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Evaluation of Indigenous justice programs Project D. Safe Aboriginal Youth Patrol programs in New South Wales and Northbridge policy and Juvenile Aid Group in Western Australia

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Project D

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Northbridge Policy and Juvenile Aid Group in Western Australia

Final Report

Trudi Cooper¹, Margaret Sims², John Scott², Pamela Henry¹, Elaine Barclay² and Terence Love¹

¹ Edith Cowan University

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Project D

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Northbridge Policy and Juvenile Aid Group in Western Australia**

Final Report

**Trudi Cooper¹, Margaret Sims², John Scott², Pamela Henry¹, Elaine Barclay² and
Terence Love¹**

¹ Edith Cowan University

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An evaluation commissioned by the
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The NSW team undertook field visits to each of the sites across NSW in which the program is operating. During these site visits, team members met some wonderful people who were exceptionally generous with their time and justly proud of the work they were doing. We want to express our sincere gratitude towards all of these people: those working in services, those receiving services and those community members who shared a passionate commitment to the wellbeing of young people. Thank you all for the time you shared with us, for your commitment and your passion.

Executive Summary

In this evaluation, we examined two different approaches to delivery of Community and Night patrol services for young people: the *Safe Aboriginal Youth Patrol programs* (SAYP) of NSW, and the *Northbridge Policy project* (NPP) sometimes also called the *Young People in Northbridge project*, in Perth, Western Australia. The overarching focus of this evaluation was to determine whether the programs should be considered as examples of ‘good practice’ to be replicated elsewhere, and to find evidence of outcomes achieved by each program.

Efficacy of night patrols

In the academic literature on night patrols we found two approaches to night patrols were well-established, and a third approach was emergent. The three approaches identified were:

- **Night patrols-for-community development**
- **Night patrols-for-crime prevention**, and
- **Night patrols-as (part of)-integrated-welfare-services** (emergent).

There was extensive literature on the established approaches to night patrols but only limited discussion of night patrols as part of integrated welfare services provision. Some night patrols appear to have both community development and crime prevention goals. To ascertain the primary orientation of patrols, it is necessary to determine whether the primary purpose of a patrol is community development, with expectation that successful community development would reduce crime; or whether the primary purpose is crime prevention, and community development occurs incidentally to crime prevention.

According to the literature:

- Night patrols that use *community development approaches* address the social causes of crime, but are difficult to sustain in communities where they are most needed because of lack of community leaders, lack of volunteers and community fragmentation and conflict.
- Previous evaluations indicated that *community involvement in governance* was essential to long-term success of patrols, and enabled patrols to be responsive to community needs.
- *Separation of management from service provision* allows community patrols to focus on service delivery, but: reduces community involvement in the governance and management of the patrol; may limit the credibility of the patrol in the local community; and does not contribute to building community capacity.
- Night patrols that focus narrowly on immediate crime prevention and community safety do not address the underlying social causes of crime, and may give rise to

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perceptions that night patrols only operate 'booze buses' and free transport that facilitate and normalise anti-social conduct.

- Patrols that focus narrowly on immediate crime prevention do not address the underlying social causes of crime, and at worst, increase community dependency on external intervention.
- An *integrated welfare approach* potentially allows programs to be implemented in environments where community development approaches have not been sustainable.
- *Integrated welfare approaches* that do not promote community development are vulnerable to the same criticisms as other night patrol programs that ignore community development. At worst, they will become self-defeating because they increase dependency on welfare services without changing underlying social conditions that are precursors of crime. To counter this risk, integrated welfare services approaches need to incorporate community development and community governance as essential elements in the model.

These findings provided reference points for this evaluation.

Good practice from previous literature

The *Pathways to Prevention* project recommended social crime prevention as a basis for crime prevention policy. In accordance with this approach, we concluded that:

- It is insufficient for patrols to focus only upon immediate crime prevention without consideration of how patrols might contribute to changing the underlying social conditions that are precursors to crime.
- Community development approaches are essential for long-term community capacity building.
- Capacity building is required to enable community representatives to actively engage in effective governance of community programs.
- Effective community governance enables programs to be responsive to locally identified needs, and increases active community support for patrols.
- Night patrols have the capability to contribute to change of underlying social conditions, including building community capacity, if provided with suitable support.
- In some communities, a community development approach alone will not be sustainable, especially where communities are fragmented or where there are entrenched conflicts.
- In fragmented or conflicted communities, *community development approaches* have more chance of success if supplemented by an *integrated welfare approach*.
- Capability and quality of night patrols increases when staff have access to administrative support, mentoring, professional supervision and appropriate additional training to extend their skills.

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- *Integrated welfare approaches* alone, without *community development*, risk disempowering local communities and increasing dependency and alienation.
- Youth night patrols with a welfare and community development foci would benefit from adopting methods and training developed for *detached youth work*.
- Indigenous ownership and involvement in night patrols and their governance is essential where patrols provide a service to Indigenous young people.
- Patrols do not have formal power, and operate by the consent of community members. Dual accountability of night patrols, to both the funding body and the local community, is important to ensure patrols have adequate community support to enable them to function effectively.

We concluded that the emergent model of night-patrols-as-integrated-welfare-services provides a promising future direction for night patrols. Lessons from previous evaluations reported in the literature indicate that such a model will need to incorporate community development and have strong community governance to overcome the limitations identified in evaluations of other night patrol models. The evaluations we conducted of the SAYP and NPP lend support to findings about the importance of community development and of strong community governance.

Contrasts between SAYP and NPP

We were asked to focus the evaluation differently for the SAY and Northbridge Policy programs because the two models of service delivery were developed in response to different policy goals. The SAY and NP programs were applied in sharply contrasting geographical and social contexts. They were informed by different values and program logic assumptions. For example, the two program models took opposite positions on the importance of voluntary engagement with the service and the use of mandatory powers to remove young people from the streets. The two programs also interacted differently with the communities they served and were organised and funded differently. The NPP was much better resourced than the SAYP and also had more onerous statutory duties.

Effectiveness of current SAY programs

We determined from the SAYP program logic model that the intended main focus of SAY patrols was integrated crime prevention and community safety. The model developed for the SAY programs incorporated some elements of good practice identified in the literature. For example, in the SAY programs in some communities there was effective community management and governance of the patrol. In some communities, patrol staff had built strong relationships with the young people who used the services and with their families, and patrols addressed needs identified by the communities in which they were located. Patrols were valued by the Indigenous community primarily for their contribution to the safety of children and young people and, secondarily, for their contribution to crime prevention. The SAYP service was considered by Indigenous informants to be culturally

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appropriate. Relationships between police and SAY patrols varied. In some communities relationships were very good, and in other communities they were strained. Despite this, police in most communities stated that they believed SAY patrols contributed to strategies for both crime reduction and prevention of victimisation.

The evaluation found that implementation of the SAY model varied between communities. At its best, according to participants, the model enabled community governance of the patrol with community involvement in the delivery of the patrol. However, in practice, community governance was mixed, and in some communities, participants felt there should be more capacity to adapt the night patrol provision to the specific needs of their community. The SAY patrols were funded to provide services, usually in conjunction with a Police and Citizens' Youth Centre (PCYC) program. Again, according to participants, the operational practices of patrols varied between locations. Some patrols provided little more than a much-needed transport service for young people from outlying communities to enable them to attend the PCYC. Other SAY patrols became more involved in young people's lives and operated similarly to a detached youth work service. These patrols sought to provide more extensive welfare and social education support to young people. In several communities, referral options were very limited. In a few communities the SAY night patrol provided the only youth service in the locality.

In response to specific questions posed about SAY programs we were told by participants that children and young people were on the streets at night because of boredom; because of heat; because it is safer on the street than at home; because they are hungry; because in some communities they don't consider it is important to go to school; and because of lack of transport to go anywhere else.

In response to a question about community perceptions of SAY programs, the study found most Indigenous stakeholders valued the provision of safe transport, safe activities and welfare support. Police valued the contribution of the patrol to community safety and crime prevention. The evaluators were asked to identify the referral processes used by SAY programs and found patrols attended interagency meetings in all communities and provided informal referral; however, in some communities, referrals were hampered by lack of services. This was identified as a severe problem, especially when there was no safe place to take a young person.

Good practice standards

The study was asked to develop good practice standards. Our suggestions are based upon the model of good practice developed from the literature. The main findings of the evaluation are:

- Patrols were highly valued by young people and the Indigenous community, and this offers opportunities to strengthen youth work and community development.
- For long-term community change, stability of funding is important. Patrols have been funded for four years. In some communities, a longer term commitment to stable

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funding is necessary to enable positive changes to underlying community conditions that provide the precursors to crime. Ideally, funding would be on-going, subject to satisfactory reporting and outcomes.

- The processes of accountability negotiated between the funding body and the local community should accommodate the need for accountability to both the funding body and the local community; funding and accountability could then be linked to an individually-negotiated service charter.
- The SAY program would be strengthened by the capacity for communities to tailor night patrol programs to their specific needs within parameters set by the DAGJ.
- There was evidence of community support for the establishment of integrated services. To realise this aspiration would require training, mentoring and professional supervision support for SAY patrol staff.
- Across-government departmental collaboration would be beneficial to examine possible responses to the identified needs for additional referral services in some communities. Perceived needs included safe houses for children and young people to provide temporary emergency accommodation if their family home is unsafe and no safe alternative can be found; and specialist mental health services.
- Many rural communities suffer rural transport deficits. SAY night patrols need access to a bus two or three times per week. A community bus that permitted multiple uses might be used on a shared cost basis: by the night patrol; by the school; by seniors clubs; by sports groups; for transport to health care appointments; and by bona fide community groups. Potentially, it could allow the possibility of a bus service run by a local not-for-profit organisation staffed by voluntary drivers.

The evaluation was asked to investigate how the SAYP could improve its capacity to work proactively with young people. Our recommendations are that it is important to recruit staff who can build positive relationships, especially with young people who mistrust adults in general, and authority figures in particular. For proactive work with 'hard-to-reach' young people, adults require particular skills and attitudes to enable them to establish a trusting relationship with young people. Trust-building also requires frequent contact to foster and maintain relationships. Qualified youth workers have these skills.

A limitation of current service provision is that some programs reported that they found it hard to recruit any staff to the service, even untrained staff. In these circumstances the reasons for the recruitment difficulty need to be addressed, because without a suitable number and calibre of staff, the program cannot operate effectively.

Recommendations for SAYP improvement

In the context of suggestions for good practice outlined in the previous paragraph, the evaluators make the following recommendations for program improvement:

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1. Additional support and guidance from the DAGJ for SAY program patrollers and SAY program service management on all aspects of program planning, development and evaluation, including:
 - a. how to develop, plan and manage youth programs to meet intended short-term, medium-term and long-term program outcomes;
 - b. advice and logistical support on how to plan and manage services over Christmas periods and other public holidays; and,
 - c. practical assistance with formative program evaluation that will provide patrols with feedback about aspects of the program that needs attention or development.
2. On-going training and retraining for SAY program staff.
3. Encouragement for police officers to work with SAY youth services and support night patrols possibly through Memoranda of Understanding that acknowledge their distinct roles and priorities.
4. More clearly focussed requirements for criminal record checks for patrol staff (see, for example, the WA Working with Children Check process), so potential SAY patrol members who present no risk to children and young people are not debarred from employment due to conviction for minor offences irrelevant to their work as a patrol officer.
5. Extend the hours of operation for SAY programs.
6. Offer SAY night patrol programs in partnership with SAY activity programs or similar programs.
7. Establish Safe houses/Youth refuges in communities where there is a need.
8. Increase the availability of youth services targeting 16-18 year olds where there is an identified gap in service provision for this group.
9. Provide clear guidelines for SAY management to enable greater use of the patrol bus for community activities when not required by the patrol.
10. Extend the healthy food program within the SAY activities model. There is an urgent need to address the problem of access to fresh, cheap food for young people, particularly in remote communities.

Effectiveness of NPP

The NPP used its night patrol as part of an integrated welfare service. From the initial NPP program logic model, it appeared the NPP had two foci: welfare protection of those aged under 16 years (Category 1 in the NPP policy document); and, crime reduction and prevention of anti-social behaviour by young people, including those aged 16-17 years (Category 2 in the NPP policy document). Interview data confirmed that since 2008, the focus of the project had prioritised welfare and child protection (Category 1). Since 2008, the project no longer prioritised the direct crime reduction/prevention of anti-social behaviour element of its remit (Category 2). This decision seemed well-justified and

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concentrated resources towards the younger age group, where early intervention might be expected to have the most positive impact.

The model developed by the NPP incorporated several elements of good practice identified in the literature. For example, NPP had developed excellent training, support, mentoring and professional development systems, and maintained comprehensive records of all apprehensions. NPP had also developed inter-agency collaboration systems that functioned well. These were documented in a formalised partnership agreement that described in detail job descriptions, the roles and responsibilities of all partners in the project, and agreements about communication, conflict resolution and information sharing. The outreach team used detached youth work methods to make contact with young people, and, if the young people were judged to be at low risk, to divert them away from Northbridge by giving them a free transport voucher to get home.

There were two important elements in the NPP model of service delivery. Firstly, the NPP aimed to provide crisis protection to children and young people found in Northbridge without adult supervision. The evidence collected in this evaluation showed that this crisis protection service was provided effectively. Secondly, the NPP aimed to provide a pro-active family support service to improve parenting skills and support families to keep children and young people away from dangerous situations. The evaluation found that this part of the service was not working well because families were reluctant to voluntarily engage with the service, and few of those who were offered this service accepted.

We determined there were a number of possible reasons why this might be. The NPP service delivery model did not incorporate any provision for community governance or community development, or any on-going meaningful connection with the communities from which the young people were drawn. The literature review had indicated that community development and community governance were important elements of night patrol models designed to address the underlying social conditions that were precursors of crime. In the NPP model, we found that *involuntary* apprehension of young people was in tension with the expectation that their families *voluntarily* engaged with the same organisations. There was also potential tension between the *involuntary* apprehension of young people by police in the NPP and the detached youth work methods used by the DCP outreach team, which place a high value on the importance of voluntary relationships with young people.

The evaluation brief posed specific evaluation questions about the Northbridge Policy Program (NPP). The NPP potentially responds to young people aged 17 years or less. In this evaluation, we were asked to investigate the effects of the project on young people aged 13-15 years and on children aged 12 years and under. We concluded that it was highly likely that the numbers of unaccompanied children and young people in Northbridge at night had declined since 2003 and it was likely that the NPP contributed to this. The evidence from interviews and crime data supported this interpretation, but other changes in the area and

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the lack of baseline data prior to program implementation in 2003 made data interpretation uncertain.

Apprehensions of young people aged 13-15 years have *risen* slightly over the life of the Northbridge Policy project. The proportion of Indigenous children and young people apprehended has declined in all categories, but remains high for children aged 12 or less. Children aged 12 years or less represent a relatively small portion of those apprehended, and there has been no consistent trend in apprehension in this age group. Before 2006, girls and young women were approximately twice as likely to be apprehended as boys and young men of the same age. Since 2008, data for apprehensions shows no significant gender difference.

Analysis of the distribution of home suburb of children and young people apprehended provided some support for the belief that the young people apprehended were likely to have originated in the suburbs to the south east of Perth. However, the data showed that significant numbers of young people travelled from suburbs located north and east of Perth and from suburbs located south west of Perth.

Information was provided by WA Police about crime incidents that involved young people in Northbridge, Perth CBD and Burswood. The WA Police crime data was consistent with the perception of stakeholders that crime committed by young people in Northbridge had decreased, and the NPP had led some young people to avoid Northbridge and re-locate to Burswood, where there is less surveillance.

We were asked to determine whether the boundaries of the current Northbridge designation were appropriate, and we concluded there will be no rationale for the present boundary to the Northbridge designated area after 2014, when the rail line will no longer separate the Perth CBD from Northbridge. We found no evidence of the displacement of children and young people from Northbridge to the CBD, which had been reported in a previous evaluation. We were asked to determine whether children and young people had altered their behaviour to circumvent apprehension. There was convincing evidence that a large number of Indigenous young people had been displaced from Northbridge and, at the time of the data collection, gathered in an area near Burswood station. They were no longer exposed to the threats to their safety inherent in the environment of Northbridge, but were subject to different threats to safety, and may have been at equal or greater risk.

We were asked to determine the efficacy of NPP referrals. We found that after apprehension most young people (over 80%) were transported home, and that no other referral was deemed necessary. If young people were apprehended more than twice, or if there were safety concerns, they were allocated case work support, which might include limited support of a single visit by Killara or Mission Australia staff and an information pack, or voluntary intensive support, delivered by Mission Australia or Killara, or referral to DCP for involuntary supervision. Only a small number of families received intensive support.

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Representatives from all service providers with a family support responsibility reported reluctance of most families to engage with family support services.

We were asked to determine outcomes of the NPP from the perspectives of different service providers, stakeholders and affected families and young people. From the perspective of the core group of service providers (Police, DCP and Mission Australia), beneficial outcomes included crisis protection of vulnerable children and young people (Category 1); prevention of harm; the capacity to offer preventative family support; and successful collaboration and service integration, which improved service delivery to children and young people. Partner services agreed that the NPP provided crisis protection of vulnerable children and young people (Category 1) and prevention of harm. They also believed that the project had facilitated successful collaboration and service integration that improved service delivery to children and young people. Representatives of both the core group of services providers and partner organisations agreed the project had facilitated information sharing and cross-referral between organisations. However, representatives of some project partner organisations were concerned about displacement of young people to potentially riskier locations and questioned whether the NPP achieved long-term positive change for families and young people.

We did not have access to any families of young people affected by the policy so we gained no direct evidence about the perspective of families and young people. Indirect evidence, including the reported reluctance of families to voluntarily engage with the support services, is indicative of a lack of positive support for the NPP from many families and young people.

Elements of good practice in the NPP model

The evaluators identified the following elements of good practice within the NPP model:

- **The funding model:** At the time of the evaluation, most key staff had on-going employment, and the service was funded on a recurrent basis.
- **The collaboration model:** The partnership agreement, the team leadership, and many elements of the information-sharing process.
- **The training, mentoring and supervision arrangements:** High quality cross-organisational training was provided, and team members had regular professional supervision and mentoring.
- **The organisation of the crisis protection aspects of the service:** This part of the service offered support to children and young people and provided a good alternative to holding children and young people in police custody pending arrangements for them to be transported home or to a place of safety.

Recommendations for NPP model improvement

The evaluators make the following recommendations for program improvement:

- 1. Strengthen community development initiatives in the main communities from which young people come:** The Department of Sport and Recreation (DSR) provides recreation programs in these communities. Potentially, these programs could provide a hub for community development programs designed to build community capacity.
- 2. Facilitate dialogue with Indigenous welfare groups to strengthen support for families and young people:** Indigenous welfare organisations (family support, youth, community groups, corporations), other than Nyoongar patrol, have no obvious lines of communication with the NPP. The model could be adjusted to strengthen provision for formal and informal Indigenous consultation and governance of the project, and better acknowledge the centrality of the role of Nyoongar Patrol to the functionality of NPP.
- 3. Seek better evidence about whether casework-based family support is the best way to support young people and families:** Families of young people who had been apprehended were reluctant to engage voluntarily with family support casework. Casework was adopted in the NPP model as the preferred means of family support, based upon standard social work practice. The reluctance of families and young people to engage with casework indicates that families and young people did not perceive that casework was relevant to their needs. To address this difference in perception would require: discussions with potential recipients of family support to gain insight into how they perceive their needs and how they believe their needs can be best met; and, reconsideration by NPP about whether their family support goals could be achieved by other means. Further evidence about the comparative effectiveness of case-based family support as opposed to other family support strategies, or generic community-based support services, might be sought and an adjustment made to the NPP model if necessary.
- 4. Resolve tension between the coercive elements of the model (forcible apprehension) and the voluntary elements (family support):** If, after investigation, casework-based family support is found to be acceptable to recipients and effective for purpose, this tension could be resolved by outsourcing family support to 'arm's length' community family support services including Indigenous family support services. In the current model, the involvement of Mission Australia in the apprehension process and information-sharing processes undermined their capacity to provide a confidential service to families and to gain their trust.
- 5. Address unintended outcomes of involuntary apprehension:** In particular, some young people changed their behaviour and relocated to other potentially risky locations where there was less surveillance. This cannot be addressed by duplicating the NPP in additional locations because displacement will be

repeated. It could be addressed by strengthening the role of the Nyoongar patrol to build voluntary relationships with young people in other locations. To some extent, the NPP model has, in practice, adapted to do this, but this role needs to be acknowledged as an integral part of the NPP model.

Transferability of NPP model to other contexts

On the question of the applicability of the model to other contexts, the design of the NPP means that it is transferable only to high-risk locations, with similar environments. The benefits of crisis protection of young people must be carefully weighed against the high costs of the service, and the potential increased risk for young people who choose to relocate to other high-risk locations where they will not be apprehended. In low-risk environments, the potential benefits are outweighed by the increased risks for young people who are displaced to higher-risk locations, and the high costs of this service model.

We concluded:

- 1. The NPP model is not transferable to most circumstances in which night patrols operate:** The disadvantages of involuntary apprehension and consequent displacement, combined with weakness of community governance and high costs, outweigh the potential benefits in most contexts. The lack of uptake of the family support program in this model means that, in most circumstances, it would be desirable for a night patrol model to incorporate community development approaches instead to bring about change to social conditions.
- 2. With modifications, the NPP model may be potentially transferable as a night patrol model to a few contexts where young people are at exceptionally high risk of harm:** The use of forcible apprehension of young people led to displacement of young people from Northbridge to other potentially risky locations. This means that unless the risk of harm to young people is very high, there would be considerable danger that young people would be displaced from lower risk locations to higher risk locations. If the model were adopted in other contexts, further research would be required to determine how the preventative family support element of the program should operate. In particular, it would be necessary to determine whether casework-based support for families is an effective response, and, if it is, how best to deliver such support.
- 3. The NPP model may be transferable as a city centre outreach child protection service and as an alternative to police custody:** The NPP model had greatly improved collaboration between the Department of Child Protection and WA Police on child protection in Northbridge. After-hours availability of a senior social worker in the outreach team was mentioned by several stakeholders as an important element within the model. As a child protection outreach model, the efficacy of such a service would then be assessed primarily in terms of child protection outcomes

rather than crime prevention. Cautions about the risks of displacement, mentioned above, would also apply in this application of the model.

Conclusions

We conclude that the SAYP and NPP models have some elements of good practice and some limitations. Both models have internal tensions between components. These tensions will undermine the effectiveness of each model unless resolved. The strengths and weakness of the two models are in different areas and are to some extent complementary. Both the SAYP and NPP models contribute to a new model for Community and Night Patrols.

Based upon the findings of this evaluation and the review of previous evaluations, a new model of Community and Night Patrols should:

- **Contribute to a strategy to support reconciliation and inter-generational change** (consistent with Closing the Gap and National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework (NILJF)) as a means to enhance community well-being and crime reduction, and improve individual health;
- **Incorporate night patrols as part of a co-ordinated integrated welfare approach** to service provision, with recognition that complementary referral and support services are required to maximise the benefits of night patrols;
- **Develop an interagency collaboration model** that formalises partnership agreements, provides skilled team leadership, and has formalised agreements on information sharing and confidentiality;
- **Use community development and detached youth work methods** to build community capacity for self-determination and effective governance;
- **Strengthen community ownership and Indigenous involvement** in the governance of night patrols, through mechanisms that enable Indigenous people to contribute to shaping the provision of night patrol services in their community, and through mentoring support to Indigenous management bodies;
- **Ensure training, mentoring and supervision arrangements** are put in place that promote high quality cross-organisational training and regular professional supervision and mentoring for all staff;
- **Facilitate dual accountability to both the host community and the funding body** and negotiate details of the service provision to address both the requirements of the funding body and the self-identified needs of the local community;
- **Develop a funding model suitable for a program** that aims for long-term community change: e.g. key staff have on-going employment; the service is funded on a recurrent basis; mechanisms for tenderers to be granted preferred provider status when services they provide are operating successfully;
- **Enable service delivery methods to be consistent with goals and intended outcomes**, which may require staff training in evaluation techniques, development of program logic models and key indicators for each program;

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- **Seek ways to attract skilled and qualified staff** including youth workers who are able to assume a broader role that includes referral, informal education and direct crisis support;
- **Develop realistic timelines for change in each community** and develop an evaluation strategy built into the program logic model adapted to the long-term nature of reconciliation and inter-generational change; and,
- **Enable support service development through a focus on *both* formative and summative evaluation.** Formative evaluation is important because it supports staff to learn from experience and to make evidence-based adjustments to programs, and mitigates the risks that summative evaluation will undermine program integrity because staff focus only on apparent compliance with targets rather than program quality.

Glossary

The following is a glossary of terms used within this report.

Community justice: *may be placed within a broader restorative justice framework. The rationale for restorative justice varies among Australian jurisdictions, but in general seeks to repair harm caused by crime; actively involve offenders, victims and communities in the criminal justice process; and provide a constructive intervention for juvenile offending (Richards 2010).*

Community safety: *is a term used to describe both statistically measured threats to safety in terms of crime, and community perception of safety, including perceptions of risk of victimisation. In the second sense, perceptions of safety will vary between population cohorts within communities (for example, young, elderly, female, male, by family affiliation), and this further complicates the meaning of the term. For the purposes of this report, we will use both meanings, and will differentiate between these two elements by referring to them as “objective measures of community safety” and “subjective measures of community safety”.*

Community policing: *is policing that ‘emphasises effective working partnerships with the community’ (Segrave and J. Ratcliffe 2004). This inclusive definition is used in this report.*

Crime prevention: *Primary crime prevention strategies that seek to reduce the factors encouraging crime before crime occurs are seen as critical in breaking cycles of crime and violence prior to intervention once people have established police records, incomplete schooling and problematic peer groups. Crime prevention has an emphasis on wider problems, as opposed to just crime; has a focus on informal social control and how this connects with formal social control; looks at implementation of policy through decentralized and local arrangements; often delivers services through partnerships, which draw together a variety of stakeholders; seeks holistic solutions, in a problem-oriented manner; and seeks harm reduction or pan-hazard crime prevention initiatives, which move beyond focus on individual offences (Blagg 2003:9; Richards et al. 2011).*

Indigenous disadvantage: *Indigenous Australians experience significant levels of disadvantage across a range of social, economic and health indicators, including educational factors (such as poor levels of schooling); economic factors (such as low income and employment); physical environmental factors (such as inadequate housing due to overcrowded dwellings and sub-standard household facilities); and social factors (such as dispossession, dislocation and discrimination). These disadvantages intensify with the remoteness of a community and underlie specific health risk factors (such as alcohol and other drug use, smoking, nutrition, obesity and physical inactivity), and contribute to Indigenous over-representation within the criminal justice system (ABS 2006).*

Youth: *For the purposes of this report, ‘youth’ are defined in the following categories:*

- *Child: 12 years and under*
- *Young person: aged 13 years -18 years*
- *Young adult: aged 19 -25 years*
- *Adult: 26 years and above*

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
AGD	Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department
ALSWA	Aboriginal Legal Service of WA
APLO	Aboriginal Police Liaison Officer
ATSIC	Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission
ATSIS	Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services
BOCSAR	Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, NSW
CBD	Central business district
CC	Crisis Care
CCU	Crisis Care Unit
CDEP	Community Development Employment Project
CJS	Criminal Justice System
DAGJ	Department of Attorney General and Justice, New South Wales
DCD (WA)	Department for Community Development, Western Australia. In Western Australia, DCD was responsible for child protection and community development until the formation of DCP.
DCP (WA)	Department for Child Protection, Western Australia. The department responsible for child protection after 1 July 2007 ¹ . (Previously the Department for Community Development)
DCS (WA)	Department of Corrective Services, Western Australia
DfC	Department for Communities, Western Australia
DFCS	Department of Family and Children's Services

¹ See, http://aeon.sro.wa.gov.au/Investigator/Details/Agency_Detail.asp?Entity=Global&Search=child%20protection&Op=All&Page=1&Id=1504&SearchPage=Global

Acronyms and Abbreviations

DOCS	Department of Community Services, NSW
DOH	Department of Health
DOJ (WA)	Department of Justice, Western Australia
DotAG	Department of the Attorney General, Western Australia
DSR (WA)	Department of Sport and Recreation, Western Australia
ECU	Edith Cowan University, Western Australia
ICC	Indigenous Coordination Centre
HYPE project	'Hillarys Youth Project Enquiry' project 'Helping Young People Engage' project
ICYP	Inner City Youth Partnership
IJP	Indigenous Justice Program
Killara	Killara Youth Support services, Western Australia
KYSS	Killara Youth Support services, Western Australia
LGA	Local Government Area
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NILJF	National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework
NP	Northbridge Policy
NPP	Northbridge Policy Program (Young People in Northbridge Program)
NSW	New South Wales
NTER	Northern Territory Emergency Response
PUA	Partnership Understanding Agreement of the Northbridge Policy project
SAY	Safe Aboriginal Youth

Acronyms and Abbreviations

SAYP	Safe Aboriginal Youth Program
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Scientists
TAFE	Technical and Further Education
UNE	University of New England, NSW
WA	Western Australia

Chapter 1: Overview of Project

This chapter provides an introduction to the report and its purposes, information about the project background, and a summary of considerations that shaped the evaluation design.

Introduction

The report provides an account of an evaluation of Night and Community Patrols in the two State jurisdictions of New South Wales and Western Australia. The study was commissioned by the Commonwealth AGD Indigenous Policy Section and was conducted during 2011-2012. The requirements of the evaluation were specified in the tender document *Evaluation of Indigenous Justice Programs Project D: Night and Community Patrols (Attorney-General's Department, 2010)*. The following sections provide an account of the specified tender requirements and a brief discussion of evaluation considerations that shaped the evaluation design. Chapter 2 describes the evaluation design and reasons for changes made to this design during the evaluation. Chapter 1 provides background to the evaluation, including definitions, and a discussion of the brief. Chapter 2 provides an outline of the research design. Chapter 3 summarises the findings of previous relevant evaluations, briefly summarises relevant literature, and presents a typology of night patrols. Chapter 4 discusses the findings in New South Wales. Chapter 5 discusses the findings in Western Australia. Chapter 6 compares the SAY models of community and night patrols from NSW with the NPP model from WA, discusses the applicability of these models to other settings, and relates the evaluation findings to policy frameworks. Chapter 7 presents the conclusions and recommendations. The appendices include data and additional material generated by the evaluation.

Purpose of Indigenous Justice Evaluations

The purpose of this evaluation was to determine whether the SAY community and night patrol program and Northbridge Policy Project could be considered good practice; and if so, on what basis. The evaluation was outcomes focussed, and an intention was to increase the number of publicly available outcomes-focussed evaluations of Indigenous justice programs. In the research briefing document, the stated purpose of the Indigenous Justice Evaluations program was to build an evidence base to evaluate the extent to which the goals of the *National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework* have been achieved. In the tender document, this is stated as: 'to develop a strong body of evidence regarding the effectiveness of these programs in achieving the goal of [the National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework]' (Standing Committee of Attorney's-General Working Group on Indigenous Justice, 2009, 2010).

Research Brief

The overarching purpose of Project D is to ‘determine the effectiveness of night patrol initiatives on community safety rates, preferably in comparison with statistically similar communities that do not operate night patrols’ (Attorney-General's Department, 2010). Supplementary documents confirmed that the evaluation should seek to gather evidence about outcomes from the projects and determine whether projects could be considered as examples of good practice. This brief specified evaluation of two services, individually and in comparison to each other:

- i. Northbridge Policy and Juvenile Aid Group (WA)
- ii. Safe Aboriginal Youth Patrols Program (NSW)

In addition to describing the overarching evaluation, the tender specified particular evaluation approaches, data sets and additional questions in each state.

Tender brief –NSW

The specific evaluation requirements for the Safe Aboriginal Youth Patrols Program (NSW) were (Attorney-General's Department, 2010):

- (1) Identify a means to measure the type of services clients are referred to, the referral process and the outcome of these referrals.*
- (2) Evaluate the communities’ perception of the program and its appropriateness for their community.*
- (3) Identify the program’s capacity to link young victims with support services.*
- (4) Identify ‘best practice’ standards in delivering an outreach service for young Aboriginal people.*
- (5) Develop a process to identify and measure crime prevention outcomes for young people.*
- (6) Identify strategies to improve the capacity of patrol workers to proactively engage young people.*

Tender brief –WA

The specific evaluation requirements for the Northbridge Policy and Juvenile Aid Group (WA) were (Attorney-General's Department, 2010):

- 1) Examine the extent to which the policy as implemented has reduced the number of children*
 - a) aged 12 years and under, and*
 - b) aged 13 to 15 years,**found without adult supervision at night in Northbridge (disaggregated by gender; Indigenous status; and home suburb).*

Chapter 1: Overview of Project

- 2) *Examine whether there has been any associated change over time in reported crime levels among these age groups:*
 - a) *in Northbridge; and*
 - b) *in the wider Central Business District (CBD).*

From the above:

- 3) *Examine if the designated area of Northbridge is still appropriate, given changes in infrastructure in the CBD and increased licensed premises in the CBD.*
- 4) *Examine if there has been a change in behaviour by juveniles to circumvent the JAG policy. (For example, there is anecdotal evidence that since juveniles are now aware of the policy and the boundaries, they are shifting their behaviours to locations outside of the policy area.)*
- 5) *Assess the extent to which the policy has resulted in children at risk being referred to appropriate services.*
- 6) *Assess the outcomes arising from these referrals, from the perspectives of:*
 - a) *statutory authorities (Child Protection and WA Police);*
 - b) *other relevant service providers (including Mission Australia and Nyoongar Patrol); and*
 - c) *affected children and their families.*
- 7) *Does the policy and its implementation provide “value for money”? This assessment should incorporate perspectives from other stakeholders such as the Public Transport Authority.*

Discussion of Brief

The evaluation tender brief required comparison of two very different approaches to the provision of Community and Night Patrols. The Northbridge Policy project/ Juvenile Aid Group (Northbridge/JAG) and the Safe Aboriginal Youth Patrols Program (SAY) provide services to children and young people. The two approaches are different in terms of their contexts, purposes, goals, and approaches.

- a. The programs are provided in different contexts (single inner urban versus dispersed rural);
- b. They operate under different jurisdictions (WA vs. NSW);
- c. They are directed under different legislative instruments (policy directed and statutory child protection powers vs. community-based);
- d. The programs have different service management and delivery methods (statutory management v. community managed) and structurally different relationships to the communities they serve; and,
- e. They focus on different age-ranges (in NSW under 18 years, in WA under 16 years).

Research Team

The research was conducted by a consortium of researchers from two Universities, Edith Cowan University (ECU) and the University of New England (UNE). The research team members were A/Prof. Trudi Cooper (team leader) (ECU), Prof. Margaret Sims (team leader) (UNE), Dr Elaine Barclay (UNE), Assoc. Prof. John Scott (UNE), Dr Margaret Giles (ECU) and Dr Terence Love (ECU). The team members have diverse disciplinary backgrounds, including criminology, youth and community work, child and family studies, police studies, psychology, sociology, policy and management. Members of the consortium have previously worked together and have conducted complex multi-site, multi-stakeholder collaborative evaluations and participative action research projects, including research and evaluation projects with Indigenous people and communities. The University of New England was well placed to conduct the field work necessary for the evaluations in rural communities in New South Wales. The Edith Cowan University Team was located close to the Northbridge Precinct. This physical proximity enabled both teams to use their local knowledge and existing networks with communities in the locations where the evaluations occurred. Coordination of the research across the two locations was made easier because the team leaders had previously worked collaboratively on other successful research projects.

Key Policy Frameworks

The SAY programs and the Northbridge Policy Project both potentially contribute to two key policy frameworks designed to address social issues relevant to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples: the National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework, and the Closing the Gap policy initiatives.

National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework

The goals of the National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework (Standing Committee of Attorney's-General Working Group on Indigenous Justice 2009) are:

- Improvement in Australian justice systems so that they comprehensively deliver on the justice needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in a fair and equitable manner.
- Reduction in the over-representation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offenders, defendants and victims within the criminal justice system.
- Ensuring that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples feel safe and are safe within their communities.
- Increased safety and a reduction in offending within Indigenous communities by addressing alcohol and substance abuse.
- Strengthened Indigenous communities through working in partnership with governments and other stakeholders to achieve sustained improvements in justice and community safety.

Closing the Gap

Closing the Gap is a commitment by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) to improve the lives of Indigenous Australians, and in particular provide a better future for Indigenous children. In 2008, COAG set specific and ambitious targets relating to Indigenous life expectancy, infant mortality, early childhood development, education and employment:

- To close the life-expectancy gap within a generation.
- To halve the gap in mortality rates for Indigenous children under five within a decade.
- To ensure access to early childhood education for all Indigenous four years olds in remote communities within five years.
- To halve the gap in reading, writing and numeracy achievements for children within a decade.
- To halve the gap in Indigenous Year 12 achievement by 2020.
- To halve the gap in employment outcomes between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians within a decade (FAHSIA 2012).

Chapter 2 Research Design

This chapter describes the research design and social program evaluation issues relevant to this evaluation project. Details of the research instruments and methods for data collection and analysis for both WA and NSW are contained in the Appendices.

Program Logic Models

Program Logic Models (PLMs) are used in this report to identify and document program assumptions, program components, program outputs, and program outcomes. PLMs help explain how a program is intended to operate and why it is expected to be effective, and as a method to visually compare data. PLMs are used to make explicit the theoretical assumptions that have guided program design and implementation, and have provided a rationale for expected linkages between outputs and outcomes. The essential importance of PLMs in evaluating Indigenous justice programs is referenced by the Office of Evaluation and Audit (Indigenous Programs, 2008), and the use of PLMs in this context has been affirmed in other recent studies, for example, the 2011 study on Night Patrols in the Northern Territory (Beacroft, Richards, Andrevski, & Rosevear, 2011), Vinson's (2009) study of Indigenous Social Inclusion and Exclusion, and a study of the development of evaluation material for indigenous communities by the Families and Schools Together (FAST) program (Guenther & Boonstra, 2009). Within this evaluation of SAY and Northbridge Policy community and night patrol programs, PLMs have been used as a research tool to present the underlying rationale for different programs in NSW and WA, to compare program implementation with original program design, to explore program fidelity and to illustrate how programs have been adapted to different contexts.

Politics and evaluation

The provision of social programs occurs in a political environment, and most social programs are shaped to some extent by political considerations. Political considerations act independently of research into effective policy and practice, and are sometimes in tension with sound theorisation about a social problem and with findings about effective practice (Walker & Forrester, 2002). Political considerations may shape or constrain all aspects of a program, including rationale, assumptions and goals and program methods, reporting and operational practices. In extreme circumstances, social programs become laden with what McDavid and Hawthorn call the *freight of political discourse* (Walker & Forrester, 2002 p. 60). This occurs when a program is strongly politically contested, but must be presented so that it is acceptable to constituencies who hold different values and want different outcomes. When this occurs, the objectives of the program are specified very broadly and imprecisely to satisfy multiple stakeholders. This creates subsequent difficulties for implementation and evaluation (Walker & Forrester, 2002). The evaluation process used in this study attempted to clarify the extent to which program objectives and methods have been shaped or constrained by political considerations that are detrimental to effective

policy and practice. A PLM was developed from policy documents and has been used to identify whether coherent program logic can be developed from policy.

Programs as Low-probability Technologies

All social programs are what McDavid and Hawthorn describe as '*low-probability technologies*', (Walker & Forrester, 2002 p. 63) meaning that compared, for example, with a construction infrastructure program, social programs have a lower level of certainty that their program 'technology' will succeed. This observation limits the evaluation design approaches that can be taken. McDavid and Hawthorn argued that in these circumstances, evaluators should focus their evaluations in *ex post* evaluations of outcomes, to gather information about how programs have operated, and their effectiveness, rather than the development of performance measures (p.63). The reason for this is that, even when social programs are successful, not enough is usually known about exactly how or why the program worked, which program components contributed to observed results, or how transferable the program is to other contexts and populations. In these circumstances, performance measurement techniques derived from engineering projects cannot be simply transferred to social programs because there is too little certainty about causation, about linkages between components, and about which features are most salient. In this project, Program Logic Models (PLMs) have been used to document program assumptions, components and operational methods. Initial PLMs present the intended program design as derived from policy. These were compared with practitioner interviews that described operational methods, adaptations made to programs, and how the program has been implemented in practice.

Attribution

Every evaluation must address the issue of attribution: the question of whether the outcomes recorded were the result of the program or some other factor. Similarly, outcomes achieved by the program can be confounded by factors in the environment. This means that even when a program operates successfully, data collected about outcome may not seem to confirm success. The evaluation design must attempt to establish the probability that the outcome was a result of the program and not of other factors. Social programs occur in open-systems, meaning that observed outcomes may occur because of factors in the environment that are independent of the program (Walker & Forrester, 2002 p. 66). This is unavoidable when a naturalistic evaluation method is specified, as it is in this evaluation. It is addressed by identifying and evaluating program linking constructs to see whether they are plausible, and by seeking *rival hypotheses* to explain the observed results. Only if there is a plausible connection of the outcome to the program, through the PLM, and no plausible rival hypothesis can be found, can it be firmly concluded that the outcome is attributable to the program. If competing hypotheses cannot be eliminated, then the evaluator must make a probabilistic judgement, using other evidence sources (Walker & Forrester, 2002).

Linking constructs

Social programs have an underlying rationale that informs their design. This rationale explains what the outcomes are that the program is intended to achieve; why the program includes particular components; how the components are expected to work together; how the internal components are assessed; and why the program is expected to achieve its intended outcomes. *Linking constructs* provide the theory that informs the program's rationale. Linking constructs can include different levels of social theory from macro level social theory about social processes, to micro level theory about practice technique, and everything in between. Sometimes linking constructs are explicitly stated; many times they are implicit. Where possible, and within the constraints of the project, the most important program-linking constructs have been explicated and evaluated.

Program fidelity

Evaluations also document how a program was implemented and the *fidelity* of the program implementation: whether it was implemented *as intended*. The evaluation will gather data on program fidelity.

Measurement

Evaluators often use both primary and secondary data, especially in an ex-post evaluation. Often the secondary data has been collected for other purposes and may be of unknown quality (Walker & Forrester, 2002). Where data relates to performance targets this may distort the program (Deming, 1986). The evaluation design will identify potential measurement validity problems, and will assess the implications for data reliability. Wherever possible, data triangulation will be used to evaluate overall evaluation reliability.

Ethical considerations

The research team were guided by the *Principles for Ethical Research* set out in the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies guidelines (AIATSIS, 2012). In particular, we recognised the need for ongoing consultation and negotiation around informed consent, the need to ensure mutual understanding of the research and the use to which its result will be put, and the need to respect Indigenous knowledge and involve Indigenous people as collaborators. The evaluation sought to ensure that perspectives of Indigenous communities and families were included strongly in the evaluation, and that the evaluation will return some immediate benefits to the communities that participate. Returns may be in terms of dialogue and exchange of knowledge about service practices and service management, or potentially improved support and training for night patrol staff in regional and remote areas. We will use the project website to make information we have gathered accessible, and create opportunities for results to be provided in other formats for those with limited online access.

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We also acknowledged the Guidelines for Ethical Conduct of Evaluations (Australasian Evaluation Society, 2006). We actively considered potential risks to participants. Our methodology was designed to enable us to collect sound data which can be used to make reasonable decisions about the programs being evaluated. In NSW, as an initial principle, we assumed confidentiality and have limited the use of direct quotes from participants, to ensure participants remain anonymous and unrecognisable from their words. In WA, several participants voluntarily waived strict confidentiality requirements.

The evaluation was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee and Panel on Ethical Research Involving Aborigines or Torres Strait Islanders of both Universities. These bodies required full disclosure of methodology, and will sight letters of consent, consent forms and all research tools, and, amongst other things, provide policies that restrict access to data and ensure secure data. This is all contained on the National Ethics Application Form, which is the required format for this Ethics application. All services provided through this tender were scrutinised by Edith Cowan University (ECU) and University of New England (UNE) Human Research Ethics Committee, in accordance with the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (NHMRC, 2007). The National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research makes special provision to safeguard the rights of potentially vulnerable populations, including young people who are legal minors, and makes special provision to safeguard the rights of Indigenous people who are participants in research. To avoid duplication, the Edith Cowan University (ECU) Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) approved research undertaken by ECU staff, and the University of New England (UNE) Human Research Ethics Committee approved the research undertaken by the UNE staff. The ECU HREC approved the Western Australian components unamended.

Timeline

The timeline was modified because of delays to the award of the tender due to the federal election in August 2010. The contract was signed in early December 2010, and commencement delayed until the beginning of February 2011. The final detailed timeline is shown in the Appendices.

Advisory groups

In NSW, a project advisory group was constituted. The main purpose of that advisory group has been to facilitate community access. In WA, key local sponsors of the evaluation indicated that they believed they had provided sufficient information about project contacts and there was little enthusiasm for the formation of another advisory group. For this reason, the project has been operating with the single advisory group in NSW.

NSW SAY Program Research Methodology

In this chapter the procedure by which data were collected for evaluation of the SAY programs in New South Wales is outlined.

The Case Study Communities

SAY programs are currently funded in eleven communities across NSW; Dareton, Nowra, La Perouse, Newcastle, Taree, Kempsey, Armidale, Dubbo and, until recently, Brewarrina, Wilcannia and Bourke (see Figure 1).



Figure 1: Map of the SAY Program sites

Data Collection

The NSW fieldwork was conducted in four stages and data was collected primarily via semi-structured interviews of participants.

Stage 1: Establishment of and consultation with a Community Consultation Group

A community consultation group was established consisting of five people. Members were respected Indigenous people with some knowledge of Aboriginal Night Patrols and/or SAY Programs and other key people with significant expertise and experience in this area. The community consultation group did not meet as a whole; instead, they were consulted separately in relation to their specific expertise.

Stage 2: Initial Scoping

We undertook phone conversations with a small sample of services and members of our community consultative committee to help develop an understanding of the realities of their work which we could use to shape the data collection. At this point we were made aware of the reporting pro-forma services used to report regularly to the DAGJ.

The team used sample phone conversations to develop a pilot set of questions to be submitted to the Ethics Committee at the University of New England (UNE). Our original proposal had indicated that we would undertake site visits to each settlement and interview service providers, professionals in other agencies, NSW Police, community members and, where possible, young people. Our proposed approach for community members and young people was a research technique called "community members as researchers" (Stehlik & Buckley, 2008). This is a technique whereby researchers work with key community members to develop appropriate questions for each community, and then the community members ask the questions of their own contacts. They recruit some of these contacts to then ask the questions of their contacts, thus the data collection snowballs through the contacts of various community members. The advantage of this technique is that it enables the inclusion of people who were likely to be missed by initial attempts at recruitment. Unfortunately, the UNE Ethics Committee made such an approach impossible by requiring they be notified of the names, contact details and qualifications of every community member who was going to ask questions for us, prior to them doing so. Given the sensitivity of many Indigenous people to this kind of formality, this approach was abandoned and we needed to develop an acceptable alternative. We finally obtained approval to interview community members, but had to access these through the service itself, recommendations of other agencies and the Police. We were allowed to engage in conversations with young people in the presence of service workers.

Stage 3: Pilot Study

The NSW team was based in Armidale, so Armidale was used as the pilot settlement. Fourteen people were interviewed. Of this group nine were male, five were female. Ages ranged from late twenties to fifties. Six people interviewed were Indigenous, with three local to the region. Some of those interviewed had lived in the region for less than two years, but most people had lived in the region for extended periods of time (20+ years). As such, participants could be considered to have strong local links within the community. Two managers and a youth support worker of the current patrol were interviewed. Seven people who had previously volunteered on the patrol, or were patrol workers and/or committee members, were also interviewed. Participants came from a range of service fields and a few occupied more than one service role. Services included: youth services, local government, health and welfare services, police, and Aboriginal Justice Groups. Interviews ranged from 15 minutes to an hour. Two interviews were hand written, while the others were taped and

then transcribed verbatim. Two interviews were conducted in a group format (two and three participants respectively).

Once the Armidale interviews were completed these were transcribed and a preliminary thematic analysis was undertaken. Identified themes were used to check the interview schedule for the remaining data collection. The key issue arising from this was the need to keep the interview schedule very flexible, so that respondents could “tell their story” in their own words. We used the schedule as a guide to make sure that we gave respondents an opportunity to address all of the issues necessary to the evaluation.

Stage 4: Site visits

Following the completion of the pilot, the NSW research team organised and undertook site visits to the remaining ten communities. These communities were identified by DAGJ as those with a DAGJ-funded SAY program / patrol. In total, field work was conducted in eleven communities in New South Wales: SAY Patrol sites at Armidale, Dubbo, Dareton, La Perouse, Newcastle, Nowra, Taree and SAY Activity programs at Bourke and Wilcannia.

Site visit participants

We made contact with the SAY patrol or activity service in each settlement prior to the visit and organised interviews with relevant service staff. We obtained recommendations as to the staff from other agencies we should contact. Independently of these recommendations, staff from other relevant agencies were contacted, including Aboriginal Community Justice Groups, Youth Workers, local Council staff and Police. In each of the communities, we attempted to interview the following groups of people (Table 1).

Table 1: NSW SAY interview participant groups

Group	Purpose
Managers and management committees of local SAY Programs	Representatives of management committees and local managers provided information on the history of SAY Programs in the community and discussed issues around program operation and management.
Drivers/staff of local SAY Programs	Staff provided information on the bus operation, referrals to other service providers, problems they encountered as well as the types of crime and social problems concerning local youth in the community.

Local police	Police officers supplied information on local crime problems and their assessment of the effectiveness of the SAY Program.
Aboriginal Elders	Elders provided their views on the SAY Program and the needs of their community, particularly for Aboriginal young people
Aboriginal Community Justice Groups	Representatives of Aboriginal Community Justice Groups provided an overview of local community issues and their thoughts on the effectiveness of the Program.
Youth Workers	PCYC staff and other youth workers provided insight into the way they worked with SAY Program teams and their views on the relevance and effectiveness of the SAY Programs for the community.
Local Councils	Mayors or representatives of local councils gave an overview of social problems in the community and their views on the relevance and effectiveness of SAY Programs.
Service Providers	Various representatives of government and non-government agencies provided insight into social problems in the community, how they worked with Program teams and their views on the relevance and effectiveness of the SAY Programs.

Some additional participants in each community were included through snowball sampling referred by key participants. In total, there were 117 participants interviewed across the 11 communities. Participants for Armidale are identified in Table 1. Those in the other communities were:

- Newcastle – Five interviews were conducted; with two female and three male participants. Of these, three were Aboriginal people. The researcher also participated as an observer in a night patrol bus run.
- La Perouse – Eleven interviews were conducted. There were six males and five females. Of these, two were Aboriginal people. Their ages ranged between late 20s and mid-40s.
- Dubbo - A total of 13 people were interviewed; eight males and five females. Of these, five were Aboriginal people. Ages ranged between 28 and 65 years.
- Taree - Eleven people were interviewed, seven of whom were female. Four were Indigenous. Ages ranged from early 20s to late 50s.

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- Kempsey - Eleven interviews comprising three night patrol staff, service providers and community leaders. There were five males and six females. Ages ranged from early 30s to 50. Of these, six were Aboriginal people. In addition, an informal dinner was arranged to coincide with the visit and this included three parents and four young Aboriginal people under the age of eighteen.
- Nowra – Ten interviews were undertaken. There were six males and four females. Ages ranged from early 20s to 50. Of these, six were Aboriginal people. A member of the research team also went on a bus run from the youth centre.
- Wilcannia - 14 local residents were interviewed, nine of whom were male and three were female. Ages ranged from 18 to 75. Nine of those interviewed were Aboriginal people; two being Elders of the community.
- Bourke - There were seven people interviewed; four males and three females and five were Aboriginal people. Their ages ranged from 28 to 68.
- Dareton - Thirteen interviews were conducted. There were eight females and five male participants of whom seven were Aboriginal people. Their ages ranged from late 20s to late 40s.
- Brewarrina - A total of eight people were interviewed; only two were females. Ages ranged from 30 to 65. Four were Aboriginal people.

Semi-structured interviews

We used a semi-structured interview schedule for service providers and community members. The interviews sought residents' opinions on local crime problems and the reasons young people were on the streets at night. Participants were also asked about their perceptions of the local SAY program, and were asked for their perceptions of: its relevance for the community; its effectiveness for youth safety and crime prevention; and the way staff interacted with other community service providers. Any problems with the service were also identified. Participants were asked for suggestions on how to improve the service and assist young people generally. While the questions focused upon the key issues pertaining to the evaluation of the services, the semi-structured format provided flexibility for further questioning and discussion.

Interviews were recorded unless interviewees requested otherwise or when the researchers elected that it was not appropriate to do so; for example, when interviewing Aboriginal elders. Six participants were not recorded. Interviewees were informed they could end the interview at any time or choose not to answer some questions.

In two communities, one of the research team accompanied a night patrol bus run. The purpose of this was to gain an in-depth understanding of the realities of the patrol, which was used to inform this research.

Trends in crime statistics in each SAY program location relative to Australian data

Crime statistics for selected offences for each community provided by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) were analysed. Offences were selected according to those commonly committed by young offenders, such as malicious damage, motor vehicle theft, break and enter, stealing and public order offences. In addition, information about liquor offences and domestic violence were included, as high incidences of these offences among adults can lead to young people being on the streets at night. These are discussed in Chapter 4 and in the appendices that outline each of the communities. As requested, trend analysis is presented for each Local Government Area to assess trends in the incidence of crime since 1998 to 2012 and since the inception of the SAY program in 2009 to 2012. The ranking of crime rates for 2011-2012 for each community against other Local Government Areas in NSW is also provided, where 1 is the highest rate of crime in the state.

Analysis

All of the field work data were transcribed and coded manually to identify key themes and narratives, principally to the themes pertinent to the evaluation but also to identify any new issues evident in the data. We used a process of constant comparison (Glaser, 1965) to identify themes in the data for each individual program site and wrote a site report for each one.

We then grouped the communities based on their geography, as we were concerned to protect the identity of our participants. Particularly in smaller communities, we felt there was a risk that a particular quote might lead to identification. The evaluation sites, for the purposes of this report, have been grouped as follows:

- Metropolitan - Newcastle and La Perouse (Metro)
- Regional Centres - Armidale and Dubbo (RC)
- Regional Towns - Kempsey, Taree and Nowra (RT)
- Small remote communities - Dareton, Wilcannia, Bourke and Brewarrina (SR)

Limitations of NSW research

The inability to interview young people and conduct the 'community members as researchers' approach to survey a wider population of Aboriginal people is a limitation of this research and has been detailed above. It needs to be acknowledged this research has been conducted by non-Indigenous researchers and, although we have strived for accuracy, it is likely that a western perspective has coloured our interpretation.

Programs report to the DAGJ on a regular basis. These reports ask for the numbers of referrals provided to young Aboriginal people over the reporting period. We had chosen not to ask our interview informants for this information because initially we were told by DAGJ we would have access to all the reports submitted by the various organisations. After the data collections had been completed, we were provided with summary data from the

reports but we did not gain access to the primary data. We used this data to report costs of the NSW programs.

More details of the methodology and the research instruments for the NSW SAY program data collection and analyses are provided in the Appendices 3 to 18.

Northbridge Policy Project Research Methodology

The evaluation of the Northbridge Policy project patrol used a pragmatic case study approach in which concurrent mixed methods were used to explore the requirements of the evaluation questions and to draw informed conclusions about the outcomes of the policy (see, for example, Creswell, 2009, pp. 10, 14).

The project used data from multiple sources, including:

1. project records maintained by the NPP coordinator that recorded data about apprehensions of children and young people that contained:
 - demographic data;
 - the immediate response; and
 - whether they were provided with case work support and by which agency.
2. semi-structured interviews with two groups of informants:
 - a. Stakeholder list 1: Department for Child Protection; WA Police; Mission Australia; Nyoongar Patrol; Anglicare Step 1 detached youth work project; Perth Inner City Youth Service; Indigenous young people and their families (number determined by data saturation, initial estimate of 5);
 - b. Stakeholder list 2 (Preliminary suggestions): Public Transport Authority; Youth Legal Service; Aboriginal Legal Service; Youth Affairs Council WA; City of Perth; Northbridge Business Association; Aboriginal Justice Forum.
3. Cost effectiveness analysis.
4. Analysis of crime data for Northbridge and Perth CBD for young people aged 10-15 years.

All interviews were recorded and transcribed, and notes were taken. In one instance the quality of the recording was poor, and the analysis for that interview relied more heavily on the notes taken. Most interviews were conducted face-to-face. One interview was conducted by phone. The transcriptions were coded to identify themes, which were used to interpret the quantitative data as explained in the section on triangulation.

Evaluation plan

The evaluation plan for the NPP is presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Northbridge evaluation plan

Task	Data source
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<p>Examine the extent to which the policy as implemented has reduced the number of children:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> aged 12 years and under, and aged 13 to 15 years, <p>found without adult supervision at night in Northbridge (disaggregated by gender; Indigenous status; and home suburb).</p>	<p>DCP data (quantitative);</p> <p>Time series analysis of data collected by DCP/ Crisis Care/ WA Police, 2001-2010; analysed to satisfy specification in the RFT document; (aged 12 years and under; aged 13 to 15 years - disaggregated by gender; Indigenous status; and home suburb).</p> <p>Interview data (qualitative); Stakeholder Group 1 and 2</p>
<p>Examine whether there has been any associated change over time in reported crime levels among these age groups:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> in Northbridge; and in the wider Central Business District (CBD). 	<p>WA Police data (quantitative)</p> <p>Change over time in reported crime amongst age groups: Time series analysis of data on reported crime collected by WA Police, 2001-2010 for Northbridge; analysed to satisfy specification in the RFT document; (aged 12 years and under; aged 13 to 15 years - disaggregated by gender; Indigenous status; and home suburb).</p> <p>Comparison with Perth CBD for crime reports: Time series analysis of data collected by WA Police, 2001-2010 for Perth CBD; analysed to satisfy specification in the RFT document; (aged 12 years and under; aged 13 to 15 years - disaggregated by gender; Indigenous status; and home suburb).</p>
<p>Examine if the designated area of Northbridge is still appropriate, given changes in infrastructure in the CBD and increased licensed premises in the CBD;</p>	<p>Interview data (qualitative)</p> <p>Interviews with Stakeholders list 1 and Stakeholder Group 2</p>
<p>Examine if there has been a change in behaviour by juveniles to circumvent the JAG policy. (For example, there is anecdotal evidence that, since juveniles are now aware of the policy and the boundaries, they are shifting their behaviours to locations outside of the policy area.)</p>	<p>Interview data (qualitative)</p> <p>Interviews with Stakeholders list 1 and 2</p> <p>WA Police incident data for Northbridge, Burswood and Perth CBD</p>
<p>Assess the extent to which the policy has resulted in children at risk being referred to appropriate services;</p>	<p>DCP data (quantitative)</p> <p>Stakeholder Group 1</p> <p>De-identified Time-series analysis 2003-2010, plus interviews with JAG and DCP, Indigenous families and young people, see Stakeholder list 1.</p>

Assess the outcomes arising from these referrals, from the perspectives of:

- statutory authorities (Child Protection and WA Police);
- other relevant service-providers (including Mission Australia and Nyoongar Patrol); and
- affected children and their families.

Interview data (qualitative)

Stakeholder Group 1;

Do the policy and its implementation provide “value for money”? This assessment should incorporate perspectives from other stakeholders such as Public Transport Authority.

Comparison between quantitative data and qualitative data

DCP data (quantitative)

WA Police data (quantitative)

Interview data (qualitative)

Stakeholder Group 2;

Sampling frames

From the research brief, the proposed stakeholder lists were:

- **Stakeholder list 1:** Department for Child Protection; WA Police; Mission Australia; Nyoongar Patrol (a partner organisation) ; the Education Department Attendance Unit (a partner organisation in NPP); Public Transport Authority (partner organisation); Anglicare Step 1 detached youth work project; Perth Inner City Youth Service; Indigenous young people and their families (number determined by data saturation, initial estimate of 5) - Advice was sought on this in stage 1 from the project advisory group; Aboriginal Justice Forum; and Juvenile Justice (Killara).
- **Stakeholder list 2:** Youth Legal Service; Aboriginal Legal Service; Youth Affairs Council WA; City of Perth; Northbridge Business Association; Aboriginal Justice Forum.

The purpose of Stakeholder List 1 was to gather data from the project partners, from other services working in Northbridge with young people, and from families and young people affected by the policy.

The purpose of Stakeholder List 2 was to gather perceptions of other groups not directly involved in the delivery of the project, but which the project outcomes affected indirectly.

The Department of Child Protection (DCP) had three separate roles in the project: project management, coordination and management of the outreach support workers, and Crisis Care management. We interviewed the DCP project coordinator and a DCP Crisis Care manager who together covered these three roles.

In the Department of Corrective Services, we interviewed a senior manager from Juvenile Justice who was responsible for liaison with the NPP, and a Killara caseworker who had

extensive experience of the Northbridge Policy project and its precedents going back to the 1980s.

From the Police we interviewed the Senior Sergeant Manager of the JAG team and a JAG patrol officer responsible for managing the day-to-day JAG team operations.

In the Department of Sport and Recreation, we interviewed a project manager for the Midland and Armadale diversionary programs.

In early discussions about the origins of the NPP, some participants suggested we should interview policy makers who had been involved with the development of the initial Northbridge policy and its subsequent evaluation. We interviewed three people who had been connected with relevant government departments when the policy was developed.

In total, eight additional stakeholders were contacted and interviewed.

Data analysis

When we examined the DCP data, we found comprehensive data was available for apprehensions of children and young people, but no data was available for the numbers of children and young people who had been diverted from Northbridge as an alternative to apprehension. We intended to analyse data from 2003-2010 inclusive. The data for 2003 was for 6 months only because the project commenced at the end of June 2003. We considered three different options for addressing the part year of 2003 (see Table 3):

Table 3: Data time period

Options	Considerations	Decision
Present all data in the analyses from July to June	This makes comparison with annual data from other sources difficult	Reject: It is useful to be able to compare multi-source annual data
Extrapolate full-year figures from the data for 6 months in 2003	Only valid if there is little monthly variation	Reject: We found high random monthly variability
Analyse the data for 2003 separately	The first six-months of data may be anomalous either because the project is not fully operational or because it has high initial impact that declines as children and young people stop coming to Northbridge. This may distort trend data	Accept: analyse data for the first 6 months separately

We made a decision to analyse the data in whole years from 2004 to 2011 inclusively. The data from 2011 was included because during this period there were disruptions within the Northbridge Policy project that offered opportunities for deeper insights into the effects of project process on data. First, the project changed its operational premises and later there

was an unexpected project restructure, and DCP decided to put the project management out to tender. We analysed this data separately and also conducted an analysis of data of the first 2 months of 2012.


Validity

Evaluation of social programs requires judgements to be made about the likelihood of a causal relationship between events when there is incomplete data and data are not sufficient for certainty. We used both qualitative and quantitative data concurrently to inform these evaluation judgements. We examined the qualitative data to interpret the meaning of the quantitative data, and the quantitative data to identify trends that may be missed when qualitative data is analysed in isolation.

Triangulation

The example discussed in the previous section explains the approach we took to data triangulation as in Figure 2. The evaluation has a concurrent triangulation design (Creswell, 2009 p. 210).

Figure 2: Concurrent Triangulation Design



Where possible we compared information from different sources to determine its consistency. Additional informants were interviewed when others with knowledge of the project and its outcomes suggested that their perspective might be important. We also researched relevant contemporary policy documents to provide context, because of the highly politicised context of the policy introduction.

Baseline data and proxies for baseline data

We were required to evaluate the extent to which the NPP as implemented has reduced the numbers of unaccompanied children and young people in Northbridge at night. From an

evaluation perspective there was an important gap in the data: no baseline data was available for the numbers of unaccompanied children and young people in Northbridge prior to the project. It has been widely assumed, by service providers, stakeholders and previous evaluators of the Northbridge Policy project, that apprehension data could be used as a reliable proxy for data about numbers of young people in Northbridge, and that trends in apprehension data provided reliable information about trends in the numbers of young people in Northbridge and the efficacy of the Northbridge Policy project. The quantitative data appeared to show the number of apprehensions had declined steadily over time, and this observed trend provided the basis for the initial selection of this project for evaluation.

We concluded that there was no reliable relationship between numbers of young people in Northbridge and apprehension data for two reasons. Firstly, the maximum numbers of apprehensions in one night are dominated by NPP process, including staffing and space. Secondly, a significant purpose of the Northbridge Policy Program was to divert young people away from Northbridge. The activities of the DCP outreach workers, the JAG team, PTA staff and Nyoongar Patrol all encourage young people who are judged to be at low risk of harm to leave Northbridge. No data had been collected about numbers of young people who were diverted in this way, but participants said that informal diversion formed an important part of the work of the NPP.

In the absence of baseline data about numbers of young people in Northbridge, and without ongoing data collection, assessment of the effectiveness of the Northbridge Policy project is dependent upon qualitative sources. The most reliable qualitative sources are those who have no vested interest in the answer to this question.

Limitation

No baseline or ongoing data was available for the numbers of young people in Northbridge. No satisfactory proxies could be found for the missing baseline and ongoing data. Most qualitative sources have a vested interest in the answer to this question.

Changes to the Northbridge Project

During the evaluation, two changes occurred that affected how the Northbridge project was delivered and had an impact on the evaluation design. Both were announced by the Department of Child Protection with little warning shortly after the evaluation had commenced. The first change occurred in July 2011. The project moved from its accommodation at Perth Station in Northbridge to the DCP offices in Stirling Street about 1 kilometre away. This disrupted most of the existing systems and processes of NPP. It allowed an unintended experiment to assess the impact of location and premises on the program and its processes, because in all other respects, the team operated as before.

The second change was more fundamental. Shortly after the move to Stirling Street, DCP announced they would no longer coordinate the project and would put the management of the project out to tender. Mission Australia, an existing project partner, won the tender, and

project management was planned to transfer from the Department of Child Protection to Mission Australia in December 2011. This significantly changed core aspects of the service delivery arrangements. After consultation with the AG Department, it was agreed to terminate the evaluation period on the 31st December 2011. The tendering process for the transfer of the Northbridge project experienced delays and the transfer from DCP to Mission Australia eventually occurred on 1st March 2012. Between December 2011 and the handover to Mission Australia, the Northbridge Policy project operated in caretaker mode.

Unavailability of data

Before the evaluation commenced, partner organisations of the Northbridge Policy project had agreed to provide data to support the evaluation. The Northbridge Policy project partners had agreed to arrange and facilitate interviews with families and young people who had engaged with NPP through Mission Australia. However, none of the NPP Service providers (Mission Australia, Department of Child Protection, Nyoongar Patrol, Juvenile Aid Group, or WA Police) were able to identify any families and young people who would wish to be interviewed. Although we were able to interview many stakeholders, we were not able to interview representatives of three organisations we approached. The Aboriginal Justice Forum representative from DotAG WA did not consider they knew enough about the NPP to be interviewed, the Aboriginal Legal Service WA could not spare anyone to be interviewed, and the City of Perth did not respond to requests for interviews.

Chapter 3: Evaluation of Indigenous night patrols in Australia

The material presented in this chapter provides a brief overview of how night patrol service policy and service delivery has developed, and how service delivery appears to have responded to evaluation. There have been many previous reviews of Indigenous night patrols in Australia (Auditor-General, 2011; Beacroft, et al., 2011; Blagg, 2003; Blagg, 2007; Blagg & Valuri, 2003; Blagg & Valuri, 2004; Curtis, 1992 revised 2003; Higgins, 1997; IPSDB, 2008; Koch, 2003; Lithopoulos, 2007; Mosey, 1994; Taylor-Walker, 2010; Walker & Forrester, 2002). The development of night patrol policy and service provision and operational processes appears to have been primarily dedicated to responding to deficiencies identified in evaluations of prior community and night patrol services. This research team conducted a review of Australian literature on night patrols that examined rationales, methods, effectiveness and service development of Indigenous night patrols. The full literature review can be found in Appendix 2. From this literature review, the authors developed a typology of four main service developmental models of night patrols that coexist, and a fifth emergent model which was identified during this evaluation. These five types of night patrol service delivery differ significantly in purpose, in philosophical perspectives on governance, and in approaches to accountability and community control.

Rationales for night patrols

Night patrols have been used for a number of different purposes and have been informed by different values and world views, especially with respect to the extent to which local communities actively contribute towards governance, priority-setting and management of patrols.

Night patrols and community development

Initially, modern Australian Indigenous night patrols were informed by community development and community activism principles (see especially Mosey, 1994, and also Vinson, in the literature review). Increased community safety and crime prevention were viewed as by-products of processes that strengthened community capacity and collective efficacy. The community development approach was linked to crime prevention and community safety, circuitously.

Community development changes social conditions and reduces drivers of crime and anti-social behaviour and increases the ability of community members as a whole to respond to and act to ameliorate problem situations (Pope, 2006; Social Inclusion Unit, 2004). The purposes of community development in the context of Indigenous night patrols were to:

- address Indigenous social disadvantage,
- build the capacity of Indigenous communities to make decisions about how they want to change their own communities, and

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- strengthen the ‘collective efficacy’ within Indigenous communities, to enable change. Community capacity-building supports community members to make small changes within their community.

Success increases the confidence of community members that change is possible and success also strengthens the belief of community members that they can institute change in their community through their own efforts by working together. This generates a sense of collective efficacy. Greater collective efficacy enables key community members to collaborate to change norms in the community that tolerate anti-social behaviour, crime and violence. This, in turn, increases community safety and reduced crime (see especially Vinson). Community development methods with respect to night patrols include:

- Building capacity and social capital at a local level through the enhancement of Indigenous leadership, community management/governance and self-determination;
- Encouragement of partnership and cultural understanding between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people;
- Increasing access to diversionary programs, outside of the formal criminal justice system, and maintaining community ‘ownership’ of night patrols; and
- Changing community norms on violence, anti-social behaviour and crime.

See the full literature review in Appendix 2 for details and references about how the earliest night patrols used community development to build collective efficacy to challenge community norms that accepted crime, anti-social behaviour and violence as inevitable. A later section in this chapter presents a typology of night patrols and reports the findings of previous evaluations, in relation to the strengths and limitations of community development approaches as implemented by different types of night patrols. Community development methods, perspectives and priorities have informed night patrols of Types 1 and 2 and may inform Type 5, as described in the typology. The benefits, limitations and tensions inherent within each ‘Type’ are also discussed in the typology later in this chapter.

Night patrols and crime prevention and community safety

Crime prevention approaches have been influenced by literature on primary, secondary and tertiary crime prevention strategies (concepts that parallel primary, secondary and tertiary prevention in health care). Primary crime prevention strategies include both ‘situational crime prevention’ and ‘Social crime prevention’. Social crime prevention seeks to ameliorate the social conditions that make crime more likely, and includes initiatives such as programs to promote school retention, prevent school truancy and promote community-based involvement in crime prevention, for example, through neighbourhood watch schemes (<http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/crm/1-20/crm001.htm>). Secondary prevention seeks to change people, and includes initiatives to steer young people away from peer groups and activities that are perceived as likely to normalise involvement in crime as a way of life, and initiatives such as the PCYC. Tertiary crime prevention seeks to

change how the justice system operates to increase its effectiveness. This includes schemes to divert from the criminal justice system first offenders and young people who have committed minor offences, to avoid normalization of a life of crime.

The crime prevention approach outlined in 'Pathways to Prevention' has influenced policy and aims to intervene holistically early in an individual's life to reduce the factors and precipitators that later lead to offending or increase offending frequency, (Ferrante, Loh, & Maller, 2004; NCP, 1999; M. Smith, 2005). 'Pathways to Prevention' integrates elements from primary, secondary and tertiary crime prevention approaches. The *Pathways to Prevention* perspective on crime prevention can encompass different approaches and seeks holistic solutions in a problem-oriented manner; and seeks harm reduction or pan-hazard crime prevention initiatives which move beyond a focus on individual offences (Blagg 2003:9; Richards et al. 2011).

Community policing perspectives have influenced the organisation and goals of some types of night patrols. This is evident where a primary goal of night patrol policies is to reduce the high levels of exposure young Indigenous people have to the criminal justice system, both as offenders and victims. Where community policing perspectives have been prominent, there is a greater focus on keeping people 'out of harm's way' so they do not become either victims of crime or perpetrators of crime, and so anti-social behaviour does not take place in public where it may constitute a public order offence. Community policing methods with respect to night patrols include:

- Diversion of children and young people from hazards and conflict, to reduce opportunities for involvement in crime and reduce initial involvement in 'minor' offences;
- Enhanced community safety by providing safe transport at night to people who may be at risk of victimisation, and to encourage people who may become violent to not linger in public places;
- Enhanced perceptions of public safety because large groups of people are not gathered in public places;
- Minimisation of harms associated with alcohol and drug use, by ensuring that people who are intoxicated are transported home where others can care for them.

The full literature review in Appendix 2 details and references how night patrols are used in community policing to reduce opportunities for victimisation, petty crime, and public disorder. A later section in this chapter presents a typology of night patrols and reports the findings of previous evaluations, in relation to the strengths and limitations of the community policing approaches as implemented by different types of night patrol. The methods, perspectives and priorities of community policing have had the greatest influence on night patrols of Types 3 and 4. The benefits, limitations and tensions inherent within each 'Type' are outlined in the typology later in this chapter.

A typology of night patrols

Four different approaches to night and community patrols were distinguished in the literature, and the fifth emerged from the research. We have called these:

Type 1: Community-owned/ controlled patrols;

Type 2: CDEP Patrols (originally ATSIC/ATSIS auspiced);

Type 3: NPOF Patrols (operating under the Commonwealth AGD Night Patrol Operational Framework or similar);

Type 4: Night Patrols Funded for integrated crime prevention; and

Type 5: (Emergent) Welfare and youth work focussed night patrol.

The typology is detailed in Table 4.

Night patrols have had varying purposes, goals, values and aspirations, and the literature shows that the issue of accountability is vexed. Typically, Type 1 patrols were minimally resourced, relied primarily upon community support to perform their functions and were responsible only to their communities. In Type 1 patrols, lines of accountability and operational relationships aligned, because the patrols were accountable directly to their communities, and relied upon support of the community to operate effectively.

Funded patrols, especially post- ATSIC, have had dual accountability: to the funding body, which required evidence that numerical targets had been met, and to their community, because patrols require community support to be effective in their role. To retain support, they must maintain their accountability to the community they serve. Dual accountability introduces potential tensions if the expectations of the funding body and the community do not align. Where expectations are not compatible, the patrol is placed in a potentially impossible position. If the patrol fails to meet community expectations, they are potentially unable to function effectively; if they fail to (apparently) meet targets, they lose funding. This is resolvable if the community and the funding body understand each other’s needs and perspectives, and if programs can be locally adjusted to be responsive to both local needs and the purposes of the funding body.

Table 4: Typology of night patrols

<i>Patrol Type</i>	<i>Funding and management</i>	<i>Primary accountability</i>	<i>Governance</i>	<i>Integration</i>	<i>Community ownership/control</i>	<i>Values</i>	<i>Aim</i>
1	Unfunded, community managed	Community	Informal	Informal with other services	Yes	Community activism, self-determination volunteers	Community Development

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2	CDEP funded patrols, auspiced by ATSIC/ ATSSIS	Community controlled	Acquittal of staff payments	Potentially	Potentially	Community activism, self-determination Payment for patrol work	Community Development
3	Funded, managed through NPOF (NT primarily)	Accountability to funding body	Formal reporting to demonstrate service utilization	No	No	Report service provision	Community safety
4	Funded (various)to support community safety	Accountability to funding body	Formal reporting against targets to demonstrate contribution to crime prevention/ community safety	Goal	An aspiration	Multi-pronged community safety	Community safety/ service provision
5	Funded (various) as part of an integrated welfare response (emergent)	Accountability to funding body	Formal reporting against targets to demonstrate referrals, collaboration with other agencies	Goal	An aspiration	Integrated welfare/ informal education services; ability to support other services with transport and referral	Integrated services/ outreach/ community development

Changes to the structure and purposes of night patrols, in response to evaluation of programs, addressed perceived limitations. Although adjustments to programs attempted to remedy identified deficiencies, the modifications have not always achieved the intended improvements, for two reasons. Firstly, they did not examine whether there were fundamental tensions within the PLM of programs. Fundamental tensions may arise either because of tensions inherent within the rationale for programs, or because there is incompatibility between the rationale for the program and its methods. Secondly, they did not recognise the problematic nature of numerical targets tied to financial sanctions (Deming, 1986). In mainstream quality management literature, Deming² (1986) cautions that whenever attempts are made to assure quality through imposed numerical targets (and when there are penalties for failure to meet targets), the workforce will find ways to

² Deming is often considered as the founder of Quality management as a discipline

apparently meet targets, often at the cost of undermining the fundamental integrity of the operation.

Type 1: Community-owned/controlled patrols

'Community owned/controlled' patrols began in Australia in the late-1980s as a practical response to community problems identified by Aboriginal elders and influential community members, (Curtis 1992, revised 2003; Blagg, 2003; Blagg and Valuri, 2004; Blagg, 2007; Attorney-General, 2008; Auditor-General, 2011). Community elders determined that Community patrols were required as a consequence of the imposition of settlement on Aboriginal people. Groups that would normally avoid each other if tensions rose, or groups who were traditional enemies, were forced to sit down together in remote settlements or gather around rations depots, which provided many opportunities for conflict. Elders would walk around new settlements mediating and resolving disputes, and they were the precursors to the first night patrols in the Northern Territory (Walker & Forrester, 2002).

These community controlled patrols were usually initiated on a voluntary basis, often without much funding to pay patrol members or to fund vehicles. In the initial night patrols in central Australia in the early 1990s, funding was limited to that obtained for facilitation, vehicles and limited funding for patrollers through, e.g. CDEP (Taylor-Walker, 2010; Walker & Forrester, 2002).

The night patrol of Julalikari, established in the mid-1980s, is regarded as one of the earliest successful examples of this type of night patrol. The Julalikari night patrol operated a roster in which Julalikari-elected Council members, executive and Elders (rather than the paid Council administrators) selected participants from among themselves for the roster and participated in the patrol (Curtis, 1992 revised 2003). This arrangement required a significant commitment from the Julalikari executive, who voluntarily worked up to 12 hours per week on night patrol duties in addition to their normal full-time employment.

The instigators of early patrols were often women who had a high level of personal commitment to the belief that communities can and should resolve problems (community self-determination) of anti-social conduct, minor disturbance and conflict between community members through active engagement and mediation by elders and community leaders (Walker, 2010). The initiation and management of a large number (14) of these early night patrols established in the late 1980s and early 1990s was facilitated by Anne Mosey from Adelaide operating under the auspices of Tangentyere Council and funded from the NT Department of Health Drug and Alcohol program (Mosey, 1994, 2009; Taylor-Walker, 2010; Walker & Forrester, 2002). Research has suggested women tend to act more as maintainers of social and family networks, while men are more authoritarian and can take a more tough line when required. Both men and women are most comfortable and effective when dealing with their own gender (Walker, 2010).

In Julalikari, this provided documented benefits, and Community-controlled remote area night patrols were established in other Indigenous communities in central Australia

primarily as a result of facilitation by Ann Mosey funded by NT Department of Health, DASA and similar bodies. There was a strong sense of ownership of patrols within Aboriginal communities, which meant that the patrol had authority to respond rapidly, and in a culturally appropriate manner (Walker, 2010). To be effective mediators in any dispute, patrols needed to be known and respected by all parties and their affiliations and family relationships in correct alignment to the disputants and to country. This contrasts with non-Indigenous dispute mediation practices where an unaligned, impartial mediator is considered to be the best option for a fair outcome (Walker, 2010).

Higgins (1997) conducted a systematic evaluation of Indigenous community/night patrols approximately six years after the inception of official remote settlement patrols. He noted there was a constant feedback along the grapevine that ensured the patrols remained accountable to their communities. However, Higgins also noted that the status of any patrol tended to fluctuate depending upon circumstances within the community. He found that communities most troubled by violence and alcohol and most in need of a patrol are those where cultural law has broken down and they are least able to form and sustain an effective patrol (Walker, 2010: 53).

Higgins recommended more support for patrols. The consequence of funding was that accountability was no longer to the patrols' community but to external funding bodies that applied non-Aboriginal systems of governance (Walker, 2010).

Subsequent evaluations of night patrols have shown mixed results. Evaluation of community-controlled night patrols has been based upon a case-study approach (Mosey, 1994) (Curtis 1992, revised 2003; Blagg, 2003; Blagg and Valuri, 2004; NSW Attorney-General's Department 2005; Blagg 2007; Attorney-General 2008; Auditor-General, 2011; Beacroft, Richards, Adrevski & Rosevear, 2011). These case studies indicated community-owned/ controlled patrols could improve community safety, both as indicated by objective measures, (such as statistics related to incidence of involvement with the criminal justice system, family violence, public order and nuisance offences), and as measured subjectively by community members' perceptions of community safety. The voluntary community-controlled model of night patrols was not readily transferable to other communities. Success depended upon high levels of personal commitment by a few individuals, and this only arose spontaneously in communities with highly committed community leaders. In addition, the case studies indicated that many patrols were under-resourced.

Evaluation found sustainability problems arose in many communities. Patrols were initiated, but were short-lived. Efforts were made to identify how to increase longevity (Blagg 2003, Taylor-Walker, 2010). Where community-controlled patrols failed, case studies indicated different causes. These included lack of funding, lack of basic resources (such as vehicles), lack of management support, family business, communal politics, and a heavy reliance on volunteer commitment.

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Reviews of community-controlled night patrols demonstrated the potential benefits of community and night patrols, but also illustrated the need for more institutional support. These evaluations influenced the subsequent development of community and night patrols, and, especially, the provision of funding to enable payment of patrol members and support for management and administration. The issues experienced by these patrols are similar to those experienced by many community-based initiatives in "going to scale" (Schorr, 1989). These particularly revolve around the importance of individual leaders and community members with the ability to engage and commit. In this sense, the difficulties experienced by these early approaches to community-controlled patrols are paralleled across a range of different community initiatives aimed at addressing disadvantage (e.g. Diamond, 2004, Higgins, 2010).

Type 2: CDEP funded patrols auspiced by ATSIC/ ATSI

In parallel to, and immediately following, the Type 1 night patrols, government funding of night patrol programs was initiated by the findings and recommendations of the 1991 report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Johnston, 1991). From the mid-1990s, funding for night patrols was typically delivered through the offices of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) and later through Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services (ATSIS) (Auditor-General, 2011). These programs were funding Community Development Employment Project (CDEP) programs to promote community development; for example, night patrol patrollers were often funded as Community Development staff (CDEP). This strategy addressed the need for funding, but did not address the need for management and administrative support. The Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) program was established in 1977 to replace the unemployment benefits for Indigenous people living in rural and remote communities by providing work and on-the-job training, and to sustain local economies (Hudson 2008). An advantage of CDEP funding was it allowed patrol members to be paid for their work. A potential disadvantage of CDEP funding was that CDEP positions were not 'real employment'. People paid through CDEP did not have the same rights as employees, and were not always selected or managed as employees. They did not necessarily see the work as a real job, and sometimes the right people for the night patrol were excluded from employment by their personal circumstances or by the terms of the CDEP programs, especially older people. Changes in government management of Aboriginal affairs in 2004 resulted in ATSIC/ATSIS programs being transferred to other government departments. In 2007-2008, many previous CDEP programs were reinstated in remote locations, with the 2009-2012 plan transitioning participants from CDEP 'wages' to Centrelink income support payments (FaHCSIA, 2009). A history of the CDEP transition for Tangentyere Council, under which many of the first night patrols were auspiced, is described at <http://www.tangentyere.org.au/enterprises/employServices/cdep.html>.

Type 3: Night Patrols contracted through the Night Patrol Operational Framework (NPOF)

From 2004 onwards, the responsibility for the ATSI night patrols program was transferred to the Commonwealth AGD (Auditor-General, 2011). Night patrols represent one of the four programs operated through the Indigenous Justice Program (IJP) through local Indigenous Coordination Centres (ICCs). The Commonwealth AGD funded service providers to implement a large group of night patrol programs in the Northern Territory, with the funding contract tied to the Night Patrol Operational Framework (NPOF) (AGD, 2008; Attorney-General, 2010). This required the service providers organising night patrol programs to establish and follow processes that addressed the management and administrative concerns identified in evaluations of the earlier community-initiated and CDEP-funded night patrols. In NPOF night patrols, access to funding is tied to implementation processes of administration and reporting that were not a requirement of CDEP funding arrangements.

Increasingly, the funding and delivery of night patrol programs became multi-layered. In the case of Commonwealth AGD funded programs, the Commonwealth AGD central offices managed the night patrol funding program nationally. Responsibilities for funding and delivering programs previously funded by ATSI and ATSIIC were coordinated by Commonwealth AGD staff located in urban, regional and remote Indigenous Coordination Centres (ICCs), part of each FaHCSIA state office (Attorney-General, 2010 p 39). A role of the staff at ICCs was to inform the Commonwealth AGD office when local conditions had effects on projects. ICCs managed processes whereby other organisations tendered to manage the provision of night patrols in communities. The successful tenderer acted as program administrator for the night patrol program and was responsible for organisation and management of the night patrol team. The contract required the 'service provider' to keep records of service 'outputs', such as the hours the night patrol operated, the numbers of staff employed and the numbers of people transported. The night patrol team itself (as distinct from the service provider organisation) usually included a night patrol manager, night patrol team leader and night patrollers (see, for example, Attorney-General's Department, 2010). The primary emphasis of this Commonwealth AGD funding and management process was in the Northern Territory. In the NT in 2006-2007, the Commonwealth AGD funded 32 night patrols compared to WA (6); Queensland (2); NSW (3) Vic (1); and SA (0) – 44 night patrols in total. In 2011, Commonwealth AGD funding for night patrols outside NT controlled by Indigenous organisations was restricted to four Indigenous organisations: Murdi Paaki Regional Enterprise Corporation in NSW, Innisfail Community Justice Group in Queensland, Mamabulanjin Aboriginal Corporation in Broome, WA and Nyoongar Patrol Systems in WA.

Evaluation of night patrols operating under NPOF was primarily outputs-based, and concerned with whether the service was provided as contracted and whether it was utilised by the target population (AGD, 2008 pp. 19-20; Attorney-General, 2010 pp. 45-46

Attachment C Performance Report template). Evaluations of night patrols focused primarily upon service provision (outputs), identifying whether the service was performing according to contract and any problems with its implementation, rather than the quality and effectiveness of its service outcomes. For example, the reporting requirements sought information about frequency of service provision, numbers of staff and the numbers of service users as well as how well the patrollers work in partnership with other organisations, and the obstacles that affect the functionality of the service (Auditor-General, 2011 pp. 21, 100-102).

In addition, some case-study evaluation was conducted (e.g. Walker & Forrester, 2002). These evaluations found examples of services that were well-managed and well-utilised and indications of a positive contribution to community safety, but in some instances services were not provided as contracted, or were completely inactive (Auditor-General, 2011). Some were alleged to provide services to one part of the community preferentially (particular families) or to exclude some people from the patrol, and there were allegations of use of patrol vehicles for purposes other than the night patrol service provision. It was recognised that evaluation of outputs about service provision has limited utility, and does not provide any data about whether the service is beneficial to communities or whether the intended outcomes are achieved (Auditor-General, 2011).

Evaluation of operations and outcomes of night patrols during the years up to 2011 concluded night patrols needed to be adapted better to individual communities (Auditor-General, 2011). The stated reason for this conclusion was that it would facilitate community ownership of the patrols and more sensitive adaptation to different community circumstances, and this had been foreshadowed by earlier reviews (Mosey, 1994; Taylor-Walker, 2010; Walker & Forrester, 2002; Blagg, 2003; Blagg, 2007; Richards, Rosevear & Gilbert, 2011). A recent evaluation concluded that night patrols could best support increased community safety, if there was a 'more coordinated approach to services delivery at the community level' and if each night patrol established 'effective partnerships with other related community support services (such as Police, safe houses, sobering up shelters and health clinics) at a local level' (Auditor-General, 2011). This conclusion subtly changes the focus of night patrols, away from a focus primarily upon short-term immediate problem-solving (persuading people to accept transport home to avoid conflict or victimisation) and towards community and night patrols taking a more prominent role in an integrated approach to service provision that addresses underlying causes of social problems that reduce community safety. In all cases, it was regarded as important to improve the framework by which information about night patrols was gathered to better align it with the program logic model by which night patrols were funded and implemented (Beacroft, et al., 2011).

