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THE IDEOLOGY OF PEDOGOGY: THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT OF IT!

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"No doubt real education could only flourish only after the Revolution, when its importance would be generally recognised and when educators would be honoured and respected by the community, but something could be honourably achieved even now. He must try to do his job as effectively as the existing educational conditions and his own limitations allowed. Though he would not without inviting the sack introduce revolutionary politics directly into his teaching, he could aim at propagating humane ideas and getting his pupils to think".

Introducing the New Teacher

Educationalists would be delinquent if they did not occasionally scrutinise the conditions under which teachers work. As an institution, the school is subject to forces both from within and without. Some are powerful, others only weak; but whatever their strength, they all have the power to insinuate themselves into the classroom. The school is a place where the educational demands of the community are received and duly articulated, with varying degrees of success. Teachers work in an atmosphere where rival interests compete for their attention, forcing them to think anew about teaching. Gone are the days of pedagogic certitude, when the repertoire of teaching was fixed and unchanging. As the boundaries of what it means to go teaching are redrawn, new burdens impose themselves on teachers, burdens that are often quite out of kilter with their expectations and training. The last fifteen years or so of educational history, both in Australia and overseas, are a chronology of unparalleled change, in which the conventions of compulsory schooling have been replaced by philosophies which counsel more humane attitudes towards pupils. As with the policy initiatives that span the period, there has been a general recognition that mass, compulsory schooling, public good that it is, is inadequate on many counts, especially

* Edward Upward. In The Thirties.
teachers should be reproved for it. Assaults on the hard won freedoms of teachers are coming from a variety of directions, and talk of accountability and restoration of controls over teachers seem designed to impose a retrogressive ideology on education. At the moment, however, the whole ethos of education is one in which a number of pedagogic ideologies, some radical, some conservative, are competing for hegemony. In this paper, I will endeavour to identify these ideologies and indicate that teachers are in the process of adopting a range of different styles to confront the problems which they confront. There is no one set formula for teaching any longer. [Connell, 1985]

A Liberal Education for Conservative Ends!
Whilst other responsibilities might have assumed equal prominence in their repertoire, teachers are still centrally concerned with the transmission of knowledge. Much of their training and education centres on acquiring expertise in particular bodies of knowledge, and developing the wherewithal to communicate this expertise in the classroom. That knowledge should be the principal subject of transmission and not other things, moreover a select body of knowledge at that, centres on the commitment our society has had to passing on the "cultural inheritance". Apologists (Oakeshott, 1967; Hirst, 1972; Peters, 1972a) for this view of education, argue that the cultural inheritance not only puts individuals in touch with the origins of our civilization, but also enhances their capacity to be active and political citizens.6 Without the rational outlook which allegedly flows from studying this inheritance, the stability of society is threatened, as are the institutions within it. Human beings are not natural creatures of reason. Baser instincts are only held in check by the veneer of education and the authority of society. Without the guiding force of rationality, societies would crumble. The transmission of the cultural inheritance is indubitably linked with the conservation of society and its political structures. Anarchy, the disease of an ill-educated society, is avoided when the rational mind asserts itself. The view that there is an essential body of knowledge, upon which the survival of society is dependent, is also accompanied with the recognition that this same knowledge has the capacity to instil moral grace and excellence. The rational mind is also a moral mind. The humanity of human beings is enhanced through education. Learning is the key to human betterment. Knowledge is good for the human soul! Without the intervention of education, there would be severe abridgement of moral capacity. Intellectual training provides moral insights, and a judicious sense of what is right and good for society. The vein of Platonism running through these arguments extends to the belief that a surfeit of practical or utilitarian knowledge in the curriculum will disturb the pathway to moral perfection. Shackled with the "millstone of Idealism", Western educationalists have long believed that classroom knowledge should eschew the everyday and the mundane. (Harris, 1984). Reason resides in the eternal not the ephemeral. The material concerns of everyday life detract from the pursuance of high moral truths. Theoretical knowledge, unainted with the everyday, represents the route to moral perfectability. Hence, there has been a tendency in Western education to berate practical subjects and knowledge of a distinctly applied tenor. Education has celebrated the virtues of theory rather than practice. Training and vocational preparation have been regarded as inferior activities, distorting the true purpose of education, which is to seed the powers of reasoning and to gain insight into moral truths. (Peters 1972b). The pursuit of moral excellence takes precedence over the pursuit of work! But then it needs to be remembered that a liberal education was just that: an education for the free person, the person of independent means and of leisure.

