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Information  
Security Technical  
Report

## Digital forensics and the issues of identity

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### 1. Introduction

There are an increasing number of issues that relate to the identity of all users of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT). These are challenging not only individuals and organisations but also the law enforcement community. At perhaps the most fundamental level is the question of what we commonly consider to be the identity of an individual. Prior to the introduction of widely used ICT, in the developed world the identity of an individual was established and normally based upon documentary evidence. This was typically in the form of a birth certificate, a passport, an Identity card or some other, normally attested document such as a social security card or a driving license. Based on these documents, people had just one identity. The use of these documents was not foolproof and all could be forged, copied or stolen, although the effort required to acquire the original document and to produce a copy that would pass even the most cursory of inspections, somewhat limited this threat. As the use of ICT has increased, people in developing countries have gained access to global communications and the services that can be accessed through them. Many of these countries do not have creditable document sources on which an identity can be founded. The birth certificate, which in the West is accepted as the foundation document for a persons' identity, in other countries either does not exist or is not held in a centralized system.

The concept of a person having one, unique identity has also changed. In the digital environment there are now a number of arguments for a single person having multiple identities. Examples of this might be one identity that is used for social networking while another that is used for on-line banking or shopping. This is a totally different approach to that which is normally applied in the physical world and as a result can be difficult to reconcile.

### 2. The changing environment

The introduction of a wide range of technologies has changed the whole environment we operate in. We find ourselves having a greater dependence on ICT systems. This is not to say that the environment has changed because of the technologies, but rather the new technologies have led to the introduction of products and services that have allowed society to change to meet a range of aspirations and pressures. In the last thirty years or so we have seen the introduction of public access to the internet and have now reached a point where mobile communications for both voice and data is almost ubiquitous. We can now easily check our location and share this information through the use of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology. This has become embedded in most mobile devices such as laptop computers, handheld devices such as Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), mobile phones and even cameras.

In the computer environment, we have seen a progression from centralized management of computer systems, where organisations owned the infrastructure and could more easily control access to their systems, to the Internet and the use of the public infrastructure, where access to a system can potentially be gained at low or no cost from anywhere in the globe. At the same time the range of methods of access to an ICT system have grown from having to connect directly to a system by cable, to dial up access over the fixed telephony system to the current situation where it is possible to connect from a mobile handheld device (mobile phone, PDA, Netbook, laptop) via wireless access points or the mobile telephony system. It is currently possible in most parts of the world to obtain an anonymous email account through Hotmail or Google or a host of other sources and to gain anonymous access to the internet from either WiFi hotspots or from an untraceable pay-as-you-go mobile phone. This is before other

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illicit methods of connection such as the hijacking of poorly protected home hubs is considered.

All of the advances in the technologies have not only made it increasingly easy to gain access to information, but have also made the issue of identifying the user more difficult as the credentials that they have to use to 'prove' their identity have had to become more international, more electronically based, and as a result, more difficult to validate.

Into this scenario we are seeing the introduction of services such as the ePassport and eVoting. A number of countries have introduced the ePassport, which aims to create harder to forge documents by digitally protecting and storing the information in embedded chips. When this was introduced in the UK, it was quickly demonstrated that the system was flawed and that the RFID tag could be cloned (Boggan, 2008; Zetter, 2006) within a very short period.

### 3. Identity in a global environment

One issue that has proven to be an increasing challenge to determining identity occurs when it becomes necessary to transliterate names from one language to another, for example from Russian or Chinese or Arabic to English. An open and wide interpretation is exhibited not only in the way in which the name is constructed, but also the way in which the name is translated. An example of this might be the translation of the name Mohammed Bin Hussein Bin Faisal Al Qhatani from Arabic to English. The name might be constructed from the Given Name, the Patronym (fathers name) and the Family Name or Tribal Name, but the patronym or the Tribal name may be omitted for convenience. In addition, the word "Bin" which means "Son of" and "Al" which means "the" can be also omitted. In some countries like Moritania, the word "Bin" is replaced by the word "Weld". So the aforementioned name can take different forms of transliteration as Mohammed Bin Hussein Faisal, Mohammed FaisalAlQahtani, Mohammed Hussein Qahtani, Mohmmmed Hussein Faisal, etc. More seriously, each element of the name can be transliterated in a number of ways. For example, Mohammed can be represented as Mohammed, Mohammad, Mohamed, Muhammad, Muhammed, Muhamed, Mehmed, Muhamed, Muhammet, Muhamet, Mehmet or even Mohd.