Evaluations concluded that multi-layered organisational arrangements that separate the administration and management functions from the service provision functions of night patrols have a number of advantages and disadvantages. An advantage is that the night

patrol staff can focus upon service provision within their community, and have administrative and managerial support for payment and reporting tasks. Two of the main disadvantages are, firstly, that the separation can result in reduced levels of community ownership (regarded as an essential factor in the success of night patrol programs), and, secondly, where management is not integral to the community, this may place barriers to integration and partnership with other community support agencies. Both of the latter were identified as important in the 2011 audit of Northern Territory night patrols (Attorney-General's Department, 2010).

Type 4: Night patrols funded to improve integrated crime prevention

In an integrated approach to crime prevention, different agencies coordinate their activities to reduce crime and improve community safety, where community safety is conceived as reduction in victimisation. This type of program has a broader focus than the Type 3 night patrol programs, but retains the primary focus on crime prevention/ reduction of victimisation. Leadership of such programs usually rests with police services and allied organisations such as PCYC. Agencies each perform their unique role, and share strategic information to maximise effectiveness. The dominant concept of the crime prevention model is secondary prevention, where the goal is to change young people who are at risk of committing crime by providing alternative activities and supervision.

The purpose of the Type 4 night patrol is to reduce crime and victimisation through interventions that reduce risk of involvement in crime. Like Type 3, evaluation of Type 4 patrols includes measures of service utilization (outputs), but also includes an analysis of changes in crime data to measure the effectiveness of the service in terms of crime and victimisation (outcomes). A conceptual limitation to this approach is that crime and victimisation data can be influenced by extraneous factors unconnected to the efficacy or otherwise of a crime prevention program. For example, for juvenile crime, although over 70% of juveniles never re-offend, chronic repeat offenders account for a disproportionate volume of crime. This means that annual crime statistics in a community can be disproportionately affected by the presence or absence of a single family, and whether particular individuals are incarcerated. Similarly, data on community safety is affected by whether people report victimisation. Increased reporting may occur when community safety is increasing and people feel at less risk of reprisals, and as violence becomes less normalised. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the effectiveness of night patrols on crime prevention and community safety through a number of indicators (both quantitative and qualitative).

Crime prevention policy has been influenced by *Pathways to Prevention* and similar approaches which require a whole-of-government approach to service delivery that extends beyond the narrower focus of the original police-led Type 4 program. The holistic approach includes 'social crime prevention' and programs that seek to change all factors that influence the likelihood that a young person will become chronically involved in crime. This

has paved the way for Type 5 services that focus upon integrated welfare and youth work - focused integrated services, to improve parenting, school retention and youth employability and to help young people achieve their fullest potential.

Type 5: Welfare and youth work focused night patrols (emergent)

During the course of this study we have become aware of an emergent fifth type of night patrol, which is in many ways a development of type 4. The emergent purpose of some patrols has moved further 'up-stream' from immediate crime prevention and community safety to focus more holistically on welfare issues that affect children and young people. In WA, the policy documents that provided the foundation for the Northbridge Policy of 2003 provide an explicit discussion of integrated crime prevention and integration of a night patrol and CPTED initiatives, and the welfare element was integral to the aims of the service (Busch, 2002; n.a., 2011, 2012; Office of Crime Prevention, 2006b).

The rationale of this approach is that if welfare issues are addressed through early intervention, young people are much less likely to enter the justice system (Stewart, Livingston et al. 2008), or will enter the justice system at an older age. In the Type 5 model, the role of the night patrol includes: to act promptly to address child protection issues; to link young people and their parents to community services that will improve parenting or lower the risk; to provide information and advice to young people; to support young people to help them overcome difficult circumstances in their own lives; and, to provide informal education opportunities to enable young people to reach their fullest potential. The successful methods for this approach can be found in youth work, especially the literature on detached youth work.

The emergence of Type 5 has a number of implications. Firstly, an integrated welfare services approach changes the evaluation of outcomes. Key performance indicators become much broader to include multiple welfare indicators such as employment, education, health, crime and community development. Secondly, workers will have an expanded role and will need additional skills and knowledge, and there are training and support implications of this. Thirdly, night patrols will need to adjust to how they provide their services to maximise benefits in their local context. This means that night patrols in different contexts will be expected to operate differently. Fourthly, the change of focus means that it is no longer appropriate for police to take a lead role in the management of programs, although police would be partners to the program. Coordination of a welfare-oriented program would be more appropriately vested in a welfare agency.

In accordance with *Pathways to Prevention*, Type 5 community and night patrols differ from type 4 patrols because their focus is upon amelioration of welfare issues. The role of patrol staff in this integrated night patrol model is broad and extends beyond provision of transport to include provision of accurate, timely information and referral of children and young people to other services, support for pro-social inter-personal norms, and provision of immediate emotional and practical support for children and young people in crisis.

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The primary methods used by night patrols for young people include building good rapport between patrol staff and children and young people, which will provide a foundation for long-term trusting and positive relationships. Night patrol staff use the non-coercive relationship they have with children and young people to provide them with information about other support and welfare services, to provide support for children and young people to use other services, and sometimes to provide transport to enable people to access other services. Detached youth work strategies have been used in crime prevention in night patrol contexts to promote youth development, the use of informal education and referral (Saddington, 1990).

Appropriate evaluation of Type 5 community and night patrol services differs from evaluation of Type 4, because the intended outcomes of integrated services policies extend far beyond the events of the night that the patrol is on duty, and beyond the goals of secondary crime prevention, and may include both short-term and long-term outcomes. Short-term outcomes include engagement in supportive and safe recreational activities (sometimes called diversionary activities), access to emergency accommodation, enrolment in school, contact with a specialist substance abuse service, and reduction of risky activities. Long-term outcomes include improved health and well-being, better educational outcomes, improved parenting, improved employment, and amelioration of inter-generational disadvantage. The effectiveness of night patrols within integrated services approaches would be assessed upon the ability of the night patrols to link children and young people to other services, and how well night patrols were able to create a healthy social ecology that facilitates positive development for young people. The efficacy of the whole program, however, would depend not only upon the capacity of night patrol staff to form relationships with young people, but also upon the efficacy of other services to perform their roles, and the ability of other services to relate well to the children and young people referred to them by the patrols.

There are at least two variants on this Type 5 model of community and night patrols. The first, a community-based variant, would be a potential development of the SAYP approach to night patrols to include a detached youth work approach. This would extend the role of patrols, whose task it would be to build positive relationships with young people, to link young people to other services, to provide advice and informal support to young people, and to encourage young people to reach their full potential. The second institutionally-based variant of the Type 5 model of community and night patrols might be similar to the one currently used in the NPP. The Northbridge Policy project provides an example of a night patrol service that has now moved away from the public order and immediate crime prevention aspects of its original brief and now focuses primarily on child protection and preventative family support services. In the NPP model, in alignment with *Pathways to Prevention*, the aim is to provide an early intervention service that will address welfare concerns, before neglect or lack of parental supervision leads to secondary consequences

such as involvement in crime, substance abuse, or early parenthood and a repeat of cycles of neglect.

The main differences between the two variants are the extent to which the local community is involved with the service and whether young people's engagement with the service is voluntary. The strength of the community-based variant is that it should be possible to incorporate community governance and community development to support long-term change. The institutional-based model strengthens collaboration between key government agencies but risks alienation from communities, families and individuals served by the patrol.

Recommendations for success

This section has two parts. The first part summarises the main findings about the efficacy of night patrols. The second part makes recommendations for good practice based upon the literature.

Summary of findings on efficacy of night patrols

The description of approaches to night patrols, their evaluation and reasons for policy changes, provides an indication of the complexity of the issues that influence the effectiveness of night patrols. Two approaches, 'community development' and 'crime prevention', are well established. The third, 'integrated welfare services', is emergent.

According to the literature,

- Night patrols that use community development approaches (as in Type 1) address the social causes of crime, but are difficult to sustain as volunteer programs in communities where they are most needed because of lack of community leaders, lack of volunteers and community fragmentation.
- A strong finding from previous evaluations was that community involvement in governance was essential to long-term success of patrols, and enabled patrols to be tailored to the needs of each community.
- Separation of management from service provision allows community patrols to focus on service delivery, but tends to reduce community involvement in the governance and management of the patrol (as in Type 4). This may limit the credibility of the patrol in the local community and does not contribute to building community capacity.
- Night patrols that focus narrowly on immediate crime prevention and community safety (such as Type 3) are open to criticism that they do not address the underlying social causes of crime, and may give rise to perceptions that night patrols only operate 'booze buses' / free transport that facilitate and normalise anti-social conduct.

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- In the absence of programs that build community capacity, it could be argued that Type 3 patrols that focus narrowly on immediate crime prevention at best do nothing to build community efficacy, and at worst, increase community dependency on external intervention in harmful ways.
- An integrated welfare approach potentially allows programs to be implemented in communities where community development approaches with restricted funding have not been sustainable.
- Night patrols that address the underlying social causes of crime through an integrated welfare approach (emergent model Type 5) may (or may not) include community development.
- Integrated welfare approaches that do not incorporate community development would be expected to suffer the same limitations as Type 4 approaches, and this would be expected to severely undermine the efficacy of the services, and reduce the likelihood that the social causes of crime can be addressed.

Conclusions about good practice

From the literature review, following the approach recommended in social crime prevention including the *Pathways to Prevention* project, we concluded that successful night patrols must:

- Contribute to changing underlying social conditions that are precursors to crime;
- Have administrative support, mentoring and additional training and professional supervision to enable them to assume a broader role;
- Adopt community development approaches for long-term community capacity building;
- Strengthen community governance to enable programs to be tailored to local need;
- Supplement community development approaches with an integrated welfare approach, especially where communities are fragmented;
- For youth night patrols, incorporate detached youth work methods;
- Have Indigenous ownership and involvement in night patrols and their governance;
- Have dual accountability of night patrols to both the funding body and the local community.

The proposed model is outlined schematically in Figure 3.

Chapter 3: Evaluation of Indigenous night patrols in Australia




Figure 3: Night Patrols: contribution of community development, integrated welfare services and youth work to community safety

Chapter 4: Summary of findings from NSW

Best Practice in SAY programs requires:

- community awareness
- enhancement of Indigenous leadership, community management/governance and self-determination
- retention of adequately resourced local staff
- building relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people
- building relationships between young people and other services providers, such as police
- being responsive to local needs
- a community safety focus
- a partnership model/ integrated approach with other services
- appropriate referral
- transparency and accountability
- streamlined funding

Introduction

In this chapter, an overview of the main findings from the field work conducted in the eleven case study communities is presented. For the purposes of this report, the sites were grouped into categories based on their size and location into:

- Metropolitan programs (metro) two communities
- Regional Centre programs (RC) two communities
- Regional Town programs (RT) three communities
- Small remote programs (SR) four communities

The grouping aims to protect the identity of participants in the research who may potentially be identifiable by their comments given the nature and size of some of the program sites. This chapter presents an analysis of the themes generated from these programs.

Community Group Descriptions

Metropolitan Centres

This group includes Newcastle on the NSW central coast and La Perouse in Sydney's eastern suburbs.

Table 5: Selected community characteristics for Metropolitan Centres (ABS 2012)

	Non- Indigenous/Indigenous		
	Newcastle	La Perouse	AUSTRALIA
Population (Town)	148,535	418	21,507,717
Aboriginal population	3927 (2.6%)	154 (36.8%)	548,369 (2.5%)
% Children aged 0-14	16.4 / 17.0	15.1 / 27.2	19.3 / 46.7
% Unemployed	5.7 / 13.2	5.5 / 10.5	5.6 / 17.1
Median household income	\$1,165 / \$1,048	\$1,037 / \$816	\$1,234 / \$991
Ave people per household	2.4 / 2.9	2.8/3.1	2.6 / 3.3
% One parent families	18.5%	31.8%	15.9%

Newcastle is situated 162 kilometres north east of Sydney. The Newcastle metropolitan area is the second most populated area in New South Wales. The city centre abuts eight beaches. Being a large regional city, Newcastle has access to a wide variety of services, health and education facilities. The city has an extensive public transport system. However, the cost can inhibit young people. The main crimes experienced include Malicious Damage, steal from a motor vehicle, Break and enter, other theft and assault.

The Wungara night patrol service is currently auspiced by the Newcastle PCYC and funded under the SAY program. The night patrol operates every Friday and Saturday night in conjunction with activities at the Newcastle PCYC from 7:30pm – 10:30pm. The bus then provides a drop off service on those nights from 9:00pm -1:00am to a safe location.

La Perouse is a small suburb located at the southern extent of Randwick City shire bounded by an extensive foreshore area on the northern headland of Botany Bay. There is a small residential area in the west of La Perouse which is a mix of low- and medium-density housing. In 2011, there were 418 people living in La Perouse. Well over one-third of the population was Aboriginal. La Perouse is the one area of Sydney with which Aboriginal people have had an unbroken connection for over 7,500 years. Being within the Sydney metropolitan area, the region is well serviced. The main crimes experienced include malicious damage to property, steal from motor vehicle, break and enter and other theft, domestic violence, and breach bail offences. The region ranked 5th in the state for the offence of 'robbery without a weapon'.

The La Perouse Street Beat bus, known as the *Boomerang Bus*, is a community-based service providing a safe transport and outreach service for people aged 12 to 20 years who are on the street late at night, when other support services are unavailable. The SAY night patrol program is managed by the Eastern Suburbs PCYC. Street Beat youth workers and volunteers also provide those in need with access to resources such as counselling, advice and advocacy. La Perouse's Boomerang Bus has two Street Beat workers, and a caseworker to work with the PCYC Activities Coordinator to ensure there are ongoing recreational programs and skills development for local young people.

Regional centres

The two regional centres include Armidale and Dubbo.

Table 6: Selected community characteristics for Regional Centres (ABS 2012)

	Non- Indigenous/Indigenous		
	Dubbo	Armidale	AUSTRALIA
Population (Town)	38,805	24,105	21,507,717
Aboriginal population	4,985 (13%)	1,513 (6.3%)	548,369 (2.5%)
% Children aged 0-14	22.5 / 39.3%	19.1 / 36.3%	19.3 / 46.7%
% Unemployed	4.9/ 18.3%	7.4 / 22.4%	5.6 / 17.1%
Median household income	\$1,096 / \$943	\$991 / \$749	\$1,234 / \$991
Ave people per household	2.6 / 3.3	2.4 / 3.1	2.6 / 3.3
%One parent families	19.3%	18%	15.9%

Armidale is situated in the New England Tablelands half way between Sydney and Brisbane. Armidale is a centre for education, agriculture, retail and professional services. The region is the traditional land of the Anaiwan people. The community is quite diverse, comprised of over 53 different nationalities. Being a large regional centre, Armidale is very well supported by service providers. Liquor offences and offensive conduct are an issue in this community. Other crimes of significance are malicious damage, assault and domestic violence and break and enter.

The night patrol service in Armidale has operated for fifteen years. The service is known as Youth Assist and is funded under the SAY program. The night patrol currently operates two nights a week.

Dubbo is a large regional city of 38,000 people that has grown rapidly over the last twenty years. Many Aboriginal people have moved into the city from outback towns seeking employment opportunities. There are 57 different Aboriginal groups in Dubbo and Aboriginal people comprise 13% of the population (ABS 2012; Dubbo KIN 2012). Youth homelessness and a lack of structured activities for young people see many on the streets at night. Local police noted that break and enter, graffiti, arson and fighting were common problems among youth between the ages of 10 and 18 years. Until 2006, Aboriginal people were primarily located within the Gordon Estate in West Dubbo. There was a high level of social disadvantage in this community and the estate became notorious for violence, high crime, vandalism and anti-social behaviour, culminating in a riot in 2005. In response, the New South Wales Department of Housing closed the estate and relocated over 200 households to other parts of Dubbo. The exercise did result in a significant reduction in Dubbo's crime rates but it also highlights the need for a night patrol, as young people need transport to homes spread across the city.

The Indigenous population in this community is significantly higher than the national Indigenous population rate. Young people aged less than 14 years and one parent families are also substantially over-represented. Break and enter, malicious damage, steal from a motor vehicle, and breach bail are the main crimes experienced in Dubbo. The community ranks particularly highly, compared with other LGAs in NSW, for crimes relating to domestic violence and other types of assault, sexual assault, break and enter offences, theft and stealing offences, and motor vehicle theft.

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Dubbo has a night patrol managed by the Dubbo Neighbourhood Centre. The bus operates Thursday, Friday and Saturday evenings from 6.00pm to 10.30pm.

Regional towns

The Regional towns include Nowra, Taree and Kempsey. These towns are all situated on the coast and thus have large, growing and diverse populations.

Table 7: Selected community characteristics for Regional Towns (ABS 2012)

	Non- Indigenous/Indigenous			
	Nowra	Taree	Kempsey	AUSTRALIA
Population (Town)	18,104	46,541	28,134	21,507,717
Aboriginal population	2,030 (8.5%)	2,500 (5.4%)	3,124 (11.1%)	548,369 (2.5%)
% Children aged 0-14	20.7/39.9	18.6/40.4	19.4/37.5	19.3 /46.7
% Unemployed	8.8/24.3	9.3/28.1	8.9/27.6	5.6 / 17.1
Median household income	\$851/\$745	\$770/\$716	\$748/\$700	\$1,234 /\$991
Ave people per household	2.5/3.1	2.4/3.3	2.4/3.3	2.6 / 3.3
% One parent families	22.7	18.4	22.5	15.9

According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics' Socio-Economic Disadvantage Index for Areas (SEIFA) for regional towns, these communities have some of the highest levels of disadvantage in NSW with higher levels of unemployment and disability than the state's average, higher rates of Indigenous residents and high rates of criminal victimization.

Nowra is the largest coastal town on the NSW south coast and is 160km south of Sydney. The area has no public transport but private contractors operate some services. This lack of access to transport for young people and limited youth services are key problems and highlights the necessity of a night patrol service. Malicious damage is the most common offence occurring in the region. Assault and harassment offences are also high.

The SAY night patrol program in Nowra is called the Koori Habitat Night Patrol program. It is auspiced by Habitat Personnel, an Indigenous Employment NGO, and is operated from the Nowra Youth Centre located on the edge of the central business district. The SAY night patrol bus operates Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays from 6pm, with last runs at 9pm when the youth centre closes. There are definite times for the bus collection points in the Nowra-Bomaderry areas.

Kempsey lies 35 km inland on the mid north coast of NSW, 420kms north of Sydney. The economy is based on tourism, farming and service industries. The unique feature of the Kempsey Shire is the number of villages and settlements scattered throughout an area of 3,335 sq. km resulting in more than half of the total population residing outside of Kempsey township. A dispersed population has consequences for the Kempsey community and demonstrates the need for a night patrol.

Kempsey has a diverse population with varied lifestyles, including lower socio-economic groups, because housing and property costs are relatively low. The traditional owners of the Macleay Valley are the Dunghutti People. Today there is a large Aboriginal community

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comprised of four distinct groups; a proportion of the population much higher than national averages. Kempsey has a high population turnover but overall a low population growth, a high unemployment rate, a high proportion of single parent families, and low medium household income rate. The main crimes experienced are malicious damage, break and enter, stealing offences, assault, and domestic violence. Kempsey is ranked fifth highest in the state for break and enter offences and motor vehicle theft.

For a regional community, Kempsey is quite well serviced. There is even a youth refuge. The SAY Program in Kempsey is a night patrol. It is auspiced by and operates from the Kempsey PCYC. The patrol operates on Friday and Saturday nights. On Friday nights young people aged 12-18 years are targeted but, in general, attendance is mainly those aged between 14 and 15. Younger children attend on Saturday nights (aged 10-12) between 5:00 and 7:30pm. Activities for older youth operate til 10pm.

Taree is a city on the Mid North Coast, 16 km from the sea coast, and 317 km north of Sydney. The town is the centre for a significant agricultural district. The main crimes experienced are malicious damage, breach bail conditions, break and enter offences, theft from motor vehicle, other theft and domestic violence. The Taree Street Beat Project is funded by the DAGJ in partnership with Greater Taree City Council. Youth workers patrol the Taree CBD, Old Bar and Wingham on Friday and Saturday nights in a 14 seater mini bus between the hours of 6:30pm and 10:30pm. In addition, the Woombarra-Wunggan Youth Services is an Aboriginal Adolescent Support Program funded by NSW Community Services. The program supports Aboriginal young people aged 12-18 years and provides a range of recreation, social and learning programs. Midnight basketball regularly operates an 8 week tournament.

Small remote communities

Of the **small remote communities (SR)**, three (Wilcannia, Bourke and Brewarrina) are located in remote areas in the far north west of the state. The other community (Dareton) is in the far south west of New South Wales and is less remote, being in relatively close proximity to a large regional centre. Population sizes range from 600 to 2,900 people. All four have large proportions of Aboriginal people and all have high levels of social disadvantage according to the ABS SEIFA scale (ABS 2010).

Table 8: Selected community characteristics for Small Remote Communities (ABS 2012)

	Non-Indigenous/ Indigenous				AUSTRALIA
	Dareton	Wilcannia	Bourke	Brewarrina	
Population (Town)	516	826	2,868	1,766	21,507,717
Aboriginal population	187 (36.4%)	466 (57.4%)	867 (30.2%)	1,043 (59.1%)	548,369 (2.5%)
% Children aged 0-14	17.1/25.1	25.6 / 34.7	25.4 / 34.3	25.3 / 31.4	19.3 /46.7
% Unemployed	10.3/28.6	11.6 / 26.2	5.1 / 17.8	12.5 / 22.5	5.6 / 17.1
Median household income	\$787/\$774	\$830 /\$830	\$1,085 /\$900	\$791 /\$720	\$1,234 /\$991
Ave people per household	2.5/3.6	2.9 / 3.9	2.6/3.2	2.6 / 3.1	2.6 / 3.3
%One parent families	23.1	30	19.3	29.3	15.9

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Dareton is a community of 516 people within the Wentworth Shire, which covers an area of 26,000sq km in south west NSW and has a population of 6,609. Dareton is 22kms from Wentworth, 19km from Buronga and 23km from Gol Gol. A SAY night patrol based in Dareton operates between these four communities. The large regional city of Mildura is just across the border in Victoria and there are problems when young people travel there, and then have difficulty finding their way back home. There is no youth centre but the SAY night patrol is managed by Mallee Family Care, which provides links to a wide range of youth services. The main crimes experienced are malicious damage, break and enter, steal from a motor vehicle, domestic violence and breach bail offences.

Wilcannia is a small, remote town of 600 people in the far west of NSW that has a long history of social disadvantage amongst its largely Aboriginal population. With limited infrastructure, high unemployment, boredom, heat, and alcohol and drug abuse in the community there have been ongoing problems with crime, violence and anti-social behaviour. The most common offences in 2012 were domestic violence, assault, malicious damage to property, harassment and various public order offences. Support services are mostly based in regional centres some distance away and are seen to be disjointed and often inappropriate for this community. The town has a SAY Activities program operating at a local youth centre. There is a bus that transports children to the centre and takes them home at the end of the evening.

Bourke is a community of 2,900 people in far North West NSW and also has a large Aboriginal population. Bourke is renowned for some of the highest crime rates in the state. The main types of crime experienced include breach of bail conditions, assault, domestic violence, malicious damage and break and enter. There are welfare and social support services available. Bourke also has a SAY Activities program operating from a fully functioning PCYC. A bus picks children up from the streets to bring them into the PCYC where they have access to food and sporting activities and are then taken home.

Brewarrina, population 923, is largely an Aboriginal community also in far North West NSW. Brewarrina has more amenities than Wilcannia, although service provision is located in Bourke about 100kms away. Apart from sport, youth activities are very limited. Consequently, youth roam the streets. The main crimes are assault, domestic violence, malicious damage, and break and enter. There appears to be a clear pattern of youth offending resulting in many Aboriginal children in this community becoming entwined in the criminal justice system. Unfortunately, Brewarrina currently has no SAY program having lost funding for a night patrol due to a failure by the management committee to meet reporting requirements. Previous bus patrols had operated Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights to 2.00am.

History

This section presents the history of the programs as perceived by those involved in them. It is not intended to be an exact, factual account (which is better obtained elsewhere) but

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rather a reflection of community perceptions, necessary for understanding attitudes towards the program.

In many cases patrols were started by the community (in one community the original patrol was called the 'granny patrol' because of its origins with female Indigenous elders). Community members imparted this information with pride for their contribution to the initiation of the service. These original patrols were sometimes foot patrols, occasionally paired with a bus, although they tended to evolve into a bus patrol over time. In all cases the patrols went through various forms, with various different sponsoring organisations. Initial sponsoring organisations were invariably Indigenous, although few current organisations are.

Regional towns: Both regional towns commenced with a volunteer patrol. The introduction of a bus service caused some concerns as there was a perception that it was used as a 'taxi service'. A participant from one community explained that there was no youth centre in the community, but early patrol workers would do a foot patrol and use a Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) bus to take young people off the streets. Some felt that the original Patrol was problematic in that young people were transported into town where there were no activities available to them. In another community, even though the purpose of the original patrol bus was to pick young people up from the street and deliver them home safely, one informant explained the service became known as the 'booze bus', because people associated the bus with drunken adult passengers. Participants raised concerns regarding the use of the bus service by groups such as 'whites' and adults and the use of buses to support broader community transportation needs (e.g. for sporting events).

Training and professionalisation of the workforce was seen as a way to manage these concerns and all programs eventually came under the auspice of DAGJ. However, this move towards professionalisation was not without challenges. An Indigenous patrol worker explained the transition from volunteerism to professionalization in his/her service resulted in a downsizing of workers and pressures from the competing interests of different community groups. Despite these pressures, patrol workers report that they are focused on maintaining equality and objectivity, good relationships with respected Elders, and the needs of the community as a whole.

Metropolitan areas: Both metropolitan areas operate a bus service that is partnered with an activity program. The organisations running the activity program are also responsible for the bus service, although the funding for these two components is separate. In one area the transport initially operated independently and was not partnered with an activity program. There was a revitalisation of the program once this partnering occurred. The way a sponsoring service develops components of the program are dependent on funding. For example, in one case the sponsoring organisation needed to seek funding from other sources to continue the activity program which resulted in problems: some components could not be continued at all, whilst others ceased for a time before resuming.

Remote areas: In the remote areas one program had recently been de-funded, but had operated as a night patrol. In the other communities variations of the SAY model were in operation; one community was not funded for the SAY model but had developed a partnership with another organisation, so the combined operation presented as similar to SAY.

Why children and young people are on the streets at night

Along with the history as perceived by participants, there is a need to understand participants' perceptions of the need for the service. Again, these reasons may or may not link with those presented by the managers of the service, but understanding how stakeholders view the functions of the service helps to position the way the service is delivered and received by the local community. It is in this context that our participants delivered their thoughts on service effectiveness. As discussed below, our participants were less concerned about crime figures and the contribution of the service to addressing criminal problems than they were about the impact of the services on what they perceived as the causes of youth street presence. In this way, they perceived from a social welfare perspective the problem the services were addressing and spoke about the services' contribution to preventing criminal activity, in terms of both young people as offenders and victims.

Boredom: Despite being in metropolitan areas, informants in these areas felt that there was a lack of things for young people to do and this resulted in young people congregating on the streets. Thus the majority of our informants linked crime with youth 'boredom'. Boredom was associated with apathy and alienation among young people and this theme was common across metropolitan, regional and remote areas. While most middle class non-Aboriginal youth are able to get their license to drive at 17yrs, Aboriginal youth find it much more difficult to find someone to teach them to drive or to buy and maintain a vehicle. Consequently, accessing transport is a big issue for Aboriginal youth. Despite the availability of public transport in metropolitan areas, this issue was highlighted in all the areas, indicating its significance across a broad spectrum of contexts.

Poverty: Crime was also linked to poverty by many of the informants and across all areas; metropolitan, regional and remote. Informants argued that young Indigenous people from backgrounds of extreme poverty are disadvantaged by low literacy levels and lack of education and have few employment opportunities. These young people frequently experience disadvantage relating to drug and alcohol abuse, family abuse and breakdowns, domestic violence, neglect, child prostitution, insufficient food and homelessness. A consequence of their disadvantage is committing petty crimes, such as shoplifting, often to obtain sustenance. They also engage in opportunistic crime, which tends to be related to boredom and loitering at night without transport.

Home is dangerous: There was a general perception that, for some young people, being on the streets, with all the attendant risks, was safer than being at home. Homes were often

characterised as being violent, with high levels of drunkenness, and a number of participants felt that young people ‘escaped’ these situations by spending time on the streets at night. In contrast, Police officers identified that, from their perspective, the main reason young people were on the streets was a lack of supervision at home. The street is a place for kids to ‘hang out’. Officers in SR related stories of very young children being on the streets from early in the morning till late at night – of one tiny four year old boy well known to police who when picked up on the streets fell asleep in the back of the police car. Police stressed the importance of giving children a meal as many are hungry.

Consequences of being on the streets: Once on the streets in metropolitan areas, young people, with limited or no money, were more likely to congregate around some of the 24 hour shops, particularly McDonalds, and partake of alcohol or drugs. Once congregating in numbers, young people were then perceived as ‘dangerous’ by locals. In contrast, in other communities, informants believed there were more active crime seeking activities where younger children (younger school ages) were encouraged by older siblings to break into homes.

Young people exhibit a certain amount of territoriality, particularly in larger centres. Informants felt in these communities, the tendency is to ensure that antisocial and criminal behaviours are exhibited outside of one’s own area where this is possible, and this causes conflict with the young people who live in the targeted areas.

Implications for best practice: What people think are the underlying reasons for the service will influence what they do as workers in, or recipients of, that service. These reasons do not always articulate with the official aims and objectives, and where this is the case, service delivery, and perceptions of service effectiveness, can be compromised. It is important that stakeholders clearly understand service mission, goals, and underpinning rationale.

Best Practice in Current SAY Program Operation: the model

Program auspice

In some communities, some people were unhappy with the allocation of the funding to PCYC and believed the program should be operated by an Aboriginal organization, rather than funding for Aboriginal programs going to non-Aboriginal agencies. In other communities there is conflict regarding whether funding for the patrol is ‘Aboriginal money’; this is related to the broader issue of whether or not the night patrol should be an exclusively Aboriginal service. Our participants are reflecting on the *Closing the Gap* agenda (<http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/our-responsibilities/indigenous-australians/programs-services/closing-the-gap>) which focuses on engagement and partnerships with Indigenous people. Experience from the variety of SAY programs addressed in this evaluation presents a conflict between the capacity to deliver the program in a manner appropriately accountable to DAGJ, and the *Closing the Gap* principle of Indigenous empowerment and agency. The

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history of these programs reflects a shift from Indigenous agencies towards agencies with the capacity to deliver the service and demonstrate accountability for that service.

One informant suggested an indirect benefit of the program to be that of fulfilling a more broad community development role. For example, the night patrol can also be a means of exposing local people to the correct way to manage a business. It was reported that in one community, the local Land Council is currently not operating because of a lack of leadership. A community leader argued that there is a need to develop this capacity in the local community.

Implications for best practice: It appears that best practice as defined by experience in the current SAY program is allocating program auspice to an agency that demonstrates capacity in management and governance. This may, or may not, be an Indigenous agency. However, best practice in terms of overarching government policy tends towards supporting the development of capacity in Indigenous agencies to manage and govern programs for Indigenous communities. Should there be a component of the SAY program that focuses on building capacity in auspicings Indigenous agencies to meet the management and governance requirements?

Hours of operation

Hours of operation vary significantly across the different communities. In some communities where the bus operates solely to collect young people and bring them to the centre, then take them home afterwards, there is an advertised bus route. The bus finishes when the activities finish, which is often around 9-10pm. Other programs will respond to a call from young people, but still only be available at specific times (usually Friday and Saturday nights up till 10pm, or midnight). Some services run the bus for limited hours (for example 6-8pm Thursday, 6-10pm on Friday and Saturday). Some services combine transport to and from a youth program with random street patrols (random in the sense that they do not follow a routine, but use community knowledge of local events to identify where young people might be at certain times). They tend to undertake the patrols after they have dropped young people home at the end of the activity programs, and may operate up until 1am on Saturday and Sunday mornings. One program introduced a permission slip system where young people will not be picked up unless there is a signed agreement (the permission slip) obtained from parents/carer. This is to ensure that the night patrol cannot be accused of kidnapping. Seeking parental permission also ensures parental involvement. Permission slips are completed three times a year. Local youth in Year 7 and those attending local sporting groups are given night patrol information packs. Parents understand if the bus drops their children home it is not because they are in trouble but it is part of a signed agreement. Blank forms are held for youth without permission slips and these are signed at the parent's/caregivers house.

Implications for best practice: The evaluation showed significant variation in hours of operation despite relatively standard provisions in the funding agreements. This is an area

where each community needs to determine what best supports the young people in their area. Thus best practice requires flexibility for community-level decision-making. There needs also to be acknowledgement of the varied resource capacity of different communities, with regional towns, for example, lacking after hours services and transport.

Clear guidelines and operating principles

There were concerns about how the patrol operated and this included the need for guidelines around places to which young people were transported and the extent of responsibility of patrol staff. Staff talked about their difficulties managing challenging issues such as abusive parents and other community members and illegal and unsafe behaviours. There was acknowledgement that each service needed to be different, coupled with a desire to find some common ground where guidelines and operating principles could be established.

Implications for best practice: Services would benefit from opportunities to get together and share practice wisdom. Awareness of the program guidelines and operating principles needs to be increased among staff.

The Night Patrol Bus

In the metropolitan areas, transport provided by the service was associated in the minds of young people with particular groups, so there were issues with territoriality and ownership of the program that were not identified as an issue in any of the other communities. Some of the young people are picked up from their homes and transported to the activity centre, whilst others are picked up from the streets and returned to a safe place, which may include the activity centre. Some communities identify pre-determined places from which they will collect young people in the bus and take them to the activity centre. In some communities the bus will respond to calls from shop owners, security staff or public transport security staff in particular areas where groups of young people are congregating.

There are times when the bus is used to transport young people when no other transport options are available to them. In one community, during summer, children flock to the local swimming pool in town but many then have about a 6km walk home. If they have spent all their money at the pool, they have no money to get home or to make calls to their parents. In some cases, their parents may not be available to get them. In the height of summer temperatures hover around 43 degrees, so the SAY staff work with the pool management to extend the pool closing times and then transport the children home.

In some communities the patrol bus is used during the day as an outreach service for a range of Aboriginal services, such as taking people to classes and medical appointments. In one community the bus operates from the youth centre to transport young people to and from a range of specific out-of-town events/shows. This gives young people an opportunity to attend events that would otherwise be inaccessible to them. The presence of the patrol at events such as the community show allows for young people to be transported home if

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there are any social issues. Interaction of this type between the patrol and young people at out-of-town events is thought to substantially reduce youth arrests. In another community the bus is used by the wider community during the day for youth activities and for transporting children to and from sport activities.

There has been some debate among patrol workers concerning whether the bus should be for an Aboriginal service or whole-of-community service; this includes picking up non-Aboriginal young people on the streets at night. Aboriginal young people are the main users of the bus in all of the communities, though in some communities non-Aboriginal young people also use the bus. In some communities there was a perception that certain sub-factions in the community had monopolised the bus and were using the service inappropriately (for example, to transport adults to social events) or excluding some people from participating in the service (for example, people from non-local or rival tribal groupings).

Both children and young people use the bus. Different programs identified different age ranges of users: some from 10-16 years, others 12-18 and another 14-17 mainly, but occasionally children as young as 7 years of age. In one community the majority of the young people on the bus are young males, but gender differences were not identified in any of the other communities:

The bus picks up and takes children home or to a safe alternative. In some communities patrol staff will get out of the bus to make sure children are actually delivered to a safe home environment. Sometimes there are occasions where staff might bring children back to the base and feed them prior to being able to take the child to somewhere safe. In most cases these are children who will need to be reported to community services. Police will also sometimes contact SAY to transport children home.

Most services staff the bus with a male and a female worker to ensure the young people have access to support that meets their needs. For Indigenous young people, these staff are positioned as an 'auntie' and 'uncle'. There is value in continuity of staff on the bus so relationships can be built with the regular users of the service.

A common request was that the size of the current bus needed to be increased. For example, one program has an 8-seater which provides for six young people to travel at a time and this was seen to severely hamper effectiveness and efficiency. This requires bus staff to make decisions and prioritise who they should transport when numbers in any one location are high. There were specific concerns expressed about young people left waiting as demand for the service increased, and stories told of young people who were moved on by Police or exposed to risk whilst waiting for the bus to return to collect them.

Implications for best practice: The evaluation demonstrated that different communities used the bus in different ways. A standardised model of bus use would not suit most of the communities; therefore, it is important that the guidelines for using the bus are flexible, and that community-level decision-making is supported. This noted, decision-making regarding

the use of the service needs to be inclusive and to recognise a variety of interests within any community.

The activities

The activity component offered by the sponsor organisation or SAY is perceived as a significant component of the model, and a key for crime prevention. Given that most of the respondents felt that boredom was a major factor causing the high street presence of young people, this is not surprising. The activity component of the program was positioned as providing young people with something (acceptable to them) to do that had the advantage of taking place in a safe and supervised environment, where learning opportunities could also be offered.

Participants in some communities commented that there was an urgent need for young people to have access to activities at night time, as in many places there were no youth services open after hours. Some communities had operated midnight basketball and generally this was very successful; however, in many cases lack of funding has led to its closure. It was claimed that this lack of access to night activities resulted in young people being 'bored' and increased the likelihood of them committing crimes because there was nothing else to do.

The provision of food is a key component to the success of the activity program. Many of the respondents saw food as a 'hook': a way of engaging young people and creating an opportunity to build relationships. Neurobiological research (Charmandari, Tsigos, & Chrousos, 2005) emphasises the link between hunger and stress, and the consequent impairment of learning associated with high biological stress levels. Thus the provision of food performs multiple functions that support the engagement and learning of young people in the activity program.

Implications for best practice: Participants from the services who delivered activity programs all agreed that the activity component of the model was essential to achieving successful outcomes for the service. There were variations in how activity programs were enacted and decisions about these need to be made at the community level. Provision of food as part of this is considered essential.

Staffing

All SAY program staff are subject to 'Working with Children Checks', as per the Commission for Children and Young People Act 1998, the Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 and the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000. SAY program staff are bound by the Mandatory Reporting Requirements as set out in the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998. Participants commonly cited a problem of finding suitable patrol staff as some of the local people who would make good patrol workers do not meet 'Working with Children' requirements. An RT Indigenous service provider explained that up to 90 per cent of Indigenous people have previously had experience with

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the police and this can result in long gaps in filling vacancies for the patrol. To increase the pool of available and willing staff, participants recommended a range of strategies. One informant recommended that, should previous offences be relatively minor in nature and a person is otherwise of sound character, s/he should be considered for positions as night patrol staff. In many cases their experience with the criminal justice system may allow them to offer genuine advice to young people to deter them from offending. Other suggestions included providing remuneration for volunteers to encourage participation. In remote communities where employment prospects are limited, such opportunities would be a good incentive. One Aboriginal participant suggested another incentive for involvement in the patrol could be that a member of patrol should be entitled to free membership of the Community Justice Group. In addition there needs to be some mechanism in place to ensure that volunteers can be on 'stand-by' for quick response and back-up support if patrol staff are not available for shifts.

Staffing of the programs varies and most include both paid and volunteer staff. Some communities are challenged by high staff turnover (both paid and volunteer) despite the enthusiasm and high levels of motivation of existing staff. One driver reflected s/he would like to have a permanent partner each night on the bus rather than needing to 'rebrief' a new partner each night.

Staff were expected to have an understanding of issues impacting on Aboriginal communities, to be accepted by Indigenous young people, and to have the ability to build rapport with young people who present challenging behaviours. Some attempt to address this is by ensuring there is at least one Aboriginal Elder available. One service requires all the bus staff to be Indigenous. However, there were concerns in some communities that whilst non-Indigenous staff could be very effective in building relationships with young people, they were often not well received by the community as a whole because they were not Indigenous and this impaired their effectiveness.

Staff are commonly selected on the basis of their own life experience, their ability to communicate and establish trusting relationships with young people, and their respect within the community. Participants commented that the best practice is having passionate people to work with the young people to engage them and bring them in. It is not simply about just being Aboriginal, but about being accepted in the local community as Aboriginal. Some staff talked about the importance of team work and being able to work effectively with groups of young people. Many of the staff talked about the importance of their desire to work with young people. One staff member characterised this as a desire to contribute to social change rather than simply earning an income. Staff need to be able to handle difficult and aggressive situations and to be thick skinned. Staff also need to have a thorough awareness of the local streets and be able to plan and co-ordinate their movements to make their driving time as efficient as possible. This was considered important because they did not want young people to be caught out waiting on the streets any longer than necessary.

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Many young people from Indigenous families have only one parent and many of these families are headed by a young mother. Therefore, a good target for staffing is considered to be strong men who are able to act as mentors for young males whose fathers, uncles and grandfathers are often in prison.

Because relationships are such an important part of the role, participants talked about the skills needed to build relationships. These included being genuine and being able to generate respect. Staff needed to be able to manage conflict, and challenging situations, in a manner that supported young people and engendered a sense of trust. Youth work training was considered one way in which staff learn the skills of engaging with young people, understanding their issues and being able to effectively support young people.

Staff training takes place through TAFE and includes first aid, anger management, using radios, dealing with people who are intoxicated, and knowing when it is safe to become involved. Staff commented that although the formal training was helpful it was no substitute for local knowledge and learning on the job. Some communities identified the need for training in administration (such as allocation of funds, monitoring and reporting).

Implications for best practice: Having the 'right' staff was identified as crucial. However, the mix of the skills and attributes which made a staff member 'right' for the job were variable according to the context of the patrol. In general, staff need motivation and passion, coupled with a range of skills of which communication/relationship building skills were considered essential. It is also necessary to consider the Working with Children' requirements, especially in rural towns, to determine if there are situations where a less rigorous interpretation of these requirements may be helpful in recruiting appropriate staff.

The referral process and capacity to link young victims with support services

According to respondents, some of the young people using the services commit petty crimes, but most are not serious offenders. The majority spend their time hanging around shopping centres or enjoy being downtown with their friends. Informants explained that many experience difficult issues relating to home life, schooling, alcohol or other drugs, or teenage pregnancy. To support young people with these issues patrolers try to establish a rapport with families and form good relationships with support services within the communities.

Some programs do not tend to refer young people on to other services on a regular basis, but in other communities referral of young people to drug and alcohol services and outreach services occurs. However, a major challenge for patrol workers in most communities is the lack of services available for young people, particularly after hours. In many, the program is the only dedicated service for youth that operates at night and, consequently, some support services are unaware of its existence. In other communities there are other agencies operating for some of the evening, and in one case, this was linked with an appreciation of the work of the patrol.

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There are also problems of an overlap of service delivery, a lack of clearly defined functions in the roles of service providers, and perceived competition between services which encourages services to be protective of their programs and outcomes. Our informants felt that some services in their communities can have quite territorial views with regard to 'competing' services. As is common with many community agencies, our informants talked about issues around confidentiality and the sharing of information. As a result there is limited interaction, cohesion or collaboration between services, and limited scope for night patrol staff to link clients to other community supports. A former patrol driver commented that this 'fracturing of service coordination and delivery' contributes to crime amongst young people. The current focus on integration of services in the *Closing the Gap* agenda (<http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/our-responsibilities/indigenous-australians/programs-services/closing-the-gap/closing-the-gap-national-urban-and-regional-service-delivery-strategy-for-indigenous-australians>) is clearly problematic based on the experiences of our participants and this is an issue that needs attention.

Greater interagency cooperation comprising major service providers could facilitate information sharing between agencies and therefore enable more supports for young people. There are potential benefits in developing a broad advisory committee to improve management and interagency cooperation. Support linking could be enhanced using information technology such as a Facebook page, phone apps, or text messaging. This would enable young people to have access to information about services and could help provide education about functions such as Legal Aid, the police, mental health services, and drug and alcohol services. To strengthen interagency cooperation within the communities and enhance the capacity for the patrol service to link young people to support services one community suggested that a support worker could be attached to the bus service to directly link young people to a range of services where required. The patrol could be connected to a late-night opening youth place where young people can be linked to other referrals.

Mandatory reporting of child protection issues presents difficulties for some night patrol staff. Service providers and night patrol staff explained that volunteers are not obliged to report child protection issues, even when issues of child safety are apparent. It was thought that night patrol staff require more training around mandatory reporting. An area of conflict is the reluctance of some Aboriginal people to report child protection issues due to their close social ties with Aboriginal communities.

Implications for best practice: Services commonly operate in isolation from other services and there appears little capacity for collaboration across agencies. Best practice, as identified by the *Closing the Gap* agenda, encourages the development of an integrated approach. Research is clear that the developing collaboration and integration of services cannot occur without resourcing (Oliver, Mooney, & Statham, 2010; Pritchard, Purdon, & Chaplyn, 2010; Tseng, Liu, & Wang, 2010). Thus consideration needs to be given as to how programs might be resourced to develop collaborations within their communities. In

addition, services need support in addressing child protection and their roles in child protection in order to meet best practice standards in relation to child safety.

Liaison with Police

Informants provided examples of good liaison between themselves and the police where they felt their service diverted young people from police attention. In contrast, one participant described the relationship between the police and young Aboriginal people as a “cycle of hate” and this emphasizes the importance of the patrol in building bridges between young Indigenous people and the police. Patrol workers pointed out that trouble can be prevented when the police and patrols work together: for example, the police can ask the patrol to get rid of a mob of potentially problematic young people. The patrol can act as a ‘buffer zone’ between young people and the police, which in turn helps form better police/youth relationships.

In some (but not all) communities police are aware of the program and Police Youth Officers will call for the bus to transport young people home. However, a high turnover in police in some communities often meant that new officers lacked local knowledge and awareness of the patrol services. In general the feeling seems to be that the relationships between the programs and police could be improved. Informants talked about the reluctance of some members of the Police to be involved in their activities, whilst in others informants talked about sharing information with the police.

There is a common misconception across many of the communities that the patrol transports young people from one party to the next. This and other misunderstandings have resulted in police viewing the patrol as a hindrance to their crime control activities. This reinforces the tendency to not work together and to criticise the others’ interactions with young people. Patrol workers argue the police and other services often manage undesirable behaviour exhibited by young people by moving them on. Some feel that this simply moves the undesirable behaviour to other sites rather than dealing with it effectively.

Implications for best practice: In some communities the evaluation found there were relationships between the service and Police, but in other communities there were not. In order to achieve best practice, it is necessary to resource and support services to develop these collaborations. Closer collaboration with police could aid crime prevention, especially in terms of young people not only as offenders, but also as victims of crime. In most of the communities visited, there had been a history of poor relations between police and Indigenous people. There was evidence that the patrols could improve police/Indigenous relations by establishing better lines of communication and trust between not only police and young people, but also staff servicing the patrols.

Measuring crime prevention outcomes for young people

For many informants, simply picking up young people and removing them from the street is considered sufficient evidence to support the positive impact of the program in crime

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prevention. However, for others, there is concern that statistics and other measures do not accurately reflect the crime prevention role of the program. This is coupled with an acknowledgement that their anecdotal evidence (whilst primary in their understanding) of crime control is limited. This suggests that whilst they might see themselves as effective, there is concern that this effectiveness is not communicated adequately through statistics and other measures.

In order to articulate this, some participants provided stories of how engagement with the program could turn certain criminal behaviour around and also positively influence other young people.

Informants recognised that some young people could not be engaged or remain engaged with the bus and its related programs, but even in these situations there was a positive impact for friends of some young people. Several told stories of how they had not maintained engagement with a particular young person, but had been able to sustain their engagement with that person's friends as examples of their effectiveness.

Informants also related that when the bus did not run, for whatever reason, it had a major impact on other services. One gave an example where the local Police identified the bus was not running one night by the increase of youth street activity.

Implications for best practice: Participants were concerned that statistical measurements of crime control success do not reflect the reality of their day-to-day experiences of the program. The strategy used in this evaluation, where they were encouraged to tell their stories (i.e. give real examples) was a valuable exercise that some participants felt enabled a real understanding of their experiences to emerge. This noted, the researchers were presented with evidence by police that serious cases of criminal victimisation of young people had been addressed through the night patrol program. In general, community representatives not directly associated with the patrols saw the patrols as addressing crime problems in their communities. It should also be acknowledged that while statistics showing young people as offenders are likely to be high in many of the communities visited, crimes against young people have been historically underreported, so any statistical evaluation of a program's effectiveness will be limited.

Effective promotion

Some participants talked about negative community perceptions of the program (for example the comment about the service simply operating a 'booze bus'). It was thought that greater promotion could help resolve some of the misunderstandings held by community members about the role and purpose of the program. A lack of understanding is seen as impairing relationships not only with the general community, but also with the police and other services, limiting the potential of the services to work together effectively.

Participants suggested a common mobile number or 1800 contact number needs to be established to promote the patrol services. In one community the patrol bus is unmarked and is not promoted and this is identified as a problem. One community has begun to

promote the service more widely by handing out rubber bracelets containing the phone number of the patrol. The bracelets were available in bright colours and had proven to be popular and effective.

Implications for best practice: The public image of a service is an essential component of its ability to establish effective working relationships with its stakeholders. Services need resourcing to enable them to build effective collaborations with community and other agencies. Community awareness of services and their functions will also assist effective service delivery.

Safe House

Problems of homelessness and a lack of appropriate housing in many communities highlight the need for a centralised after-hours service to provide a safe environment and holistic care for young people. Because the night patrol staff have local knowledge of the community and families they come to know, when there is violence or abuse in the home, this enables them to move the young person to an aunt or a safe house wherever possible. However, some participants expressed concern about the lack of availability of a safe house in the community, explaining that when there are many parties taking place and a grandmother or an aunty wasn't available, there is no safe location for young people. In contrast, others argued that there was always someone in the community to whom they could take a young person.

Implications for best practice: Local knowledge is essential in providing staff with the wisdom to know families in the community who can provide temporary shelter for young people who, for whatever reason, cannot safely be returned home at night. Agencies working in collaboration will be able to identify if there is a need for a safe house and can jointly determine how to achieve this if necessary. Thus best practice requires agency collaboration and local knowledge.

Funding

Funding for services is considered 'tight' and this meant some staff received reduced hours and less pay due to the new award, and this put pressure on remaining staff and retention. One of the services had to cut programs because of funding limitations. One participant told of how staff had been cut from full-time to part-time resulting in them seeking alternative employment, contributing to staff turn-over. These funding limitations often meant the employment of part-time staff only, which provides little scope for establishing tight team structures or team cohesion.

Many participants argued that increased funding would enable the services to extend the hours of operation. Some wanted to extend the opening hours for the activity component and others wanted to offer the activities on more nights over the week and/or more often over the holidays. Others argued for extended bus hours (for example into the early hours of the morning over weekends). However, it was not universally agreed that increasing

hours of operation was a good thing. One informant claimed that extended hours would only encourage young people to be out on the streets later at night.

Increased funding may also be used in some communities to expand the clientele. For example one informant argued that the bus could be used to take other people in the community to the soup kitchen on Friday nights. In addition the night patrols are well placed to act as an education van providing sex education and safe sex packages. This could include providing free condoms to young people to help prevent Sexually Transmitted Infections.

There is a perception of inconsistency in resources between patrol services and managers across the regions, and participants felt there needs to be fairness across the sector. Some patrol services receive greater resourcing from government than other areas, and some managers are paid more than others. There is also a perception that management of funds needs to be more closely monitored. Some patrols reported they spent all their funding in eight months and had nothing left to operate the patrol for the remaining four months. We were told by the DAGJ that they had no evidence of this, and if this happened, it would breach contractual arrangements. We were told by informants that funding is topped up based on reporting but there is no monitoring of spending throughout the year.

Implications for best practice: Almost all participants spoke about how their service could increase its service capacity with additional funding which could be used to increase hours of operation. It is also proposed that additional funding would enable services to engage in effective promotion, develop collaborative partnerships with Police and other agencies in their local community and contributes towards building the capacity of Indigenous organisations to meet DAGJ requirements with reference to management and governance.

Conclusion: Do SAY programs make a difference?

This evaluation of the SAY programs was designed to assess whether the current program operations are considered best practice. Accordingly, the following lists the standards for best practice for SAY programs and working with young people identified in the literature, and provides an assessment as to whether the programs currently operating in the case study communities are meeting these standards. Some additional best practice characteristics identified in the current evaluation are also presented.

SAY Program strengths

The strengths of night patrols identified in the literature included:

- **a reduction in incidents of crime, especially in terms of ‘minor’ offences, by diverting children and young people from hazards and conflict;**

While statistical crime data cannot prove that the SAY programs achieve this aim, staff, service providers and community leaders identified this as an outcome in every community. Participants maintained patrols were effective in getting youth off the streets at night. Most acknowledged that child safety was the main aim of patrols and crime prevention was a

secondary outcome. As such, a good measure of the success of patrols may be their ability to refer children and young people to support services. The fact that many patrols had built stronger lines of communication between police, patrols staff and young people, suggests that the patrols assist in the reporting of crime and building better police/community relations.

However as noted in the findings, whether or not lower crime rates are a consequence of SAY program operations is difficult to accurately assess. As one participant noted, if patrols are picking up more young people from the streets, it is not necessarily a good measure of success. Fewer clients could indicate the program's effectiveness: less young people on the streets might mean that the programs were working, but such a view ignores the functions of many patrols to remove young people from potentially dangerous home environments and the appeal of services which offer after-hours activities programs.

Local crime statistics for each community compiled by local police may be useful for statistically assessing juvenile crime trends in a community. However, social accounting could offer the best approach to try to measure crime prevention outcomes. It needs to be noted that when asked, people tend to overestimate crime rates in their community (REIS 1980). Therefore residents' perceptions of crime rates falling and their connecting this fall to the implementation of the SAY programs would be more of a measure of success. Should crime rates rise, it would be useful to gather residents' opinions as to whether SAY programs were worthwhile.

In reducing fear of crime and increasing perceptions of safety, these programs are improving the quality of life in the communities they service. Also, the presence of these programs, especially in disadvantaged and troubled communities, is perceived by residents as an important resource and form of social capital, especially when programs are considered for their deterrent effect on criminal activities.

- **minimisation of harms associated with alcohol and drug use;**

The SAY programs offer a safe haven for young people in situations where drug and alcohol abuse make their home an unsafe environment or where they are neglected. The Healthy Meal program is essential here as many children are hungry. Drug and alcohol education programs for young people are commonly provided through SAY activity programs or PCYC or youth centres which manage the SAY program.

However, SAY programs are not addressing the needs of young people themselves who use drugs and alcohol. Young people under the influence are not permitted in the activity programs or on the night patrol bus. Often this group are youths aged 16 to 18 who are not attracted to the SAY programs because they do not wish to socialise with younger children. Therefore this group remains vulnerable and is identified in this study as a problematic gap in service delivery.

- **enhanced community safety;**

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Community perceptions were that the SAY programs did improve community safety as young people are occupied in activities or are taken home by night patrols and are therefore not loitering in groups in the business district which, especially in small communities, creates concern amongst residents. In smaller communities night patrols would provide security for people who requested support due to previous victimisation. Patrols also remove youth from unsafe situations to prevent them being victims of crime or potential offenders. Patrols can also deal with these offenders within their community before they become entwined in the criminal justice system.

Patrol staff in some communities ensured they patrolled central business districts, sometimes parking in trouble spots to reassure business owners that community safety was being addressed. They also noted that they strove to respond quickly to any concerns raised by the local business community.

The findings of this evaluation revealed that in every community, SAY programs were highly valued by local residents. In remote communities, there is no public transport – often no taxis. Aboriginal reserves and missions are often located on the outskirts of towns. Hence, Aboriginal people are required to walk long distances to and from their homes to access entertainment and resources in centralised locations. This is one of the reasons youth congregate on the streets at night and demonstrates the importance of the night patrol service. Children are particularly vulnerable in the smaller remote towns that are located on major highways where there are the dangers of heavy trucks, strangers or drunks on the highway, and lighting is minimal on back streets. Even in larger cities where there is public transport, young people do not have the fare.

Every police officer interviewed maintained the programs were essential irrespective of the variability in the levels of police involvement with programs between communities. Anecdotally, police believed patrols were effective for crime prevention because they removed young people from the streets and kept them out of harm's way, as possible offenders or victims. However the findings also highlighted the need for a night patrol as well as an activities program working in concert to effectively meet the needs of local youth.

- **increased access to diversionary programs, outside of the formal criminal justice system and maintain community 'ownership' of night patrols;**

The ability of programs to facilitate youth access to diversionary programs varied between communities according to the availability of programs and the degree of remoteness of the community. However this goal was best achieved in the regional towns which seem to have the most successful SAY programs and referral processes. This is largely due to additional support from their local councils, which have provided an information and referral service and other youth services. In other communities, management by local neighbourhood centres provide similar ease of referral for children identified by SAY program staff as requiring support. Such amalgamation of services also aids in advertising the SAY programs and facilitates greater interagency collaboration. It is recommended that local support from

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Shire councils, Service Clubs and other community services should be encouraged to benefit local youth and the wider community.

- **enhanced safety of young at-risk populations and/or those who cannot access mainstream services;**

In all but one community there were concerns that there was not a safe place to take young people: their homes were not safe. There were refuges for adults and small children were able to accompany women to women's refuges but for older children, options were very limited. Police resources also do not provide for officers spending time trying to find someone to take children in. Night patrol staff face the same issue. However, participants in each community claimed homelessness among Aboriginal youth was not really an issue as patrol staff knew the community well and in most cases could find a relative to care for a child. As communities grow and change and Aboriginal families move away from their kinship base, patrol staff and police officers were finding that there were no other options. In some cases, police had no choice but to keep children in the police lockup if there was no suitable place for them to stay. It seems pertinent to conduct a needs assessment for youth refuges/safe houses in these communities.

Best practice

In terms of best practice, the literature indicates that night patrols:

- **operate effectively when there is broad community awareness of the night patrols services;**

The evaluation agrees with this point. In every community, marketing the availability of the SAY programs was seen as essential but almost all noted that this aim was not being achieved. One participant stated: 'the bus works at night and nobody sees it'. Every community reported the need to raise awareness of SAY programs within the wider community to ensure young people and their parents know about the service and to avoid any community misperceptions about what the programs provide. Night patrol buses need to be well signed to advertise the service and also create a sense of ownership among local youth. Other promotional ideas included:

- Wrist bands for young people with contact details for Night patrols.
- Phone app with SAY program locations/contact details and other information and to enable texting to local youth to update important information on program activities and bus timetables etc.
- A website and Facebook page for advertising programs and current information for clients.
- \$5 Taxi vouchers (refunded by the RTA) to meet the needs of youth seeking transport home beyond patrol operational hours.

- **can build capacity and social capital at a local level through the enhancement of Indigenous leadership, community management/governance and self-determination;**

In all locations, an Indigenous presence was seen as essential for effective operation of SAY programs. As Walker and Forrester (2002, pp. n.p.) point out: 'Night Patrols are an Aboriginal idea. They are based in and come from the Aboriginal people living in the community. That is why they work'. However, the most effective management of programs was evident in communities where non Aboriginal organisations, such as neighbourhood centres, PCYC or welfare organisations were organising programs. Thus 'ownership' of the SAY program is taken away from Aboriginal people. This has caused resentment within some communities, but as one participant noted, while the local Aboriginal community might complain, it makes no difference to local Aboriginal youth, who still use the services.

Aboriginal community justice groups appear to be effective for overseeing program operations as well as alerting SAY staff, other welfare and support agencies and local police, to any problems within the community and the welfare of local children. These groups also assist in the referral process.

In some communities, local politics within the Aboriginal community have impeded program management. Yet it remains essential the local Aboriginal community be heavily involved in SAY programs as paid staff and volunteers and also in management committees. This is particularly important in more remote communities where employment opportunities are limited. SAY programs offer an opportunity for Aboriginal people to be engaged in management and therefore learn business and management skills which can be transferred to other Aboriginal organisations or programs.

Aboriginal ownership of SAY programs for local youth has been effective in increasing participation in some communities where local youth have named and designed logos for the night patrol bus. Once the bus is sign painted it is easily recognisable within the community, which assists in promoting the service but more importantly, local youth claim it as 'Our bus'.

- **Recruit local staff who are adequately resourced and retain such staff.**

This is a goal of every management team. Ideally, local Indigenous staff OR non-Indigenous people who are accepted by the local Aboriginal community are employed. It is essential that the right staff be employed with the ability to build rapport and to listen. Much care must be taken in employing staff. One police officer suggested that a panel of local community people be engaged to select the right person. Our participants explained that staff were selected on the basis of:

- having an understanding of issues impacting on Aboriginal communities,
- being accepted by Indigenous young people,

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- having the ability to build rapport with young people who present challenging behaviours,
- their own life experience,
- their ability to communicate and establish trusting relationships with young people,
- their respect within the community,
- having a passion to work with the young people to engage them and bring them in.

To retain staff there was a universal call for consistent funding that would allow long term contracts as the current practice of reapplying for short term contracts frustrated many staff and they left. As employment opportunities are limited for Aboriginal people particularly in remote communities, solid employment with SAY programs is important.

There is a need for regular staff training and mentoring for new staff. This is occurring to some degree with most staff completing CERT 4 qualifications. There is a need for orientation for new staff as on the job training is important. Many SAY staff called for annual conferences. One has been held previously and all who attended reported how valuable that had been for training and sharing experiences. Suggestions included training on management, accountability, and report writing, and training on child protection and mandatory reporting.

Researchers were impressed by the quality of SAY program staff, working tirelessly and absolutely committed to supporting youth in their community. Many were young Aboriginal people aged 20 to 30. Their focus was on keeping children safe and out of the criminal justice system and providing them with some alternatives.

Every community experienced difficulty finding volunteers or suitable staff to assist in the operation of the patrol bus or youth clubs. Requirements for supervision in youth clubs meant that sometime the clubs could not open because of lack of staff. Some remuneration is needed for volunteers to encourage greater participation. Another incentive for volunteers could be free membership of the Community Justice Group.

The need for a criminal record check for all those working with children also significantly reduces the number of people able to work with the programs, particularly in remote communities where Aboriginal people are significantly more likely to have been involved with the criminal justice system. Some flexibility in rules and regulations concerning these requirements is required. In places where there is little employment, people want to be paid for their services – some people saw this as a lack of community spirit but in reality it is more about self-worth.

There needs to be found a way to accredit the work SAY staff do and the skills they provide, perhaps through involvement with a TAFE course where the SAY Program could provide traineeships. This means they could be paid. Perhaps Job Network could get people to work for the service in a way that did not affect Centrelink payments. This would build up skills and experience that could lead to further work for Aboriginal people.

- **have the ability to encourage partnership and cultural understanding between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people;**

This is desirable but has not been easy to effect in many communities. The SAY programs are targeted to Indigenous youth but some non-Indigenous youth do access the services. As one patrol staff stated: how can you pick up one child and leave another on the road? However, in general, community perceptions are that the programs are only for Aboriginal youth, which means that there is little interaction between the SAY programs and the wider community. This leads to misperceptions of what the programs actually provide. SAY staff are aware of this issue and do seek ways to improve understanding through promoting the service.

- **should build trust and rapport between night patrol staff and young people and other services providers, such as police;**

Trust and rapport between SAY staff and young people were recognised by all participants as essential for effective programs. In every community staff are employed based upon their ability to engage with young people. All reported that employing local Aboriginal people on patrols and within programs was important for this aim as they know their community and can more easily relate to young Aboriginal youth. They are also respected by the children and their parents and can discipline when necessary. Their knowledge of kinship relationships enables them to deliver children to appropriate relatives when their own home is not safe.

Empowering youth by engaging them in decision making within the SAY programs was cited as important. This ensured program participation, created mutual respect between young people and SAY staff, trained young people in program leadership and built self-esteem.

The relationship between SAY programs and local police was also universally seen as important, but not all communities were able to achieve this aim. Where SAY programs operated from a PCYC there was necessarily an ongoing interaction with police officers attached to the PCYC. However in places where SAY programs operated as a stand-alone service, the relationship with police varied depending on the nature of the community, the role of SAY staff within their community and the police officers themselves. A strong relationship saw night patrols advising police of the hours they were operating, regularly communicating with police during the night, and working with police when incidents occurred in the community by providing transport for people from the scene or finding safe places for any children involved.

Sometimes police would ask patrols to remove groups of children where there was potential for trouble. Police were also actively involved in some way with SAY program management committees. Both police and SAY staff emphasised that SAY patrols were not there to do police work as their primary role was child safety. Yet patrols can provide additional guardianship within communities, which can be a great support for police who are often stretched for resources. In some communities, police had limited awareness of patrol

operations. In one community, patrol staff complained that sometimes when they needed to ferry large groups of children home, those left behind waiting for the bus to return were dispersed by police. In other places, police appeared to see patrol staff as interfering in police work. This may be an issue when patrol staff seek to remove youth from likely arrest, especially when the young people are kin to staff members. Yet these actions may be integral to averting further violence within the community.

Effective collaboration between local police and SAY programs is dependent upon the interest of individual officers but also local Police leadership. Senior police consulted for this project reported that if there is a commitment by the Officer in Charge of Police to make collaboration work, it will. This has been evidenced in several locations with Aboriginal/Police projects. Successful collaboration is complicated by the Police transfer reward system where Police get their choice of location after a time at a remote or difficult location. Some officers bide their time with little community engagement while others really try to make a difference. Consequently, success is reliant upon the selection process to get the 'right' Police at these locations.

- **should adapt to community experiences and vary their organisation and structure according to location, population size, client base, availability of related services, and other social and economic indicators of community well-being;**

The findings highlighted the diversity of these communities and the need for SAY programs to be tailored to individual community needs. This has already been recognised by the DAGJ as there is great variance in the types of services provided in each of these communities. SAY staff have strived to meet the unique needs of their local community in how, when and where they operate. While funding was limited to eight hours per week, local management committees had a certain degree of flexibility to operate their programs on the days and times that they deemed important to meet the needs of the local community.

In every community, flexibility was key to effective operation, especially as reduced funding has led to a reduction in hours of operation. There were a large number of concerns voiced about the limitations in service delivery to eight hours per week imposed by funding limitations. Most SAY staff would like to offer services on a Thursday as well as a Friday and Saturday. Furthermore, reduced hours means that children are on the streets long after the patrol has ended for the evening.

There were also suggestions in some communities that limiting the service to young people was not a useful community strategy, and that people of other age groups had unmet needs.

More flexibility was called for to allow programs to vary according to seasons – most participants reported that they do not see full operation in winter. 'No point in a bus driving around and around on a cold night picking up only one or two kids'. In contrast, one SR community reported consistent need for patrols irrespective of season.

Chapter 4: Summary of findings from NSW

Many communities identified a need for increased funding to enable them to purchase a larger bus. There were concerns that a small bus meant that some young people were required to wait whilst the bus transported some of their group, and that this posed a risk. This was particularly the case in metropolitan centres where children wait over an hour for the return of the bus. However, in places where SAY patrols operated from a PCYC or other well established youth centre, usually that organisation had a bus which the SAY staff could call upon when needed.

There was a strong call for SAY activities and night patrols to operate together. This is to ensure patrols have somewhere to take children to keep them occupied and provide programs and support. Often when patrols take children home, they are immediately back out on the streets. In some cases their home environments are not safe. Alternatively, patrols can ensure links with other existing youth centres in a community such as a PCYC. Care needs to be taken when selecting PCYC management as in some centres Aboriginal youth avoided those clubs. This can also be due to different community groups preferring to keep to themselves. In such situations, it is important that an alternative youth club be established for Aboriginal youth to provide activities, food and support and keep them off the streets.

There was a common call for more Midnight Basketball programs to be conducted in conjunction with SAY programs. These are very successful in regional towns where the night patrol provided transport.

Many children go without food for more than a day. The Healthy Meal Program was seen as essential in conjunction with programs to educate young people on a healthy lifestyle. Staff in several communities noted the value of sitting down with young people and talking over a meal. This establishes rapport with youth which leads to conversations where problems can be identified and referrals made to support youth in trouble.

- **have a focus on both short-term and long-term problem solving through a crime prevention and integrated strategy for community safety;**

Where SAY activity programs operated or where patrols were linked with other youth centres or programs such as Midnight Basketball, there were accounts of frequent educational programs offered for children on health and safety. This is another reason for a combined activities/ night patrol approach to service delivery.

Where relationships with local police were strong, patrols were able to work with police to enhance community safety and crime prevention. This practice needs to be encouraged, but with clear guidelines on boundaries for patrol staff – and police.

- **Should develop coordinated and/or integrated approach to service delivery at a community level through partnerships with related community support services.**

There were several calls for wider community use of the night patrol bus – including providing access to Aboriginal people other than the targeted aged group of children. In

small remote communities, the lack of transport makes a bus a prized possession. Community use of the night patrol bus during the day does occur and this was particularly important for older people or people with disabilities who could not make the long walk into town, or needed transport to health facilities. This aligns with the aim of integrating services.

However, this use of a government funded resource needs to be managed. In one regional centre there is wide use of the patrol bus by the community, but this is closely monitored by the Neighbourhood Centre which manages the patrol. It appears to work well. Such arrangements can take the ownership and management of the bus out of the hands of the Aboriginal community and this is an issue that needs consideration. However, the aim of integrating services and, through these partnerships, ensuring the bus is available to other community groups, is one that can work.

- **provide accurate, timely information and referral of children and young people to other services;**

To seek a means of evaluating the referral process was difficult as each community has unique needs and there is great variability in the types of support services available. The communities where the referral process seems to work well are those where management of the SAY program is in the hands of a large welfare support organisation and referral to a wide range of support programs is virtually automatic. Such is the case in one SR community where the night patrol is managed by a welfare agency which automates a case management approach to youth in trouble who are referred by SAY staff. As noted above, the other successful arrangements occurred in regional towns where SAY programs were provided with additional support from their local councils and service clubs who have 'one stop shops' providing information and referral services and other youth services. Such arrangements aid in advertising the SAY programs and facilitate greater interagency collaboration. There is also ease of referral in places where management is provided by neighbourhood centres.

Often referral happened informally through staff who had the skills and ability to build rapport and trust with local children, who knew the local community well and would therefore know where to take children if they could not be left at their own home. In the more remote communities, participants maintained these staff must be Aboriginal people.

All program staff reported that they were aware of the need for mandatory reporting to community services when required and according to all interviewed this process is occurring. However there was some concern that this requirement can be a problem for SAY program staff who are related to a child in trouble or are closely linked.

One way of assessing the referral process could be by annually surveying the support agencies to assess how many referrals they receive from SAY staff. However, this identifies formal rather than informal referrals so is limited in its usefulness. It also advantages communities where there are other services to which young people can be referred. Other

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methods of evaluation that are more flexible and responsive to unique community contexts include approaches such as Most Significant Changes (Davies & Dart, 2005), other forms of qualitative evaluation (see, House, 2005) and the social accounting approach discussed in the next dot point.

- **Operate with transparency and accountability, by collecting and making available robust and meaningful program performance information. This might include the development of performance and reporting frameworks specific to local contexts;**

This is an issue. All SAY staff interviewed reported that they completed the reporting requirements, and by making funding contingent on the completion of reports, greater compliance has been achieved. However, accurate reporting may be hampered by the heavy demands of a busy night for program staff. In one SR community funding had been cut due to the failure of management to meet these requirements.

It is recommended that future accounting of the effectiveness of night patrols incorporate social accounting. This could be achieved by establishing a panel; a broad community reference group comprised of a purposeful sample of approximately ten participants within each community who could complete an independent annual evaluation of the effectiveness of the night patrol. Members could include:

- SAY program staff and management committees
- Aboriginal Community Justice Groups
- Representatives of all key family groups in a community including young people
- Local police
- Private security patrol agencies
- Local government representatives
- Community crime prevention committees
- Representatives of local schools
- Youth workers
- Community Health
- Community Welfare and Support Services

The survey could be a short internet survey (i.e. survey monkey) or a telephone survey to assess how well the program was operating. Data from annual surveys would produce longitudinal data that could inform future policy and programs. This is essentially Participant Action Research. The reference group could also be useful in ensuring patrol management and staff were well selected, which is important for ensuring effective patrol operations.

- **Streamline funding arrangements to ensure consistent provision of high quality service delivery.**

This is an important aim and an issue that needs to be addressed, as management teams noted many issues associated with the funding model, particularly the stability and length of funding. Current funding structure requires contracts to be regularly reviewed and renewed;

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there are difficulties in maintaining program staff. For many small agencies, this meant that long term employment contracts could not be offered to people, and thus experienced employees were likely to seek alternative employment in order to attain some degree of stability. Much of the work was part-time which also did not suit many people, thus those with skills and qualifications were likely to move on to other employment. This was particularly an issue for smaller agencies who did not have the infrastructure support to bridge uncertainties in funding, nor the resources inside paid hours to seek alternatives.

Managers of patrols called for longer term contracts for staff (at least three years) as they have found they cannot retain staff with short term contracts. This results in a lack of continuity for the service. Frequent staff changes impact on relationship building, which is a crucial component of the SAY work. This is an important issue for the effectiveness of SAY programs, which are dependent upon the staff being respected and well known within the local community. Staff need to build relationships with community, young people, other agencies and the police.

Chapter 5: Northbridge Policy Project

In this section, we describe the organisational arrangements current during 2010 and outline the main perceptions of benefits, limitations and effectiveness, according to members of the core group of agencies who deliver the Northbridge Policy project, Partner agencies, and other stakeholders with an interest in the Northbridge Policy project. This chapter uses data drawn from multiple sources to determine whether the NPP provides a model of good practice. The method we used was to:

- Develop a detailed account of how the project has operated in practice. This was compared with the original PLM, and revisions will be noted
- Provide answers to the specific questions that this evaluation was intended to address
- Record the perceptions of the Core group, Partners and Stakeholders about achievements and any difficulties encountered with processes
- Record the perceptions of the Core group, Partners and Stakeholders about outcomes for clients, benefits, and limitations of the project
- Summarise findings about project outcomes,
 - data from NPP records of apprehensions;
 - police incident data about juvenile for Northbridge, Perth and Burswood;
 - value for money analysis
- Draw conclusions about whether NPP provides a model of good practice that is transferable to other contexts

Background

This account has been gathered from multiple interviews and provides an overview of how the project operated from 2008-2011. After February 2012, structural changes were implemented and the leadership was transferred to Mission Australia. This change was imposed without consultation with the NPP leadership or partners, as part of a broader Department of Child Protection (DCP) departmental restructure.

Terminology

There is a need to clarify, especially with respect to the terms 'stakeholder', and project 'partner'. Documents produced by the Northbridge project refer to the core team who directly deliver the project as 'stakeholders', and the associated agencies, who support the delivery of the program, as 'partner' organisations. In the tender brief, the word 'stakeholder' was used to refer to agencies not directly involved in service delivery, and included agencies who share information with the Northbridge project, and organisations and agencies that have an interest in the operations and outcomes of the Northbridge policy.

Chapter 5: Northbridge Policy Project

To resolve this potential ambiguity, in this report we are using the terms ‘core group’, ‘partners’ and ‘stakeholders’ in the following ways:

Core group: Agencies that collaborated to provide direct services on the night. The Core group of agencies were:

- Department of Child Protection (DCP) 1 senior social worker
 - Crisis Care Unit (CCU) 2 duty social workers
 - Outreach Support Workers (OSW) 3-4 Outreach workers
- WA Police / Juvenile Aid Group (JAG) 4 Police Officers
- Mission Australia ‘On-Track’ (MA) 2 lounge staff and part-time coordinator

The ‘Core’ operational agencies collaborated to provide an integrated service, and were co-located when this evaluation commenced. The purpose of the NPP was two-fold: to provide immediate assistance to children and young people; and, to use case work and referral to fulfil the policy objective of prevention. Commenting on the proposal to house the agencies separately, one participant stated

The project won’t work – well you could make it work - but effectively those three [agencies] need to be in one physical place.

Partners: Agencies that share information with the Northbridge project and attend the senior managers meetings, and either refer young people to the Northbridge project (for example Nyoongar Patrol) or accept referrals from the Northbridge Policy project. The Department of Sport and Recreation (DSR) staff who operate diversionary programs in Midland and Armadale perceive themselves to be partners to the Northbridge Project, but are not party to the senior management meetings, and are not obviously included by other partners. The Partner agencies were:

- Nyoongar Patrol (NPOS)
- Killara Youth Support Services (KIL)
- Department of Education, Western Australia (DEWA)
- Public Transport Authority, Western Australia (PTA)
- Department of Sport and Recreation, Western Australia (DSR)

The partner agencies collaborated with the core group of agencies through information sharing, provision of transport services, and provision of advice and support to young people and families. Partner agencies also contributed to diversion by referral to the project (Nyoongar Patrol, and Public Transport Authority) and by accepting referrals from the project (Department of Education WA and Killara). The Department of Sport and Recreation (DSR) programs in Armadale and Midland support the Northbridge Policy through provision of a program of local alternative recreational activities. The purpose of the DSR programs is to encourage children and young people to remain close to their home suburb in a supervised environment. Information sharing between partner agencies includes both

sharing information about changes within their own organisations that may have implications for the operations of other services, and sharing information about children, young people or their families. The DSR involvement in the Northbridge project began in 2008, and they are less fully integrated than other partners.

Stakeholders: Stakeholders have an interest in the Northbridge Policy project either because they work in Northbridge with a related client group (for example Step 1 and PICYS) or because they are a relevant advocacy organisation (for example, Youth Affairs Council of WA (YACWA), Youth Legal Service (YLS),) or because they have some other interest, (for example business organisations in Northbridge, City of Perth, City of Vincent, The East Perth Redevelopment Authority, local government).

NPP design

Northbridge Policy project workflow, roles and processes

Figure 4 provides a flow diagram to illustrate the immediate roles and processes within the Northbridge Policy project on operational nights, as they were during 2010-2011. The figure was developed from data derived from the Partnership Understanding Agreement (n.a. 2011) and interviews with representatives from partner agencies.

The police check the identity of all young people apprehended in Northbridge to determine whether they are recorded on the police database. The young person is interviewed by a Crisis Care officer who accesses DCP databases for (Category 1) child protection issues and for reports of anti-social behaviour and health-risk behaviour. Finally, unless the young person is violent, Mission Australia staff ask the child or young person to complete a Mission Australia psycho-social assessment. If the young person consents to complete this assessment, they are allowed to enter the Mission Australia Lounge, and are provided with food. If they refuse, they are returned to the JAG team and are held in police custody.

All information gathered about a young person and their family obtained from all the partners in the Northbridge Policy project is then added to the DCP Crisis Care database. The information on an individual and their family from the DCP database is then redistributed to Northbridge Policy partners according to the information sharing agreement. Mission Australia then pass information about the young person and their family situation to the Education Department through Mission Australia On-Track youth work staff.

If a young person is apprehended, organisations have distinct responsibilities. Police are responsible for law enforcement, for restraining young people if necessary, and for ensuring that they are not a threat to others in the building. Crisis Care checks the DCP database to confirm whether the young person or their family is known to DCP. Crisis Care also has the responsibility of making the decision about whether a safe place and a safe person can be identified for each child or young person. The necessary information is often difficult to find, or the young person may be unforthcoming because of intoxication, unwillingness or anger.

Address checks are conducted to confirm whether the approved person is present. Mission Australia is responsible for the ‘lounge’ where children and young people are provided with food whilst they await transport. More information on Roles is contained in Appendix 30.

For family case work, Mission Australia and Killara use information from DCP and NPP when they visit families to provide background information about what a young person was doing when apprehended. See Appendices 20, 21, 22, 30 and 32 for an expanded analysis.

Several agencies are engaged in diversion of children and young people away from Northbridge, but the main organisations that have this role are the DCP Outreach Support Workers, the Nyoongar Patrol, and the PTA security staff.

The Nyoongar Patrol plays an important role bridging between Aboriginal agencies and interests and government agencies and policies and other public interests. The central focus and mission of the Nyoongar Patrol is to provide support for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to improve their lives and divert people away from the criminal justice system. Partners and Core group interviewees reported the Nyoongar Patrol provides valuable support to the NPP because of their knowledge and understanding of local Indigenous communities and provides practical support with transport for young people. Nyoongar Patrol Inc. strongly supports the Northbridge Policy. However, the Nyoongar Patrol is not funded by the NPP and there is concern that funding from other sources may not be available in future years.




Figure 4: Northbridge Policy project process flow chart to point of young person arriving somewhere safe

Figure 4 shows diversion processes, apprehension processes and immediate actions on the night. Figure 4 does not include subsequent case work roles, referral, or liaison with other agencies that occur at a later time. Figure 4 illustrates the complexity of the collaboration, the degree of role differentiation, and role redundancy, where different agencies may perform the same role, depending on circumstances. The inter-dependency of roles and functions within the collaborative structure means that effective team work is required to ensure good functionality.

Distinguishing features of the NPP model

The NPP model has several distinguishing features:

- Inter-agency collaboration, between three core agencies and six partner agencies, discussed in the next section and detailed in Appendix 20;
- Information sharing between core agencies and partner agencies, discussed in the next section;
- Integrated preventative casework with families and young people;
- A welfare and child protection focus, premised upon research that shows that prevention of child maltreatment and neglect is effective as a means to reduce entry into the juvenile justice system;
- Two night patrols operate in Northbridge: the NPP and the Nyoongar Patrol. The Nyoongar Patrol is an Indigenous night patrol that operates in Northbridge and several locations around Perth. The NPP is staffed by outreach workers whose role is to divert young people from Northbridge if they are judged to be at low risk of harm. The Nyoongar Patrol can provide transport home to young people who might otherwise be apprehended by the police.

Casework

The role of case work is central to fulfilling the aims of the Northbridge Policy project in prevention of family crisis, and remediation of conditions that predispose young people to harm or criminal activity. As one participant commented, the problems of Northbridge with children and young people can be seen as a *'manifestation of problems in other places'* and a failure to *'strengthen families and do all the corrective work that needs to be done'*.

Factors that shape case work include:

- 'Frequent flyers', children and young people who attend the project multiple times
- 'Self-presentation' of young people (young people who walk in voluntarily as distinct from involuntary 'apprehension')
- How case work is allocated
- Numbers of families engaged in intensive case work support
- Family engagement with case work
- Casework, mandated engagement and trust

These issues are discussed later in the evaluation and in detail in Appendix 23.

Perceptions of achievements of NPP

Several areas of achievement were identified. Core group service providers, partners and stakeholders considered that the NPP:

- Provided immediate protection that addresses child protection concerns for children and young people under 16 years old in an adult entertainment precinct without adult supervision at night, and who might not voluntarily engage with the services;
- Improved interagency collaboration where multiple agencies were involved with the same family;
- Information-sharing

Child protection

Partners and Core group members believed that NPP was making a real difference to some children and young people, and responded effectively to some children and young people who might not voluntarily engage with support services in Northbridge. From a child protection perspective, one interviewee stated

‘These kids aren’t safe in Northbridge irrespective of how it may affect the rest of the community. We’ve seen many individuals [young people] and the experiences they have been through. So there is a value and a benefit as much as some kids mightn’t admit it even – and [even in spite of] the things that they call JAG! ‘

The establishment of a night-time crisis child protection service in Northbridge, on three nights per week, is a significant project achievement. The value of this service was confirmed by stakeholders, even some who had been initially sceptical of the NPP. Stakeholders interviewed about the reasons for the inception of the NPP confirmed that routine begging and prostitution by young people and children had been concerns. From our interviews, it did not seem as if these activities were common in Northbridge any more.

Improved collaboration between agencies

All direct service-providers of the Northbridge Policy partners reported that there had been difficulties with interagency collaboration in the first four years of the Northbridge Policy project. In early 2008, it was clear to the DCP manager of the NPP that internal tensions and organisational territoriality and disputes over process, e.g. how many young people could be processed at any one time, were *‘making it difficult to operationalise things’*. Interviewees reported that the difficulties and tensions between Northbridge Policy project partners restricted the ability of the Northbridge Policy project to fulfil its aims of providing an integrated multi-agency service.

The Core group and Partner organisations agreed that cooperation, collaboration, morale, and information sharing between agencies involved in the Northbridge Policy project had

improved since 2008, and were now good. Participants attributed this improvement to the leadership and openness of the project coordinator who managed the project between 2008 and February 2012. They stated he had changed the project culture. When asked, the coordinator stated that his goal was to create *‘an emotional environment in the workplace in which ... we’re all supporting each other.’* His strategy for change was to keep the things that were working and bit by bit change the problematic arrangements to achieve gradual improvement. The successful mechanisms included:

- a. **Partnership agreement:** Formalise roles, relationships and responsibilities in a partnership agreement. This took three years to negotiate, see Appendix 21.
- b. **Workflow:** Create a formally-defined and detailed representation of the workflow process that was continually reviewed for efficacy and revised as necessary.
- c. **Meetings:** Convert all meetings to an ‘open forum’ format that was transparent and non-hierarchical. Different meetings for different purposes; improved collaboration at the Senior Management meeting; involvement in the Nyoongar Patrol meetings.
- d. **Information sharing:** Adopt new processes to improve information sharing and focus the information sharing on achieving benefits for young persons. Align information sharing with WA State policy guidelines on information sharing between government agencies and the information sharing guidelines in the Children and Community Services Act 2004.
- e. **Joint training** with other Northbridge Policy project partners where one agency offers training to others about the specifics of particular legislation; improves understanding of all agencies about constraints on the Northbridge Policy process.
- f. **Include all partners:** Improve collaboration with all Partner agencies through better information sharing and active and inclusive problem-solving.
- g. **Resolve conflict:** Act quickly to resolve problems with process, differences in professional judgement and conflicts in relationships.

All interviewees commented that the collaboration and functioning of the Northbridge Policy project had been improved since the strategies were put in place. The Core service providers recognised there is on-going need to actively maintain collaboration, as summed up by one of the participants:

‘To be really vigilant to maintain collaborative information sharing, motivating people and ensuring they feel they are doing a good job and they are using their ideas and they become open to that as well. It doesn’t have to be perfect – we’re human beings after all’.

This is a significant achievement, because an important purpose of the Northbridge Policy was to improve collaboration between key agencies (DCP, JAG, Mission Australia, Killara,

PTA, Nyoongar Patrol, Education Department) especially when families with complex needs engaged with multiple agencies. The collaboration arrangements are detailed in Appendix 20.

Information sharing

Functional information sharing was identified by Partner interviewees as central to enabling the NPP to function as a successful integrated multi-agency project. The importance of information-sharing was illustrated by the example provided by one of the project participants:

'A difference between the Northbridge Policy project and other night patrols is the Northbridge project is more than simply picking people up and dropping them off home. The information sharing with other agencies extends its success and outcomes. For example, Education has a small role – not an active operational role – but they get information and they provide information on every kid that should be enrolled in school and that's passed onthey come through Mission Australia. Mission Australia follows up that info from EDWA [DEWA] in a timely manner. Whether the kid is at school...whether they are enrolled...'

This evaluation identified key aspects to the information sharing in NPP

- Identify information sharing problems
- Establish procedures to resolve information sharing problems
- Document information sharing practices
- Maintain separate information databases
- Identify benefits of information sharing

Information sharing between agencies is regulated by legislation. We were told, however, that despite a policy framework already in place for information sharing between government agencies (D. o. Attorney-General, 2003) initially agencies had been reluctant to share information. Information management processes adopted by the Northbridge Policy project subsequently aligned with both the formal Northbridge Policy and with existing legislation and other government policy. The agreed NPP information sharing protocols were built on the policy framework for information sharing between government agencies (Attorney-General, 2003) modified to enable sharing with NGOs (Mission Australia and Nyoongar Patrol). The only remaining significant barrier to sharing information identified by stakeholders is the Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA Government, 2012). We were told that staff in each organisation use protocols and professional judgment to ensure information sharing is relevant and essential. See Appendix 22 for more detail on information sharing.