Even though the school curriculum of the 1980's is somewhat removed from the goals of a liberal education, its ideology still persists in the tendency of the school to value theoretical knowledge more highly than practical knowledge, and in the tendency of the school to prescribe a core of subjects for all pupils, irrespective of its relevance or appropriateness. Indeed, any notion of relevance is regarded as being contemptible. Teachers are, first and foremost teachers of subjects, subjects which provide the intellectual skills needed for active citizenship. Epistemological experiences dominate the ideology of such pedagogy, almost to the exclusion of everything else. That many pupils find the epistemological experiences offered by the school deeply alienating and unrewarding does not undermine their value or their importance. On the contrary, their limited appeal provides a useful sorting mechanism for classifying pupils and for ensuring that the moral force of education is delivered only to those pupils capable of responding to it. That the mechanism sets potential mental workers from manual workers, conceivers from executers, also adds to its importance as an instrument of labour power reproduction (Braverman 1974). On the other hand, it needs to be born in mind that the whole ideology is predicated on the assumption that a full education for all, given the uneven distribution of talent and intelligence in the community, might be both fruitless and dangerous, particularly where the moral condition of society is concerned. Only a meritocratic approach to schooling, dominated by the "competitive academic curriculum", designed to sort and sift pupils into appropriate learning tracks, is ultimately justifiable given the basic make up of society. (Connell, Ashenden, Kessler & Dowssett 1982). In effect the school is a place
where a cultural elite, responsible for the upkeep of moral standards and the conservation of society, is generated. A more egalitarian distribution of knowledge, of the sort favoured by more progressive ideologies of teaching, would only have deleterious effects, leading to the general debasement of cultural and societal values. (Elliot, 1972)

**Pedagogic Libertarianism and Cultural Nihilism**

If much of the ideology of pedagogy upon which Western education is founded assumes that children require knowledge and learning to keep the dark side of the human personality at bay, there is another body of ideology, admittedly less corporeal than the former, which holds that children do not need the civilising influence of knowledge in order to assume their place in society as active citizens. The key to human perfectibility is not necessarily contingent upon the acquisition of an intellectual sensibility. Indeed the ideology holds that it is perfectly natural for human beings to be moral; there is no need to intervene in their upbringing for them to acquire respect for persons and the other attributes of moral maturity. Goodness is an innate disposition, requiring no further cultivation than the right environment for it to flourish. Humans have an inner potential for high moral excellence. There is no need for education to assist in its unfoldment; given optimum conditions that will happen of its own accord. Indeed there is some suspicion that education might well inhibit its unfoldment, leading to a malformed personality, unable to form sound moral judgements. The teacher yields too much influence and power over children, preventing them from free development. This same ideology also questions the degree to which the school is dominated by academic concerns. The pursuits of learning and knowledge have enslaved the school, and caused it to take on attributes anathema to the full development of the individual. Compulsion, irrelevant curricula, the teacher as a kind of secular magisterium ... are but some of the unwelcome side effects of a schooling system in which growth of mind takes priority over everything else. What intellectual growth that does take place in the school is often tethered to the needs of the state an magisterium ... are but some of the unwelcome side effects of a schooling system in which growth of mind takes priority over everything else. What intellectual growth that does take place in the school is often tethered to the needs of the state and the military-industrial complex. (Spring 1975). Mass schooling, in effect, amounts to mass thought control; it is the institution of “mental despotism” on a prodigious scale. Liberal rhetoric to the effect that schooling permits self-realisation and growth of the individual masks its true intent: to supervise the development of personalities in accordance with the priorities of contemporary society.

The school is a place of social engineering, a place where human beings are created, according to the specifications of the state. Libertarian pedagogy, especially in its most extreme forms, questions the involvement of the state in education, and also the degree to which the school worships knowledge. It would prefer schools to concentrate on the development of the pupil as a person, not as a mind into which pour epistemological goods. The teacher is seen as a counsellor rather than a don or scholar, and the objectives of learning are ontological rather than epistemological.