This provides a huge potential for accidental or intentional confusion over the identity of an individual.

### 4. Social networking

One of the ways in which we communicate and share information has also changed significantly with the near ubiquitous availability and use of the World Wide Web has been the advent of social networking sites. There are currently in excess of 650 such sites, with nearly seventy of them claiming in excess of one million users. Facebook alone claimed over 500 million subscribers (Facebook Blog, 2010) in July 2010. Together with the popularity of social network sites have come warnings and reports of their use by criminals to gain information that is subsequently used to 'steal' the users identity (BBC News, 2007; Perez, 2009).

There is the obvious problem of account hijacking, which can and has been used to extort money from friends who do not know to double check a plea for help via different channels (Sullivan, 2009). But more sinister is the use of public knowledge in one social network to gain trust in another (Elgan, 2008). If you can become a "friend" of someone in one social network, it is possible to learn enough about them to impersonate them in another.

In the past, people mostly shared personal information with trusted friends when they met in person, during telephone conversations or via a letter. This limited the number of people who gained first hand access to the information and, with the exception of the letter, meant that there was no long term record of the information that was exchanged. With Social Networking, the number of people that an individual shares information with has increased dramatically (according to Facebook (Facebook Statistics), users have an average of 130 'friends') who have visibility of any information that a user posts. So we now have a vastly expanded circle of people who have instant access to personal information, combined with the fact that there is now a permanent record of all of the information that is posted. Consequently, we see a corresponding increase in the level of risk that the information may be misused in some way.

You would hope that the creators of these social networks would strive to make them safe. Any harm that comes to their users through Identity Theft is bad for business. Unfortunately, commercial pressures, whether in the form of advertising or as a result of the desire to capture the live-search/trending topics market is pushing us towards more open networks. The defaults are clearly in place to expose as much personal information as possible. Consider the case of Rebecca Javeleau (Jamieson, 2010) who wanted to invite fifteen of her friends to her birthday party. Over 20,000 Facebook users RSVP'd. Similar episodes in the past have lead to serious property damage (Daily Telegraph, 2010). Though the risk of such highly-publicized events is great, the ones that get so much attention are not the greatest threat, as they are likely to at least provide warning for any adults involved. How many children's birthday parties have been organized on Facebook where instead of thousands, only a handful of strangers learned the details?

For the most part, users of the world wide web and in particular of social network sites have continued the way they approach information sharing in the physical world into the electronic environment, but without realizing that the use of the new environment has changed the level of risk.

In the electronic world, the risk has increased in a number of ways. Firstly, the majority of people appear to be much less cautious about who they accept into their circle of friends. Recent experiments have shown that nearly 40 percent of people asked to be a 'friend' of a character that had been created, but that did not actually exist, accepted the character as a friend within a very short period of time. This gave the character access to the personal details that they had posted and also to the details of their other friends. For a criminal intent on blackmail, identity theft or cyber-stalking, this level of access to an individual's information provides a rich environment in which to operate. There now exists a market for the buying and selling of social network accounts, offering

261 financial rewards for access to a large number of people's  
262 information (Milner, 2010). The level of incidents of identity  
263 theft has continued to rise with reports of almost ten million  
264 US citizens affected during the year 2008 according to a report  
265 by The Javelin Strategy & Research Center (*Identity Theft*  
266 *Statistics, 2009*), a rise of 20% on the previous year.  
267