Perceptions of NPP limitations

This section includes both identified model limitations and issues that had been identified as not yet resolved. During interviews we asked participants to describe the limitations of NPP.

From interviews we found that participants identified four limitations inherent in the design of NPP, rather than temporary problems that may be overcome:

- Displacement
- Constraints within the operational model
- Database duplication
- Role strain and Nyoongar Patrol

We also identified two issues which were potentially resolvable

- Better data management and evaluation processes
- Weak links with non-partner stakeholder organisations

Displacement

Partners and stakeholders identified displacement patterns due to NPP in detail and described how they had changed over time. The descriptions were consistent with each other. Interviewees were able to identify individual young people, their accounts were consistent, and all were certain that displacement had occurred.

‘One of the oldest Policeman’s tools in his toolbox was always, “if you can’t solve crime you’ll displace it somewhere else”

‘One of the big limitations I see, essentially it’s the Northbridge project which has just moved the problem elsewhere. ‘

According to interviewees, initially, displacement from Northbridge increased activity along Armadale rail line locations south east of the city initially around Kelmscott and Gosnells and in Fremantle. Simultaneously, it appears some groups went to Fremantle from Midland via Perth, whilst young people from Armadale and nearby could change trains at Mclver or Claisebrook to avoid apprehension in Perth. It was reported that there has also been displacement from Perth CBD and Northbridge to Claisebrook and Mclver stations, which are inner city rail stations on the Armadale and Midland rail lines, and also to Oats Street station, which is slightly further from the City centre on the Armadale line. Most recently, very large numbers of young people have begun to gather in the Burswood area close to the Burswood casino. This is the location most participants believed children and young people now congregated. Burswood is located on the Armadale/Thornlie rail line 10 minutes from central Perth. The station is old and isolated, adjacent to the Casino car park and waste ground known as ‘Hamburger Hill’. The area is not well-maintained or well-lit, and has poor surveillance³.

³ "Since the data collection in 2011, the PTA has introduced a number of measures to make the land under its control less attractive to large groups and easier to monitor. The lighting on Railway Property exceeds national standards as recommended by “Crime Prevention through Environmental Design” (CPTED) protocols. Extra CCTV cameras (monitored) have been installed and the surrounding vegetation/ trees on PTA land were removed and still maintained to allow staff a good line of site and to eliminate hiding places. Burswood Station is staffed daily from: 2:45 pm until last trains every day of the week and has a new purpose-built office. Part of the PTA Car Park has been fencing off and is closed daily at 7:00pm. This allows PTA Transit Officers,

'It's attractive because there is land out there with 24 hour shop, park across the road, the Burswood precinct where they may have relatives at the casino. For criminal types there are opportunities with cars, people round the car parks etc.'

'Currently, the Burswood station is a 'powder keg' hardly under control with 50 to 200 young people at any one time in a situation that could easily evolve into a riot at any time.'

'With the railway at Burswood, the problem isn't robberies it's the antisocial behaviour, and that is mostly family feuding and fighting. This has moved on from Northbridge.'

We were told that incident statistics were consistent with an interpretation that young people have moved to Burswood from other locations SE of Perth, as well as from Northbridge.

There was no discussion about the movements of young people from suburbs north of the city, even though they appear as a significant percentage in the records of apprehensions in Northbridge. It is possible they used public transport to travel to locations to the south of the city, but we do not have any information about this.

Constraints within the operational model

The interviews provided several examples of where constraints within the NPP operational model determined the numbers of children and young people who are apprehended, independently of numbers of children and young people in Northbridge. For example, the numbers of young people apprehended depend upon whether the JAG team are operating at full complement, how they interpret the Northbridge Policy, and transportation time to the JAG offices when young people are apprehended.

In the second half of 2011, when NPP moved to temporary premises, the JAG team commented that there were delays due to increased transport and handover time. This resulted in a significant reduction in the number of young people that could be apprehended and processed in any one evening. Data for this period shows a steep decrease in apprehensions immediately after the re-location, although apprehensions later increased as other strategies were adopted.

The capacity of other services to process young people also influences apprehension numbers, independently of the numbers of children and young people on the streets. DCP, including Crisis Care, is limited in their capacity to process young people who are apprehended. Similar to JAG, if Crisis Care staff are unavailable due to sickness or other priorities, then no apprehensions are possible. The Mission Australia lounge can accommodate only 12 young people, but we were told that the lounge does not reach

Surveillance Operators and Police to monitor a smaller space where young people congregate. Police commented that this has reduced anti-social behaviour at the station itself however also stated that some of it has moved it on to other surrounding areas. Surrounding areas adjacent to Burwood station are the responsibility of other authorities, (the Casino and the Town of Victoria Park) and some remediation works are planned for the future."

capacity. Case management resources are limited, especially for intensive support. Interview data did not indicate that either the Mission Australia lounge or the case work provision needed more capacity, but did identify that JAG and Crisis Care staff unavailability sometimes limited the operations of the project. In summary, we conclude operational processes rather than the numbers of children and young people eligible for apprehension determines the numbers of children and young people apprehended.

Database duplication

Information sharing and privacy presented special challenges, and raised ethical and legal considerations for agencies. Although information was shared, databases were not shared. A consequence of this has been a growth in numbers of databases containing personal information about clients of NPP (nine at last count). According to participants, each Northbridge Policy project agency maintains a separate database that contains personal information about young people and their families because no agency is willing or able to share its database with other partners, because of concerns about potential access this would provide to other information.

The databases of personal information were held within Partner organisations and potentially shared with people who are not part of the Northbridge Policy project. Access occurs under a variety of security protocols and processes, different external sharing arrangements and differing levels of authorisation. Nine databases contain similar replicated sets of personal information about young people and their families. Interviewees indicate that separate databases are maintained because:

- Individual departments require all staff to maintain agency specific records that contribute to the data set for the whole agency.
- Some of the partner agencies need access to personal information about the young people and their family situations to be able to provide appropriate services to young people and their families and would not want to depend on a Crisis Care staff member to provide this.
- The personal information about young people and their family situations was gathered from partner organisation other than DCP Crisis Care staff. For example, Mission Australia, Outreach workers, Killara, Nyoongar Patrol staff and PTA staff obtain information directly from young people.
- The Education Department and Killara, PTA and the JAG team access and share information from a range of other sources, and contribute their data back to these sources.

This duplication seems to be unavoidable, but is worrying because misinformation may be widely disseminated, but not necessarily widely corrected.

Role strain and Nyoongar Patrol

The Nyoongar Patrol is a Partner of the NPP, but they are not a member of the core-service provision group. Relationships between the Nyoongar Patrol and NPP were very supportive. However, three tensions emerged:

1. Unlike Police and DCP, there was no on-going funding for the Nyoongar Patrol despite the centrality of their role in the NPP;
2. There is potential for role strain to arise because of tensions between the funded purposes of the Nyoongar Patrol, and their role within the NPP;
3. DCP has mandated Nyoongar Patrol staff to perform address checks through Crisis Care for all young people found in Northbridge, including 17 year olds, prior to transportation by Nyoongar Patrol. Transport can only be provided to an address if Crisis Care approves the 'safe place' and 'safe person'. On nights that NPP does not operate and at other locations, this is not required.

Role strain occurs when a person or organisation has competing duties that are not compatible. There are differences in the aims and priorities of the Nyoongar Patrol and the Northbridge Policy project. This has potential to place the Nyoongar Patrol staff in situations of role strain, or where their role may be misconstrued. Nyoongar Patrol staff reported they often faced criticism from both Indigenous people and businesses in Northbridge.

Compulsory address checks may also mean that some young people choose not to be transported by the Nyoongar Patrol, if they do not want Crisis Care (and the police) to know their location. This may place them at greater risk, and potentially compromises the Nyoongar Patrol's funded role. Even though the role of the Nyoongar Patrol is strongly supported by Police and government, it is not always understood by others. It is not easy to see how the role strain can be resolved without changes to the current model.

Role strain could be mitigated if the model were adapted to give greater priority to the funded purpose of the Nyoongar Patrol and to allow Nyoongar Patrol staff more autonomy to execute this role. For example, it is helpful for the Nyoongar Patrol to be able to access Crisis Care when they are concerned about whether a proposed address is safe, but it is a hindrance to their role if they are required to get every address checked in all circumstances. Therefore, we recommend that the Nyoongar Patrol should be able to exercise discretion about whether they request address checks, especially for young people over 15 years and possibly for younger children and young people over the age of 12 years.

Project data management and evaluation processes

Our perception was that the project records were maintained to a high standard. The project coordinator at the time of the evaluation was keen to develop an evidence-based approach to project management. He reported that because the project was located remotely from the main DCP offices (at the time of the interviews), remote computer data recording systems were very slow and this made it very time-consuming for the NPP coordinator to access project data and DCP systems. The project coordinator believed that

he needed better support to monitor and analyse project outcomes. At the time of the evaluation, he collated data from staff in Police, JAG, Crisis Care, Mission Australia, and Nyoongar Patrol and recorded this in an Excel spread-sheet. He did not believe this provided a 'flexible enough tool' for analysis. In addition, slow and unreliable computer access caused workflow problems for DCP staff.

This limitation could be resolved fairly simply with a better server link and access to more appropriate software.

Weak links with Stakeholder who are not partners

Interviews indicated there were few links between the Northbridge Policy project and other non-Partner stakeholder organisations, even when these might be expected. For example, the Department of Sport and Recreation considered it was a partner because of its diversion programs in Midland and Armadale but DSR was not recognised as such within NPP. In some ways, this lack of links is not surprising because of the difficulty of establishing collaborative relationships between the existing partner agencies. Links may be easier to develop now a formal collaboration has been ratified between existing Partners.

The Nyoongar Patrol is the only Indigenous organisation that is a project Partner and appears to be the only Indigenous organisation with which the NPP has active links. There did not seem to be active links between the NPP and any Indigenous family support organisations, or Indigenous youth organisations. This is a limitation for a group of organisations that works predominantly with Indigenous young people and families, especially because preventative family support is a high priority. Of the three organisations with which we did not manage to arrange an interview, two were Indigenous organisations. We did not get a sense that the Northbridge Policy was well-linked to either Indigenous organisations or Indigenous families and communities, except through the Nyoongar Patrol.

Youth agencies in Northbridge and the inner city area work with some of the most vulnerable young people aged 12 years and older. They have developed strong voluntary relationships with these young people, many of whom avoid Police and DCP and some of whom are already parents or will soon become parents. These youth agencies are working to break cycles of inter-generational disadvantage, to help young people overcome difficult life circumstances and lack of support, to support their physical and mental health and well-being, to reintegrate young people into education and, where appropriate, to strengthen young people's parenting skills.

The absence of informal contact with them represents a limitation for the Northbridge Policy project in the long-term, and is potentially resolvable, without any changes to the fundamental model.

Evaluation of the Model

This section provides a discussion and summation of our findings in response to each of the specific evaluation questions, and the overarching question about whether the NPP provides a model of good practice.

Specific evaluation questions

The discussion that follows addresses the specific evaluation questions for the Northbridge project. Discussion begins with an analysis of the question, and what is required to answer the question satisfactorily, and then synthesises relevant data gathered. Fuller presentation of the data can be found in the Appendices 20-30.

Children on the street

1. Examine the extent to which the policy as implemented has reduced the number of children
 - a. aged 12 years and under, and
 - b. aged 13 to 15 years,found without adult supervision at night in Northbridge (disaggregated by gender; Indigenous status; and home suburb).

For evaluation purposes, this question poses a number of sub-questions, including

1. **How closely does implementation align with the intentions of the Northbridge Policy?** What are the key modifications? What are the implementation achievements and limitations?
2. **What has happened?** How have the numbers of children and young people in Northbridge changed over time? What is the relationship between the numbers of apprehensions of children and young people and the total numbers of children and young people in Northbridge?
3. **How have project activities contributed to change?** To what extent can any changes identified be attributed to the Northbridge Policy project? Are there 'competing hypotheses' or alternative plausible explanations that explain observed changes?

Policy implementation

We found that a decision had been made to focus implementation upon children and young people in Category 1 of Northbridge Policy and judged this was appropriate

The evaluation question required us to evaluate outcomes for children and young people aged 15 years or less, found without adult supervision at night in Northbridge. This question relates only to children and young people apprehended under Category 1 of the Northbridge Policy. We were told that a decision was made in early 2008 to focus resources on children and young people in Category 1 of the Northbridge Policy. The reasons for apprehension of young people aged 16-17 years in Category 2 were very different from those in Category 1, and potentially raised different management issues following

apprehension. We judged that the decision to focus on Category 1 was an appropriate priority for the project. We found that the leadership of the DCP coordinator since 2008 had enabled the NPP to achieve effective communication and collaboration and had resolved many earlier implementation problems.

Numbers of children and young people in Northbridge without supervision

We could draw no firm conclusions about this, but on balance believe that numbers have probably declined. Police incident data is consistent with the proposition that numbers have declined and both Stakeholders and Partner organisation believed that numbers had declined. The number of children and young people apprehended had declined, however numbers apprehended may not be indicative of numbers eligible for apprehension (see next answer).

All NPP organisations and stakeholders interviewed stated they believed numbers of children and young people in Northbridge had fallen. Police incident data showed that there had been a decline in numbers of young people involved in police incidents in Northbridge. We have no independent quantitative data for the total numbers of children and young people in Northbridge, either before the NPP commenced or subsequently.

We concluded that apprehension data collected by the NPP was not a reliable proxy for the numbers of children and young people in Northbridge.

The Northbridge Policy project provided detailed records about the age, gender, ethnicity and home suburb of children and young people who had been apprehended. The records were generally very comprehensive and were well-maintained, especially since 2008. Initially we used the qualitative interviews to determine whether there was a reliable relationship between the numbers of young people apprehended and the total number of unaccompanied young people in Northbridge. From the interview data we determined that the numbers of young people apprehended was strongly influenced by several factors other than the numbers of young people in Northbridge. However, qualitative interview data gathered from interviewees who were not connected with each other consistently confirmed a perceived decline in the numbers of unaccompanied children and young people in Northbridge. We then disaggregated the apprehension data by age and found that although the apprehensions of young people aged 16-17 had declined steeply over time, the number of young people age 13-15 years had risen over time. We returned to the qualitative data and discovered there had been an internal change in priorities in 2008 that resulted in less priority being given to apprehensions of young people aged 16-17 years. Therefore, on the basis of the combined data, although it was incomplete, we accepted that the numbers of children and young people had probably declined, but this still left the question of whether the decline was a result of the project or other factors. At that point we began to search for rival hypotheses that might better explain the perceived decline.

We concluded that apprehension data collected by the project was not a reliable indicator of total numbers of children and young people in Northbridge for four reasons.

- Firstly, operational factors limited the number of children and young people who could be apprehended in one night.
- Secondly, an unknown number of children and young people were in Northbridge but were diverted home by Outreach workers, PTA security or by the Nyoongar Patrol.
- Thirdly, an unknown number of children and young people were in Northbridge but were neither apprehended nor diverted.
- Fourthly, changes to policy implementation meant that Category 1 apprehensions were prioritised from 2008 onward.

We have some indications that numbers of children and young people apprehended vary according to JAG interpretation of level of risk and the appropriateness of apprehension rather than diversion. We found that unavailability of key operational staff implementation still hampered apprehensions of children and young people, and meant that numbers of apprehensions were not necessarily related to numbers of unsupervised children and young people on the streets in Northbridge at night. Police operational practices meant that sometimes the JAG team members were called to other policing priorities. When this happened, no children or young people could be apprehended. This issue has been raised in previous evaluations but remains unresolved. Implementation was also disrupted if CCU were unavailable to make decisions about the place and person of safety for a child or young person because no transportation could be approved. When this occurred, we were told that the JAG had to stop apprehending additional children or young people. These issues can only be addressed through decisions of senior management within the Police and CCU that give greater priority to the needs of NPP.

We found that the total number of apprehensions had reduced over time but the patterns were different for each age group

The reduction in apprehensions was greatest for young people aged 16-17 years, who were apprehended under Category 2 of the Northbridge Policy, and from 2008, young people in Category 2 were no longer a priority for the project (Figure 5). This group of young people are not included in our brief, but are included in data presented here. The greatest numbers of apprehensions was of young people aged 13-15 years, and apprehension of this age group increased over time. The numbers of children aged 12 years or less was relatively small. These numbers had neither increased nor decreased significantly on average over time, although there has been some variation from year to year.




Figure 5: Summary of trends in apprehension by age

We found that the numbers of Indigenous children and young people apprehended in Northbridge had declined over time

We found that the numbers of Indigenous children and young people had declined especially since 2009, see Figure 6.




Figure 6: Numbers of Indigenous children and young people apprehended

We found that the proportion of Indigenous children and young people had declined since 2008, see Figure 7. This decline in numbers of Indigenous children and young people apprehended since 2008 was most apparent for children and young people in Category 1 especially children 12 years old or less. By 2008, numbers of young people in Category 2 aged 16-17 had already declined, and have remained at a low level.




Figure 7: Proportion of Indigenous children and young people apprehended

The proportion of Indigenous young people apprehended has declined from a peak of 91% in 2007 to a low of 66% in 2010.

We found that the numbers of girls and young women apprehended in Northbridge had declined over time

We found that the numbers of girls and young women aged 15 years or less had declined over time, especially since 2006, see Figure 8.




Figure 8: Apprehensions by gender (Category 1)

We found that the proportion of girls and young women under 16 years had declined from over two thirds of apprehensions before 2006 to about half of apprehension since 2008 (Figure 9). The decline occurred before 2008 and we do not know whether this occurred because of changes to the gender ratio of children and young people coming to Northbridge at night or because of decisions about operational priority in the early years of the project. We have some indications from interview data that initially the NPP prioritised apprehensions of girls and young women, because of concerns about prostitution and sexual vulnerability.




Figure 9: Gender ratio of young people apprehended (Category 1)

We found that 80% of children and young people apprehended came from 22% of Perth suburbs

We found the home suburbs of most children and young people apprehended was located either in one of the suburbs North of Perth, along the South East Rail Corridor or along the Eastern rail line (Figure 10). Of the top twenty suburbs, nineteen were located in one of these three areas. The twenty suburbs contributing the greatest number of young people included:

- **North of Perth:** Girrawheen, Bedford, Balga, Mirrabooka, Koondoola and Clarkson
- **South East:** Armadale, Gosnells, Forrestfield, Cloverdale, Thornlie, Maddington, Bentley, Kenwick and East Victoria Park
- **East:** Beechboro, Bayswater, Rivervale and Lockridge
- **South West:** Hamilton Hill

This information may be of use to determine where local diversion services might be most usefully offered.




Figure 10: Home suburb of children and young people apprehended

Contribution of the Northbridge Policy Project

We concluded that on balance the Northbridge Policy project contributed to the reduction in numbers of children and young people in Northbridge.

The Northbridge Policy project was reported by several participants to provide an effective deterrent to some groups of children and young people, which discouraged them from coming to Northbridge at night. A consequence of this, however, was displacement of children and young people to other areas, especially Burswood. One participant observed that Northbridge may actually provide a safer environment for some children and young people than alternative locations where there was less surveillance.

Some other changes have occurred in Northbridge during the same period that may have contributed to the reduction in numbers of children and young people in Northbridge, including some alterations to the built environment. For example, the gentrification of Russell Square has discouraged Indigenous people from gathering there. This may also be a contributory factor.

Changes in reported crime levels

2. Examine whether there has been any associated change over time in reported crime levels among these age groups:
 - a. in Northbridge; and
 - b. in the wider Central Business District (CBD).

For evaluation purposes, this question poses three sub-questions,

1. **Is the data statistically significant?** Reported crime levels amongst children and young people aged 13-15 years are relatively low because diversion is used in preference to formal processes for all except more serious offences or for the most frequent offenders who have exhausted all diversion options. This is especially true for young people aged 12 years and less, who are more likely to be subject to welfare interventions than to be formally charged with any offences. If they are under 10 years old they are below the age of criminal responsibility and any offences will trigger a welfare response.
2. **How have informal changes to Northbridge Policy project activities affected crime in the CBD?** We found that the Northbridge Policy project Core group and Partners sometimes operated in the areas immediately outside the designated Northbridge boundaries, including the CBD.
3. **Are changes in reported crime associated with the Northbridge Policy project?** Is there any plausible link between the project and reductions in reported crime? Are there 'competing hypotheses' that might offer an alternative explanation for observed changes, for example, changes to the policy and practices in police

responses to juveniles, or changes to policy or practices in juvenile justice intervention in the Department for Corrective Services?

There has been change over time in police incident data with respect to young people

Police incident data for young people followed similar trajectories in Northbridge and in Perth. Between 2004 and 2008 there was a rising trend for police incidents involving young people. For the period 2008-2012, there was a falling trend. By contrast, police incidents involving young people at Burswood began from a low base and have shown a rising trend across the entire period. Examples of competing hypotheses include:

Hypothesis 1: As the figures for the age groups 13-18 are dominated by ‘public order offences’ where the police may be the only complainant, and the trends in Northbridge and Perth followed the same trajectory, the NPP had no effect on the numbers of police incidents within the target age range. The numbers of police incidents may reflect changing policing priorities, decision-making or style of interaction between police and young people.

We cannot completely exclude this possibility, but from our conclusion in answer to question 1, on balance, it is more likely that police data reflect a reduction in the number of young people in Northbridge over time.

Hypothesis 2: Comparison of police incident data for Northbridge and Burswood is consistent with the proposition that there has been displacement of young people from Northbridge to Burswood, and a consequent change in patterns of offending.

This hypothesis was accepted: This is corroborated by other data.

Hypothesis 3: The NPP has had little effect on police incidents with young people aged 16 years and above, because when the project ceased to prioritise work with this group, police incident data showed a continued decrease, contrary to expectation

This hypothesis was rejected: The NPP had affected the total numbers of young people in Northbridge, even when they were no longer targeting young people aged 16 and older, because young people had already changed their social patterns. This reduced the number of police incidents for all age groups.

Hypothesis 4: NPP has most effect with the age group 13-15 years, because there is a lower rate for police incidents for this age group, as compared with either Burswood or Perth.

This hypothesis was accepted: on balance: It is likely that these figures are partly explicable as diversion to the NPP by the police and partly as displacement of 13-15 year olds from Northbridge because of the NPP.

Current relevance of Northbridge Designation

3) Examine if the designated area of Northbridge is still appropriate, given changes in infrastructure in the CBD and increased licensed premises in the CBD;

For evaluation purposes, this question poses a number of sub-questions, including

1. **Perth CBD:** How has the CBD changed? Is there any evidence that children and young people are attracted to the CBD?
2. **Is the current Northbridge Designation relevant?** Are there special features of Northbridge that give this designation particular relevance?

Perth CBD

We concluded that there will be no rationale for the present boundary to the Northbridge designated area once the rail line no longer separates the CBD from Northbridge

At present, the main rail line from the west of the Perth city centre provides a physical barrier between the CBD and Northbridge, and forms the southern boundary of the Northbridge Designated area. A project is underway to sink the main rail line, and to create a square with additional facilities that will unite the two areas. We found from interviews that some Northbridge Policy project partners already go into the CBD, especially if they believe that children or young people may enter Northbridge from the CBD. We found no strong evidence that unaccompanied children and young people came to the CBD at night instead of Northbridge.

Relevance of Northbridge Designation

We concluded that caution should be applied to any extension of the policy to locations with different characteristics, to avoid displacing young people from relatively safe to less safe locations

The Northbridge Designation (Category 1) was designed for an inner city area to provide protection and support to unaccompanied children and young people under 16 years old in a specific context. The context was an entertainment area with a developed sex industry and many liquor outlets. The assumption, mentioned in discussion of the original policy (MacArthur), was that children and young people were attracted to 'bright lights' to have fun, but unwittingly, or deliberately, find themselves in an unsafe environment. Under the provisions of Category 1 of the Northbridge Policy, the NPP provided immediate crisis intervention to remove children and young people from a potentially unsafe environment, followed by coordinated support to assist the family to offer better protection to their child.

The policy applies in an environment where there are particular risks to children and young people associated with adult entertainment and the night-time economy. There are two dangers of extension of the policy to other locations that do not share the same characteristics or immediate risks: firstly children and young people may be exposed to greater risks if they are displaced from areas that are relatively safe, to areas where they may be less safe; secondly, there is likelihood that replicated projects will be less well resourced.

Changes to behaviour of children and young people

4) Examine if there has been a change in behaviour by juveniles to circumvent the JAG policy. (For example, there is anecdotal evidence that since juveniles are now aware of the policy and the boundaries they are shifting their behaviours to locations outside of the policy area.)

For evaluation purposes, this question poses a number of sub-questions, including

1. **Has the behaviour of children and young people changed?** Do they actively attempt to circumvent the Northbridge Policy?
2. **If children and young people have changed their behaviour, where have they gone?** What locations have children and young people moved to? Would the Northbridge Policy be effective in these locations?

Circumvention of apprehension by children and young people

We concluded that Indigenous children and young people change their behaviour to actively circumvent apprehension

There was compelling evidence from different core group members, partners, and stakeholders, that some Indigenous children and young people had changed their behaviour. Perhaps more accurately, the next generation of children and young people have adopted social patterns that were different from those of their older peers, five years ago. Some Indigenous children and young people now appear to avoid Northbridge, as evidenced by consistent reports that Indigenous young people gathered in large numbers at other locations, and the declining numbers and proportion of Indigenous children and young people apprehended in Northbridge.

The information we received from different sources was consistent. Participants reported that displacement from Northbridge to other areas began very soon after the policy was instigated. According to participants, present and past locations have included Fremantle, Gosnells, Oats Street station, Mclver station, Claisebrook station and Burswood. There was agreement that an area in Burswood was the main location where Indigenous children and young people who used to come to Northbridge gathered at the time of this research. There was agreement that the children and young people who gathered at Burswood were mostly displaced from Northbridge; however, there is also some evidence that Burswood has attracted young people from other locations as well.

Locations where children and young people gather

We concluded that a Northbridge Policy style project would be ill-advised and possibly detrimental in circumstances where children and young people are willing to change their social patterns to avoid surveillance and apprehension

The area of Burswood where children and young people gather is the area around Burswood station which is adjacent to the Burswood Casino car park and an area of waste ground known as 'Hamburger Hill'. At the time of this study we were told sometimes up to

200 people used to gather in this area and we were told this included Indigenous children and young people, of varying ages. The area was not well-maintained or well-lit⁴. We were informed that the location is attractive because of easy access, availability of a shop that is open day and night, the open space, lack of surveillance, and opportunities for petty crime, although it was also reported that fighting and feuding were greater problems than theft.

A project like the Northbridge Policy project would not be quick or easy to establish in another area, because it requires both infrastructure and team building to succeed. A trial project similar to the Northbridge Policy project but operated by the police alone was launched in summer 2011/12 in the Burswood area with extensive media publicity, but was quietly discontinued without any public comment. It seems probable that if children and young people are willing to change their social patterns to avoid apprehension, by the time a project is established and functional, the children and young people would have moved to another location. Under these conditions a Northbridge style project would only achieve further displacement, at great financial cost. As one participant suggested, if the sole aim were to move people on, a cheaper option would be to run the reticulation sprinklers all night. In circumstances where young people are mobile and actively avoid apprehension, the only approaches that will succeed are those that build positive voluntary relationships with young people without coercion. These services would need to be mobile, and to focus upon trust-building and support. In such a situation, the approach taken by the Nyoongar Patrol, or a detached youth work service that builds relationships and offers voluntary assistance, is likely to be more effective than an approach that uses forced apprehension.

Referral of children and young people

(5) Assess the extent to which the policy has resulted in children at risk being referred to appropriate services;

For evaluation purposes, this question poses a number of sub-questions, including

1. **Which children have been referred?** How many children have been referred? What are the needs? What are the services? What crisis support? What preventative family support?
2. **Have the services been appropriate?** Do the services match their needs?

Service referrals for children and young people

We found that only a small proportion of children and young people who were apprehended were referred for intensive support

Children and young people can be provided with either a crisis referral or a referral for medium or long-term intensive support. For most children and young people who were apprehended, the Northbridge Policy project arranged transport to a safe place and safe

⁴ We have been told this has now been addressed, see previous footnote

person (usually home) but did not provide referral to any other service for either crisis support or longer term support, other than provision of information packs (Figure 11).




Figure 11: Transport home

Children and young people who had been apprehended three or more times were allocated some form of case work support. The type of case work depended upon whether the young person had an open DCP file (DCP casework), an open juvenile justice file (Killara), otherwise Mission Australia. Case work support might involve a single visit and information pack, short-term support, or in a small number of cases, intensive support, see Figure 12.




Figure 12: Case work

From interview data we discovered that a small number of families of children and young people received intensive case work support, sometimes from more than one agency. We were not provided with exact numbers. Interview data indicated that four families were receiving joint support of both DCP and Mission Australia, at the time the interviews were conducted.

Appropriateness of referrals

We concluded that the case work allocation process was appropriate but questioned whether the NPP was well-placed to form long-term relationships with hard to reach young people and families with high support needs

Case work referral was allocated according to a system. In most instances, no case work was provided if a child or young person had been apprehended only once or twice, unless DCP or Killara had an open file, or there were other immediate reasons for concern. DCP were allocated any families or young people where they had an active DCP file or where there were child protection concerns. Killara was allocated young people where there were justice concerns. Mission Australia was allocated all other families where case work was considered appropriate, but where there were no immediate child protection or justice concerns. DCP could require families to engage with their staff where there were child protection concerns. All case work engagement with Killara and Mission Australia was voluntary. Mission Australia gave priority for intensive support to families and young people who were willing to change. Other families had more limited contacts; sometimes only a single visit and information. Killara provided information packs to all, and short-term case work where the young person or family was willing to engage.

It was reported that all agencies found the majority of families were reluctant to engage with case work. Willingness of families to engage with case work depends upon relationships and trust and it was acknowledged that organisations with statutory powers do not engender trust. Mission Australia had a voluntary relationship with families, but information sharing between Mission Australia and statutory organisations (like Police and DCP) has potential to undermine the trust they develop with families. This is most likely if families are not aware that all information they provide to Mission Australia will be shared with DCP and the Police, and discover this subsequently, or if families or young people mistrust the closeness of the relationship between Mission Australia and statutory services.

Families with the greatest needs may be the most reluctant to trust any organisation. In some instances, other agencies might be better placed to engage with some hard-to-reach young people and families. Some families and young people with long-term support needs might be more willing to engage with organisations that have an 'arm's length' relationship with the NPP agencies, especially if the other organisations have already gained trust of families and young people in their local area. Suitable referral agencies might include specialist Indigenous family support organisations; specialist youth support services; and local youth and community-based services. We did not find evidence of any links between the NPP and other services that provide non-compulsory support services to families and young people, or to other organisations that may be well-placed to establish long-term relationships of trust with hard to reach young people and families.

Outcomes for children and Young People

- (6) Assess the outcomes arising from these referrals, from the perspectives of:
- a. statutory authorities (Child Protection and WA Police);
 - b. other relevant service-providers (including Mission Australia and Nyoongar Patrol); and
 - c. affected children and their families.

For evaluation purposes, this question poses a number of sub-questions, including

1. **Is the service grouping appropriate to the question?** This question interrogates tacit assumptions that inform the way the question is framed.
2. **What are the perspectives of Northbridge Policy project Core group?** –revised category
3. **What are the perspectives of NPP Partners?** –revised category
4. **What are the perspectives of families and young people?** – category confirmed

Appropriateness of nominated service grouping

We conclude that there are good reasons to modify the comparator groups to allow comparison between perspectives of: NPP Core group agencies; NPP Partners; and, affected families and young people

We assume that the intention of the question was to elicit multiple perspectives on outcomes from the project from people who are well-placed to make these judgements. The framing of the original question is premised upon the tacit assumption that there is a sharp divide between the perspectives of government statutory agencies such as the Police and DCP, and perspectives of non-government, non-statutory organisations such as Mission Australia and Nyoongar Patrol. In the context of NPP, we found that the situation was more complex. We did not find any evidence of a dichotomy between perspectives of statutory and non-statutory service providers. We found that team building within the NPP had established a very cohesive Core group with a shared perspective about service delivery, and this closeness transcended statutory/ non-statutory designations. We found more diversity of perspectives in our interviews with Partner organisations that provided referrals to the project or received referrals from the project. As a consequence of our observations, we have made minor adjustments to the categories in the original question.

Perspectives of Northbridge Policy project Core group

We found that the Core group of service providers considered that outcomes included:

- **crisis protection of vulnerable children and young people (category 1) and prevention of harm;**
- **capacity to offer preventative family support;**
- **successful collaboration and service integration which improved service delivery to children and young people**

From the perspective of organisations that formed the Core group within the NPP, the NPP provided much needed support and protection for unaccompanied vulnerable children and young people in Northbridge at night. The Core group considered that the capacity to offer intensive preventative family support to some families was a major advantage of the NPP as compared with other night patrols. All members of the Core group reported great improvements in collaboration between JAG, DCP/ CCU/ Mission Australia, and other partners, and provided examples of how collaboration had improved service delivery to families and young people. In particular, they valued the collaboration with the Nyoongar Patrol, which provided transport for children and young people and information about community dynamics that was helpful to preventative strategy.

Perspectives of Partners

We found that Partners considered that outcomes included:

- **crisis protection of vulnerable children and young people (category 1) and prevention of harm;**
- **successful collaboration and service integration which improved service delivery to children and young people**
- **benefits of information exchange and cross-referral**

We found that some Partner agencies were concerned about:

- **displacement of young people to potentially riskier locations**
- **whether the NPP achieved long-term change for families and young people**

From the perspectives of the Partner organisations within the NPP, the NPP has been successful in offering crisis support and protection to unaccompanied children and young people in Northbridge at night. The Partners reported that collaboration between services had improved as a direct result of the NPP, and this has improved services to children and young people. Partner organisations also provided examples of how information shared with them had enabled them to perform their role more effectively. The Education Department Attendance Unit reported it had benefited from exchange of information with the NPP, but did not elaborate upon how they used the information they received.

Partner organisations perceived there were limitations to the NPP model. Some expressed concern that reductions in numbers of children and young people seemed to have occurred in part because the NPP apprehension policies had displaced some of the most vulnerable children and young people to potentially riskier, insecure and unpoliced locations, where there were fewer support opportunities. Some Partner organisations questioned whether family support strategies used by the project achieved long-term change.

Perspectives of families and young people

We are unable to draw any direct conclusions in relation to this question; however, the fact that none of the NPP agencies were able to facilitate contact with families who wanted

to discuss their experiences and the statements from all agencies that they found it difficult to persuade families to voluntarily engage with support services, led us to a conclusion that the program does not have strong support from most families or young people who use the service.

Value for money

(7) Does the policy and its implementation provide “value for money”? This assessment should incorporate perspectives from other stakeholders such as Public Transport Authority.

An evaluation (value-for-money analysis) of publicly funded initiatives usually requires a comparison of the annual cost of running the program with the annual cost savings attributed to the program. This comparison represents the specific return on investment (ROI) for the program and could be used to determine the continuation of the program or the implementation of the program in other jurisdictions. Alternatively, the cost of the research can be compared with the annual cost savings attributed to the program. This represents a ROI to the funding body, in this case, the Western Australian Government.

The techniques available to estimate ROI are *cost benefit analysis* (CBA), which traditionally enables the comparison of costs and benefits of an initiative in dollar terms, and *cost effectiveness analysis* (CEA) which compares dollar valued costs with unvalued benefits or outcomes such as lives saved or lives improved. Both analytical techniques estimate equivalent annual program costs. CBA is used when benefits or cost savings can be explicitly valued in dollar terms whereas CEA acknowledges but does not attempt to value, in dollar terms, benefits. Both CBA and CEA require outcomes, such as reduced vandalism in terms of property damage, to be known.

In the evaluation of the Northbridge Policy project (NPP), the *outcomes* of the policy, as distinct from the *outputs* of the service, are not known:

- The DCP data on the numbers of young people apprehended is primarily shaped by operational factors and does not provide a proxy measure for numbers of young people on the street in Northbridge.
- The data gathered by DCP does not provide any measure of the numbers of young people diverted from Northbridge as a result of NPP.
- There has been no data gathered as part of NPP on social, economic, or developmental outcomes for families and young people at risk as a result of apprehension of young people via NPP and subsequent support.
- The police data on incidents in Northbridge, CBD and Burswood provide information about the trajectories of incident numbers per year for different offences and groups of young persons. The data are shaped by operational and other confounding factors (especially diversion) and cannot be used as a direct measure of outcomes of the NPP, especially as displacement does not reduce overall costs.

Without outcomes, CBA and CEA could not be undertaken, nor could the rates of return to the program be estimated. The following analysis therefore presents the annual costs of the NPP and the costs per apprehension.

The fixed and variable annual costs are calculated for the 'core partners' in the NPP responsible for undertaking and managing the apprehensions on the night: the staff from JAG, DCP and Mission Australia. Vehicle costs, premises and immediate transport costs have been calculated. The NPP process also involves a range of subsequent service provision with associated costs including family case work, emergency accommodation provision, transportation provided by other service providers such as Killara, Nyoongar Patrol Inc. and taxi companies, diversionary transport provided to young people by TransPerth, and diversionary programs in Midland and Armadale provided by the Department of Sport and Recreation. Some aspects of the services involve costs for other partners and stakeholders such as the two weekly meetings (DCP and Nyoongar Patrol Inc.) and the quarterly meeting of senior managers of partners in NPP.

Estimating the costs of these subsequent aspects of the NPP is hampered by lack of information. For example, the interviews with stakeholders indicated the casework undertaken is substantially less than the number of referrals to agencies. Every apprehension is allocated to a single lead agency. The numbers of unique individuals each year is around half the number of annual apprehension records, and the number of unique families less because young people from the same family are apprehended. A list of these 'subsequent costs' without calculation has been listed for transparency. Full details are found in Appendix 34.

The Northbridge Policy Program is relatively expensive. The total annual operational cost for the Core staff group (DCP; JAG; Mission Australia) was estimated at \$904,377. This excluded the costs for Partner organisations because they were funded from different sources. On an annual per capita calculation, the cost of each apprehension is \$933. Because some young people are apprehended multiple times, the cost per individual is much higher. High project cost was accounted for by salary costs, explicable because staff were professionally qualified and the service operated 24 hours per week throughout the year. The NPP had a full-time coordinator at the time of the evaluation.

Under WA legislation, both DCP and WA Police have statutory responsibilities for child protection, and it could be argued that the cost of this project is not excessive because if a specialised team did not perform this function, other officers in both organisations would have to perform these tasks. We noted also that some benefits of the project accrued to Partner organisations through information-sharing and these benefits were not costed. There was also no data available on the numbers of young people who were diverted by the outreach team without being apprehended. In addition, we were also not able to cost some aspects of the project, such as the costs of transport and case work provided by other agencies. Cost for transport home is only partially included in this calculation. If transport is provided by the Core services, it is included. If the transport is provided by a Partner

organisation, it is not included. For example, the cost of transport and support provided by Nyoongar Patrol is not included in this calculation, because Nyoongar Patrol is funded separately from other sources, but the NPP is highly dependent on these services. Likewise, transport provided by Killara staff is not included.

The NPP had a much broader remit than other night patrols. In particular, a goal of the project was to work preventatively with families to address family issues that might place children at risk of harm or might mean they became involved with the criminal justice system. We sought evidence about the acceptance and efficacy of family support. The evidence we gathered indicated that family support was not voluntarily accepted by most families and the main service provided to most young people was transport home. The main follow-up support was a single visit and an information pack. We were not able to gather independent evidence about the efficacy of family support for the families who did participate in this service.

See Appendices 23, 26, 27, 30, 29 and 32 for a fuller report.

Discussion of Effectiveness for purpose

This section compares the NPP with the findings about effectiveness of night patrols, presented in chapter 3, to determine which elements of the NPP model can be considered good practice, and with the National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework, to determine the extent to which the NPP contributes to the goals of the NILJF.

NPP as model for good practice

This section synthesises the conclusions of the literature review with the findings of the evaluation. The NPP provides an example of a Type 5 night patrol, where night patrols are used as part of an integrated welfare service, where the purpose is to change the underlying social conditions that contribute to crime. The benefit of this approach is that it can be implemented in locations where a community development approach alone may not be sustainable. A potential drawback to this approach is that the service may increase dependency, alienation and apathy of service recipients, unless the model also incorporates community governance and community development.

The rationale for the NPP is that welfare support, especially in late childhood and early adolescence can 1) prevent victimisation; and 2) prevent involvement with the justice system. Both these theoretical assumptions are well-founded, so the model has a well-founded theoretical basis.

Integrated welfare services require good inter-agency collaboration and communication for successful functionality. The impetus for adoption of an integrated welfare model for the NPP derived from the Gordon Inquiry recommendations. The Gordon Inquiry recommended that when multiple agencies were involved with the same family, there needed to be a lead agency, better coordination and data sharing between agencies. The NPP has overcome

many of the operational difficulties connected with inter-agency collaboration, and information sharing. This represents a considerable achievement, and other night patrols might benefit from adopting some of the organisational and collaborative arrangements documented in this report, as outlined on p.100 and detailed in Appendices 20 and 21.

Staff in night patrols that form part of an integrated welfare service require good administrative support, mentoring and additional training and professional supervision to enable them to assume a broader role. The NPP had excellent administrative systems, staff mentoring, training and professional supervision processes. Stakeholders not directly involved in the project agreed that NPP provided an effective crisis protection service to children and young people under 16 years old who are in Northbridge late at night, and had reduced potential victimisation of young people in Northbridge.

The literature on night patrols concluded that successful night patrols should contribute to changing underlying social conditions that are precursors to crime. The NPP aspired to achieve this through the family case work element of the project. However, from evidence gathered, the family support element seemed less effective than had been hoped. The literature review suggested that, for maximal benefit, an integrated welfare service approach requires a complementary community development program. The limited success of the family casework program appears to derive from the lack of trust in the agencies that delivery the programs. A complementary community development program within the model would build community trust and determine whether family casework was perceived by families and young people to be relevant to their needs.

In addition, there is tension between involuntary elements within the model, which derive from the institutional perspectives of powerful government departments (police and DCP) and community development perspectives that would stress the importance of voluntary engagement with services. The NPP incorporated detached youth work methods in its outreach diversion program. Detached youth work aims to build trusting relationships with young people, on the basis of voluntary engagement, but here too the involuntary elements of the model are in tension with the basic presumption of voluntary engagement.

National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework

Comparison with the National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework (NILJF), illustrates the extent to which the NPP is able to contribute to the goals of this policy. The goals of the National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework (Standing Committee of Attorney's-General Working Group on Indigenous Justice, 2009) are summarised in Table 9.

Table 9: National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework

National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework Goals	Potential for contribution of NPP	Evidence	Potential for improvement
a. Improvement in Australian justice systems so that they comprehensively deliver on the justice needs of Aboriginal and	Killara's role in diversion from the justice system.	Killara's role in the project has diminished over time because of changed NPP priorities,	Find alternative means to support diversion of Indigenous young people from the justice system

Chapter 5: Northbridge Policy Project

Torres Strait Islander peoples in a fair and equitable manner.		and this trend is continuing	
b. Reduction in the over-representation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offenders, defendants and victims within the criminal justice system.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Killara, as discussed above 2. Contribution of crisis service and family support services to child protection, 3. Crisis intervention to reduce victimisation of children and young people 	<p>Some evidence for efficacy of crisis intervention to prevent victimisation</p> <p>No evidence available about effectiveness of preventative family support program</p>	<p>Partner with Indigenous and community organisations to improve the options of support for families and young people who are not willing to engage with NPP case work</p> <p>Provide family support at 'arm's length' from NPP</p>
c. Ensuring that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples feel safe and are safe within their communities	n/a	n/a	n/a
d. Increased safety and a reduction in offending within Indigenous communities by addressing alcohol and substance abuse	NPP has a role to discourage and minimise harm from substance abuse and under-age alcohol consumption	<p>Care provided for intoxicated children and young people</p> <p>Referral to specialist programs</p>	
e. Strengthened Indigenous communities through working in partnership with governments and other stakeholders to achieve sustained improvements in justice and community safety	Nyoongar Patrol (NPOS) are a partner Organisation	<p>NPOS have formal partnership agreement.</p> <p>No evidence of strong formal or informal links with other Indigenous advocacy, justice or community services organisations.</p>	Concern about how the coercive foundation of the service model limits potential for partnership with some other Indigenous organisations

There is evidence to support claims that NPP contributes directly to both reduction of victimisation in Northbridge of children and young people, and reduction of harm through care for intoxicated children and young people in Northbridge. Project staff used every opportunity to attempt to build positive relationships, even in relatively unpromising situations, and seemed to have gained the trust of at least some children and young people who chose to self-present to the service when they were in difficulties. It is plausible that the NPP may contribute indirectly to reduction in over-representation of Indigenous people in the justice system, if the project improves child protection, and if this subsequently reduces involvement in the justice system. There is limited Indigenous involvement in project governance and strategic direction through the Nyoongar Patrol, which is a project Partner and a member of the Senior Management group.

From the perspective of the NILJF, the greatest limitation of the project is the coercive foundation of the service model. The key organisations within the NPP, in particular JAG and DCP/CCU, had formal power to make decisions about the lives of children and young people, and to enact them without the consent of families and young people. This did little to build trust between the NPP and Indigenous young people and families. There was convincing evidence that many Indigenous young people now avoided Northbridge to circumvent apprehension and potentially placed themselves in greater danger. There was no evidence of widespread support for the NPP from Indigenous advocacy and justice organisations. The acknowledged reluctance of families to engage with casework support programs reinforces a perception that the project does not have strong support from a broad cross-section of

the Indigenous clients and organisations, notwithstanding the good relationship with the Nyoongar Patrol and some individual young people.

Conclusions

The Northbridge Policy Project model (NPP)

The NPP project model and its implementation have been effective in the following ways:

- **Interagency collaboration:** It has addressed the concerns of the Gordon Inquiry, and stakeholders claimed it has improved coordination of services for families that interact with multiple services. It has also apparently addressed perceptions aired in the Gordon Inquiry that the Police and DCP were not sufficiently responsive to child protection concerns that were expressed by other agencies and government departments.
- **Victimisation:** It has reduced numbers of unaccompanied children in Northbridge at night, and it has provided immediate crisis protection to address child protection concerns for children and young people under 16 years old in an adult entertainment precinct at night without adult supervision. This has reduced potential for victimisation of this group of children and young people.
- **Welfare intervention and crime prevention:** welfare intervention with children aged 8 -14 years has been found to be especially significant for juvenile crime prevention (Stewart, Livingston et al. 2008). We did not have access to casework outcomes, but the focus of the NPP on welfare needs of children and young people under 16 years old should translate into reduced juvenile offending.
- **Anti-social behaviour:** It has reduced anti-social and nuisance behaviour in Northbridge.
- **Some casework success:** It has provided limited compulsory and voluntary family case work support for families identified by DCP and Mission Australia.
- **Diversion:** It has provided diversionary mechanisms for children and young people through on street advice and free public transport home. Through partnerships, it offers diversionary recreation and youth work programs for young people in Midland and Armadale. These programs include sport, food and personal development.

Where the NPP has not been effective:

- **Displacement:** A significant number of the children and young people who might previously have gone to Northbridge transferred elsewhere to locations where the risks were different but where they were not necessarily safer.
- **Extension of policy problematic:** An extension of the Northbridge policy to other areas within Perth is likely to be costly and promote further displacement of young people to other areas with less surveillance. Young people can change location faster than new projects can establish.

- **Reluctance of families to accept services:** The unwillingness of many families to engage with support services provided by NPP agencies indicates that the NPP does not have the trust and support of families affected by the Northbridge Policy.
- **Lack of basis for trust:** There is a fundamental tension, inherent in the underlying NPP model, between the coercive elements of the NPP model (apprehension and in some cases, compulsory family case work) and the expectation that families will trust NPP and accept their support.

Model improvements

Suggested improvements to the NPP model include:

1. **Strengthen community development initiative in the main communities from which young people come:** The DSR provides diversionary activities in key communities. Potentially, these initiatives could provide a hub for other activities designed to build community capacity.
2. **Facilitate dialogue with Indigenous welfare groups:** Indigenous welfare organisations (family support, youth, community groups, corporations) other than Nyoongar Patrol have no obvious lines of communication with the NPP. The model could be adjusted to strengthen provision for formal and informal Indigenous consultation and governance of the project, and better acknowledge the centrality of the role of Nyoongar Patrol. This would strengthen community capacity and contribute to the goals of the NILJF.
3. **Seek better evidence about whether case-work based family support is the best way to support families:** Families were reluctant to voluntarily engage with case work. Casework has been adopted in this model as the preferred means of family support, but there is no clear evidence to support the efficacy of case work-based family support as a crime prevention measure, and there is qualitative evidence of the unacceptability of casework to recipient communities. To address this would require discussions with potential recipients about how they perceive their needs and how they believe their needs can be best met. Further evidence about the comparative effectiveness of case-based family support as opposed to other family support strategies, or generic community-based support services, might be sought and an adjustment made to the model, if necessary.
4. **Resolve tension between the coercive elements of the model (forcible apprehension) and the voluntary elements (family support).** If after investigation, casework based family support is found to be acceptable to recipients and effective for purpose, this tension could be resolved by outsourcing family support to an 'arm's length' community family support service, including Indigenous family support services. In the current model, the involvement of Mission Australia in the apprehension process and information sharing processes undermined their capacity to provide a confidential service to families and to gain their trust.

5. **Address unintended outcomes of forcible apprehension:** In particular, some young people changed their behaviour and relocated to other potentially risky locations where there was less surveillance. This cannot be addressed by duplicating the NPP in another location, because displacement will be repeated, but could be addressed by strengthening the role of the Nyoongar Patrol to build voluntary relationships with young people in other locations. To some extent, the model has, in practice, adapted to do this.

Applicability to other contexts

Models of good practice need to be assessed in context. We concluded:

1. **The NPP model is not transferable to most circumstances in which night patrols operate:** This is because in most circumstances, the disadvantages of forcible apprehension and consequent displacement, combined with weakness of community governance and cost, outweigh the potential benefits.
2. **With modifications, the NPP model may be potentially transferable as a night patrol model to a few contexts where young people are at exceptionally high risk of harm:** The use of forcible apprehension of young people led to displacement of young people from Northbridge to other risky locations. This means that unless the risk of harm to young people is very high, there would be considerable danger that young people would be displaced from lower risk locations to higher risk locations. If the model were adopted in other contexts, further research would be required to determine how the preventative family support element of the program should operate. In particular, it would be necessary to determine whether case-work based support is an effective response, and, if it is, how best to deliver such support.
3. **The NPP model may be transferable as a city centre outreach child protection service:** as an alternative to police custody. The efficacy of the service would then be assessed solely in terms of child protection outcomes rather than crime prevention. The cautions about the risks of displacement mentioned above and potential breach of community trust would also apply in this instance.

Chapter 6: Comparison of SAYP and NPP

The purpose of the comparison of SAYP and NPP in this chapter is to compare the two models to determine what conclusions can be drawn.

This chapter:

- Compares the purposes, rationales, methods and intended outcomes for each model;
- Examines contrasting features of the two models;
- Compares the service models, drawing upon the findings about good practice identified in Chapter 3;
- Draws conclusions about how elements from both models may contribute to a new model of good practice.

Comparison of purposes, methods, and intended outcomes

The SAY programs were framed around integrated crime prevention and community safety, whilst the NPP originally had two focuses: welfare and protection of those aged under 16 years (Category 1, in the NPP policy document); and, crime prevention and prevention of anti-social behaviour by young people, including those aged 16-17 years (Category 2, in the NPP policy document). Interview data confirmed that since 2008, the focus of the NPP project had prioritised welfare and child protection (Category 1), and the NPP was no longer involved with the crime prevention/ prevention of anti-social behaviour element of its remit (Category 2).

The SAY programs provide examples of Type 4 services, according to the schema outlined in Chapter 3. The data showed that SAYP patrols encountered child protection issues, but the SAYP services were neither funded nor equipped to respond to these issues. SAYP staff received no training in child protection, and did not have adequate support or referral options to address these issues. In other instances, patrols reported concerns about lack of referral options if the home appeared unsafe. SAYP staff also stated they had no access to services that could check whether they were delivering the child to a safe location or a safe person.

At the time of the evaluation, the NPP night patrol had become a service that focused upon integrated welfare services, and provided an example of a Type 5 service, according to the schema outlined in Chapter 3. From its inception, part of the NPP remit was established to address child protection issues. Initially the NPP had a dual focus upon both child protection, and crime prevention and community safety issues. According to interview data, this dual role was problematic to manage, and after 2007, the Northbridge project focussed primarily upon child protection and family support. Crime prevention became an indirect consequence, rather than a primary focus, of the project. Despite this change in focus, the NPP was still able to refer young people who were at risk of offending, or in the early stages

Chapter 6: Comparison of SAYP and NPP

of offending, through its partnership with Killara and the DCS, and the NPP retained access to the specialist Juvenile Justice community-diversion team.

The scope of intended outcomes of the SAYP model is less extensive than for NPP. The SAYP staff focus upon diversionary activities and transport, whereas the NPP explicitly and proactively addresses child protection issues and family support, as well as diversion from crime, immediate protection, and transport. Table 10 compares the purposes, rationales, methods, processes and intended outcomes of the two programs.

Table 10: Comparison of programs

	SAYP	NPP
Purposes	Crime prevention; diversion from justice system; prevention of victimisation;	Child protection; improved collaboration between Police, the DCP and the NGO working in child protection and family support; Indirectly, crime prevention;
Target group	Indigenous young people under 18 years old, in practice, mostly under 16 years old, in practice, a few non-Indigenous young people use the bus in some locations.	Since 2008, any young person under 16 years old who is unsupervised in Northbridge after 10pm (after dark if under 13 years old). Indigenous children and young people now make up only about 50% of service users (down from 90%)
Rationale	Community safety. Transport reduces risk of victimisation and offending; activities reduce boredom which reduces petty crime and prevents or delays involvement with justice system	Child protection (links between child neglect and entry into criminal justice system). It is unsafe for children and young people to be in an adult entertainment precinct unsupervised; improved parenting can prevent young people being unsupervised in risky environments; intervention with families can improve parenting. Child neglect leads to many subsequent social problems including involvement in crime
Methods	Patrols: Transport young people to supervised activities and transport them home afterwards. Activities: Provide structured activities	Police patrols with compulsory apprehension: Police apprehended young people regarded as being 'at risk' who were then processed by DCP and NGO staff, delivered to a safe person and place, Diversion: DCP outreach patrols diverted young people seen to be as 'low risk' onto the public transport system away from Northbridge, on the assumption they would travel home and be safe at home. Child Protection: DCP and Crisis Care provided child protection support where deemed necessary including emergency accommodation Family Support: Provision of compulsory and voluntary family support and case work services to improve parenting and enable parents to take more responsibility for their children.
Processes	Variable: Patrol model - safe transport only, or transport to and from PCYC or similar, detached youth work. Activity model with bus transport to and from activities	Diversion of young people judged to be at low risk of harm Forced apprehension and assessment of children and young people judged to be at higher risk of harm. Follow up case work in some instances
Intended outcomes	Crime prevention. Keep children safe: aim to prevent youth from being victims or offenders	Protect unsupervised children and young people from immediate harm; work with families to improve parenting and improve parental supervision of children and young people. Improve business environment in Northbridge, Reduce crime in Northbridge.
Voluntary or non-voluntary	Interaction with service is voluntary and welcomed by the young people and their families	Interaction is usually involuntary, and is often unwelcome by the young person, and not always welcomed by families

Contrast between models

This section examines some of the differences between the two models to understand why differences occurred and to determine what can be usefully learnt from the contrasts.

Issues of support, compulsion and control

In both SAYP and NPP models, patrols transport young people and take them home. The SAYP patrol staff in some locations reported that they sometimes had concerns about the safety of the young person and would make a decision to take the young person to an alternative address. When this occurred, sometimes patrols felt they had too little support and did not have sufficient back up or referral options.

Under the NPP process, the transportation of any young person under 18 had to be approved by Crisis Care (DCP), who determined a safe place and a safe person for every young person. A consequence of this was that if the Nyoongar Patrol picked up any young person in Northbridge who was under 18 years old, they were required to report the name of the young person to the Crisis Care manager at NPP who would then decide whether the young person could be transported to a particular address and particular person. This was required to happen, even if the Nyoongar Patrol staff knew the young person and the family, or were related to the young person, and even if the young person was 17 years old. The Nyoongar Patrol did not have any discretion in these issues in relation to Northbridge, in contrast to their role elsewhere in Western Australia.

As illustrated in the case studies, SAYP patrols made decisions about the safe place and person for a child based upon their knowledge of family relationships and immediate circumstances of individual households. The case studies showed that sometimes SAYP patrols decided to take a child to a relative other than the child's parent. In this context, the requirements of the NPP on the Nyoongar Patrol in Northbridge appear to be overly restrictive, especially for older young people, who at 17 years old might easily be parents themselves. A potential unintended consequence of this aspect of NPP policy is that some vulnerable young people may refuse transport with the Nyoongar Patrol to avoid disclosure of their whereabouts or to avoid formal inquiries into their circumstances.

By contrast, the SAYP patrols appear to have too little support, because they do not have the possibility to ask the Department of Community Services, NSW (DOCS) to provide advice about a safe place and person, if they have doubts about the safety of a particular household. On balance, a better option might be for all patrols to exercise judgement about where to transport children and young people, and for all patrols to have timely access to advice and support if they have doubts or concerns about the safety of a particular address. In addition, rural patrols need better access to safe houses in communities where there is no alternative family to take in a child.

Indigenous involvement and governance

Indigenous involvement, governance, accountability and funding are compared in Table 11. These issues have been selected for scrutiny because they emerged as significant issues in interviews, and in the literature review of previous evaluations. In previous evaluations of night patrols, key issues regarded as important, as identified in Chapter 3 and the Appendices, were: Indigenous ownership and involvement in night patrols and their governance; and the issue of dual accountability of night patrols to both the funding body and the local community. Table 11 summarises the comparisons between the SAYP and NPP in terms of Indigenous involvement, governance, accountability and funding.

Table 11: Indigenous involvement, accountability, governance, funding and costs

	SAYP	NPP
Indigenous staff	Some staff Indigenous	Few or no Indigenous staff members in Core team
Staffing	Variable, often includes both paid staff and volunteers. Indigenous and non-Indigenous staff. Staff recruitment difficult in some locations.	All staff in core agencies are paid by the NPP. Few or no Indigenous staff in the core agencies. Core agencies: Police: 4 officers; DCP: 1 F/T, plus Crisis Care, plus 3-4 outreach workers (paid); Mission Australia: approximately 2.5 workers plus case workers Partners: (Nyoongar Patrol Inc. has Indigenous staff); Support from Nyoongar Patrol and Killara for transport; and from Killara for case work
Collaboration	Variable, sometimes none. In some localities the SAYP patrol is the only youth service, and the only bus service. Relationships with police vary, strong in some locations; distant or difficult in others. Some SAYP patrols work with PCYC or other youth centre	Partnership between Police; DCP and Mission Australia with 5 other agencies. Education Department; Nyoongar Patrol; Public Transport Authority; Corrective Services; Department of Sport and Recreation
Service funding	Tendered on a 3 or 4 year contract from DAGJ, NSW. Some also supported by local government, service clubs and wider community.	At the time of evaluation, on-going funding for core operations from DCP departmental budget and from WA Police budget.
Governance /Service management	Usually established welfare or youth agency i.e. PCYC. Overseen by local Indigenous justice groups.	Managed by DCP at time of evaluation, (subsequently managed by Mission Australia.) Advised by a Senior Managers Group, which consisted of senior managers in Partner agencies
Accountability	To the DAGJ	To the Director-General of the DCP, through the NPP project coordinator. Police have their own line of accountability.
Hours of operation	8 hours per week funded by DAGJ; Usually Friday and Saturday night, 4 hours per night	Three nights per week, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, from 7pm until about 3am
Young people's engagement with service	Voluntary. The service is welcomed by young people	Mostly involuntary, (a few voluntary self-referrals). Evidence that some young people avoid Northbridge to avoid apprehension by the Police JAG team and Northbridge Policy project.
Annual Program costs	Variable, \$78,279 -\$108,042	\$904,377 (does not include partner costs or case work costs)
Cost per interaction (2010)	Variable, but between \$4.36 and \$42.30 per contact (DAGJ, data provided)	\$933 per apprehension. This does not include subsequent costs for family support, case work, or emergency accommodation, etc.

There were significant differences in Indigenous community involvement and support for the SAYP and the NPP projects. SAYP patrols operated in localities in which patrol members resided and were reliant upon active community involvement to ensure that patrols operated effectively. In some communities, SAYP worked with other services, such as the PCYC that provided activity programs and healthy meals. This meant patrol members had opportunities for informal relationships in other areas of life with the children and young people and their families. Interview data showed that in some cases this potential was realised, whilst in other there were few dual relationships. Where they existed, these informal relationships strengthened the programs. The interview data indicated that in many communities there was scope to strengthen relationships between the SAYP night patrol and other community organisations and services.

By contrast, the NPP did not directly employ Indigenous staff members (except the Nyoongar Patrol who were a project Partner), but sometimes the JAG team might include an Indigenous staff member. Northbridge is not a residential area for the young people who were apprehended by NPP. The NPP patrol operated a long way away from where either the NPP agencies' staff or young people lived. In a city the size of Perth, it is unlikely that any NPP core group staff would mix socially or would have dual relationships with families of young people apprehended. In the NPP model, only the Nyoongar Patrol had informal networks and dual relationships that over-lapped with the families of young people who had been apprehended. The NPP had strong support from the Nyoongar Patrol and depended upon the Nyoongar Patrol for information and transportation. We were not aware of any other formal or informal consultation or communication channels between the NPP agencies and Indigenous organisations or community groups in feeder communities where young people who used the service resided. This is possibly one reason why NPP family support was not accepted by most families of young people apprehended by NPP.

Accountability

A comparison between the SAYP and NPP project models shows that Indigenous involvement in SAY programs is substantially greater than in the NPP. Notwithstanding this observation, interviewees in the review of the SAY programs felt that SAY programs were not sufficiently responsive to local circumstances and needs, and there should be greater scope to tailor service provision to meet locally identified needs and to fit with local circumstances and resources.

The NPP was not devised to be responsive to the perceptions or wishes of the young people, their families or their communities. We found from our interviews that the NPP was primarily devised by the WA government to address child protection issues and failings identified by the Gordon inquiry (Gordon, Hallahan, & Henry, 2002), especially the need for improved interagency collaboration when several agencies were working with the same family. In addition, the NPP project was designed to respond to concerns expressed by Northbridge businesses that they were adversely affected by unruly young people. At its

inception, therefore, the NPP was a government planned project, rather than a community owned project, and did not consult communities where the young people live. In terms of accountability to communities, the structure for both the SAY and NPP programs gave priority to accountability to the funding body. Neither program required accountability to service users.

Comparison between contexts

The location of the SAYP and NPP projects provides a very obvious contrast that has shaped the purposes of the programs, the potential of each program to link with other services, and the funding available to the project. Funding provided another significant contrast.

Funding

The NPP, as an inner city project directly managed by two powerful government departments (Police and DCP), was relatively well-funded. At the time of the evaluation, the partner organisations did not have to tender for funding to provide the service because the patrol was a core responsibility for both the Police and the DCP. The NSW evaluation found communities operated the SAYP model differently because of opportunities and constraints in their context, including availability of funding, availability of other partners and services, and availability of suitable staff and volunteers who have no criminal record. The funding available to support patrol activities was variable. Some local government areas could afford to supplement SAYP grants, and had the political support to do so, whereas others could not. Typically, this limited services to two nights per week, which was universally considered insufficient, but greatly appreciated all the same.

Geographic context

The contexts in which the SAYP and NPP programs were delivered contrast sharply. The NPP was designed for an inner city adult entertainment precinct, with high levels of flow of business revenue and a very low residential population. The SAY project was designed for Indigenous communities across NSW, but especially those in regional and remote areas, where there is a large Indigenous population. Another key contrast is almost all the young people who use the SAYP buses are resident within the locality where the bus operates, whereas none of the young people apprehended by the NPP lived in Northbridge, and many had travelled by public transport for up to 50 kilometres to get to Northbridge from their home suburb. Other differences were that SAYP staff mostly did not have specific training in youth work or social work and had little access to in-service training, whereas the NPP staff were highly trained professionals and had easy access to in-service training. Finally, in rural and remote areas, the SAYP workers had few referral options if young people indicated that they needed other services, and no support in emergencies. By contrast, the NPP had multiple referral options and access to specialist youth services. The comparison of the different contexts of the SAY projects and the NPP is shown in Table 12

Table 12: Comparison of context

	SAYP	NPP
Context	Multiple sites, great diversity in location. Settlements where there is a substantial Indigenous population. Mostly Rural and remote, although some urban.	Single site. Inner City tourist/ adult entertainment district, with low resident population.
Residence of young people	Local	Not local, come from suburbs distant from the city centre
Training	Most staff had no training or very limited training. Limited access to in-service training	Highly trained staff. Good access to in-service training
Referral service	Limited availability in most locations. In some locations, this was the only youth service	Good referral options, although some agencies may be full

Tensions within the models

Both models are effective to some degree, but the evaluations identified that both models have failed in some respects. A weakness of both models was the limited community consultation and ownership of the night patrol projects. From an evaluation perspective, there are two different modes of failure for any service delivery models. Firstly, models may fail because there are inherent tensions between elements within the model that lead to contradictions when the model is implemented. Secondly, the model may fail because, although the elements within the model are congruent, implementation (or program fidelity) is poor. Program fidelity can be undermined by lack of suitable staff, poor organisation, lack of training, or if the staff do not understand how the program is intended to operate.

There are inherent tensions between program components in both models. In the SAYP night patrol model, internal tensions within the model include

- Tensions between the **dual accountability requirements**, to the funding body and to the community. These are potentially resolvable if the program can be negotiated between the funding body and the community and modified to meet community perceptions of need.
- Tensions between **intended outcomes and measures used to evaluate success**. The intended outcome was long-term community change to reduce violence and crime. However, the project reporting and accountability processes measured short-term changes in reported crime and victimisation statistics. Other measures, such as service utilization, indicate whether the service was provided but do not indicate whether it achieved change. This is resolvable if crime and victimisation statistics are supplemented by other measures of community stability and conflict, or other measures of changes to norms, for example, school attendance and achievement.
- **Unrealistic expectations in communities**. For example, in some locations, there seemed to be expectation from some within the community that a night patrol which operated two nights per week for four hours a night, run by untrained part-time staff, with little support from other agencies, would be able to change an

entrenched culture of crime and violence within a short period of time, such that reported crime would be reduced. This is not a realistic expectation.

In the SAY program, program fidelity was variable, in part because of varying local needs and constraints within different communities. Informally, patrols adapted their activities to local circumstances, availability of staff and services, and perceptions of need.

In the NPP night patrol model, internal tensions within the model include

- Tensions between **compulsion and trust**. Compulsory apprehension of young people undermines the trust required for voluntary relationships to facilitate personal and cultural change with young people and their families.
- Tensions between **protection and displacement**. Compulsory apprehension enables young people to be protected from immediate harm more rapidly. However, it also means that some young people will actively avoid future apprehension by relocating their activities to locations where they will avoid apprehension. Some of these locations may be unsafe.
- Tensions between **danger on the street and dangers at home**. For some young people at some times of the night, the street provides a safer environment than their home. This possibility is acknowledged by staff and is the central reason why Crisis Care identifies the 'safe place' and 'safe person' for all young people who are apprehended, before they can be transported home. However, the diversion role of the Northbridge Policy Program is tacitly premised on the assumption that 1) if young people are diverted away from Northbridge they will go home and 2) that home is safer for them than Northbridge.
- Tension between the **power of government departments and ownership by local communities**. The NPP model gives precedence to the priorities of government departments (which sometimes conflict) rather than ownership by local communities. The NPP successfully resolved tensions between the different priorities of different government departments that had previously caused difficulties, and this is an achievement. However, in the current model there are few avenues for consultation or dialogue between the NPP and Indigenous community organisations and Indigenous local communities. Even when dialogue occurs, as with Nyoongar Patrol, DCP has the power to require operational procedures contrary to the preferences of the Nyoongar Patrol staff; for example, compulsory address checks for 17 year olds prior to transportation.

In the NPP, program fidelity was excellent. Staff understood how the program was intended to work and their roles within the operation of the program. The program was adequately resourced and staff were highly qualified and well supported. The only operational weakness identified occurred when key staff were unavailable (JAG police, Crisis Care) and this severely reduced the operational capacity of the program.

Transferability to other contexts

The NPP project model is potentially transferable to a very limited number of similar contexts: where there are strong reasons to suppose a particular environment poses extreme risks to young people, and where extreme risks are not present in other environments to which young people may be displaced.

Transfer of the program to overcome inherent tensions within the current model would require:

- Separation of the voluntary support services from the involuntary elements of the service;
- Improved mechanisms to build relationships with communities where young people live, perhaps developed from the hubs where DSR diversionary activities operate;
- Greater emphasis on diversionary programs that provide alternative social and informal educational options for young people in their home communities;
- Acknowledgement that displacement will occur and ensure that young people are not displaced to more unsafe environments;
- Voluntary youth work support in the environments to which young people are displaced;
- A review to mitigate operational features that limit the capacity of the program to apprehend young people

The SAYP project model is potentially transferable to similar contexts in other states, and to overcome tensions within the current model would require:

- Resourcing and support to enable patrols to respond to welfare concerns;
- Strengthened community ownership;
- Strengthened partnerships with other community services;
- A review of approaches to support crime prevention through a multi-agency strategy for inter-generational change that might include: community capacity building, community development, reconciliation, personal and social development;
- Alignment of patrol methods with youth work and community development, employment of qualified youth workers, and provision of access to training for part-time staff and volunteers who support the program;
- A review of reporting and evaluation processes to align with metrics suited to long-term community change; and,
- Development of supportive relationships between the RCs and the SAYP project staff, in which RCs can mentor SAYP staff to creatively resolve problems.

Chapter 7: Towards a model of good practice

The final chapter summarises the findings of this evaluation about good practice and makes recommendations for a new model of night patrols.

Good practice elements within each model

The strengths of the SAYP model are:

- **Culturally appropriate:** It was considered culturally appropriate by most Indigenous participants and was valued by Indigenous people.
- **Some opportunities for community governance and management:** It provided some opportunities for community management and governance of patrols, (dependent upon tendering).
- **Transport and activities valued:** The service was valued highly by service users and in some locations provided the only youth service and the only transport. In some communities, especially rural and isolated, the SAY project provides transport that enables children and young people to attend activity centres where otherwise it would be impossible.
- **Crime prevention:** The SAY programs were believed by police to assist crime prevention.
- **Victimisation:** The SAY programs were believed by families to reduce victimisation.
- **Indigenous involvement:** Local Indigenous people were employed in most services.
- **Trusting relationships:** Some patrol staff were able to develop long-term trusting relationships with young people who used their services.

The strengths of the NPP model are:

- **The funding model:** At the time of the evaluation, most key staff had on-going employment, and the service was funded on a recurrent basis.
- **The collaboration model:** This includes the partnership agreement, the team leadership, and many elements of the information sharing process.
- **The training, mentoring and supervision arrangements:** High quality cross-organisational training was provided, and team members had regular professional supervision and mentoring.
- **Crisis protection service:** This part of the NPP service was considered effective, and offered a good alternative to holding children and young people in police custody pending arrangements for them to be transported home or to a place of safety.
- **Good referral options:** The NPP model provided staff with specialist support and the project had access to several different services that accepted referrals.
- **Crime prevention:** After 2008, this was no longer a direct project goal of NPP. Juvenile crime had reduced in Northbridge probably because of the NPP; including

Chapter 7: Towards a model of good practice

through displacement, changes to policing methods, urban re-development and increased surveillance.

When both SAYP and NPP models are compared with the proposed model of good practice in Chapter 3, the gaps in the SAYP and NPP models become apparent (Table 13). Neither model included any community development elements.


Table 13: Comparison of SAYP and NPP models to good practice in literature

Conclusions from literature review	SAYP	NPP
Contribute to changing underlying social conditions that are precursors to crime	No, attempted diversion from crime, rather than an attempt to change social conditions	Attempt through family support program, but families not engaging willingly
Have administrative support, mentoring and additional training and professional supervision to enable them to assume a broader role.	Administrative support and some training, but professional supervision and more training would be welcomed	Yes, does this well
Adopt community development approaches for long-term community capacity building	No	No
Strengthen community governance to enable programs to be tailored to local need	Opportunities for community governance, but little opportunity for program adjustment	No
Supplement community development approaches with an integrated welfare approach, especially where communities are fragmented	No	Integrated welfare model, but without community development. Good collaboration between services
For youth night patrols, incorporate detached youth work methods	In some instances, but limited by service goals and lack of referral options	Yes, to some extent but tension between involuntary elements of model and youth work approach presumption of voluntary relationships
Indigenous ownership and involvement in night patrols and their governance;	Sometimes	Only the Nyoongar Patrol not the NPP
Dual accountability of night patrols to both the funding body and the local community	No	No

Conclusions and Future Directions

A new model for future night patrols should build upon what is already known from previous evaluations as summarised in Chapter 3, and the findings of these evaluations. The emergent direction of night patrols within an integrated welfare services model still seems to promise a good direction for future development of night patrols. The NPP project demonstrated that service integration is possible, and the methods they used are described in Chapter 5 and Appendices 20-22. The NPP project did not have strong relationships with Indigenous community leaders or community organisations, and this omission from their model is sufficient to explain the lack of acceptance by community members of the family support program that formed a key part of their service. The configuration of a coordinated multi-service approach is presented in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Closing the Gap: change within one generation



We conclude that both the SAYP and NPP program models had some elements of good practice and some limitations. Both models have internal tensions between different program components, which will continue to undermine the effectiveness of each model unless resolved. The strengths and weakness of the two models were complementary to some extent, and insights gained from both evaluations have contributed to a new model for Community and Night Patrols.

Based upon the findings of this evaluation and the review of previous evaluations in Chapter 3, the new model should:

- **Contribute to a strategy to support reconciliation and inter-generational change** (consistent with Closing the Gap and National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework (NILJF)) using community development as a means to enhance community well-being and crime reduction, and individual health;
- **Incorporate night patrols as part of a co-ordinated integrated welfare approach** to service provision, with recognition of the need for complementary referral and support services to maximise the benefits of night patrols;
- **Develop an interagency collaboration model** that formalises partnership agreements, provides skilled team leadership, and has formalised agreements on information sharing and confidentiality;
- **Use community development** to build community capacity for self-determination and effective community governance;
- **Strengthen community ownership and Indigenous involvement** in the governance of night patrols, through mechanisms that enable Indigenous people to contribute to shaping the provision of night patrol services in their community, and through mentoring support to Indigenous management bodies;
- **Ensure training, mentoring and supervision arrangements** are put in place that promote high quality cross-organisational training and regular professional supervision and mentoring for all staff;
- **Facilitate dual accountability to both the host community and funding body** and negotiate details of the service provision to address both the requirements of the funding body and the self-identified needs of the local community;
- **Develop a funding model that is suitable** for a program that aims for long-term community change, e.g. key staff have on-going employment, and the service is funded on a recurrent basis, or mechanisms for tender to be granted to preferred providers when services they provide are operating successfully;
- **Enable service delivery methods to be consistent with goals** and intended outcomes; this may require staff training in evaluation techniques, development of program logic models and key indicators for each program;
- **Use detached youth work methods** to make contact with young people who are not engaged with activity programs to gain their trust, provide support and referral, provide information and advice, develop their leadership skills and provide informal social education;
- **Seek ways to attract skilled and qualified staff**, including youth workers who are able to assume a broader role that includes referral, informal education and direct crisis support;

Chapter 7: Towards a model of good practice

- **Develop realistic timelines for change in each community** and develop an evaluation strategy built into the program logic model adapted to the long-term nature of reconciliation and inter-generational change;
- **Enable support service development through a focus on *both* formative and summative evaluation.** Formative evaluation is important because it supports staff to learn from experience and make evidence based adjustments to programs; and, mitigates the risks that summative evaluation will undermining program integrity because staff focus only on apparent compliance with targets rather than program quality.

Appendix 1: Night Patrols Research Timeline

PROJECT TIMELINE PHASE 1: PROJECT PREPARATION (0-3MONTHS)

Anticipated Timeline: 1 February 2010 – 30th April 2010

1. **Advisory groups** –Establish Community Advisory Groups (WA & NSW).
2. **Ethics application:** Submit project for ethics approval at both Universities.
3. **Project website:** Develop an evaluation website.
4. **Appointment of research assistants:** to collate and analyse data.
5. **Literature Review** – using a range of databases such as Proquest, Metaquest (literature since 2000), to support both projects, including: literature for night patrols and similar services; (Both) Evaluation methods for night patrols, detached youth work and similar services; (NSW); literature on the Northbridge intervention; (WA).
6. **Initial scoping of context and existing data in WA** to include:
 - a. Discuss purpose and proposed methods for the project with key stakeholders, seek support and ascertain changes required;
 - b. Seek access to relevant de-identified data sets from DCP/Crisis Care and from the JAG/WA Police. Discuss project with Nyoongar Patrol and whether they would be willing to permit any access to data for the purposes of this evaluation; and
 - c. Determine whether the Perth CBD will be used as the comparator study.

Phase 2: Data collection and preliminary analysis

Timeline: 15 months from the completion of Phase 1

In WA

1. **Effect on numbers of children & YP found without adult supervision in the Northbridge area:** Time series analysis of data collected by DCP/ Crisis Care/ WA Police, 2001-2010; analysed to satisfy specification in the RFT document; (aged 12 years and under; aged 13 to 15 years - disaggregated by gender; Indigenous status; and home suburb).
2. **Change over time in reported crime amongst age groups:** Time series analysis of data on reported crime collected by WA Police, 2001-2010 for Northbridge; analysed to satisfy specification in the RFT document; (aged 12 years and under; aged 13 to 15 years - disaggregated by gender; Indigenous status; and home suburb).
3. **Comparison with Perth CBD for crime reports:** Time series analysis of data collected by WA Police, 2001-2010 for Perth CBD; analysed to satisfy specification in the RFT document; (aged 12 years and under; aged 13 to 15 years - disaggregated by gender; Indigenous status; and home suburb).
4. **Evidence of changed behaviour by juveniles:** Interviews with Stakeholders list 1.
5. **Referral of children at risk to services:** De-identified Time-series analysis 2003-2010, plus interviews with JAG and DCP, Indigenous families and young people, see Stakeholder list 1.
6. **Outcomes arising from referral:** Investigated in interviews with Stakeholders list 1.

7. **Value for money:** Data to inform the 'value for money' analysis will be collected from the Stakeholders identified in list 2.
8. **Effectiveness of Northbridge policy:** Gather data on other Perth interventions and relevant policy changes that might influence changes observed (stakeholder list 1) to inform the comprehensive analysis undertaken in the final stage of the project.

Phase 3: Analysis and Final Report

Timeline: 6 months from the completion of Phase 2

1. **Full analysis** of data collected.
2. **Quantitative data** will be analysed using SPSS. The specific analyses will depend on the form of the data, but we should be able to present a range of data summary statistics and graphs specific to each research question.
3. **Qualitative data** will be analysed using NVivo to enable us to search the data for themes relating to the research questions. We will use a process of constant comparison (Boeije, 2002; Glaser, 1965) in coding the data: this requires a comparison of each new piece of data with what is already allocated to a specific theme. This comparison enables the definition of the theme to develop from the data. We will use the information gathered from the literature review and the quantitative analyses to triangulate the themes.
4. **Synthesis** of findings across project sites.
5. **Draft report** Consultation with funding body about preliminary findings.
6. **Final report.**

TIMELINE : Night patrols: reporting timeframe

PHASE ONE	31 st January 2011	Commencement of Phase One
PHASE TWO	30 th April 2011	Commencement of Phase Two
PHASE THREE	31 st July 2012 30 th December 2012	Commencement of Phase Three Submission of Final Report

Appendix 2: Literature Review Aboriginal night patrols in Australia: origins and functions

The literature on community and night patrols includes reviews of generic (adult and youth) community and night patrols, because reviews of youth-specific patrols were not commonly found. Philosophically, night patrols are based in community-development, crime prevention and early intervention paradigms. In Australia, night patrols are philosophically originally based on a community development paradigm rather than crime prevention (Taylor-Walker, 2010; Mosey, 1994). Community patrols are features of citizen patrols in places such as South America, Peru, Canada and Ghana where autonomous citizens have banded together to patrol communities in face of reduced police services and increasing rates of crime (Lithopoulos, 2007). In these instances, it is believed that greater security can be achieved by taking control of issues at local levels.

Australian Aboriginal night patrols, also known as ‘foot patrols’, ‘street patrols’ and ‘mobile assistance patrols’ originated in the mid-1980s in the Northern Territory. The initiation and management of the early night patrols in the Northern Territory around Tennant Creek and Yuendumu was facilitated by Anne Mosey, a female art lecturer from Adelaide. Anne Mosey, as Yuendumu Women’s Centre coordinator, helped Yuendumu women set up their night patrol in 1990 (after the failure of the men’s night patrol) and facilitated the establishment of around 14 night patrols immediately following, funded by DASA, NT Department of Community Development, Sport and Cultural Affairs, CDEP and others (Mosey, 2009; Taylor-Walker, 2010; Walker & Forrester, 2002). Anne focused on community development rather than crime prevention as the basis for the patrols she facilitated, and this pathway was followed by later facilitators in the same role. Anne published a review of Aboriginal Night Patrols in 1994, around a decade before what has been elsewhere in the literature considered the initial reviews of night patrols (Mosey, 1994, 2009; Taylor-Walker, 2010).

Night patrols seek to move ‘people at risk’, in terms of both criminal offending and criminal victimisation, from public places to ‘safe’ places. Different types of Aboriginal night patrols operate in Australia depending on local community needs. Patrols often have had access to vehicles and one important role of patrols has been to transport people away from entertainment venues, and enable them to get home safely. This is a substitute for public transport, which is not available or restricted/limited in the evenings, especially in regional and remote communities, and also in some urban communities.

Appendix 2: Literature Review Aboriginal night patrols in Australia: origins and functions

In New South Wales, Aboriginal Community Patrols have focused on all age groups (Aboriginal community patrols : a practical guide / Crime Prevention Division, New South Wales Attorney General's Department 2003; see, e.g., [http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/Lawlink/cpd/ll_cpd.nsf/vwFiles/Patrol%20Guidelines%202003%20Section%201.pdf/\\$file/Patrol%20Guidelines%202003%20Section%201.pdf](http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/Lawlink/cpd/ll_cpd.nsf/vwFiles/Patrol%20Guidelines%202003%20Section%201.pdf/$file/Patrol%20Guidelines%202003%20Section%201.pdf)) A recent review of Aboriginal Patrols led to funding being focused primarily on young people, with an emphasis on providing safe activities, an outreach service and transport to a safe home or a safe activity and transport home afterwards, as well as providing food and personal development training through the Safe Aboriginal Youth Programs (Aboriginal Programs Unit, 2010; AIHN, 2012; NSW Government, 2012), similar to the programs of the Department of Sport and Recreation in Western Australia such as Midnight Basketball (<http://www.midnightbasketball.org.au/Locations/ARMADALE/Pages/default.aspx>). The NSW refocusing of night patrol funding primarily on young people in urban areas aligns with that of Western Australia (n.a., 2012; Office of Crime Prevention, 2004, 2006a) and is in contrast to the Northern Territory, where night patrols deal mostly with adults, alcohol and drug misuse, and violence (Auditor-General, 2011). This difference between urban and rural/remote night patrols in which urban night patrols primarily focus on young people and rural/remote night patrols focus on 'adults, grog and other substance abuse, and violence' appears to be a longstanding characteristic of night patrols (Blagg quoted in Walker & Forrester, 2002).

Blagg (2003) identified the core functions of night patrols as the provision of basic services such as safe transportation, diversion from contact with the criminal justice system and intervention to prevent disorder in communities, with Mosey and Taylor-Walker extending this to community development functions, harm minimisation, and dispute and other preventative activities. It has been argued that night patrols, as a form of alternative dispute resolution, prevent social disorder by maintaining the community peace, security and safety (Walker & Forrester, 2002). This is achieved through such activities as mediating violent situations and preventing crime by moving clients out of harm and/or referring them to support services. In addition to these functions, night patrols also deal with local issues not addressed by other bodies, and the types of issues vary from place to place (Blagg, 2003; Walker, 2010). The shift of emphasis of night patrols onto young people changes the focus of many of the roles of night patrols into youth development and family support to achieve crime prevention outcomes and improve community safety. This parallels the differences between juvenile justice and adult justice paradigms (see, for example, Richards, 2011b) and implies the need for night patrols to be seen as part of a multi-agency, multi-dimensional developmental support strategy as described in the Auditor-General's review of NT night patrols (Auditor-General, 2011). It is often assumed night patrols carry out a form of community based policing, which

distinguishes their activity from the police or private security (Blagg 2003); however, 'this does the patrols a great disservice and fails to recognise the extraordinary complexity of Patrol functions and strategies' (Taylor-Walker, 2010 p. 7). In Australia, the initial night patrols such as Julalikari were essentially Aboriginal community initiatives (Curtis (1999), followed almost immediately by community controlled, externally facilitated night patrols funded by government agencies (Mosey, 1994, 2009; Taylor-Walker, 2010) and later community-based night patrol programs. Blagg (2003: 15), Taylor-Walker (2010) and the Commonwealth AGD (2010, p 41) have distinguished between community *ownership/controlled* programs and initiatives and community *based* programs and services. It was the flexibility of Mosey's community development basis for night patrols that enabled the strong sense of community ownership and control of early night patrols and enabled their rapid and appropriate (in Aboriginal terms) response to resolving events and conflicts (Taylor-Walker, 2010 p. 14). Blagg (2003) stated: '*Community based services simply relocate the service to a community setting, rather than reformulating the fundamental premises upon which service is constructed*'. Examples of community-based justice programs are police and court services (Taylor-Walker, 2010). Earlier Night Patrols were community *owned* in the sense defined by Curtis and Blagg. A large group (14) of Aboriginal night patrols emerged around Tennant Creek, Yuendumu and Alice Springs in the 1990s. The initiation and management of these by Aboriginal community members and families was facilitated by Anne Mosey funded by DASA, NT Health Service Drug and Alcohol 'Living with Alcohol' Program and a range of one-off grants auspiced under Tangentyere Council. They operated from a basis in community development and depended on local cultural law and kinship structures (Taylor-Walker, 2010 p. 15).

Early night patrols appeared at first glance to work by processes of consent, rather than enforcement, to achieve their goals, and were operating within Aboriginal protocols (Higgins, 1997). It appears that Aboriginal night patrols do not have a coercive role, and unlike police (and to a more limited extent private security), do not have any formal power to demand compliance with legal requirements or to restrain people to prevent crime (beyond the rights or an ordinary citizen). This must necessarily, however, be viewed through a lens in which Aboriginal Law has its own effective coercive power and appropriate application of force. For example, Julalikari night patrol comprised the elders of Julalikari and hence enforcement of Aboriginal Law was implicit in the responses of the patrol. Ability to enforce compliance comes from Aboriginal cultural protocols, elder authority, and occasionally outright force. In current urban situations, Aboriginal night patrols use their relationships with people within the community to persuade individuals to desist from harmful or anti-social conduct, through encouragement to consider possible alternative actions (such as accepting a lift home), and through offers of personal and social support. In policy

terms, in interrupting potential conflicts, taking responsibility for unprotected children and removing drunken and other persons likely to commit criminal acts, and early intervention strategies (e.g. those involving sport, entertainment and food for young people), it is considered that Aboriginal communities are empowered to act for themselves.