A.S. Neill, the most celebrated advocate of such pedagogy, raged against learning which was head - rather than heart - centred. He subscribed to the belief that self-knowledge should come before book learning. To this end, Neill actively discouraged both reading and learning at Summerhill (Croall 1983). His whole approach to education personified that of a cultural nihilist at war with the values of academicism. Growth of being took precedence over growth of mind; knowing thyself preceded knowing about the world. Erudition and happiness were seen as being immiscible. Learning was the enemy of a healthy psyche. True childhood was playground not schoolhood. The whole spirit of Neill’s approach to education, as it continues to be for most libertarian teachers, was person rather than discipline-centred. Passing on the cultural inheritance was all very well, but if it did not produce happy human beings (and it was Neill’s observation that it rarely did), then it stood condemned as an objective.

However, there is more to libertarian pedagogy than simply the eviction of knowledge from the classroom. Libertarians are often, and again Neill provides the classic example, highly critical of the “gogue” aspects of the pedagogue’s role. Neill, for instance, found the hierarchical distribution of power in the classroom repugnant. He thought that teachers exercised too much control over the educational fate of children. His solution was to radicalise the relationship between the child and the teacher. Both had equal power at Summerhill. No one person in the school owned more power than any other person, and all persons had the same rights and freedoms - in theory at least! Summerhill was a community of shared responsibilities, of democracy rather than “peda-cray”. General Meetings allowed pupils to have a say in the running of the school and the power to determine critical areas of school policy. Reducing the sovereignty of the teacher permitted greater freedom for the child. Absence of freedom Neill believed, was injurious to psychological health. Neuroses, traumas, psychopathologies of various kinds ... were products of an overdisciplined upbringing. For Neill, the child had to be delivered from all forms of oppression, be they in the classroom or the home. Children he believed, should have the right to regulate themselves and to be free of the malevolent influence of the
teacher.

The anti-school philosophy, which underpins much libertarian pedagogy, inevitably leads to deschooling, and the belief that the school has outlived its usefulness. Moreover, the school represents the archetypal oppressive institution, from which many of the ills of contemporary society ultimately stem. Society would function much better if it were to rid itself of its schools, and returned to a situation wherein individuals learn from another, and from the world, rather than teachers. (Illich, 1978). The “professional ministerings” of teachers leads to a diminution of individual initiative and the value of “incidental learning” - that acquired out of school! The school serves to undermine the power of autodidacticism, which all individuals possess; it has created the impression that learning is properly the province of schools and professional teachers, and that what is learnt in school cannot be learnt elsewhere. Myths abound about the power of the school as an institution of learning, myths which mask the school’s role in maintaining the values of consumerist society and the inequitable structures of capitalism. Society has to be freed from the terrible institution that is the school. The only ideology of pedagogy that is finally satisfactory is one in which pedagogy is transferred from the teacher to the individual, and from the school to the world at large. But whether this would have the effect of mitigating the effects of oppression depends upon whether the school is the sole institute responsible for the spread of oppression in contemporary society. The deschoolers amplify the evils of schooling at the expense of focussing on related evils, such as the economic system and capital accumulation. (Apple 1978; Gintis 1972), The right to educate oneself, laudable though it might be, is a liberty only worth fighting for if it can be proved that a world of autodidacts would be in a better position to reform the other oppressive aspects of contemporary society. The trouble is, the deschoolers, like their libertarian forebears, tend to have a contemptuous disregard for society and its structures. The solutions they propose are mostly individualistic, and centre on liberating human beings from sexual and bureaucratic controls of various kinds. It matters not whether someone is rational or not, or has a firm grasp of the cultural inheritance: but it does matter that they are able to do their own thing and feel free of oppressive structures.

Praxis and Participation

Neither of the ideologies thus far identified is perfect. Each emphasises a different facet of the learning process: the one cognitive and the other affective. Their attitudes to society, and the relationship education bears to it, are also dissimilar. The one uses education to preserve society, the other to destroy it. One emphasises cultural respect and veneration, the other nihilism verging on the iconoclastic. Both ideologies are, in fact, deficient in the degree to which they misperceive crucial aspects of the knowledge process. Teachers of the knowledge-oriented pedagogy, for instance, have a tendency to believe that the knowledge they transmit represents the best possible of selections. As such, it is non-negotiable despite the fact that many pupils find it hard to see its relevance and are dismayed by its overly theoretical character. Supporters of such pedagogy make a presumptive fallacy that the curriculum they have to offer necessarily will benefit all pupils. They fail to see the problematic aspects of this presumption: that knowledge is a social construction, whose value is not necessarily universal, but reflects the preferred epistemological dispositions of a particular social class or group. (Szup, 1978). In essence, a liberal education is for the liberated not the oppressed.