## 268 5. Technology

269 As the technologies have developed and become increasingly  
270 widely used, there has been a massive increase in the range of  
271 devices that might be used. We have moved from mainframe  
272 computers with 'dumb' terminals, to servers and networked  
273 PCs, laptops, PDAs, mobile phones, Netbooks, smart phones to  
274 the iPad and similar devices. We have also seen the intro-  
275 duction of a range of other digital devices including cameras,  
276 MP3 players and GPS devices, all of which have the capacity to  
277 store digital information. At the same time the storage  
278 capacity of the devices has continued to grow rapidly, which  
279 has meant that the volume of information that is stored on the  
280 devices is greater and as a result, takes longer to analyse. For  
281 the digital investigator, this has meant that they potentially  
282 have to have an in-depth understanding of an ever widening  
283 set of devices, their operating systems and the applications  
284 that they support. For any one investigator the diversity of  
285 devices has now passed the point where they can realistically  
286 be expected to have an in-depth knowledge of more than one  
287 or two of the device groups and has meant that they have had  
288 to specialize in specific areas. This in turn has put increasing  
289 pressure on an already limited resource and may mean that  
290 for an investigation into one incident in which a range of  
291 devices are involved, several investigators may be required.  
292

## 293 6. Proving an identity

294 Both the theft of an identity or the use of a false identity in any  
295 digital environment is relatively easy. From this it follows that  
296 establishing the identity of a suspect to a point where it is  
297 beyond reasonable doubt is also increasingly difficult. In  
298 digital forensics, it has been relatively achievable to determine  
299 the computer or device that has been used in the commission  
300 of a crime. What has always been more difficult is proving  
301 who was using the device at the time and whether they were  
302 in control of the device and responsible for actions taken on it.  
303 The latter is increasingly a problem as malware has made  
304 modern computers unreliable. The problem now is how far  
305 does an investigator have to go to 'prove' that the suspect was  
306 using the device at the time in question and whether they  
307 were responsible for the actions taken by the device.  
308

309 This was highlighted in the UK with the Caffrey case (*BBC*  
310 *News, 2003*) in 2003 when the 'Trojan Defence' was first  
311 successfully used. In this case, the suspect claimed that  
312 a trojan (malicious code installed on a system by disguising  
313 itself as something benign) had acted on his computer without  
314 his knowledge and then deleted itself from the system,  
315 leaving no trace. He was subsequently acquitted of the charge.  
316

317 Proving the identity of the person who had operated  
318 a computer would be a relatively simple matter for the digital  
319

320 forensic investigator if, amongst other things, there was no  
321 malicious software and people protected their access  
322 credentials for a device and did not share them, either  
323 intentionally or inadvertently. It would also help if they  
324 selected strong passwords or used dual factor authentication  
325 and logged off the device when they had finished using the  
326 system. Unfortunately, the real situation is very different.  
327 People do not take this level of care in protecting the access to  
328 their systems and, as a result, the accountability for actions  
329 taken using the device is more difficult to determine. This  
330 means that proving a specific individual was using a device at  
331 a specific time and that they knew what actions were being  
332 performed on that device can be difficult or impossible. It is  
333 rarely possible to achieve this using just the records and logs  
334 that are maintained by the devices and systems being used  
335 and it is often a combination of records that will provide the  
336 required level of confidence. This may be a combination of the  
337 login details on the device, coupled with access control logs  
338 for the area in which the device was located (if the suspect was  
339 the only person in the room at the time that the device  
340 was used, the main problem remaining is to prove that there  
341 was no malicious software running on the system).  
342

343 There are three sources of information from which an  
344 identity can be verified. Traditionally these have been using  
345 something that you know (a password) or something that  
346 you own (a token) or something that you are (a biometric  
347 such as a fingerprint or a retinal scan). The use of two  
348 factor authentication (two methods of identification) has  
349 been used increasingly to improve the level of confidence  
350 that the identity of a person is correct. Two factor  
351 authentication usually takes an identifying feature from  
352 two separate areas, such as a password and a token. This  
353 can significantly increase the confidence that the user is  
354 the person that they claim to be, but unfortunately even  
355 this is not foolproof.  
356