'Night patrols in many cases are replacing the family and traditional structures of discipline which are weakened by the death, absence, or drinking by appropriate relatives' (quoted in Taylor-Walker, 2010)

With the support of local police, but often without their active engagement, the community relies on the resources of Indigenous people and their codes of conduct, including night patrols with funding by the attorney general's office and other government organisations in this problem-solving work (Blagg, 2003; AIC 2004; Blagg and Valuri, 2004; Office of Crime Prevention, 2006; Blagg 2007; Attorney-General's Department, 2008; Aboriginal Programs Unit, 2010; Auditor-General, 2011; Beacroft, Richards, Andrevski & Rosevear, 2011; Richards, Rosevear & Gilbert, 2011; n.a. 2012). In Western Australia, the government tried giving night patrols some limited legal powers as 'wardens' following the community policing model, but this removed workers from their grassroots community and, ultimately, adversely impacted upon the credibility and effectiveness of night patrols (Walker and Forrester, 2002).

The need for Aboriginal Youth Programs

It is widely acknowledged that Indigenous Australians experience significant levels of disadvantage across a range of social, economic and health indicators (Anderson & Wild, 2007; Higgins, 2010; Macklin, 2011; Ministry of Justice, 2010; Cunneen 2007). Factors contributing to the disadvantage of many Indigenous people include educational factors (such as poor levels of schooling); economic factors (such as low income and employment); physical environmental factors (such as inadequate housing due to overcrowded dwellings and sub-standard household facilities); and social factors (such as dispossession, dislocation and discrimination) (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Provision, 2011). These disadvantages intensify with the remoteness of a community and underlie specific health risk factors (such as alcohol and other drug use, smoking, nutrition, obesity and physical inactivity), and contribute to Indigenous over-representation within the criminal justice system (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Provision, 2011)(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006).

Drought and economic decline in rural Australia over the past two decades has meant many towns have lost population, services and employment opportunities. Many young people aged 15 to 24 years have moved from rural areas to urban centres (Barclay and Donnermeyer, 2007). The exception to this trend is the Indigenous population. The Indigenous population has a much younger age structure

than the non-Indigenous population; the median age for Indigenous people is 21 years in contrast to 37 years for the non-Indigenous population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Furthermore, 36% of Indigenous people were under 15 years of age compared with 19.3% of non-Indigenous people living at 30 June 2011. The relative youthfulness of Indigenous people is important because reported crime is more likely to involve many young Indigenous people living in towns with declining resource (service and recreational) infrastructure, and remote rather than urban in location (Allard, Chrzanowski, & Stewart, 2012).

Depending on their location and mobility, some Aboriginal people may spend time with extended family in both urban and rural locations, and frequently move between the two, but in general they remain in their community (Cunneen 2007). Geographic separation and, often, isolation, has only heightened perceptions that Aboriginal people, particularly Aboriginal youth, constitute a specific law and order problem. This in turn has led to 'over-policing' of Indigenous people in some areas (Barclay, Hogg, and Scott 2007).

Cultural studies have noted two dominant constructions of youth as a problem population: 'youth as trouble' and 'youth in trouble' (Spurgeon, Ferrier, Gunders & Graham, 2012). The idea of 'youth as trouble' emphasises a need to control young people, while the notion of 'youth in trouble' invokes a need to protect young people. Controlling youth has been the responsibility of the family, schools and the criminal justice system, while protecting them has again been the responsibility of the family with assistance from welfare agencies and health authorities. Typically young men have been identified as 'youth as trouble' while young women have been represented as 'youth in trouble' (Griffin, 2005). Images of 'youth as trouble' have dominated rural media coverage that has focused on street disorder, vandalism, violent crime, and drug and alcohol abuse among youth (Hogg & Carrington, 2006). Alcohol is the main substance that is abused by Aboriginal people, and is associated with violence and self-harm and abuse among Aboriginal people. The legality, ready availability, and low cost of alcohol encourages its over-consumption in comparison to illegal and more expensive drugs, such as marijuana. In general, illicit drug use is less prevalent within the Indigenous population than the non-Indigenous population. However, marijuana, colloquially known as ganja or gunja weed is of growing concern amongst Indigenous youth (Walker 2010).

Offences committed by youth are visible and of the kind that rural residents associate with dominant representations of the local crime problem: those equated to street crime and attacks on property. The victimisation of young people is much less likely to violate these boundaries, occurring as it does within private space, unnoticed, under-reported, and unrecorded (Barclay, Hogg & Scott 2007).

Many young people feel alienated in rural communities, being unsupported and undervalued. Fabiansson (2006) and Onyx et al. (2005) surveyed youth in the Broken Hill district and found that young people believed they were not heard or valued, issues of youth suicide and youth pregnancy were not addressed, and there were few entertainment or employment opportunities for them. The perceptions of rural young people can be strongly influenced by discrimination and oppressive mindsets, particularly in regard to gender, race and sexuality. Homophobia in rural communities has been linked with the high incidence of rural male youth suicide (Wyn, Stokes & Stafford, 1998; Gloz, 2004). Attitudes towards Indigenous people and ethnic minorities impact upon the aspirations of young people from these groups. A report by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission found Indigenous youth are repeatedly subject to subtle messages that because they are Indigenous they cannot achieve (HREOC, 1999:12). When such messages are combined with limited employment and education opportunities, inadequate housing and support, high arrest rates, poor health and substance abuse, Indigenous youth in rural areas face enormous obstacles that limit their expectations and aspirations for the future (Kenyon et al. 2001, cited in Alloway et al. 2004:54; Gloz, 2004).

The experience of alienation manifests itself in criminal activity that impacts on self and others; for example, self-harming behaviours (alcohol and drug abuse, youth suicide, especially among Indigenous youth) and criminal behaviours (malicious damage, break, enter and steal, motor vehicle theft, and offensive behaviour). Rural Australia has one of the highest rates of youth suicide in the world. Youth suicide rates are higher in remote and rural areas compared to metropolitan areas—remote: 24.1 per 100,000, rural: 8.8 per 100,000, and metropolitan: 6.4 per 100,000 (AIHW, 2003). In many cases, the suicide of a young adult living in a rural setting, or an unsuccessful attempt, has been attributed to drug and alcohol abuse. Baume and Clinton (1997, cited in Patterson & Pegg, 1999) suggested the predictive factors of rural youth suicide are personal vulnerability and structural factors, such as declining populations and restricted employment opportunities, the media representation of suicide, the greater availability of the means of lethal self-harm in rural communities, and problems in accessing and using mental health and drug and alcohol services.

Support for Aboriginal Youth

Recreation options that occupy young people in urban areas such as cinemas, major shopping centres and other sport and recreation facilities are limited in rural Australia. Even where youth in rural areas do have access to these, it often involves considerable travel and money. Consequently, social life in rural communities usually revolves around sport, pubs and barbeques (Gloz, 2004). Problems are particularly evident for young people who may not be interested in sporting activities and are too young to attend pubs and clubs. Rural communities cater to and support young

males to a greater extent than young females, especially through involvement with sporting clubs and organisations (Fabiansson, 2006). These problems of constraints on access to education, training, work and social life are exacerbated by the lack of public transport in rural communities (Alston & Kent, 2001).

Boredom results in many young people gathering in the streets on evenings and during weekends. The literature on youth crime has focused on the way in which young people use public spaces (that is parks and streets) and commercial spaces (that is shopping malls). Iso-Ahola & Crowley (1991) maintain that individuals who experience high levels of leisure boredom may engage in deviant activities such as substance use, crime and antisocial behaviour. Bone, Cheers & Hil's (1993) study of young people living in rural communities of northern Queensland found the lack of activities for youth led to a deep sense of boredom, alienation and marginalisation that manifested in excessive use of alcohol and/or drugs and strained relationships with local police. Barclay and Mawby's (2006) research found in one remote town of Western Australia the local tavern was the one and only source of entertainment, which meant underage drinking was a major problem. Studies have shown recreation can benefit the development of young people including their mental health and self-worth, as well as reduce alcohol and drug use and other risky behaviours (Patterson & Pegg, 1999; Gloz, 2004). Leisure activities are important because they provide adolescents with opportunities to explore and form their autonomy and identity, as well as meeting their social needs (Iso-Ahola & Crowley, 1991).

Blagg and Valuri (2004), in a study of night patrols, revealed the most common reason young people in small remote communities are on the streets at night is boredom, itself a product of under resourcing in remote and isolated communities. Some are there because the street is a safer place than home. In warmer months where temperatures can be extreme in 'outback' locations, evenings bring cool relief and opportunities to escape from hot dwellings. Children who are picked up by night patrols and taken to youth centres and provided with sporting and creative activities are content to be driven home at the end of the evening and stay home. Nutrition, often provided by youth centres, can be a major incentive for using patrol services. In providing recreational and nutritional support, patrols directly address the material causes of much criminal activity involving Indigenous youth.

The large distances, inaccessibility and low population thresholds in rural and remote areas make provision of even basic services extremely expensive (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Provision, 2011) (Rolley & Humphreys, 1993). Hospitals are understaffed and government offices and transport services are being removed or rationalised in many country areas (Joyce, 1995). This shrinks the employment base and encourages people to leave. The out-migration of families reduces demand on education, health, transport, retail and other services, thus

further eroding their viability in what can become a vicious spiral of decline (Joyce, 1995). As a consequence there has been a shortfall in specialist services in relation to drug and alcohol use, psychiatric and psychological assessment and counselling and life skills. There have also been problems in attracting and keeping sufficient numbers and appropriately skilled staff. Justice services tend to be concentrated in certain regional centres leading to problems in youth access. These problems can be exacerbated by a lack of networks of supportive and positive relationships between young people, their families, social institutions and community members to meet material, emotional, mental and physical, and spiritual needs of communities (Pope, 2006; Social Inclusion Unit, 2004). Across all these issues, however, refocusing of government investments as a result of, for example, the 'Closing the Gap' initiative (Higgins, 2010) have led to reported improvements in availability of resources such as healthcare (see, for example, AIHW, 2011)

Indigenous Youth and the Criminal Justice System

Aboriginal children grow up in socially-disadvantaged communities and soon realise their role within their community and can act out accordingly (see, for example, Calma, 2008; Wundersitz, 2010). There is regular engagement with police, the criminal justice system and corrections. As Gillian Cowlshaw (1998) explained, criminality in these communities is not a quality of individuals, but a social condition involving normality and identity.

Criminal offending (at least as measured by criminal court appearances) falls in late youth or early adulthood. Such bald statistics can be misleading. Juvenile offending is for a number of reasons more visible. Adult authorities are also more sensitised to the deviations of youth because it is seen as a transitional phase in the life cycle: a phase in which informal (parental, educational and other) mechanisms of governance of the young are relaxed, although the self-controls associated with mature adulthood are not yet formed (Barclay, Hogg & Scott, 2007).

Indigenous people comprise less than 2.5 per cent of the total Australian population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012) yet they account for over a quarter (28%) of young people in juvenile detention and more than one-quarter (26%) of the total prison population (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2009). Indigenous youth (aged 10 to 16 years in Queensland and 10 to 17 years in other jurisdictions) are over-represented at every level of the criminal justice system, particularly in detention centres where they are 24 times as likely to be detained than non-Indigenous juveniles (Richards et al, 2011). They are also 15 times more likely to be under supervision and 14 times more likely to be under community-based supervision; although this over-representation has fallen from the 2007-08 level, where Aboriginal youths were 28 times more likely to be in detention. Nevertheless 39 per cent of juveniles within community-based supervision or in detention were

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Indigenous, even though indigenous young people make up only about 5 per cent of the total youth population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2012).

A recent report (AIHW 2012) found on an average night in the June quarter 2012, Indigenous young people aged 10-17 were 31 times as likely as non-Indigenous people to be in detention, up from 27 times in the June quarter 2008. The report also showed the level of Indigenous over-representation increased in un-sentenced detention over the four year period (from 24 to 31 times), but decreased slightly in sentenced detention (32 to 30 times).

Richards et al (2011) listed several explanations for this over-representation identified in the literature, including:

- lack of access or disparate access to diversionary programs (Allard et al. 2010; Cunneen 2008; Snowball 2008);
- systemic discrimination against Indigenous juveniles (e.g. police bias against Indigenous juveniles) (Cunneen 2008; Kenny & Lennings 2007);
- inadequate resourcing of Aboriginal legal services (Cunneen & Schwartz 2008);
- genuinely higher levels of offending by Indigenous juveniles (Kenny & Lennings 2007; Weatherburn et al. 2003; Richards et al 2011).

As the greater proportion of appearances by Indigenous people before courts involves children, Indigenous adults receive harsher sentences due to their prior convictions. Chen et al.'s (2005) study into the likelihood of juvenile offenders re-offending as either juveniles or as adults found that nine out of ten Indigenous youths who appeared in a children's court went on to appear in an adult court within eight years. Of these children, 36 per cent received a prison sentence later in life. The dramatically higher rates of criminalisation and police intervention of Aboriginal people compared to non-Aboriginal people reinforce their exclusion from social and economic participation (Cunneen 2001; Ferrante, et al., 2004).

Aboriginal youth are more likely to have their first contact with the criminal justice system at a young age, to have multiple contacts, and multiple episodes of supervision (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2012; Carrington & Pereira 2009; Snowball 2008). The types of offences Indigenous youth most commonly commit include property crimes such as burglary, break and enter and other forms of theft, and public order and violence-related offences (Carrington & Pereira 2009; Cunneen & White 2007). Some research (Cunneen & White 2007) has maintained Aboriginal youth tend to be charged with more serious types of offences than non-Indigenous young people, such as more serious forms of property crime.

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The causes of youth crime in rural areas reflect those in urban areas: socio-economic stress, family breakdown, quality of parent/child relationships, abuse and neglect, negative experiences at school, peer pressure, and drug and alcohol abuse. Gender and Indigenous status interact with these factors to produce a more persistent involvement of young men and Indigenous Australians in criminal activity and the justice system (Barclay et al 2007).

Explanations for Indigenous victimisation and offending can be divided into socio-structural and behavioural categories, which are often interrelated. In terms of socio-structural factors, the legacies of colonisation, dispossession and child removal policies, such as psychological distress and social disorganisation, heighten the risk of criminalization and victimisation. Other risk factors include low educational achievement, unemployment, living in a crowded household, financial stress, living in an area with perceived community problems, and being a member of the 'stolen generation' (those children who were taken from their families under previous protectionist policies). Policies of child removal and institutionalisation have severely damaged the parenting capacity of many Indigenous people. Many parents are further incapacitated by their poor health, substance abuse and imprisonment, and poor parenting is a significant risk factor for juvenile offending (Weatherburn, Snowball & Hunter 2006).

Of great concern is the identification of an intergenerational cycle of abuse and violence. Many forms of interpersonal violence, especially in domestic or family spaces, are common in rural settings, yet are seriously under-reported and shrouded in silence and ambivalence (WESNET 2000; Hogg & Carrington, 2006). Young people are often the secondary, if not the primary, victims of such violence. Ironically the measures, such as de facto curfews, that are sought to control the visible presence of young people on the streets may increase their vulnerability to such victimisation. Furthermore, Indigenous children who frequently witness or experience violence, which is normalised, are more likely themselves to use violence (Wundersitz, 2010).

Ogilvie and Van Zyl (2001), studying Indigenous juvenile offenders from regional and remote communities in the Northern Territory, found imprisonment and detention, rather than being a deterrent, was in fact a rite of passage for many of the young offenders, and for some, a means to construct an identity. Young offenders may refer to jail as their second home, with the offer of a more stable life than their own communities. Young people living in communities with few opportunities for employment or other meaningful social engagement were less likely to experience negative consequences as a result of imprisonment, such as shame, peer rejection or reduced employment prospects (which were negligible to begin with). Some regarded detention as a chance for new experiences such as a plane ride, more interesting activities and the opportunity to spend time with friends who preceded them.

Many offences, such as theft and vandalism, are committed in groups, simply to break the monotony of what is experienced as a highly-circumscribed existence. Incarceration removes young men from what should be productive work and family roles, teaches young offenders criminal skills, distorts role models for young people growing-up where it is normal to have large numbers of people in prison, and each contact with the criminal justice system further reduces the employability of individuals (Barclay, Hogg & Scott 2007).

Small populations and high levels of mutual recognition in rural communities also mean the activities of young people are more visible, and more likely to be policed. As Meek (2006) observed, the high visibility of young people in rural communities has resulted in their marginalisation and stigmatisation. Yet, at the same time, until recently, rural and remote youth have tended to be invisible in terms of research, service delivery and policy (Allard, et al., 2012).

Community safety

The use of public space within town centres by young people has been accompanied by efforts to make them invisible through the coercive actions of police and private security companies to move them on (B. Smith & Reside, 2011). Other strategies include the use of closed circuit television to monitor central business districts and youth curfews. For young people, this is often seen as persecution, which breeds resentment and leads to retaliatory behaviour. Local businesses are often the major targets for street crime, and groups of idle youth with little or no spending power are commonly perceived as a threat to trade, tourism and community values (Barclay, Hogg & Scott, 2007).

Community safety is a term that is used to describe both statistically measured threats to safety or risk of crime, and community perceptions of safety including perceptions of risk of victimisation. In the second sense, perceptions of safety will vary between population cohorts within communities (for example, young, elderly, female, male, by family affiliation), and this further complicates the meaning of the term. For the purposes of this report, both meanings will be employed, differentiated as “objective measures of community safety” and “subjective measures of community safety”.

Objective measures of community safety, as used by the Police, measure community safety primarily statistically, in terms of rates per capita (rather than rate per area, e.g. LGA) of crime for selected categories of offences (for example, public order, assaults, burglary, break and enter, and vehicle thefts). Community safety is deemed to have been improved when offending rates for these categories of crime decline. An example of this approach is found in ‘Improving the Quality of Life of Communities’ (ICPC 2010 p1] Sometimes these assessments are based upon reported crime (used as a proxy for all crime). Sometimes other research is

conducted to estimate the ratio of reported to unreported crime for different categories of offence in particular communities. It is essential in this case to use per capita crime rates rather than absolute crime numbers. The benefit of 'objective' approaches to community safety is that it allows risk of crime in different neighbourhoods to be compared, and facilitates judgements about where crime prevention efforts ought to be focussed (which neighbourhoods, which types of crime).

Subjective assessments of community safety assess community safety qualitatively in terms of people's perception of safety (this may include both crime and public order). Community safety is deemed to have been improved when people living in a particular area, working in an area or visiting an area for entertainment report that they have less fear of crime or feel safer. Examples of this approach include Pope (2006), Whitzman and Zhang (2006), Anderson and Wild (2007), Grossman and Sharples (2010), Higgins (2010), International Centre for Prevention of Crime (2010), Willis, (2010), Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011), and Ekblom (2011). Subjective approaches recognise that fear of crime is not always directly related to risk of victimisation. For example, older people generally, and women of all ages, have a greater fear of assaults in public places than young men, but young men are most likely to be victims of assaults (evident in crime statistics). However, part of this difference is explicable, precisely because people who fear assault modify their own actions to reduce their likelihood of victimisation (avoiding certain places, not being alone); likewise, people who fear burglary are more likely to adopt some form of deterrence (security screens, burglar alarms, dogs, extra locks, not leaving the house unattended). Thus, subjective perceptions of community safety are important to understanding both how people perceive their need to actively protect themselves from crime (which crimes, what measures) in order to feel safer in their communities, whether they perceive the measures they take result in undue restriction on their daily activities, and whether they consider that they are able to reduce their perceived risk to an acceptable level, for them to feel safe.

Formal Policing in Indigenous communities

The over-representation of Indigenous people in the criminal justice system and its effects on the Indigenous population has been a challenge for policy makers and a source of advocacy and concern for many, particularly Aboriginal people themselves. The past two decades have seen strenuous efforts by Indigenous groups, the courts, law reform bodies and the police to address these problems (AIHW, 2012; Allard, et al., 2012; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2010; Ministry of Justice, 2010; n.a., 2012; Richards, 2011a; N. Smith & Weatherburn, 2012; Willis, 2010; Cunneen, 2007).

Social disadvantage and prejudice lead to structurally discriminatory law enforcement against Indigenous people (Jobes 2003; O'Connor and Gray 1989). To avoid disrupting the dominant normative system, some officers practice reactive policing, which may involve prejudice, abuse of powers and cultural insensitivity. Over-policing, whether in rural or urban communities, has resulted in Indigenous persons feeling harassed by, and resentful about, police (Scott and Jobes 2007). Conventional models of policing based on an adversarial approach isolate police from community and, as such, hinder crime control efforts. Proactive policing, as opposed to reactive policing, is favoured in crime prevention models. Community policing, for example, seeks to re-thread police back into the fabric of community and bring community expertise and commitment to the fore (Ryan et al. 2006).

The challenge for police is to try to assimilate the traditional patterns of behaviour of local Indigenous people into the conventional concepts and procedures of criminal law. The process is confounded by communication and language barriers, the role of kinship, Indigenous customary law, multi-tribal and inter-clan conflicts, substance abuse and the historical legacy of social discrimination and dispossession (Hogg and Carrington 2006). For example, open air spaces within towns are often places where Indigenous people congregate and drink, which conflicts with the commercial and service functions of a community. This results in high levels of policing, non-comparable with non-Indigenous populations, and high arrest rates for minor offences, such as bad language (Hogg and Carrington 2006).

The shift from conventional models of policing can be traced back to a Royal Commission into Indigenous Deaths in Custody (1987). Since this inquiry, police agencies, in partnership with their state governments, have made significant changes to reduce the disadvantage experienced by Indigenous people within the criminal justice system. New programs include: the adoption of community policing; diversionary programs; cross cultural training and education for police officers; a commitment to improve custodial health and safety; and greater Indigenous autonomy concerning justice issues. There has also been growth in grass roots Indigenous responses to crime, such as holistic anti-violence programs, community justice groups, Indigenous courts, and night patrols. More Indigenous staff have been employed in courts and prisons and alternative forms of community-based sentencing have been introduced (Cunneen 2007; Mazerole 2003). In NSW, Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers (ACLOs), for example, provide a link between the police and Indigenous communities. These NSW liaison officers are unsworn employees, without police powers such as arrest, search or use of force. In contrast, in Western Australia and other states, the ACLO role is undertaken by fully sworn in Police officers. In NSW, the ACLOs quintessentially represent community policing. Their roles vary across jurisdictions, but their core functions are similar and include (NSW Police, 2011):

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- building good communication and relations between police and Indigenous communities;
- resolving disputes between police and Indigenous people;
- improving understanding within communities about the role of police and encouraging Indigenous people to discuss crime problems with police;
- helping police and Indigenous communities work together on crime prevention solutions;
- identifying local crime problems and other issues impacting on police relations with the community; and
- Liaison officers work closely with Indigenous offenders during interviews and while in custody, as well as victims and their families. In some cases, they advise Indigenous people on basic legal issues and justice processes and may contribute to government policy development.

One response to the difficulties of policing rural areas has been to limit the periods in which officers are assigned to racially divided and under-resourced (usually isolated) towns. In NSW, officers are rotated every two years. While such a system serves a valuable function in ensuring such areas are adequately resourced and limits the possibility that a police culture may develop which is antagonistic to the local Indigenous community, officers lack the time to embed themselves in the local community. Studies of policing indicate that police officers living in rural areas often develop a 'localistic' as opposed to 'legalistic' approach to policing which is based upon the likelihood that such officers will both reside and embed themselves in the communities they service. Having officers 'move on' after a limited period of time may impact upon their ability to build trust and rapport with local populations (Scott and Jobes, 2007).

As communities are not homogeneous, and neither are the structure of night patrols, reviews of the way night patrols operate throughout Australia reveal that relationships between police and night patrol staff also vary greatly (see Blagg, 2003)(Auditor-General, 2011; Beacroft, et al., 2011; Blagg, 2007; Blagg & Valuri, 2003; n.a., 2012; Taylor-Walker, 2010). In many places, night patrols provide a strong support for police, particularly in providing intelligence. Police support patrols and rely on them whenever possible for information and negotiation in situations involving Indigenous victims and offenders. In Western Australia, the Police (through the Police Juvenile Aid Group team) perform the central function of the largest night patrol. Interestingly, however, the activities and outcomes of this patrol (Northbridge Strategy) depend crucially on the knowledge and expertise of the Aboriginal night patrol operated by Nyoongar Patrol Services Inc. In some communities, night patrol staff have reported police being uncooperative, and problems may arise through personality clashes between individual officers and patrol staff or more deep-seated historical tensions which have produced a lack of

trust between Indigenous communities and police (Taylor-Walker, 2010; Walker & Forrester, 2002). A lack of communication may result in police moving-on young people from patrol collection points, which may in turn place them at greater risk of criminal victimization (interview data).

Community Policing

Community policing engages a community in broader responsibility for social development and social sanctions, as well as supporting the adoption of harm minimization strategies and mechanisms. With this model, the role of the community is to provide expert knowledge and to mobilize previously untapped cultural and community resources to develop situational and culturally appropriate responses that will engender change in the community and individuals. There is also adjustment in the role of government from that of expert to that of facilitator and enabler. The objective here is to increase capacity of local communities to self-manage program elements (Ryan et al., 2006).

This contrasts with the origins of Australian Night Patrols in the 1980s and 1990s, which were primarily based on a community development model (Mosey, 1994, 2009; Taylor-Walker, 2010). The latter aligns with the aims, objectives and intended outcomes of recent funding of night patrols by Commonwealth AGD and State Attorneys-General primarily to achieve community development improvements that then provide the basis for crime reduction and improved perceptions of community safety. The adoption of classic 'community policing' models (as in the UK model) as a basis for night patrols would appear to potentially conflict with the current Commonwealth AGD aims of reducing Indigenous involvement in the legal system using a multi-threaded community development approach.

The broader international focus of community policing is on crime prevention, rather than detection. Primary crime prevention strategies that seek to prevent crime before it begins are seen as critical in breaking the cycle of crime and violence prior to intervention (NCP, 1999). Crime prevention has an emphasis on wider problems, as opposed to just crime; has a focus on informal social control and how this connects with formal social control; looks at implementation of policy through decentralized and local arrangements; often delivers services through partnerships, which draw together a variety of stakeholders; seeks holistic solutions, in a problem oriented manner; and seeks harm reduction or pan-hazard crime prevention initiatives which move beyond a focus on individual offences (NCP, 1999)(Blagg 2003; Richards, Rosevear & Gilbert 2011).

The ability of people within a community to intervene for the common good to maintain social order depends upon conditions of mutual trust and solidarity amongst residents or 'collective efficacy' (Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls 1997). Collective efficacy is embedded in structural contexts and therefore it can be eroded

by social change, such as residential instability, ethnic diversity, and social and economic disadvantage. Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls (1997) maintain that the differential ability of communities to maintain effective informal social controls is a major source of variation in crime.

Aboriginal night patrol managers claim improvement in quality of life and service delivery for Aboriginal people are marked and immediate when the mix of traditional authority and Police, courts, government and funding agencies is right, or when 'We got both laws behind us' (Ron McNamara of Laramba Night Patrol in Walker & Forrester, 2002). Community policing aims to weaken the state's monopoly in policing (Attorney-General's Department, 2011). Mainstream justice systems have impacted negatively on Indigenous community strength and cohesion. The historical experience of contact with mission and reserve administrations and mainstream legal practice disrupted customary laws and norms. Still, authority of Elders and culturally embedded practices can be used to make a difference to justice outcomes and community led solutions for self-growth and community healing. Community justice requires a shift from an adversarial offender-centric approach to acknowledging offending as a community issue requiring a collective response. Problem solving and community orientation underpin this model. Community justice intervention programs have three elements: restorative justice; prevention and early intervention and community strengthening; self-determination and engagement (Ryan et al. 2006).

Community justice may be placed within a broader restorative justice framework. The rationale for restorative justice varies among Australian jurisdictions, but in general seeks to repair harm caused by crime, actively involve offenders, victims and communities in the criminal justice process, and provide a constructive intervention for juvenile offending (Richards, Rosevear & Gilbert, 2011).

There is a need to attend to social justice needs of Indigenous peoples. Mainstream interventions have failed because they are not responsive to the needs and aspirations of Indigenous people. Mainstream justice programs are based on an adversarial approach, linear thinking, with strict adherence to assigned methods, and regimented implementation inattentive to local context (Ryan et al. 2006).

Community and Night Patrols and Youth Work

There are similarities between the role proposed for Community and Night patrols with children and young people and approaches developed in some forms of outreach and detached youth work. These similarities include: purpose, role, values and methods.

The literature on detached youth work is not extensive because detached youth work developed as a practice learned by experience rather than a formally taught

method of work. The literature is most developed in the UK and the US. In the UK, detached youth work developed to make contact with young people who did not voluntarily have contact with other youth provision, especially those who socialised on the streets (British Ministry of Education, 1960). In the 1960's, they were referred to as 'unclubbable'; now they are referred to as 'hard-to-reach'. There was concern that this group of young people, who were marginalised and potentially alienated from society, had not achieved their potential, were engaged in unwholesome activities, and were a threat to themselves and to others. The young people in this situation were variously characterised as a group who distrusted all forms of authority; had left school early without achieving their potential; had high social and welfare support needs; were in physical or moral danger; or were a nuisance and a threat to community well-being and safety. These young people were not attracted to 'mainstream' youth provision such as Scouts, Guides, and youth clubs, and detached (and outreach) projects were established to try to establish contact with them, to get to know them and to win their trust 'on the streets' where they socialised. Once trust had been achieved, flexible programs could be developed that would begin with understanding how young people perceived their own needs and interests. Through these programs, flexible support could be offered, to provide informal education opportunities, to link them to other services, to help young people through crises, to mediate between young people and institutions in their lives, to provide information and advice, or to build a bridge between these groups of young people and other services and opportunities to which they had no previous access. The intentions of these programs were to address intergenerational disadvantage, to help these groups of young people reach their true potential and to offer support that would enable young people to feel valued.

Methods developed in detached youth work have many parallels with methods developed independently by Community and Night patrol workers: both originated in the Community Development tradition and there is strong evidence of this in the literature of both. Like Community and night patrols, many youth projects were initially instigated by volunteers and were community managed. Like Community and Night patrols, many of these initiatives were hard to sustain without external funding and external guidance and training in the long-term. This was especially so when the voluntary youth workers were working in communities where there were entrenched and challenging social problems.

There are also similarities between the methods of Community and Night patrols and those used in detached and outreach youth work. Youth workers work holistically with young people to support their personal and social development, and do this through the relationship they form with young people. Youth worker training has been developed at both VET and HE and has the potential to contribute positively to skill development of Community and Night Patrol staff.

Previous studies of Community and Night Patrols in Australia

Much early writing on night patrols has focused on Western Australia and the Northern Territory and the impact of patrols on reducing public drunkenness and violence (AIC, 2004; Attorney-General, 2008a, 2008b; Auditor-General, 2011; Beacroft, et al., 2011; Blagg, 2003; Blagg, 2007; Blagg & Valuri, 2004; Carpenter, 2006; Curtis, 1992 revised 2003; Higgins, 1997; IPSDB, 2008; Koch, 2003; Mosey, 1994; n.a., 2011, 2012; NSW Attorney-General's Department, 2005; Office of Crime Prevention, 2004, 2006a; Putt, 2011; Taylor-Walker, 2010; Walker & Forrester, 2002). A specific focus was upon relations between patrols and sobering-up shelters and diversion from detention in police custody. Work in NSW in the early 2000s evaluated the work of street beat programs from crime prevention and human rights perspectives (Blagg, 2003). However, mainstream police studies ignored the issue, as has critical work on private policing in Australia (Blagg, 2003: 14).

Subsequently there have been several comprehensive reviews of community and night patrols in Australia, (Mosey, 1994; Taylor-Walker, 2010; Walker & Forrester, 2002)(see, for example, Blagg, 2003; Australian Institute of Criminology, 2004; Blagg and Valuri, 2004; Segrave and Ratcliffe, 2004; Office of Crime Prevention, 2006; Blagg, 2007; Attorney-General, 2008; Walker, 2008; Standing Committee of Attorney's-General Working Group on Indigenous Justice, 2010; Auditor-General, 2011; Beacroft, Richards, Adrevski & Rosevear, 2011; Richards, Rosevear and Gilbert, 2011; n.a. 2012). These accounts provide detailed histories and, in some cases, evaluation of current and previous community and night patrol services.

Blagg and Valuri (2004) reviewed over 100 self-policing initiatives throughout Australia during 2001-2002. They found no universal model for night patrols, yet common to night patrols was a commitment to working through consensus and intervention in culturally appropriate ways for diversion from hazards and conflicts. Requirements for night patrols varied widely according to differences in remoteness; population size; size of client base; social and economic pressures; and availability of related community services. Effectiveness in achieving safety outcomes for the community depended on the cultural authority of patrollers and the targeting of community safety issues (Auditor-General, 2011).

In 2003, Blagg (2003) provided a comprehensive review of patrols Australia-wide and found that most patrols deal mainly with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, although a sizable proportion also service non-Indigenous people in NSW, QLD and SA. Of these schemes 58% focus on men and 55% focus on women. Youth (13-18) and young adults (18-25) were the main target groups. In NSW the focus has been on all ages, and recently funding has prioritised night patrol work with Aboriginal Youth, reflecting concern with at risk youth issues in this state. Only 33%

of patrols focused on children under twelve years of age and this was mostly in NSW, QLD and WA. The NT has the highest number of patrols targeting the over-26 age group. On a busy night patrols deal with 50 or more people, although average numbers are less than 40. The smallest numbers reflect the size of remote and isolated communities. SA and WA have the highest numbers of clients on a busy night. Police and patrols generally work in partnership. Sometimes there are delays in the responsiveness of both due to communication issues and their capacity to respond due to the shortages of police in some areas and concern that patrols cannot run a full-time service. Patrols are seen to be less responsive than private security or police to calls from businesses. SA patrols are perceived to be more responsive to community calls, but NSW patrols less so. Two main barriers to effectiveness were funding and lack of community support and involvement.

Strengths of night patrols

The 1986 NSW Law Reform Commission of Australia's review of customary law noted that Aboriginal people want a police presence and a voice on how policing is carried out. This review argued that self-policing provided flexibility to Indigenous communities in how 'trouble-makers' are dealt with, while taking pressure off limited police resources (Law Reform Commission, 1986). Community policing has been found to be sensitive to the social and welfare needs of specific groups in the community. In Australia, it uses 'local Aboriginal knowledge' to create new regulatory networks (Ryan et al, 2006; Taylor-Walker, 2010). Night patrols have produced enhanced public perceptions of safety and minimized harms associated with alcohol misuse in Northern Australia (Ryan et al., 2006).

To be effective, community policing initiatives for Indigenous communities need to incorporate different strategies, be community driven, be culturally appropriate, and involve significant others, such as family members and community Elders (Auditor-General, 2011; Memmott et al 2006; Mosey, 1994; Taylor-Walker, 2010). Rural and remote Indigenous communities are diverse and unlike other Australian communities, particularly in terms of the mixes of families, relationships, responsibilities and territories, therefore night patrol memberships and activities must be designed for the specific circumstances of each community (Taylor-Walker, 2010). Traditional and cultural value systems must be considered when planning activities. Programs have little chance of being effective if they are imposed upon an Indigenous community by external organisations (Mosey, 1994; Taylor-Walker, 2010). Programs are more likely to succeed when they adopt a pro-active harm reduction approach including commitments to broader community objectives such as education, case management, building community capacity, liaison with agencies, and referral and coordination with community services and police. It is important patrols are not placed in a law enforcement role; patrols are not para-police (Taylor-

Walker, 2010). Rather than a night watchman role, patrols have potential as facilitators of services (Auditor-General, 2011).

In New South Wales, the recent focus of SAY night patrols has been on young people and supporting them to move from 'at risk' to 'safer' situations (Aboriginal Programs Unit, 2010; AIHN, 2012; NSW Government, 2012). Removing young people from town streets has a number of effects (Blagg and Valuri, 2004). All SAY night patrol initiatives in NSW claimed reduction in crime during their first few years of operation. Programs were also said to have wide community support in trying to deal with positive services to young people. The presence of Street Beat was said by the Aboriginal Justice Council to provide a buffer between police and youth. However, in Moree the service was seen as problematic, given a history of racial conflict and public demand for extreme law and order initiatives directed against young people in that community (Blagg & Valuri, 2003). In Moree, there were less resources for advocacy and support of young people and the service was directed almost solely at young Indigenous people who, if they did not cooperate, would be referred to police. It was also reported, during the early years of operation, that the Street Beat program only serviced a sub-section of the Indigenous community and offered no genuine and accessible youth services, as was the case in Ballina. In 1999, the Redfern Street Beat program was evaluated as having provided a safe transport outreach program to young people from the South Sydney area, operating at night when few other services were working. The program also provided youth with information and referral. It was also noted that the outreach and diversionary role of the program could be improved by building better relations with police (Blagg, 2003).

Weaknesses of night patrols

A number of weaknesses of night patrols have been identified by previous evaluations of service provision. These issues are not specific to night patrol services, but might also be considered as ongoing problems affecting a range of services directed to address Indigenous disadvantage. For example, a recent major report by the NSW Ombudsman into Aboriginal disadvantage concluded crucial areas that need to be addressed in service delivery include:

- Establishing strong leadership and governance to drive ground level change and meaningful community participation;
- Developing a whole-of-government strategy to address Aboriginal disadvantage;
- Creation of more efficient and effective service sector through a collective approach to decision making and local service planning;
- Adopting innovative approaches to respond to critical areas, such as vulnerable children and adolescents; and

- Establish greater transparency and accountability of services through a mechanism of independent scrutiny.

These issues are highlighted in the literature on night patrol service delivery.

Co-option

Night patrols have been criticised on a broader level for problems such as ‘net-widening’, a process by which the client reach of the criminal justice system is extended by increasing the overall proportion of the population subject to some form of social control (Ryan et al, 2006). This is said to arise from the programs becoming too closely linked with formal systems of intervention and the problems encountered as a result of endemic funding shortages. There is danger in Indigenous community initiatives being co-opted in new security networks, into meeting needs of non-Indigenous interests or being colonized by powerful agencies of business and government. Here ‘local Aboriginal knowledge’ is used to create new regulatory networks, as has been seen with some Indigenous dispute resolution programs that have been appropriated by powerful state agencies such as the police (Nolan, 1995). Their position at the bottom of the service provision chain makes patrols vulnerable to co-option. Partnerships have been questioned where community organizations are seen as junior partners, and information tends to flow one-way (upward) rather than being shared. Some key decisions have even been made away from community forums; often perceived to be talking shops or window dressing (Blagg, 2003:10). An enforcement model sees the role of patrols as removing the ‘Aboriginal problem’. Here Indigenous agency is used to achieve traditional policing objectives of cleansing public space of Indigenous people.

One size fits all - problems with the NT model

Many initiatives have failed to improve Indigenous communities in meaningful and effective ways. When priorities have been determined from a central perspective there is limited consultation and engagement with communities and consideration of the individual community’s circumstances. In some cases, in the NT, flexibility of night patrol provision was restricted because a standardised service delivery approach did not align with community needs and/or expectations. The Commonwealth AGD has provided guidance on minimum standards for night patrol operations and service providers are required to determine details of operations through consultation with the community. There are three problems with this. The first is that arrangements for management of service providers are situated at a regional administration level, rather than at community level; the second is that this compromises the ability of Aboriginal Patrollers to use traditional law and culture to advantage; and the third is it has resulted in constraints to the scope of use of resources such as vehicles (Taylor-Walker, 2010). There is a need to be more responsive to community circumstances (Auditor-General, 2011). A one-size-fits-all

approach limits flexibility to adapt night patrols to circumstances of individual communities and maintain ownership of the service. Thus adopting a model that is more tailored to individual community circumstances is recommended.

In Western Australia, flexibility is gained by operating Aboriginal community and night patrol services as a private company (Nyoongar Patrol Services Inc.) operating independently of government patrol services. This then enables the Nyoongar Patrol Services' Aboriginal community and night patrols to operate to support Aboriginal people directly, and to flexibly liaise with and form partnerships on their own terms with WA Police and other government and non-government organisations and businesses (NPS, 2011).

In NSW, the need for flexibility is supported by a recent NSW Ombudsman's Report (2011) into Aboriginal Disadvantage, which has argued that in creating more effective governance structures there can never be a 'one size fits all' solution. Rather there needs to be: rationalisation and reduction of the number and complexity of reference groups, consultative bodies and working parties in communities, for support and inclusivity; recognition that a single forum cannot represent all views in a divided community, so formal consultations need to be supplemented with informal forums; and training and mentoring to broaden the knowledge and skills base of members and ensure involvement.

Communal politics

Issues associated with depth and breadth of community involvement also exist. Sometimes closeness to members through kinship and guardianship lead to a coercive or heavy-handed approach and conflict between patrollers and clients (Walker 2010). Similarly, problems can arise where a project has been developed by a small minority of community members in isolation and without input or support from the broader community. Unless the community as a whole develops the solution, they will not take ownership of the project nor maintain a commitment to ensure it succeeds. If community ownership is a goal, then projects should be planned by people who have the trust of the community, have an intimate knowledge of social issues in the community, have an understanding of strategies that may be successful, and have an ability to review and adjust programs to ensure they retain community support and become effective from the perspective of the funding body.

Projects that are community owned and effective in one Indigenous community context are more likely to be adopted by other like-communities. Community consultation is therefore very important at all stages of the project, but this process can be time consuming and requires flexibility. The process can be confounded by local politics; the rules pertaining to kinship, Indigenous customary law, and multi-tribal and inter-clan conflicts (Memmott, Chambers, Go-sam & Johnson, 2006).

Strategies for undertaking this successfully have been documented by Mosey and others (Taylor-Walker, 2010; Walker & Forrester, 2002)

A recent NSW Ombudsman's Report (2011) into Aboriginal Disadvantage has argued the key to effective community development is a focus on capacity building and the creation of social capital at a community level. Community activism requires genuine participation and leadership from community members. Often the most disadvantaged and socially disorganized communities struggle to create and sustain the leadership required to pressure government agencies and services to take effective action. In divided communities it can be difficult for agencies to establish who the Aboriginal people are and with whom they should be partnering (Achterstraat, 2011). Efficient and integrated consultation processes may be impeded by multiple layers of governance.

The same NSW Ombudsman's report noted that continued disadvantage does not reflect a failure by successive governments to allocate funding; observing that in 2008-2009 the NSW government spent \$2.65 billion delivering services to Aboriginal people, including \$240 million for Aboriginal Specific services. While Aboriginal people accounted for 2.3% of the state's population, this expenditure accounted for 5% of the government's overall expenditure on service delivery. An issue is waste and the agency-centric nature of many programs: services fail to be integrated on the ground and often fail to reach those who need them (Achterstraat, 2011). There exists a 'fragmented' approach in planning, funding and delivery of services to Aboriginal communities. The report concluded the (NSW) government needs to adopt a very different way of doing business with Aboriginal communities, translating rhetoric about partnership into genuine involvement in decision making and problem solving. This echoes the NSW Auditor-General's audit of the multi-agency 'Two Ways Together – NSW Aboriginal Affairs Plan' followed in NSW until recently (Achterstraat, 2011)

A major issue in Indigenous service delivery in NSW is fractured, poorly planned, weakly integrated and poorly executed responses of government and non-government agencies, which help reinforce existing schisms and ill-informed or flawed decision making. Agencies can actually undermine the capacity of communities to advocate on priority issues by not engaging with communities or creating their own community committees or governance structures which by-pass existing or weak decision-making and consultation processes (Achterstraat, 2011)(NSW Ombudsman 2011).

The literature indicates there are some characteristic difficulties in coordinating patrols across Australia with other services and encouraging patrol clients to access support through these services. A coordinated approach to service delivery at a community level needs the establishment of partnerships with community related

support services; otherwise, fragmented service delivery and the failure to achieve objectives result. The different times of operation and different understandings of roles and responsibilities makes establishing relationships with other service providers difficult. The DAGJ has recently established an MOU with services and police which could be replicated at the level of other services (Attorney-General's Department, 2011).

Resourcing

For community and night patrol service organisation, the annual competitive grant process for program funding creates additional workload and is at odds with them achieving long term planning objectives (Taylor-Walker, 2010). There is a need to streamline funding arrangements associated with an annual cycle and recruiting and retaining local Indigenous people is difficult (Auditor-General, 2011). The training and support needs of patrollers vary as there is a wide variety of experience and qualifications (Pratt et al. 2011) and there is evidence that appropriate training of night patrol staff is badly compromised by the actions of institutional training providers, at least in remote communities (Taylor-Walker, 2010). Blagg (2003) showed that programs often rely on limited community interest for support. There can be a high burnout rate and turnover of patrollers. Some communities appear to have now exhausted their pool of volunteers. Patrols often develop without involvement of residents at program design stage. Often citizens are unaware of program goals and how they might become involved.

In NSW, two recent reports, one into Aboriginal disadvantage and the Two Ways Together Aboriginal Affairs Plan, noted there also needs to be adequate mechanisms for holding agencies to account for their responsibilities (Achterstraat, 2011; NSW Ombudsman 2011). There is a need to collect robust and meaningful program performance information required for adequate assessments (Beacroft, et al., 2011; Morgan & Homel, 2011). It is difficult to measure performance, particularly in prevention, when success is judged by the absence of undesirable events such as arrest or incarceration. There are gaps in current data collection, collation and analysis that affect the ability of government agencies to make an overall assessment of the programs' performance (Beacroft, et al., 2011; Auditor-General, 2011).

Summary and Conclusions

The philosophy of successful night patrols seems to have been primarily derived from community development, and early intervention approaches to problem solving and crime prevention. Alongside improving community conditions and reducing crime, one of the rationales for night patrols in NSW has been to move at risk populations, in terms of both criminal offending and criminal victimisation, from

public spaces or places of danger to safe places. Other core functions of night patrols have included the provision of basic services, such as transportation, to prevent harmful or anti-social forms of behaviour. Night patrols can be distinguished from private security and formal policing operations in that they are typically 'community based' operations and in some cases 'community owned' or 'community-controlled'. Typically, night patrol patrollers function primarily through cooperation and consent, rather than coercion.

Night patrols in Australia have been largely used to address Indigenous social disadvantage, and especially to help reduce the high levels of exposure young Indigenous people have with the criminal justice system, both as offenders and victims. Night patrols can be valuable resources in regional and/or isolated settings where there are a lack of social and cultural resources to address alienation and disadvantage experienced by young people.

Summary of potential strengths of night patrols include:

- A reduction in crime rates, especially in terms of 'minor' offences, by diverting children and young people from hazards and conflict;
- Enhanced community safety;
- Increased access to diversionary programs, outside of the formal criminal justice system, and maintaining community 'ownership' of night patrols;
- Broad community awareness of the night patrols' services;
- Enhanced perceptions of public safety;
- Enhanced safety of young at-risk populations and/or those who cannot access mainstream services;
- Building capacity and social capital at a local level through the enhancement of Indigenous leadership, community management/governance and self-determination;
- Encouragement of partnership and cultural understanding between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people;
- Minimisation of harms associated with alcohol and drug use;
- Patrols need to adopt to specific community experiences, varying widely according to location, population size, client base, availability of related services, and other social and economic indicators of community well-being;
- A coordinated and/or integrated approach to service delivery at a community level through partnerships with related community support services;
- A focus on both short term and long term problem solving through a crime prevention focus and integrated strategy for community safety;
- Provision of accurate, timely information and referral of children and young people to other services;

Appendix 2: Literature Review Aboriginal night patrols in Australia: origins and functions

- The ability to operate with transparency and accountability by collecting and making available robust and meaningful program performance information. This might include the development of performance and reporting frameworks specific to local contexts;
- Building trust and rapport between night patrol staff and young people and night patrol staff and other services, such as police;
- Streamlining funding arrangements to ensure consistent provision of high quality service delivery;
- Recruitment of local and trained staff who are adequately resourced, and the retainment of such staff.

Appendix 3: Introduction to SAY programs in NSW

This report presents the findings of an evaluation of Indigenous Youth Programs in New South Wales. Specifically the study reviewed current operations of the Safe Aboriginal Youth Program (SAYP) across 11 NSW communities. The Safe Aboriginal Youth Program (SAYP) was established in 2009 following a previous review of the Aboriginal Community Patrols (Blagg and Venturi 2008).

Safe Aboriginal Youth Patrol Program (SAY)

The SAY program now provides two different youth support options, a Safe Aboriginal Youth Patrol and a Safe Aboriginal Youth Activity program (Aboriginal Programs Unit 2010).

The **SAY night patrol** is a community-based bus service that provides a safe transport and outreach service for young people who are on the streets late at night. The buses are staffed by skilled local people who patrol their community at night engaging with young people. SAY patrols aim to reduce the risk of young people becoming victims of crime or offenders by transporting them to a safe home or a safe activity or referring them to a support service (Aboriginal Programs Unit 2010).

The **Safe Aboriginal Youth activity model** is a community-based service that provides supervised recreational and structured activities as well as access to food for young people. The program seeks to engage young people in safe and supportive activity on Friday and Saturday nights and on peak nights during school holidays. The program aims to reduce the risk of young people becoming victims or persons of interest in relation to crime. The program budget provides a vehicle so that children can be transported to and from the program. Other community youth service providers, Police Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers and community members are also encouraged to link children with the program (Aboriginal Programs Unit 2010).

SAY Program funding is provided to non-government organisations in identified priority communities. Funding is provided for up to four years subject to compliance with Performance Agreements. These programs are funded to operate for eight hours per week, usually over two nights, with some additional funds provided for supplementary nights during school holidays or to coincide with key community events. Patrols and activity programs operate at priority times identified by local Police. Aboriginal Community Justice Groups or other local Aboriginal youth inter-agencies provide an advisory role for SAY patrols and activity programs (Aboriginal Programs Unit 2010).

Objectives of the study

The evaluation aimed to examine each of the current SAY programs within each of the eleven communities to identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to program effectiveness. The specific objectives of the evaluation were to:

- Identify a means to measure the type of services clients are referred to, the referral process and the outcome of these referrals.
- Identify local perceptions of the SAY program and its appropriateness for the community.
- Identify the program's capacity to link young victims with support services.
- Identify 'best practice' standards in delivering an outreach service for young Aboriginal people.
- Develop a process to identify and measure crime prevention outcomes for young people.
- Identify strategies to improve the capacity of patrol workers to proactively engage young people.

The research approach included:

- a review of the literature, including previous evaluations and commentaries on Aboriginal Night Patrols in Australia
- site visits to all communities in New South Wales where SAY programs operate that involved interviews and focus groups with SAY program staff, management committees, local police, health and welfare agencies and other key informants, and
- observational research as part of two night patrol operations.

It needs to be acknowledged that this research has been conducted by non-Indigenous researchers and although we have strived for accuracy, it is likely that a western perspective has coloured our interpretation.

Appendix4: Safe Aboriginal Youth Programs (SAY) Overview of programs

Origins of SAY program

The Safe Aboriginal Youth Patrol Program (SAY) in New South Wales emerged in 2009 out of the earlier Aboriginal Community Patrols program (NSW Attorney-General's Department, 2005) and is managed by the Aboriginal Programs Unit of the DAGJ (Aboriginal Programs Unit, 2010). The SAY program is a community-based service (Aboriginal Programs Unit, 2010) to 'reduce the rate of juvenile offending' (AIHN, 2012); reducing the risk of young people engaging in crime and the likelihood of victimisation (NSW Government, 2012).

Purpose of SAY

The Safe Aboriginal Youth (SAY) program (NSW Government, 2012):

Identifies vulnerable Aboriginal youth who are unsupervised on the street at night. SAY patrols provide safe transport options to clients and link them to a safe place where they can access supervised activities and trained youth worker. The Youth workers effectively engage SAY clients and link them with services relevant to their individual needs.

Proposed methods according to the SAY contract

The SAY program has two aspects: the Safe Aboriginal Youth Patrol that provides the street presence and transport; and the Safe Aboriginal Youth Activity program (Aboriginal Programs Unit, 2010).

SAY Programs are operated for a minimum number of hours per week (typically 2 nights plus special events and holidays) at times identified by local Police. The management of SAY patrols and activities is also advised by local Aboriginal youth inter-agencies and Aboriginal Community Justice groups (Aboriginal Programs Unit, 2010). The NSW Government chooses to fund SAY programs to be operated by professional non-government organisations with 'significant cultural and youth engagement expertise' (NSW Government, 2012).

The centrality of 'access to trained Youth Workers' in the SAY Activity program is specified in the NSW Government description of the SAY Program on the NSW Government 'Keep Them Safe' website (NSW Government, 2012) but is absent from the main description of the SAY Program by the Aboriginal Programs Unit of the DAGJ (Aboriginal Programs Unit, 2010).

SAY Intended Model of Service Delivery PLM 1

The SAY Program logic model as defined by the Aboriginal Programs Unit of the DAGJ has two separate components: the SAY Patrol and the SAY Youth Activity Model, each with their own purposes and goals (Aboriginal Programs Unit, 2010).

The specified goals of the SAY Aboriginal Youth Patrol are:

Appendix4: Safe Aboriginal Youth Programs (SAY) Overview of programs

1. To provide a safe youth outreach program for young Aboriginal people on the street at night.
2. To transport young Aboriginal people on the street at night to a safe home or safe activity or refer them to a support service.
3. To reduce the risk of young Aboriginal people in program sites being victims of crime.
4. To reduce the risk of young Aboriginal people in program sites becoming Persons of Interest in relation to crime.

The specified goals of the SAY Youth Activity Model are:

1. To engage young people in safe and supportive activity on Friday and Saturday nights and on peak nights during school holidays.
2. To reduce the risk of young Aboriginal people in program sites being victims of crime.
3. To reduce the risk of young Aboriginal people becoming Persons of Interest in relation to crime in SAY program sites.

The program logic model for the Safe Aboriginal Youth Program as described in the NSW government description of the program is as shown below in Table 14.

Appendix4: Safe Aboriginal Youth Programs (SAY) Overview of programs

Table 14: Program Logic Model of the Safe Aboriginal Youth Program (SAY) as described in NSW Government description of the program

Inputs	Components	Implementation objectives	Outputs	Linking Constructs	Short-Medium-Long-term Objectives
<p>Vehicle</p> <p>Skilled workers capable of : staffing a bus; patrolling the community at night; engaging with young people</p> <p>Staff with working with children checks as per the Commission for Children and Young People Act 1998, the Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 and the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000. And bound by the Mandatory Reporting Requirements as set out in the Children and Young Peoples (Care and Protection) Act 1998.</p> <p>Funding for 4 years subject to compliance with Performance Agreements</p> <p>Operated by NGO with significant cultural and youth engagement expertise</p>	<p>Safe Aboriginal Youth Patrol</p>	<p>Safe transport and outreach service for young people who are on the streets late at night.</p> <p>Engagement with at risk unaccompanied young people on streets</p> <p>Transport of young people identified as being vulnerable and unaccompanied at night in areas covered by SAY program to a safe home or a safe activity or referring them to a support service.</p> <p>Outputs in line with Performance Agreements</p>	<p>Staffing a bus</p> <p>Patrolling the community at night</p> <p>Identifying and engaging at-risk unaccompanied Aboriginal young people in the SAY program area.</p> <p>Transporting targeted young Aboriginal people on the street at night to a safe home or safe activity or refer them to a support service.</p> <p>Service provided minimum average number of hours per week</p> <p>Service provided in holidays and for community events</p> <p>Service provided at priority times identified by local Police</p>	<p>Provision of supervised transport to organised activities overcomes limitations imposed by lack of transport</p> <p>Children and young people who have safe transport home will be at reduced risk of victimisation or engagement in criminal activity</p> <p>Positive relationships between young people and adults provide young people with access to reliable information support and advice</p> <p>When children and young people engage voluntarily with support services it is easier to develop trust</p>	<p>To provide a safe youth outreach program for young Aboriginal people on the street at night.</p> <p>To reduce the risk of young Aboriginal people in program sites being victims of crime</p> <p>persons of interest in relation to crime</p> <p>To transport young Aboriginal people on the street at night to a safe home or a safe activity or refer them to a support service.</p>
<p>Premises/ location.</p> <p>Staff to provide young people with: supervised recreational and structured activities and provided food</p>	<p>Safe Aboriginal Youth Activity Model</p>	<p>Community-based service that provides young people with: supervised recreational and structured activities access to food</p>	<p>Supervised recreational and structured activities</p> <p>Access to food</p> <p>Access to trained youth workers⁵</p>	<p>Provision of supervised activities will provide young people with an environment where they can socialise and seek challenge safely</p> <p>Provision of healthy food improves nutrition and makes participation attractive to children and young people.</p>	<p>To engage young people in safe and supportive activity on Friday and Saturday nights and on peak nights during school holidays and community events.</p>

⁵ The centrality of ‘access to trained Youth Workers’ in the SAY Activity program is specified in the NSW Government description of the SAY Program on the NSW Government ‘Keep Them Safe’ website (NSW Government, 2012) but is completely absent from the main description of the SAY Program by the Aboriginal Programs Unit of the NSW Government Department of Justice and Attorney General (Aboriginal Programs Unit, 2010).

Appendix4: Safe Aboriginal Youth Programs (SAY) Overview of programs

Staff with working with children checks as per the Commission for Children and Young People Act 1998, the Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 and the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000. And bound by the Mandatory Reporting Requirements as set out in the Children and Young Peoples (Care and Protection) Act 1998.

Funding for 4 years

Operated by NGO with significant cultural and youth engagement expertise

Police Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers and community members link children with the program.

Outputs in line with Performance Agreements

Service provided minimum average number of hours per week

Service provided in holidays and for community events

Service provided at priority times identified by local Police

When children and young people take part in activities facilitated by police ACLOs it improves children and young people's perceptions of police and makes informal crime prevention and diversion initiatives more effective

To reduce the risk of young Aboriginal people in program sites being victims of crime.

To reduce the risk of young Aboriginal people becoming Persons of Interest in relation to crime in SAY program sites.

Appendix 5: NSW SAY Programs Semi Structured Questionnaire

Name of Participant:

Name of Service:

Address:

Phone:

Occupation:

Age:

Gender:

Male / Female

First: Do you have any questions about this study?

1. How long have you been in(community)(years)
2. How long have you been in this job?(years)
3. What do you think are the most frequent issues that the young people in [town] face?
4. What do you think are the main reasons young people are out on the streets at night in [town].
5. Are there any particular problems policing young people in a community such as this?
6. Do you think that the current night patrol programs are appropriate for this community? YES/NO
(Briefly explain)
7. Do you think Night Patrols make a difference? YES/NO
8. Are they (or could they be) an effective strategy for Crime Prevention?
9. Do you know what type of services the Night patrol staff refers young people to? How does that referral work and what are the outcomes – *[encourage them to tell you stories of actual events]*
10. What do you think is best practice in night patrols? *Give me some examples to illustrate this*
11. What are the best strategies to effectively engage young people? *Give me some examples to illustrate this*
12. Are there any aspects of the Night Patrol Program that could be improved?
13. What do you see as the impact of Night Patrols on the local community/local Indigenous community?
Give me some examples to illustrate this
14. In what ways do you think the night patrol could further help the young people in this community?
15. Is the night patrol a service that deserves ongoing funding or is there another service that supports the same young people that is more deserving?
16. Do you discuss the problems of crime and crime prevention in your community with other local service providers? YES/NO If YES, when?

Do you have any other comments?

Do you have any further questions?

Thank you

Appendix 6: Armidale Profile



The city of Armidale is situated in the New England Tablelands, half way between Sydney and Brisbane and two and a half hours from the Coast. The Armidale district is the traditional land of the Anaiwan people. Narwan Village is a former Aboriginal reserve situated on the south-east side of the city.

The Field Work

Fourteen people were interviewed in Armidale in November 2011. Nine were male, five were female. Ages ranged from late twenties to fifties. Six were Indigenous, with three local to the region. Participants included staff of the current patrol, previous volunteers, committee members, police and service providers.

Social Profile

Table 15: Armidale Social Profile SOURCE AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 2011 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING (2012)

	Armidale	%	Australia	%
Population	24,105		21,507,717	
Indigenous people	1513	6.3	548,369	2.5
Median age	35		37	
Indigenous median age	20		21	
Children aged 0-14	4598	19.1	4,144,025	19.3
Indigenous children aged 0-14	552	36.3	256,283	46.7
Persons aged 55 and over	6185	25.7	5,516,010	25.6
Indigenous Persons aged 55 and over	151	9.9	53,003	9.7
Unemployed	827	7.4	600,133	5.6
Indigenous persons unemployed	90	22.4	30,462	17.1
Median household weekly income	\$991		\$1,234	
Indigenous median household weekly income	\$749		\$991	
Average people per household	2.4		2.6	
Average Indigenous people per household	3.1		3.3	
One parent families	1049	18.3	901,634	15.9
Persons born overseas	4339	18%	6,489,870	30.2

With education being a large industry in the region, the average age of the population is younger than the national average although the numbers of children under 14 are of similar proportions. There are fewer Indigenous children than national averages. Household incomes are much lower than average, possibly due to the high proportion of students in the community. Although the proportion of overseas born residents is lower than average, for a regional community, Armidale is quite diverse, comprised of over 53 different nationalities (ABS 2012).

The SAY Program

A SAY night patrol currently operates on a Friday and Saturday night each week. A night patrol service in Armidale has operated approximately fifteen years, having originated as a foot patrol. The bus service now operates as Youth Assist. It has been part of the SAY program since late 2009.

Local Crime Problems

BOCSAR 2012 data for Armidale indicates that malicious damage, assault and domestic violence, break and enter, liquor offences and offensive conduct are an issue in this community. The Armidale Dumaresq Councils Community Safety Plan focuses on the reduction of anti-social and violent behaviour and identifies that alcohol abuse is a contributing factor for violent crimes including assault.

Boredom and lack of entertainment and structured activities were cited as a key issue causing young people to be involved in petty street crime. Alcohol use, especially binge drinking, was also cited as a major issue affecting young people. Alcohol consumption among youth was also linked to boredom. Most do not have money so free entertainment is crucial. Midnight basketball is a great success, but there are limited sessions.

People talked about a lack of parental support and supervision. They cited absence of parents during evenings, largely because they were at pubs or clubs, gambling and/or drinking, which they thought resulted in young people being on the streets and disengaged from school. This leads to a cycle of petty crime and then onto more serious criminal activity and engagement with law enforcement.

Currently the PCYC is the main outlet for local youth. A police officer and an assistant operate a service that receives positive feedback from the community, but community members also feel that it needs to be open for longer hours. They claim that youth are hungry after school and walk to the PCYC and are walking home after closing at 6.30pm, which is after dark in the winter. For some there is no way to get home and many congregate in the streets.

Best Practice in SAY programs

The night patrol currently operates two nights a week. Staff considered this as inadequate as Thursday night is experiencing high contact with clients, as is the case with Saturday nights, and they have requested further resources from the Department to extend the operation of the service. The service will continue to operate Friday and Saturday nights because consistency of service delivery is considered important. Interviewees argued that the youth know the movements of the service and have an expectancy that the service will operate in a regular fashion; in particular, they rely on it for transport to their homes. Short-

term programs, such as midnight basketball which operates for 8 weeks only, are considered of limited value: appreciated whilst they are operating but responsible for a vacuum when not.

A driver would typically be accompanied by a male and female escort on the patrol, who would ensure young people were well-behaved. The service maintains running sheets each night. These sheets record numbers of contacts and the age of participants. Numbers using the program vary. Young people often leave town over the holidays so targets are often not met during these times. This implies that monthly numerical targets are probably not the best way to monitor service effectiveness.

Local Crime Trends

Table 16: Recorded incidents of selected offences for Armidale Dumaresq LGA: Annual totals and trends from October 1998 to September 2012 and from 2009 to 2012 and ranking against other LGAs in NSW

Offence	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	NSW Rank	1999-2012 trend	Ave % change	2009-2012 trend	Ave % change
Arson	12	21	22	22	9	21	15	24	14	37	22	21	14	38		*	**	Down	-1.5%
Domestic violence	85	84	86	92	93	91	68	93	132	133	124	111	135	165	32	Up	5.2%	Stable	**
Assault - non-domestic	171	166	189	183	182	144	160	170	203	208	188	189	186	221	27	Up	2.0%	Down	-4.6%
Assault Police	14	14	16	20	39	21	24	14	33	29	27	14	9	13		*	**	Stable	**
Breach AVO	24	21	32	36	52	43	39	34	42	49	81	64	63	65		Up	8.0%	Stable	**
Breach bail	19	42	29	60	73	65	35	43	101	104	85	89	48	66		*	**	Up	8.5%
Break & enter dwelling	435	299	416	394	430	392	245	304	266	311	205	244	208	252	44	Down	-4.1%	Down	-5.9%
Break & enter non-dwelling	232	163	292	236	280	129	122	187	144	194	153	92	43	60	97	Down	-9.9%	Down	-13.3%
Harassment	47	47	66	47	103	88	68	91	139	111	96	122	113	126		Up	7.9%	Stable	**
Indecent assault	63	30	29	22	36	27	33	19	29	27	26	25	30	28		*	**	Stable	**
Liquor offences	5	11	9	17	74	49	58	50	56	80	109	171	192	140		*	**	Stable	**
Malicious damage	504	475	586	498	573	518	587	475	559	598	521	482	382	445	54	Stable	**	Down	-3.7%
Motor vehicle theft	35	41	41	29	71	51	44	40	47	60	62	53	24	23	119	Stable	**	Stable	**
Offensive conduct	31	35	27	35	51	67	75	43	63	60	79	98	96	90		Up	8.5%	Stable	**
Offensive language	54	71	51	46	59	39	47	32	54	65	39	72	68	58		Stable	**	*	**
Other theft	268	284	281	234	230	177	162	168	147	146	113	128	124	141		Down	-4.8%	Up	5.5%
Possession and/or use of cannabis	62	47	69	72	45	55	37	40	52	87	61	62	52	119		Stable	**	Stable	**
Resist or hinder officer	25	43	28	37	57	37	35	30	53	58	51	37	28	47		Stable	**	Down	-13.0%
Steal from dwelling	178	181	162	181	169	132	166	101	160	103	90	101	70	84	92	Down	-5.6%	Down	-1.0%
Steal from motor vehicle	162	214	259	512	282	259	139	189	166	208	170	196	112	195	101	Up	1.4%	Down	-6.2%
Steal from person	0	0	0	16	32	26	16	12	16	22	17	17	25	18	24	*	**	Up	6.9%
Steal from retail store	70	93	83	143	144	107	73	60	79	90	89	103	77	132	16	Stable	**	Stable	**

Trespass	40	32	46	49	56	52	32	61	71	61	74	65	58	60		Up	3.2%		
<p>* A trend is not calculated if at least one 12 month period in the selected timeframe had less than 20 incidents.</p> <p>** No annual percentage change is given if the trend is stable or if a trend has not been calculated.</p>																			

Food

Providing nutrition is an important aspect of the SAY activity model. Armidale patrols used to feed youth when they were serviced by volunteers. The PCYC provided a hot spot program that lasted a month. As part of this, Business houses sponsored food and other resources. As a consequence youth were well-fed. They played sport, were entertained and by the end of the night, it was claimed, they were happy to go home and stay home, rather than go out at night again. This is a common problem for rural communities – programs have a short life span due to insufficient resources. Participants thought it would be good to have an ongoing service, in particular because there are no food outlets open late at night. Lack of food interacts with alcohol intake, exacerbating risks.

Clients

Clients could be quite young – seven years of age – but were typically about 12-18 years of age. They comprised large cohorts of Aboriginal, Non-Aboriginal and African youth.

Clients could be found in certain locations – under a local bridge, at a central courthouse or neighbourhood centre – which became identified as pick-up points. If young people saw police at these points, they would scatter.

In the winter there is a lack of after-hours leisure activities and services for young people, which results in little for young people to do. In addition, the colder weather causes problems, especially with regard to health and comfort, both at home and on the street. In the summer time, after-hours leisure activities are more available. Clients could be found out on the streets all year around, even during the harsher Armidale winter months. Despite the extreme weather, there was a perception that some young people were safer on the streets than in their homes.

Clients of the service expressed concern with alcohol use (drugs rarely touched-upon in interviews), anger management, lack of self-control and violence (which could see them expelled from school), and health and hygiene. Many young people had been exposed to domestic violence.

Staff

Participants observed that it is really important that the person who was driving the van and the off-sider had a rapport with the young people. The ability to build trusting relationships with young people, genuinely care about their welfare and work as a team with the other staff are all crucial skills. Rapport with parents and the broader community was important for staff as well. Fundamental to all these is the ability to be non-judgemental.

Generally the replacement of volunteers with paid workers was considered a good measure that had allowed for consistency in service delivery, high professionalism, and greater levels of dedication to the service. Staff were recruited by advertising in the local paper and using services, such as Jobs Australia and Joblink Plus. Volunteers had often lacked the time to provide to the service, especially as many themselves had children. They had also proven unreliable, in some cases, for turning up to shifts. Volunteers still played a role in the service, but largely sat on the committee overseeing the service and would occasionally join the service as replacements for paid staff.

While Armidale was considered a good town for volunteerism, patrol staff felt that the service lacked widespread community support, especially amongst local clubs. Local University students were also seen as a potential source of support/staffing for the service, especially those with training in relevant fields such as psychology or town planning. Permanent staff talked about their role in the past supervising volunteers and how this impacted on the time available to spend with the young people.

Recruitment of staff

There had been long periods in filling vacancies in the service. Some locations struggle to get staff. Participants claimed that there needs to be ownership by the local Aboriginal community of the service and more Aboriginal people involved in supporting the service. They also felt that there were some good young leaders in communities. They stated that there needs to be found a way to accredit the work they do and the skills they provide, perhaps through involvement with a TAFE course, where the Night patrol could provide traineeships. This means they could be paid. One argument was that the Job network could get people to work for the service and in a way that did not affect Centrelink payments. It was thought that this would build up skills and experience that could lead to further work. Some agencies would be more likely to employ someone who had done this. There is a tendency to employ Indigenous people, and supporting them in this way would be useful.

Ethnicity of staff

There is a perception that Aboriginal youth only respond to an Aboriginal face. Many strongly disagreed with this perception, arguing that they never had youth complain. In Armidale, the local patrol staff, who were not Indigenous, were considered to have built strong and meaningful relationships with local youth. The early service had mostly been staffed by Indigenous volunteers. This had been problematic at times, because staff would offer different levels of service to youth based on contact with them or kinship ties. Patrols recently changed to focus on paid positions with new contracts drawn up and position statements, which encourage Aboriginal people to apply, but this was not necessary.

The Referral Process

Staff provide a link to other agencies. They will go with young people as support to other agencies. The bus gives staff time to talk to youth and it was claimed that under such conditions, youth 'open-up'. The key is to build rapport without being a 'mate' (so long as you did not become too close and lose sight of the core responsibilities of the service).

Being a large regional centre, Armidale is very well supported by service providers. However, one participant claimed that there was a lack of coordination of community services. Some participants claimed that services protective about their little bits of money tend to keep to themselves. Participants thought there would be huge value in pooling resources to work together to implement programs but were not optimistic about the chances of this happening.

Relationships with other agencies and services in the community are critical, especially as the night patrol was the only dedicated service for youth which operated after hours. This noted, one person on the night patrol committee thought that the patrol did a stand-alone service, lacking interaction with other services. There will always be grey areas in service coordination (a common ongoing problem). Some services choose not to work with the night patrol, instead often competing. There was a perception that middle ground was needed. The night patrol staff attend interagency meetings to build these collaborations.

One problem was that most service providers operated during regular business hours, whereas the night patrol did not. The situation created low referral rates. A health worker doubted if the staff know or understand what their service did and staff admitted to having a limited relationship with DOCS – only a few child welfare cases – not much child protection. One issue was that *volunteers* are not obliged to report incidents (mandatory reporting to DOCS).

A service provider thought that there had been a lack of initiative within the community to support the service, especially through alternate sources of funding. Those interviewed were generally critical of a perceived lack of youth services in the local area, as well as poor coordination of services. Limited opening hours of services meant that the night patrol was the only dedicated after hours service for youth. The operating hours of the PCYC were considered to limit its effectiveness in terms of supporting youth, especially those who were the target clientele of the night patrol service.

Relationship with police

Police were perceived to have poor rapport with the youth and were not trusted by them. Youth congregating publicly in groups are often perceived by police as a problem, and if the young people are abusive, police are more likely to intervene. Some suggested the patrol provided a buffer zone between youth and police, which allowed for young people to form better relationships with certain police.

The level of interaction between young people and police was considered by one youth worker to be restricted to reactive policing and failed to build a deeper relationship, either at a personal or a community level. Our participants believed there is considerable social pressure not to 'dob' [inform] on mates to police. This emphasises the importance of the patrol in building rapport/trust with the young people.

Strengthening relations between youth and police

The local ACLO has built up good rapport with local youth; they interact well with him when he is on duty. The ACLO builds bridges between police and local youth and has a productive relationship with the local night patrol. The ACLO would speak to the patrol 1 to 2 times a night.

A few participants cited problems in the relationship between the service and police. Poor relations were considered systematic throughout many areas where night patrols ran. Police lacked an understanding of what the patrol did and were thought to consider it as a hindrance to their crime control activities. Police

were concerned that the bus transports youth from one party to the next. A patrol worker observed that a conference on night patrols had a police community relations spokesperson visit to attempt to address poor relations between patrol staff and police.

Police have been known to attempt to move young people on who were waiting to be picked up by the patrol service, which dispersed them and placed them at risk. The problem here was that police did not care where they went, just as long as they were not loitering. There was a claimed lack of communication between police and patrol workers. It was said that police would take youth into the station and ring their parents late at night rather than have patrol workers come and collect them and take them home.

Poor relations with the police were considered linked to earlier models of the night patrol service, when the service operated more as a 'taxi' and to lower professional standards. In more recent times the service has developed policies and procedures to help communicate with the police, and this was facilitated when the ACLO was able to work night shifts (which is no longer occurring). A memorandum of understanding had been drafted to improve relations between patrol workers and police.

Effectiveness

Accurate record keeping and reporting was an important element of contemporary night patrol services. Records are kept of service activity, although one informant observed that picking up more young people from the streets was not a good measure of success, because the fewer clients the patrols had, the more effective they had been: less young people on the streets meant that the patrols were working. The driver was tempted not to go out for a couple of months to see what happens. They argued that crime statistics do not really tell what the impact of the service is.

Good record keeping could dispel myths about the service and provide an accurate profile of the service. One informant argued that there was a perception that Indigenous young people were the main troublemakers, and that accurate records of service recipients would help dispel this perception.

Effectiveness for crime prevention

Juvenile court appearances at Armidale have been cut by more than half since the foot patrol was introduced in the Armidale central business district on Friday and Saturday nights in 1998. Participants generally thought that the night patrol addressed crime problems. The service not only prevented crimes being committed by young people, but also prevented crimes being committed against them. Nonetheless, young people were often unjustly blamed for crimes.

Training

Participants felt that patrol workers need appropriate training. This includes knowledge of legislation. Training has a cost implication and patrol workers have to try and source training themselves. A conference held by AGs where the various patrols congregated was seen by staff as a great opportunity for people to share experiences and training.

In terms of training, first aid was considered important, as were other areas, such as self-defence. Training for staff was also considered to be highly important for most participants. Uniform job descriptions were also required for staff across the sector.

Position descriptions have evolved over the years but over this time the structure of patrols has changed. One participant thought that removing volunteers has made the service less dynamic and less integrated with the community, and especially other service providers. The structure of the SAY model, especially regular reportage, was considered to be more onerous on staff and also limited the capacity for community relationship building.

Funding

Inconsistency of patrol services was considered a problem by one participant, who observed that some areas received greater resourcing from government than other areas. Some managers were paid more than others. Some were effective and others were less effective. Participants felt there needed to be a means to ensure fairness across the sector. For example, they pointed out that some can use up to \$100,000 in 8 months and then don't operate for the remaining 4 months of the year. Others have money left at the end of the year. Therefore, they felt, patrols need closer monitoring. There was a suggestion that patrols be paid every 6 months, with money topped up based on reporting. The requirement to submit yearly reports led to some patrols not bothering with interim reports once they had their annual money. There was a perceived need to tighten up on over/under spending.

Operating hours

The limited nights of operation was considered a problem by a number of participants, especially those who were working or had worked with the service. There was a feeling there needed to be more time to follow up and to offer more intensive support.

Equipment

For some the size of the bus was considered a problem. This related to the need to transport large groups of young people on occasion. A smaller bus meant there were times when the bus had to transport people in relays, and that meant leaving groups of young people on the streets, waiting for the return of the bus.

Target population

One point of conflict in the service involved whether it was an Aboriginal service or a whole of community service. Some participants felt they were judged for including service to non-Indigenous young people, but argued their charter identified young people under 18 years of age, and did not specify the requirement that they be Indigenous. Some participants argued the bus needs to be perceived as a resource for the whole community.

Strategies for improvement

Armidale Patrol staff designed and produced rubber handout bracelets with the phone number of the service on them. In their experience cards did not work as they are often lost. It was reported that the bracelets are popular and work in terms of raising awareness of the service. They are bright colours (youth don't like white ones). It was thought all the youth have mobiles, or their mates have one, so the service also asks for their number so they can call back or contact them if need be.

Staff maintained that the service needs an 1800 number. Whilst all youth have mobiles many may not have credit and an 1800 number would enable them to reach out to the service when necessary. They find Facebook very useful to track parties, especially as young people also use this to find parties. They are also looking at developing app-based information for news from the patrol which could be used for sharing information about resources available locally, events etc.

Education in the SAY model

Engaging with young people in a meaningful and sustained manner was important in terms of creating an effective service. That means patrols need to offer support in areas that will capture the attention of young people; for example, they may hand out condoms, or talk about upcoming school parties or forthcoming court appearances. There is a feeling amongst some that the patrol could be used more extensively in education around issues such as health care, drugs and alcohol etc.

SAY activity model

A centralised, after-hour's service providing holistic care was considered important by one participant, but lacking in the current model. Others argued for more flexibility and an increase in operational capacity.

Conclusions

Having originated as a foot patrol with local Aboriginal people, Armidale now has a successful and well established night patrol. As in most communities, the reduction in funding to allow only two nights per week for patrols is seen as inadequate. The lack of an activities centre where patrols could take children was an issue for patrol staff. When the PCYC did provide services or Midnight Basketball operated, the benefits for local youth were very evident.

Appendix 7: Bourke Profile



Bourke is situated on the Darling River, 369km North West of Dubbo and 780km North West of Sydney. Bourke shire covers an area of 43,000 square kilometres.

The Bourke Aboriginal community is extremely diverse with more than 20 language groups. The traditional owners, the Ngemba, are a minority alongside other major language groups including the Wanggamurra, Murrawari and Barkindji.

The Field Work

Two researchers visited the area in December 2011. Interviews were conducted with police and other service providers, community leaders, Aboriginal Elders and residents of Bourke who had an interest in or were involved in the operation of the SAY program in Bourke. There were seven people interviewed; four males and three females and five were Aboriginal people. Their ages ranged from 28 to 68.

Social Profile

Bourke has a high Aboriginal population (30.2%) and a high proportion of single parent families in comparison with national averages. Average household sizes reflect the norm.

Table 17: Bourke Social Profile (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011 Census of Population and Housing (2012))

	Bourke	%	Australia	%
Population	2,868		21,507,717	
Indigenous people	867	30.2	548,369	2.5
Median age	35		37	
Indigenous median age	25		21	
Children 0-14	728	25.4	4,144,025	19.3
Indigenous children 0-14	296	34.3	256,283	46.7
Persons aged 55 and over	641	22.4	5,516,010	25.6
Indigenous Persons 55 and over	113	13	53,003	9.7
Unemployed	64	5.1	600,133	5.6
Indigenous persons unemployed	43	17.8	30,462	17.1

Median household weekly income	\$1,085		\$1,234	
Indigenous median household weekly income	\$900		\$991	
Average people per household	2.6		2.6	
Average Indigenous people per household	3.2		3.3	
One parent families	124	19.3	901,634	15.9
Persons born overseas	522	18.2	6,489,870	30.2

There are less Indigenous children and more older Indigenous Australians in comparison with the other case study communities and with national averages. Unemployment rates are high, incomes are low and, with the isolation of the town and the high cost of living, many residents experience hardship, particularly those within the Aboriginal community.

The SAY program

A strong, well-managed PCYC club and SAY Activities program with a transport bus working together provides transport, activities and support services for young people in Bourke. A bus picks up children and young people and brings them to the PCYC centre where they have access to food and sporting activities and then takes them home at the end of the evening.

Local Crime Problems

The main types of crime experienced in Bourke include breach of bail conditions, assault, domestic violence, malicious damage and break and enter. According to BOCSAR, in recent years the Bourke LGA has consistently ranked the highest in the state for rates of domestic violence, sexual assault and breach of bail (across the Indigenous and non- Indigenous community). However, data must be interpreted with caution as a small number of offences in this small community generate high statistical rates of crime which can inflate the actual experience of crime in Bourke.

Trend analysis (Table 18) indicates that there has been a general fall in the number of offences since 1998. However, since the inception of the SAY program in 2009, there has been no further reduction apart from malicious damage offences. The incidence of break and enter offences and beach of bail have increased.

Local police noted problems with break and enter, malicious damage, graffiti and motor vehicle theft. Offenders were described as a diverse group, but some were children aged as young as nine years. All of the participants in our study identified youth crime as a major problem in the town. Police reported young people lacked respect for their role; something they described as generational. One officer also did not believe the Young Offender's Act was appropriate for local youth. Youth fail to attend a caution and do not take the possible consequences seriously.

Participants thought that youth were on the streets because of lack of supervision at home. The street is a place for youth to 'hang out'.

Table 18: Recorded incidents of selected offences in the Bourke Local Government Area

Offence	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	NSW Rank	1999-2012 trend	Ave change %	2009-2012 trend	Ave % change
Arson	14	11	13	18	10	11	26	37	36	30	43	36	39	57		*	**	Stable	**
Domestic violence	115	134	151	149	151	151	166	142	101	113	123	107	128	133	1	Up	1.1%	Stable	**

Assault	166	137	148	150	181	167	138	122	80	86	93	84	90	88	1	Down	-4.8%	Stable	**
Assault Police	45	25	24	32	26	24	20	7	11	7	8	7	15	12		*	**	*	**
Breach AVO	37	39	49	50	47	40	46	37	27	47	71	43	61	71		Stable	**	Stable	**
Breach bail conditions	96	122	142	126	122	140	144	184	82	130	99	98	191	177		Stable	**	Up	21.4%
Break and enter - dwelling	146	152	91	183	198	142	126	115	87	72	69	41	78	112	2	Down	-2.0%	Up	17.5%
Break and enter - non-dwelling	72	122	57	72	93	51	70	77	27	21	27	36	29	32	4	Down	-6.0%	Stable	**
Harassment	42	43	55	79	107	86	97	86	47	43	68	58	53	52		Stable	**	Stable	**
Indecent assault,	9	11	10	10	10	7	10	12	19	7	14	9	15	7		*	**	*	**
Liquor offences	23	26	33	42	52	45	85	48	55	63	82	54	66	44		Up	5.1%	Stable	**
Malicious damage	253	238	291	328	332	340	334	391	219	251	206	142	133	136	2	Down	-4.7%	Down	-12.9%
Motor vehicle theft	37	28	80	86	55	89	44	85	43	28	39	22	34	28	1	Down	-2.1%	Stable	**
Offensive conduct	23	29	27	29	41	33	51	17	12	12	43	14	31	19		*	**	*	**
Offensive language	45	21	26	25	27	34	54	26	27	20	43	18	15	13		*	**	*	**
Other theft	79	87	87	73	82	62	73	60	48	41	34	31	41	38		Down	-5.5%	Stable	**
Possession and/or use of cannabis	32	9	22	17	16	19	17	21	19	7	11	24	34	27		*	**	*	**
Resist or hinder officer	59	37	38	41	35	41	39	20	14	12	31	17	31	25		*	**	*	**
Steal from dwelling	72	84	51	66	66	77	58	72	45	35	40	32	51	41	1	Down	-4.2%	Stable	**
Steal from motor vehicle	45	115	116	150	108	91	74	64	47	44	58	44	64	63	1	Up	2.6%	Stable	**
Steal from person	0	0	0	5	18	17	11	5	7	6	6	2	5	6		*	**	*	**
Steal from retail store	24	22	58	40	70	39	46	45	47	19	22	20	19	18	5	*	**	*	**
Trespass	48	80	48	119	104	114	114	106	69	65	32	49	52	60		Up	1.7%	Stable	**
* A trend is not calculated if at least one 12 month period in the selected timeframe had less than 20 incidents.																			
** No annual percentage change is given if the trend is stable or if a trend has not been calculated.																			

There is resentment within the community about ongoing youth crime. The local Council had conducted a survey on economic development, and found that the most critical thing prohibiting economic development in Bourke identified by the residents was dogs barking. Some attributed this barking to the movements of young people on the street.

There is a Safe house which provides crisis accommodation for homeless adults, but does not accommodate homeless youth. Police face a dilemma when confronted with children on the streets late at night. Often relatives are asked to care for the children, but if no other options are available, children are sometimes brought back to the station for the night. However, one resident maintained that Aboriginal youth always have a place they can stay with extended family or friends and in reality are not strictly 'homeless'.

Best Practice for the SAY Program

The program operates as a patrol combined with an activity component, funded for 4 hours on each of Friday and Saturday nights. In reality, they operate for 7 hours on Friday and 5 hours on Saturday. They run a drop-in centre on Friday from 3-5pm, and run structured activities from 5-6pm, offer healthy food from

6-7pm then run more structured activities until 9pm. The patrol collects young people from 5pm, and then drops them home after 9pm. After this the bus runs around the town looking for young people still on the streets. They operate an 8-seater bus and also use a 14-seater owned by the PCYC. They work with young people from 5-18 years of age, the majority of whom are males (approximately 70%) and Indigenous. They may have up to 70 young people a night, though in winter numbers may drop to 20-30.

The meal component of the program is judged to be critical as many of the young people do not have access to healthy foods such as vegetables outside the program. Food is expensive in town and the service often purchases food from an out-of-town distribution centre, spending between \$50-\$80 a weekend. The young people usually eat whatever is on offer, universally accepting fruit and vegetables, and many return for second and third helpings. For some, this might be the only food they eat in a day. There are no take-away outlets and thus the young people do not demonstrate the preference for the less healthy take-away foods often seen in other settings. Service providers see sharing food, and conversation over a meal, is an important part in building trusting relationships.

Staff

The PCYC has a manager and nine staff, three of whom are Aboriginal people. Four are female. There is funding for a coordinator for the SAY program and four staff. The PCYC manager is new to the area having previously managed the Newcastle PCYC. Several participants acknowledged that the new manager was 'refreshing' and has 'renewed' the service. The manager was perceived to have the ability to engage the community and has already received strong support. He was keen to introduce some new ideas to improve the service.

Barriers to best practice

There is no youth refuge in Bourke, which creates problems for police and SAY staff when children need a safe environment.

Volunteer services are stretched and, as a consequence, sometimes SAY activities have not been able to be conducted through a lack of staff. Several participants reported that a lack of volunteers impeded what the SAY program and PCYC could offer the community. Often it was not possible to have sufficient staff available to work weekends, and this meant services had to be restricted (e.g. running the bus but not the activities).

Another concern with the struggle to get staff in remote communities is that a criminal record check, which is a requirement for working with children, excludes too many people in small remote communities – especially Aboriginal people who may otherwise be ideal working with local youth. One service provider claimed that 'In Bourke 90% of the population has had some interaction with police!' It is recommended that should previous offences be relatively minor in nature and a person is otherwise of sound character, they should be considered for positions with SAY programs. In many cases their experience with the criminal justice system may allow them to offer genuine advice to young kids to deter them from offending.

As the current funding structure requires contracts to be regularly reviewed and renewed, there are difficulties in maintaining program staff. Because of lack of guaranteed continuity in employment around contract renewal time, staff look for alternatives, and are lost to the program.

