patriotism became the primary public mode of address: ‘the networks identified themselves with the role of valiant victim’. Aufderheide continues: ‘It was a moment when the training of professional journalists to use scepticism in the service of accuracy clashed with the role of the only national mass media—the networks—to provide emotional reassurance’ (p. 10).

This is arguably not the first moment of its kind. Mellencamp (1998, p. 212) notes that in the context of the assassination of President Kennedy ‘the constant coverage realised television’s potential for collective identification and national cohesion—television’s dream that by informing us and setting a good, calm and rational example via the anchors, the populace could be united, soothed, and finally ennobled by the repetition of and patient waiting for information’. In the context of 9/11, Aufderheide (2002) is ambivalent about the ‘therapeutic patriotism’ that dominated coverage in the first weeks after the attack. As a model of healing, it reflected realities of emotional stress and recovery. At the same time, she argues, therapeutic patriotism can excuse forgetting, and lock America into a removed position from the process of history, and an ‘anti-intellectualism that is paired with confidence in the practical and empirical’. An analysis of the coverage of 9/11 raises many crucial questions for a journalism of affect, its role in moments of crisis, and the dangers of pandering to misplaced gestures of innocence, or ignoring context where these include the complexities of American
foreign policy. For Aufderheide, 'the rupture of daily life with the September 11 attacks potentially offer an opportunity to consider the cost of willful ignorance and to apply both money and imagination to an enduringly patriotic cause: informing the American public’ (p. 11). In countries other than America, this patriotism itself can be unpacked (and should be unpacked) to reflect the debate in that non-American nation about the specific relevance of the 9/11 attacks on America to non-American nations. As the war on terror widens to include people increasingly distant from the supposed masterminds behind the perpetrators of 9/11, this duty becomes increasingly pressing.

While Aufderheide (2002) usefully identifies and describes therapeutic patriotism, there is a sense in which she opposes this communicative raison d’être to champion a more rational program of public information, and also sees this as linked to a moment of crisis. We suggest that a program of informing the public need not be an antithesis of an increased attention to affectivity, but can be enhanced by a journalism of affectivity. Affectivity is an important aspect of public information (which is why it is so prone to commodification, especially in sports broadcasting and interviews with athletes at the track or the pool focusing on ‘how it all feels’). Affectivity does not have to mean loss of perspective. Finding a perspective can indeed result from recognition of affective investment. Additionally, we contend that there is a need to re-think the role of television as an ‘emotion-soaked medium’, both to further the development of a journalism with some emotional intelligence, and also to question any emphasis on public information that leaves out issues of affect. Indeed, an analysis of affect is required if we are to update fourth-estate ideals, and make them more relevant to the new media age. Soloman (n.d.) notes that, when President Bush stated that ‘This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil’, the media reactions were overwhelmingly favourable. Where there are acts that are absolutely evil—such as 9/11—it is a fallacy to generalise from the act to the people who perpetrated them. Factoring in affect is one way to explore and report a world in which people are rarely unambiguously absolutely good or absolutely evil. Affectivity, we suggest, involves a continued interrogation of absolutes.

Affect is unpredictable. It can be individual and collective. It can be objective and subjective, and problematises that neat dichotomy. At times it can be falsified as incorrect, and at other times it is ‘real’ in the sense that it is part of a culture and resists falsification. There is also much about affectivity we have not discussed: for example, the way words and images can affect us in different ways. With the unpre-
dictability of affect in mind, what we are proposing is not some therapy for journalism. Indeed, we are wary of this gesture. Emotion has had bad press in most western cultures. It has been set up as the opposite to rationality, and has been caught up in a gendered structuring of what is strong and what is weak. Affect has, through these operations, been set up for therapy. It has been corralled into a certain style of behaviour. It has been individualised, and subject to an 'effects' or 'stimulus-response' paradigm of research. Beyond this paradigm, affectivity abounds throughout culture, in the way we are moved by a work of art, and experience feeling, moods, and genres. It is in this sense integral to communication.

What we are proposing, then, is not a (new age) program for healing, but rather a careful re-thinking through the relationships between journalists, journalism, stories, and the world, and the ethical framework within which these are put together. Our claim is that alongside the press's established responsibilities concerning democracy, the provision of information, informed debate, and accuracy, journalism should consider a responsibility to affect.

On a more immediate level, if we accept the necessity of a new perspective on affective reporting, we must also come to terms with the ways in which a responsibility to affect will change the notion of ethics implicit in journalistic codes of practice. Increasingly, these codes are models of professional behaviour designed for highly commercial media environments. They are secular codes respectful of power and of the rights of the individual, as well as respectful of the rights of others. Such ethical codes tend to value the notion that 'journalists describe society to itself', and have a responsibility to hold a mirror to cultural policy and practice. There is a sense, in the reporting of 9/11 and other wars and disasters, that society is in the process of fracturing across multiple affective zones—a situation that no mirror can reflect. Journalists are no longer solely involved in telling us our stories: increasingly, they are suggesting how we should feel about them. The time has come for journalists to be up-front and responsible about their role in this process.

Notes
1. Echoing Evans's perception of 'pornography', 'The BBC's head of newsgathering, Adrian Van Klaveren, said a distinction should be made between showing distressing images of people close to death as breaking news coverage, and showing them as edited highlights packages' (Wells, 2001).
2. One of the first innovations of the cyber-era was the invention of the emoticon: the shorthand communication of emotion (as information) via the keyboard.

3. Dunlevy (1998, p. 123) has discussed how notions of scientific discipline have influenced the separation of fact and value in journalistic practice.


5. Recent initiatives such as the ‘World’s Biggest Hug for Peace’ demonstrate that this therapeutic discourse has itself evolved, and there is evidence to suggest that this approach is not just about forgetting the horror of the event. For example: ‘we at the “World’s Biggest Hug for Peace” feel that the lessons of this tragedy have not yet been learned. The same problems we face every day on our streets are translating to the unresolved fear and hatred that currently divides nations’ (World Peace Society, 2002).

REFERENCES