357 The use of biometrics as a means of identification has  
358 existed for some time now and there has been a gradual  
359 improvement in the range of measures that can be used and  
360 the effectiveness of the systems used to capture the  
361 measurements. The range of measures that can be taken  
362 includes fingerprints, retinal scanning, voice recognition,  
363 wrist vein patterns, facial features and gait characteristics as  
364 well as keyboard input measurements, to name just the most  
365 common. One problem is that most biometric measurements  
366 are not universally applicable, for example elderly pop-  
367 ulations and manual labourers are often unable to enroll in  
368 a fingerprint biometric system.  
369

370 The use of something that you own (normally a 'dongle' or  
371 a token which generates a one-time use numeric string) is an  
372 alternative, but also has potential problems. If you have  
373 a token for each separate account, you need to carry and  
374 protect them, which can be inconvenient and confusing. If  
375 you lose a token, it can be used by someone else who may try  
376 to guess the password. The loss of a token may also be  
377 extremely inconvenient and result in a denial of access to  
378 systems at a time when you need it most. The replacement of  
379 a lost token may also take some time.  
380

381 While the use of passwords has long been regarded as  
382 a weak form of identification, there does not yet seem to be  
383 sufficient confidence for organisations and users to adopt just  
384

one of the other means of identification. However, the use of the flawed password system in conjunction with either a biometric measurement or a token significantly improves the likelihood that the user is who they claim to be.

## 7. How far do you have to go to prove the identity of a person?

Forensic science has developed significantly during the past century and we now have at our disposal the means to identify people through their fingerprints, their DNA and a range of other less common measures. In the area of ICT, digital forensics has also developed rapidly. Towards the end of the last century we saw the rise of computer forensics which started to examine the evidence that was available on computer hard disks and on logs maintained by the networks. This has developed with the changes in technology to the digital forensics of today that examines not only the hard disks of computers but also the storage media of Netbooks, PDAs, mobile phones including smart phones, games consoles, GPS systems, MP3 players, cameras and a range of other technologies.

As the range of devices has increased, the storage media has become capable of containing ever larger volumes of data and the software has become ever more sophisticated, so the job of identifying the user of the device has become more complex.

Identifying the device that was used when an incident occurred and tying it to the person who was using it at the time in question are two of the major challenges. This has always been a problem in digital forensics and it is often the case that the information available on the device itself is not sufficient to prove who the user was. In many cases, it is actually necessary to catch the person in the act or to find corroborating evidence from other sources. The increasing popularity of cloud computing may cause additional problems for the forensic investigator, as information that was previously stored on the device that was used by a suspect may now be stored elsewhere and may not be easily accessible.

The investigator must, in most scenarios, provide enough evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the suspect was the person who was in control of the device when the actions took place. If a biometric authentication measure was used to access the device, it is unlikely that the fact that the user was operating the device would be challenged. The same does not apply to passwords and tokens as they could have been obtained and used by someone else. The investigator also has to be able to show that the device was not under the control of malicious software and that the user had knowledge of the actions that were taking place on the device. This may be achievable from the records that are created and retained by the device, such as typed search terms, network connections, SMSs or calls made. It can also be strongly inferred by the profiling of a users activity on the device over a period of time.

## 8. Conclusions

Establishing the identity of a user of a device and proving beyond a reasonable doubt that they were in control of a device at a specific time has always been difficult. The increased globalization of communications and easier and cheaper access has resulted in massively increased volumes of traffic and a much wider range of available services. This has lead to many more people using the Internet and sharing, either intentionally or inadvertently, information about themselves that can be used by others to steal their identity. At the same time, the technologies have developed to support the increasing demand for access to information at any time or place. The result is that while determining the identity of a user on a network or a device is less easy, the range of devices that must be examined and the storage capacity of these devices has continued to increase. In short, proving the identity of a user of a device without external corroboration is becoming increasingly difficult.

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