One local Aboriginal resident maintained the current program lacks visibility and is as not well-known throughout the local Aboriginal community. This informant thought the program was seen as a babysitting service which enabled parents to go to the club or pub. Parents were often not at home when the bus returned the young people, forcing staff to drive from one home to another until they found an appropriate person to take responsibility. Some staff were sufficiently respected in the community to be able to visit the club or pub and demand parents returned home.

Staff were concerned that the service was not meeting the needs of all youth in the community. There were some young people who came to the program, and it is likely that the ones who do not are the ones whom the program really needs to target.

The Referral process

Overall Bourke is relatively well serviced by welfare and support services in comparison with neighbouring communities. There are a number of non-government services in place. As the SAY program is located with the PCYC, it provides access to other programs and support services.

It was reported that young local police seem genuinely concerned about the problems in the town and are actively involved in trying to improve life for young people in the community. Police were working with the PCYC staff to organize youth activities, such as pool parties for Christmas, and regular sausage sizzles. Police were also collaborating with the PCYC and Mission Australia to conduct a healthy living program for young Aboriginal girls aged 12 to 17.

Perceptions of program and appropriateness for the community

Respondents agreed that the program was effective. Many attributed this to the fact that by participating in activities, young people were not wandering aimlessly, and therefore not engaging in crime. Some argued that having the young people together in one place, under supervision, was a significant deterrent to criminal behaviour.

Another participant thought that the bus could assist police by providing another crime prevention presence on the streets. Local police were very supportive of the SAY program and believed it reduced the potential for trouble making, as once youth are home they are unlikely to walk back into town. Police were keen for the bus to operate every night especially in the summer or at least on Thursday, Friday and Saturday, 'but really every night is a Saturday night here'.

However, one participant noted that the efficacy of the program cannot be established because of the difficulty of gathering data and establishing clear social indicators of the program's role in reducing crime and social problems within the community.

Strategies to improve SAY programs

- More funding to extend the hours of operation as the program is perceived to contribute to crime prevention. The programs only address youth roaming the streets between 9.00pm and 10.00pm and are not really meeting the needs of those youth on the streets beyond those hours.
- Clear operational guidelines for SAY programs on some key issues would be useful.
- Remuneration is required for volunteers to encourage greater participation. This is important in remote communities where employment prospects are limited.
- Another incentive for volunteers could be free membership of the Community Justice Group.
- There needs to be some mechanism in place to ensure that volunteers can be on 'stand-by' for quick response and back-up support if program staff are not available.
- One community leader believed the program could play a liaison role between services and institutions within the community and local children and their families. However, he made a strong argument that service provision would be improved by channelling scarce resources through one major agency such as the Department of Community Services. This would address problems of agencies competing for funds, mismanagement of funds, and a doubling up of services for individual clients or families.

Conclusions

Unemployment and social disadvantage are concerns for the Bourke community, and especially impacts upon young people. Very young children are found on the streets at night and there is a general sense of resentment within the community about the crime and antisocial behaviour that occurs. Therefore, support for structured activities for young people, including a night patrol, will remain vital for the well-being of this community.

Appendix 8: Brewarrina Profile



Brewarrina is a town of 943 people situated 787 km North West of Sydney, 378km North West of Dubbo and 96km East of Bourke. The town is located at the place where the Barwon River ends and the Darling commences. The Brewarrina Shire covers an area of approximately 18,500 square kilometres and is home to the Ngemba, Muwarrari and Yualwarri peoples. The area was a traditional inter-tribal meeting place for Aboriginal people.

The Field Work

Two researchers visited Brewarrina in November 2011. Eight people were interviewed; only two were female. Ages ranged from 30 to 65. Four were Aboriginal people. Participants included community leaders, service providers, former patrol staff and interested residents.

Social Profile

Table 19: Brewarrina Social Profile (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011 Census of Population and Housing, 2012)

Brewarrina		%	Australia	%
Population	1,766		21,507,717	
Indigenous people	1,043	59.1	548,369	2.5
Median age	33		37	
Indigenous median age	24		21	
Children aged 0-14	447	25.3	4,144,025	19.3
Indigenous children aged 0-14	324	31.4	256,283	46.7
Persons aged 55 and over	361	20.4	5,516,010	25.6
Indigenous Persons aged 55 and over	153	14.7	53,003	9.7
Unemployed	89	12.5	600,133	5.6
Indigenous persons unemployed	71	22.5	30,462	17.1
Median household weekly income	\$791		\$1,234	
Indigenous median household weekly income	\$720		\$991	
Average people per household	2.6		2.6	

Average Indigenous people per household	3.1		3.3	
One parent families	122	29.3	901,634	15.9
Persons born overseas	164	9.3	6,489,870	30.2

The SAY Program

The Brewarrina night patrol originated as a community service organised by a group of older women in the community. They were provided with a bus by the Variety Club. There were varying reports as to the success of this service labelled the 'Granny Patrol' by some of those residents interviewed. Under the Brewarrina Community Action Plan, another patrol was initiated and it was reported that both patrols were funded at one stage by the DAGJ. Later, funding to this patrol ceased, leaving only one patrol operating in the community. Management of this service was subsequently transferred to the Brewarrina Business Centre and funding continued through the DAGJ. However, in 2011 funding was terminated because of a failure to comply with reporting requirements.

Local Crime Problems

Like many small remote communities, employment opportunities particularly for local Aboriginal youth are limited. Thus, poverty, social disadvantage, drug and alcohol abuse, violence and crime are widespread community concerns. It was reported that young people are on the streets because of boredom, limited youth activities and dysfunctional home environments. The trajectory of local Aboriginal youth into the criminal justice system is an all too familiar story.

A participant stated that most crimes are break-and-enter offences and that the offenders are mainly children; young males and females probably from twelve – might have been younger – up to about eighteen years of age. Yet police maintained that problems, including crime, in Brewarrina were no worse than in other towns. Break and enter, malicious damage and assault including domestic violence are the main types of offences occurring in this community. Trend analysis presented in Table 20 indicates that crime has fallen since 1998.

Table 20: Recorded incidents of selected offences in the Brewarrina Local Government Area

Offence	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	1999-2012 trend	Ave % change
Arson	0	2	4	3	4	2	3	3	20	8	17	35	15	19	*	**
domestic violence	89	65	122	91	91	67	88	65	80	77	55	58	58	56	Down	-3.5%
Assault	121	77	82	99	101	76	59	55	66	75	57	41	45	65	Down	-4.7%
Assault Police	36	21	23	10	9	9	3	6	10	8	4	3	9	1	*	**
Breach AVO	32	25	29	29	34	29	43	27	28	38	23	24	25	28	Stable	**
Breach bail conditions	61	76	45	47	48	51	44	40	67	76	47	44	41	46	Stable	**
Break and enter - dwelling	48	82	44	80	68	37	55	61	63	39	60	31	80	59	Stable	**
Break and enter - non-dwelling	85	72	87	115	55	58	46	49	23	13	18	21	54	36	*	**

Harassment	10	33	32	48	14	32	25	19	34	29	29	38	30	30	*	**
Indecent assault	4	5	4	2	3	6	6	5	12	5	5	6	7	9	*	**
Liquor offences	54	217	333	412	363	140	79	14	29	38	42	31	47	31	*	**
Malicious damage	147	149	163	138	159	105	111	112	101	66	98	83	73	66	Down	-6.0%
Motor vehicle theft	9	19	11	20	19	12	18	23	25	14	22	6	15	16	*	**
Offensive conduct	30	23	22	20	19	15	4	5	4	17	8	16	11	13	*	**
Offensive language	45	39	23	18	9	15	8	12	26	36	16	13	15	11	*	**
Other theft	36	30	42	37	41	19	14	26	17	7	22	16	32	24	*	**
Possession and/or use of cannabis	8	3	4	1	2	1	1	2	4	7	8	7	11	4	*	**
Resist or hinder officer	36	30	14	8	8	10	9	4	16	19	21	11	13	23	*	**
Steal from dwelling	12	18	24	23	29	21	28	24	24	11	23	19	19	21	*	**
Steal from motor vehicle	40	45	34	45	64	32	38	39	24	14	24	17	56	43	*	**
Steal from person	0	0	0	1	5	4	3	0	3	1	2	0	2	3	*	**
Steal from retail store	10	6	5	5	9	5	1	6	3	0	3	1	3	1	*	**
Trespass	27	42	47	43	29	21	18	21	19	14	19	21	25	26	*	**
* A trend is not calculated if at least one 12 month period in the selected timeframe had less than 20 incidents.																
** No annual percentage change is given if the trend is stable or if a trend has not been calculated.																
No ranking available for communities with populations under 3,000																

Best Practice for the Night Patrol

The previous night patrol operated on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights, with more intensive services in the summer compared to the winter. It operated with 2 staff, a driver and an observer. These staff knew the local young people. Bus operation times were varied according to need and to prevent local youth becoming overly familiar with when the bus operated.

The loss of funding for a night patrol has caused contention between different groups within this small community. All participants in the study called for the night patrol to be reinstated. The bus was a safety and security resource for youth and others in need as well as a practical means of transport across the eight kilometres of town area. The local community were not supportive of proposed plans to change the patrol to a SAY activities program.

Barriers to best practice

Participants maintained that funding arrangements need to allow for local community requirements and permit a certain degree of autonomy in local ownership and management. However, this desire does not always meet the requirement for accountability of government funding.

The referral process

The patrols worked with police. They knew when locals were coming home from prison and were able to contact the police when there were problems on the street. Police themselves identified the importance of a good working relationship with the patrol but emphasized the need to be clearly identified as different entities.

Perceptions of program and appropriateness for the community

All of the residents interviewed agreed that the concept of night patrols is excellent. As in other communities, the lack of public transport of any kind meant that the bus was utilised by the community for transporting adults on some occasions. Aboriginal patrol staff also saw their role as significant in the community, particularly in acting as a bridge between the police and younger members of the Aboriginal community

The move towards the SAY program did not fit with Brewarrina's needs. Participants stressed that transportation was needed for all Aboriginal people at risk or in need and not just children.

Assessing crime prevention outcomes

Local police maintained former patrol operations had been effective for crime prevention in the town, but only when they were well managed. Police found the patrol useful in keeping track of what is going on in the community and in crime prevention. Other residents also maintained the night patrol was very effective for crime prevention. A local business owner identified s/he had more broken windows this year than in all the years since 1926. This has a major impact on insurance, and s/he has had to install Crimsafe.

Strategies to improve SAY programs

To address the problem of local politics, one service provider suggested that consultation with all agencies in the community was important to avoid one agency or one group in town taking control of the financial and operational management and to ensure the right people for the job are hired. There is a feeling that face-to-face workers need to be Aboriginal; however, these could be employed in consultation with a range of agencies, not simply one auspicing agency. Local police emphasized that activities for children, particularly sport, was essential. They would be keen for a combined night patrol/SAY activities program to be available in Brewarrina.

Conclusions

In small communities like Brewarrina, the lack of transport makes a bus a prized possession. Aboriginal reserves were traditionally located on the outskirts of towns. Hence, Aboriginal people are required to walk long distances to and from their homes. This means they often remain longer in town centres than they would if their homes were closer. This is one of the reasons children are on the streets at night. Access to the use of the night patrol bus was particularly important for older people or people with disabilities who could not make the long walk into town. Therefore the 'misuse' of the night patrol bus during the day is likely, and this is an issue that needs to be considered with regard to the future funding and planning of SAY programs.

Appendix 9: Dareton Profile



Dareton is a small town situated on the junction of the Murray and Darling Rivers in south-western New South Wales. The town is within the Wentworth Shire which covers an area of 26,000sq.km. There are four other towns in the Shire: Wentworth, Buronga, Gol Gol, and Pooncarie. The closest major regional centres are Broken Hill, 270 km to the north, and Mildura, which is 24kms south just across the border in Victoria.

Social Profile

Dareton has a population of 516 people with an Indigenous population of 36%. In comparison with the rest of Australia, there are more older people. Unemployment in the region is very high and incomes are low.

Table 21: Wentworth LGA and Dareton State Suburb Social Profiles (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011 Census of Population and Housing, 2012)

	Dareton SS	%	Wentworth LGA	%	Australia	%
Population	516		6,609		21,507,717	
Indigenous people	187	36.4	841	10.3	548,369	2.5
Median age	44		42		37	
Indigenous median age	21		23		21	
Children 0-14	85	17.1	1,336	20.2	4,144,025	19.3
Indigenous children 0-14	47	25.1	270	32.1	256,283	46.7
Persons 55 and over	180	34.9	2,033	30.8	5,516,010	25.6
Indigenous 55 and over	18	10	92	11	53,003	9.7
Unemployed	15	10.3	184	6	600,133	5.6
Indigenous unemployed	8	28.6	69	32.4	30,462	17.1
Median household weekly income	\$787		\$886		\$1,234	
Indigenous median household weekly income	\$774		\$782		\$991	
Average people per household	2.5		2.5		2.6	
Ave Indigenous people per household	3.6		3.2		3.3	
One parent families	33	23.1	254	14	901,634	15.9
Persons born overseas	57	11	754	11.4	6,489,870	30.2

Traditional owners include the Ngiyampaa, Paakantji and the Mutthi Mutthi people. Aboriginal people mostly reside in the Namatjira Aboriginal Settlement, a former Aboriginal mission, situated 5km south of the town.

The Field Work

The site was visited in December 2011 by one researcher. Thirteen interviews were conducted comprising representatives from the Night Patrol, welfare support services, Aboriginal leaders, local government and the Police. There were eight females and five male participants, of which seven were Aboriginal people. Their ages ranged from late 20s to late 40s.

The SAY Program

The Dareton night patrol was one of the original patrols in NSW. It is now auspiced by Mallee Family Care Services, based in Mildura, but the main bus service and the majority of the staff are based at the Mallee Family Services office at Dareton. The night patrol bus services all towns in the Wentworth Shire, as Dareton is 22kms from Wentworth, 19km from Buronga and 23km from Gol Gol.

Local Crime Problems

Dareton lacks dedicated facilities for youth recreation. A building which used to be a drop-in centre for youth is currently unusable. Mildura has some youth services, but in the Wentworth Shire, there is little else other than some youth programs provided by Mallee Family Services. Consequently, young people often have little to do.

Boredom is an issue for local youth. Young people frequently travel to Mildura, as it is only 24 kms away. However, this creates a social problem, as the return trip late at night is often not possible. Taxis are an \$80.00 fare one way and buses are not available at night. Victorian Police are concerned about the number of children from NSW who they see in Victoria and how to get them home. The NSW night patrol is unable to enter into Victoria to collect NSW youth. Consequently, these children are at risk either through criminal activity by stealing vehicles in Mildura to find a way back home, or they become victims themselves of crime.

Victorian Police are keen for the SAY Patrol to go into Victoria to collect these children, as they are at risk of committing crime or being a victim of crime. An initial service arrangement exists where the Victorian Bacchus Patrol and the Say Patrol meet over the bridge at the State border to collect the children. The local Council installed lights to assist with this, but timing and resources means this link up is hard to maintain. However, patrol staff reported that the arrangement with Bacchus is spasmodic.

The main crimes experienced are malicious damage, break and enter, stealing from a motor vehicle, domestic violence and breach bail offences (Table 22). The Trend analysis shows that since the inception of the night patrol there has been a fall in assault and general theft, but other crimes have remained stable. Dareton residents revealed that Break and Enter and Drug and Alcohol abuse offences were major community concerns. One participant noted that in most cases where children are involved in petty crime or break and enters, it is to access basic resources such as food, and transport.

Table 22: Recorded incidents of selected offences in the Wentworth Local Government Area

Offence	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	NSW Rank	1999-2012 trend	Ave % change	2009-2012 trend	Ave % change
Arson	4	4	5	2	8	6	14	9	13	11	14	21	25	9		*	**	*	**
Domestic violence	58	83	119	94	80	80	66	73	81	70	90	89	55	72	7	Stable	**	Down	-7.2%
Assault	99	77	75	47	55	70	58	55	54	65	70	49	41	42	42	Down	-6.4%	Down	-15.7%
Assault Police	13	17	25	24	8	3	8	6	6	4	7	10	4	4		*	**	*	**
Breach AVO	13	30	57	46	39	35	21	34	42	40	45	45	16	36		*	**	*	**
Breach bail conditions	6	7	13	9	32	9	61	49	50	57	84	100	101	56		*	**	Stable	**
Break and enter - dwelling	76	76	89	54	93	56	57	113	77	77	69	90	91	89	8	Stable	**	Stable	**
Break and enter - non-dwelling	57	66	78	35	83	61	42	37	33	56	63	106	57	73	3	Stable	**	Stable	**
Harassment	13	24	29	26	26	23	16	18	14	21	29	30	15	22		*	**	*	**
Indecent assault	7	11	12	13	23	12	17	16	12	18	12	11	11	18		*	**	*	**
Liquor offences	3	2	7	5	5	11	10	8	14	3	6	11	5	6		*	**	*	**
Malicious damage	108	132	165	111	155	159	134	140	141	130	143	162	133	154	32	Stable	**	Stable	**
Motor vehicle theft	49	65	49	27	54	49	35	39	17	31	35	42	45	31	3	*	**	Stable	**
Offensive conduct	13	13	5	1	6	2	4	7	7	8	15	5	5	5		*	**	*	**
Offensive language	37	52	38	15	17	7	6	10	12	16	6	13	5	8		*	**	*	**
Other theft	94	92	67	78	82	73	55	59	55	65	61	66	65	67		Down	-2.6%	Stable	**
Possession and/or use of cannabis	9	27	21	19	29	44	45	18	39	66	48	47	39	43		*	**	Stable	**
Resist or hinder officer	21	35	30	27	12	11	9	12	10	11	25	25	3	10		*	**	*	**
Steal from dwelling	58	58	67	30	63	43	44	52	56	46	51	40	53	45	6	Stable	**	Stable	**
Steal from motor vehicle	70	55	41	28	55	65	50	35	33	48	46	82	83	50	11	Stable	**	Stable	**
Steal from person	0	0	0	2	0	2	3	2	1	0	2	11	4	4	67	*	**	*	**
Steal from retail store	19	13	15	5	8	6	8	5	9	4	11	15	18	12	48	*	**	*	**
Trespass	23	28	26	18	35	28	34	27	23	24	21	33	18	17		*	**	*	**

* A trend is not calculated if at least one 12 month period in the selected timeframe had less than 20 incidents.

** No annual percentage change is given if the trend is stable or if a trend has not been calculated.

Best Practice for the SAY Program

The bus operates Friday and Saturday evenings between 8pm and midnight and is able to support more vulnerable younger children within this time frame. The night patrol bus is used by the wider community during the day for youth activities and for transporting children to and from sport activities. It carries a spotlight and torches. It is not unusual for the service to operate well beyond paid hours, so that children are not left at risk. Mallee Family Care has 24 hour management on call so that SAY staff can always call for support/direction.

There is no clear pattern or plan to where and when the bus travels, but routes are based on local knowledge of local events. The patrol will frequent certain locations, such as the wharf at Wentworth, where kids will 'hang-out', or other locations where young people might be with adults and alcohol. Not having a clear schedule has drawn criticism within the community because it is perceived that the SAY patrol is favouring certain youth in certain locations.

The agency has introduced a permission slip system where children will not be picked up unless there is a signed agreement (the permission slip) obtained from parents/carer. This is to ensure that the night patrol cannot be accused of kidnapping. Seeking parental permission also ensures parental involvement. Permission slips are completed three times a year. Local youth in Year 7 and those attending local sporting groups are given a night patrol information pack. Blank forms are held for youth without permission slips and these are signed at the parent/caregiver's house.

Patrol staff will get out off the bus to make sure children are actually delivered to a safe home environment. There are occasions where staff might bring children back to the base and feed them prior to being able to take a child to a safe location. Sometimes local knowledge is used to identify other family members where it is judged not safe to return the young person home, or if parents are not at home. In most cases these are children who will need to be reported to community services. Police will also sometimes contact SAY to transport children home.

The patrol operates with some flexibility often in consultation with local police and shop owners and also in line with community activities. If events like disco are held, then SAY will be flexible to operate at beginning and end of night to assist with transport. During summer, local children flock to the local swimming pool in town but many then have an approximate 6kms to walk home to the Namatjira Aboriginal Settlement. If they have spent all their money at the pool, they lack money to get home or to make calls to their parents. In some cases, their parents may not be available to get them. In the height of summer temperatures hover around 43 degrees, so the SAY staff work with the pool management to extend the pool closing times and then transport the children home.

Staff

Staff include a manager and two part time staff and one full time. The manager tries to keep a gender balance, a male and female, on the patrols to ensure safety and in case there are family issues. The three patrol staff are rostered in rotation and there are always two staff on the patrol. The staff are all Aboriginal people who are well-connected to community, which allows for better social control over local youth, because the staff are known to families. There are six volunteers.

All staff work towards qualifications; that is, they have a staff developmental plan and complete Cert 3 and Cert 4 in Community Services and Diploma. Development is considered essential for staff because of the skills needed to assess levels of community support and service provision that might be needed for a particular child. However, it is recognised that the job is stressful and takes up time normally spent with family members, so staff are encouraged to consider their needs as well.

It was considered best practice to have Indigenous people on the bus and to consider the gender balance of staff, as well as staff training and skills. Staff require appropriate orientation. Appropriate policies and

procedures need to be in place to ensure consistency in handling specific issues in a manner that empowers families and young people.

Managing reporting in general and mandatory reporting specifically was also cited in relation to best practice. This is a particular issue when staff are involved in reports relating to their own family members. Finally, marketing was seen as essential for effective operation of the service.

The Referral Process

The SAY program sits under the community support and engagement program at Mallee Family Services. This links the patrol service to other programs for community referral and information. Parent and community engagement extends to school, sport and recreation programs. The SAY program and Mallee Family Support Program work together delivering 'Say no to violence' and 'Where are your kids' programs. Participants noted that there has been a reduction in 'adolescent to adolescent' violence within the community.

The structure essentially allows for case management of youth in trouble. This case management response is a strength of this service. Referral pathways support the fact that the SAY program is working with youth engaged in a range of other activities. Referral numbers held by Mallee Family Support would demonstrate what interventions and engagement can do for young people and could be another source of data collection for the referral process.

Workers make decisions about what interventions are needed, such as medical or counselling, and this information is reported to Mallee Family Services and to the Team Leader Manager for follow-up. If a particular child is collected two or three weekends in a row with a similar story, this results in a 'warm' referral to Mallee Family Support Program. The family support team, often with a SAY patrol member, will then visit the family to make them aware that they have picked up their child on a few occasions, and ask if there is something they can do to help support the family. The practice also allows for follow-up mandatory referrals, if required.

Relationship with police

The service has formed links with local police. Patrol staff will call the police to let them know the service is on the road. Police will call the patrol to check on kids if they are congregating in certain locations. Previously ACLOs would ride along on the bus, but changes to police penalty shifts have meant that they can no longer be involved. There is no 24 hour 7 day a week police station, so calls can be diverted, which means timely response by local police can be difficult.

Community Perceptions of the Program

Overall participants agreed the patrol was an excellent service for local youth. It had a primary role in addressing significant local transport issues (e.g. its role in getting young people to sporting events) and in providing a safe alternative to a risky home environment.

Effectiveness for crime prevention

Some maintained the patrol can reduce the perception of a high crime rate. Participants believed that the presence of the bus when on the streets deters some crime. The Bus is well signed and will park in streets so that it is a visible service to all the community. One participant maintained that the bus is seen as 'rolling security'.

Barriers to Best Practice

The size of the bus (an 8 seater) is a problem as two seats are taken up by staff which means the service can only carry six children at a time. Also there are no bracket points in the Hyundai van for car seats for babies/young children.

When the bus is required to pick up large numbers of young people, staff need to assess which children should be taken home first. There are concerns that kids might move on before the bus can return. Sometimes a worker may stay with kids, leaving the driver to transport some of the youth home. This can be an issue for staff safety but considered essential to ensuring the safety of local children and youth. Staff will contact police when the patrol is not able to accommodate children and youth on the bus or if they are causing problems, such as drinking etc.

Intoxicated youth are not allowed on the bus but this means staff face an ethical dilemma as to who makes that call if someone is intoxicated. This raises concerns about legal responsibilities.

There is no Safe House for young people in the shire when no safe alternative to home/extended family are available. The closest safe house is in Mildura. The local Community Working party is attempting to address this issue but, as in other small communities, the absence of safe houses or youth refuges is a major gap in service provision.

Strategies for improvement

Participants offered the following suggestions:

- More operational hours: at least one more night particularly in the warmer months. And more staff.
- For the safety of patrol staff, a clear perspex barrier between the front seat for staff and the rear of the mini bus.
- A more inclusive service: allowing adults as well as children to use the bus as there is no public transport.
- A regular conference for SAY staff.
- A bus with only one sliding door as there are concerns when the door opens up to oncoming traffic.

Conclusions

For this widely dispersed population, the patrol is essential. One participant concluded:

I would hate to lose it. I don't believe it has been given the chance to really show itself. You know with the hours being there and then dropped and that sort of thing. So I would like to see it be given enough opportunity to really show what it can do in the area.

Appendix 10: Dubbo Profile



Situated in the central west of New South Wales (412 km north-west of Sydney) the city of Dubbo is a commercial, industrial and administrative hub of the western NSW region. The shire covers an area of 3,321 square kilometres. Dubbo is characteristic of large regional inland cities that have grown rapidly over the last twenty years due to drought and economic decline in rural Australia. This expansion is often at the expense of surrounding smaller rural towns.

Traditional owners of the region are the Tubba-Gah People of the Wiradjuri Nation. Aboriginal people comprise 14.5% of the city's population and 13% across the wider local government area. In recent years Aboriginal people have moved into Dubbo from outback towns such as Bourke, Brewarrina, Wilcannia and Walgett seeking employment. There are up to 57 Aboriginal Communities represented in Dubbo.

Social Profile

Table 23: Dubbo Social Profile (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011 Census of Population and Housing, 2012)

	Dubbo	%	Australia	%
Population	38,805		21,507,717	
Indigenous people	4,985	12.8	548,369	2.5
Median age	36		37	
Indigenous median age	19		21	
Children 0-14	8,731	22.5	4,144,025	19.3
Indigenous children aged 0-14	1,959	39.3	256,283	46.7
Persons 55 and over	9,852	25.4	5,516,010	25.6
Indigenous Persons aged 55 and over	452	9	53,003	9.7
Unemployed	941	4.9	600,133	5.6
Indigenous persons unemployed	306	18.3	30,462	17.1
Median household weekly income	\$1,096		\$1,234	
Indigenous median household weekly income	\$943		\$991	
Average people per household	2.6		2.6	
Average Indigenous people per household	3.3		3.3	
One parent families	1,970	19.3	901,634	15.9
Persons born overseas	4,074	10.5	6,489,870	30.2

Until 2006, Aboriginal people were primarily located within the Gordon Estate in West Dubbo. The area had the highest proportion of persons below the age of 14 of any public housing area in NSW, the greatest proportion of low income earners and a high level of social disadvantage. However, with the influx of 'out of towners', many of whom were traditional 'enemies', the estate became notorious for violence, crime, vandalism and anti-social behaviour. Riots in the estate on New Year's Day 2005 demanded a new approach to tackling crime and antisocial behaviour. So in 2006 the NSW Department of Housing closed the estate and relocated over 200 households; mostly to other parts of Dubbo. The exercise was hailed as the major reason for a significant reduction in Dubbo's crime rates. However, the project also saw the breakdown of an Aboriginal community where many people knew their neighbours and lived near their relatives. Many ex-residents still make daily visits to their families who have remained on the estate. This social change in Dubbo highlights the need for a night patrol as young people need transport to homes that are spread across the city.

SAY Program

The Dubbo night patrol service is managed by the Dubbo Neighbourhood Centre. The service operates Thursday, Friday and Saturday evenings from 6.00 to 10.30pm. The bus is a 12-seater Toyota.

Local Crime Problems

BOCSAR 2011 data for Dubbo indicates that break and enter, malicious damage, steal from a motor vehicle, and breach of bail, are the main crimes experienced in Dubbo (Table 24). Local police added that robberies, break and enter, graffiti and fighting were common problems. Boredom is seen as a major contributor to criminal behavior. Youth congregating in groups was reported as an issue about which police could do little. One Aboriginal service provider was concerned that so many young children aged 12 or 13 fail to attend school and spend most days from 6.00am to late into the evening hanging around in groups, or on their bikes or skate boards, particularly in the warmer months. They have little respect for safety, often skating in front of traffic or in front of people on the footpath. Many gather on the river bank, light fires and survive on packets of noodles.

Table 24: Recorded incidents of selected offences for Dubbo LGA: Annual totals and trends from October 1998 to September 2012 and from 2009 to 2012 and ranking against other LGAs in NSW. (BOCSAR 2012)

Offence	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Rank	1999-2012 trend	Ave % change	2009-2012 trend	Ave % change
Arson	25	58	53	56	57	50	88	141	124	102	140	77	68	119		Up	12.8%	Stable	**
Domestic violence	164	191	199	316	458	418	360	313	320	268	289	300	313	310	13	Up	5.0%	Stable	**
Assault - non-domestic	287	337	389	394	483	433	447	446	405	409	380	403	369	364	13	Stable	**	Stable	**
Assault Police	42	44	45	46	48	51	39	25	24	20	23	18	27	21		*	**	*	**
Breach AVO	129	95	94	96	189	135	148	86	122	140	114	122	131	146		Stable	**	Stable	**
Breach bail	95	106	144	123	159	177	237	543	181	160	389	437	448	525		Up	14.1%	Up	10.5%
Break & enter dwelling	849	822	1015	860	807	841	650	531	416	442	416	456	398	569	11	Down	-3.0%	Stable	**
Break & enter non-dwelling	396	641	510	437	596	519	405	366	210	193	158	98	97	116	86	Down	-9.0%	Down	-9.8%
Harassment	100	98	115	133	196	208	261	202	233	324	299	292	232	356		Up	10.3%	Stable	**
Liquor offences	17	12	33	85	152	80	131	178	119	99	114	127	145	61		*	**	Down	-18.8%
Malicious damage	854	803	1045	875	1124	1156	1179	1304	1078	1117	908	917	819	887	21	Stable	**	Stable	**

Motor vehicle theft	235	295	386	381	283	330	389	345	195	187	145	148	116	155	40	Down	-3.2%	Stable	**
Offensive conduct	49	51	57	70	122	101	84	75	56	84	86	82	74	64		Stable	**	Stable	**
Offensive language	140	88	74	67	93	54	63	47	61	48	67	61	56	61		Down	-6.2%	Stable	**
Other theft	480	467	461	424	363	336	285	353	245	258	224	198	175	215		Down	-6.0%	Stable	**
Possession and/or use of cannabis	129	88	65	63	54	76	90	80	64	74	70	98	76	106		Stable	**	Stable	**
Resist or hinder officer	92	81	100	79	121	70	70	54	73	57	64	64	78	47		Down	-5.0%	Up	19.4%
Steal from dwelling	335	321	323	313	281	265	259	262	236	248	181	198	224	201	14	Down	-3.9%		
Steal from motor vehicle	657	821	1007	1104	689	839	777	868	382	407	483	492	336	677	14	Up	0.2%		
Steal from person	0	0	0	72	92	69	50	52	32	36	27	31	33	51	30	*	**		
Steal from retail store	346	273	231	258	313	229	198	164	137	173	168	176	198	286	13	Down	-1.5%		
Trespass	115	94	68	104	120	105	134	154	126	165	120	114	121	177		Up	3.4%		
* A trend is not calculated if at least one 12 month period in the selected timeframe had less than 20 incidents. ** No annual percentage change is given if the trend is stable or if a trend has not been calculated.																			

The service provider noted the change in the population with many Aboriginal people coming to Dubbo from outlying remote areas. There are problems associated with the large number of single parents with young children. He noted that it was difficult for the local Aboriginal community to maintain social control.

Best Practice

The service has an average of 400-500 young people a month, although this number varies significantly, with summer being the busier season. It operates 3 nights a week normally, and 4 nights a week over the school holidays. There is a need for service every night some of the time. Friday and Saturday nights are the busiest. Young people can contact the bus and ask to be picked up. Most of the young people are between 14 and 17, though the service has picked up children as young as 8, particularly in the summer.

Staff

There are three regular staff. There is preferably a female staff member on every shift. Staff are dedicated and passionate about their work, and demonstrate they care for the young people. Some are elderly, so stamina is required to complete several shifts in a row. One staff member is a local Aboriginal elder who was considered to be well respected within the community. Participants maintained it is important to have an Aboriginal person on the bus especially when dealing with Aboriginal kids.

Barriers to best practice

A lack of awareness that a night patrol operates in Dubbo was cited by some participants as a problem for the patrol's effectiveness. A need for extended hours was a common complaint as children still congregate on the streets long after the bus has ceased operation at night.

The lack of a youth centre linked with the service was an issue raised by several participants. This can create a problem for the night patrol in finding safe houses to take children when home is not a safe place to be. Homelessness in Dubbo was a concern for local welfare agencies. Current emergency accommodation at the emergency shelter is limited with a four or five-day waiting list. Although there is a PCYC, it was suggested that local Aboriginal youth feel unwelcome there.

Another issue was the employment of patrol staff under the current funding structure. The work is part-time and the pay is not considered particularly good.

Most of the Aboriginal people interviewed did not consider homelessness to be a problem in the community. They argued that there is always an Aunty, friend or someone within the community who will take children in if they are homeless. However, one added that overcrowding was a concern.

The referral process

Referrals to support services appear to work well, as the SAY program is managed by the Dubbo Neighbourhood Centre which houses a number of support groups. In addition, outreach is effective because of the active participation of Aboriginal staff of the night patrol and the mentoring of the 22 member Aboriginal Community Justice Group representing 17 different language groups, which provides a network of support services.

While Patrol staff acknowledged that they often tried to deal with youth problems as they were able, there were times when it was necessary to refer youth in trouble to support services. One Aboriginal participant gave the example of one young teenage girl who revealed to patrol staff that she was pregnant. Patrol staff were able to refer her to prenatal support and health services. However, he noted that if referrals are made, they also require follow-up. For example, in the case of the pregnant teenager, an incident report was made by the night patrol staff and the following morning, the case worker was contacted. Ideally a support worker should be attached to the bus service.

One issue of concern is the difficulty of mandatory reporting for Aboriginal people within the close social ties of Aboriginal communities. This can potentially be managed by engaging patrol staff in neighbourhood team meetings, where child protection issues could be discussed and plans determined.

Relationship with the police

Another issue raised by several participants was the lack of interaction between the patrol and the police. There was recognition that this relationship could be improved, but that this was difficult in the context of differing shifts and staff changes.

Perceptions of program and appropriateness for the community

Participants maintained the patrol is appropriate for the community. Patrol staff are thought to be perceived more as 'aunties' and 'uncles' rather than officials and this helps the effectiveness of the program in creating a non-threatening image in the minds of young people. Removing young people from the street is seen as an effective crime prevention strategy (see *Measuring Crime Prevention Outcomes* below).

Community involvement

The bus seems to be well used as a community bus by a range of services outside the hours of the patrol. The bus is used during the day as an outreach service for various Aboriginal activities, including picking up people to take them to medical appointments or to various services and sometimes to help older people with grocery shopping. The bus is also used to pick up children and their parents for Arts and Crafts classes held at the public school. People who use the service range from elderly people in their 70s, single mothers

with children, and people with mental illnesses; Indigenous and Non-Indigenous. It's especially helpful in offering support to the Schizophrenic Fellowship, which cannot access other services. The bus is also used to pick up people and take them to the soup kitchen that operates on a Friday night. The bus will also take them home to their door. There are strict guidelines in place for bus access; namely, that use must not conflict with the night patrol operation. Other services using the bus must also pay the fuel costs. These arrangements seem to work well.

Measuring crime prevention outcomes

When asked further if the patrol was effective for crime prevention, all participants agreed that it was because it kept kids from roaming the streets at night and therefore removed the potential for them to cause or be victims of trouble. This was strongly supported by local police who saw the transport provided as an essential crime prevention strategy. Local police noted that crime rates had fallen in recent years - although much of this change has been accredited to the dispersal of the Gordon Estate. They could not assess the impact of the patrol upon crime rates in the city.

Strategies to improve SAY programs

Extended hours of operation for patrols was a suggestion made by several participants. Local youth know the hours the bus operates and wait until the patrol ends to roam the streets. However, it is acknowledged that more hours would be costly. Patrol staff thought the bus could be extended to the rest of the community as a significant lack of public transport impacts on all members of the community. Dubbo Council has introduced an alternative: providing cheap taxi vouchers for young people. These can be used for taxi fares within the local area and this is seen as an effective move.

Staff Training

Training for patrol staff was cited as essential to ensure those working with vulnerable children knew how to manage difficult situations as they arose. Current patrol staff also raised the issue of training and the need to keep skills updated.

Some participants were concerned that sections of the community were unaware of the service and believed that it should be widely promoted. Others added that sometimes the service is difficult to contact, especially considering the hours that they operate. One participant suggested that mobile numbers be made available so that staff are easy to reach.

The need for the patrol to be linked with a youth service was raised several times in discussions. The poor relationship between the local PCYC and Aboriginal youth is something that could be addressed to ensure that such a space is available for the night patrol. Alternatively, the replacement of the Gordon Estate youth centre could be an option.

Other strategies were offered including offering a drop-in centre and a pick up from school, sharing space with other services and agencies and developing a more integrated approach. The need for a youth refuge noted above was seen as essential for the community. Another suggestion was for a broad advisory committee comprised of major service providers to improve management and interagency cooperation, and potential auspice from a recognized national organisation.

Conclusions

The SAY patrol is managed by the Dubbo Neighbourhood Centre, but patrol staff are local Aboriginal people. Those interviewed strongly supported the night patrol for its role as a 'watch dog', ensuring youth safety and crime prevention.

Referrals to support services appear to work well as the bus is monitored by the local Aboriginal Justice group. The bus seems to be well used by a range of services and community groups outside the hours of the patrol. This seems to work well and is tightly managed by the neighbourhood Centre; a model that *may* work in other communities where there is a lack of community transport.

Appendix 11: Kempsey Profile



Kempsey lies 35 km inland on the mid north coast of NSW 420kms north of Sydney. The Kempsey Shire covers an area of 3,335 sq. km which incorporates 50 km of coastline and a hinterland of farm land, mountain forests and national parks. The unique feature of this Shire is the number of villages and settlements scattered throughout the area, resulting in more than half of the total population residing outside of Kempsey township. A dispersed population demonstrates the need for a night patrol.

The Field Work

A member of the research team visited Kempsey in October 2011. Eleven interviews were conducted with night patrol staff, service providers and community leaders. Participants comprised five males and six females. Ages ranged from early 30s to 50s. Six were Aboriginal people. An informal dinner was arranged with three parents, and four Aboriginal youth under 18 years.

Social Profile

Table 25: Kempsey LGA Social Profile (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011 Census of Population and Housing, 2012)

	Kempsey	%	Australia	%
Population	28,134		21,507,717	
Indigenous people	3,124	11.1	548,369	2.5
Median age	45		37	
Indigenous median age	21		21	

Children aged 0-14	5,475	19.4	4,144,025	19.3
Indigenous children 0-14	1,169	37.5	256,283	46.7
Persons aged 55 and over	9,998	35.5	5,516,010	25.6
Indigenous Persons aged 55 and over	336	10.7	53,003	9.7
Unemployed	912	8.9	600,133	5.6
Indigenous persons unemployed	165	27.6	30,462	17.1
Median household weekly income	\$748		\$1,234	
Indigenous median household weekly income	\$700		\$991	
Average people per household	2.4		2.6	
Average Indigenous people per household	3.3		3.3	
One parent families	1,686	22.5	901,634	15.9
Persons born overseas	3,609	12.8	6,489,870	30.2

Kempsey has a high proportion of Aboriginal people, high unemployment, more single parent families, and low-medium household income compared to national averages. Generally the population is older than national averages due to the high proportion of retirees.

The traditional owners are the Dughutti People. Today there is a large Aboriginal community comprised of four distinct groups, including South Kempsey, Burnt Bridge, North Street and Greenhills. There are also new Aboriginal families who have moved into the district with no kinship attachment to the area.

Profile of the SAY Program

The SAY Program in Kempsey is a night patrol. It is managed by and operates from the Kempsey PCYC, located in South Kempsey. The SAY patrol is funded to operate between 8-12 pm two nights a week. Additional time is contributed by the local PCYC and this includes grant money for additional staff. All staff working on the bus are PCYC staff. The PCYC Club manager is responsible for organising activities and events and manages the SAY patrol program. Youth are able to join in the PCYC activities via the SAY patrol. The patrol will ensure any young people utilising the service are taken to a safe location of the young person's choice or to the PCYC for a meal and activities designed to keep them safe.

Local Crime Problems

The main crimes experienced in this community are malicious damage, break and enter, stealing offences, assault, and domestic violence. Kempsey is ranked fifth highest in the state for break and enter offences and motor vehicle theft.

Table 26 presents the number of selected recorded crimes 1998 to 2012 including the trend in the percentage change over that period as well as the percentage change since 2009, since the inception of the SAY program. Of concern is the increase in cannabis use. Also on the rise is theft from retail stores, which may be associated with drug use.

Table 26: Recorded incidents of selected offences for Kempsey LGA: Annual totals and trends from October 1998 to September 2012 and from 2009 to 2012 and ranking against other LGAs in NSW. (BOCSAR 2012)

Offence	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	NSW Rank	1999-2012 trend	Ave % change	2009-2012 trend	Ave % change
Arson	13	45	78	100	72	59	46	82	62	67	77	76	114	132		*	**	Up	19.7%
Domestic violence	210	200	204	281	245	212	205	210	209	279	235	191	211	170	23	Stable	**	Stable	**

Assault - non-domestic	218	244	303	339	346	276	293	244	232	252	251	235	201	222	35	Up	0.1%	Down	-4.0%
Assault Police	29	15	25	19	35	39	27	17	17	24	16	12	15	13		*	**	*	**
Breach AVO	136	100	138	134	112	87	74	108	108	136	125	92	64	107		Down	-1.8%	Stable	**
Breach bail	34	33	60	122	101	77	98	64	44	87	92	56	60	86		Stable	**	Stable	**
Break & enter dwelling	382	316	375	357	359	299	242	230	235	253	337	349	485	398	5	Stable	**	Stable	**
Break & enter non-dwelling	264	217	266	279	262	277	295	231	240	191	189	131	194	155	12	Down	-4.0%	Stable	**
Harassment	38	77	72	125	158	199	198	211	209	220	274	168	132	219		Up	14.4%	Stable	**
Indecent assault	24	21	40	34	38	28	46	47	31	28	38	33	32	35		Stable	**	Stable	**
Liquor offences	24	40	35	42	92	105	186	210	194	151	199	119	63	82		Up	9.9%	Down	-25.6%
Malicious damage	540	530	597	683	590	657	666	623	568	690	594	563	648	541	20	Stable	**	Stable	**
Motor vehicle theft	96	115	194	130	174	172	145	136	123	121	175	141	173	119	5	Stable	**	Stable	**
Offensive conduct	27	40	29	58	70	71	94	43	56	72	65	29	36	13		*	**	*	**
Offensive language	101	46	42	82	79	95	98	76	59	62	64	68	23	19		*	**	*	**
Other theft	245	261	307	309	263	223	246	174	268	238	258	249	218	212		Down	-1.1%	Stable	**
Possession and/or use of cannabis	80	94	75	92	95	88	91	53	74	79	71	89	79	110		Stable	**	Up	15.7%
Resist or hinder officer	72	64	34	77	64	54	85	62	90	81	62	37	57	37		Stable	**	Down	-15.8%
Steal from dwelling	174	178	159	194	267	199	196	158	173	155	199	201	196	211	7	Stable	**	Stable	**
Steal from motor vehicle	252	307	229	267	334	278	418	195	173	159	183	184	190	290	36	Up	1.1%	Stable	**
Steal from person	0	0	0	14	22	13	20	16	16	22	18	25	25	19	28	*	**	*	**
Steal from retail store	135	136	96	89	158	109	85	91	82	85	51	58	52	94	75	Down	-2.7%	Up	22.6%
Trespass	31	35	48	101	128	81	100	85	66	60	84	64	49	49		Stable	**	Down	-16.4%

* A trend is not calculated if at least one 12 month period in the selected timeframe had less than 20 incidents.

** No annual percentage change is given if the trend is stable or if a trend has not been calculated.

Best Practice for the SAY Program

The bus runs young people to and from activities at the PCYC, but also patrols the streets. It does not collect young people from their homes, but rather meets them at pre-determined places in town. It will also respond to young people's requests for transport. The bus route varies depending on the season. In the summer, with a larger population, the bus extends its route to South West Rocks and Crescent Head.

The patrol operates on Friday and Saturday nights. On Friday nights young people aged 12-18 years are targeted, but in general attendance is mainly those aged between 14 and 15. Younger children attend on Saturday nights (aged 10-12) between 5.00 pm to 7.30 pm. These children are dropped-off by their parents and the PCYC provides them with a meal. The SAY bus takes children under 12yrs home or to an alternative safe place around 7.30 pm. Activities for older youth finish around 10 pm and they are then taken home. Participants estimated that numbers averaged around 40 each night.

Additional programs accessed by young people attending the PCYC include midnight basketball. This is particularly popular and seen as a significant crime deterrent. One informant claimed that crime had dropped 56% on a Friday night when midnight basketball was running. The PCYC offers a range of other programs and workshops including painting, volleyball, indoor bowls, cricket, various workshops, drumming, Twister, Pictionary and other such games.

Food is a key element of the program, although there is some confusion as to the funding for the food (from SAY or PCYC). It appears that additional fundraising is needed to provide this component of the service. All involved sit down together to eat and the meal is used as an occasion for conversation and building relationships.

Staff

The bus is staffed by two adults. Staff are selected and evaluated on their capacity to engage with kids and earn their respect. Respect itself is thought to arise from the way staff interact with young people. Informants identified that a particular target for staffing are strong men who are able to act as mentors for young males. This is identified as a particular issue in this community because up to 50% of Aboriginal families in Kempsey have only one parent and a lot of these families are headed by a young woman. A large number of families are perceived as struggling. Several local men are imprisoned at the Kempsey correctional centre. A significant number of young males therefore do not have a male role model as they are missing fathers, uncles and even grandfathers.

Staff need to have Police and Working with Children Checks. This excludes some local people from working and this is not always perceived positively by those concerned. Checks are renewed each year.

The referral process

Relationships with a wide range of other services appear strong, but these relationships tend to be with the combined PCYC/SAY, rather than with one or the other individually. Staff have a MOU with some organisations regarding collaboration, such as the community justice group. The PCYC has access to many support agencies which results in mental health workers, Drug and alcohol workers, local elders and Juvenile justice workers offering support through the program. Other agencies also refer to the PCYC and Patrol and encourage young people to attend.

The PCYC runs a morning program and a number of the youth involved with SAY also participate in this. The *Clean Slate* program offers a cooked breakfast, shelter, and exercise. It operates Monday, Wednesday and Friday mornings from 6am and uses the patrol bus to collect young people from their homes at 5.30am and deliver them to school afterwards. Lunch packs are available for those who need them. One informant claimed that, of the 25-30 young people attending, none have been suspended from school on the days they attend the program.

Relationship with the police

The patrol notifies the police when they commence and finish patrolling. The police will sometimes contact the patrol when they see young people loitering, as the patrol are perceived as a more gentle first intervention compared to the police. The patrol will not normally contact the police unless there is anti-

social activity occurring. On occasion the patrol has assisted the police in intervening in a situation before it escalated to potential trouble.

The Police are also involved with activities at the PCYC and this is highly appreciated by the staff, who feel it creates an opportunity for police to build relationships with young people.

Perceptions of program and appropriateness for the community

Informants felt that the demand for the service is reflected in attendance. On average they service 40 to 50 young people a night. Many of these are repeat attendees, who bring with them friends and siblings. 'Repeat business' is seen as a strong measure of effectiveness.

There have been some very positive outcomes. A number of the young people have gone on to do the *Blue Star Leadership Program* and are now mentoring younger cousins. Effectiveness is also gauged through feedback from families and community.

The patrol was perceived by one informant to be responsible for lessening community rivalries, in particular rivalries between South Kempsey; West Kempsey; Greenhills; Bellbrook etc. This is because the bus services all these areas and is not perceived as belonging to one only.

Some segments of the community are unhappy with the allocation of the funding to PCYC for the SAY program as previous patrols have been managed by the Aboriginal community. This is the issue that arose in several sites - that of the appropriateness of a non-Indigenous agency running an Indigenous service.

Local youth feel a sense of ownership of the bus and are involved in determining the rules. The Code of Conduct that the young people developed began at the midnight basketball, but has since been transferred to the bus. Working with young people to create a feeling of ownership in this manner and to support the development of empowerment is considered an important element of the success of the program.

Assessing crime prevention outcomes

A number of participants claimed that crime has gone down because the program has ensured that there were not as many young people on the street. Crime data demonstrate there has been a reduction in juvenile crime, with fewer juveniles detained or arrested and a gradual decline overall for crime in the Kempsey district over the last 12 months. A number of informants felt that young people committed offenses through boredom, and that providing interesting activities was a way of preventing these crimes.

Visibility of the bus is considered to be very important. As it is easily recognizable, it is easy for young people to recognise and know that it was safe. High visibility also acted as a crime prevention tool.

Patrol staff believed that the bus played a role in establishing 'soft contact' with young people; it offered an opportunity to engage them through simply offering transport and that more substantial relationships could be built from this non-judgmental beginning.

Suggestions for improvement

Participants called for more funding for more hours and flexibility in operation. This would include extending hours at night and perhaps opening on a Sunday as well as a Thursday night. The argument given was that there is not a lot to do in town, and that without activities to address boredom, young people are

more likely to engage in criminal behaviour. Others would like a bigger bus and wider use of the bus within the community (for example being able to take people to medical appointments).

It was acknowledged that the SAY funding was targeted at operating the bus, and that the activities were funded through the PCYC. However, informants felt the combination of services was critical and that this should be addressed in the funding.

Conclusions

Kempsey is quite well serviced for a regional community, but with a growing population, there is a need for additional services. Council has provided several youth services including a youth liaison officer, and information and referral service. There is also a youth refuge, although the services are limited and a safe house is needed for this community.

The SAY patrol is managed by the Kempsey PCYC and operates to coordinate with PCYC youth activities. While SAY programs operate 8 to 12pm on two nights a week, additional time is provided by the PCYC. There are also links to other programs and workshops including the very popular midnight basketball. The Clean Slate program that seeks to improve truancy is an excellent concept. This cooperative arrangement works well and is optimal for youth services, providing safe transport as well as structured activities. Food is also a key element. There are clear rules for conduct for access to all programs which local youth respect. This suite of programs is also considered to be a significant crime prevention program for the community. It works because of dedicated staff and because the wider community including Rotary supports the initiatives

Appendix 12: La Perouse Profile



The suburb of La Perouse is located at the southern extent of Randwick City LGA and is bounded by an extensive foreshore area. The La Perouse peninsula is the northern headland of Botany Bay. There is a small residential area in the west of La Perouse which is a mix of low and medium-density housing.

La Perouse is the one area of Sydney with which Aboriginal people have had an unbroken connection for over 7,500 years. The original owners of the land were the Kameygal people. Today, many residents at La Perouse have strong connections with the Aboriginal community at Wreck Bay. In 1885, three hectares of land at La Perouse were made an Aboriginal reserve: the only one in Sydney. Several missions were established, the most significant being the La Perouse Aboriginal Mission. During the 1920s, La Perouse people became politically active in support of land rights, but it was not until 1984 that the La Perouse Local Aboriginal Land Council was given ownership of the reserve (Kensy 2008).

Social Profile

The Eastern Suburbs of Sydney has a population of approximately 258,500 people. The youth population (aged under 15 years) is 14.6% and the Indigenous population is just under 1%. Maroubra is the largest suburb in Randwick City. The Maroubra population is similar to the Randwick City average, with higher proportions of 20 to 34 year olds and fewer children and older people. Maroubra has slightly more family households and married people. More people speak a language other than English at home than the average, with the most popular languages being Chinese (Cantonese and Mandarin), Greek and Indonesian.

In 2011, there were 418 people living in La Perouse. Well over one-third of the population is Aboriginal. Many are older people with the median age higher than national averages. La Perouse has a higher proportion of larger households (4+ people) and family households. Incomes are lower and the proportion of one parent families much higher than the rest of Australia. The majority of people speak English at home, and do not have a second language.

Table 27: La Perouse Social Profile (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011 Census of Population and Housing, 2012)

	La Perouse	%	Randwick	%	Australia	%
Population	418		128,989		21,507,717	
Indigenous people	154	36.8	1,843	1.4	548,369	2.5
Median age	41		35		37	
Indigenous median age	25		27		21	
Children 0-14	76	18.7	19,502	15.1	4,144,025	19.3
Indigenous children 0-14	x		503	27.2	256,283	46.7
Persons aged 55 and over	126	30	29,224	23	5,516,010	25.6
Indigenous Persons aged 55 and over	x		254	14	53,003	9.7
Unemployed	15	8.6	3,634	5.5	600,133	5.6
Indigenous persons unemployed	x		69	10.5	30,462	17.1
Median household weekly income	1,037		1,577		1,234	
Indigenous median household weekly income	816		1,155		991	
Average people per household	2.8		2.4		2.6	
Average Indigenous people per household	3.1		2.8		3.3	
One parent families	34	31.8	4,549	14.9	901,634	15.9
Persons born overseas	104	25	59,427	46	6,489,870	30.2

The SAY Program

The La Perouse Street Beat Night Patrol commenced in 2004 with the formation of the Project Steering Committee, including the La Perouse Koori Interagency and the La Perouse Community Working Party. The 12-seater La Perouse Street Beat bus, known as the *Boomerang Bus*, operates from the Eastern Suburbs PCYC. It provides a safe transport and outreach service for people aged 12 to 20 years who are on the street late at night. Street Beat youth workers and volunteers also provide those in need with access to resources such as counselling, advice and advocacy.

Local Crime Problems

The BOCSAR 2011 data is for the Local Government Area of Randwick, which incorporates the suburbs of La Perouse and Maroubra. The main crimes experienced include malicious damage to property, steal from motor vehicle, break and enter and other theft, domestic violence, and breach bail offences (Table 28). Crime has fallen generally since the inception of the SAY program with the exception of cannabis use, theft from a retail store and breach of bail.

Youth in this area tend to form in groups according to their particular suburb and there can be rivalry between these groups. This also influenced young people's use of either public transport and/or the Boomerang bus in that different groups do not share the same resource at the same time.

There is a differing perspective of how Police and security services deal with young people in numbers on the streets and how the Boomerang Bus and other services that are more sensitive to youth issues might respond. One informant claimed that the police prefer to move young people on but that this strategy only resulted in them congregating elsewhere so that trouble was shifted rather than dispersed.

There was a strong perception that boredom was the underlying cause of most of the problems encountered. Informants spoke of the lack of things for young people to do in the area and that this was why so many young people were on the streets and why the Boomerang bus was such a necessary service to assist. In addition, young people have limited money so are more likely to be hanging out on the streets, and they tend to gravitate to some of the 24 hour shops, particularly McDonalds.

Table 28: Recorded incidents of selected offences in the Randwick Local Government Area (BOCSAR 2012)

Offence	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	NSW Rank	1999-2012 trend	Ave % change	2009-2012 trend	Ave % change
Arson	42	49	49	68	44	42	50	63	63	49	29	31	39	45		Stable	**	Down	-1.5%
Domestic violence	251	240	236	337	314	305	312	300	405	412	350	324	313	369	96	Up	3.0%	Stable	*
Assault	601	598	687	633	768	655	687	731	719	730	639	583	571	493	81	Down	-1.5%	Down	-4.6%
Assault Police	33	31	36	38	40	41	67	38	45	42	66	38	68	50		Up	3.2%	Stable	*
Breach AVO	177	144	147	159	174	131	171	140	152	150	184	153	149	158		Stable	**	Stable	*
Breach bail conditions	34	65	71	86	111	330	342	554	1008	828	1217	1036	770	607		Up	24.8%	Up	8.5%
Break and enter - dwelling	1421	1817	2311	1916	1831	1714	1270	977	1097	998	892	719	733	832	52	Down	-4.0%	Down	-5.9%
Break and enter - non-dwelling	456	574	648	524	503	338	289	267	229	192	159	114	146	106	125	Down	-10.6%	Down	-13.3%
Harassment	208	243	220	287	330	282	317	274	352	292	342	295	287	269		Up	2.0%	Stable	*
Indecent assault	56	61	44	65	76	60	73	77	66	50	64	71	69	68		Stable	**	Stable	*
Liquor offences	39	47	47	119	83	123	224	158	167	181	152	203	325	231		Up	14.7%	Stable	*
Malicious damage	1482	1621	1665	1480	1656	1576	1533	1784	1664	1603	1437	1154	1169	1179	95	Down	-1.7%	Down	-3.7%
Motor vehicle theft	995	844	1106	978	813	866	494	562	637	645	367	405	386	345	33	Down	-7.8%	Down	-5.0%
Offensive conduct	27	19	22	30	22	42	69	69	38	70	101	81	96	82		*	**	Stable	*
Offensive language	60	35	28	34	64	69	78	78	42	61	97	70	92	59		Down	-0.1%	Stable	*
Other theft	1401	1442	1568	1259	1137	936	817	665	720	701	649	629	688	655		Down	-5.7%	Down	-3.1%
Possession and/or use of cannabis	64	51	135	96	116	120	114	95	87	139	121	141	193	166		Up	7.6%	Up	5.5%
Resist or hinder officer	93	77	92	93	108	100	131	98	94	83	128	92	103	71		Stable	**	Stable	*
Steal from dwelling	479	513	692	548	498	403	369	330	351	373	315	270	323	355	99	Down	-2.3%	Stable	*
Steal from motor vehicle	1547	1612	2018	1540	1388	1522	971	942	1081	1070	844	763	866	902	43	Down	-4.1%	Down	-1.0%
Steal from person	0	0	0	308	343	386	233	217	228	176	185	136	170	149	15	*	**	Down	-6.2%
Steal from retail store	178	179	185	202	227	179	128	167	170	185	174	181	202	204	84	Stable	**	Up	6.9%
Trespass	23	39	66	89	110	124	119	102	113	160	107	128	117	103		Up	12.2%	Stable	*

* A trend is not calculated if at least one 12 month period in the selected timeframe had less than 20 incidents.

** No annual percentage change is given if the trend is stable or if a trend has not been calculated.

Best Practice in the SAY Program

The Boomerang bus operates from the PCYC on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights. The Bus has two Street Beat workers, and a caseworker to work with the PCYC Activities Coordinator to ensure there are ongoing recreational programs and skills development for local young people.

The Boomerang bus operates a slightly different service across the three nights of operations. Its central role is to pick up and drop off young people, but on Thursday night the bus targets the major shopping centre complex, Westfield East Gardens. Young people congregate at the complex and this is generally viewed as a problem by security staff. The Boomerang bus assists in managing young people to get home from the complex, and frequently this is initiated by contact from security staff.

On Friday nights, the Boomerang bus initially links to activities at the PCYC with younger age children targeted and a deliberate early crime prevention focus. Some children come directly to the PCYC themselves whilst others who are known to the service are brought to the club by the bus that starts pick-ups from 6pm. With activities finishing by 9.30pm, the Boomerang bus drops the children home. Young people attending range in age from 5 to 12. The success of the Friday night service has seen the numbers of young people attending steadily grow, but this brings with it risks about safety and care of large

numbers of children. The pick-up and drop-off role of the Boomerang bus was acknowledged by informants as the critical role of the service, particularly given the limited public transport options and their cost.

Food is identified as an important part of the Friday night program to attract young people. A number of the young people eat huge amounts of food on these occasions, leading staff to believe that they are often hungry at home.

The PCYC Manager is responsible for managing the activities and operations of the Boomerang bus. The program times have been changed to better match young people's movement over summer/winter months and to work in better with other agencies.

Whilst the bus links to programs at the PCYC, its funding is kept separate from other operations and funds are not used to support it. This means there are some restrictions on hours of operation and some of the geographic coverage for the bus. Changes to schedules can interfere with the predictability of the service: it can also pressure the staff to work beyond their hours.

The Boomerang bus maintains geographic coverage in the local area of Maroubra and La Perouse. It will respond to calls outside its usual area of operation, but generally attends certain hotspots where young people might assemble. Informants said that most of their pick-ups (one estimated 80%) were from young people making calls to the bus, but on occasions the bus will stop when staff see young people on the streets. There is concern that the bus cannot always respond immediately when a young person calls: sometimes the caller will wait but at other times not.

Staff

The Boomerang bus has two staff, the driver and the off-sider who maintains the log books that record number of children and times. These staff are employed as activities officers. Volunteers sometimes support the activities programs at the PCYC and also help out on the bus if a staff member is unavailable. Being of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander background is not an essential employment requirement for the Boomerang bus staff, but was identified as a particular strength that helped engage with young people and the communities, and also encouraged young people to use the service. Given that the majority of the young people are Indigenous, there is a perception that Indigenous staff are very important in building relationships. Having Aboriginal staff from the local community involved was also considered important to be able to understand some of the background of the children using the service and develop trust with them. This also helped inform other staff to work better with these young people.

It was acknowledged as important that staff were well equipped to handle themselves in difficult and aggressive situations and that they be 'thick skinned'. There are occasions when staff need to manage young people who are violent or young people who have drunk excessive amounts of alcohol and who vomit on the bus. There is a balance between being assertive and being non-judgemental and staff need to walk this line carefully. As part of this, communication skills were constantly identified as a key requirement for staff. Some saw these as part of the youth worker skill set. In addition, staff need to have a thorough awareness of the local streets and be able to plan and co-ordinate their movements to make their driving time as efficient as possible. They spoke of not wanting young people to be caught-out waiting on the streets any longer than necessary.

Informants recognised that many of the kids are known to the service and the staff were aware of the addresses and where to drop the children. They might also employ some other strategies if confronted with difficult circumstances; for example, delaying the drop-off or finding other family members to take responsibility for the young person. For some informants, their background knowledge or experience, having come from the community, was the basis for decisions made, and these staff were used to help inform other staff if they were uncertain about what to do in relation to particular children. Some staff have been confronted with parents abusing children they have brought home on the bus. There was a reluctance to intervene based on the employment status of the staff and what they felt was and was not appropriate within their responsibilities.

The Referral process

There were different perspectives about the degree to which staff viewed their role in ensuring safety for children dropped home. In this large and diverse community there was concern about crossing boundaries. Staff argued they were employed as Activity Officers, not Youth Workers, and this placed different responsibilities on them, which included no responsibility to intervene in home situations of concern. Informants were well aware of other agencies and how the Boomerang bus could best support and fit in with other services. In Bondi a similar bus outreach program operates and staff are aware that some young people also use this service. It was seen as important in assisting young people in the area that the Boomerang bus and PCYC were engaged with other services and youth networks. Services respected confidentiality, but shared appropriate information.

Community Perceptions of the Program

Informants believed that activities were useful in socially engaging young people. Activities were enjoyable and the transport ensured that they were accessible. Others spoke of community perceptions of the Boomerang bus as only for the use of Indigenous young people who may have initially comprised its users. There was strong support for the Boomerang bus being based at PCYC. Parking outside the PCYC made the bus visibly associated with the organisation and its reputation. The association of the Boomerang bus with PCYC and its reputation was felt to reinforce the quality of staff and the vetting of staff involved. One advantage of the Boomerang bus being run out of PCYC was perceived neutrality that would not discriminate against any particular cultural or geographic group, which participants felt made the program more able to engage young people from a variety of different backgrounds.

Effectiveness for crime prevention

A number of participants were very clear that the role of the Boomerang bus in picking up young people was important as a crime reduction strategy. Having young people on the streets drunk and bored was seen as a significant risk for criminal behaviour. There was evidence from informants as to how this engagement could turn certain criminal behaviour around, and also positively influence other young people. One informant told this story:

There was this kid who used to commit all these offenses over in the Eastern Beaches. He was a little Aboriginal boy, now he's not so little. He's turned 18... he was so heavily involved with the PCYC and programs, and the Boomerang bus came and picked him up and took him home, so he knew the people on it so well that he calls them Auntie and Uncle and they're no relation, but they're happy to do that.

Since he attended these programs and he got taken to and from all the time by the Boomerang bus, he has now become a volunteer at the PCYC, and when they go on the bus, he still jumps on the bus with them in the mornings, and he stays on the bus when everyone else is getting picked up and dropped off. He's a bit like a bigger brother to a lot of the boys; he's one of their bigger brothers. One of the boys who is in a bit of trouble right now, he's doing the whole don't do what I did, come to the PCYC, come on the Boomerang bus they'll look after you, they're like family.

Strategies for improvement

A common request was that the size of the current bus needed to be increased. The current 8-seater only provides for six young people to travel at a time and this was seen to severely hamper the effectiveness and efficiency of the Boomerang bus. There was specific concern about children left waiting as demand for the service increased. This requires the Boomerang bus staff to make decisions and prioritise who they should transport when numbers in any one location are high. There are concerns about the compromises they need to make. They tend to take the girls first but judgements made depend on the circumstances at the time. Occasionally some young people need to wait several hours for their turn on the bus.

Whilst the capacity of the bus was a common concern, others also felt that improvements could result from better advertising of the program. This would improve community understanding of the program and perhaps encourage access.


Funding for the service was recognised as tight and this meant some staff now received reduced hours and less money due to the new award and this put pressure on remaining staff and retention. Staff talked of a drop in hourly rates and this resulted in some leaving. Increased funding was also seen as a means to extend the hours and operation of the service particularly at peak times during public and school holidays when there is a greater risk of young people being bored.

Conclusions

La Perouse is an area with a long Aboriginal history but the eastern suburbs region now has a large, widespread and diverse community. Although the site is within a metropolitan area, boredom was still cited by participants as a problem for young people in the area. Young people tend to congregate at the many beaches or shopping centres and the latter are a security concern for local businesses. Police move-on powers do little but displace problems to other areas. The night patrol provides a crime prevention option for taking groups of young people home.

Young people are used to using public transport to move to other parts of Sydney, but this can create concerns about safety. Yet, public transport is costly and beyond the reach of marginalised youth or it places them at risk of travelling illegally. With up to 80 clients some nights, the bus may travel up to 100 kilometres in a night doing return trips to take large groups of children home. It also requires patrol staff to make decisions and prioritise who they should transport and they who should leave behind. The SAY patrol is not the only night patrol in the area. The SAY patrol sees a need for longer hours as the other bus service is overwhelmed with clients outside of the Boomerang patrol hours. Together these services are providing a vital service for youth in this region.

Appendix 13: Newcastle Profile



The Newcastle metropolitan area is situated 162 kilometres north east of Sydney and is the second most populated area in New South Wales. The Awabakal and Worimi peoples are the traditional custodians of the land and waters of the area.

The Study

A member of the research team conducted field work in Newcastle in December 2011. Five people were interviewed; two females, three males. Three were Aboriginal people. They included current and former staff and management of the night patrol and PCYC. The researcher also participated as an observer of a night patrol bus run.

Social Profile

Table 29: Newcastle Social Profile (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011 Census of Population and Housing, 2012)

	Newcastle	%	Australia	%
Population	148,535		21,507,717	
Indigenous people	3,927	2.6	548,369	2.5
Median age	37		37	
Indigenous median age	23		21	
Children aged 0-14	25,304	16.4	4,144,025	19.3
Indigenous children aged 0-14	1,239	17	256,283	46.7
Persons 55 and over	39,511	26.6	5,516,010	25.6
Indigenous Persons aged 55 and over	414	10.5	53,003	9.7
Unemployed	4,282	5.7	600,133	5.6
Indigenous persons unemployed	203	13.2	30,462	17.1
Median household weekly income	\$1,165		\$1,234	
Indigenous median household weekly income	\$1048		\$991	
Average people per household	2.4		2.6	
Average Indigenous people per household	2.9		3.3	
One parent families	7,022	18.5	901,634	15.9
Persons born overseas	26,307	17.7	6,489,870	30.2

The proportion of Indigenous people within Newcastle reflects national averages. However, the population has a greater proportion of older people and fewer children under the age of 14 than Australia as a whole. There are also more single parent families. However, unemployment rates reflect the norm and incomes are higher than national averages.

The SAY Program

The Wungara night patrol service is currently managed by the Newcastle PCYC and funded under the Safe Aboriginal Youth (SAY) program. The patrol provides transport specifically to the PCYC, followed by transport home or to a safe location at the end of the evening. As the patrol has a strong relationship with the Newcastle PCYC, and the broader PCYC organisation, the way the patrol operates must adhere to PCYC objectives and policies. The bus has a Facebook site providing current information to the local community (see <http://www.facebook.com/#!/WungaraBus>)



Newcastle's PCYC Wungara Bus

Local Crime Problems

The main crimes experienced include Malicious Damage, steal from a motor vehicle, Break and enter, other theft and assault. The trend analysis in Table 30 indicates that crime has declined since 1999. Since the inception of the SAY program, the number of incidences of crime has remained stable, although breach of bail, harassment and liquor offences have increased.

Table 30: Recorded incidents of selected offences for Newcastle LGA: Annual totals and trends from October 1998 to September 2012 and from 2009 to 2012 and ranking against other LGAs in NSW. (BOCSAR 2012)

Offence	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	NSW Rank	1999-2012 trend	Ave % change	2009-2012 trend	Ave % change
Arson	74	95	131	128	145	127	111	121	161	229	176	202	161	196		Up	7.8%	Stable	**
Domestic violence	398	529	671	745	740	695	761	696	792	635	673	563	604	693	60	Stable	**	Stable	**
Assault - non-domestic	1186	1274	1286	1584	1689	1553	1554	1509	1548	1411	1308	1443	1312	1238	17	Stable	**	Down	-1.8%
Assault Police	48	66	72	89	85	75	77	74	65	89	63	51	58	52		Stable	**	Stable	**

Appendix 13: Newcastle Profile

Breach AVO	321	381	412	425	457	383	373	386	386	368	397	397	396	430		Stable	**	Stable	**
Breach bail	59	103	154	242	216	146	182	176	149	377	411	407	685	923		Up	23.6%	Up	31.0%
Break & enter dwelling	3033	2761	2560	2743	2341	2113	2273	1847	1735	1763	1567	1304	1408	1276	20	Down	-6.4%	Down	-6.6%
Break & enter non dwelling	2021	1916	1810	2008	1621	1387	1342	1201	1275	1202	848	638	569	605	47	Down	-8.9%	Down	-10.6%
Harassment	134	296	259	301	428	422	520	513	487	526	481	552	637	729		Up	13.9%	Up	14.9%
Indecent assault	89	106	144	196	180	177	189	190	182	165	130	124	141	169		Stable	**	Stable	**
Liquor offences	43	91	88	316	338	227	281	221	498	354	264	305	350	358		Up	17.7%	Up	10.7%
Malicious damage	2958	2891	3199	3192	3234	2781	3440	3259	3600	3714	3593	3230	3175	2810	24	Down	-0.4%	Down	-7.9%
Motor vehicle theft	1571	1737	1531	1192	881	977	911	903	940	893	831	865	683	734	7	Down	-5.7%	Down	-4.1%
Offensive conduct	102	100	149	214	226	204	222	177	342	487	275	302	327	303		Up	8.7%	Stable	**
Offensive language	123	122	144	158	144	109	147	97	145	181	128	149	159	158		Stable	**	Stable	**
Other theft	1875	1979	2034	1889	1620	1473	1422	1302	1383	1239	1060	1162	1227	1072		Down	-4.2%	Stable	**
Possession and/or use of cannabis	292	336	433	332	329	287	248	194	225	232	234	313	286	314		Up	0.6%	Stable	**
Resist or hinder officer	103	146	182	227	221	137	197	144	196	203	167	182	162	190		Stable	**	Stable	**
Steal from dwelling	1062	1107	1030	1072	997	926	923	869	803	715	718	668	642	657	43	Down	-3.6%	Stable	**
Steal from motor vehicle	2631	2870	3074	3120	2695	2018	1911	2180	1978	2350	1966	1758	2247	1789	6	Down	-2.9%	Stable	**
Steal from person	0	0	0	330	441	328	341	313	311	273	277	287	291	302	8	*	**	Stable	**
Steal from retail store	542	523	679	836	686	592	600	464	494	609	708	707	596	750	20	Stable	**	Stable	**
Trespass	93	131	164	161	199	170	223	179	197	194	186	165	190	220		Up	6.8%	Stable	**

* A trend is not calculated if at least one 12 month period in the selected timeframe had less than 20 incidents.

** No annual percentage change is given if the trend is stable or if a trend has not been calculated.

One participant in the study noted vandalism was the main problem associated with local youth. Another key local problem identified by participants in the study was youth under 18 years consuming alcohol. Apart from physical health impacts, short-term behavioural changes that follow can cause problems, particularly for young males drinking in groups. As they are aged under-18, their consumption is likely to occur unsupervised in the street or a park.

There are problems with poor school attendance and a lack of available activities that interest youth. Although Newcastle is a large city with a wide range of services and recreational options for young people, those who use the night patrol bus service are likely to suffer socio-economic disadvantage, as in all locations where SAY programs have been funded to operate. Many of the Newcastle youth the night patrol staff deal with are homeless or significantly detached or estranged from their family home. Staff maintained that there were inadequate social services to provide for this group compared with adults or young children in families that faced housing emergencies as they are not old enough to qualify for housing support.

Best Practice for the SAY Program

The night patrol operates every Friday and Saturday night in conjunction with activities at the Newcastle PCYC from 7.30 pm - 10.30 pm. The bus then provides a drop-off service to a safe location on those nights, from 9.00 pm - 1.00 am. Friday night is the busiest with most participation in activities. The large majority of children and youth that use the Wungara service are male. In general, their ages range between 13 and 16 years, although some children as young as ten years also use the service regularly. The service tends to see the same group of young people every week. Those with experience in rural areas noted the contrast of fewer young children in need of the service in Newcastle than in rural communities. The service aims to serve disadvantaged children and youth in a large area around Newcastle. As a Safe Aboriginal Youth (SAY) project, it is primarily aimed at Aboriginal youth, yet clearly conveys many non-Indigenous persons.

Children and youth are collected from streets, parks and railways stations within a broad area of suburban Newcastle. Many clients telephone the vehicle driver from any of these locations, or their home, and ask to be collected. They are taken to the PCYC, given a meal and have the opportunity to participate in structured activities. They are then transported to their usual home or other safe destinations. The bus is well signed to advertise the patrol within the community. The well recognised logo was designed by a local 17 year old girl.

The activities programs are viewed as an essential complement to the night patrol. A key objective of the program is to give the children a healthy meal. Local children are provided with business cards with contact details for the bus.

Staff

The service is operated by a paid coordinator, two staff both of whom are Aboriginal people and volunteers. Currently there are 30 volunteers. Ages range from 21 to 50. The three paid staff members alternate between weekends while volunteers are rotated. There is an attempt to have the same driver who knows the young people and where they congregate. The coordinator aims to have male and female staff operating the bus.

Recently the PCYC engaged a highly motivated and energetic person as SAY Coordinator. They viewed this action as crucial to build a significant base of volunteers to ensure the bus always had two responsible adults on board and for the operation of structured activities at the PCYC.

Half of the volunteers are Indigenous and are actively trying to get their Indigenous friends to join. One participant felt recruitment of Indigenous staff was vital because the key target group of clients was Indigenous children and youth. The current coordinator is not Aboriginal, which she described as challenging. Despite this, other participants did not cite having Indigenous staff as being a significant factor in the performance of the service.

Participants suggested that anybody who works within the program must be motivated by a genuine desire to assist the at-risk children and youth the service targets. The genuine desire to 'make a difference' to the lives of these young people may itself be motivated by different reasons.

The Referral process

The local Aboriginal Justice Group meets regularly with operators of the bus service and then reports back to the DAGJ. These meetings occur regularly to address any issues arising with the bus service. The Aboriginal Justice Group also liaises with various State Government Departments including Housing, Juvenile Justice, Probation and Parole and the NSW Police Force, which encourages the referral process and coordination of service provision.

Local SAY Staff were cautious about referring children who were regular users of the service onto other services. They were concerned this would impair their relationships with the young people and destroy trust. There was also some uncertainty about the limits of their role and the need to not step outside appropriate boundaries.

Community Perceptions of the Program

Informants felt the best measure of the success of the program was the ongoing attendance of young people: if the service was not appropriate, young people would not attend or maintain contact in any way.

Relationship with police

Participants noted that the relationship between the Wungara service and Police was positive, yet could be improved. Since the service is attached to the PCYC, there is a close and positive relationship with Police officers who are attached to the Club. The PCYC police were viewed as people who genuinely cared about the youth that attended the service and tried to relate to them.

One example of positive cooperation involved the Wungara bus and the police working together at a major Newcastle music event called 'Fat as Butter'. This example illustrates how their cooperation resulted in positive outcomes:

There were a couple of girls that had just far too much alcohol – under aged. There was another young girl from Port Stephens, her mother had no idea she was in town. And so if the Police felt that they needed to be removed or if they ended up at that Police tent, we then drove them home, and made sure that there was somebody responsible at the other end. We weren't there as police -; we were just there as the patrol. And if that service hadn't have been there, they would have ended up at Newcastle railway station, walking around the park, drunk or drug-affected, and who knows what could have happened to them, especially the girls. Also, I know there was one boy that we had to take out and he'd been king-hit - he was like only fifteen.

One participant maintained that police need to have greater awareness of the role of the service and utilise it more. This would be far more beneficial to at risk youth than being potentially introduced or re-introduced to the criminal justice system. Perhaps there is a need for greater training in this regard for officers to understand how using the service benefits them by freeing up time and resources, as well as minimizing the contact between vulnerable youth and the criminal justice system.

Participants added that State Transit officers did not work with the program as well as they could.

Barriers to best practice

A high turnover of staff and volunteer staff has been a challenge for the Wungara service. There are times when the activities do not run because of lack of staff, but at the time of the study this was not currently a

problem. As one driver stated, it would be highly desirable to have a permanent partner each week, for there would be greater consistency and new staff would not need to be 're-briefed'.

The cessation of funding for the activity programs has meant they may struggle to operate to the same level in the future. PCYC has sourced funds from elsewhere to maintain current programs.

Suggestions for Improvement

There is a need to publicise the patrol and PCYC activities to the wider community. Currently, staff go to the local secondary schools regularly to meet young people and inform them of the services available to them. They offer business cards with contact details for young people to keep. One informant believed that further advertising should be done at community events and festivals such as NAIDOC. Networking with other crime prevention programs in the community was another suggestion. For example, staff had established a link with the security guard at the local McDonalds so they could be called before trouble erupted.

There was strong agreement that having a structured activity program linked to the Patrol was essential. The activities provided an outlet for young people and the transport ensured they were not on the streets after the activities finished. Yet even in a large city where there are many activities, disadvantaged youth who are not attracted by SAY program activities form a gap in service provision. However, it was thought that a strong program and leadership is currently turning around this trend. A new application for funding seeks to provide more activities to engage this group. However this will require more paid staff. The new program is envisaged to follow a surf-club model with a large pool of volunteers (so each volunteer was perhaps working only once a month). This would prevent loss of volunteers through over-commitment and overuse.

Conclusions

While Newcastle has all the recreational opportunities and support services available in a large city, there is a cohort of young people who are socially disadvantaged and who benefit from the presence of the SAY programs. There are problems with poor school attendance and a lack of available activities that interest youth, particularly between the ages of 16 and 18. Those young people who do not attend PCYC programs or take the bus home are those who fall through the gap and become involved with drug and alcohol abuse, crime and anti-social behaviour. Thus activity programs that will engage this group are a priority for local SAY night patrol staff.

Appendix 14: Nowra Profile



Nowra is situated 160km south of Sydney and is the largest coastal town on the NSW south coast. Nowra is the business and administrative centre for the Shoalhaven Shire which covers an area of 453,063 sq. km. Other towns in the vicinity include Bomaderry, Ulladulla, Sussex Inlet, Berry, Kangaroo Valley, Shoalhaven Heads, Huskisson and Currarong as well as several other smaller towns and villages. The traditional owners of the region are the Wodi-Wodi tribe of the Yuin nation and the Dharawal people.

The Field Work

A member of the research team conducted field work in Nowra between the 6th and 8th December 2011. Ten interviews were undertaken with representatives of the night patrol, local service providers and community leaders. Six males and four females were interviewed. Ages ranged from early 20s to 50. Of these, six were Aboriginal people. A member of the research team also participated in a night patrol run from the youth centre.

Social Profile

Table 31: Nowra Social Profile (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011; Census of Population and Housing, 2012)

	Nowra	%	Shoalhaven	%	Australia	%
Population	18,104		92,812		21,507,717	
Indigenous people	2,030	8.5	4,314	4.6	548,369	2.5
Median age	37		46		37	
Indigenous median age	20		20		21	
Children 0-14	3,753	20.7	16,428	17.7	4,144,025	19.3
Indigenous children 0-14	810	39.9	1,641	38	256,283	46.7
Persons 55 and over	4,926	27.2	35,308	42.6	5,516,010	25.6
Indigenous Persons 55 +	238	11.7	494	11.5	53,003	9.7
Unemployed	622	8.8	2,798	7.6	600,133	5.6
Indigenous unemployed	140	24.3	273	21.2	30,462	17.1
Med household weekly income	\$851		\$822		\$1,234	

Indigenous med household weekly income	\$745		\$819		\$991	
Average people /household	2.5		2.3		2.6	
Ave Indigenous people/household	3.1		3.2		3.3	
One parent families	1,013	22.7	4,410	17.3	901,634	15.9
Persons born overseas	3,645	20.1	17,611	18.1	6,489,870	30.2

Nowra has a high proportion of Aboriginal people (8.5%) which is higher than the national average of 2.5%. Compared with national averages, unemployment particularly amongst the Aboriginal population is very high, and household incomes are much lower. There is a high proportion of single parent families. The average age is older than national averages reflecting the large number of retirees in the region.

The SAY Program

The SAY program in Nowra is the Koori Habitat Night Patrol program. It is auspiced by Habitat Personnel, an Indigenous Employment non-Government organisation and is operated from the Nowra Youth Centre (The Youthie) located on the edge of the central business district. The region of Nowra-Bomaderry, where the night patrol operates, has a population of approximately 35,000 people.

Local Crime Problems

The following data (Table 32) must be interpreted with caution as BOCSAR data are available only for the Shoalhaven Shire, which is a considerably larger area than the Nowra-Bomaderry region. Malicious damage is the most common offence occurring in the region. Assault and harassment offences are also high. Break and enter and domestic violence are two crimes of concern in the Shoalhaven shire and are the main focus of the Shire's crime prevention plan.

Since 1999 there has been variance in the experience of crimes. Assault, domestic violence, breach bail and cannabis use has increased while break and enter, malicious damage, motor vehicle theft and other theft have declined. Since 2009 and the commencement of the SAY program there has been a considerable reduction in crime overall (Table 32).

Participants in the study estimated that 60% of the local crime is youth related and offenders are considered to be drawn from a small group within the community. It is not uncommon for young people from other areas to come into the community and they are perceived as the 'trouble-makers'. Much crime was viewed as opportunistic and relatively minor acts of vandalism, arising out of boredom and/or intoxication.

Table 32: Recorded incidents of selected offences for Shoalhaven LGA: Annual totals and trends from October 1998 to September 2012 and from 2009 to 2012 and ranking against other LGAs in NSW.

Offence	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	NSW Rank	1999-2012 trend	Ave change %	2009-2012 trend	Ave change %
Arson	56	70	64	66	69	72	65	136	124	105	100	138	90	120		Up	6.0%	Stable	**
Domestic violence	353	434	457	521	544	547	524	491	516	538	509	557	505	446	42	Up	1.8%	Down	-4.3%
Assault - non-domestic	512	474	572	545	535	570	610	612	676	710	683	651	660	555	28	Up	0.6%	Down	-6.7%
Assault Police	54	44	43	51	32	45	42	33	32	45	56	51	26	34		Stable	**	Down	-15.3%
Breach AVO	224	302	311	323	388	367	393	289	310	308	360	312	331	335		Stable	**	Stable	**
Breach bail	62	51	73	105	80	96	78	134	124	141	155	219	233	347		Up	14.2%	Up	30.8%
Break & enter dwelling	1102	1003	971	963	1070	798	713	741	642	768	784	816	752	739	22	Down	-3.0%	Stable	**

Break & enter non-dwelling	547	614	669	617	515	432	404	409	411	468	315	392	453	277	30	Down	-5.1%	Stable	**
Harassment	163	182	171	208	270	274	321	357	376	486	503	656	713	716		Up	12.1%	Up	12.5%
Indecent assault	95	88	87	99	84	88	83	82	95	89	86	92	85	78		Stable	**	Stable	**
Liquor offences	61	51	105	162	317	344	186	246	336	371	375	298	246	249		Up	11.4%	Down	-12.8%
Malicious damage	1429	1574	1390	1293	1375	1445	1534	1805	1869	1929	1787	1638	1474	1361	45	Down	-0.4%	Down	-8.7%
Motor vehicle theft	376	358	422	507	368	341	406	333	307	269	238	276	294	242	30	Down	-3.3%	Stable	**
Offensive conduct	80	65	70	64	79	59	76	83	81	76	88	82	81	42		Stable	**	Down	-21.9%
Offensive language	135	77	73	71	83	68	73	77	56	96	113	96	69	67		Stable	**	Down	-16.0%
Other theft	634	636	780	699	642	600	582	562	491	499	551	550	494	457		Down	-2.5%	Down	-6.0%
Possession and/or use of cannabis	173	97	119	131	159	127	85	135	164	187	164	248	170	200		Up	1.1%	Stable	**
Resist or hinder officer	92	83	97	120	92	87	99	115	99	158	162	139	117	82		Down	-0.9%	Down	-20.3%
Steal from dwelling	422	504	444	508	548	481	450	422	387	375	420	407	342	366	50	Down	-1.1%	Down	-4.5%
Steal from motor vehicle	668	869	842	766	709	537	610	799	554	566	693	552	725	711	40	Up	0.5%	Stable	**
Steal from person	0	0	0	61	76	74	49	51	52	35	59	52	45	39	56	*	**	Down	-12.9%
Steal from retail store	265	170	219	302	357	216	190	196	150	164	253	300	215	327	44	Stable	**	Stable	**
Trespass	75	70	63	92	70	99	104	126	129	176	121	182	117	137		Up	4.7%	Stable	**

* A trend is not calculated if at least one 12 month period in the selected timeframe had less than 20 incidents.

** No annual percentage change is given if the trend is stable or if a trend has not been calculated.

Best Practice in the SAY Program

The Night patrol functions as an important link to provide youth services to young people who may otherwise not be able to participate. The night patrol bus collects young people, brings them to the youth centre for activities, and then transports them home afterwards. The youth centre offers a range of activities (such as pool competitions, cooking) and intervention strategies, and many young people who use the service become engaged in other activities such as camps.

The SAY night patrol bus operates Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays from 6pm with last runs at 9pm when the youth centre closes. There are definite times for the bus collection points in the Nowra-Bomaderry areas. The 8pm and 9pm services often alternate to give young people a chance to access the Centre's services till 9pm.

Rules require passengers to wear a seat belt, allow for only one ride per person per night and will not allow the bus to transport people to parties. Passengers on the bus range from birth to 18 years of age: the bus will not take young people over 18. The bus will only deliver young people to their homes, not to other places. The service has a structured schedule and routes, resulting in groups of young people arriving and leaving the centre at predictable times. The feeling is that this is a better way to use workers' and drivers' time, particularly as some of the routes involve considerable distances and time (e.g. Culburra takes half an hour to do a return trip). There is generally a male and female staff member on the bus.

It is not uncommon for young people to come to the youth centre usually on their own accord and rely on the bus to take them home. Others may use the bus to get transport into town, but not attend the youth centre until just prior to the return bus trip.

One key element in the bus transportation is ensuring that young people are dropped off somewhere safe. Staff ensure someone is home but will make their own judgement if the home is a safe environment at that

point in time and take the young person to another family member if necessary. Their knowledge of the local community is sufficient for them to do this.

Staff believe it is important that young people do not see the bus as a right, but something that they need to respect. This involves certain expectations of behaviour when using the bus.

Youth Centre Activities

Approximately 50-60 young people a night attend the Habitat Youth Centre depending on the season. The young people range in age from 12-18 years. Once the young people are at the centre participating in activities, they are interacting with staff and volunteers, and building relationships that position these adults as mentors and role models.

Staff

The Night patrol staff are considered very much as part of the youth centre team and get input and support from team meetings/team training etc.

All staff need a C class license and there is an attempt to share the duties of driving and activities. On Thursday night, all five staff are usually in attendance, but on Friday and Saturday there are four. This pattern of staffing allows a driver and one other staff member to go on the bus, leaving two staff at the Centre to engage with young people. Staff must have the required police clearances. They are all employed under the social welfare award and have completed at least Cert 2. Respondents felt that other training is useful and this included Youth mental health, first aid, cultural competency and youth specific training. At the same time there was also a perception that formal training was no substitute for learning on the job.

Staff are selected on the basis of their own life experience (including having teenagers of their own and being Aboriginal) and it is felt that this helps staff manage young people and relate to them. Staff are expected to be able to establish trusting relationships with young people and be able to communicate effectively with them. In addition, staff are expected to have extensive knowledge of the community and be respected by the young people.

The referral process

Relationships with other agencies in the community are variable and the perception of the effectiveness of these relationships varied across different informants. Some felt that they operated in isolation, particularly because they were working in the evenings when other agencies are not open. In contrast, another informant felt that relationships were strong and that other agencies notified them when there were events, borrowed equipment and called on SAY staff to volunteer for them.

Relationship with police

The police station is located directly opposite the youth centre, but police rarely attended or engaged with centre. Informants saw this as a missed opportunity to build rapport with young people. This relationship was thought to be stronger in the past when police would come across and play pool with some of the young people.

Police also regretted the current state of their relationship with the service and discussed the issues they experienced with staff continuity and wellbeing. Currently it is not common for Police Officers to

contact the Youth Centre when they see young people congregating in the street or looking as if they may be moving towards trouble. Staff at the Youth Centre see this as a missed opportunity to prevent trouble before it escalates.

Effectiveness for crime prevention

The programs were seen as effective for crime prevention, based on the premise that young people with nothing to do are likely to get bored and engage in criminal activities. Along with the crime prevention argument (that bored young people will commit crimes) is the concept that by being together under supervision, the young people are safe from becoming victims and safe to explore issues that might be worrying them.

Having the bus visible on patrol acts to prevent crime. There is a belief that the visibility of the bus, and thus the patrol, sends a message that the streets are being monitored and that young people will think twice about committing an offence if they have been previously spotted by the patrol in a particular area. Providing transport to various outlying areas is also seen as a crime prevention strategy. Informants argued that if young people had to walk home at night it would be inevitable that they would engage in some form of vandalism during the long walk. In addition, being on the streets late at night walking home would expose them to greater risk of victimisation, particularly around the times when pubs shut. However, some expressed concern that the regular routes travelled by the bus lessens their ability to drive randomly around town and establish relationships with young people who are not attending the centre, and this limits their crime prevention capability.

Informants told stories of young people with whom they had worked in the past to illustrate the positive impact of the program:

There's an example of a young fellow just recently who was sort of coming here, we'd known him for quite a while and his home life was really, really bad, really terrible. And he started to fall in to the same track and was turning up stoned and all the rest of it. So we sat down and had a chat with him and some of his family had been able to, lucky enough to get a scholarship at a XXXX High School. So some of the night patrol workers helped the young person to look at those avenues, and talk to his brother about how it would be possible. And he's now up at the XXXX school on a [sports] scholarship up there, so they've investigated that, talked to the young fellow and got him out of trouble.

In addition, others gave examples of young people who had once used the centre and who now were working in the program as evidence of its impact.

Barriers to Best Practice

As with every other centre, finding volunteers to assist with the programs was difficult and the requirement to work at night was seen as a considerable impediment. Another common problem was the lack of awareness of the program activities within the wider community and the negative perception generally held about young people. There was a feeling that if local business owners could engage positively with young people over the activity program, they would be more understanding and supportive. Instead, staff feel that the night patrol service is held responsible for the actions of all young people in the community and that this is unfair and unreasonable. There is recognition that there needs to be some work done on community attitudes, accompanied by a feeling of powerlessness to do this work.

Suggestions for Improvement

Funding was uniformly identified as a need to enable more staff to be employed, and a wider geographic area to be covered. Others felt additional funding to extend operating hours (longer hours per day and/or more days, perhaps to be open after school) and to have a bigger bus would be good things but others disagreed. One informant felt that longer hours of operation would simply encourage young people to be out later. Some would like a bigger (22 seat) bus, but not everyone agreed with this, particularly because of the additional driver's license requirements associated with a larger bus.

One participant suggested creating a physical hub where a range of youth services could be co-located.

Training was also mentioned as a target for improvements, particularly training associated with child protection. One informant identified training as necessary to create a 'tool kit' of strategies that can be called upon when needed.

Conclusions

Nowra is well serviced with a SAY night patrol working in concert with Habitat Youth Centre activities. These two programs cater to this large district that has many communities scattered throughout the region. Set timetables for bus operation is relevant for this area, but the lack of randomness lessens the patrol's guardianship ability.

The issues raised by those interviewed in Nowra were similar to other case study communities and included: the need to better publicise the program throughout the wider community to avoid any misunderstandings regarding the purpose of the patrol; the need for more volunteers; the need for a bigger bus; and the need for more funding to increase hours of operation and employ more staff. The idea of making the Habitat Youth centre a key access and referral centre for local youth is a good suggestion and would reflect similar services that operate in the Greater Taree Shire. Such amalgamation of services would aid in advertising the SAY Programs and also facilitate greater interagency collaboration.

Appendix 15: Taree Profile



Taree is a city situated on the Manning River, 16 km inland on the Mid North Coast and 317 km north of Sydney. Taree is within the Greater Taree Shire which covers an area of 3,752 sq. km. The traditional owners of the Manning Valley were the Birpai. There are several different Aboriginal groups in the community today in different locations such as Purfleet, and Bushland.

The Field Work

A member of the research team visited Taree in December 2011. Eleven people were interviewed, seven of whom were female. Four were Aboriginal people. Ages ranged from early 20s to late 50s.

Social Profile

The 2011 Census reveals a social profile of a regional community with an Aboriginal population which is twice the national average. Unemployment is high especially within the Aboriginal community and, accordingly, average incomes are much lower than Australian averages.

Table 33: Greater Taree LGA Social Profile (Source Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011 Census of Population and Housing, 2012)

	Taree LGA	%	Australia	%
Population	46,541		21,507,717	
Indigenous people	2,500	5.4	548,369	2.5
Median age	46		37	
Indigenous median age	18		21	
Children aged 0-14	8,676	18.6	4,144,025	19.3
Indigenous children aged 0-14	1,008	40.4	256,283	46.7
Persons 55 and over	1,7661	37.9	5,516,010	25.6
Indigenous Persons 55 and over	253	10	53,003	9.7
Unemployed	1,672	9.3	600,133	5.6
Indigenous persons unemployed	177	28.1	30,462	17.1
Median household weekly income	\$770		\$1,234	
Indigenous median household weekly income	\$716		\$991	
Average people per household	2.4		2.6	
Average Indigenous people per household	3.3		3.3	
One parent families	2380	18.4	901,634	15.9

Persons born overseas	6522	14	6,489,870	30.2
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The SAY Program

The Taree night patrol or Street Beat commenced in 2001, funded by the DAGJ SAY Program in partnership with Greater Taree City Council. The Council also provides in-kind support including a garage for the vehicle at its depot, with separate access so it can be obtained at any time without reliance on the depot being open. A strategy of the 2000 Taree Crime Prevention Plan, the project has a current operating budget of \$65,000 a year. It has a minimum target of 180 youth every three months.

The SAY program works with other programs funded by the Greater Taree City Council such as 'Live 'n Loud', a musical event held once per term - usually at the Taree Library. Youth are encouraged to come and listen to live local bands and musicians all while eating free Pizza.

The Woombarra Wunggan Youth Services is an Aboriginal Adolescent Support Program funded by NSW Community Services. The program supports Aboriginal young people aged 12-18 years and provides a range of recreation, social and learning programs. Midnight Basketball is a national youth social inclusion program which regularly operates an eight week tournament. Each evening of the program participants have dinner and participate in compulsory life skills workshops before they play basketball. The Street Beat bus transports youth to and from this program.

Local Crime Problems

BOCSAR 2012 data for Taree indicates that the main crimes experienced are malicious damage, breach bail conditions, break and enter offences, theft from motor vehicle and other theft, assault and domestic violence, and harassment (Table 34). Alcohol and other drug abuse cause many problems for affected young people. Excessive drinking by their parents can make their homes unsafe places. Taree has reported child abuse problems including physical violence, sexual abuse, neglect, and child prostitution.

One participant reported that boredom amongst local youth instigated petty crime and malicious damage. Much petty crime is related directly to material disadvantage. For example, many children not being adequately fed by their parents at home break into and enter premises or shoplift to obtain food. Engaging in 'opportunistic crime' has a strong relationship with lack of transport. Having no alternative to walking long distances at night to reach home, adolescents can become bored and engage in vandalism or attempt to steal a car.

Table 34: Recorded incidents of selected offences for Greater Taree LGA: Annual totals and trends from October 1998 to September 2012 and from 2009 to 2012 and ranking against other LGAs in NSW

Offence	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	NSW Rank	1999-2012 trend	Ave % change	2009-2012 trend	Ave % change
Arson	8	19	22	35	48	34	34	63	71	87	89	70	82	95		*	**	Stable	**
Domestic violence	163	212	222	255	271	261	275	288	309	269	276	236	224	275	7	Up	4.1%	Stable	**
Assault - non-domestic	267	309	375	397	342	311	366	402	358	357	336	287	317	292	42	Stable	**	Stable	**
Assault Police	22	25	46	28	21	20	20	27	34	37	29	22	45	29		Stable	**	Stable	**
Breach AVO	88	142	146	150	121	103	153	139	168	181	168	113	138	153		Stable	**	Stable	**

Breach bail	52	29	39	63	80	87	154	158	158	159	168	202	178	186		Up	10.3%	Stable	**
Break & enter dwelling	470	439	507	453	418	699	448	352	415	592	538	675	355	329	8	Stable	**	Down	-15.1%
Break & enter non-dwelling	301	354	570	436	278	293	333	271	235	259	259	248	244	257	3	Down	-1.2%	Stable	**
Harassment	49	53	109	101	188	165	186	183	227	261	254	184	227	275		Up	14.2%	Stable	**
Indecent assault	29	32	59	38	52	48	42	62	70	55	79	47	55	39		Up	2.3%	Stable	**
Liquor offences	20	8	11	80	86	52	68	90	86	89	97	57	70	54		*	**	Stable	**
Malicious damage	471	571	760	628	648	685	695	740	847	868	859	741	784	798	32	Up	4.1%	Stable	**
Motor vehicle theft	222	218	238	122	139	148	150	183	166	198	278	147	139	157	3	Stable	**	Stable	**
Offensive conduct	41	34	30	56	41	48	43	63	74	61	83	72	93	51		Up	1.7%	Stable	**
Offensive language	76	51	71	60	48	34	35	35	69	69	55	87	98	54		Down	-2.6%	Stable	**
Other theft	295	335	304	220	237	218	191	236	294	229	240	259	282	266		Stable	**	Stable	**
Possession and/or use of cannabis	189	82	63	109	131	105	93	128	135	154	130	214	250	189		Up	0.0%	Up	13.3%
Resist or hinder officer	56	56	68	56	64	52	48	72	82	80	72	80	96	61		Up	0.7%	Stable	**
Steal from dwelling	213	213	217	205	232	259	200	234	279	203	192	232	209	214	6	Stable	**	Stable	**
Steal from motor vehicle	393	357	345	203	225	297	300	234	191	271	268	286	269	354	11	Stable	**	Stable	**
Steal from person	0	0	0	21	22	33	25	22	24	26	32	45	37	22	67	*	**	Stable	**
Steal from retail store	197	115	150	181	259	192	148	97	112	117	107	206	158	164	48	Stable	**	Stable	**
Trespass	71	63	72	76	83	108	117	100	96	120	90	90	99	123		Up	4.3%	Stable	**

* A trend is not calculated if at least one 12 month period in the selected timeframe had less than 20 incidents.

** No annual percentage change is given if the trend is stable or if a trend has not been calculated.

Best Practice in the SAY program

Street Beat is currently funded to operate on Friday and Saturday nights between 6:30pm and 10:30pm. The 14 seater mini bus patrols the Taree CBD and surrounding areas including Old Bar, Wingham and Hallidays Point. Street Beat also patrols identified 'hot spots' in the area where young people regularly congregate including the local skate parks. Occasionally youth are collected from further afield if they specifically request it and have no other means of transport home.

In practice there is significant flexibility in operating times for Street Beat to effectively meet the needs of the children and youth it serves. For example, the Midnight Basketball program operates until approximately midnight on numerous Friday nights, and the bus transports young people home at its conclusion until 12:30am. This can be attended by up to 70 young people, all of whom need transport home afterwards.

There is greater demand for the service during summer than over the winter months. On some winter nights when there is very few people about the bus will stop operating sooner to make cost savings that can pay for extended operating hours during busy summer nights.

The key age group is youth aged 10 – 16 years. Younger children, aged less than 10 years, sometimes use the services, most often with older siblings. There are few users aged 16 years and older. Indigenous youth comprise at least 90% of the overall passenger load, and 97% of Midnight Basketball participants are Indigenous. Non-Indigenous persons can and occasionally do use the service.

There are clear guidelines for operation of the service, which are understood by local youth. Bus drop-offs are always to home or another safe location, not to a party for example. Criminal behaviour will be reported but young people are supported through that process.

An activity program that includes a nutritious meal is seen as highly beneficial. If these children or youth are simply transported off the streets, they may not be fed at home. Some young people may not be able to eat for 2 days at a time at home.

Best practice for programs was the combination of activities set in conjunction with the night patrol. The activity component offers supervision, safety, food, chances to learn new skills and prevents them from engaging in criminal behavior through boredom. Transport is essential for young people to access these activities.

Staff

Street Beat is now predominantly operated by paid staff. This is different from earlier models that relied wholly or largely on volunteer labour. There are two paid workers, including one driver, on board the Street Beat vehicle whenever it operates. There are eight drivers but they are youth workers as well as drivers because they also work for Woombarra Wunggan. Consequently there is a good group of support staff.

The service has specific policies about staffing. There is a requirement that one male and one female worker must be present on all bus runs. Also, when possible, at least one worker is to be Indigenous. Despite this, all maintained Aboriginality was a far less important characteristic for staff compared with being “right for the job”. Workers need to be accepted not so much by the broader local Aboriginal community, but by the Indigenous children who, by all accounts, comprise the vast majority of the total bus passengers. Local knowledge is particularly useful especially when making judgements about safe drop-off. Staff must have empathy, understanding of the issues the local Aboriginal communities deal with and the ability to build a rapport with young Indigenous people who can present challenging behaviour.

Some who view Streetbeat as an Aboriginal service feel that it should be wholly staffed with Aboriginal personnel. However, there are ongoing difficulties in finding appropriately qualified Indigenous people who are willing to work in the program.

Currently volunteers have a secondary role in the coordination and operation of Street Beat. They can provide additional support during busier times, or as reserve labour but, by the very nature of volunteerism, are not available regularly and consistently. Consistency is seen as important and this is better achieved through paid staff. One informant argued that seeing the same person every night helped

young people build trusting relationships with that person, and this made it easier to communicate and share concerns.

The Referral Process

There appears to be strong links with other youth programs, largely because of the relationship between Street Beat and the local shire, which has a large youth support, information and referral service. There was a strong sense that building and maintaining effective relationships with other community and social service providers was essential for Street Beat to succeed. Organisations mentioned include Hunter New England Health Service (hospital accident and emergency and community health services), Police and Citizens Youth Club (PCYC), Youth Refuge, the Woombarra Wunggan Aboriginal Adolescent Support Service, community radio stations and a church-based activity program. Strong support was expressed for structured activity programs, with Midnight Basketball cited by all as exemplary.

Woombarra Wunggan has effectively complemented Street Beat by providing an ongoing activity program, including regular Friday night activities when Midnight Basketball is not operating. Yet doubts were expressed about how this would continue, as the funding for Woombarra Wunggan is being shifted from activity programs to case management of individuals. This is viewed as probably resulting in a major gap in service provision.

Various programs, including Midnight Basketball, formerly operated at Taree Police Citizens Youth Club (PCYC) providing for over 80 children at any one time. It was a good venue for operating large-scale activity programs. However, due to disagreements, there has been a decline in the relationship between PCYC and Street Beat, and other youth services.

There was consensus that the short-trip transport environment did not lend itself to children disclosing significant and sensitive information about their personal lives. However, there was seen to be the possibility of noticing behavioural changes in a young person, and that having built a rapport with a Street Beat driver, they could talk to them or even refer them to a specific social service.

Relationship with Police

The relationship between Police at Taree and Street Beat is highly regarded, although not without challenges. Those interviewed generally spoke positively of Police attitudes towards and interactions with Street Beat. They felt that in general local Police officers viewed Street Beat positively for it actively contributed to crime prevention.

The service may also directly reduce the time Police deal with juveniles who are walking the streets. Work done by Street Beat may previously have consumed police time, such as escorting juveniles home, or to another safe location. This may have occurred in a far more haphazard manner than what Street Beat can consistently provide. For example, a quiet night where Police officers can locate at-risk children and transport them to safety could be followed by another night where they are completely occupied with significant crimes or road crashes.

Street Beat workers begin each shift by reporting to the local Police Station and exchanging information about local activity and planned routes for the evening's patrol. The Police also provide party registration details to Street Beat, who make a point of frequenting these locations with a view to providing transport and reporting to Police if activity gets out of hand.

Despite this, other participants found the relationship with police was not as good as it could be. Police are not always able to respond immediately when staff call for assistance and this is perceived as a lack of trust in their judgement.

The relationship between Police and young Aboriginal people in Taree was viewed as poor. One description was of a 'cycle of hate' that presumably flows both ways between the two groups. A common opinion was that Street Beat and its officers generally had more positive and constructive relationships with disadvantaged Indigenous youth than do the police. More than one respondent highlighted that many local police recognised this as beneficial to policing. That is, during minor situations involving youth, Street Beat workers who had succeeded in building a rapport with young people have far more success in 'moving on' the youth than the Police.

Community Perceptions of the Program

The overall view of Street Beat from all persons interviewed was highly positive. The general view was of an effective, necessary community service that has become a vital component of the overall local Indigenous 'landscape'.

Several participants highlighted the significant benefits of activity programs orientated towards local youth, with Midnight Basketball cited as an exemplar several times.

The SAY program has benefited by significant support from the local Council, which has allowed them to extend programs and provide more youth support in the community. For example, through Council support for the expenses associated with the bus, staff were able to trial day patrols.

Effectiveness for crime prevention

Street Beat has achieved success since its inception in 2001 in reducing the number of young people roaming the streets without purpose. Project activities including Friday Night Activities have also served to build relationships between the Street Beat workers, young participants, volunteers and other involved organisations and community members including the PCYC and their Police representatives, which has made a positive difference to perceived community safety.

The local NSW Police Area Command has indicated that the project is a major contributor to the decreased criminal activity and anti-social behaviour engaged in by young people in the Taree area, while the local Department of Juvenile Justice officers also consider that the Street Beat project has had a major impact on the decreased numbers of clients under the age of 18 years being referred through the court system to the department. In April 2006, the Taree Street Beat Project was awarded a Certificate of Merit in the National Crime Prevention Awards and was the only patrol program in Australia to do so. The Patrol continues to go from strength to strength. <http://www.yapa.org.au/youthwork/stories/streetbeat.php>

Barriers to Best Practice

The service is often misunderstood within the broader community. Few non-Indigenous youth are aware of the patrol and staff feel they need to continually remind non-Indigenous young people they are available. In comparison, Indigenous young people know about the service and use it regularly.

This is underpinned by the view amongst some members of the local Aboriginal community that the service should strictly be for Aboriginal children and youth and therefore its operation should be

conducted by an Aboriginal organisation. This was a common thread in several of the interviews from different sites.

There is an inadequate level of funding to maintain consistent, regular structured activity programs over the long term. Such programs are vital to crime prevention and child protection. When effective programs such as Midnight Basketball operate they are popular with the young people and engage them in positive ways. Yet Midnight Basketball only operates for eight-week blocks and when they conclude there is a lack of structured activities for youth in Taree. The change in Wombarra Wunggan away from an activity-based model is considered to be worsening this situation.

Strategies for Improvement

An additional patrol night, notably a Thursday night, was suggested because of late-night shopping. More funding for activities is also required.

Another suggestion was day patrols as the pilot previously undertaken resulted in a decrease in crime. Shop owners in particular were really appreciative of the day patrol.

Conclusions

Taree seems to have the best of service provision being supported by the local shire and the broader community. Taree is a diverse community with several different Aboriginal groups. There is a high level of social disadvantage, but the combination of a SAY street beat program with other youth activities does play a significant role in improving life for local youth.

Appendix 16: Wilcannia Profile



Wilcannia is a small town within the Central Darling Shire about 1,000 kilometres west of Sydney. The shire is the largest Shire in NSW covering an area of 53,000 square kilometres. Yet it has the smallest population with only 826 people (ABS 2012). Besides Wilcannia, the Central Darling Shire has three other towns; Ivanhoe, Menindee and White Cliffs. The traditional owners are the Barkindji people who remain the greater proportion of local Aboriginal people. The other main group is the Ngiyampaa people.

The Field Work

Two researchers visited the community in December 2011. Fourteen local residents were interviewed, nine of whom were male and three were female. Ages ranged from 18 to 75. Nine were Aboriginal people, with two being Elders of the community. Other participants included representatives from the SAY program, former members of the night patrol, service providers and community leaders.

Social Profile

Table 35: Wilcannia Social Profile (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011 Census of Population and Housing, 2012)

	Wilcannia	%	Australia	%
Population	826		21,507,717	
Indigenous people	466	57.4	548,369	2.5
Median age	31		37	
Indigenous median age	24		21	
Children aged 0-14	211	25.6	4,144,025	19.3
Indigenous children aged 0-14	162	34.7	256,283	46.7
Persons aged 55 and over	153	18.5	5,516,010	25.6
Indigenous Persons 55 and over	50	10.7	53,003	9.7
Unemployed	45	11.6	600,133	5.6
Indigenous unemployed	37	26.2	30,462	17.1
Median household weekly income	\$830		\$1,234	

Indigenous median household weekly income	\$840		\$991	
Average people per household	2.9		2.6	
Ave Indigenous people per household	3.9		3.3	
One parent families	60	30	901,634	15.9
Persons born overseas	50	6.2	6,489,870	30.2

In comparison with national averages, Wilcannia has a high proportion of Aboriginal people, twice the rate of single parent families, high unemployment, low average household incomes, and more people per household.

The cost of living in Wilcannia is extremely high. The cost of fresh food is excessive, with only one small supermarket and one roadhouse selling fast food and a small range of groceries. Social disadvantage is heightened by the low economic status of the local Aboriginal population. A Community Access Bus between Wilcannia and Broken Hill operates five days per week at a cost of \$15.00 return. Participants in this study reported that most local people use this service to do their weekly shopping in Broken Hill, as it is cheaper than shopping locally. In August 2012 the one and only food store closed down for one week, leaving the town without any access to fresh food, baby food and basic items. The store had been the subject of a Fair Trading investigation into price-gouging. This is an important issue, as the study found children are often on the streets at night because they are hungry. As Wilcannia is on the main inland highway to Adelaide, food should not be expensive.

The SAY Program

A SAY activity model is conducted through the Wilcannia Youth and Community Club Association (WINGS) drop-in centre. WINGS provide youth development activities, after school and holiday programs, sport and community cultural activities. WINGS has a bus for transporting local kids to and from the centre and youth activities. The program is managed by the Maari Ma Health Aboriginal Corporation based in Broken Hill.

Local Crime Problems

The most common offences for the Central Darling Shire in 2012 were domestic violence, assault, malicious damage to property, harassment and various public order offences (Table 36). Wilcannia crime rates have been found to be higher than other communities in the shire and there is an acceptance within the community of crime and of criminal justice processes.

Trend analysis in Table 36 shows a reduction in crime since the night patrol operated in Wilcannia. However, since 2009 and the introduction of the SAY Activities program, incidences of crime have remained stable and malicious damage of property has increased by nearly 22%. These data suggest that there is a need for a night patrol.

One community leader believed kids gathered on the streets at night because it is cooler at night. A recent installation of air conditioning in some houses might impact on this.

Appendix 16: Wilcannia Profile

Table 36: Recorded incidents of selected offences for Central Darling LGA: Annual totals and trends from October 1998 to September 2012 and from 2009 to 2012.

Offence	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	1999-2012 trend	Ave % change	2009-2012 trend	Ave % change
Arson	3	5	7	7	7	0	2	6	3	2	5	0	2	4	*	**	*	**
Domestic violence	115	128	115	134	190	170	114	107	114	83	109	110	98	133	Up	1.1%	Stable	**
Assault	87	119	102	92	105	96	86	84	56	32	50	36	54	56	Down	-3.3%	Stable	**
Assault Police	36	33	17	22	32	16	12	10	8	6	4	6	13	6	*	**	*	**
Breach AVO	39	31	45	47	61	63	29	30	42	20	34	48	49	36	Stable	**	Stable	**
Breach bail conditions	35	37	44	47	94	46	55	48	56	36	37	39	54	24	Stable	**	Stable	**
Break and enter - dwelling	70	42	42	47	63	69	49	34	34	27	56	25	30	27	Down	-7.1%	Stable	**
Break and enter - non-dwelling	51	48	68	59	33	46	9	29	18	9	16	9	19	24	*	**	*	**
Harassment	15	34	33	34	27	25	23	31	43	24	30	29	31	39	*	**	Stable	**
Indecent assault	5	7	8	3	12	3	6	5	3	7	11	6	5	2	*	**	*	**
Liquor offences	10	90	135	90	42	10	35	15	125	34	80	49	17	28	*	**	*	**
Malicious damage	141	137	119	114	111	111	115	110	81	38	49	62	60	88	Down	-3.6%	Up	21.6%
Motor vehicle theft	2	2	10	13	6	11	5	21	9	7	12	8	7	9	*	**	*	**
Offensive conduct	43	26	22	34	42	14	26	8	16	11	19	6	5	8	*	**	*	**
Offensive language	68	28	60	57	26	10	14	3	4	6	8	7	15	29	*	**	*	**
Other offences	17	38	54	57	71	34	36	40	25	15	17	31	33	25	*	**	*	**
Other theft	42	22	23	40	30	32	17	20	8	6	15	16	28	16	*	**	*	**
Possession and/or use of cannabis	5	16	9	7	4	10	7	11	9	11	14	7	3	21	*	**	*	**
Resist or hinder officer	47	33	51	50	45	26	28	23	20	12	8	15	20	22	*	**	*	**
Steal from dwelling	22	16	18	9	15	17	13	6	5	6	4	18	13	9	*	**	*	**
Steal from motor vehicle	48	13	26	29	22	34	19	12	7	7	22	17	10	24	*	**	*	**
Steal from person	0	0	0	2	0	1	1	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	*	**	*	**
Steal from retail store	6	8	4	6	3	2	3	1	0	0	1	3	1	2	*	**	*	**
Trespass	29	18	36	33	28	17	23	9	10	12	18	21	19	13	*	**	*	**

* A trend is not calculated if at least one 12 month period in the selected timeframe had less than 20 incidents.
 ** No annual percentage change is given if the trend is stable or if a trend has not been calculated.
 No ranking available for communities with populations of less than 3000 people

Best Practice

The SAY model in Wilcannia was cited by participants in other centres as being very successful and an example of best practice. The program attracts large numbers of young people and retains participation. Food is offered and young people are involved in its preparation. There are pool tables and a roster to manage who can play and when, similarly for the Play station and the Wii. Handball is available. There are times when they sing and/or rap together and a disco is run monthly. Staff offer rewards for positive behaviours.

An example of the children's' activities at the WINGS centre can be seen at:

<http://www.sharingstories.com.au/?q=hi/communities/2369>.



Staff

The local centre is staffed by a former teacher from the local school and her partner. The couple have great rapport with the young people and offer programs that teach discipline, manners, hygiene, and instil self-esteem. At the time of field work, two young Aboriginal people, a brother and sister, were being trained to take over management in the future. The local WINGS staff were pleased to report that they were all about to commence a Cert IV in Youth Work. As this is an apprenticeship-based training most of the workplace assessments can be conducted locally through TAFE.

The move to the SAY Activities program

The original night patrol program was changed to a SAY program. It was felt that Wilcannia is not sufficiently large to need transport and that staff time would be better utilised in offering an activity program. Around 60-70 young people now attend the program (from a town where there may be up to 150 young people in total). However, amongst our participants, there was a strong desire for the night patrol to be reinstated. Even the staff of the WINGS centre could see a need for the service. For example after the discos they transport the young people home because there is poor lighting and some of the young people live quite a distance from the service, and in an area that is not safe. In addition there is concern around the risk of young people being victimised by adults who are drunk.

WINGS staff were asked if a patrol was reinstated if they would like it coordinated through the WINGS service. However, they thought that the workload would be too great. Also staffing problems experienced when the bus was operating had created additional stress for SAY staff. Any new patrol would require new staff and a new manager.

Operation of the former night patrol

Residents involved in the operation of the previous night patrol maintained that the patrol provided a necessary service for the community and should be reinstated. The bus operated until 10.00pm on a Thursday, Friday and Saturday night, although staff claimed they were likely to work through to 2 – 3 am. The bus worked with young people from 10 – 17 years of age but occasionally had older people wanting a lift into town. They were busier on pay week.

Patrol Staff

Participants maintained that it was essential to always have a male and a female on the buses.

Community Perceptions of the Night Patrol Program

One of the former patrol staff lamented the change to the SAY program as the patrol had a role in preventing conflict on the streets. Another patrol staff member said the effectiveness of the patrol was because staff were local people working with local community problems.

Effectiveness for crime prevention

One of the former patrol staff emphasized the crime prevention role of the patrol. The street presence of the patrol meant that people were less likely to cause trouble on the streets because they were likely to be seen. Since the patrol ceased there have been more reports of young people drinking, roaming the streets and getting into trouble. A community leader agreed that the night patrol had a place. Young people were likely to be on the streets at night because it was cool, this informant claimed, and once on the streets, were more likely to engage in criminal behaviour through boredom. The patrol had a role in managing this.

Relationship with Police

The relationship between the night patrol and local police was cited as one of the problems faced by night patrol staff. A high turnover in police based in Wilcannia also meant that new officers lacked local knowledge and awareness of the patrol services. If police had knowledge of and were supportive of the patrol service, it worked well. However, this required police commitment to build a working relationship with the patrol and this did not always happen. Informants thought the patrol could help new police understand the complex relationships that characterised Wilcannia, and that this understanding would facilitate their police work.

The Referral Process

The management of the program by Maari Ma health service in Broken Hill does provide easy access to support services but there is a strong desire for management to be locally based. There are problems with disjointed, inappropriate, remote service delivery in

Wilcannia, which is seen to undermine community capacity or infrastructure. Short-term program funding and a lack of planned or coordinated services managed by remotely located multiple federal and state government agencies and non-government organisations are ongoing and significant problems for the community.

Barriers to best practice for the night patrol

Managing the patrol had been a challenge. One person involved in overseeing the process reported that as funding was not continuous, it was difficult to find employees in Wilcannia willing to fully commit to a job with the patrol. No full time positions could be offered and consequently, for their own job security, most staff treated the patrol job as a second job. Other commitments in their lives would take precedence over the patrol shifts, meaning that the bus did not operate on some nights because of a lack of staff. In a remote town like Wilcannia where employment is scarce, this was a concern. There were also problems with the guidelines for the service which did not match local need.

Barriers to best practice

While the SAY program was recognized as a great asset to the community, it did not necessarily remove children from the streets at night. Many children were out well beyond the time when the patrol finished, and on nights the patrol did not operate.

The SAY program also does not reach all of the kids within the community and this is a concern for the WINGS staff. They are struggling to engage with those young people who choose not to participate in the activities and see the need to do so.

Concern about public liability has meant local council has prevented several initiatives for local youth – much to the frustration of youth workers. For example a bike track built by the service with the help of the young people was very popular but was quickly closed because of liability issues.

Suggestions for Improvement

A community leader called for more local management of the night patrol and continuous funding. In a sense this is a call for a more integrated approach to service delivery, and the funding for that service delivery. Funding needs to be more reliable and continuous, so that there is some degree of predictability of employment for staff. It needs to be flexible to be able to adjust to local needs. For example, the inability to have adults and children on the same bus was seen as impractical for a remote community such as Wilcannia. Far greater flexibility is needed in rules and regulations.

The need for adequate staffing was seen as essential for an effective operation of the previous night patrols, but it was also about providing meaningful job opportunities for local youth, and this was seen as essential for places like Wilcannia. Initiatives such as the night patrol can be a means of exposing local people to the correct way to manage a business. For example, even the local Land Council is currently not operating because of a lack of

management and the Shire is run by people from out of town. There is an opportunity for a SAY program to deliver skills in management and governance to local community members in addition to delivering services to young people.

The need for training of people working with patrols or with the SAY program was another important suggestion. The range of skills needed by staff is wide and appropriate training is necessary to build capacity.

Another suggestion was for more training for local youth such as anger management, conflict resolution or something similar. Appropriately trained staff can offer these opportunities to young people.

One idea was for service providers to spend some time with the night patrol to gather an insight into the types of social problems within the community. This will increase their understanding of the service and help build inter-agency links.

Greater social control could be exercised if spaces could be created within the town for children to congregate other than the drop-in centre. For example a concrete skate ramp was seen as nearly indestructible, and would provide a central place where monitoring of young people could be made easier.

Conclusions

The success of the SAY program in Wilcannia is largely due to a highly committed and creative youth worker team. However, the centre only operates until 8.00pm and there is a lack of activities for youth other than the SAY program in this small community. Participants argued that a night patrol operating in conjunction with the WINGS centre was essential for the community to ensure youth are kept safe beyond the operating hours of the SAY program. There was a consensus that some of the problems with local youth were reduced when the night patrol was operating. The lack of consistent funding for the night patrol meant that regular staff could not always be retained and service provision was not consistent. A high turnover of police officers also meant there was inconsistency in how well police worked with local services and connected with local youth.

Generally there is a predominance of short term program funding and a lack of planned and coordinated service provision managed and delivered from outside this community. In an area where employment opportunities are extremely limited, services such as a night patrol offers job possibilities and skills training in youth work and business management for some local people. Community- led initiatives that addressed broad social, cultural and economic issues within a community were seen as necessary to reinforce positive community dynamics that prevent crime. Thus a locally managed night patrol funded for three year terms in conjunction with the SAY program working with local police would provide a more comprehensive approach to maintaining child safety and security and improve crime prevention as well as open up employment opportunities.

Appendix 17: Safe Aboriginal Youth Programs (SAY) Main findings

Introduction

In this appendix, an overview of the main findings from the field work conducted in the eleven case study communities is presented. For the purposes of this report, the sites were grouped into categories based on their size and location into:

- Metropolitan programs (metro) two communities
- Regional Centre programs (RC) two communities
- Regional Town programs (RT) three communities
- Small remote programs (SR) four communities

The grouping aims to protect the identity of participants in the research who may potentially be identifiable by their comments given the nature and size of some of the program sites. This appendix presents an analysis of the themes generated from these programs.

Community Group Descriptions

Metropolitan Centres

This group includes Newcastle on the NSW Central coast and La Perouse in Sydney's eastern suburbs.

Table 37: Selected community characteristics for Metropolitan Centres (ABS 2012)

	Non- Indigenous/Indigenous		
	Newcastle	La Perouse	AUSTRALIA
Population (Town)	148,535	418	21,507,717
Aboriginal population	3,927 (2.6%)	154 (36.8)	548,369 (2.5%)
% Children aged 0-14	16.4 / 17.0	15.1 / 27.2	19.3 / 46.7
% Unemployed	5.7 / 13.2	5.5 / 10.5	5.6 / 17.1
Median household income	\$1,165 / \$1,048	\$1,037 / \$816	\$1,234 / \$991
Ave people per household	2.4 / 2.9	2.8/3.1	2.6 / 3.3
% One parent families	18.5%	31.8%	15.9%

The two metropolitan communities are slightly different in their composition. One community includes a Department of Housing subdivision (flats and townhouses ranging from one to three storeys). In the target area there is a high proportion of Indigenous families (more than a third). The other is a large, highly populated area where recent changes in industry led to a rapid increase in unemployment to around 12%. There are a large variety of services available. The Indigenous population is higher than the national

average, with a significantly higher number of Indigenous children (under 14 years of age). BOCSAR 2011 data indicates that the main crimes experienced include Malicious Damage and stealing from a motor car.

Newcastle is situated 162 kilometres north east of Sydney. The Newcastle metropolitan area is the second most populated area in New South Wales. The city centre abuts eight beaches. Being a large regional city, Newcastle has access to a wide variety of services, health and education facilities. The city has an extensive public transport system. However the cost can inhibit young people. The main crimes experienced include Malicious Damage, steal from a motor vehicle, Break and enter, other theft and assault.

The Wungara night patrol service is currently auspiced by the Newcastle PCYC and funded under the SAY program. The night patrol operates every Friday and Saturday night in conjunction with activities at the Newcastle PCYC from 7.30pm - 10.30pm. The bus then provides a drop off service on those nights from 9.00pm -1.00 am to a safe location.

La Perouse is a small suburb located at the southern extent of Randwick City council bounded by an extensive foreshore area on the northern headland of Botany Bay. There is a small residential area in the west of La Perouse which is a mix of low- and medium-density housing. In 2011, there were 418 people living in La Perouse. Well over one-third of the population is Aboriginal. La Perouse is the one area of Sydney with which Aboriginal people have had an unbroken connection for over 7,500 years. Being within the Sydney metropolitan area, the region is well serviced. The main crimes experienced include Malicious damage to property, Steal from motor vehicle, break and enter and other theft, domestic violence, and breach bail offences. The region ranked 5th in the state for robbery without a weapon offences.

The La Perouse Street Beat bus, known as the *Boomerang Bus*, is a community-based service providing a safe transport and outreach service for people aged 12 to 20 years who are on the street late at night, when other support services are unavailable. Street Beat youth workers and volunteers also provide those in need with access to resources such as counselling, advice and advocacy. La Perouse's Boomerang Bus has two Street Beat workers, and a caseworker to work with the PCYC Activities Coordinator to ensure there are ongoing recreational programs and skills development for local young people. The SAY night patrol program is managed by the Eastern Suburbs PCYC.

Regional centres

The two regional centres include Armidale and Dubbo.

Table 38: Selected community characteristics for Regional Centres (ABS 2012)

Non- Indigenous/Indigenous			
	Dubbo	Armidale	AUSTRALIA
Population (Town)	38,805	24,105	21,507,717
Aboriginal population	4,985 (13%)	1,513 (6.3%)	548,369 (2.5%)
% Children aged 0-14	22.5 / 39.3%	19.1 / 36.3%	19.3 /46.7%
% Unemployed	4.9 / 18.3%	7.4 / 22.4%	5.6 / 17.1%
Median household income	\$1,096 / \$943	\$991 / \$749	\$1,234 /\$991
Ave people per household	2.6 / 3.3	2.4 / 3.1	2.6 / 3.3
%One parent families	19.3%	18%	15.9%

Armidale is situated in the New England Tablelands half way between Sydney and Brisbane. Armidale is a centre for education, agriculture, retail and professional services. The region is the traditional land of the Anaiwan people. The community is quite diverse comprised of over 53 different nationalities. Being a large regional centre, Armidale is very well supported by service providers. Liquor offences and offensive conduct are an issue in this community. Other crimes of significance are malicious damage, assault and domestic violence and break and enter.

The night patrol service in Armidale has operated for fifteen years. The bus service now operates as Youth Assist and is funded under the SAY program. The night patrol currently operates two nights a week.

Dubbo is a large regional city of 38,000 people that has grown rapidly over the last twenty years. Many Aboriginal people have moved into the city from outback towns seeking employment opportunities. There are 57 different Aboriginal groups in Dubbo and Aboriginal people comprise 13% of the population (ABS 2012; Dubbo KIN 2012). Youth homelessness and a lack of structured activities for young people see many on the streets at night. Local police noted that break and enter, graffiti, arson and fighting were common problems among youth between the ages of 10 and 18 years. Until 2006, Aboriginal people were primarily located within the Gordon Estate in West Dubbo. There was a high level of social disadvantage in this community and the estate became notorious for violence, high crime, vandalism and anti-social behaviour, culminating in a riot in 2005. In response, the New South Wales Department of Housing closed the estate and relocated over 200 households to other parts of Dubbo. The exercise did result in a significant reduction in Dubbo's crime rates but it also highlights the need for a night patrol as young people need transport to homes spread across the city.

The Indigenous population in this community is significantly higher than the national Indigenous population rate. Young people aged less than 14 years and one parent families are also substantially over-represented. The community ranks particularly highly, compared with other LGAs in NSW, for crimes relating to domestic violence and other types of assault,

sexual assault, break and enter offences, theft and stealing offences, and motor vehicle theft.

Dubbo has a night patrol managed by the Dubbo Neighbourhood Centre. The bus operates Thursday, Friday and Saturday evenings from 6.00pm to 10.30pm

Regional towns

The Regional towns include Nowra, Taree and Kempsey. These towns are all situated on the coast and thus have large, growing and diverse populations.

Table 39: Selected community characteristics for Regional Towns (ABS 2012)

	Non- Indigenous/Indigenous			
	Nowra	Taree	Kempsey	AUSTRALIA
Population (Town)	18,104	46,541	28,134	21,507,717
Aboriginal population	2,030 (8.5%)	2,500 (5.4%)	3,124 (11.1%)	548,369 (2.5%)
% Children aged 0-14	20.7/39.9	18.6/40.4	19.4/37.5	19.3 /46.7%
% Unemployed	8.8/24.3	9.3/28.1	8.9/27.6	5.6 / 17.1%
Median household income	\$851/\$745	\$770/\$716	\$748/\$700	\$1,234 /\$991
Ave people per household	2.5/3.1	2.4/3.3	2.4/3.3	2.6 / 3.3
% One parent families	22.7	18.4	22.5	15.9

According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics Socio-Economic Index for Areas (SEIFA) for regional towns, these communities have some of the highest levels of disadvantage in NSW with higher levels of unemployment and disability than the state's average, higher rates of Indigenous residents and high rates of criminal victimization. One of these communities also has substantially higher rates of crime than other NSW LGAs for offences relating to receiving stolen goods, stealing offences, break and enter, and robbery offences. In comparison to other NSW LGAs, another community ranks statistically higher for domestic violence, break and enter offences, retail theft, harassment and threatening, and other theft (BOCSAR 2012). There is a shortage of public transport in the town, which impacts on young people who lack private transport to attend school. One of the communities also has significantly higher rates of Indigenous residents, welfare recipients, domestic violence, victimization and sole parents than the NSW average. The community has substantially higher crime rates than other NSW LGAs for assault, robbery and break and enter offences, motor vehicle theft, malicious damage, receiving stolen goods, and other theft.

Nowra is the largest coastal town on the NSW south coast, 160km south of Sydney. The area has no public transport but private contractors operate some services. Access to transport for young people and limited youth services are key problems and highlight the necessity of a night patrol service. Malicious damage is the most common offence occurring in the region. Assault and harassment offences are also high.

The SAY night patrol program in Nowra is called the Koori Habitat Night Patrol program. It is auspiced by Habitat Personnel, an Indigenous Employment NGO, and is operated from the Nowra Youth Centre (The Youthie) located on the edge of the central business district. The SAY night patrol bus operates Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays from 6pm with last runs at 9pm when the youth centre closes. There are definite times for the bus collection points in the Nowra-Bomaderry areas.

Kempsey lies 35 km inland on the mid north coast of NSW 420kms north of Sydney. The economy is based on tourism, farming and service industries. The unique feature of the Kempsey Shire is the number of villages and settlements scattered throughout an area of 3,335 sq. km resulting in more than half of the total population residing outside of Kempsey township. A dispersed population has consequences for the Kempsey community and demonstrates the need for a night patrol.

Kempsey has a diverse population with varied lifestyles. Kempsey also attracts lower socio-economic groups because housing and property costs are relatively low. The traditional owners of the Macleay Valley are the Dunghutti People. Today there is a large Aboriginal community comprised of four distinct groups. Kempsey has a high population turnover but overall a low population growth, a very high population of Aboriginal people compared to national averages, high unemployment, a high proportion of single parent families, and low medium household income. The main crimes experienced are malicious damage, break and enter, stealing offences, assault, and domestic violence. Kempsey is ranked fifth highest in the state for break and enter offences and motor vehicle theft.

Kempsey is quite well serviced for a regional community but with a growing population, there is a need for additional services. There is a youth refuge. The SAY Program in Kempsey is a night patrol. It is auspiced by and operates from the Kempsey PCYC. The patrol operates on Friday and Saturday nights. On Friday nights young people aged 12-18 years are targeted but in general attendance is mainly those aged between 14 and 15. Younger children attend on Saturday nights (aged 10-12) between 5.00 to 7.30pm. Activities for older youth operate between 5 and 10 pm.

Taree is a city on the Mid North Coast, 16 km from the sea coast, and 317 km north of Sydney. The town is the centre for a significant agricultural district. The main crimes experienced are malicious damage, breach bail conditions, break and enter offences, theft from motor vehicle and other theft and domestic violence. The Taree Street Beat Project is funded by the DAGJ in partnership with Greater Taree City Council. Youth workers patrol the Taree CBD, Old Bar and Wingham on Friday and Saturday nights in a 14 seater mini bus between the hours of 6.30pm and 10.30pm. In addition, the Woombarra Wunggan Youth Services is an Aboriginal Adolescent Support Program funded by NSW Community Services. The program supports Aboriginal young people aged 12-18 years and provides a range of recreation, social and learning programs. Midnight basketball regularly operates an 8 week tournament.

Small remote communities

Of the **small remote communities (SR)**, three (Wilcannia, Bourke and Brewarrina) are located in remote areas in the far north west of the state while the other (Dareton) is in the far south west of New South Wales and is less remote, being in relatively close proximity to a large regional centre. Population sizes range from 600 to 2,900 people. All four have large proportions of Aboriginal people and all have high levels of social disadvantage according to the ABS SEIFA scale (ABS 2010).

Table 40: Selected community characteristics for Small Remote Communities (ABS 2012)

	Non-Indigenous/ Indigenous				
	Dareton	Wilcannia	Bourke	Brewarrina	AUSTRALIA
Population (Town)	516	826	2,868	1,766	21,507,717
Aboriginal population	187 (36.4%)	466 (57.4%)	867 (30.2%)	1,043 (59.1%)	548,369 2.5%
% Children aged 0-14	17.1/25.1%	25.6 / 34.7%	25.4 / 34.3%	25.3 / 31.4%	19.3 /46.7%
% Unemployed	10.3/28.6%	11.6 / 26.2%	5.1 / 17.8%	12.5 / 22.5%	5.6 / 17.1%
Median household income	\$787/\$774	\$830 / \$830	\$1,085 / \$900	\$791 /\$720	\$1,234 /\$991
Ave people per household	2.5/3.6	2.9 / 3.9	2.6 /3.2	2.6 / 3.1	2.6 / 3.3
%One parent families	23.1%	30%	19.3%	29.3%	15.9%

Dareton is a community of 516 people within the Wentworth Shire, which covers an area of 26,000sq km in south west NSW and has a population of 6,609. Dareton is 22kms from Wentworth, 19km from Buronga and 23km from Gol Gol. A SAY night patrol based in Dareton operates between these four communities. The large regional city of Mildura is just across the border in Victoria and there are problems when young people travel there and then have difficulty in getting back home. There is no youth centre but the SAY night patrol is managed by Mallee Family Care, which provides links to a wide range of youth services.

Wilcannia is a small, remote town of 600 people in far North West NSW that has a long history of social disadvantage amongst its largely Aboriginal population. With limited infrastructure, high unemployment, boredom, heat and alcohol and drug abuse in the community there have been ongoing problems with crime, violence and anti-social behaviour. Support services are mostly based in regional centres and are seen to be disjointed and often inappropriate for this community. The town has a SAY Activities program operating at a local youth centre. There is a bus that transports children to the centre and takes them home at the end of the night at 8.00pm.

Bourke is a community of 2,000 people in far North West NSW and also has a large Aboriginal population. Bourke is renowned for some of the highest crime rates in the state. Yet there is a lot of welfare and social support services available in this town. Bourke also has a SAY Activities program operating from a fully functioning PCYC. A bus picks children up from the streets to bring them into the PCYC where they have access to food and sporting activities and then are taken home.

Brewarrina, population 923, is largely an Aboriginal community also in far North West NSW. Brewarrina has more amenities than Wilcannia, although service provision is located in Bourke about 100kms away. Apart from sport, youth activities are very limited. Consequently, youth roam the streets. Again, the main crimes are assault, domestic violence, malicious damage, and break and enter. There appears to be a clear pattern of youth offending resulting in far too many Aboriginal children in this community becoming entwined in the criminal justice system. Unfortunately, Brewarrina currently has no services at all, having lost funding for a night patrol due to a failure by the management committee to meet reporting requirements. Previous bus patrols had operated Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights to 2.00am.

The reasons why children are on the streets at night

A number of key factors were identified as the reasons why children were on the streets at night.

Despite being in metropolitan areas, informants in these areas felt that there was a lack of things for young people to do and this resulted in young people congregating on the streets. Informants linked crime with youth boredom. Boredom was also identified as an issue for local youth in the small remote communities. In one of these communities there is a large regional city only 24 kilometres away over the state border, and young people frequently travelled there to shop. However, this creates a social problem as the return trip late at night is often not possible. Taxis are an \$80 fare one way and buses are not available at night. The NSW night patrol is unable to enter into Victoria to collect NSW youth. Consequently, these children are at risk either through criminal activity (i.e. there is a high incidence of stolen vehicles by young people needing to find a way home), or they become victims themselves of other crime. While most middle class non-Aboriginal youth are able to get their license to drive at 17yrs, Aboriginal youth find it much more difficult to find someone to teach them to drive or to buy and maintain a vehicle. Consequently, transport is a big issue for Aboriginal youth.

Crime was also linked to poverty. In several of the regional towns informants argued that young Indigenous people from backgrounds of extreme poverty are disadvantaged by low literacy levels, lack of education and few employment opportunities. These young people frequently have issues relating to drug and alcohol abuse, family abuse and breakdowns, domestic violence, neglect, child prostitution, insufficient food and homelessness. A consequence of their disadvantage is committing petty crimes such as shoplifting, often to obtain food. They also engage in opportunistic crime, which tends to be related to boredom and hanging around town at night without transport.

There was a general perception that, for some young people, being on the streets, with all the attendant risks, was safer than being at home. Once on the streets, young people were likely to hang out with other young people. Lack of things to do resulted in boredom.

Police officers interviewed identified that, from their perspective, the main reason young people were on the streets was a lack of supervision at home. The street is a place for kids to 'hang out'. Officers in SR related stories of very young children being on the streets from early in the morning till late at night – of one tiny four year old boy well known to police who when picked up on the streets fell asleep in the back of the police car. Police stressed the importance of giving children a meal as many are hungry. 'They eat like they haven't eaten for a week'.

Once on the streets in metropolitan areas, young people, with limited or no money, were more likely to congregate around some of the 24 hour shops, particularly McDonalds, and partake of alcohol or drugs. In other communities informants believed there were more active crime-seeking activities where younger children were encouraged by older siblings or relatives to break into houses. Prison was positioned as a '... holiday... It's like having custard and jelly. Green jelly you have that in prison – you can't get that at home.'(SR)

Young people exhibit a certain amount of territoriality, particularly in larger centres. Informants felt in these communities, the tendency is to ensure that antisocial and criminal behaviours are exhibited outside of one's own area where this is possible, and this causes conflict with the young people who live in the targeted areas.

Issues for young people changed often and participants identified the need to engage to keep the service informed. For example, in one setting sniffing deodorant had been popular recently, and social media concerns such as bullying on Facebook are a regular issue.

Profile of services

History

In many cases patrols were started by the community (in one community the original patrol was called the "Granny patrol" because of its origins with female Indigenous elders). These original patrols were sometimes foot patrols, occasionally paired with a bus but not always, although they tended to evolve into a bus patrol over time. In all cases the patrols went through various forms, with various different sponsoring organisations. Initial sponsoring organisations were invariably Indigenous, although few current organisations are. Some communities now operate the SAY model, others have partnered with a youth organisation and use the patrol to transport young people to and from their partner youth centre, whilst others operate a night patrol only. In some communities both the SAY program and an affiliated youth program offer activities to which the patrol links.

Both regional towns started off with a volunteer patrol. The introduction of a bus caused some concerns as there was a perception that it was used as a taxi service. A similar pattern of development is seen in the regional towns. A participant from one community explained that there was no youth centre in the community but early patrol workers would do a foot patrol and use a Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) bus to take young people off the streets. Some felt that the original Patrol was problematic in that young

people were transported into town where there were no activities available to them. In another community, even though the purpose of the original patrol bus was to pick young people up from the street and deliver them home safely, the service later became known as the 'booze bus' due to an expanded role of picking up people who had been drinking.

Training and professionalisation of the workforce was seen as a way to manage these concerns and all programs eventually came under the auspice of DAGJ. However, this move towards professionalisation was not made without conflict. An Indigenous patrol worker explained there was a number of challenges in the transition from volunteerism to professionalization, in particular a downsizing of the workforce and pressures from the competing interests of different community groups. Despite these pressures, patrol workers report that they are focused on maintaining equality and objectivity, good relationships with respected Elders, and the needs of the community as a whole.

Both metropolitan areas operate a bus service that is partnered with an activity program. The organisations running the activity program are also responsible for the bus service, although the funding for these two components is separate. In one area the transport initially operated independently and was not partnered with an activity program. There was a revitalisation of the program once this partnering occurred. Funding for the activity component is not always consistent and in one case the sponsoring organisation needed to seek funding from other sources to continue the activity program, which resulted in problems as some components could not be continued at all, whilst others halted for a time before resuming.

In the remote areas one program had recently been de-funded but had operated as a night patrol. In the other communities variations of the SAY model were in operation; one community was not funded for the SAY model but had developed a partnership with another organisation so the combined operation presented as similar to SAY.

Current Patrol Operation

The model

In some communities, some members of the community were unhappy with the allocation of the funding to PCYC and believe the program should be operated by an Aboriginal organization, rather than funding for Aboriginal programs going to non-Aboriginal agencies. In other communities there is conflict regarding whether funding for the patrol is 'Aboriginal money'; this is related to the broader issue of whether or not the night patrol should be an Aboriginal service.

The patrol service is frequently misunderstood within the broader community and there has been a perception of the patrol as a publicly funded service for drunks. Additionally, participants commented that when there are negative community perceptions of young people, the patrol service may be held responsible for what is felt to be wrong. Negative

community attitudes are difficult to shift and one patroller described their position in terms of 'powerlessness' to shift community attitudes.

Hours of operation

Hours of operation vary significantly across the different communities. In some communities where the bus operates solely to collect young people and bring them to the centre, then take them home afterwards, there is an advertised bus route. The bus finishes when the activities finish, which is often around 9-10pm. Other programs will respond to a call from young people but still only be available at specific times (usually Friday and Saturday nights up till 10pm, or midnight). Some services run the bus for limited hours (for example 6-8pm Thursday, 6-10pm on Friday and Saturday). Some services combine transport to and from a youth program with random street patrols (random in the sense that they do not follow a routine, but use community knowledge of local events to identify where young people might be at certain times). They tend to undertake the patrols after they have dropped young people home at the end of the activity programs, and may operate up until 1am on Saturday and Sunday mornings. One program introduced a permission slip system where young people will not be picked up unless there is a signed agreement (the permission slip) obtained from parents/carers. This is to ensure that the night patrol cannot be accused of kidnapping. Seeking parental permission also ensures parental involvement. Permission slips are completed three times a year. Local youth in Year 7 and those attending local sporting groups are given night patrol information pack. Parents understand if the bus drops their children home it is not because they are in trouble but it is part of a signed agreement. Blank forms are held for youth without permission slips and these are signed at parent/caregiver's house.

The bus

In the metropolitan areas, transport provided by the service was associated in the minds of young people with particular groups, so there were issues with territoriality and ownership of the program that were not identified as an issue in any of the other communities.

Some of the young people are picked up from their homes and transported to the activity centre, whilst others are picked up from the streets and returned to a safe place, which may be the activity centre but may not. Some communities identify pre-determined places from which they will collect young people in the bus and take them to the activity centre. In some communities the bus will respond to calls from shop owners, security staff or public transport security staff in particular areas where groups of young people are congregating.

There are times when the bus is used to transport young people when no other transport options are available to them. In one community, during summer, local children flock to the local swimming pool in town but many then have about a 6kms walk home. If they have spent all their money at the pool, they have no money to get home or to make calls to their parents. In some cases, their parents may not be available to get them. In the height of

summer temperatures hover around 43 degrees, so the SAY staff work with the pool management to extend the pool closing times and then transport the children home.

In some communities the patrol bus is used during the day as an outreach service for a range of Aboriginal services, such as taking people to classes and medical appointments. In one community the bus operates from the youth centre to transport young people to and from a range of specific out-of-town events/shows. This gives young people an opportunity to attend events that would otherwise be inaccessible to them. The presence of the patrol at events such as the community show allows for young people to be transported home if there are any issues. Interaction of this type between the patrol and young people at out-of-town events is thought to substantially reduce youth arrests. In another community the bus is used by the wider community during the day for youth activities and for transporting children to and from sport activities.

There has been some debate among patrol workers concerning whether the bus should be used for an Aboriginal service or as a whole-of-community service; this includes picking up non-Aboriginal kids on the streets at night. As the Charter does not stipulate that the service is for Aboriginal youth only, a patrol worker commented “Everyone needs ownership....it should be for all kids”. Subsequently, the service continues to be available to non-Indigenous young people, though in many communities Aboriginal young people are the main users of the bus.

Both children and young people use the bus. Different programs identified different age ranges: some from 10-16 years, others 12-18 and another 14-17 mainly but occasionally children as young as seven. In one community the majority of the young people on the bus are young males, but this is not identified in any of the other communities.

The bus picks up and takes children home or to a safe alternative. In some communities patrol staff will get out of the bus to make sure children are actually delivered to a safe home environment. Sometimes there are occasions where staff might bring children back to the base and feed them prior to being able to take the child to somewhere safe. In most cases these are children who will need to be reported to community services. Police will also sometimes contact SAY to transport children home.

The activities

The activity component offered by the sponsor organisation or SAY is perceived as a significant component of the model, and a key for crime prevention. Engaging in activities provides opportunities for modelling and skill development. Young people are safe and are not bored.

The provision of food is a key component to the success of the activity program. Many informants argued that young people were not getting nutritious food at home, and some claimed that it was not uncommon for young people to have not eaten for several days prior

to attending the program. Inadequate nutrition is linked in the research to problems with learning and ongoing problems with health and wellbeing.

Staffing

All SAY program staff are subject to working with children checks as per the Commission for Children and Young People Act 1998, the Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 and the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000. SAY program staff are bound by the Mandatory Reporting Requirements as set out in the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998.

Staffing of the programs varies and most include both paid and volunteer staff. Some communities are challenged by high staff turnover (both paid and volunteer) despite the enthusiasm and high levels of motivation of existing staff. One driver reflected s/he would like to have a permanent partner each night on the bus rather than needing to “re-brief” a new partner each night. Most provide a male and female worker on the bus and at the activities to ensure the availability of an “auntie” and “uncle”.

Services maintain a mix of Indigenous and non-Indigenous staff. Some attempt to ensure there is at least one Aboriginal Elder available. One of the key advantages of Indigenous staff is their knowledge of families and their ability to make judgement calls on the safety of drop-offs and on the behaviour of the young people. One service requires the bus staff to all be Indigenous. However, there were concerns in some communities that whilst non-Indigenous staff could be very effective in building relationships with young people, they were often not well received by the community as a whole because they were not Indigenous.

Staff need to be able to handle difficult and aggressive situations and to be thick skinned. Staff also need to have a thorough awareness of the local streets and be able to plan and co-ordinate their movements to make their driving time as efficient as possible. They spoke of not wanting young people to be caught out waiting on the streets any longer than necessary, so that planning when and where they operated was essential.

There are a range of characteristics required to undertake this work. These include:

- team work,
- being able to engage with young people,
- the ability to effectively manage groups of young people,
- being open, friendly and adaptable,
- being motivated by social change,
- be genuine,
- be able to earn and deliver respect,
- be accepted by the young people,
- have Police and Working With Children’s Checks,
- being able to build trusting relationship with young people

Referrals/ liaison with other agencies

Some of the young people using the services commit petty crimes but most are not serious offenders. The majority spend their time just hanging around shopping centres or enjoy just being downtown with their friends. Many experience difficult issues relating to home life, schooling, alcohol or other drugs, or teenage pregnancy. To support young people with these issues patrollers try to establish a rapport with families and form good relationships with support services within the communities.

Some programs do not tend to refer young people on to other services on a regular basis but in other communities referral of young people to drug and alcohol services and outreach services occurs. However, a major challenge for patrol workers in most communities is the lack of services available for young people, particularly after hours. In many the night patrol is the only dedicated service for youth that operates at night and, consequently, some support services are unaware of its existence. In other communities there are other agencies operating for some of the evening, and in one case, this resulted in a greater appreciation of the work of the patrol.

There are also problems of an overlap of service delivery, a lack of clearly defined functions in the roles of service providers, and perceived competition between services which encourages services to be protective of their programs and outcomes. Our informants felt that some services in their communities can have quite territorial views about 'competing' services and there are issues around confidentiality and the sharing of information. As a result there is limited interaction, cohesion or collaboration between services, and limited scope for night patrol staff to link clients to other community supports. A former patrol driver commented that this 'fracturing of service coordination and delivery' contributes to crime amongst young people.

Mandatory reporting of child protection issues presents difficulties for some night patrol staff. Service providers and night patrol staff explained that volunteers are not obliged to report child protection issues, even when issues of child safety are apparent. It was thought that night patrol staff require more training around mandatory reporting. An area of conflict is the reluctance of some Aboriginal people to report child protection issues due to their close social ties with Aboriginal communities.

Liaison with Police

One participant described the relationship between the police and young Aboriginal people as a "cycle of hate" and this emphasizes the importance of the patrol in building bridges between young Indigenous people and the police. Patrol workers pointed out that trouble can be prevented when the police and patrols work together; for example the police can ask the patrol to get rid of a mob of potentially problematic kids. The patrol can act as a 'buffer zone' between young people and the police, which in turn helps form better police/youth relationships.

In some communities police are aware of the program and Police Youth Officers will call for the bus to transport young people home. However, a high turnover in police in some communities often meant that new officers lacked local knowledge and awareness of the patrol services. In general the feeling seems to be that the relationships between the programs and police could be improved.

There is a common misconception across many of the communities that the patrol transports young people from one party to the next. This and other misunderstandings have resulted in police viewing the patrol as a hindrance to their crime control activities. Thus this reinforces the tendency to not work together and to criticise the others' interactions with young people. Patrol workers argue the police and other services often manage undesirable behaviour exhibited by young people by moving them on. Some feel that this simply moves the undesirable behaviour to other sites rather than dealing with it effectively.

Effectiveness

For many informants, simply picking up young people and removing them from the street is evidence supporting the positive impact of the program in crime prevention. The more young people removed from the streets, the greater the crime prevention impact.

There is concern that statistics and other measures do not accurately reflect the crime prevention role of the program, but there is an acknowledgement that their anecdotal evidence (whilst primary in their understanding) is limited. There was evidence from informants as to how engagement with the program could turn certain criminal behaviour around, and also positively influence other young people. Informants recognised that some young people just couldn't be engaged or remain engaged with the bus and its related programs, but even in these situations there was a positive impact for their friends.

Informants also related that when the bus didn't run for whatever reason, it had a major impact on other services. They told stories of other services being much busier when the bus did not operate.

One informant suggested an indirect benefit of the program to be that of fulfilling a more broad community development role. For example the night patrol can also be a means of exposing local people to the correct way to manage a business.

Suggestions for Improvement

Clearer guidelines and operating principles

There were concerns about how the patrols operated and this included the need for guidelines around places to which young people were transported and the extent of responsibility of patrol staff. Many informants talked about a lack of clarity around where their responsibilities lay.

Staffing

Patrol staff commonly cited a problem of finding suitable patrol staff as some of the local people who would make good patrol workers do not meet 'Working with Children' requirements. This is due to issues of law breaking which may have taken place a number of years earlier.

To increase the pool of available and willing staff, participants recommended a range of strategies. Given that in some areas up to 90 per cent of Indigenous people have had some criminal offense recorded, one informant recommended that should previous offences be relatively minor in nature and a person is otherwise of sound character, the person should be considered for a position. In many cases their experience with the criminal justice system may allow them to offer genuine advice to young people to deter them from offending. Other suggestions included providing remuneration for volunteers to encourage participation. In remote communities where employment prospects are limited, such opportunities would be a good incentive. One Aboriginal participant suggested another incentive for involvement in the patrol could be that a member of patrol should be entitled to free membership of the Community Justice Group. In addition there needs to be some mechanism in place to ensure that volunteers can be on 'stand-by' for quick response and back-up support if patrol staff are not available for shifts.

Staff training

Despite differences of opinion about whether the patrol should be an Aboriginal service, participants agreed that Aboriginality is less important than being suitable for the job. Suitability was defined in terms of having an understanding of issues impacting on Aboriginal communities, being accepted by Indigenous young people, and having the ability to build rapport with young people who present challenging behaviours.

Staff are selected on the basis of their own life experience, their ability to communicate and establish trusting relationships with young people, and their respect within the community. Participants commented that the best practice is having passionate people to work with the young people to engage them and bring them in. It is not simply about being Aboriginal but about being known in the community, being of Aboriginal descent and being accepted in the community as Aboriginal.

Many young people from Indigenous families have only one parent and many of these families are headed by a young mother. Therefore a good target for staffing is considered to be strong men who are able to act as mentors for young males whose fathers, uncles and grandfathers are often in prison.

Staff training takes place through TAFE and includes first aid, anger management, using radios, dealing with people who are intoxicated, and knowing when it is safe to become involved. Staff commented that although the formal training was helpful, it was no substitute for local knowledge and learning on the job. Some communities identified the

need for training in administration (such as allocation of funds, monitoring and reporting). Other suggestions included youth worker skills, and the ability to engage with young people. Communication skills were constantly identified as a key requirement for staff.

Size of the bus

A common request was that the size of the current bus needed to be increased. For example, one program has an 8-seater which provides for six young people to travel at a time and this was seen to severely hamper effectiveness and efficiency. There was specific concern about children left waiting as demand for the service increased. This requires bus staff to make decisions and prioritise who they should transport when numbers in any one location are high. There are concerns about the compromises they need to make, and the risks to which those who are waiting are exposed.

Funding

Funding for services is tight and this meant some staff now received reduced hours and less pay due to the new award, and this put pressure on remaining staff and retention. One of the services had to cut programs because of funding limitations. Funding limitations often meant the employment of part-time staff only, which provides little scope for establishing tight team structures or team cohesion.

Increased funding would enable the services to extend the hours of operation. Options included:

- Longer hours of operation on existing nights
- Adding other nights
- Increased services during peak periods (statutory and school holidays)

However, it was not universally agreed that increasing hours of operation was a good thing.

Increased funding may also be used in some communities to expand the clientele. For example, one informant argued that the bus could be used to take other people in the community to the soup kitchen on Friday nights. In addition, the night patrols are well placed to act as an education van providing sex education and safe-sex packages. This could include providing free condoms to young people to help prevent Sexually Transmitted Infections.

There is a perception of inconsistency in resources between patrol services and managers across the regions and participants felt there needs to be fairness across the sector. Some patrol services receive greater resourcing from government than other areas, and some managers are paid more than others. There is also a perception that management of funds needs to be more closely monitored. Some patrols can spend all their funding in eight months and have nothing left to operate the patrol for the remaining four months. Funding is topped up based on reporting but there is no monitoring of spending throughout the year. Our difficulty in obtaining copies of the reports each of the programs is supposed to

file with DAGJ is a good example. Despite multiple requests and interventions, these reports have not been provided.

Effective promotion

It was thought that greater promotion could help resolve some of the misunderstandings about the role and purpose of the program. A lack of understanding is seen as impairing relationships with the police and other services, limiting the potential of the services. Participants suggested a common mobile number or 1800 contact number needs to be established to promote the patrol services. In one community the patrol bus is unmarked and is not promoted.

One community has begun to promote the service more widely by handing out rubber bracelets containing the phone number of the patrol. The bracelets were available in bright colours and had proven to be popular and effective. Another community hands out business cards with the bus number.

Enhancing the capacity for support linking and referrals

To strengthen interagency cooperation within the communities and enhance the capacity for the patrol service to link young people to support services, one community suggested that a support worker could be attached to the bus service to directly link young people to a range of services where required. The patrol could be connected to a late-night opening youth place where young people can be linked to other referrals.

Greater interagency cooperation comprising major service providers could facilitate information sharing between agencies and therefore enable more supports for young people. There are potential benefits of developing a broad advisory committee to improve management and interagency cooperation. Support linking could be enhanced using information technology such as a Facebook page, phone apps, or text messaging. This would enable young people to have access to information about services and could help provide education about functions such as Legal Aid, the police, mental health services, and drug and alcohol services.

More activities for young people

Participants in some communities commented that there was an urgent need for young people to have access to activities at night time, as in many places there were no youth services open after hours. Some communities had operated midnight basketball and generally this was very successful; however in many cases lack of funding has led to its closure. This lack of access to night activities resulted in young people being bored and increased the likelihood of their committing crimes because there was nothing else to do.

Safe House

Problems of homelessness and a lack of appropriate housing in many communities highlight the need for a centralised after-hours service to provide a safe environment and holistic care for young people. Because the night patrol staff have local knowledge of the community and families, they come to know when there is violence or abuse in the home; this enables them to move the young person to an aunt or a safe house wherever possible. However, participants expressed concern about the lack of availability of a safe house in a number of the communities, explaining that when there are many parties taking place and a grandmother or an aunty wasn't available, there is no safe location for young people.

Appendix 18: NSW SAY Qualitative Findings

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of Say Programs in communities in NSW for reducing juvenile crime and other social problems and for improving community safety. The project also sought to assess the effectiveness of management and staffing of patrol operations and identify any barriers to their endeavours. The research team was also interested in identifying any ideas for improving current service provision. The original briefing asked that the evaluation address the following research questions:

1. Identify local perceptions of the SAY program and its appropriateness for the community.
2. Identify a means to measure the type of services clients are referred to, the referral process and the outcome of these referrals.
3. Identify the program's capacity to link young victims with support services.
4. Identify 'best practice' standards in delivering an outreach service for young Aboriginal people.
5. Develop a process to identify and measure crime prevention outcomes for young people.
6. Identify strategies to improve the capacity of patrol workers to proactively engage young people.

In this appendix, the main findings of the NSW field work are summarised and the implications discussed according to the above research criteria. In conclusion, some possible solutions are offered for improving SAY program operations.

Summary of the key findings

The Communities

SAY programs target communities with high proportions of Aboriginal people and high levels of social disadvantage. The review of key census data characteristics for the case study communities highlighted the high levels of unemployment and low incomes across all communities in comparison with national averages. Furthermore, these levels were much higher for Aboriginal residents in comparison to non-Aboriginal residents of these communities. The Indigenous population was also much younger with a higher proportion of children under the age of 14 years. These findings demonstrate the need for SAY programs for these communities.

The reasons why young people are on the streets at night

The consultations with residents of these communities revealed several key reasons why young people were on the streets at night.

Boredom

In every community, boredom and a lack of structured activities for youth in a community were cited by participants as the main reasons for children wandering the streets. Boredom was also identified in previous evaluations as the main catalyst for youth on the streets. Children hang out at certain places; a street corner, the river. There is camaraderie on the streets. Even in a large city like Newcastle, which has a PCYC, a pool, skate parks, movie theatres etc., boredom was seen as an issue. Young people often lack money to access these activities.

Boredom was linked to petty crime and malicious damage, which featured amongst the main types of crime experienced in all case study communities. Damage appears to be indiscriminate, an expression of frustration and anger of marginalized youth. This is particularly the case in small remote communities where there is little hope for the future for young people. While SAY programs are providing youth support in these communities, participants in every community called for increased hours of operation to meet the needs of young people beyond the current hours of operation.

Heat

One of the reasons children roam the streets at night is that their homes are hot, especially in remote communities, and children come out at night when it is cooler. Homes have no air-conditioning, although the government is addressing this in their move to improve Aboriginal housing. High environmental temperatures are associated with an increase in violent crime including homicide, suicide, domestic violence, sexual violence and aggression. Heat can also affect mood, human behaviour and function as well as sleep deprivation and school attendance (REF). Yet even in the winter time, children sit on the highway because of the heat in the road. Over the past decade in many remote Aboriginal communities in Australia, governments have funded programs to improve Aboriginal housing, including the provision of air-conditioning.

It's safer

In many cases children are escaping home environments where there is drug and alcohol abuse and associated violence or just poor parenting. This is where SAY programs meet a very real need in providing safe alternatives for children at risk. We heard of very young children being on the streets from early in the morning till late at night –one tiny four year old boy well known to police who when picked up on the streets fell asleep in the back of the police car.

Hunger

Several participants reported that many petty thefts and break and enter are perpetrated by children merely looking for food. While SAY and PCYC programs provide a healthy meal program, this is usually only provided one night a week.

Truancy

With very few job opportunities for Aboriginal children particularly in these remote communities, school attendance is not seen as a priority. Participants in several communities identified the employment opportunities for youth work provided through the SAY programs, particularly in remote communities, was important.

Lack of transport

In remote communities, there is no public transport and rarely taxis. Aboriginal reserves and missions are traditionally located on the outskirts of towns. Hence, Aboriginal people are required to walk long distances to and from their homes. This means they often linger longer in town centres than they would if their homes were closer. This is one of the reasons children are on the streets at night and demonstrates the importance of the night patrol service. Children are particularly vulnerable in the smaller remote towns that are located on major highways frequently traversed by heavy trucks, and there can be strangers or drunks, and on back streets lighting is minimal. Even in larger towns and cities where there is public transport, not all services operate at night and children do not have the fare.

Implications of the findings

The following implications of the findings of this evaluation study are presented according to the key research questions defined by the brief.

Research Question 1: Community perceptions of SAY Programs

The study sought to identify local perceptions of the SAY program and its appropriateness for the community. We found that community perceptions of the programs varied across different communities and different sectors of the community.

Business owners

Central business districts with extended trading hours tended to attract groups of young people and this often caused concerns for business owners. Local business owners did not like groups of young people congregating around their premises and were likely to ring the patrol and ask them to move the young people on. This is a common occurrence where groups of youth “hanging” in central business districts are seen as “youth as trouble” (Griffin, 2005:14–15). This is particularly the case in small rural communities where their salience is heightened.

In one community, local business owners regretted the closure of the patrol. The perception was that crime had increased in the community since the patrol ceased patrolling the central business district.

Overall, it was felt that local business owners appreciated the patrol and felt that the patrol helped make their business feel safer for community members. Patrol staff in some communities ensured they patrolled central business districts, sometimes parking in trouble

spots to reassure business owners that community safety was being addressed. They also noted that they strove to respond quickly to any concerns raised by the local business community.

Families and community members

Knowledge of the SAY program varied amongst community members. In a number of communities the current program evolved out of earlier versions that were instigated by community elders (in one community Aboriginal Elders ran a “Granny Patrol”) and this meant that many Elders were familiar with the concept, even though they may not have kept up-to-date with the changes in the service as it moved from one auspicing agency to another.

Whilst the original purpose of the patrol buses in each community was to pick young people up from the street and deliver them home safely, some services later became known as the ‘booze bus’ due to an expanded role of picking up people who had been drinking. This has created confusion within some sections of the community and some patrols have experienced problems when refusing access to adults or inebriated people seeking transport home.

Current community knowledge of the program thus consisted of a mixture of the services that had operated previously in each community, and what was operating currently. Mixed up in this are different perceptions of current auspicing agencies: in some communities these are not Indigenous agencies and this received mixed reactions. Some felt that the program was greatly appreciated, but others thought the program was exploited by families and/or that their work was not appreciated.

Other agencies

A number of participants working for other agencies identified problems with knowing about the patrol which made linking services impossible. One informant talked about inviting staff from other agencies to come on the patrol to help them understand what was offered.

Not all services working with young people in a community communicated with each other (see 4 below) although there were some communities in which regular interagency networking meetings helped build understanding of the work of other service providers.

Police

In all communities, there were mixed reports on the relationship between the police and the night patrol staff. Police were very supportive of the concept of patrols but were clear that their operations should be separate.

Overall, the relationship between SAY programs and local police was seen as important in all communities. Where SAY programs operated from a PCYC there was necessarily an ongoing interaction with police officers attached to the PCYC. In small rural communities, effective

policing is dependent upon officers accommodating community expectations regarding service provision and the maintenance of law and order, being a good listener, earning the trust of the residents, and treating the placement as a 24-hour job. Police effectiveness is also dependent upon officers being familiar with and understanding rural life. Community policing means being actively involved in community life. Youth club staff welcomed local officers who gave of their free time to join in with club activities and get to know local kids. However, not all officers avail themselves of these opportunities. One participant maintained that; “as a matter of course, all these programs have got to build a relationship with the local Police.”

Overall the relationship with police varied depending on the nature of the community and the personalities of patrol staff and police officers themselves. A good relationship saw patrols advising police of the hours they were operating, regularly communicating with police during the night, and working with police when incidents occurred in the community by providing transport for people from the scene or finding safe places for any children involved. Sometimes police would ask patrols to remove groups of children where there was potential for trouble. Police were also actively involved in some way with SAY program management committees. These positive relationships depended upon the attitude of police towards the operations of SAY programs and SAY staff.

Both police and SAY staff emphasised that SAY patrols were not there to do police work as their primary role was child safety. Rather, patrols can provide additional guardianship within communities, which can be a great support for police who are often stretched for resources.

Some communities have an ACLO and this is considered crucial in building relationships with young people. Patrol staff in all communities noted the loss of interaction with ACLOs since these positions are now only funded for daytime duties. Previously ACLOs would often accompany patrols, interacting with local youth. This built relationships between police and young people and greatly assisted patrol operations. This is no longer possible.

In some communities, police had limited awareness of patrol operations. In one community, patrol staff complained that sometimes when they needed to ferry large groups of children home, those left behind waiting for the bus to return were dispersed by police. In other places, police appeared to see patrol staff as interfering in police work. This may be an issue when patrol staff seek to remove youth from likely arrest, especially when the young people are kin to staff members.

The patrols were thought to provide a ‘buffer zone’ between the police and young people. Building those relationships can begin with police participating in activities with young people. However, relationship building needs to be constant, as individuals change in both the Police and the SAY program. Service staff also need time to commit to building relationships, and the funding model for SAY does not allow this.

Communication between the patrol and Police is essential in building and maintaining these working relationships. Where communication was working well, the Police and SAY program staff worked together effectively. On occasions they have been able to support each other in crime prevention activities, and share information. Where communication was not working well, there were concerns that the consequences of this sometimes meant that police actions were not supporting effective practice. In some cases there is concern that the role differentiation between police and patrol responsibilities is unclear.

Relationships with 'the community'

Overall there were concerns about the relationship between the SAY program and the community. It appears that services working with young people are often 'tainted' by negative community images held about young people and a feeling in some cases that the patrol is considered unrealistically responsible for all young people. Despite this, there were extremely positive comments made about the efficacy of the patrol by a range of stakeholders, balanced by a sense of fatalism that the program is struggling in a hostile climate.

As night patrols operate at night, the general public are not readily aware of patrol activities. This concern was raised in every case study community. SAY staff noted the need to promote the service throughout the community by personally visiting schools, private security firms, and local businesses, and having a display table at community events. Advertising program service times and dates in local media and in posters displayed in various places throughout the town was seen as very important. The need to have signed buses was also important. In Newcastle and Nowra, a competition to design a logo for the night patrol had proven to be a very successful exercise.

Program staff had developed some interesting means of delivering information to local children; a wrist band; fridge magnets; cards; Facebook pages and other internet sites. These findings indicate that advertising is essential for SAY programs effectiveness.

Perceived effectiveness of SAY Programs

The findings revealed, as have previous studies, that Night Patrols are regarded as essential by the communities they serve. Participants maintained patrols were effective in ensuring the safety of young people by removing them from the streets at night. Most acknowledged that child safety was the main aim of patrols and crime prevention was a secondary outcome. Most participants wanted longer operating hours for patrols to address the problems of children roaming the streets outside of the designated patrol times. Funding guidelines restrict hours of operation usually to just two nights a week.

Patrols were particularly effective when they were linked to youth activity programs at youth centres such as PCYC centres. In the two centres that have SAY Activity programs rather than a night patrol, residents would prefer to have a bus patrolling the community as well as the activity program as the safety of young people on the streets was paramount.

Research Question 2: Identify the referral process

Programs are expected to report to the DAGJ on a regular basis. These reports ask for the numbers of referrals provided to young Aboriginal people over the reporting period. We chose not to ask our informants for this information because:

1. We were told we would have access to all the reports submitted by the various organisations.
2. We did not want to bother our respondents for information that we were told we could get elsewhere.

However, despite multiple requests, and several interventions by DAGJ, these reports have not been provided to us. It is not clear to us if the inability to access the reports means this data is not available at all or simply if the data is not available to us. This leads us to infer that having this information as a required component of the regular reporting is not an effective measurement of referral and outcomes.

The qualitative data on referrals is addressed in 3 below.

Research Question 3: Linking victims to support

In all communities there are interagency meetings between local service providers which are attended by representatives of SAY programs. Some program managers or members of management committees also are participants in community consultation committees or Aboriginal Community Justice Groups, which also ensures that children at risk are brought to the attention of relevant service providers.

One Aboriginal leader did raise a strong point regarding the need for follow-up on referrals. For example one young teenage girl who revealed to patrol staff that she was pregnant was referred to prenatal support and health services. An incident report was made by patrol staff and the following morning, a case worker was contacted to follow the matter. This reinforces information given by young people on the bus is heard and is acted upon.

The qualitative data suggest that relationships with other agencies and the responsibility to refer were understood in different ways in different communities. In some services good relationships were claimed with other agencies, and referrals were claimed to occur as required. For example, in one small remote town links had been built with a family support service, and young people who were frequently picked up by the patrol were referred in what the service called a 'proactive casework response'.

In some communities relationships were built on sharing resources (particularly important in smaller communities with limited access to resources). Some involve other agencies in the SAY program. Involving other agencies in the activity program at the Youth Centre, as part of the SAY activities, ensures that young people have access to support. Organisations offered additional activities such as transition to employment, provision of health information (e.g. sexual health), domestic violence support, and leadership programs. They

felt that basing this additional support at the Youth Centre as an integral part of the SAY program increased the acceptability of the support to young people and aided the young people to develop relationships with staff working in the other programs.

In other communities, few participants in the evaluation perceived referral as a key component of the service. In a number of communities few other services (such as drug and alcohol services, outreach services) worked in the evenings so the ability of SAY staff to support referrals and to follow them through was extremely limited. There was a perception in a number of communities that, because SAY services operated at nights when other services were closed, SAY was unknown to other community services.

There was also a perception in some communities that services were in competition with each other; competing for funding and competing for clients. Our informants felt this made it impossible for services to work together.

Another issue that informants identified as making it difficult to work with other agencies was related to the rules around information sharing. Linking to child protection services was identified as problematic in some cases. This is particularly the case for Indigenous workers who were embedded in their community because of the tension between mandatory reporting (required of them by their employment) and loyalty to their community (required of them as Indigenous community members).

Volunteers are not required to report and some communities saw this as a problem as it was thought to weaken the ability of the program to address child protection issues.

It has been established in this study (and others e.g. Beacroft et al 2011) that the effectiveness of patrols is dependent upon how well the patrol workers know their community and how well they are respected in the community. However, the issue was raised in two communities that there can be problems with mandatory reporting when a child in question may be related to patrol staff.

This same social pressure may also extend to staff protecting young offenders from police. The problem of over-policing in Indigenous communities has been widely documented, but at the same time under-policing can also have negative impacts on Aboriginal youth (Blagg & Valuri 2004b; Beacroft et al 2011). Night patrols emerged as a means to address both these concerns. The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCIADIC) in 1991 recommended that efforts be made to keep Aboriginal people out of the criminal justice system, particularly for minor matters (Beacroft et al (2011). However there is a fine line between maintaining social order by addressing problems before the police become involved versus hiding offenders from police, which is an offence.

Research Question 4: Identifying best practice standards

The study also aimed to identify 'best practice' standards in delivering an outreach service for young Aboriginal people. Informants identified a number of key issues that addressed what they considered important to include in best practice standards.

Stability of funding / length of contract

Informants identified many issues associated with the funding model, particularly the stability and length of funding. For many small agencies, this meant that long term employment contracts could not be offered to people, and thus experienced employees were likely to seek alternative employment in order to attain some degree of stability. Much of the work was part-time, which also did not suit many people, thus those with skills and qualifications were likely to move on to other employment. This was particularly an issue for smaller agencies that did not have the infrastructure support to bridge uncertainties in funding, nor the resources inside paid hours to seek alternatives.

Managers of patrols called for longer term contracts for staff (at least three years) as they have found they cannot retain staff with short term contracts. This results in a lack of continuity for the service. Frequent staff changes impact on relationship building which is a crucial component of the SAY work. This is an important issue for the effectiveness of SAY programs, which are dependent upon the staff being respected and well known within the local community. Staff need to build relationships with community, young people, other agencies and the police. Relationship building takes time, and this is recognised as a key issue in community development (Muirhead, 2002; Tesoriero, 2010). The short term, part-time nature of employment compromises this ability. In many communities this is managed to some extent because many of the people employed are locals who have a history with the local community and whose relationships have been built up over time through their multiple community roles.

The need for a criminal record check for all those working with children also significantly reduces the number of people able to work with the programs, particularly in remote communities where Aboriginal people are significantly more likely to have been involved with the criminal justice system. Some flexibility in rules and regulations concerning these requirements is required. In places where there is little employment, people wanted to be paid for their services – some people saw this as a lack of community spirit but in reality it is more about self-worth.

Recruiting, training, supporting and retaining appropriate staff for community night patrols has been previously raised as an important issue for ongoing and effective operation (FaHCSIA 2010a, 2010b; Allen Consulting Group (2010: 66). SAY programs provide opportunities to provide employment in rural communities, which can address the acute unemployment problem particularly for Aboriginal people. Night patrols also provide opportunities for experience in business management which could transfer to other enterprises. The present study found every community experienced difficulty finding volunteers or suitable staff to assist in the operation of the patrol bus or youth clubs. Requirements for supervision in youth clubs meant that sometime the clubs could not open because of lack of staff.

While government funding is necessary to support night patrols and youth programs, in every community it was noted that once government funding was established, volunteer participation declined. The number of people in small communities able to volunteer is limited, especially with a loss of population in recent years due to drought and declining economies. In places where there is little employment, people wanted to be paid for their services – some people saw this as a lack of community spirit but in reality it is more about *raison d’etre*.

Reporting

The annual competitive grant process for program funding creates additional load for services and is at odds with long term planning objectives. There is a need to streamline funding arrangements associated with an annual cycle (Pratt et al. 2011).

There are issues with reporting and accountability (as evidenced by our inability to obtain what were identified as the required reports to DAGJ that need to accompany funding guarantees). These accountability requirements conflict with the needs of agencies to have some degree of predictable funding in order to have time for staff to develop relationships with the community. We believe it necessary for DAGJ to explore ways to better manage this tension. It may be necessary to individually negotiate appropriate reporting requirements with each community to ensure that accountability needs are met in ways that are do-able. Individual service contracts (charters) may be one way that this can be undertaken. Such an approach has been undertaken in New Zealand for many years in early childhood. Smith and Farquhar define chartering as: (2002, p. 123).

‘...a process where various stakeholders (parents, staff and the community) are given the opportunity to define quality at the individual centre level in negotiation with a government agency. The intent of the process is to strike a balance between centrally determined criteria of quality and the philosophy and local needs of centres. The government agency retains its right to insist on certain aspects of quality while encouraging the individual services to codify their own values and goals. The charter forms the basis for accountability procedures which determine whether centres meet their stated goals.’

Consequently, the following best practice standard is proposed:

BPS1: the funding model guarantees continuity of funding for SAY programs for at least 3 years subject to mutually agreed reporting requirements.

Accountability

There is a need for government agencies to collect robust and meaningful program performance information for adequate assessment of program effectiveness. However previous studies have found, as did this current study, that it is difficult to measure performance, as success is judged by the absence of undesirable events such as arrest or incarceration. There are gaps in current data collection, collation and analysis which affect

the ability of government agencies to make an overall assessment of the programs' performance (Pratt et al. 2011).

SAY program management committees are required to submit regular progress reports and program assessments as well as quarterly reports on clients of the programs. Policy changes have meant that ongoing funding to SAY programs is dependent upon management committees regularly submitting these returns. In Brewarrina, local police statistics showed that when the night patrol was operating, crime rates had fallen. However, in all communities it proved impossible to prove that night patrols had a significant impact on local crime rates and crime prevention because of the difficulty of gathering clear data on patrol operations and establishing clear social indicators of the patrol's role in reducing crime and other social problems. There are too many intervening variables.

A review of night patrols in the Northern Territory found only four of the twelve service providers had demonstrated the capacity to provide timely and accurate reporting (ANAO 2011). The loss of funding for the night patrol in one community due to a failure of the management committee to meet reporting requirements has caused contention between disparate groups within this small community. While the withdrawal of funding may be justified, the consequences are that the youth of the community are without a night patrol or sufficient youth activities.

It is a challenge for government to balance the need for accountability with distribution of public funds while simultaneously allowing for self-determination in Aboriginal communities, with the knowledge that not all communities have the resources or the ability to meet the reporting requirements necessary for funding agreements.

As an Aboriginal community initiative, night patrols value the principles of self-determination. The broader community has a responsibility to protect such values. Based on principles of social justice and human rights, night patrols present an opportunity for Australians to recognise difference in expressions of citizenship (Behrendt, 2009). Yet the question remains: how does DAGJ address the need for accountability with distribution of government funds while simultaneously allowing for self-determination in Aboriginal communities, with the knowledge that not all communities have the resources or the ability to meet the reporting requirements necessary for funding agreements?

Ivanitz (2001) argues that including social accounting in the process may improve accountability issues with Aboriginal funding agreements. This means that issues arising owing to factors such as culture are taken into consideration in the development of audit opinions. The underlying premise of social accounting is that organisations, economics, politics, culture, and all facets of societies are all systems and they all interact. Further, giving formal audit consideration to culture would improve transparency, since the actions of the mainstream with respect to Aboriginal organisations would become more visible and vice versa.

It is recommended that future accounting of the effectiveness of night patrols incorporate social accounting. This could be achieved by establishing a panel; a broad community reference group comprised of a purposeful sample of approximately ten participants within each community who could complete an independent annual evaluation of the effectiveness of the night patrol. Members could include:

- SAY program staff and management committees
- Aboriginal Community Justice Groups
- Representatives of all key family groups in a community including young people
- Local police
- Private security patrol agencies
- Local government representatives
- Community crime prevention committees
- Representatives of local schools
- Youth workers
- Community Health
- Community Welfare and Support Services

The survey could be a short internet survey (i.e. survey monkey) or a telephone survey to assess how well the program was operating. Data from annual surveys would produce longitudinal data that could inform future policy and programs. This is essentially Participant Action Research. The reference group could also be useful in ensuring patrol management and staff were well selected, which is important for ensuring effective patrol operations.

Funding to enable flexible and targeted service delivery

The findings highlighted the diversity of these communities and the need for SAY programs to be tailored to individual community needs. This has already been recognised by the Department of Attorney General and Justice as there is great variance in the types of services provided in each of these communities. While funding was limited to eight hours per week, local management committees had a certain degree of flexibility to operate their programs on the days and times that they deemed important to meet the needs of the local community.

There were a large number of concerns voiced about the limitations in service delivery to eight hours per week imposed by funding limitations. Most SAY staff would like to offer services on a Thursday as well as a Friday and Saturday.

There were also suggestions in some communities that limiting the service to young people was not a useful community strategy, and that people of other age groups had unmet needs.

Many communities identified a need for increased funding to enable them to purchase a larger bus. There were concerns that a small bus meant that some young people were required to wait whilst the bus transported some of their group, and that this posed a risk.

These issues suggest that the differences in the needs of each community are significant and that the model of service delivery needs to differ across each community. Currently there is a standard set of expectations relating to service delivery that each community modifies to some extent. This level of flexibility clearly does not meet the needs of each community. One way of addressing this might be to negotiate individual service contracts (charters) with each community as discussed above. Charters allow each community to develop its own service model within a framework of more general pre-set parameters identified by DAGJ. Funding is then tied to the goals identified in the charter, as is accountability.

BPS2: that a system is developed (e.g. chartering) that enables each community to identify its goals and objectives within a framework of more general pre-set parameters identified by DAGJ.

BPS3: that funding and accountability is linked to each individual service charter.

Resourcing the development of integrated services

Whilst the aim of the program is clearly identified as offering an integrated service, many informants indicated that this was not happening. Programs had difficulty in establishing co-operative relationships with other agencies.

Research on integrated services (Anning, Cotrell, Frost, Green, & Robinson, 2010; Brechman-Tousaint & Kogler, 2010; Gibson, 2011; Moore, 2011 are some examples) is clear that integration does not always occur without significant support (including funding) being directed towards that aim. Expecting services to operate in an integrated manner without providing the resources to support them to do so, will not result in the desired outcome (Brettig & Sims, 2011). Given that integrated service delivery is the aim, it is essential that provision be made in the funding agreements to enable agencies to have the resources to work towards this in each community. If a chartering system was to be used, this aim could be identified as one of the pre-set required outcomes, and services could then identify in their charter how they plan to work towards this in each community.

BPS4: that DAGJ provide resources unique to each community to support the aim of building integrated services.

The most effective services were in those communities such as Taree where a SAY Patrol operated in partnership with a fully functioning youth centre funded by local government. This ensured optimal services for local youth, with a bus linking children with structured activities. If resources are limited for SAY programs, perhaps some expectations could be placed upon local government and chambers of commerce to work with DAGJ to support youth centres or alternatively a patrol bus. Crime prevention is of concern to local government and economies and therefore with some advertising, local support may be possible. However, it is vitally important to note that not all communities have the rate base or resources to provide such support. This is particularly the case for small rural and remote communities where drought and economic decline have caused a loss of population. Thus

any future policy in this regard must take into consideration each community's individual needs and adaptive capacity.

The need for a safe house

In all but one community there were concerns that there was not a safe place to take young people: their homes were not safe. There were refuges for adults and small children were able to accompany women to women's refuges but for older children, options were very limited. Police resources also do not provide for officers spending time trying to find someone to take children in. This is the same issue for night patrol staff.

However, participants in each community claimed homelessness among Aboriginal youth was not really an issue as in most cases, patrol staff knew the community well and in most cases could find a relative to take in a child. As communities grow and change and Aboriginal families move away from their kinship base, patrol staff and police officers were finding that there were no other options. In some cases, police had no option but to keep children in the police lockup if there was no suitable place for them to stay. It seems pertinent to conduct a needs assessment for youth refuges/safe houses in these communities.

BPS5: that future policies ensure safe houses are made available in each community to support SAY programs and ensure the safety of children.

Use of the SAY bus

In small rural communities, the lack of transport makes a bus a prized possession. Aboriginal reserves and missions have been traditionally located on the outskirts of towns. Hence, Aboriginal people are required to walk long distances to and from their homes. This means they often linger longer in town centres than they would if their homes were closer. This is one of the reasons children are on the streets at night and demonstrates the importance of the night patrol service. Children are particularly vulnerable in the smaller remote towns that are located on major highways where strangers pass through, where street lighting is minimal and where people can be drunk on the street.

Community use of the night patrol bus during the day does occur and this was particularly important for older people or people with disabilities who could not make the long walk into town. But this use needs to be managed. Therefore the 'misuse' of the night patrol bus during the day is arguably excusable and is an issue that needs to be considered by DAGJ in future funding. There were some accounts of a patrol bus being used by some sections of the Aboriginal community for funerals or other functions. In some cases such 'misuse' had resulted in the discontinuation of funding for the patrol. Aboriginal kinship relationships and the obligations that follow are fundamental in Aboriginal communities. There are shared responsibility agreements between kin groups based on the concept of mutual obligation or "reciprocity". Larissa Behrendt (2011) defines Aboriginal reciprocity as a social norm that requires those who have resources to share them with those who do not, and that those

who receive this generosity must provide for and share with others. Therefore the needs of the community would take precedence over the use of the bus in these towns where there is a distinct lack of transport.

In Dubbo there is wide use of the patrol bus by the community, but this is closely monitored by the Neighbourhood Centre which manages the patrol. It appears to work well. But such arrangements can take the ownership and management of the bus out of the hands of the Aboriginal community. It is essential to ensure that Aboriginal leaders are involved in management committees – to get the balance right. Perhaps this works in a large fragmented community like Dubbo, but in smaller communities where everyone knows everyone else, local politics can impede the successful management of a bus. As Jenny Walker (2010) states, ‘when the mix is right and mutual respect prevails, improvements in quality of life and service delivery for Aboriginal peoples are marked and immediate’.

Research Question 5: Process to measure crime prevention

The study was also required to develop a process to identify and measure crime prevention outcomes for young people. Anecdotally, SAY programs were regarded as essential by the communities they serve. Participants maintained night patrols were effective in getting kids off the streets at night. Most acknowledged that child safety was the main aim of patrols and crime prevention was a secondary outcome.

Participants were clear that they saw the combination of transport and activity programs as key in crime prevention. Patrols were seen as essential for patrolling the community and ensuring children are taken from unsafe to safe places. However in communities where there were no active PCYC clubs or Youth Centres, participants maintained that it was important that patrols had somewhere to take children, especially if it was early in an evening or home was not a safe option. This is predicated on the assumption that much of youth crime arises from boredom and that the provision of safe alternatives will divert young people away from offending behaviour. Conversely, participants in communities where SAY activity programs operated argued that while having a transport bus was useful to transport children from activities, there was a need to have the bus patrolling the town throughout the night; otherwise, children at risk remain on the streets.

Removing young people from risky situations is also positioned as a crime prevention strategy. However, there were concerns about the extent of responsibility for patrol staff in assessing safety.

Measuring crime prevention was seen as problematic. There are problems with using crime data. There are also problems using measurements of contacts and referrals. Our informants all had their own perspective on the effectiveness of the program, and these were varied. There was not unanimous support. Some argued that the program had an impact on other agencies and that this was evidence of its effectiveness. Others argued that the best measure of effectiveness was when young people who were part of the program

either actively sought to engage their siblings or friends, or themselves began working in the program (voluntarily in many cases) to mentor others.

In Brewarrina, local police statistics showed that when the night patrol was operating, crime rates had fallen. However, in all communities it proved impossible to prove that night patrols had a significant impact on local crime rates and crime prevention because of the difficulty of gathering clear data on patrol operations and establishing clear social indicators of the patrol's role in reducing crime and other social problems. There are too many intervening variables.

There was general consensus that statistics do not tell the correct story, and may, in fact, distort the reality within each community. For example, in recent years the Bourke LGA has consistently ranked highest in the state for rates of domestic violence, sexual assault and breach of bail (across the Indigenous and non- Indigenous community - Vivien and Schnierer 2010). However, data must be interpreted with caution as recorded crime rates in Local Government Areas with small population sizes under 3,000 are unreliable (BOCSAR 2012). A small number of offences in this small community generate extremely high statistical rates of crime which in reality may not be an accurate depiction of the actual experience of crime in Bourke.

This concern mirrors that identified in the evaluation literature (for example House, 2005; McDavid & Hawthorn, 2006; Office of Planning Research and Evaluation, 2010; Stufflebeam & Shinkfield, 2007) where it is recognised that different approaches to evaluation provide different answers and that there is not one way of determining the effectiveness of any program. One of the challenges of good program governance is to build into normal program reporting data that can be used to evaluate overall program effectiveness, not just of each individual agency but of the program itself overall. Agencies need to find these reporting criteria do-able; otherwise, the data is not regularly provided and cannot be used for evaluation purposes. Working with agencies to collaboratively identify the appropriate strategies to achieve this is more likely to result in success than simply imposing something on them. However, in any collaborative work, it is necessary that, between all the partners, the necessary information is available for the group to make informed decisions. The role of ADG here is to provide information on the various evaluation options so that agency staff can reflect on what is most relevant for them. Evaluation strategies such as The Most Significant Change approach (Davies & Dart, 2005), empowerment evaluation (Fetterman, 2000) or participatory action research (Baum, MacDougall, & Smith, 2006) might be approaches worth discussing with agencies.

A further suggestion

A statistical analysis of the impact of SAY programs on crime rates by comparing communities could be attempted using a quasi-experimental design, i.e. an experimental design where cases (towns) are not randomly assigned between treatments (presence or absence of a SAY program). Secondary data such as crime statistics, census data and

hospital emergency data are readily available. A number of social characteristics of a community can also be included, such as the number of support services available, number of police, etc. Local councils also produce data that could be used. Other social factors identified within this study and previous evaluations of night patrols can also be given a nominal figure to be included in the analysis.

However, the research methodology literature notes that quasi-experimental designs are inferior to randomised controlled trials because of the possibility of confounding factors, i.e. the very factors that determined whether towns were successful in getting a SAY program could be the same factors that affect crime rates. For example, towns where there are people with the skills to write good applications for funding may have less people committing crime. Policing numbers also impact upon crime rates. A quasi-experimental design should make an attempt to include these possible confounding factors in the study and use a statistical technique that will control for their presence, e.g. multiple regression. So to proceed with the quasi-experimental design, it would be essential to:

1. Have full knowledge of how towns came to have SAY programs.
2. Derive from this a list of factors that could make it more or less likely for towns to have a SAY program.
3. Evaluate these factors to see if any of them might also be connected with crime rates in some way.
4. Ensure that any factors that are connected are included in the study.

Crime data are also available over time, which enables examination of crime rates in towns before and after the implementation of SAY programs. Here confounding factors, such as changes in legislation, policing numbers or policing practices, can affect analyses. These types of confounding factors can be controlled for by comparing communities that established SAY programs at different times. The literature also points out that a quasi-experimental design is stronger if an effect can be demonstrated due to commencement and discontinuation of a treatment. So if the BOCSAR figures after introduction of night patrols go back to pre-introduction levels once night patrols are discontinued, that's fairly convincing evidence, although still not immune to confounding factors.

There are two ways of measuring the dependent variable, the crime rate - either by official BOCSAR data or by local observation. A sound study would use both and attempt to resolve the reasons for any discrepancies between the two measures. In short, such an analysis would be a useful endeavour which can reveal insights beyond the capacity of any qualitative analysis. However, as with all quantitative social research, it will not be perfect.

Research Question 6: Improve capacity to work proactively with young people

There were a number of factors that our informants considered important in working proactively with young people:

Building trust through relationships

The young people (particularly Indigenous young people) targeted by the SAY program are likely to mistrust police, and often mistrust most adults. Therefore engaging, and maintaining engagement, can be problematic. This is best managed through developing trusting relationships. In many programs this is begun by employing people who are already known and valued in the targeted communities. Often this was through their status in the Indigenous world, but non-Indigenous people were also able to attain this recognition through a long-term, positive presence in the local community.

This relationship needs continuous work to maintain, and this work is best undertaken through frequent contact. Our informants argued that engagement with young people in activities, as well as being available to talk with them on the bus, were key opportunities for this relationship work.

There was considerable concern that the requirements of mandatory reporting could compromise trust and that would, in the long term, have a negative impact on the capacity to work proactively with young people, even though in the short term it was recognised as essential for the safety of specific young people.

Having a clear set of guidelines

There were areas of practice where informants felt that it helped to have clear guidelines.

Safety drop-off

Different services managed the issue of where young people could leave the bus in different ways. Some required the drop-off point to be the young person's home.

Others were more likely to use their knowledge of the community to find alternative drop-off venues if they judged the home to be unsafe.

We were told of one case study where the patrol were instructed to take a young person home but ended up not doing so because they made a judgement call that home was unsafe. The young person was taken to a relative's place.

Determining what behaviours are acceptable or not and the consequences of unacceptable behaviour: as in any group situation, there need to be rules about what behaviours are acceptable and what behaviours are not. In some programs the workers make this determination. In other programs the young people themselves set the rules and the consequences of rule breaches.

Healthy Meal Program

It was disheartening to still find that despite numerous policies and programs, Aboriginal children in these remote communities continue to suffer neglect, social disadvantage, poor nutrition, poor education and few employment opportunities.

The healthy meal provided as part of the SAY Activity model was seen as essential in these communities. Many Aboriginal children are used to going without food for a day. A police officer observed: *Children eat like they haven't eaten for a week*. Yet these are children in their growing years.

The issue of the lack of access to fresh food in remote communities is a major concern. In Wilcannia for example, the cost of local food is so excessive that people prefer to travel two hours to Broken Hill by bus to shop. However, not all residents are able to do that. In August 2012 the one and only food store closed down for over a week leaving the town without access to fresh food. The store had been the subject of a Fair Trading investigation into price-gouging. As Wilcannia is on the main inland highway to Adelaide, food should not be expensive.

Yet it was heartening to learn of initiatives by youth leaders and Aboriginal Police Liaison officers in these communities to try and improve the social problems within their local communities through healthy living programs designed to educate young people. Yet a lack of funding to provide excursions as a reward for participating in such programs had impeded these initiatives. It is recommended that these programs be supported in the future.

Gaps in services

In each community, youth aged 16 to 18 were identified as a group that did not utilise the night patrol or the youth activities under the SAY program or the PCYC. The perception was that often these children consider themselves too cool for these services but also their use of alcohol or drugs meant they were forbidden to use these services. This age group was also seen as those who primarily roamed the streets late at night, were responsible for crime and can be poor role models for younger children. They are too young for clubs and pubs; they have no money but do not want to hang out with younger children. In all communities, SAY program staff were seeking to find activities that would attract these children.

Having appropriate staff

This relates to point 1 above, building relationships. Indigenous staff were thought to be more likely to have existing knowledge of the young people engaging in the program, and to have pre-existing relationships with their families which made it easier (in most cases) for them to establish trusting relationships.

However, most informants felt that having the right skills and knowledge was more important. Thus employment of staff often focused around either the employment of people who were locally known and respected who were judged capable of learning those skills and knowledge, or those with the skills and knowledge already who had the capacity to earn community respect. Staff were selected on the basis of:

- having an understanding of issues impacting on Aboriginal communities,
- being accepted by Indigenous young people,

- having the ability to build rapport with young people who present challenging behaviours,
- their own life experience,
- their ability to communicate and establish trusting relationships with young people,
- their respect within the community,
- having a passion to work with the young people to engage them and bring them in.

Communication skills were constantly identified as a key requirement for staff.

In all cases training was considered essential to enhance capacity to work proactively with young people. Other training suggestions included training on management, accountability, and report writing, and training on child protection and mandatory reporting.

Most smaller services found training difficult to locate and attend because of the part-time nature of their work, the difficulty in accessing appropriate training, and their perception that their time would not be funded when they attended training courses. Those who are affiliated with larger organisations have easier access to appropriate training. Several mentioned a SAY Conference they had attended recently and all who discussed this said they found it most useful.

Discussion of Effectiveness for purpose

Anecdotally, it seems clear in the minds of almost all those we interviewed that patrols do have a beneficial impact for removing children from the streets as potential offenders as well as potential victims. As most Aboriginal missions were established on the outskirts of country towns, Aboriginal children have a long walk home, often in areas without street lighting. Police in all towns were very supportive of patrols and maintained that they definitely made a difference for crime prevention and youth safety because they removed the opportunity for youth to offend or to be victimized. All police interviewed would like to see the hours of operation of night patrols extended.

National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework and SAYP

The potential contribution of the aims and goals of the National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework by NSW SAY patrol programs is shown below in Table 41.

Table 41: SAYP contribution to the National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework

National Indigenous Law and Justice Framework Goals	Potential for contribution of SAYP	Evidence	Potential for improvement
a. Improvement in Australian justice systems so that they comprehensively deliver on the justice needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in a fair and equitable manner.	n/a	n/a	n/a

b. Reduction in the over-representation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offenders, defendants and victims within the criminal justice system.	Indirectly, where patrols divert children and young people away from offending. More likely to occur where patrol operates in conjunction with other services that offer recreational activities	Examples in case studies; i.e. Patrols sort out potential problems before police action; SAY staff support young offenders' re-entry to community. Adult patrol members report that former patrol staff had helped them when they were younger	Enable patrol staff to build constructive relationships with young people using detached youth work. Link patrols to other services (difficult in small communities where there are no other services) More hours of SAY operation Provide more healthy meals to avert petty theft
c. Ensuring that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples feel safe and are safe within their communities	Patrols had potential to help children and young people feel safer in their communities and to help other community members feel safer	Examples in case studies, patrol's presence reassures youth and families; e.g. intervention of patrol to prevent rape	Facilitate patrols being able to gain police support where this is required ; more promotion of bus/programs
d. Increased safety and a reduction in offending within Indigenous communities by addressing alcohol and substance abuse	Patrol can prevent victimisation, provides safe places for children where homes are unsafe; see examples	Care provided for intoxicated children and young people; educational programs.	Availability of appropriate referral services. Need safe house in each community.
e. Strengthened Indigenous communities through working in partnership with governments and other stakeholders to achieve sustained improvements in justice and community safety	Partnership arrangements differed between locations. There was potential within the model for strong partnerships between communities and government, although this did not always eventuate	Aboriginal Community Justice Groups etc. play advisory role for SAY. Links within local interagency meetings.	Active support for partnerships between patrols and multiple Indigenous community stakeholders

Some ideas

A number of good ideas for improving security for young people and their communities were identified. These included:

In Dubbo: Taxi vouchers for young people at the cost of \$5 which taxi drivers can then redeem at the Department of Transport were provided through the local council. This provided an additional service for youth outside of the operational hours of the night patrol.

Limitations of the research

The inability to interview young people as clients of night patrols due to strict ethical guidelines is a significant limitation of these research findings. While one researcher rode along on one night patrol and did engage with the children with the permission of the patrol staff, and some young people were present while their parents or guardians were participating in an interview, overall, the voices of children are absent from this review.

Factions within Aboriginal communities sometimes limited access to all sides of debate on certain issues, such community use of the night patrol bus outside of operational hours.

One final note

One very positive finding emerged from this research. In every community studied there was at least one or two young Aboriginal people aged in their late 20s early 30s who were passionate about their community and actively engaged in youth work. Some were

educated, some were not, but they all demonstrated a passionate desire to improve the lot of local youth. This observation is a relatively new phenomenon. Previous research conducted in 2000 by the researcher in these communities found matriarchs within the Aboriginal community were the main drivers for change. They remain, but with the emergence of young community leaders, both male and female, come possibilities for change in the future.

Recommendations

This discussion has highlighted the following issues in the operating environments of SAY programs that are recommended for consideration in future program development.

1. More guidelines are required from the DAGJ on exactly how to manage youth programs; e.g. how to manage services over Christmas periods or other public holidays.
2. More training and retraining for SAY staff.
3. Encourage police officers to work with youth services and support night patrols. Need to be separate services, but supportive.
4. More flexibility for requirements for criminal record checks for patrol staff.
5. Extend hours of operation for SAY programs.
6. SAY night patrol programs be offered in partnership with SAY activity programs or other existing Youth programs in all communities.
7. Ensure Safe houses/Youth refuges are available in all communities.
8. More youth activities such as Midnight basketball be provided, especially targeting 16-18 year olds as this group seems to be forming a gap in service provision.
9. Need for clear guidelines and management to enable greater use for night patrol bus for community activities during non-patrol operation hours.
10. There is an urgent need to address the problem of access to fresh, cheap food, particularly in remote communities.
11. Extend the healthy food program within SAY activities model.

Appendix 19: NPP Overview

This appendix provides a background to the Northbridge Policy project, and explains the policy and its purposes, and its historical and political context. The information in this appendix is drawn from both documentary sources and interview data collected during this project.

The Northbridge area

Northbridge is the main entertainment precinct in Perth and is situated adjacent to the main rail station. The railway line separates Northbridge from the CBD and main shopping area of Perth. The Northbridge area includes restaurants, hotels, night clubs, sex shops, and brothels, a very small amount of residential housing and European, Asian and Middle Eastern grocery shops and cafes. Historically, Northbridge was a meeting area for Indigenous people because of its easy accessibility to the rail station (Busch, 2002 and respondent interviews). Responsibility for the Northbridge area is divided between two local council areas, the City of Perth and the City of Vincent, and Northbridge also falls under the remit of the East Perth Redevelopment Authority.

The Northbridge Policy applies within an area bounded by Newcastle Street, Roe Street, Beaufort Street, the Mitchell Freeway and William Street to Brisbane Street. This is similar to the proposal for boundaries for Northbridge identified by Jack Busch (Busch, 2002) in the 'Future of Northbridge' report commissioned for Premier and Cabinet on community safety and planning reforms, which respondents identified as one of the documents that contributed to the Northbridge Policy.

The Northbridge Policy

The Northbridge Policy restricts night-time access to the Northbridge precinct by children and young people. Under the policy, certain categories of children and young people can be apprehended by Juvenile Aid Group (JAG) or, in extreme circumstances, by the Northbridge Outreach team and Nyoongar Patrol officers, and held until they are collected by their parents or taken to a place of safety. The Northbridge Policy has been described in detail in the 'State Government Northbridge Strategy Young People in Northbridge Policy' (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006c). According to this report, the Northbridge Policy applies to two distinct categories of children and young people.

Category 1: 'Children not under the immediate care of a parent or a responsible adult who are vulnerable by their age in an adult entertainment precinct at night. These are:

- Primary school age children, that is children 12 years of age and under, in the Northbridge precinct during the hours of darkness.
- Young people 13 to 15 years of age in the Northbridge precinct after 10.00 pm.'

Category 2: 'Children and young people who by their anti-social, offending or health compromising behaviour are at risk to themselves and to others. These are:

- Any children or young people misbehaving, engaging in violence, intimidation, provoking aggression or other offensive behaviours.
- Any children or young people, visibly affected by or engaging in substance abuse (e.g. alcohol, cannabis, solvents and other substances).
- Any children or young people soliciting or begging.'

The Northbridge Policy was intended to apply to 'children and young people who are physically or morally vulnerable or engaging in anti- social, offending or health compromising behaviour' (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006c) (in accordance with Section 138B of the Child Welfare Act (Western Australian Government, 1947) but not to apply to 'those children and young people who have legitimate reasons for being in Northbridge, to go to or from employment, are resident in Northbridge, or are under the immediate care of a parent or a responsible adult' (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006c).

Key agencies

The key agencies involved in the Northbridge Policy project, as of 2010, when this evaluation commenced, included:

The **Department for Child Protection**, which provided three roles within the project: project management and coordination for the whole project; an outreach team; and an emergency response team through Crisis Care.

In 2010, DCP provided **coordination and management** for the whole project. This role was undertaken by a Senior Social Worker appointed full-time to manage and coordinate the project.

The Senior Social Worker was also responsible for the appointment and management of **Outreach Workers** who patrolled Northbridge on foot. Their role is to make contact with any children or young people who are subject to the Northbridge Policy and, if they are identified as low risk, to persuade them to go home. The role of the outreach workers was, where possible, to educate young people and divert them away from the more formal apprehension processes.

The **Department for Child Protection** provided emergency response services through **Crisis Care** personnel who were attached to the Northbridge Policy project. Crisis Care provides an emergency service, including a '*telephone information and counselling service for people in crisis needing urgent help*'. The service is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The service can provide a variety of after-hours crisis interventions services including urgent child protection, transport and crisis accommodation in emergency situations such as sudden homelessness, domestic violence, or where there is no-one to care for children. Crisis Care Officers are empowered to seek immediate care and protection orders if a child or young person is at immediate risk in Western Australia (DCP, 2012a, 2012b). In the context of the Northbridge Policy project, Crisis Care personnel made the decisions about whether it was safe to return the child or young person to their home. Crisis Care staff used

information in the DCP databases to identify potential risks to children and young persons, and to identify a safe place and safe person for each young person to return to. When no safe place and safe person could be found for a child or young person, Crisis Care staff made decisions about alternative accommodation, arranged transport and found emergency accommodation for them. Crisis Care staff also collected and collated child protection related information received from the young people who were apprehended, and from other core group and partner agencies in the Northbridge Policy project.

The **Western Australian Police** through the **Juvenile Aid Group (JAG)**, which is a special unit within the WA Police formed in 1991 to work with children and young people. The JAG team was originally established to collaborate with Killara Youth Support Services. This partnership was initiated in response to changed policy to extend the use of police cautions for minor offences (Omaji, 1997). The role of JAG was to collaborate with other agencies to prevent or delay entry of children and young people into the justice system (Browne, 2000). At times, the JAG team has included Aboriginal Police Liaison Officers (APLO).

Killara Youth Support Services was established by the Ministry of Justice (now Department of Corrective Services) and provides *'an outreach support service for young people and their families who are having problems which are attracting, or may attract, attention of the police and the law. The service is free and confidential. It operates from 8.00 am to 1.00 am, seven days a week, and is staffed by caseworkers who can offer telephone counselling or visits to young people and their families to help sort out conflicts and difficulties'* (DCS, 2010; *The Northbridge History Project report 2005-2010*).

Killara is part of the 'Prevention and Diversion' function of the Government of Western Australia's Department of Corrective Services, and engagement with the service is voluntary.

'Families can contact Killara for advice or, more frequently, Killara makes contact with families after police caution a young person about something they have done.'

(<http://www.correctiveservices.wa.gov.au/youth-justice/prevention-diversion.aspx>)

Mission Australia operates the **On-TRACK** program, which, when the evaluation commenced, was based in Northbridge. The purpose of the program has been to provide *'a preventative and brief intervention service to young people under 18 who have been apprehended under the Northbridge Policy'* and provides an alternative to police custody whilst children and young people are being processed. Mission Australia also provided case work support to families of young people apprehended (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010; Mission Australia, n.d.)

Nyoongar Patrol Systems Inc. provides the **Nyoongar Patrol Outreach Service**, which is a community-based service funded to operate in various locations in the Perth metropolitan area, including Northbridge (NPS, 2011). The purposes of the patrol are *'to provide early street level interventions to local and remote Indigenous people frequenting public spaces in nominated locations. The target groups are people at risk of coming into contact with the*

criminal justice system due to various social and welfare issues.'

(<http://www.nyoongarpatrol.com.au/>)

The **Public Transport Authority** (PTA) operates a security team of Transit Officers who are responsible for security and safety on Perth trains. The main station in Perth is located within the Northbridge precinct. On PTA property, the Transit Officers have the same powers as Police. The PTA share information with the Northbridge Policy project especially about the movement of large groups of children or young people, and could call upon the Northbridge Policy team if there are welfare issues for children or young people in Perth Station. Until mid-2011, the Northbridge Policy project was located in specially built accommodation in PTA property within the Perth Rail Station precinct.

The **Department of Education Western Australia** attendance unit is linked to Department of Education initiatives such as the Student tracking System and the 'Students Whereabouts Unknown' list and shares information with the Northbridge Policy project, and checks whether young people who are apprehended in Northbridge are enrolled in school, whether they attend, and DEWA attendance staff follow up as required.

The **Department of Sport and Recreation** provides diversionary activities to discourage children and young people from coming to Northbridge. These projects began in 2008 and the two projects discussed by interview respondents are located in Armadale and Midland. The relationship between DSR and the Northbridge Policy project was ambiguous during our evaluation. Department of Sport and Recreation staff are not invited to NPP Senior Management meetings, and DSR was not one of the original partner agencies. However, staff who operate the DSR projects consider DSR to be a Northbridge Policy project partner.

Background

The Northbridge Policy was proposed on 15 April 2003 (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006a) and came into effect on Saturday, 28 June 2003. The project has been described variously, as 'part of a major long-term strategy to enhance the whole Northbridge area' and as 'the Government's response to the immediate problem of 'at risk' children and young people in Northbridge at night.' (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006b). The policy was sponsored by the Western Australian Labour government, and Dr Geoff Gallop, as premier, took an active personal role in the promotion of the policy (Office of Crime Prevention, 2004). At the time, public opinion and the media strongly supported the policy (MacArthur), although there were concerns expressed by several non-government organisations about the human rights implications of the curfew (e.g. Outcare, n.d. and respondents from stakeholder organisations).

Purposes of the policy

The stated purposes of the Northbridge Policy fall into three linked categories: those related to the Child Welfare Act 1947 and concerned with child protection and prevention of harm to children and young people; those related to the Child Welfare Act 1947 and concerned

with prevention of crime and nuisance by children and young people; and those related to improvement of the Northbridge precinct.

In the context of child welfare, the provisions of the Child Welfare Act 1947 were not specific about circumstances under which children and young people should be apprehended, or the circumstances under which various government departments had to take action, or share information with each other. The Child Welfare Act 1947 required the Police and others to apprehend children and young people who were *'at risk of physical and moral danger or were misbehaving and return them to their usual place of residence'* (Office of Crime Prevention, 2004). This required discretion and judgement about what constituted physical and moral danger or misbehaviour. A purpose of the Northbridge Policy was to clarify what constituted physical and moral danger and misbehaviour in the context of the Northbridge precinct and to ensure that the Department for Community Development (DCD/DCP) and the Departments of Justice and Education *'acknowledge their responsibilities for the long-term welfare of those children'* (interviewee) and act appropriately. The intention was to put 'upstream' services in place that would prevent harm to children and young people rather than responding to crisis after harm had occurred. For example, Killara (as part of the Ministry of Justice, now the Department of Corrective Services) provided support for families of young people who had already received cautions and supervision orders, but Killara staff felt that earlier intervention to prevent entry into the justice system would improve outcomes.

The Northbridge Policy was, therefore, intended to provide *'guidance to the Police and others in the application of Section 138B of the Child Welfare Act 1947 (WA) in relation to Northbridge'* (Office of Crime Prevention, 2004, 2006a), and specifically *'targets children and young people, not under the supervision of a parent or adult, when there is a risk to their well-being because of the nature of the place where they are found or the behaviours they are exhibiting'* (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006b). In this statement the issue of lack of adult supervision and the nature of the location are explicitly identified as factors that make a child or young person vulnerable, even when their conduct does not contribute to risk.

The Child Welfare Act 1947 (Western Australian Government, 1947), which was repealed on 1 March 2006, was replaced in 2004 by the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (CCSA 2004). The language of the CCSA 2004 aligns clearly with the interpretations of child welfare found in the Northbridge Policy. The power to apprehend a child is specified in the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA) under Section 41, which:

'authorises a police officer (or authorised officer) to move an unsupervised child to a safe place, if that officer reasonably believes that there is a "risk to the well-being of the child because of the nature of the place where the child is found, the behaviour or vulnerability of the child at that place or any other circumstance".'

Thus, the language of child welfare/ protection has changed from 'physical and moral danger and misbehaviour' to a potentially more inclusive concept of 'risk to well-being'.

The final purpose of the Northbridge Policy was to contribute to an integrated crime prevention response to reverse the perceived decline in safety in the Northbridge area. During 2001-2002, Jack Busch was commissioned to investigate how Northbridge could be reinvigorated (Busch, 2002). His report found that public perception was that Northbridge had become more dangerous in recent years, and the report recommended an integrated approach to crime prevention and community safety (real and perceived) in Northbridge. At the time, there was a highly publicised incident when a young person stole food from an *al fresco* diner's plate. There was concern from local business that customers would move to other inner-city entertainment districts such as Leederville and Subiaco, which had developed more recently and did not have the perceived safety concerns. The Northbridge Policy was presented in the media as an initiative that would contribute to crime prevention and nuisance reduction in Northbridge (MacArthur, 2007).

Is this policy a Curfew?

Since the inception of the Northbridge Policy, there has been public debate about whether or not the policy constitutes a curfew on young people in Northbridge (see, e.g. Koch, 2003; Outcare, n.d.). This topic is sensitive because many of the children and young people apprehended under the Northbridge Policy are Indigenous, and until the 1960s, there was a curfew banning Indigenous people from central Perth, including Northbridge, at night. Many of the respondents interviewed in this evaluation regarded the Northbridge Policy as an intentional curfew. There are still conflicting perceptions of this issue. For example, a report by the Office of Crime Prevention stated that the implementation of the Policy was

'effectively banning unsupervised children and young people in the Northbridge precinct at night' (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006b).

However, another interviewee suggested,

Technically the Northbridge Policy was not of itself a curfew. Rather, it detailed how the Child Welfare Act should be applied. This was in a context in which it was apparent that State government agencies were selectively employing the Child Welfare Act for their own purposes.

The technical explanation seems to be correct, because children and young people of any age are permitted in Northbridge at any time provided they are accompanied by a 'responsible adult' or have reason to be there, if they are unaccompanied. It has been noted in a previous evaluation (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006) that definition of the term 'responsible adult' is unclear. Restaurants in the area promote themselves to families for evening dining. In addition, although the policy applies throughout the week, the Northbridge Policy project only operates Thursday to Saturday.

Political context of Northbridge Policy program

Although the Northbridge Policy required no new legislation, and could have been instituted purely administratively, a decision was made to debate the matter in parliament

(MacArthur, 2007). This debate was used in conjunction with a media campaign to garner public support for the policy. The discourse used in the campaign has been analysed elsewhere and enabled the government to appear to be both tough on crime and strong on child protection, both populist causes (MacArthur, 2007). A media debate on human rights ensued, and made little progress as parties disagreed about whose rights counted most, and which rights were paramount (see, e.g. Outcare, n.d.).

Behind the scenes, the Northbridge Policy development was influenced by contemporary events that received much less publicity. According to our respondents, the Northbridge Policy was developed in response to both the findings of the Gordon Inquiry and concerns to re-develop and improve Northbridge. Thus, the Northbridge Policy responded to two parallel policy concerns: the acknowledged failure of government preventative and support services to provide effective support to Indigenous families and young people that would reduce or prevent child abuse and family crisis, and would delay or prevent entry of children and young people into the justice system (Gordon, et al., 2002); and the problem of falling property values and economic viability of businesses in Northbridge and the need to revitalise the Northbridge precinct, which had implications for town planning and business development, and integrated crime prevention (Busch, 2002).

When the Northbridge Policy was conceived, the report of the Gordon Inquiry (Gordon, et al., 2002) into the circumstances surrounding the death of Susan Taylor had just been released. Susan Taylor was a 15 year old Aboriginal girl who had committed suicide in 1999 after she reported she had been assaulted and sexual abused, and various government departments had failed to respond effectively. The Gordon Inquiry had been critical of the failure of multiple State Government and non-government agencies to coordinate their efforts and act effectively to better support Susan Taylor and her family. At the time of her death, Susan Taylor was formally in the care of her grandmother, who was in poor health and cared for several other grandchildren from different parents. However, Susan was not living with her grandmother, and had moved address frequently. Multiple agencies including WA Police, DCD and the DOJ were involved with the family, and there were a variety of documented concerns including poverty, pregnancy and substance abuse. However, no agency took a lead role in coordinating the assistance provided to Susan or her family, communications between agencies were poor, and lines of responsibility between agencies were unclear.

The findings of the Gordon report raised several concerns and focussed attention on welfare issues for children and young people, especially Indigenous children and young people in the care of family members who were overburdened. The Gordon report made many specific recommendations about how services to Aboriginal young people and their families could be improved. In response to the Gordon report, the Government released a policy document (Australia, 2002) where they accepted the need for better communication and coordination where multiple agencies work with the same family, and accepted that highly

mobile young people, like Susan Taylor, are especially vulnerable and need better support services.

In addition to this, documentary sources indicate that a report by the Police Juvenile Aid Group stated that police had ‘picked up’ over 450 young people from Northbridge between January – March 2003 (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006a), contributing to the judgement that Northbridge was a location where children and young people gathered who were vulnerable under the provisions of the Child Welfare Act 1947. In this context the Northbridge Policy developed as an attempt to better coordinate support when multiple agencies are involved with a family or young person, and as an attempt to provide preventative services that would reduce the need for crisis support.

Precursors to the Northbridge Policy Project

Although the Northbridge Policy was officially launched in 2003, the implementation of the Northbridge Policy project involved agencies that were already working in Northbridge, had established collaboration during the 1990s, and had operated in the Northbridge area since that time. An important precursor to the Northbridge Policy project was the Inner City Youth Partnership (ICYP), which included the Juvenile Aid Group, Family and Children’s Services (now DCP), Crisis Care, Education, Ministry of Justice (through Killara) and non-government service providers, including Nyoongar Patrol System Inc. and Mission Australia’s On-Track Program (Browne, 2000). This group also formed links with other services that could provide family support, and drug and alcohol services and crisis accommodation.

In summary, the Northbridge Policy project incorporated agencies that had collaborated with each other in Northbridge for several years. The pre-Northbridge Policy project collaborations in ICYP were:

- Coordinated by JAG.
- Juvenile Aid Group (JAG) collaborated closely with Killara from the Ministry of Justice (now Department of Corrective Services) in response to Juvenile Justice policies that supported diversion through the use of police cautions where possible for most minor offences (Omaji, 1997).
- Mission Australia developed the On-Track program (which developed from the operations of Killara, when Killara staff were recruited by Mission Australia, (interviewee), to provide additional preventative programs and diversionary programs to reduce young people’s involvement with the justice system through programs for young people and through family support.
- The Nyoongar Patrol provided night patrol services to support Indigenous people (including young people) in Northbridge.
- Crisis Care provided after-hours support for situations that required DCD staff involvement.

The Northbridge Policy project brought about some changes to the existing collaboration in Northbridge. Firstly, as already discussed, the Northbridge Policy specified how the Child Welfare Act 1947 should be interpreted in the Northbridge precinct. Secondly, the Northbridge Policy introduced changes to collaboration management and practices. Under these changes, DCD took a more extensive role and became the lead agency in place of JAG. Thirdly, the policy added an outreach team of DCD workers, in addition to the existing partners, managed by DCD.

HYPE and the Northbridge Policy Project

The Northbridge Policy project incorporated important aspects of the Hillarys Youth Project Enquiry (HYPE) outreach model to provide a rationale for its program logic, organisation, roles and management. The HYPE model had been trialled in 1998/9 as a diversionary response to risky or anti-social behaviour by young people at Hillary's Boat Harbour, a marina and entertainment development in the northern suburbs of Perth (AIC, 2002; Stirling Council, 2001). In the HYPE project, the Department of Family and Children's Services (later DCD/DCP) had been the lead agency and partial funder in partnership with local government (which sponsored the project, employed staff and paid costs) and local businesses (which funded wages) (Jarvis, 2003; Stirling Council, 2001).

The original HYPE project was established in response to perceived problems similar to those identified in the Northbridge Policy – large gatherings of several hundred young people aged 12-16, under-age drinking, anti-social behaviour, inappropriate sexual conduct and prostitution for alcohol and drugs by young people (AIC, 2002). The role of the outreach workers was to divert young people away from actions that might place them at risk, might be anti-social, or might lead to police intervention (Stirling Council, 2001). The HYPE teams had back-up from police and security if young people continued with conduct that might constitute an offence. The HYPE approach was subsequently re-badged as Helping Young People Engage (HYPE) when the method was transferred away from its original location (Jarvis, 2003).

The original HYPE project was evaluated independently in 2002 and found to be successful as a method to reduce risky behaviours by young people and as a cost effective method to reduce petty crime (K. Smith et al., 2002). The evaluation did not investigate whether displacement had occurred. By the time the Northbridge Policy project officially started, the methods had already been adopted in several other locations, especially shopping malls. The first manager of the Northbridge project had previously had a prominent role in the HYPE project (pers. comm.), and the Northbridge Policy project seems to have adopted key elements of the HYPE model, especially the management structure and the use of outreach workers to divert young people, as a first stage intervention.

Killara and the Northbridge Policy

The overall role of the Killara Youth Support Services team in the Northbridge Policy project has changed over time. Killara was established in 1991, in Western Australia, to work in conjunction with the WA Police, particularly the police Juvenile Aid Group (JAG), after the introduction of Police Cautioning in 1991 (Omaji, 1997; Wells, 1997). Killara provided the support aspect of the Police Cautioning System. The intention was to divert young people from the criminal justice system (Omaji, 1997), and the system of diversion was formalised in the Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA Government, 1995). The role of Killara was to provide support to families and young people:

'Families are either referred to the service by Police, are offered support by Killara following the issue of a Police caution to their child, or can phone the service direct. It provides crisis counselling, a short term case work service where appropriate, and supports families and young people to make contact with agencies and services that will assist them with their difficulties.'

Killara's role aligns most closely with support of young people apprehended under Category 2 of the Northbridge Policy. In the 1990s, before the Northbridge Policy, Killara worked closely with JAG to provide family support to prevent offending. Later in the 1990s, Mission Australia also began to offer family support and diversion programs. When the Northbridge Policy project began, Mission Australia was a member of the Core group, and Killara was a Partner.

Killara's role in the Northbridge Policy project has reduced over time, as the priorities of the project have changed. During the first five years of the Northbridge project about 20%-30% of young people were 16-17 year olds who had been apprehended under Category 2 of the Northbridge Policy, and Killara provided transport, case work and family support. After 2006, and especially after 2008, the priorities of the project and the profile of young people apprehended changed, and there was a greater focus on child protection, and the younger age groups (Category 1). Children and young people apprehended under Category 1 of the Northbridge Policy align better with the priorities of DCP than of Killara. Between 2006 and 2008, the proportion of young people aged 16 -17 years decreased. From 2008 onwards, Category 1 apprehensions made up 95% of apprehensions; Category 2 comprise about 5% of young people apprehended, and consequently Killara's role in the Northbridge Policy project reduced.

Other Youth Services in Northbridge

Other Youth Work projects operated in Northbridge during this period, most notably Anglicare's **Step 1** project, a detached youth work project that offered a support and advocacy service to street present young people aged 14-25 years; and **Perth Inner City Youth Service**, which offered a range of services including accommodation, advice and support services for street present young people in Perth. The **Needle Exchange** service also

operated in Northbridge. The focus of these youth services differed from the Northbridge Policy project both in ethos and in target age-range.

Legislative and other changes since 2003

Some legislative and other changes occurred between 2003 and 2010 that caused minor changes to the project. These include replacement of the Child Welfare Act 1947 (Western Australian Government, 1947) with the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA Government, 2004); the relocation of the WA Central Police Station from Hay St to Beaufort St; and the transition of funding for the Nyoongar Patrol from CDEP to award wages for salaried patrollers.

In 2011, two major changes occurred. Firstly, redevelopment of Perth rail station meant the project lost its operational hub, which had been located at the station and had been built specifically to meet the needs of the project. A consequence of this was that the operational base of the Northbridge Project moved to temporary accommodation in DCP at Stirling St, around 1.5 km from the previous location and outside the Northbridge precinct. After this move, service providers were no longer co-located for their day-to-day operations. DCP was located in Stirling Street in North Perth, JAG was located in Central Police Station on Beaufort Street at the boundary of Northbridge, and Mission Australia was located in Balcatta, a suburb 15km from Northbridge. A second change occurred in late 2011, when the DCP made an unexpected decision, without consultation with any of the Northbridge Policy project partners, to outsource management of the Northbridge Policy project, the management of the outreach team, and preventative case work intervention, following a review of its role in youth services provision in Perth (DCP, 2011). The contract for these services previously provided by DCP to the Northbridge Policy project was offered for tender and awarded to Mission Australia. This restructure of the Northbridge Policy project reduces direct involvement of DCP, and means the role of DCP reverts to what it was before the Northbridge Policy project, under ICYP –when Crisis Care provided the only departmental support within the inter-agency approach.

The decision not only changes the management structure of the project, but also represents a departure from the rationale and methods trialled in the HYPE program and incorporated into the Northbridge program. These changes have implications not only for project management, but also for program operations, relationships between government departments and agencies, accountability, and the underlying program logic model. As one of the interviewees stated, a concern in the transition to the recent outsourcing of the Northbridge Policy project to an (NGO), Mission Australia, is the lack of formal power that an NGO can wield, to ensure that government departments fulfil their responsibilities and duties. This is especially true when the NGO is dependent on a government department for continued funding. The interviewee commented

‘An NGO can't say to education, for instance, "Why isn't this kid going to school? You've got to do something about it." The schools will say, "Well, keep your nose out of our

business," whereas the Department and the Director-General can get on the phone and say to their counterparts in education, "This is not good enough. You've got to do something about it." ... 'Crisis Care will still be in there but not driving it. A government agency has got to be pivotal to driving it'

Previous evaluations

The first evaluation of the Northbridge Policy project was undertaken by the Office of Crime Prevention in 2004 (Office of Crime Prevention, 2004). The report drew favourable conclusions about the efficacy of the Northbridge Policy project. The Office of Crime Prevention analysed data provided by the project about their activities and the number of apprehensions. The total number of contacts over the period was 961. The highest number of apprehensions in a single week was 59, the lowest was two, and the average number of apprehensions over 52 weeks was 18.5. The total number of individual children and young people apprehended over the 52 weeks was 529. The report found that 88% of total apprehensions were Indigenous children or young people; 66% of apprehensions were girls or young women; 13% of apprehensions were of children aged 12 years and less; 66% of apprehensions were of young people aged 13-15 years; and 21% of young people apprehended were aged 16-17 years. The report concluded that the project had been successful, because numbers of children and young people apprehended fell rapidly after the first six months.

A second evaluation of the Northbridge Policy project was undertaken in 2006 by the Office of Crime Prevention (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006a), which concluded that the policy had achieved significant outcomes including:

1. Improved community confidence, agency and organisation operations.
2. A 35% reduction in the number of unsupervised young people on the streets of Northbridge late at night.
3. A reduction in the number of young people apprehended/ charged by the JAG in Northbridge.

The 2006 evaluation made several recommendations for service improvement, subject to evaluation of budgetary and cost implications. Table 42 summarises the recommendations, the reasons and the action taken.

Table 42: Recommendations and actions from the 2006 Evaluation of the Northbridge Policy project (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006a)

Recommendation	Reason	Action
Enlarge operational geographic boundaries to include parts of the CBD and East Perth	A survey found that young people in Perth walked between the CBD and Northbridge, so the geographic boundaries did not align with young people's night time patterns of movement around the city	Not formally adopted, but there is some flexibility
Extend or modify operations to meet the changing needs of Northbridge	Opening of Mandurah Perth rail link may increase numbers in	No change

	Northbridge; venues offer student/ backpacker specials on Wednesday which attracts growing numbers of younger people	
Improve efficiencies in transportation arrangements	Current arrangement for transporting young people to place of safety not efficient	No formal change but coordinator reported there was an increased expectation that parents would collect children
Improve understanding of the Policy and processes	Different interpretations of policy especially with respect to 16-17 year olds, and also definition of "responsible adult" potentially undermines collaboration	Interviews confirmed problem partially resolved through focus on children and young people under 16 years old,
Improve case-management of 'chronic re-offenders' (three or more apprehensions)	A small number of young people who are apprehended on three or more occasions.	Three apprehensions triggers an assessment for intensive family support
Permanency of JAG officers	All police including JAG are rotated as a staff development measure and to reduce opportunities for corruption but this makes it difficult for JAG to build relationships and interact effectively with children and young people	Acknowledged problem, but recommendation not adopted
Improve partnership with PTA	Better communication would mean that PTA could alert NPP staff to the imminent arrival of unsupervised young people	Communication has improved, the PTA is now a formal project Partner, and this now occurs
Procedures for dealing with injured young people while in care	Uncertainty about which agency is responsible for child or young person's health care	Unclear but Mission Australia seem to have taken this role especially for young people under the influence of drugs and alcohol

Limitations of previous evaluations

Neither of the earlier evaluations of the Northbridge Policy project investigated how **diversion** was used within the Northbridge Policy project. Fundamental to the program logic model for the Northbridge Policy project was the idea that diversion was preferable to apprehension where children and young people were at low risk of harm. Children and young people in breach of the policy, but at low risk of harm, would be educated about the policy and encouraged to go home as an alternative to being apprehended. In the original philosophy of the project, apprehension can be seen as an intervention of last resort. Diversion is, however, central to the Northbridge Policy. It is central to Juvenile Justice (WA Government, 2012), and central to the roles in the Northbridge Policy project of the DCP Outreach workers, Nyoongar Patrol, the PTA transit guards, the Department of Education attendance unit, the DSR diversionary programs in Armadale and Midland and the case work by Mission Australia, DCP and Killara undertaken as part of the Northbridge Policy project. Neither of the previous evaluations of the Northbridge Policy project has included any discussion of diversions and the project has not collected data on diversion. In consequence, the brief for this evaluation of the Northbridge Policy project did not ask us to examine this diversion aspect of the Northbridge Policy. It was only after we had collected data that we realised the importance of the omission of diversion from previous evaluations and from the brief for this project.

Similarly, neither of the earlier evaluation reports on the Northbridge Policy investigated whether there had been **displacement**. Neither report examined what had happened to the

children and young people who no longer came to Northbridge, where they had gone, and whether where they had gone to was safer than Northbridge. The presumption was made that they were at home and they were safe.

Observations of previous evaluations and reviews

The Northbridge Policy project operational processes and outputs were formally reviewed and minor (unspecified) operational changes were made in 2004, at the first annual review (Office of Crime Prevention, 2004). The program was reviewed again in 2006 (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006a). The 2006 evaluation (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006a) commented favourably upon the increased involvement of DCD/ DCP.

‘A major improvement resulting from the Policy has been the increased involvement of the DCD, through the CCU, and the subsequent improvements to the follow up action occurring after the initial JAG contact.’

However, an interviewee also reported that in 2006, there were still difficulties with follow-up and preventative family support work. Under the arrangements in place at the time, DCD officers from local offices (e.g. Mirrabooka, Gosnells, Armadale and Fremantle) were supposed to talk to families of children and young people apprehended multiple times in Northbridge, but frequently this did not occur. Apparently, the resolution of this difficulty led indirectly to the development of the 2008 Parental Support and Responsibility Act (D. o. P. a. C. WA Government, 2008) that formalised the preventative family support role of DCP staff.

Other informal internal reviews of the Northbridge Policy project led to changes to the Northbridge Policy process. We have no data about internal reviews before 2008. We were told by interviewees that, in 2008, a decision was made to focus resources upon children and young people aged 15 years or less. This sharply reduced the numbers of young people aged 16 -17 years who were apprehended, increased apprehensions of young people aged 13-15 years, and was accompanied by changes to the gender balance of those apprehended. Also in 2008, changes were made to the process of allocation of family case support and follow-up. All of these changes are clearly evident in the quantitative analyses of the Northbridge Policy project.

Northbridge Intended Model of Service Delivery

The material described in this section is referenced from the ‘State Government Northbridge Strategy Young People in Northbridge Policy June 2003 (updated 2006)’ (Office of Crime Prevention, 2006c). The Northbridge Policy interpretation and implementation was delegated to the Police and officers of DCD (later DCP) authorised by the Minister, and it was intended the Police and DCD/DCP would work in ‘collaboration with other State Government agencies, the City of Perth, relevant non-government organisations, the Northbridge business sector, and the local community.’ The decision-making process as specified in the original policy document appeared simple and straightforward. Judgements

about the appropriate action depended entirely upon judgements about risk of harm and offending:

- ‘Children and young people considered to be at **low risk** will be advised to leave the area.’ [diversion]
- ‘Children and young people considered to be at **medium to high risk** of physical or moral danger or who are misbehaving will be assisted from the streets, assessed and linked to a safe place and to safe people.’ [apprehension]
- ‘Children and young people who are **offending** will be liable to police action and dealt with in accordance with prevailing laws.’ [arrest]

The intended operational process for the project was described in detail in the original document, the *Young People in Northbridge Policy* (referred to in the policy as “the Curfew”), and described four ‘phases’ (Office of Crime Prevention, 2004) within the project (Table 43).

Table 43: Four Phases of Northbridge Policy project (Office of Crime Prevention, 2004)

Phase	Activity
Phase 1 Street Patrols	This phase involves the Police (Juvenile Aid Group), Outreach Workers, Nyoongar Patrol Officers and Transit Guards (now Transit Officers) patrolling their respective areas, engaging with juveniles on the streets, and diverting young people onto trains and to their homes.
Phase 2 Finding Safe Places And Safe People	<p>This phase involves the Police taking those children and young people deemed to be in moral or physical danger to the JAG Office at the Central Station area. At this location, Police and Crisis Care (DCD) officers interview and assess the degree of risk the individual presents. The purpose of this phase is to determine the risks involved, access all relevant DCD information and to plan for transport for the juveniles to a safe place and safe persons.</p> <p>Mission Australia’s On Track Program, located at the same premises, supports young people affected by substance misuse and assists with short-term safe accommodation along with locating families by phone. The Nyoongar Patrol also assist at this point and in addition to providing transport to safe places for the young people, the Patrol officers make house calls to see that the environments are safe and suitable. The Department of Justice’s Killara Program also provides transport, assistance and counselling to individuals and families.</p>
Phase 3 The Operational Debrief	Every Monday morning the agency representatives gather at the JAG Office and under the leadership of the Project Coordinator, undertake a debrief of the operations of the previous week, address any outstanding issues, ‘pool’ intelligence gained from the streets at night, discuss each of individuals apprehended and make an assessment as to follow-up action required.
Phase 4 Follow-Up And Case Management	<p>The Project Coordinator (DCD Officer) has the responsibility of collating all of the statistics, the assessment details and the follow-up decisions. This information is then transferred to the DCD District Managers for action.</p> <p>‘Every child or young person who is apprehended and taken through the JAG facility is assessed and this is followed up by a home visit.</p> <p>Some individuals are placed on short-term intervention programs, some are included in the intake of the Department for Community Development for full case management and some are collaboratively case managed by a number of agencies (e.g. Education and Training, Killara (DOJ), Department of Housing and Works, Department of Health and the Department for Community Development). The Young People in Northbridge Policy has been successful in identifying individuals and families who need ongoing, extended support and assistance.</p> <p>The Young People in Northbridge Policy has assisted with the identification of 27 chronic presenters in Northbridge and has enabled the above-mentioned agencies to concentrate their services on these young people and their families. Non-government agencies also play an important part in providing the right kind of support for the individual and the family.’</p>

Northbridge Policy Project Intended Program Logic Model 1

The Northbridge Policy had stated objectives and specified a program to achieve these objectives. The policy and the program are connected by ‘linking constructs’, which include both the ‘worldview’ that informs the design of the program, and a rationale for how the proposed program is be expected to bring about the intended outcomes. Linking constructs are rarely explicitly described and must usually be inferred from context and other related materials. In many instances, public statements about the rationale for the policy may not provide a complete picture, especially when the issue is highly politicised (Walker & Forrester, 2002), as we found in this case. The reliability of the process of inference depends upon the comprehensiveness and reliability of source materials located. In this case, we supplemented public statements about the rationale for the Northbridge Policy project with material derived from associated contemporary policy and program documents, information received from policy makers and others about the unofficial context of the policy, and information about the program structure and the intended program activities.

Table 44 presents a program logic model for the Northbridge Policy projects based upon the policy documents reviewed in this appendix, the program and the linking constructs we inferred from the sources to which we had access.

Table 44: Program Logic Model 1: Northbridge Policy Project

Inputs	Components	Implementation objectives	Outputs	Linking Constructs	Short-Medium-Long-term Objectives
<p>Nyoongar Patrol, Dept. of Community Development Outreach workers, Aboriginal Police Liaison Officers (APLOs), Juvenile Aid Group (JAG) members of Police force.</p>	Phase 1: Outreach and Engagement	<p>Nyoongar Patrol, Department for Community Development (DCD) Outreach Workers, the Aboriginal Police Liaison Officers and the Juvenile Aid Group (JAG) of the Police Service working across Northbridge and identifying young people 'at risk'. Tasks: engage with children & young people, build rapport, educate about Northbridge policy and outcomes if they ignore curfew; encourage positive peer pressure and risk reduction, encourage CYP to make their way home or to seek appropriate help or assistance from family or others, if they are able to do so safely.</p>	<p>Unsupervised YP at low risk of harm encouraged to make their way home. Rapport built with young people 'at risk'. Young people encouraged to seek appropriate help or assistance.</p>	<p>1. Prevention better than cure: Effective prevention and diversion is more effective than formal process and custodial intervention. 2. The presence of children and young people in Northbridge during curfew hours is symptomatic of problems in the family system 3. Links between neglect and offending: Children who are neglected or abused are more likely to enter the justice system than those who are not 4. Age of first offence: Children who enter the justice system at an early age offend more and are more likely to become repeat offenders than those who first enter the system when they are older 5. Custody and contamination: when young people commit minor offences and mix with others who are repeat offenders, there is a risk that offending behaviour is normalised. HYPE model –connect with young people and encourage them to choose to reduce potentially risky behaviour, to consider potential outcomes, and to make choices that will avoid formal intervention by police and child protection agencies. Early intervention juvenile justice rationale, work with young people either before they offend/ first offenders/ minor offenders to: Prevent or delay entry into the justice system and/or prevent escalation in the severity and frequency of offences, through intervention with families to support parenting and to ameliorate environmental and family conditions that may increase the risk of involvement in criminal activities</p>	<p>YP having increased awareness: 1. Northbridge not a suitable place for them at night. 2. They will be apprehended under the curfew. 3. Awareness of other places that may be more wholesome to spend their evenings. Less YP at risk in Northbridge. Improved business environment. Reduced crime⁶</p>
<p>Police officers DCD Officers Mission Australia Staff</p>	Phase 2: Processing	<p>Police officers take those children and young people deemed to be in moral or physical danger to the JAG</p>	<p>Number of young people apprehended Number of YP arrested on criminal charges (independent of</p>	<p>Response to perceived risk: If a young person is apprehended, it is because they are judged to be at medium or high risk of harm (otherwise they would have been diverted). It is therefore important to check their identity, and investigate their personal and environmental circumstances so that the most effective support strategy can be</p>	<p>Less YP at risk in Northbridge. Improved business environment. Reduced crime⁷</p>

⁶ It is often assumed, crime levels in Northbridge are due to YP. Police data from 2006 OCP review of Northbridge Policy indicates that crimes due to YP are <1% of crimes in Northbridge.

<p>JAG facility. Transport resources Phone services Computer services Police database DCP database</p>	<p>Office at the Central Station area. The goals are: 1. To assess the risk faced [by the young person?] 2.access any related DCD information 3. Transport young people to safe places and safe people. DCD and police staff will make the assessments. Mission Australia's On Track program, located at the same premises, will deal with young people affected by substance misuse and will assist with short-term safe accommodation along with locating families by phone.</p>	<p>apprehensions). [No record in DCD data?] Risks to young people identified [no record of this being recorded anywhere?] DCD information on young person is accessed [?] Young persons transported to safe places and safe persons [by whom?]</p>	<p>selected, and so that an informed judgement can be made about any immediate risks of harm or crisis intervention that may be required</p>	<p>Contact with YP's parents enabling parenting education input. Contact with YP's parents opportunity to offer parenting support. Safe arrangements identified for young people YP with high risk factors identified. Review of safety of environments for YP</p>	
<p>Police DCD Crisis Care Officers Mission Australia Staff Nyongar Patrol staff Dept. of Corrective Services Killara Program staff JAG facility. Phone services DCP database</p>	<p>Phase 3: Follow up</p>	<p>The Department for Community Development Project Co-ordinator will ensure: 1. that next day follow-up is targeted to those most at risk, and 2. Will provide the link with other care agencies both government and non-government who are responsible for assisting families and carers.</p>	<p>Numbers of meetings. Numbers of people attending meetings. Intelligence and information exchanged. Outstanding issues resolved. Discussion of information about every YP apprehended over weekend. Assessment of follow up action required for each individual.</p>	<p>Target intensive support services where it will be most effective: 1. where there is a substantial risk of adverse outcomes if no changes are made, especially where the young person/ family are already involved with multiple services 2. where the family and/or the young person want to make changes and are willing to engage with support services</p>	<p>Improvements to interagency interaction Inter-agency information sharing Review of decisions made over weekend – quality control. Multi-agency assessment of apprehended individuals</p>
<p>DCD coordinator DCD District managers DCD staff DCS staff</p>	<p>Phase 4: Debrief</p>	<p>A forum for key workers and agencies to discuss issues that have arisen during the previous week's contact in Northbridge.</p>	<p>Statistics collated onto computer Assessment details collated onto computer</p>	<p>Reflective practice is important: Important to learn from practice, especially mistakes and improve operational effectiveness Important to review decisions made on incomplete information or under pressure: Share any additional information and review judgements made on the night and modify if necessary</p>	<p>Improved future policy development from data collated.</p>

<p>DET staff Dept. Health staff Dept. Housing and Works</p>	<p>This will provide a critical link between the processing and follow-up phases.</p>	<p>Follow up details collated onto computer. Assessment by DCP (duplicated with debrief?) individuals are placed on short-term intervention programs, some are included in the DCD's intake for full case management and some are collaboratively case managed by a number of agencies, e.g. Department for Community Development, Department of Corrective Services Department of Education and Training, Department of Health, and the Department of Housing and Works.</p>	<p>Build collaboration: Information sharing is necessary to ensure effective collaboration and to check that all agencies understand their role/responsibility in each case</p>	<p>Actions by DCP District Managers providing case support. Compulsory and optional support and interventions by government and NGO agencies. Improved lives for YP. Reductions in crime. Reduced future workloads for DCD, Police and other government agencies due to early intervention.</p>
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Appendix 20: NPP Collaboration in practice

Policy and previous reviews have identified the formal roles and responsibilities of each agency in general terms, as described in Chapter 8. This section outlines how the roles and processes have been developed over time, and the implications of this for

- Team work and team building;
- Formalisation of partnerships;
- Balancing different organisational priorities;
- Role differentiation and role redundancy;
- Information-sharing, and;
- Co-location;

Team work and team building

In early 2008, it was clear to Neal Osborne that the internal tensions and territoriality and disputes over process, e.g. how many young people could be processed at any one time, were *'making it difficult to operationalise things'*.

The coordinator implemented changes to create an 'open forum' that was non-hierarchical, that emphasised open communication and information sharing, and that clarified the processes.

The Northbridge Policy project partners stated that the project requires an interdependent mix of skills and roles and each organisation contributes to that,

'So it's about that, about staff understanding that you've all got complementary skills and respecting those skills' (Core)

All direct service-provider from Northbridge Policy partners reported that there had been difficulties with interagency collaboration in the first four years of the Northbridge Policy project. According to participants, these occurred because different agencies made assumptions they were 'more important' than other partners, and that their priorities should take precedence. Interviewees reported that the difficulties and tensions between Northbridge Policy project partners restricted the ability of the Northbridge Policy project to fulfil its aims of providing an integrated multi-agency service. Review of the comments made by interviewees indicates the difficulties and tensions arose as a result of a number of different factors:

- **Legislative**— different agencies were operating under different legislative constraints and directives.
- **Working practices** – different agencies had different and well established traditions of working practices and interagency collaboration contradicted these established practices or required work to modify them.
- **Professional worldviews** - different agencies had different understandings of the Northbridge situation, expectations about the role of the individuals and groups

involved, the implications of the policy and the way it should be applied, and different understanding and values in regard to the different groups and organisations. In addition, many were subject to priorities and expectations from within their own agency.

- **Organisational attitudes** - entrenched critical and often negative attitudes and views of agencies about other agencies. These different ways of viewing the world amounted to organisational cultural parochialism.
- **Organisational culture of secrecy** - Agencies with a tradition of information secrecy and security refusing to share information with other agencies and operating almost completely in organisational silos.
- **Personal attitudes and behaviours** – some of the tensions and difficulties appear to have been due to the personal attitudes of individuals involved, rather than being due to larger scale differences in organisational culture.
- **Organisational dominance, power and status** – agencies insisting the whole of the project should align with the working practices, priorities and work culture of their agency; competition for power and status, or conflicting attitudes about which organisations had more power and status and greatest authority for decision making.
- **Territoriality** – there was an operational gap between the four agencies whose operating base was the JAG offices (JAG, Crisis Care, Mission Australia, and the DCP Outreach workers) and the other partners, whose operating bases were elsewhere.
- **Structural** – some difficulties and tensions appear to have been due to structural arrangements in terms of the way the premises were arranged, activities were conducted, when meetings were held, which information was shared, etc.

All of these factors interacted to increase the difficulties and reduce interagency collaboration. The tensions and difficulties in collaboration also led, or were driven by, critical attitudes of some agencies by other agencies. This has been reported elsewhere in the literature on interagency collaboration. When this occurs there is a power struggle for dominance and control, which can take many forms and can subvert the work of all the organisations.

Participants reported that when Neal Osborne was appointed as project coordinator in December 2007, his high priority was how to improve collaboration between agencies and to resolve the collaboration and process problems. His goal was to create *‘an emotional environment in the workplace in which ... we’re all supporting each other.’* His strategy for change was to keep the things that were working and bit by bit change the problematic arrangements to achieve gradual improvement. The successful mechanisms included:

- **Partnership agreement:** Formalise roles, relationships and responsibilities in a partnership agreement.

- **Workflow:** Create a formally-defined and detailed representation of the workflow process that was continually reviewed for efficacy and revised as necessary.
- **Meetings:** Convert all meetings to an 'open forum' format that was transparent and non-hierarchical. Different meetings for different purposes; improved collaboration at the Senior Management meeting; involvement in the Nyoongar Patrol meetings.
- **Information sharing:** Adopt new processes to improve information sharing and focus the information sharing on achieving benefits for the young persons. Align information sharing with WA State policy guidelines on information sharing between government agencies and the information sharing guidelines in the Children and Community Services Act 2004.
- **Joint training:** with other Northbridge Policy project partners where one agency offers training to others about the specifics of particular legislation; improves understanding of all agencies about constraints on the Northbridge Policy process.
- **Include all partners:** Improve collaboration with all Partner agencies through better information sharing and active and inclusive problem-solving.
- **Resolve conflict:** Act quickly to resolve problems with process, differences in professional judgement and conflicts in relationships.

All interviewees commented that the collaboration and functioning of the Northbridge Policy project had been improved since the above collaboration improving strategies were put in place.

Regular Meetings

Regular meeting are part of the team building processes of the project, the information sharing process, and the policy development and review processes. Open and transparent information sharing was considered important because

'It helps increase trust among workers and trust amongst agencies and understanding and an emotional environmental workplace in which 'we're all doing a great job, we're all helping each other and we're all supporting each other and there's no preciousness – it gets rid of all that that someone is more special than someone else. It helps outcomes too.' (NO)

There were three different types of meetings that were important to achievement of collaboration:

- Monday weekly operational debriefing meetings chaired by the Northbridge Policy Coordinator for all staff held at the JAG Offices.
- Wednesday weekly 'Stakeholder' meetings of Nyoongar Patrol Systems Inc. held at the Nyoongar Patrol Offices at 11am. These were also attended by managers of agencies in the Northbridge Policy project, although they are not formally part of the Northbridge Policy project.

- Required by the partnership agreement, at least twice yearly Senior Managers Meetings were held at the DCP offices. In practice they were convened more frequently (every two months).

Weekly meetings were concerned with operational issues, such as allocation of lead agency for follow-up, and debrief on the events of the previous weekend, and any interpersonal conflict resolution. All the Core Group and some of the Partners also attended weekly meetings hosted by the Nyoongar Patrol. The Wednesday meeting is primarily an operational meeting for all Nyoongar Patrol Systems patrollers, managers and staff and is used to share and exchange information about what is happening to individuals 'on the street'. For example, the Coordinator of the Northbridge Policy project may outline that Indigenous young people have been apprehended the previous weekend, who and where they were transported to and what the follow up will be. Nyoongar Patrol members may correct the information used by DCP and provide *'more accurate intelligence about family background and what is happening'*.

Nyoongar Patrol officers will also raise operational issues about the Northbridge Policy project in the previous week. For example *'Why did Mission, or why didn't Crisis Care refer kids to us? Why did they not take our calls? We rang three times.'* For example, if a Nyoongar Patrol officer asks why a particular communication didn't happen with DCP, this might get referred back to Crisis Care staff. It was perceived that the Wednesday meeting helps make the Northbridge agencies more accountable for how they operate, and provide a forum in which *'everyone polices each other in how they actually do the business'*. Thus, the Nyoongar Patrol meeting performs a useful review and quality control function for the Northbridge Policy project.

Bi-monthly Senior Management Meetings were used to guide the strategy, future planning and any inter-agency collaboration difficulties. The Senior Management Meetings ensure that there is high level support for the agencies' continued participation in the Northbridge Policy project. Partners shared information about their organisation's involvement in the project, and also about any changes to their organisation that might affect future collaboration. For example, through the Senior Management meeting the Education Department they became aware that DCP has recently appointed an attendance office in the Pilbara without any discussion with the Education Office there. [LM]

Training

Training for staff of the different service providers and partners used to be 'siloed', with each service provider and partner training their own staff. Joint Training has been initiated recently, and was offered immediately after the regular Monday Interagency Operations meetings when most staff were on-site. Crisis Care and the Department of Child Protection provided guest speakers and have included sessions on mandatory reporting, indicators of sexual abuse and safety for children and young people. Partners reported that they believed

that joint training was beneficial. The Northbridge Project Coordinator commented the joint training had been beneficial in establishing better collaboration between partners.

Mission Australia staff have been provided with limited training in working with young people, sometimes from trainers in-house and other times outsourced. Some interviewees stated that they believed that improvements were needed in police training to enable them to work more successfully with young people with mental health issues and with families, especially Indigenous families. Nyoongar Patrol Systems Inc. employs Indigenous patrollers and as part of their employment provides them with significant levels of training. Some of the Nyoongar Patrol staff are members of the same extended families as some of the young people apprehended in Northbridge. The Nyoongar Patrol training supports staff to fulfil their role in the patrol and patrollers also act as supports and resources to their extended family, and were able to informally support parents and discourage children and young people from coming to Northbridge.

Appendix 21: NPP Partnership Agreement

Announcement of agreement of the Partnership Agreement occurred at the same meeting as the announcement that DCP had decided unilaterally to restructure the Northbridge Policy project, which changed some key roles and responsibilities. The agreement was the culmination of a process of negotiation that began in 2008 and was completed in 2011. The partnership agreement formalised processes, roles, responsibilities and expected contribution of all Core agencies and all Partner agencies in the Northbridge Policy project (see Appendix 23). The Partnership of Understanding Agreement' detailed processes and had the formal support of senior managers of all the agencies involved in the Northbridge Policy project. The Department of Sport and Recreation are not signatories to the Partnership agreement possibly because their program commenced after the negotiation process had commenced. The operational process is reproduced in full (Table 45) because it provides a succinct overview of roles, responsibilities and processes.

Table 45: Operational process of Northbridge Policy project (from the 'Partnership Understanding Agreement')

OPERATIONAL PROTOCOL & PRACTICES MATRIX – YOUNG PEOPLE IN NORTHBRIDGE PROJECT		
ROLE	AGENCY	PROTOCOL
Identifying young people at risk	NPOS OSW	Assess and identify young people at risk, report to either camera room or directly to JAG, provide name, age of child, what they are wearing, the location and why they are at risk.
Diversionsary transport of young people	NPOS	If agreeable between all parties and subject to CCU assessment and approval, young people may be transported home or to identified safe place by NPOS without being formally processed through the Northbridge Project.
Apprehending of young people	WA Police	JAG and at times, other police will apprehend young people deemed to be at risk under Section 41 of the Children and Community Services Act 2004.
Transport of young people to JAG	WA Police	Once apprehended young people to be directly transported to JAG where the intake process will commence.
Check Police data base	JAG	To verify name, age and any existing legal issues. If the young person does have outstanding justice issues (i.e. breached bail, or outstanding warrants) consultation shall occur between JAG and Juvenile Justice. Young people may not proceed through the Northbridge Project.
Intake form	JAG CCU MA	JAG will coordinate all intake procedures to enable reciprocal response efficiency. JAG to gather basic information from young person and rationale for their apprehension. Crisis Care to complete assessment outcome information and return form to JAG and record all information and outcomes on the DCP Interaction Report. Record young person's details on database and provide weekly report to interagency meeting.
Searching of young people	JAG	All young people will be legally searched by police under Section 115 of the Children and Community Services Act 2004, to ensure that they are not carrying weapons or illegal substances. This process must be completed before young people enter Mission's On Track.
Information check of YP	WA Police CCU MA	JAG to consult with CCU and obtain information from DCP records. Intake form to be photocopied and handed over to CCU for checks. Undertake a search of DCP records. Provide relevant information to JAG. Provide relevant information to CCU as a result of prior / current contact with YP.

Appendix 21: NPP Partnership Agreement

Completion of DCP records search	CCU	Search to include name and address for the young person and associated adults, contact log check, especially recent contacts through NB project, as well as person believed responsible; checks for an adult with whom the young person is being placed. Records search should be included in the CCNI Interaction Report to stream line process should the young person present in the future. Once search is completed information is given directly to JAG to aid them in their assessment of the young person.
Young people to enter Mission Australia lounge	MA	Young person is to be invited to 'On Track' premises by MA staff. One worker to escort the young person from JAG. MA staff are to explain their role and any requirements they have in relation to appropriate behaviour of the young person. The other Mission worker must be close by to ensure the safety of both young people and staff.
Initial assessment by Mission Australia staff	MA	Youth workers to complete a psycho/social assessment to be entered into the MA data base. Information gathered may be presented at interagency meeting on Mondays. If the worker deems there is a risk to the safety of the young person they will then complete a risk assessment. MA workers will also provide immediate care such as food and drink. If requested workers may also assist in confirmation of address of responsible adults to CCU.
Risk Assessment	WA Police	JAG to undertake initial assessment in collaboration with CCU and MA and refer to CCU for further assessment as indicated.
	CCU	CCU to work collaboratively with JAG and MA in assessment of young people. CCU to undertake further assessment processes as required.
	MA	Mission Australia to advise JAG/CCU of any risk issues that arise while young people in their care. If deemed necessary workers will complete a suicide risk assessment form.
	MA	Young people may provide information to MA staff that they are not comfortable providing to JAG/CCU. Therefore engagement with young people in 'On Track' is an important part of the overall process.
	OSW	If OSWs have any information relating to young people at risk they are to share the information with either JAG or CCU.
When child is found to be a high risk of self harm/suicidal ideation	WA Police CCU MA	If a child has been found to be of high risk of either self harm or suicide the child must as soon as possible be referred to appropriate medical services for proper medical assessment.
Transporting young people to emergency services	JAG	Due to the nature of the situation, any young person needing to be transported to appropriate medical services must be transferred by either JAG or by ambulance to the medical services.
Indicators for when further assessment is needed	ALL AGENCIES	The need for further assessment of any young person may occur if the young person is; of primary school age (age 12 years and under) under a protection order or is currently in the CEO's care expresses self harm/suicidal ideation who present any information that indicates past or present child abuse
Process of interviewing young people	CCU	CCU has primary responsibility for conducting the interview. A single field officer will generally conduct interviews unless there are significant concerns that statutory involvement may be required. They should focus on providing an appropriate crisis response to the immediate needs and gathering of information for further follow up by relevant agencies unless immediate Child Protection issues are identified and need to be acted upon. May be requested to participate in the interview process where criminal issues are present, i.e. assault or where statutory action may be required by DCP in the future, and no other statutory DCP officer is available, i.e. disclosure of abuse.
	JAG	If requested by CCU or JAG, OSW's may assist in gathering further information by providing assistance with interviews.

Appendix 21: NPP Partnership Agreement

	OSW MA	May be requested to participate in the interview process as a support to young people.
Locate responsible adult / confirm appropriate placement options	WA Police CCU	Work collaboratively with CCU to contact parents/guardians or alternative responsible adults. Use information gathered to ascertain appropriate placement option. Undertake address checks as required. Work collaboratively with JAG and MA to contact responsible adults. Arrange alternative accommodation entry (as appropriate).
Address checks when no contact is possible known as Door Knocks	WA Police NPOS Killara & OSW Taxi Company	To attend the address provided by CCU. Once responsible adult is located assessment is then made to ascertain whether that adult is responsible to have the child returned to their care. May assist CCU to locate a responsible adult. A door knock shall be carried out at the address given by CCU. As with JAG officers OSW's are to assist CCU in determining if adult is responsible to have child returned to their care. When required taxis can be arranged for the purpose of address checks. However assistance in determining the viability of the place as a safe one is beyond their role. The driver once locating the responsible adult is to give them the relevant information.
Transport Services	CCU NPOS Killara OSW	CCU to be primarily responsible to liaise with agencies & co-ordinate transport services for young people and may be used as a last resort as a transport option. To be used as a priority. . To be used as a priority To assist CCU with the transportation of young people.
Transportation of difficult young people	WA Police	JAG to provide transport assistance of young people as required specifically when:- The young person is violent. The young person is at risk of self harm. There is no responsible adult that can be contacted at the assessed place of young person's residence. If both CCU and WAPOL assess that the young person is a flight risk. There is the need for further detailed assessment.
Exiting YP from facility	ALL AGENCIES	Before any young person is allowed to leave the building they must be escorted from 'On Track' to JAG to receive their belongings and to be formally released from the custody of JAG. JAG will coordinate the exiting of all young people from the facility. At this time JAG will complete their paper work.
Interagency operational meetings	ALL AGENCIES	A representative from all agencies shall attend the weekly meeting normally convened on Monday (excluding DET [DEWA]).
Senior Management Meeting	ALL AGENCIES	This meeting is to occur at least twice a year with meetings minuted and items actioned and/or addressed.
Grievances—Operational Issues	ALL AGENCIES	All stakeholders and partner agencies to establish and maintain internal liaison officers. Grievances should be directed to the relevant internal liaison officer/s. Grievances to be mediated by the respective internal liaison officer/s in a timely and professional manner.
Information sharing	ALL AGENCIES	All agencies to ensure appropriate protocols and practices are maintained regarding the sharing of information about any young person processed by the Northbridge Project and that those protocols and practices are cognisant with relevant legislative principles, provisions and guidelines.

The partnership agreement clearly differentiates roles and responsibilities of different agencies. In summary,

- Police – have authority on all criminal matters; apprehend young people; search all children and young people; check identity of all children and young people; intervene if there is a risk of violence (young person or family) or self-harm; emergency medical transport; escort young people when they leave the premises; address checks; Door knocks;
- DCP – they have the final decision about where is a safe place for a young person and who is a safe person; have authority on all child protection issues; DCP allocates and undertakes case work based on the judgments made by DCP and Crisis Care officers in line with the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA Government 2004); Door Knocks (OSW)
- Mission Australia – provide supervision and support for a child or young person and a safe place and activities while they wait for transport, also collect additional information which they provide to DCP
- Nyoongar Patrol – Provide support to Indigenous people; liaise between Indigenous people and other organisations; provide transport home; Door Knocks
- Killara – provide transport; Door knocks; case work for those apprehended who are only in early stages of involvement with the Criminal Justice system

Some interdependencies between agencies, for example police and DCP, are specified in legislation. All Police Officers have a responsibility to apprehend and manage young people at risk of harm as legislated under Section 41. Organisationally, this places the Police in a position of requiring the services of other state agencies such as DCP in order to fulfil some aspects of the Police's duties under the Act, such as identifying a safe place and safe persons to which young people can be returned; providing services directly in the case of the large proportion with open cases to DCP, under the care of the CEO, or with juvenile justice orders; and providing the appropriate transport.

Participants reported that it was advantageous when each operation has a distinct identity and role in the process.

I believe that because we have separate identities and roles and responsibilities, each party who's there knows clearly what their task is and what they're going to be doing, and it's complementary; every step of the way it's complementary. The police have their task, Crisis Care have their roles, DCP, and [Mission Australia have their] roles.'

When more than one agency has the same role or responsibility, as in transport and 'Door Knocks', the agreement clarifies how to determine which organisation would be most appropriate under particular circumstances.

The Partnership agreement goes some way to resolving problems caused because different organisations have different operational priorities; however, it is limited in what it can achieve. This is especially the case when priorities are imposed upon partners by parts of their own organisation that are not party to the Northbridge Policy project. This is a particular problem for the police. The JAG team have an important role in the Northbridge Policy project; however, the Police have a wide variety of competing duties that are prioritised by managers moment by moment. According to participants, the JAG role of Police officers is viewed as secondary to many other aspects of Police business. Police also operate under different conditions from other organisations, and rotations of Police officers' roles are frequent. This means there have often been abrupt changes in JAG personnel. Police and other partner interviewees reported that in the earlier years, relationships between Police and the other Northbridge Policy project partners were not as good as they might have been because of lack of continuity and the perceived lesser priority of JAG compared with other policing tasks. In recent years, collaboration between Police and other Northbridge Policy project partners has improved significantly, but the inherent structural tensions remain.

Appendix 22: NPP Information sharing

Information sharing and privacy presented special challenges, and raise both ethical and legal considerations for agencies. Yet, like case work, information sharing is an important component of the Northbridge Policy project, and a component that differentiates the project from other night patrols. The importance of information-sharing was illustrated by the example provided by one of the project participants:

A difference between the Northbridge Policy project and other night patrols is the Northbridge project is more than simply picking people up and dropping them off home. The information sharing with other agencies extends its success and outcomes. For example, Education has a small role – not an active operational role – but they get information and they provide information on every kid that should be enrolled in school and that’s passed onthey come through Mission Australia. Mission Australia follows up that info from EDWA [DEWA] in a timely manner. Whether the kid is at school...whether they are enrolled...

This section reports the concerns that prompted the project to review information-sharing processes, their current information-sharing processes and procedures

- information-sharing problems
- procedures established
- information-sharing practices
- benefits of information-sharing

Information-sharing problems

Most interviewees commented that lack of information sharing had previously represented a significant impediment to the functioning of the Northbridge Policy program in the earlier years. According to participants, in the early days of the project some organisations had refused to share information (for a variety of reasons) and this had caused intra-organisational tensions that reduced the ability of each organisation to fulfil its role. This caused tension to escalate, which further reduced enthusiasm for sharing information. Since December 2007, the aim of the project coordinator has been to create a ‘*professional appropriate information sharing collaborative consultative working environment*’.

The changes to the collaborative environment and the Partnership agreement appear to have improved information sharing; however, there was concern that the information sharing was not always reciprocal, particularly with DCP

‘DCP are probably an organisation that it’s really, really difficult to get information out of and I guess that’s because of the sensitivity of the area that they work in. And they share some... information with the other people in the partnership. Certainly, non-government organisations getting information out of DCP ... I mean, it’s hard for us and we’re actually another government organisation. And one would think that we should be saying how can we best help these people. We’re both working with them. Let’s share our information. I

mean, we give them a lot now and even though they say, "Oh, yeah, we've got a memorandum." ... they will give you surface information and ask you if you've got any real information. But it's still that kind of organisation and I think that's a government thing anyway. You know, "My decision is already made. I can't share anything with you."

Data sharing procedures established

Information sharing between agencies is regulated by legislation. It appears, however, that despite a policy framework already being in place for information sharing between government agencies (D. o. Attorney-General, 2003), agencies had apparently been reluctant to share information. It was important to ensure the information management processes adopted by the Northbridge Policy project aligned with the formal Northbridge Policy and were consistent with existing legislation and other government policy. The Office of Crime Prevention suggested the Northbridge Policy project information sharing guidelines were weak and needed to be improved. The reason for their weakness was *'the [WA] government was wanting to put up the Privacy Act and it was hopeful that was going to clarify a lot of the things'* (interviewee). According to a core group member, the national legislation on information sharing for Commonwealth agencies states that *'you can share any information between agencies where it is in the client's best interests. And that means that agencies should be looking for opportunities to share information, not the barriers as to why they can't.'* The only significant barrier to sharing information is the Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA Government, 2012)

Partner agencies (D. o. Attorney-General, 2003) agreed that information should be shared when:

- It was in the child or young person's best interests and
- Sanctioned by legislation, protocols and processes.

The staff of each agency use protocols and standard procedures and professional judgment to restrict information sharing to that which is essential. The agreed information sharing protocols were built on the policy framework already in place for information sharing between government agencies (D. o. Attorney-General, 2003) modified to enable sharing with NGOs (Mission Australia and Nyoongar Patrol). The Act covering information sharing in WA (D. o. Attorney-General, 2003), and the national government information sharing strategy (n.a., 2009) provided a basis for the information-sharing agreement in the *'Partnership Understanding Agreement'* (n.a., 2011). The improvements to information sharing were strongly supported by managers at JAG and Mission Australia and Nyoongar Patrol, especially in relation to those young people who were high priority. A core group member expressed the view that improved information sharing:

'Gives more of a go of keeping those kids safe and doing some positive work for them'.

Information databases

According to participants, each Northbridge Policy project agency maintains a separate database that contains personal information about young people and their families.

Separate databases of personal information about young people and their families are held at least by the following Northbridge Policy partners:

1. DCP main databases – accessed via Crisis Care staff
2. Northbridge Policy coordination database of individual apprehension records - created and accessed by the Coordinator
3. Police databases – accessed by JAG team members
4. Mission Australia database used by the On-Track Staff
5. Mission Australia database used by their case workers (may be the same database as 4)
6. Education Department databases (multiple databases used by the Attendance section, some involving other states through the Tri-Border Attendance Strategy whereby databases are held by the Systems Interoperability Framework (SIF) Association members (includes US, UK and Australia)
7. Public Transport Authority security and ticketing databases
8. Killara and Department of Corrective Services databases
9. Nyoongar Patrol Systems Inc. databases

These databases of personal information are held and shared externally with people in Partner organisations that are not part of the Northbridge Policy project. Access occurs under different security protocols, and with different processes, different external sharing arrangements and differing levels of authorisation. The nine databases contain similar replicated sets of personal information about young people and their families. The databases are maintained separately, even though the DCP Main databases accessed through Crisis Care staff could potentially provide data to all partner agencies, as required for the project. Interviewees indicate that separate databases are maintained because:

- Departments require all staff to maintain agency specific records that contribute to the data set for the whole agency.
- Some of the partner agencies need access to personal information about the young persons and their family situations to be able to provide appropriate services to young persons and their families and would not want to depend on a Crisis Care staff member to provide this.
- Much of the personal information about young people and their family situations is gathered from agencies other than DCP Crisis Care staff. For example, Mission Australia, Outreach workers, Killara, Nyoongar Patrol staff and PTA staff obtain information directly from young persons.
- The Education Department and Killara, PTA and the JAG team access and share information from other sources, and contribute their data back to these sources.

Information-sharing practices

For all young people apprehended in Northbridge, the role of the police is to check the identity of the child or young person and to check whether they are recorded on the police database. The young person is then interviewed by the duty Crisis Care officer who accesses DCP databases from their room in the Northbridge Policy JAG offices. They do this both for (Category 1) child protection issues from the Northbridge Policy and Section 41 of the Children and Community Services Act 2004, and for young people apprehended under Category 2 of the Northbridge Policy where the focal concern is with anti-social and health risk behaviour. The child or young person is then assessed by Mission Australia staff, who ask the child or young person to complete a psycho-social assessment as a condition to entry into the Mission Australia Lounge, and access to food. All information gathered about a young person and their family obtained from all the partners in the Northbridge Policy project is then added to the DCP Crisis Care database. The information on an individual and their family from the DCP database is then redistributed to Northbridge Policy partners according to the information sharing agreement. Mission Australia then pass information about the young person and their family situation to the Education Department through Mission Australia On-Track youth work staff.

Benefits of information-sharing

Crisis Care has the responsibility of making the decision about whether a safe place and a safe person can be identified for each child or young person. Frequently, the necessary information is difficult to find, or the young person is unforthcoming because of intoxication, unwillingness or anger. Sometimes incorrect information is provided deliberately. Sometimes relevant information about a young person and their family circumstances is held by different Northbridge Policy partner organisations, each with part of the story and not all information will be accurate. Crisis Care is responsible for gathering and sifting through this information to make a decision that will provide a safe outcome for the young person.

Mission Australia and Killara found it useful to receive information from DCP, especially when they were going to visit families, because it provided them with information about what the young person was involved with doing on the night when they were offended and this enables an easier discussion with the families.

Appendix 23: NPP Role of Case Work

Case work is an important component of the Northbridge project, because of the central role of case work in prevention of family crisis, and remediation of conditions that predispose young people to harm or criminal activity. Integrated case work is also a distinguishing feature of the rationale for the Northbridge Policy project. As one participant commented, the problems of Northbridge with children and young people can be seen as a *'manifestation of problems in other places'* ... and a failure to *'strengthen families and do all the corrective work that needs to be done'*. Case work is the strategy used in this project to strengthen families, and to do the necessary corrective work.

This section of the report identifies

- Frequent flyers –Children and young people who attend the project
- How case work is allocated
- Family engagement with case work
- frequency
- Numbers of families engaged in intensive case work support

Frequent Flyers

A small percentage of young people who are apprehended are 'frequent flyers'. Frequent flyers are young people who are apprehended multiple times, sometimes because of self-presentation. All partners made a clear distinction between young people who were apprehended only infrequently, once or twice, and the small number of young people whom they saw more frequently. Children and young people come under increased scrutiny when they have been apprehended three times or more, and at this point they will be allocated case work support, led by one of the partner agencies, according to the decision-making hierarchy outlined previously. The number of apprehensions does not capture the total number of contacts between 'frequent fliers' and Northbridge Policy partners because the JAG team, DCP Outreach workers and Nyoongar Patrol report they have contact with this group of young people on the street, but they are not always apprehended; for example, they might be 'diverted' if they agree to take the train home.

'Frequent fliers' are typically the group of young people whom participants considered were in greatest need of case work and other follow-up services.

Many 'frequent fliers' self-present to the Northbridge Policy project JAG offices. They do this for a number of reasons:

- For self-protection (interviewees), for example, if there are family issues or it is becoming too dangerous on the street
- To get access to food and personal support
- To get access to free transport home (GS)
- Using the JAG offices as a safe city youth centre

- To delay getting home till after family members are drunk and asleep.

The DCP data received for this evaluation does not contain sufficient information to exactly calculate the numbers and percentages of 'frequent fliers' or the profile of the numbers of apprehensions per individual. Using numerical approximations from data based on scale-invariant power law analysis we estimate frequent flyers make up around 30% of the apprehensions, and the annual 'average' of formal apprehensions of 'frequent fliers' is 4.3 apprehensions per year but ranges from 2 to 15 apprehensions, and that frequent fliers represent about 175 -230 individuals annually.

Self-presentation

During the interviews, it became apparent that some children and young people are not apprehended but 'self-present' to the project. In the data these young people are recorded as apprehensions. From qualitative data, it is the 'frequent fliers' who have a relationship with project staff who are most likely to 'self-present' to the project. Officially, repeat apprehensions are discouraged; however, one participant stated that some young people re-present, or self present and these occasions offer opportunities to build relationships, and provide support to them and their families, and hence to achieve the intended benefits of the Northbridge Policy project.

'What has happened also over the last few years, a lot of these young people are consistently turning up every weekend and we're the face of, we're the non-government face of the project. We've developed a really, really good relationship with them,

Allocation of case work

Case work decisions are confirmed at the regular Operational meetings held every Monday. Case work and referrals are primarily allocated to three organisations: Killara, DCP and Mission Australia. Other agencies may be contacted to follow-up children and young people; for example, the Department of Education of Western Australia may be asked to follow up the families of children or young people who are not enrolled in school or who have not been attending school. Allocation of referrals is undertaken by the project coordinator. Decisions about which is the most appropriate lead agency depend upon whether any of the agencies have an existing open case with the family, child or young person. In most instances, follow-up referrals are to one of three partner agencies: Mission Australia, DCP and Killara. According to participants, since 2007, DCP has taken a reduced proportion of the referrals of young people from the Northbridge Policy project compared to other agencies. DCP case workers have focussed on a small number of the more serious cases, who are typically members of the 'frequent flier' group.

Decisions are made on the basis of existing records held by DCP and Killara.

- If Crisis Care find DCP files that indicate the child or young person has an open file with DCP (a social worker), the child or young person is referred to DCP and DCP will follow up with family or carers.
- If the child or young person has an open case with Killara or DCS, then Killara will follow up with the young person and their family, and provide short-term support.
- The remaining 45-50% of the referrals are made to Mission Australia, and Mission Australia will provide follow-up support to the child or young person and their family. Mission Australia's case work staff provided longer term support to families of young people that were apprehended (VK).
- In some circumstances, a decision is made that no further follow-up is required; for example, if a child or young person is apprehended once, they have no open files with DCP or Killara, and they are returned home or a parent collects them, (MD, NO and VK).
- A small proportion of children and young people are referred to other agencies (Police, an Emergency Accommodation Service (EAS), or a Supported Assisted Accommodation Program (SAAP) or hospital etc.).

Intensive case work numbers

From interview data we found that Mission Australia receives approximately half of the referrals from apprehensions in the Northbridge Policy project. Many of these referrals are 'frequent fliers', and hence the real number of unique individuals referred for case work by Mission Australia is likely to be less than half the number of referrals from apprehensions. Accurate figures for individuals have not been made available by DCP or Mission Australia. Mission Australia suggests they have around 400-500 referrals per year, which would be expected to comprise less than 300 unique individuals in any one year.

'Frequent fliers' numbers are important when data on apprehensions and case work are interpreted. The data about case work and apprehension capture the number incidents and referrals rather than the number of unique individuals. Multiple apprehensions of 'frequent fliers' mean the number of unique individual young people involved with the Northbridge Policy project in any one year is typically only 55% of the total number of apprehensions. According to participants, the same accounting processes are used when case work numbers are recorded.

Family engagement with case work

Lack of willingness to engage with case work means that intensive case support is accepted and used with only a small proportion of the young people and families of those apprehended and processed through the Northbridge Policy project. Most direct service providers commented on the difficulty of getting families and young people to engage in case work. Case work with Mission Australia is voluntary, and participants from core agencies thought that most families were more willing to engage with Mission Australia

staff than with Police or DCP staff. (NO, VK, SD) In spite of this, Mission Australia regards engagement with young people's families as extremely difficult. Sometimes Mission Australia casework staff will share support of a client. The fact that some families, children and young people are prepared to engage and form relationships with Mission Australia staff is used to the advantage of DCP and is used by both DCP and Mission Australia to fulfil their own aims. At the time of interview, four Mission Australia cases were being case managed jointly with DCP.

There's four of those clients just now at the moment who are deeply DCP involved, but my case managers are going in there and sharing that workload and supporting DCP, and supporting that young people and the family, because the relationship's there. And to make a real change that's what you need to do.

According to participants, DCP workers have case loads of 50-60 and Mission Australia staff have similar numbers. It is not possible to offer intensive support to all, so choices have to be made about how to prioritise cases.

Mission Australia staff are aware it's more efficient to engage with young persons who are really wanting to engage. Even if they are a shared case with DCP, that's where Mission Australia staff will focus because that's where the changes are being made. So yes, everyone's given the minimal support. . . slightly different information packs . . . but when it comes to actually real case management of clients we are looking at the clients who have at least 50% of the way. . . So if a young person's willing to move forward and willing to attend schools and willing to attend appointments, and to become [engaged], 100% of the way, I have no issue with shared case management.

Only a very small proportion of those referred to Mission Australia receive full 'intensive' case management. Mission Australia managers only provide intensive case work support to families and young people who have enthusiasm to engage and to change.

Case work, mandated engagement and trust

Some argued that there are advantages to having a partnership between agencies where one has the power to mandate engagement and the other to offer voluntary engagement. The argument was that families may choose to engage with the voluntary agency, in preference to being forced to engage with DCP. Hence both types of agencies in the service provision partnership may benefit case management, through increased engagement.

The fact that they [Mission Australia] are a non-government agency, a voluntary agency, that's the difference, Even Killara, they can tell you to naff off. . . If push comes to shove with the department [DCP], they can say naff off but they know that the department [DCP] may come back, and the Department makes statutory mandatory kind of power. So one is a kind of 'voluntary' agency' and one is 'mandatory'. That's what they are set up for - to provide that kind of support.

Whilst DCP can mandate families to work with them, the quality of coerced engagement was questioned by participants. Several interviewees drew attention to the problems created for service provision by widely held negative attitudes about DCP. Participants

commented that effective case work and family support depended on both engagement and trust. Trust was difficult to achieve because participants reported that families and young people often did not trust either JAG or DCP. There was better trust of Mission Australia staff, but this depends upon their perceived independence from JAG and DCP.

In a low trust environment, it is difficult to initiate even the minimal engagement required to start building positive relationships, and there are few opportunities within the project for trust-building to occur between Core agency staff and families. In the structure as it was when we evaluated the service, Mission Australia had more opportunities to establish trusting relationships with young people and families, because it offered a more comprehensive range of services, and their relationship with young people and families was perceived to be voluntary. Trust is fragile and there is a very real risk that if Mission Australia were perceived to be too closely integrated with DCP and JAG, young people and families would be less willing to trust them. This has implications for information sharing, and especially the extent to which JAG and DCP act upon information provided to them by Mission Australia.

Appendix 24: NPP Apprehensions by Age, Gender, ATSI status and Suburb

Age of children and young people apprehended under the Northbridge policy

The evaluation focus was outcomes for young people in Northbridge Policy Category 1, which includes children aged 12 years and under, and young people aged 13-15 years (see Figure 14). When we examined the data, we found young people aged 16 and over apprehended in the first four years of the project comprised 25-30% of total apprehensions. From January 2008 onwards, young people aged 16 years and over fell to approximately 5% of the total numbers.




Figure 14: Reductions in numbers of young people 16 years and older, apprehended

The trajectories of the average annual figures for apprehensions in the ages 12 years and under, 13-15 years, and 16-18 years is shown below in Figure 15.




Figure 15: Trends in apprehensions per year (complete years 2004 to 2010)

The above graphs show a slight overall fall in apprehensions, a significant increase over the period in apprehensions of 13-15 year olds, a relatively stable level of numbers of annual

apprehensions of children aged 12 years and under, and a significant fall in apprehensions of 16-17 year olds.

Indigenous status

The numbers of apprehensions across all age groups were disaggregated by Indigenous status for the years 2004 to 2010 in




Figure 16 and this appears to show a transition from 2008 onward away from primarily targeting children and young people with ATSI background.




Figure 16: Children and young people ATSI and non-ATSI all ages by year (2004-2010)

During 2004-2010, Indigenous young people aged 13 to 15 years old were apprehended at a much higher rate than young people with other heritages (Figure 17). Since 2008, the proportion of Indigenous young people apprehended in this age group has declined.

Appendix 24: NPP Apprehensions by Age, Gender, ATSI status and Suburb




Figure 17: 13-15 year olds ATSI and non ATSI apprehensions 2004 to 2010

Apprehensions of the 12 years and under age group comprise predominately Indigenous children (Figure 18).




Figure 18: Children 12 years and under ATSI and non-ATSI apprehensions 2004-2010

Similarly, apprehensions of 16 to 18 year olds comprised predominately individuals of ATSI heritage (Figure 19). Over the period 2004-2010, there has been a reduction of 84% in numbers of Indigenous young people aged 16-17 years apprehended.




Figure 19: young people aged 16-18 years ATSI and non-ATSI 2004-2010

The ratio of apprehensions of children and young people with ATSI heritage to apprehensions of other children and young people has changed over time as shown in Figure 20 below. Overall, the proportion of Indigenous children and young people apprehended in Northbridge reduced from 86% (2004) to 66% (2010) (peaking at 91% in 2007).




Figure 20: Proportion of children and young persons apprehended with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island heritage (2004-2010)

Gender

Initially a much higher proportion of girls and young women were apprehended, see Figure 21.

Appendix 24: NPP Apprehensions by Age, Gender, ATSI status and Suburb




Figure 21: Apprehensions by gender 15 years and under (2004-2010)

This declined over the period 2004 to 2010 from 73% to around 50%, see Figure 22.




Figure 22: Gender ratio of young people apprehended aged 15 years and under (2004-2010)

Suburbs

Children and young people apprehended during the period 2003-2012 came from 347 different home suburbs. A Pareto analysis shows approximately 80% of children and young people come from 21.9% of these 347 suburbs (Figure 23).




Figure 23: Graph of distribution of home suburb of (80%) of children and young people who were apprehended

This distribution of home suburbs for 80% of children and young people who have been apprehended along with the direction of the suburb relative to Perth CBD is shown in the Appendices.

The assumption has often been made that the majority of children and young people come from a few suburbs (especially those in the South East rail corridor or from the suburbs east of Perth on the Midland rail line). This data supports this assumption to some extent. The data, however, shows a diversity of home suburbs in which nineteen of the top twenty suburbs were either along the South East rail line to Armadale (especially Armadale, Gosnells, Forrestfield, Cloverdale, Thornlie, Maddington, Bentley, Kenwick and East Victoria Park), along the rail line east of Perth to Midland, (Beechboro, Bayswater, Rivervale and Lockridge) or in the area North of Perth (especially Girrawheen, Bedford, Balga, Mirrabooka, Koondoola and Clarkson). The apprehensions from the remaining 327 suburbs were distributed relatively evenly through the larger Perth metropolitan area from south of Rockingham to north of Wanneroo.

Appendix 25: NPP 'Frequent Fliers' analysis

Overview

A significant factor in the Northbridge Policy project is the number of young people with multiple presentations. Colloquially, these are known to members of the service provider organisations as 'frequent fliers' (in part because in the earlier days of the project some individuals were taken home several times in the same evening).

The data provided to the research group by DCP is de-identified and does not contain the level of detail to enable accurate graphing of multiple apprehensions of individuals. DCP has, however, released annualised aggregated figures for total individual young persons for years 2004-2010 (n.a., 2012) that can be compared with annual aggregated numbers of apprehensions from the data released to the researchers, see Table 46.

Table 46: Comparison annualised aggregated figures total individual young persons and numbers of apprehensions 2004-2010

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total individual young people	767	671	706	626	590	729	582
Presentations/ apprehensions	1373	1153	1249	1202	1248	1320	982

Two factors relating to 'frequent fliers' potentially assist with better understanding of the functioning of the project:

1. The proportion and number of 'frequent fliers'
2. The average number of apprehensions per 'frequent flier'

From the interviews with service providers, it appears a relatively large proportion of the young persons apprehended in Northbridge are apprehended only once. This is supported by the data: the number of apprehensions is typically less than double the number of individual young persons apprehended.

Evidence from the suburb data suggests the situation is typical of one shaped by factors that result in scale-invariant power law behaviour of outcomes. This latter is in itself supported by the correlation between situations following power law behaviour and situations dependent on high levels of socio-cultural interaction and individual communications – typical of the Northbridge and similar scenarios.

If the situation is characterised by scale-invariant power law behaviour then it is reasonable to apply Pareto principle as a first –level characterisation.

This latter suggests 80% of multiple apprehensions would be from 20% of individuals. The calculations in Table 47 below suggest:

1. 20% (934 individuals) are frequent fliers responsible for 80% of duplicate apprehensions (3085 incidents)
2. This results in an average number of 4.3 apprehensions per frequent flier (3.3 duplicate apprehensions plus the 1 original apprehension)

It is important to bear in mind that if the distribution of apprehensions follows a power law then there will be a distribution of apprehensions per individual. On one end of the graph are a large number of individuals with only one apprehension, and on the other is the small number of individuals with an average of more than 4.3 apprehensions.

Multiple apprehensions is important as it is one of the criteria (originally from Killara) that triggers DCP service provision.

Implications

If the above assumptions are correct or are confirmed by further release of data from DCP, the above numbers (20% (934) responsible for 80% (3085) of incidents at 4.3 incidents each -2004-2010) have several implications for policy and strategic planning of services.

In reality, the numbers could only be significantly different from the above if the proportion and number of 'frequent fliers' was extremely small and thus most of the duplicate apprehensions/presentations was associated with a very small number of individuals. The current (Pareto) assumption involves repeat apprehensions by only 2-3 individuals per week which appears to accord with the interviews. A radically different picture might require assuming (say) only about 5% of apprehensions were repeats. In which case, over the 7 years, this would result in an average repeat apprehensions rate of 17.5 apprehensions for 234 young persons (frequent fliers). This would be somewhat odd as there would be a significant disjoint in the graphed distribution of apprehensions (i.e. it would no longer be a smooth curve as might be expected) in which 4437 young persons had a single apprehension yet the remaining 234 had on average 17.5 apprehensions each. This would also be at odds with the understanding of the presence in Northbridge as part of a social process. Without further information, the Pareto principle appears to offer a more convincing picture of the distribution.

Assuming the Pareto distribution figures are in the right ball court, it has the following implications:

1. Numbers of young people requiring DCP support services as triggered by multiple presentations are relatively small at around 133 per year with an average of 4.3 apprehensions each.
2. Numbers of young people apprehended as being inappropriately in Northbridge (667 per year) are relatively small compared to the overall population of 473,288 young people 0-15 years in WA (ABS, 2011).

3. The majority of young people found inappropriately in Northbridge as defined by the Northbridge Policy (regardless of the distribution model chosen) are convinced to avoid Northbridge after one or at most two apprehensions.
4. In most cases, these individuals will not trigger follow-up casework support. The costs and additional workload are primarily associated with casework and follow on activities.
5. The presence, however, of these young persons (single apprehension) will be displaced elsewhere. Without further data, it is not known exactly where they transfer their activities to and why. This is significant because many of these, though not frequent fliers in Northbridge, may instead be the young persons involved in displacement to Oat St, Burswood, Fremantle, Joondalup etc.

The annual figures for unique individuals provided by DCP may be compromised by time-overlap, particularly for 'frequent fliers', whose involvement with Northbridge may span several years. There may be some duplication of counting. It is possible that some individuals may have been counted multiple times as unique individuals in each of the seven years.

Analysis

Table 47: Frequent Fliers – approximate calculation of average number of trips

Frequent Flier Proportions										
Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010			
Total individual young people	767	671	706	626	590	729	582			
Presentations/ apprehensions	1373	1153	1249	1202	1248	1320	982			
		2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	SUM 04-10	Average
Individuals		767	671	706	626	590	729	582	4671	667
Apprehensions		1373	1153	1249	1202	1248	1320	982	8527	1218
Duplications		606	482	543	576	658	591	400	3856	550
RATIOS		56%	58%	57%	52%	47%	55%	59%	55%	55%
%Frequent fliers	30%	230.1	201.3	211.8	187.8	177	218.7	174.6	1401.3	
Pareto 80:20 calculation										
20% individuals									934.2	
80% excess apprehensions (0.8*total duplicates)									3084.8	
Average apprehensions/ frequent flier									4.3	

Appendix 26: NPP Stakeholders Perceptions of Achievements

This section presents partners' and stakeholders' perceptions of the achievements of the project, as distinct from the project outcomes, which are reported in a later section.

Crisis child protection service in Northbridge

Partners and Core group members believed that the project was making a real difference to some children and young people, and responded effectively to some children and young people who might not voluntarily engage with support services in Northbridge. From a child protection perspective, the benefits are summarised in the following quotation from one of the participants

'These kids aren't safe in Northbridge irrespective of how it may affect the rest of the community. We've seen many individuals [young people] and the experiences they have been through. So there is a value and a benefit as much as some kids mightn't admit it even – and [even in spite of] the things that they call JAG!'

The establishment of a night-time crisis child protection service in Northbridge, on three nights per week, is a significant project achievement.

Leadership of the Northbridge Policy Project

The Core group and Partner organisations agreed that cooperation, collaboration, morale, and information sharing between agencies involved in the Northbridge Policy project had improved since 2008, and was now good. They believed that the positive changes had occurred because of formal agreements, consultation arrangements and changes to the project culture, and because of the leadership and openness of the project coordinator, who managed the project between 2008 and February 2012. The current success in interagency interaction and functioning had required effort and time to nurture, and it was recognised that there would be an ongoing need

'To be really vigilant to maintain collaborative information sharing, motivating people and ensuring they feel they are doing a good job and they are using their ideas and they become open to that as well. It doesn't have to be perfect – we're human beings after all.'

This is a significant achievement, because, as previously discussed, an important purpose of the Northbridge Policy was to improve collaboration between key agencies (DCP, JAG, and Mission Australia, Killara, PTA, Nyoongar Patrol, Education Department....) especially when families with complex needs engaged with multiple agencies.

Appendix 27: NPP Stakeholders Perceptions of Difficulties

Bridging two worlds

The Nyoongar Patrol reported that they often faced criticism from both Indigenous people and businesses in Northbridge. This has occurred because there is a significant difference between the aims and priorities of the Nyoongar Patrol and the Northbridge Policy project, although there are some shared interests. The central focus and mission of the Nyoongar Patrol is to provide support for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to improve their lives. The Nyoongar Patrol plays an important role in bridging between Aboriginal agencies and interests and government agencies and policies and other public interests. Their role is to support Indigenous people and to divert people away from the Criminal Justice System (CJS). This role was strongly supported by Police and government, but not always understood by others.

Interviewees reported the current Northbridge Policy project relies frequently on the depth of information and relationships of the Nyoongar Patrol and its officers. In addition to the 'official' operational meeting of Northbridge Policy partners, there is a weekly meeting at the Nyoongar Patrol office that representatives of the Northbridge Policy project partners attend to gain in-depth information and advice. This Nyoongar Patrol meeting offers Northbridge Policy partners essential operational insights otherwise not available to them. The Nyoongar Patrol supports the Northbridge Policy, and there are mutual benefits from their involvement. At the same time it is important to acknowledge that their involvement may sometimes place them in a difficult situation if the Northbridge Policy appears to be in tension with the mission of the Nyoongar Patrol.

Monitoring and evaluation

The project coordinator believed that he needed better support to monitor and analyse project outcomes and make adjustments, where required. At the time of the evaluation, he collated data from staff in Police, JAG, Crisis Care, Mission Australia, and Nyoongar Patrol and recorded this in an Excel spread-sheet. He did not believe this provided a 'flexible enough tool' for analysis. [Notwithstanding this observation, another participant observed that there had been improvements to collaboration that ensured data was collected and recorded consistently. Recorded data were used in meetings and this helped reduce unnecessary differences in opinions.]

[The coordinator] also began to use the recorded data to guide the day to day operations of the project in terms of encouraging or discouraging effort to be committed to apprehensions, referrals and follow up in line with the available capacity of partner organisations at any time]

Computer access

Slow computer and unreliable computer access caused workflow problems for DCP staff. Northbridge Policy project DCP staff had secure access to the DCP database through Citrix thin client software. Access was reported to be slow and unreliable in comparison to direct database access, which the DCP staff gained after the project moved to temporary accommodation in the DCP offices at Stirling Street. A reason for using Citrix rather than a VPN is its higher speed, and should be easy to rectify. Improved speed of access would significantly reduce records management times, and the time taken to process children and young people.

Misunderstanding of the project

Some participants were concerned that public perception and media comment on the Northbridge Policy suggested the policy is racist and anti-youth; and that the project limits young people's rights and primarily targeted Aboriginal young people. Core group services providers, however, believe that these perceptions are unwarranted and the primary purpose of the project to keep young people safe.

'I think once you read the policy and understand it's actually to keep children safe and that they're apprehended for their safety and not apprehended to be charged with anything, I think all the, either cultural or moral or whatever you want to call it, reasons why it's terrible to do that to young people are trying to negate that. When you're actually working frontline and you actually see that young girls and young boys are coming in and they're being victims ... they have been assaulted or they're sexually, they're completely intoxicated. . . And on average it's about 20 to 25 young people every weekend who are coming in those states, you know? So if we can apprehend them and bring them in and keep them safe and get them home somewhere safe'.

These participants believed that better public information and more positive media presentation would result in a more supportive public attitude towards the project.

Appendix 28: NPP Stakeholders Perceptions of Effectiveness and Outcomes

The intention at the start of this evaluation was to identify and present perceptions of the effectiveness of the project and its outcomes from the perspectives of three different groups who have a stake in the effectiveness and outcomes of the project:

- **Core Group and Partners:** Those directly involved in the Northbridge Policy project
- **Other stakeholders:** Other organisations with an interest in the outcomes of the project who are not directly involved in its delivery
- **Affected children and their families:** Young people, children and their families who have been supported by the project

So far, we have not been able to interview any families or young people who have been supported by the project, because we have not been provided with the necessary contact details or support to enable us to interview them. The ALSWA did not have the resources to be interviewed; the AJF member from the A-GD in WA did not feel they know enough about the project and declined to be interviewed. The City of Perth did not respond to requests for an interview despite multiple attempts. We do not have any data about the numbers of young people who choose to take transport home or who are provided with transport home on the advice of outreach support workers, as an alternative to apprehension, because as far as we are aware, no records are available. We have information about numbers who attend diversionary programs in Midland and Armadale.

In the discussion that follows we first present the claims about positive outcomes and any differences of opinion, or dissenting voices from within the group.

Partners and Core Group Perceptions of Outcomes

There are several categories of outcome from the project, including diversion, crisis intervention, and preventative support for families, and other outcomes.

Diversion: We have very little data on the outcomes from the diversion activities of the project because as far as we are aware, no records are kept about young people who are diverted by the outreach team, or by the Nyoongar Patrol. However, diversion without apprehension was considered to be a useful outcome for some young people

'young people are there, picked up and taken to safety, it's getting them off the street . . . having people accessible on the street to identify young people who might be at risk and actually talking to them and moving them along or even assisting them has got to be a good thing' [JS]

However, one tangible outcome of the project is that DCP Outreach workers, PTA staff and Security officers, Mission Australia staff, and youth workers working for agencies outside the Northbridge Policy project (e.g. PICYS staff, Anglicare Step 1 staff) were authorised to provide young people with a time and date stamped one-journey rail/bus pass to enable

them to get home, without the additional risk of a fine for fare evasion. In addition, some children and young people attend diversionary programs in Midland and Armadale funded by the Department of Sport and Recreation (Midnight Basketball etc.). These projects are linked to the Northbridge Policy project.

Crisis intervention: Crisis intervention has already been discussed in detail in earlier parts of this chapter. Many of the Core group and Partner agencies discussed the child protection crisis intervention role of the project, and all felt that this aspect of the work had achieved some good outcomes. A common theme that was expressed was that the project protected children and young people from harm. One participant expressed this as:

‘Ensuring the kids who come into the Northbridge precinct unsupervised – we are providing an option of safety for those kids to keep them from harm.’

.Another Partner considered that the more active role of DCP and the availability of DCP staff on the night meant that children and young people were more likely to receive help from DCP.

‘The thing that actually made the difference was actually DCP, or Crisis Care out there, part of DCP, actually had been there on the evening and actually having to see the kids. Because guess what, now they’ve actually physically seen their kids they can’t go around and say, “They don’t need our help.” So that made a huge difference’

Despite these positive perceptions, others within the Partnership were more ambivalent about outcomes. For example, one Partner indicated that despite the apprehension efforts of the team, young people were still present in Northbridge late at night.

‘There are still kids hanging around after the last train at 4am in the morning’

Others suggested that Northbridge might be a safer option than some of the other places that young people might be and that the reduction of young people from Northbridge may have resulted in displacement to a less well managed situation with greater adverse effects on young people and their families.

Northbridge has public surveillance that makes it safer than some of the environments [MD]

Preventative work with families: Preventative work with families has already been discussed in some detail in earlier parts of this chapter. Partner agencies considered that some young people, children and their families had benefited from the preventative work with families. One participant stated of the project

‘It has been beneficial to individual young people in terms of improving the envelope of family safety and family support.’

Service providers like the Police reported that the project gave them confidence that required support would be provided to children and young people they apprehended who had experienced traumatic events.

'It's a case of, it's not just looking at the end of our involvement once we've picked a child up, we then give them access to the right resourcing in relation to DCP to do the, the ground work post referral and then you're looking at all the social aspects in relation to the family, so that has a positive impact which is very difficult to measure'.

Others expressed more doubts about the efficacy of the preventative work with families undertaken by the project:

'The main limitations and weaknesses are that it's just scratching the surface . . . negatives outcomes are ... kids that are there probably week after week. It's not an agent for change, or it doesn't appear to be. '

Other preventative outcomes: School attendance is a protective factor that reduces the likelihood of early entry into the juvenile Justice system. The Education Department Attendance Unit reported that they found the information they received from the Northbridge Policy very useful.

'Is very useful in our attempts to track kids when they're identified by a school as a child that's at risk. And it's a good source of data about perhaps where transient kids are or kids that aren't attending may emerge in the data that's provided to us to that project. We may be able to identify particular kids and track them down for the school.'

The benefits to the Education Department of the information from the Northbridge Policy project have been experienced mostly in relation to metropolitan schools, but the data is also supplied to the Tri-Border Attendance Strategy (part of the 'Better Attendance Brighter Future attendance strategy'). This Commonwealth funded (DEEWR) project across the Western Desert areas of WA, SA and NT maintains a database of personal information about children and young people 'shared between the three jurisdictions and the schools . . . designed to track transients but it also holds a whole range of other information about our individual kids in terms of their learning and achievement'. The aim of the database is to provide a central resource to keep track of transient children and young people who move between the three jurisdictions. The focus of the DEWA Attendance Unit is

'to address the issue of non-attending, at-risk youth and trying to promote quick responses that keep our kids safe because our primary concern is about getting kids to school and keeping kids in school.'

This strategy contributes to the Education Department strategy to 'Close the Gap' between the school attendance rates of Indigenous and non-Indigenous children and young people.

'The Education Department expects a high correlation between the 'frequent fliers' and what they call 'at-risk, non-attendance students'. Their interest is in understanding 'where are these kids' Are they predominantly in a metropolitan area? Are they indigenous or non-indigenous? Is it a pattern that's across all kids or is it just particular communities?'

Crime prevention: The Police reported that through their apprehension of children and young people they gained information about more serious perpetrators of crimes that may put other children and young people at risk.

'I think it has been successful and in addition to that, you'd be surprised at the amount of information and knowledge which comes from some of the street children as well when we speak to them. . . not just crime related for stealings (sic) and assaults, but you'd be surprised in relation to sexual predators. There've been a few occasions where you're looking at something like child prostitution. If, you know, you gain information from that, you're getting the children into contact with the right health services and obviously DCP in relation to how they're being protected.'

Reduced nuisance behaviour: Partner agencies expressed the opinion that the Northbridge Policy project had reduced anti-social behaviour and nuisance behaviour in Northbridge.

'It has cleaned up a lot of anti-social behaviour and my belief is that that is where a lot of the trust in it being set up came from.'

Improvement of tourist potential of Northbridge: Displacement moves the problem to other jurisdictions.

'The Northbridge Policy project has improved the image of Perth for visitors to its evening entertainment precinct. There are still issues around the lock out arrangements and on streets late at night. Northbridge has quietened up a bit. '

A similar view was expressed by another Partner who agreed but felt that the project had only achieved part of its goals.

'I think the project's successful for what it is, but I don't think it's gone far enough. It's a surface thing and I mean the cynical part of me might say it's about moving the young people out of what used to be a major tourist precinct.'

Other Stakeholder Perceptions of Outcomes

Other Stakeholders expressed a variety of views about the outcomes of the project. Almost all interviewees commented the reduced numbers of young people in Northbridge had benefitted traders and commercial organisations operating in or out of Northbridge. Youth agencies commented that there was no interaction between the Northbridge Policy project and themselves; even though they were operating in overlapping areas, their roles and functions were distinct. Youth agencies believed that the Northbridge Project performed a crisis child protection role for young people under 16 years old, for which there was a need. They did not believe that the project had anything to offer young people aged 16 years or older, who had different needs, especially for emergency accommodation. Youth agencies felt that there was a need for emergency accommodation and for intermediate transitional accommodation, which was not addressed through the Northbridge project. These comments align with those of J. Murray QC in his annual report of the Supervised Release Review Board 2011/2012 (Murray, 2012) where he noted that DCP and Crisis Care had a shortfall of accommodation and this meant that potentially young people were being released without support and accommodation.

'Appropriate, supported public accommodation is often not available without a long waiting list. The Department for Child Protection seems to face substantial demands for accommodation of this type. . . . Sometimes the result is that a child cannot be released

from detention because there is literally nowhere for him/her to go, except to accommodation which exposes him/her to danger'

Youth agencies working with young people in Perth City centre note that the problem is even greater in finding sufficient transitional long-term accommodation for young people.

The Northbridge Business group was originally formed around 2000 to 'enliven an area that was becoming decayed' [IM]. From the businesses' point of view, the Northbridge policy project was implemented 'because of problems that occurred with youth coming to the district at night, who were under the age of 16 and they were unaccompanied . . . they basically roamed the streets . . . caused a little bit of distress for patrons of businesses and . . . were a little bit of a nuisance and with no direction on where to go and what to do.'

Business representatives reported there had been significant outcomes and changes since the inception of the Northbridge Policy.

'Since 2003 the district has come alive. It's starting to go through a rebirth and regeneration. The problems are not as great as what they were and I feel that the actual situation of today is where the foundations have been laid for a better Northbridge. And you can, I don't know if you've ever been there yourself, by walking around Northbridge whether it be day or evening, but there is strong evidence that there is a rebirth coming in the area.'

Family and Young People's Perceptions of Outcomes

Despite repeated requests to partner organisations and stakeholder organisations, no families were referred to us for interview.

Appendix 29: NPP Stakeholders Perceptions of Limitations of NPP

During interviews we asked participants to discuss what they felt were the limitations of the project. Limitations are inherent in the design of the project and the model of implementation, rather than temporary problems that may be overcome. Three different limitations were mentioned. These were:

- Displacement
- Constraints within the operational model
- Weak links with non-partner organisations

Each will now be presented.

Evidence for Displacement

In the tender brief for this project we were asked to investigate evidence for whether the Northbridge Policy had led to displacement of children and young people from Northbridge to other areas. In the early years of the Northbridge Policy, it was assumed that very little displacement had occurred, and the previous evaluations of the Northbridge Policy project were not asked to investigate displacement (Refs), although the 2006 evaluation commented that some young people were now going to the Perth CBD, which is just outside the boundaries of the Northbridge project (ref). In this evaluation, we asked participants whether they thought displacement had occurred and to discuss the reasons for their judgement.

The Partners and Stakeholders most likely to identify displacement were those whose organisations operated in public spaces, in other areas in addition to Northbridge. These organisations included Police, PTA and Nyoongar Patrol. These three agencies were able to identify the displacement patterns and locations in some detail, were able to describe how displacement had changed over time, and all three organisations were able to identify individual young people, either formally or informally. Their accounts were consistent and all were certain that displacement had occurred. One participant commented:

‘One of the oldest Policeman’s tools in his toolbox was always, if you can’t solve crime you’ll displace it somewhere else. And I think that’s also evident now...’

‘One of the big limitations I see, essentially it’s the Northbridge project which has just moved the problem elsewhere.’

The Nyoongar Patrol believed that displacement from Northbridge had occurred as a result of the Northbridge policy, and that different groups transferred to different locations. Initially, displacement from Northbridge increased activity along Armadale rail line locations south east of the city and in Fremantle. On the Armadale line, this occurred initially around Kelmscott and Gosnells. Simultaneously, some groups went to Fremantle instead. The train from Midland passes through Perth station, so young people from Midland could travel

straight through Perth to Fremantle, and young people from Armadale could change trains at Mclver or Claisebrook to avoid apprehension at Perth main station. More recently, there has been reported displacement of young people from Northbridge to the rail stations on the Armadale line, especially to Oats Street station. Displacement to Claisebrook and Mclver stations in East Perth, immediately east of Northbridge, has also been reported.

‘Young people who used to go to Northbridge via the Perth railway station now get off at Mclver and Claisebrook stations and now the security situation there has become difficult. It has resulted in a recent safety audit and additional security lighting’

Most recently very large numbers of young people have begun to gather in the Burswood area close to the Burswood casino.

‘The success we are having is also to the detriment of other Police districts within our organization, like Burswood. And I’m aware of that, some of the train lines which go out to Armadale now have issues and problems with the children. And also looking down at Fremantle and things like that, I think some of the issues may have been displaced down there.’

Burswood

Burswood was the location where most participants believed children and young people now congregated. Burswood is located on the Armadale/Thornlie rail line about 10 minutes ride from central Perth. The station is old and isolated from residential housing. The station is adjacent to the Casino car park and waste ground known as ‘Hamburger Hill’. The area is not well-maintained or well-lit.

‘There has been a move from Perth to Burswood.(1) ... Well you have the Burswood train station at Hamburger Hill and the Armadale line runs down to...(2)’

‘The main problem outcome of the Northbridge Policy project has been the displacement to Burswood and surroundings with easy train access, extensive open spaces and poor lighting in the areas outside the station with poor CPTED, footpaths, trees, dark places....’

Burswood was attractive as an alternative venue for a number of reasons, partly because there is little surveillance, and partly because there are some facilities close at hand.

‘It’s attractive because there is land out there with 24 hour shop, park across the road, the Burswood precinct where they may have relatives at the casino. For criminal types there are opportunities with cars, people round the car parks etc. ’

Partners and Core group members believed that one of the reasons children and young people had stopped coming to Northbridge and now came to Burswood was to avoid being apprehended by the JAG team.

‘I think there always has been to varying degrees proposed any number circumstances individually and combined why people aren’t coming in here [Northbridge] anymore. A bit of it is that they have found somewhere else to go where they are not going to get hassled by JAG.’

'The reason is 'generational'. Young people who were in Northbridge in 2005 now have had children and they advise them not to go to Northbridge because they will be harassed by the Police. Instead young people have started to go to Burswood.'

Very large numbers of young people regularly gathered on the station, in the area round about. Trouble usually occurred between groups of young people, and involved fighting and family feuding rather than theft. Transit Officers normally operate in pairs, and had had to develop strategies to attempt to manage large groups of potentially violent young people without provoking further violence.

'Currently, the Burswood station is a 'powder keg' hardly under control with 50 to 200 young people at any one time in a situation that could easily evolve into a riot at any time. On the station, transit officers cannot afford to arrest anyone because they cannot afford the resources that would be needed. Instead they have a strategy to manage people in groups..... Lots of staff off on workers compensation through damage '

'With the railway at Burswood, the problem isn't robberies it's the antisocial behaviour, and that is mostly family feuding and fighting. This has moved on from Northbridge. PTA has security footage of this that they have released to other agencies (including Nyoongar Patrol). '

According to participants, displacement of young people to Burswood has drawn young people away not only from Northbridge but also from other areas where previously young people had gathered.

'These problems have also moved to Burswood from other areas in the SE corridor. This is reflected for example in the changes in quarterly incident statistics (to April 2012) in which Kelmscott has fallen by 50% compared to the previous year [numbers provided] and Burswood has more than doubled [numbers provided], increasing by approximately the same number of incidents '

There was no discussion about the movements of young people from the suburbs north of the city, even though they appear as a significant percentage of the records of apprehensions in Northbridge. It is possible they used public transport to travel to locations to the south of the city, but we do not have any information about this.

This displacement has prompted additional Police projects and the redirection of the outsourced Northbridge Policy project to additionally undertake similar work in and around Burswood.

Constraints within the Operational model

The interviews provided several examples of where constraints within the operational model, rather than numbers of children and young people in Northbridge, determined numbers of children and young people who are apprehended. The numbers of children and young people apprehended critically depend upon whether the JAG team are operating at full complement, how they interpret the Northbridge Policy, and transportation time when young people are apprehended.

Apprehension numbers are directly influenced by the availability of the full contingent of JAG officers. To understand why, it is necessary to understand the role and operational requirements of the JAG officers, both as police officers in the WA Police, and their operational practices within the Northbridge Policy project. The JAG team comprises four WA Police Officers who are deployed to the JAG team. Two officers must remain in the JAG premises if any children or young people are present, and two officers patrol the streets to apprehend children and young people. Police operate in pairs, and if one officer is absent for any reason, the police are not able to patrol. As WA Police officers, JAG team members can be drafted to other duties, at short notice, if a senior officer determines there are other more pressing operational policing needs. According to participants, the work of the JAG officers is viewed by the WA Police as secondary to some other policing tasks. Absence of JAG officers may occur either because they have been drafted to other duties or because of sickness, leave or a vacancy in the team.

When police are not able to patrol, the whole service becomes very limited in its capacity to operate. The JAG team have a central role in the Northbridge Policy project process, because only the police apprehend children and young people. Other Northbridge Policy core group agencies do not apprehend children or young people (although some DCP staff have the authority to apprehend) and so the JAG role is pivotal to the operation of the project. Other police officers can bring young people to the project, but are less likely to do so than the specialist JAG officers, because they have other functions. The Mission Australia staff and Crisis Care duty staff rely upon JAG to apprehend young people. The Outreach Support Workers are able to operate on the street, when the JAG team are not able to patrol, but cannot call upon JAG to apprehend young people. Children and young people who 'self-present' voluntarily bypass a potential bottleneck in the apprehension process because they do not depend upon police transport. When they arrive at the premises, these young people are then apprehended by JAG officers who have remained on site. Unavailability of JAG officers was reported as a cause of interagency tensions, and is likely to substantially reduce apprehension.

How JAG officers interpret their role and whether they choose to divert or to apprehend children and young people, also strongly influences the numbers of young people who are apprehended. For example, Mission Australia commented that one particular JAG operational manager was 'highly enthusiastic' and encouraged her team in ways that resulted in much higher numbers of apprehensions than occurred either before and after her time at JAG. Her deployment 'either side' of 2009 (we presume this means from late 2008 to early 2010) coincides with a recorded rise in apprehensions and is apparent in the data graphs.

In the second half of 2011, the location of the JAG offices was moved from its central location on Perth Railway station to its distant temporary accommodation in the DCP offices on Stirling St. When the project moved to these temporary premises, the JAG team commented that there were delays due to increased transport and handover time. This

resulted in a significant reduction in the number of young people that could be apprehended and processed in any one evening. Data for this period shows a steep decrease in apprehensions immediately after the re-location, although apprehensions later increased as other strategies were adopted.

These examples indicate that operational factors, and especially the availability and judgements of the JAG officer, have a strong relationship to numbers of children and young people apprehended in Northbridge.

The capacity of other services to process young people also has the potential to influence apprehensions, independently of the numbers of children and young people on the streets. When Police apprehend young people, they expect DCP and other government agencies to have the capacity to process as many as are apprehended. In the past, this has also led to tensions between agencies concerning exactly how many young people can be processed at one time (NO). According to interviewees, the Mission Australia lounge can comfortably accommodate up to 12 young people. There was no indication from the interviews of an adverse effect of lack of capacity of other agencies to process children and young people. From the interviews, it was stated that case management resources were limited, especially for intensive support. Mission Australia explained how they allocate priority. It is not clear whether resource limitation for case work at DCP influenced DCP case work with families, but it is acknowledged that limitation of service capacity may affect referral independently of need.

In summary, we conclude that in some circumstances operational processes rather than the numbers of children and young people eligible for apprehension determine numbers of children and young people who are apprehended.

Weak links with Stakeholder who are not partners

Interviews with Stakeholders who were not Partners of the Northbridge Policy project indicated that there were few links between the Northbridge Policy project and other non-Partner organisations, even when these might be expected. In one instance in the case of the Department of Sport and Recreation diversion program, the organisation considered it was a partner, but was not recognised as such. In some ways the lack of links is not surprising, because of the difficulty of establishing collaborative relationships between the existing partner agencies. Links may be easier to develop now collaboration has been established between the Partners.

The Nyoongar Patrol is the only Indigenous organisation that is a project Partner and appears to be the only Indigenous organisation with which the project has active links. There did not seem to be active links between the Northbridge Policy project and any Indigenous family support organisations, or Indigenous youth organisations. This is a limitation for a group of organisations that work predominantly with Indigenous young people and families, especially because preventative family support is such a high priority.

Most organisations we approached agreed to be interviewed either in person or by phone. Of the three organisations with which we did not manage to arrange an interview, two were Indigenous organisations. We did not get a sense that the Northbridge Policy was well-linked to either Indigenous organisations or Indigenous families.

Youth agencies in Northbridge and the inner city area work with some of the most vulnerable young people aged 16 years and older. They have developed strong voluntary relationships with these young people, many of whom avoid the Police and DCP and some of whom are already parents or will soon become parents. These youth agencies are working to break cycles of inter-generational disadvantage, to help young people overcome difficult life circumstances and lack of support, to support their physical and mental health and well-being, to reintegrate young people into education where appropriate, and to strengthen young people's parenting skills. These goals are achieved through voluntary relationships and are similar to the objectives of the preventative family support programs. The absence of informal contact represents a potential limitation for the Northbridge Policy project in the long-term.

Media representation

Some Core group members were concerned about public perception and media comment on the Northbridge Policy that suggested the policy is racist and anti-youth; that the project limits young people's rights, and primarily targeted Aboriginal young people. One Core group service provider expressed the view that these perceptions are unwarranted because the primary purpose of the project is to keep young people safe. It is unclear whether this was a current concern or a concern about media publicity at the time of the project's inception. No other interviewees raised concerns about media representation of the project.

Appendix 30: NPP Roles and Tasks

The lists of roles and tasks of individuals and agencies below who were delivering the Northbridge Policy Project were distilled from a combination of: the Northbridge Policy project descriptions in the OCP documents (Office of Crime Prevention, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c); the Northbridge Policy project Partnership of Understanding Agreement Operational Procedures and Practices (n.a., 2011); job vacancy advertisements for posts on the Northbridge Policy project; descriptions of the Northbridge Policy project on the DCP website; interviews with Northbridge Policy project partners and stakeholders; and notes taken at Senior Management meetings.

DCP Coordinator

The DCP Northbridge Policy program Coordinator has seven aspects to their role in the Northbridge Policy program:

1. Liaise with and coordinate the activities of the Northbridge Policy service providers and partner agencies
2. Employ and manage the DCP Outreach Support worker team
3. Act as a DCP officer authorised by the Minister
4. Collate the weekly and annual statistics for the Northbridge Policy project
5. Act as an intermediary with DCP
6. Develop performance reports for the Northbridge Policy
7. Arrange and participate in joint training with Northbridge Policy team service providers and partners.
8. Arrange and chair meetings with the Northbridge Policy team members and the Senior Management group

DCP Outreach Support Worker team

The DCP Outreach Support Worker team are employed under conditions PSGA 2002 of the Western Australian Public Service. The job description is detailed in the DCP Outreach Support Worker Form. Their duties are listed as:

1. As a member of a team provide group and individual care and information to young people at risk.
2. Documents observations on young people and their families according to specified protocols.
3. Works with police and Crisis Care Workers to eliminate confrontation in regards to anti-social behaviours and supports services on a “needs” basis.
4. Participates in activities with young people to promote positive growth and development.
5. Provides life skills and role model appropriate behaviours for young people.

6. Links with surrounding Youth Services and liaises with departmental, government and non-government agencies and family members.
7. Encourages an increase in the level of positive interaction between young people and other key agencies including local business.
8. Performs administrative duties including data entry and provides written and/or verbal reports as required.
9. Participate in training, performance management and staff development programs.
10. To work outside of normal hours as required.
11. Performs other duties as directed.

DCP Crisis Care staff

DCP Crisis Care staff have thirteen aspects to their role in the Northbridge Policy program:

1. Assess children and young people who have been apprehended or who self present at the JAG offices and who have been processed by the JAG team.
2. Identify suitable safe place and safe persons for each child or young person to return to.
3. Arrange accommodation if necessary.
4. Contact parents
5. Make transport arrangements
6. Liaise with staff in Mission Australia lounge for holding young person awaiting transport
7. Provide information to and receive information from other service providers and partners in the Northbridge Policy team
8. Identify a follow-up agency
9. Act as one of the follow-up agencies
10. Arrange case support or other forms of support to children and young people and their families as appropriate
11. Provide case support or other forms of support to children and young people and their families as appropriate
12. Collaborate with, conduct joint training with, and jointly operate with other Northbridge Policy team partners.
13. Participate in meetings with other members of the Northbridge Policy program team

JAG team members

The JAG team members have eight aspects to their role in the Northbridge Policy program:

1. Apprehend young people in Northbridge of Categories 1 and 2 of the Northbridge Policy and transport them to the JAG offices.
2. Process at the JAG office those young people they have apprehended plus young people who have been persuaded to 'walk in' to the JAG office (e.g. by DCP Outreach workers) or who 'self present' to the JAG offices. The JAG team process involves

confirming the young person's identity and checking the police records for information about them.

3. Provide information to and receive information from other service providers and partners in the Northbridge Policy team.
4. Provide limited transport to deliver young people to a safe place and safe people when no other option is available.
5. Collaborate with, conduct joint training with, and jointly operate with other Northbridge Policy team partners.
6. Arrest and follow normal police procedures for young people (and others) found or suspected of committing a crime.
7. Participate in meetings with other members of the Northbridge Policy program team.
8. Be available to provide support to other police activities (e.g. incidents) when called upon.

Mission Australia staff

Mission Australia staff have both an onsite role managing the Jag Office 'lounge' (which provides comfortable surroundings, with food and games) and providing youth support services at the JAG offices and an off-site role providing supplementary Christian case support services. The Mission Australia staff have 11 aspects to their role in the Northbridge Policy program.

1. Manage the 'lounge' at the JAG offices providing food and care for children and young people who have been apprehended waiting for transport who have agreed to complete (and completed) Mission Australia's Personal Psychological Assessment forms. This latter is a condition of entry to the Mission Australia lounge. Children and Young people who refuse to complete Mission Australia's Personal Psychological Assessment forms have to stay in the outer section in the police holding area
2. Provide Youth Work personal support services to children and young people in the JAG Lounge
3. Provide Youth Work services to children and young people elsewhere in the Northbridge Policy program process
4. Use personal contact with individual children and young people to gather information about the young person and their circumstances that the young person has not provided to the JAG team or the DCP Crisis Care assessors, and communicate that to the JAG officers and DCP Crisis Care team.
5. Provide limited transport to deliver young people to a safe place and safe people when no other option is available.
6. Act as a follow-up agency
7. Keep records at Mission Australia independently of DCP of the details of individual children and young people and their personal circumstances.

8. Review information about children and young people who have come through the Northbridge Policy process and, in collaboration with DCP Crisis Care staff, decide on families to offer Mission Australia case support services.
9. Collaborate with, conduct joint training with, and jointly operate with other Northbridge Policy team partners.
10. Participate in meetings with other members of the Northbridge Policy program team.
11. Provide Mission Australia case support services to families of children and young people processed through the Northbridge Policy program that have accepted Mission Australia's offers of support. Sometimes, these Mission Australia case support services are provided in collaboration with case support provided by DCP staff. These latter services are provided from Mission Australia offices.

Appendix 31: NPP Home suburb of children & young people apprehended 2003-11

Table 48: 20% of suburbs with highest Northbridge Policy project apprehensions 2004-2010

Suburb	Apprehensions 2003-12	Area
Girrawheen	358	N
Bedford	311	N
Armadale	283	SE
Gosnells	241	SE
Balga	220	N
Forrestfield	206	SE
Cloverdale	203	SE
Beechboro	196	E
Thornlie	190	SE
Mirrabooka	183	N
Maddington	180	SE
Bayswater	176	E
Rivervale	176	SE
Bentley	173	SE
Hamilton Hill	172	SW
Lockridge	170	E
Kenwick	169	SE
East Vic Park	159	SE
Koondoola	150	N
Clarkson	148	N
Beckenham	141	E
Nollamara	141	N
Midvale	140	E
Belmont	134	E
Como	130	SW
Yangebup	129	SW
Midland	124	E
Kelmscott	119	SE
Ashfield	110	E
Scarborough	109	N
Camillo	106	SW
Doubleview	98	N
Redcliffe	98	E
Kensington	93	City
Innaloo	91	N
Swan View	89	E
St James	87	City
Quinns Rocks	83	N

Appendix 31: NPP Home suburb of children & young people apprehended 2003-11

Brookdale	82	SE
Carlisle	82	SE
Bassendean	81	E
Willagee	80	SW
High Wycombe	79	E
Huntingdale	78	SE
Middle Swan	74	E
Morley	69	N
Ballajura	62	N
Eden Hill	62	E
Stratton	62	E
Hilton	60	SW
Queens Park	58	SE
Ellenbrook	57	N
Embleton	57	N
Langford	57	SE
Wanneroo	57	N
South Lake	51	SW
Marangaroo	50	N
Merriwa	50	N
Cullacabardee	49	N
Manning	49	SE
Waikiki	49	SW
South Perth	47	City
Victoria Park	47	SE
Wilson	47	E
Padbury	46	N
Maylands	45	SE
Lynwood	44	SE
Cottesloe	43	W
Beldon	42	N
Bellevue	41	E
Cannington	41	SE
Spearwood	41	SW
Caversham	40	E
Highgate	40	City
Beaconsfield	37	SW
Beeliar	37	SW

Appendix 32: NPP Referral to Appropriate Services

This section of the report relates to the brief to evaluate

‘The extent to which representatives of service providers and partner agencies believe the policy has resulted in children at risk being protected and appropriate support services being provided to the children at risk and to their families?’

Referral to appropriate services has two elements, immediate (or crisis) referral and long-term (or preventative) referral. In this section we analysed data on both the immediate actions taken on the night of apprehension, and data about referral to preventative services.

Immediate Actions on the night of Apprehension

Each record in the DCP data on the Northbridge Policy project contains a field (labelled ‘Outcomes’) that records what actions were taken on the night of apprehension; for example, whether the child or young person was transported home, sent to hospital, or remanded in juvenile detention. The figures presented here have been extracted from the nightly records for 2004 to 2010. They are for young people apprehended in Category 1 and Category 2. They do not include the figures for young people processed by the Police through the criminal justice system rather than the Northbridge Policy. For example, if a young person was apprehended in Northbridge without a responsible adult, and was found to be carrying stolen goods or drugs, they would be apprehended by Police and managed under conventional policing arrangements and would not appear in the Northbridge Policy project data.

Phase 3 of the Northbridge Policy, in accordance with Section 41 of the Children and Community Services Act 2004, requires that each child or young person must be delivered to a safe place and safe persons. The data show that the great majority of children and young people are returned home after they are apprehended. Where a child or young person cannot be returned home, another place of safety must be found. Many alternative places of safety are small; some are only intermittently funded. Requests for beds exceed the number of beds available in all youth emergency accommodation services in Perth. The records showed that the Northbridge Policy project team used a large number of organisations, including several different emergency accommodation services, the Drug Arm ‘drying out’ hostel service, hospital, and custodial remand. Over the period 2004-2010:

- 89% of young people were transported home or a responsible person collected them.
- 4.9% of young people were transported to emergency accommodation
- 1.6% of young people were sent to Rangeview Juvenile Detention Centre
- 1% of young people were sent to hospital

- 0.8% of young people were sent to the Drug Arm drying out facility
- 2.7% of young people were sent to sundry other (30) service agencies or had information supplied to them, or the outcome is not recorded.

The majority of young people (89%) returned home. The numbers per year are relatively stable across the period. The reduced number in 2010 reflects the reduction in apprehensions that year (see Figure 24)




Figure 24: Proportion returned home after apprehension as a result of Northbridge Policy

The immediate outcomes for children and young people who are not returned home are shown in more detail in Figure 25.




Figure 25: Initial actions after apprehension other than being returned home

The graph in Figure 18 illustrates:

- Decreased use of emergency accommodation occurred since 2008, when apprehension focused on those aged 15 years and less that occurred after 2007.
- The decrease and stabilisation of numbers of young people sent to Rangeview juvenile detention centre. This reduction accords with the change of emphasis onto Category 1 children and young people and the sharp reduction in the number of

young people aged 16-17 years old apprehended under Category 2 (anti-social behaviour, intoxication etc.).

- The reduction and stabilisation of numbers of young people transferred to hospital
- The 3 year gap in service provision from the Drug Arm Drying Out Centre believed to be due to a gap in funding of Drug Arm
- An increase in numbers of children and young people sent to ‘other’ services.

Preventative follow-up referral

Three agencies, DCP, Mission Australia and Killara, provide the majority of follow-up support as shown in Figure 26.




Figure 26: Follow up agencies for complete years 2004 to 2011.

It is useful to compare these with the numbers of apprehensions (Figure 27).




Figure 27: Apprehensions per year for whole years 2004 - 2011

After 2008, there was a decrease in the number of referrals to DCP and an increase in referrals to Mission Australia and Killara. This increased level of follow-up for Killara is unexpected and contradicts the information provided by interviewees about the reduced role of Killara in the Northbridge Policy project in later years. Killara has a specific role in relation to Police cautions. The referrals to Killara, however, were apparently on the basis of whether there were juvenile justice concerns, according to DCP records. The number of referrals to Nyoongar Patrol as a follow-up agency reduced significantly from 2008, as does

the number of records in which the follow-up agency was 'unknown'. From 2010, the total number of referrals declined steeply. Referrals to DCP declined more steeply than those to Mission Australia and Killara. The numbers of referrals to Police and emergency accommodation were very small throughout the period. This is probably because if emergency accommodation was required, the referral would normally be made on the night as a crisis referral, and EAS/SAAP would provide subsequent referrals.

Interviewees explained that from 2008 onwards the system of case allocation operated as follows, based upon data held by DCP and Police:

- Young people for whom DCP held information about child protection concerns were allocated to DCP as the lead referral agency
- Young people for whom DCP or Police held information about juvenile justice concerns were allocated to Killara Youth Support Services as the lead referral agency
- Young people for whom there was no child protection or juvenile justice information held by Police and DCP were allocated to Mission Australia as the lead referral agency

Table 49: Numbers of referrals to follow up agencies per year 2004 -2010 (young person 15 years old and less)

Year	Killara	Mission Australia	DCP	Unknown	Nyoongar Patrol (N)	EAS	Blank	Nyoongar Patrol (NP)	Police	SAAP	Total
2004	178	298	409	57	62	6	1	4	1	1	1017
2005	172	264	319	45	26	7	0	1	1	0	835
2006	230	304	339	40	34	6	0	1	2	3	959
2007	234	320	401	36	41	5	0	1	0	4	1042
2008	236	418	433	43	41	4	1	1	2	1	1180
2009	325	553	363	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1243
2010	156	373	365	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	895

The data indicates that for each apprehension event, the young person involved was referred to only one agency. An improvement to record keeping occurred from 2008, and after 2008 referral is to Killara, Mission Australia and DCP only.

Appendix 33: NPP Police Incident data for Northbridge, Perth CBD and Burswood

The project brief requires a comparison between Northbridge, Perth CBD and Burswood for police incident data for the period 2004-2010. Data was supplied for young people aged under 12 years; 13-15 years; and 16-18 years (we requested data on 16-17 year olds, but received data for 16-18 year olds). Court data was not used because extensive diversionary mechanisms mean it does not reflect activity on the street (WA Department of the Attorney-General pers.comm.). Police incident data is significantly more comprehensive and detailed and is more representative of street conditions. The Police incident data as supplied was by incident and indicated:

- Period: 2004 to 2012, monthly in complete years
- Age: under 12 years, 13-15 years, 16-18 years
- Gender: Male, female, unknown
- ATSI status: ATSI, other, unknown
- Home suburb: home suburb at time of incident
- Offence: standard offence categories
- Date of incident
- Date of process

The following analyses draws on the above incident data for Northbridge, Perth and Burswood supplied by the WA Police Business Intelligence Service. The reference date used in the analysis was the date of incident. Incident data is dependent on Police resources and the ways these are directed. This results in interdependency between locations. For example, increased activity by Police in one area may mean less police activity in another area.

Comparison Police incident data 18 years and under in Northbridge, Perth and Burswood

A comparison of the police incident data for children and young people under 19 years old (Figure 28) showed that

- Incident rates are dominated by the numbers of children and young people apprehended by police in Perth compared to Burswood or Northbridge.
- The total number of incidents was similar in 2004 and 2012 although numbers peaked in 2009.
- Numbers apprehended in Northbridge have fallen over time and the numbers apprehended in Burswood and Perth have increased over time. This is consistent with displacement from Northbridge to Burswood and to a lesser extent to Perth.

Appendix 33: NPP Police Incident data for Northbridge, Perth CBD and Burswood

- Northbridge incident rates trended upwards between 2004 and 2008 in contradiction to claims of Northbridge Policy project evaluations in 2004 and 2006.
- Perth incident rates followed the same trajectory in the period 2004 -2008. This suggests that it is unlikely that the NPP had any effect on either the increase or the subsequent decrease in police incidents involving young people. The peak of incidents may maybe affected by some changes in how young people socialise in the Perth and Northbridge areas, or could be a response to internal police decision-making about deployment and focus on particular geographic areas or particular population groups.




Figure 28: WA Police incident data for individuals 18 years and under for Northbridge, Perth and Burswood.

Table 50: WA Police incident data for individuals 18 years and under for Northbridge, Perth and Burswood.

Year	Total NB	Total Perth	Total BUR	TOTAL
2004	142	681	30	853
2005	201	754	38	993
2006	247	911	52	1210
2007	350	987	44	1381
2008	452	997	70	1519
2009	343	1265	64	1672
2010	153	1088	43	1284
2011	64	788	84	936
2012	47	768	81	896
Total	1999	8239	506	10744

Detailed analysis by ATSI status and gender is available in Appendix 24.

Analysis of age cohorts

The three age cohorts serviced by the NPP have been analysed separately to see whether police incident data lend support to claims that the NPP has effectively diverted young people from criminal activity that might lead to police incidents.

Comparison Police incident data 13-15 year olds: Northbridge, Perth and Burswood

A comparison of data for the three areas (Figure 29) shows that:

- A greater number of young people were apprehended in either Perth than either Northbridge or Burswood.
- Numbers of 13-15 year olds apprehended by police in Burswood were initially 80% lower than Northbridge but increased over time. This finding would be consistent with displacement, or might be indicative of a changed policing deployment. Interview data indicates an increased policing deployment to Burswood in response to greater numbers of young people in this location.
- There is a crossover in incident rates post 2010 between Northbridge and Burswood (Northbridge fell as Burswood rose). This is consistent with interview data which claims that young people were displaced from Northbridge to Burswood.
- A stabilisation of numbers is evident 2010 to 2012 in Northbridge for 13-15 year olds but not in Perth. This would be consistent with a displacement thesis.
- The incident rates for 13-15 year olds in Perth are much higher and more volatile than those on either Northbridge or Burswood, allowing for the area differences. This is the age group that is the main focus of the Northbridge Project. These statistics are consistent with displacement from Northbridge to the areas of Perth beyond the Northbridge boundary. It is possible that the NPP may have actively diverted some young people in this age range but there was no available data on the numbers of young people who were diverted from Northbridge to the train station, and no data about where young people went after they boarded the train.




Figure 29: WA Police incident data for individuals 13-15 years old (Northbridge, Perth and Burswood).

Table 51: WA Police incident data for individuals 13-15 years old (Northbridge, Perth and Burswood).

Year	Total NB	Total Perth	Total BUR	TOTAL
2004	40	262	8	310
2005	35	319	6	360
2006	44	350	14	408
2007	61	438	2	501
2008	62	407	12	481
2009	51	510	18	579
2010	47	454	12	513
2011	8	352	32	392
2012	4	314	33	351
Total	352	3406	137	3895

Comparison Police incident data under 12 year olds in Northbridge, Perth and Burswood

Analysis of incident data for young people aged 12 years and under (Figure 30) indicated that:

- The incident rate for 12 years and under is dominated by the numbers apprehended in Perth compared to Northbridge and Burswood
- Perth incidents involving 12 years and under are dominated by theft (60% of incidents) (separate temporary Pivot table analysis not included in report)
- The total number of police apprehensions of this age group is relatively small and stable over time, despite annual variance
- The numbers in Northbridge have trended slightly downward whilst the numbers in Burswood have increased over time. This is consistent with a displacement thesis from Northbridge to Burswood.




Figure 30: WA Police incident data for individuals 12 years and under: Northbridge, Perth and Burswood.

Table 52: WA Police incident data for individuals 12 years and under: Northbridge, Perth and Burswood.

Year	Total NB	Total Perth	Total BUR	TOTAL
2004	5	35	0	40
2005	1	17	0	18
2006	1	31	0	32
2007	3	27	0	30
2008	2	39	0	41
2009	1	28	4	33
2010	2	29	0	31
2011	0	18	2	20
2012	0	39	2	41
Total	15	263	8	286

Comparison of Police incident data for 16-18 year olds: Northbridge, Perth and Burswood

Analysis of the police incident data for 16 to 18 year olds (Figure 31) in Northbridge, Perth and Burswood showed that

- The reduction in Police recorded incident rates of 16-18 year olds from 2008 follows a similar trajectory to the reduction in numbers found within the DCP data for NPP. Participants in the NPP interviews suggested Police were the more appropriate organisation to respond to incidents that involved 16-17 year olds; however, this data shows that there was a reduction in police incidents during the period 2008-2012. This is at the same time as a reduction in diversionary contact between NPP and this age group.
- There is a cross over in incident rates 2010 onwards between Northbridge and Burswood (Northbridge rates decreased and Burswood rates increased) and this supports the claims in some interviews that there has been displacement from Northbridge to Burswood.

- There is some support for the thesis there may have been displacement from Northbridge to Perth in the period 2008-2010. The time series in Figure 31 if triangulated by other data might support the idea there was displacement post 2008 from Northbridge to Perth.
- The stabilisation in 2011 and 2012 occurs strongly for 16-18 year olds in Perth. This may be a recording issue.




Figure 31: WA Police incident data for individuals 16-18 years old (Northbridge, Perth and Burswood).

Table 53: WA Police incident data for individuals 16-18 years old (Northbridge, Perth and Burswood).

Year	Total NB	Total Perth	Total BUR	TOTAL
2004	97	384	22	503
2005	165	418	32	615
2006	202	530	38	770
2007	286	522	42	850
2008	388	551	58	997
2009	291	727	42	1060
2010	104	605	31	740
2011	56	418	50	524
2012	43	415	46	504
Total	1632	4570	361	6563

Conclusions

Caution must be exercised in interpretation of this Police crime incident data. Incident data is dependent on Police resources and the ways these resources are directed according to policing priorities. Taken together with interview data, police incident data is consistent with the claims put forward by several participants that there has been displacement of young people of all ages from Northbridge to Burswood and to a lesser extent to Perth.

This police incident data does not lend support to the claim that the NPP was effective as a diversionary measure for 16-18 year olds, because when the NPP actively engaged this

Appendix 33: NPP Police Incident data for Northbridge, Perth CBD and Burswood

group in the period 2004-2007, numbers of police incidents in Northbridge rose (as they did in Perth), contrary to the claims of previous evaluations OCP (2004; 2006). When the NPP ceased to actively engage this group in the period 2008-2012, the number of police incidents fell, as they did in Perth, contrary to expectations of NPP, who considered that police were a more appropriate agency to respond to this age group under the terms of the Northbridge Policy.

Appendix 34: NPP Value-For-Money Analysis

An evaluation (value-for money analysis) of publicly funded initiatives usually requires a comparison of the annual cost of running the program with the annual cost savings attributed to the program. This comparison represents the specific return on investment (ROI) for the program and could be used to determine the continuation of the program or the implementation of the program in other jurisdictions. Alternatively, the cost of the research can be compared with the annual cost savings attributed to the program. This represents a ROI to the funding body, in this case, the Western Australian Government.

The techniques available to estimate ROI are *cost benefit analysis* (CBA), which traditionally enables the comparison of costs and benefits of an initiative in dollar terms, and *cost effectiveness analysis* (CEA), which compares dollar valued costs with unvalued benefits or outcomes such as lives saved or lives improved. Both analytical techniques estimate equivalent annual program costs. CBA is used when benefits or cost savings can be explicitly valued in dollar terms whereas CEA acknowledges but does not attempt to value, in dollar terms, benefits. Both CBA and CEA require outcomes, such as reduced vandalism in terms of property damage, to be known.

In the evaluation of the Northbridge Policy Project (NPP), the *outcomes* of the policy, as distinct from the *outputs* of the service, are not known:

- The DCP data on the numbers of young people apprehended is primarily shaped by operational factors and does not give any representation of numbers of young people on the street in Northbridge.
- The data gathered by DCP does not provide any measure of the numbers of young people diverted from Northbridge as a result of NPP.
- There has been no data gathered as part of NPP on social, economic, or developmental outcomes for families and young people at risk as a result of apprehension of young people via NPP and subsequent support.
- The police data on incidents in Northbridge, CBD and Burswood is highly variable over the years. They provide information about the trajectories of incident numbers over the years for different offences and groups of young persons. The data are, however, strongly shaped by operational and other confounding factors. This compromises their use as a direct measure of outcomes of the NPP.

Without outcomes, CBA and CEA could not be undertaken, nor the rates of return to the program be estimated. The following analysis therefore presents the annual costs of the NPP and the costs per apprehension.

The fixed and variable annual costs are calculated for the 'core partners' in the NPP responsible for undertaking and managing the apprehensions on the night: the staff from JAG, DCP and Mission Australia. These are directly funded and are calculated below.

The NPP process also involves a range of subsequent service provision, with its own costs including family case work, emergency accommodation provision, transportation provided by other service providers such as Killara, Nyoongar Patrol Inc. and taxi companies, diversionary transport provided to young people by TransPerth, and diversionary programs in Midland and Armadale provided by the Department of Sport and Recreation. It involves costs for other partners and stakeholders such as the two weekly meetings (DCP and Nyoongar Patrol Inc.) and the quarterly meeting of senior managers of partners in NPP. In some cases, there are cost savings. For example, the Department of Education Attendance unit obtains information about young people from NPP that it would otherwise have to acquire at a cost.

Estimating the costs of these subsequent aspects of the NPP is hampered by lack of information. For example, the interviews with stakeholders indicated the actual casework undertaken is substantially less than the number of referrals to agencies. Every apprehension is allocated to a single lead agency. The numbers of unique individuals each year is, however, around half the number of annual apprehension records, and the number of unique families less than that in cases where apprehended young people are from the same family or span multiple years. Lack of data on these issues means the basis of estimation of these subsequent costs is unreliable. In addition, these costs are funded through other mechanisms than NPP and are for services for which other agencies and partners are funded as part of their normal work.

A list of these 'subsequent costs' without calculation has been inserted below the calculation of annual fixed and variable costs for the 'core partners' for transparency.

Fixed costs

The NPP program required a 3 litre Toyota Hiace Van and two mobile phones used by DCP Outreach staff. The purchase price of the van ($C = \$39,490^i$) – is converted to an annual cost using the straight line depreciation method over seven years ($n = 7$) with an \$8,000 residual ($R = 8,000$). That is, the depreciation cost $(C - R) / N$ amounts to \$4,499 per annum.

Two mobile phones were used in the program. The phones are priced in terms of a median cost plan of \$1,752.00 over 24 months for Optus/iPhoneⁱⁱ. The annual cost per phone is twelve monthly payments or \$876. Insurance of \$13 per month amounts to \$156 per annum.

The JAG team also required the use of a Police vehicle calculated similarly to the above and pro-rata 60% (three days per week).

The program also required an office in Northbridge. The price of office space in Perth is extremely variable and depends on the age of the building, the facilities provided and the floor space. In this analysis, an average office space of 150 square metres at an annual rental price of \$325 per square metre is usedⁱⁱⁱ.

Variable costs

The program was staffed by two to four DCP outreach workers (average 3), two Mission Australia lounge staff and a coordinator, two senior social workers (one as NPP co-ordinator and the other as Crisis Care representative) and four police officers who, together, diverted young people away from Northbridge, apprehended, processed and escorted children and young people to a safe person and safe place on each night that the program operated. The four police officers were one sergeant (\$89,688 per annum), one constable (\$74,502 per annum) and two three year service officers (\$66,339 per annum each)^{iv}. Including a shift allowance of 11%, total annual police staffing costs are thus \$329,524. At an hourly rate of \$28.51^v and assuming full-time equivalent (FTE) of 1200 hours per worker (3 times 8 hour days per week)^{vi}, the cost of the three DCP outreach workers and the two Mission Australia lounge staff is \$171,060. For the senior social workers, an hourly rate of \$40.60 is used^{vii}. This gives an annual salary cost of \$73,080. On-costs for all staff are assumed at 25%.

Vehicle running costs for the DCP Outreach worker vehicle are based on Australian Tax Office work-related car expenses rate of 75 cents per kilometre for a vehicle with engine capacity of 2601cc (2.601 litre) and over^{viii}. In 2010, 969 children and young people were driven home from Northbridge to suburbs in the metropolitan area^{ix} at return distances ranging from 1 kilometre (Perth) to 78 kilometres (Ravenswood). Total kilometres for these trips were 20,163.4 kilometres. The vehicle operating cost is thus estimated at \$15,123.

For the Police vehicle, the vehicle running costs are estimated on a more limited basis of 2 km per apprehension being the return distance to apprehend a young person and return them to the NPP office. For 969 apprehensions per year, at the above ATO vehicle expense rate of 75 c/Km for 2 km per young person apprehended, the annual vehicle variable running cost is estimated at \$1,453. The second Police vehicle was available as backup.

Consumables are estimated at \$20,000 per annum^x.

Total costs

Table 54: Annual Costs for NPP

Program costs	
Fixed costs	
Vehicle depreciation (DCP Outreach worker)	4,499
Vehicle depreciation (Police pro-rata 60%)	2,699
iPhone plan including insurance	1,032
Rent (imputed)	48,750
Subtotal fixed costs	56,980
Variable costs	
Police (4 staff)	329,524
DCP outreach and MA lounge staff (5 staff at 1200 hrs.)	171,060
Senior social worker (Crisis Care)	73,080
NPP Coordinator	75,000
Subtotal staffing	648,664
Staff on-costs (25%)	162,166

Vehicle kilometres	16567
Consumables	20,000
Subtotal variable costs	847,397
TOTAL Annual costs (Core Services)	\$904,377
Annual NPP (core services)	\$933 per apprehension

969 apprehensions, this gives a cost for the 'core partners' of **\$933 per apprehension**.

Subsequent costs for apprehension (not included in the costing above) include:

- Family case work (Killara, Mission Australia and DCP)
- Emergency accommodation (Crisis Care and sundry emergency accommodation providers)
- transportation provided by other service providers such as Killara, Nyoongar Patrol Inc. and taxi companies
- Diversionary bus and rail transport provided to young people by TransPerth (young people diverted from Northbridge by DCP outreach workers, youth workers, TransPerth security staff etc. and consequently not apprehended)
- Diversionary programs in Midland and Armadale (Midnight Basketball etc.) provided by the Department of Sport and Recreation
- Costs of attendance etc. of representatives of partners and stakeholders at the two weekly meetings (DCP and Nyoongar Patrol Inc.)
- Costs of attendance of senior managers at the quarterly NPP Senior Managers meeting

Summary

In summary, the bulk of the annual costs of the NPP relate to staffing costs (salaries and on-costs), about 90%. Half of these staff costs are for four police officers and the remaining staff costs are for DCP and Mission Australia Staff. The transportation costs are less than 3% of total costs.

Appendix 35: NPP Semi-structured Interview Questions

Questions for Service Delivery Partners

1. Background and role (settling down question): Can you tell me about how you came to be involved in the project and how you see your role? **Prompts:** How long have you been involved in the project? Previous experience? What you like about your role? What is most difficult/ frustrating?
2. What do you think the value of the project is? What do you think the main social issues that the project addresses? **Prompts:** (ask without prompting then add prompts if necessary) alcohol/drug abuse? Mental health issues? Child protection? Homelessness? Young people's involvement in crime? Victimisation and violence? Other issues? Have issues changed at all over the time you have been involved with the project.
3. What do you think are the main benefits/ achievements of the project? **Prompts:** How do these occur? Please explain. Can you give an example of a positive outcome?
4. What do you think are its main limitations/ weaknesses? **Prompts:** How/ why do these occur? Please explain. Can you give an example of a negative outcome? What could be done to improve the project? (and who should do it)
5. How do the partners work together? **Prompts:** Have there been any times where partners have disagreed about the approach taken by the project? If so, what happened?
6. Are other stakeholders consulted or involved in the project, if so who and how?
7. On balance, do you consider the project has succeeded or failed to meet its intended outcomes? **Prompts:** Can you identify any unintended outcomes? Probe reasons. What do you think would be different if the project ceased to operate?
8. What are the most important things you have learnt through your involvement with the project?
9. Do you think this type of project should be offered in other places? **Prompts:** Why or why not? If yes, what types of situation would it be suitable to replicate this project? If you were in charge, what changes would you make?
10. Anything else you would like to add?

Questions for Families and Young People

1. Please could you tell me about how you and your family became involved with the Northbridge project?
2. Can you tell me a bit more about your involvement with the Northbridge project (Probe: what kinds of support? How long? Referrals).
3. From your experience, do you think there are any benefits to young people and families from involvement with the Northbridge project? Please could you give an example? (Probe for a concrete example of a benefit).
4. From your experience, do you think there are any disadvantages to young people and families from involvement with the Northbridge project? (Probe for a concrete example of a disadvantage).

5. Is there anything else you can tell us, or that you would like to add?

Questions for Stakeholders

1. Please can you tell me how you see the role of the Northbridge Policy project as it affects you as a stakeholder?
2. What do you think the value of the project is? What do you see as the main issues the project addresses?
3. What do you think are the main benefits/ achievements of the project? Please could you give an example of a positive outcome for stakeholders?
4. What do you think are the project's main limitations/ weaknesses? Please can you give an example of a negative outcome?
5. How do stakeholders collaborate with the service providers and the policy makers in relation to the Northbridge project? Have there been times where different parties disagreed about the approach taken by the project?
6. Are stakeholders consulted or involved in the project, if so who and how?
7. On balance, do you consider the project has succeeded or failed to meet its intended outcomes?
8. What are the most important things you have learnt through your involvement with the project?
9. Do you think this type of project should be offered in other places? If you were in charge, what changes would you make?
10. Anything else you would like to add?

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Appendix 37: Acknowledgements

Agency (alphabetic)	Person (alphabetic)	Title (where known)
Anglicare/Step 1	Philippa Boldy	General Manager, Youth Services
	Esben Kaas-Sorensen	Manager, Step 1
Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department	Christine Freudenstein	Former Director, Indigenous Justice and Community Safety Branch
	Kosta Lucas	Former Legal officer, Indigenous Justice and Community Safety Branch
	Jessica Robinson	Director, Indigenous Justice and Community Safety Branch
	Jessica Trappel	Legal Officer, Indigenous Justice and Community Safety Branch
	Martina Wardell	Director, Indigenous Justice and Community Safety Branch
	Leith Watson	Former Senior Legal officer, Indigenous Justice and Community Safety Branch
BIGN (Business Improvement Group of Northbridge)	Ian Marchesi	Deputy Chairperson
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) (NSW)	Jessie Holmes	Senior Project Officer
Consultants	Jack Busch	Formerly Department of Premier and Cabinet (WA), now consultant and executive coach
	John Scougall	Consultant for Nyoongar Patrol
Curtin University	Annalee Stearne	Research Associate, National Drug Research Institute.
Department of the Attorney General (WA)	Sarah Burnside	Senior Policy Officer, Policy and Aboriginal Services Directorate
	Glen Caton	Team Leader, Aboriginal Justice Program
	Patricia Dodson	Principal Policy Officer
Department of Child Protection (WA)	Lynda Atherton	Senior Social Worker, Crisis Care
	Graham Chandler	Senior Social Worker, Crisis Care
	Caroline Nichols	Acting Director
	Neal Osborne	Project Coordinator NPP, Senior Social Worker
	Nick Trahanas	District Director

Appendix 37: Acknowledgements

	Rossana Trinchi	Assistant District Director
Department for Communities (WA)	Stuart Reid	Director, Policy and Planning
Department of Corrective Services (WA)	Mike Davies	Team Leader. Protection and Diversion (Killara Youth Support Services) Central Metropolitan Youth Justice Services
	Janfrey Smith	Manager, Central Metropolitan Youth Justice Services
Department of Education (WA)	Linda Markovic	Principal Consultant, Attendance
	Jan McGrath	Student Tracking Coordinator
Department of Premier and Cabinet (WA), (formerly)	Michael Thorn	Now CEO, Alcohol Education and Rehabilitation Foundation
Department of Sport & Recreation (WA)	Sarah Campbell	State-wide Programs Team (Indigenous Sport Programs)
Edith Cowan University	Swee Chow	Faculty Office Team Leader
	Kim Gifkins	Research Ethics Officer
	Dr. Margaret Giles	Senior Lecturer, Accounting Finance and Economics
	Wyman Low	Senior Finance Officer
	Pieter Prinsloo	Senior Finance Officer
Mission Australia	George Cherian	Operations Manager
	Mark Finch	Senior Case Work Manager
	Vivienne Keeley	Services Manager
	Katie Price	Manager of Northbridge Services
Nyoongar Patrol Systems Inc.	Maria McAtackney	CEO
Perth Inner City Youth Services	Karen Beard	Mental Health Support Worker (interview was with Karen and colleagues)
Public Transport Authority (WA)	Steve Furnedged	Director, Security Services
	Natasha Guerinoni	Project Communications Manager
	John Kitis	Transit Manager, Admin Revenue
	George Svirac	Transit Manager, Security
Western Australia Police	Rory Atkinson	Sergeant, Team Supervisor JAG
	Steve Dawson	Senior Sergeant, JAG
	Bart Lethlean	Director, Business Intelligence

	Bruce Miller	Assist. Director, Business Intelligence Office
	Michaela Miller	A/Manager, WA Police Academic Research Administration Unit
	Denis Perich	Inspector, Business Intelligence Office
	Kellie Properjohn	District Superintendent
	Sam Rohde	Senior Constable, JAG
	Paul Steel	District Inspector
	David Wray	Assistant Director, Office of Crime Prevention
Youth Affairs Council of Western Australia	Craig Comrie	Executive Officer
Youth Legal Service Inc. Western Australia	Cheryl Cassidy-Vernon	Director

Endnotes

ⁱ 2012 price (see http://www.carsales.com.au/new-cars/details.aspx?R=642934&_Qpb=1&vertical=Car&Cr=2&_Ns=p_HasPhotos_Int32|1||p_Year_String|1||p_ReleaseMonth_Int32|1||p_Make_String|0||p_Model_String|0&_N=2994+3296+4294942755+4294842770&sil0=1304&seot=1&_Nne=15&treCs=12&_sid=13BA902DB36F).

ⁱⁱ 2012 price (see https://www.optus.com.au/shop/mobilephones/iphone/iphone5?CID=sem:goog::osc:mob:bau:&utm_source=google&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=perf_mob_bau&utm_content=sFMzftdiE|pcrid|29234180623|pkw|%2Boptus%20%2Biphone|pmt|b).

ⁱⁱⁱ 2012 price (see <http://www.realcommercial.com.au/property-offices-wa-northbridge-500500487>).

^{iv} 2012 salaries (see <http://www.stepforward.wa.gov.au/benefits/salary.html>)

^v Based on 2nd year level two Public Service Agreement 2008 – Non-specified Callings, including 20% loading.

^{vi} 48 weeks at 5 days per week and 7.5 hours per day.

^{vii} 2012 pay grade for Senior Social Worker based on Health Professionals and Support Services Award 2010 (see

https://extranet.deewr.gov.au/ccmsv8/CiLiteKnowledgeDetailsFrameset.htm?KNOWLEDGE_REF=216392&TYPE=X&ID=7757504689191837288889912894&DOCUMENT_REF=373264&DOCUMENT_TITLE=Social,%20Community,%20Home%20Care%20and%20Disability%20Services%20Industry%20Award%202010&DOCUMENT_CODE=MA000100); Health professional employees, Level 4, Pay point 3 (calculated using <http://paycheck.fwo.gov.au/PayCheckPlus.aspx>).

^{viii} From 2011/2012 individual taxation expenses (see <http://www.ato.gov.au/content/33874.htm>).

^{ix} Excludes 3 country locations – Bunbury, Northam, Pinjarra.

^x Love, T. (2012). Personal communication. 21 December.