On the other hand, a pedagogy which eschews knowledge experiences altogether for the sake of personal development and self-realisation is deficient in the degree to which it places the importance of individual need above more collective needs. Pupils brought up on a diet of doing their own thing, in a atmosphere of total freedom, do not appear to develop, as was hoped, altruistic and co-operative patterns of behaviour.

A libertarian classroom, on its own, does not necessarily generate a sense of community or encourage superorogative behaviour done in the name of the community. (Cagan, 1978; Bowers, 1984).

The cultural nihilism which attaches itself to this pedagogy is also inadequate. It tends to underestimate the importance of knowledge as an empowering force, as one which could assist the individual to become aware of and solve problems in his or her social milieu. As knowledge is a communal activity, a sense of culture, appreciation of the important public forms of knowledge could offset some of the excesses of individualism inherent in libertarianism. There is no escaping the fact that the individual needs knowledge, but whether it is the sort of knowledge traditionally offered by the school is a moot point.

It might be that teachers will have to think more about tailoring the curriculum to suit pupils particular needs and social circumstances. In short, a more appropriate pedagogy might be one which attempts to fuel knowledge-based education with one which stresses both communal and individual needs. Some synthesis between the ideals of liberalism and libertarianism might offer a more cogent pedagogic ideology, one which combines the conservation of culture with the reconstruction of society.
Recent developments in radical pedagogic theory, both in Australia and overseas, after a period of flirtation with Nellian style libertarianism, seem to be moving in this direction. The libertarian aspects are still apparent, revealing themselves in such tendencies as the democratic classroom and the need for open relationship between pupils and teachers, but they have been conflated with a renewed concern for the epistemological. Knowledge is no longer a dangerous thing to have in the classroom. The cultural nihilists seem to have had their day.

Antonio Gramsci’s influence, together with that of Paulo Freire’s, have been major factors in the rehabilitation of classroom knowledge. Gramsci, educationally speaking the more conservative of the two philosophers, believed passionately in the importance of education, moreover in the importance of a classical education, even for the working classes. He was a fervent believer in mental training and intellectual rigour, and was a professed enemy of educational progressivism. His reasoning was simple: if members of the working class were to assume positions of leadership in society they would need the kind of thinking powers which only the discipline of classical learning can generate. He believed that the interior development of the personality is thwarted when education pursues vocational ends or is softened by Rousseau-esque style pedagogy. Gramsci held that all men and women were intellectuals and that ability was distributed equally throughout the whole population and through all social classes (Hoare and Nowell-Smith 1980:19). A curriculum based on the ideals of classical humanism was therefore appropriate for all children. There was no need to have one style of education for the rich and another for the poor, such only served to exacerbate the lot of the latter. The road to a revolutionary society was founded upon conservative schooling, even to the extent of stressing traditional patterns of discipline like “diligence, precision, poise, ability to concentrate on specific subjects” (Hoare and Nowell Smith 1980). The notion of praxis, of establishing a nexus between theory and practice, labour and learning, disturbs what otherwise is a very traditional ideology of education, as does the notion of the teacher as an “organic intellectual”, servicing the educational needs of the working classes in their attempt to establish a socialist society.

Gramsci was committed to the notion that the teacher has a responsibility to make available to the masses, in ways which they can appreciate the literature of ideas and intellectual discourse. (Entwistle 1979:122). Intellectuals had to establish a rapport with the working class, and the place to begin that rapport was the school.

Freire’s more existentialist variety of Marxism focusses upon oppression as a major disfiguring force in modern society. He traces its origins to the classroom, to the pedagogy of dominance that reigns there. The relationship between the pedagogue and the pupil is a paradigm of oppression. The pedagogue is an agent of imposition, of mental despotism and tyranny, who acts to disempower pupils. Freire sees the classroom as the cradle of enslavement, where the traits of defence and obedience are taught. Learning, he says, is, in the main, “domestication”, and not, as it should be “liberation”. Part of the problem is epistemological. Knowledge is presented in an entirely passive way, as though it was an inert commodity to be banked and deposited in pupils. (Freire 1972). The notion of knowledge as an active ingredient in the transformation of society is not passed on. Pupils receive the impression that they are destined to be impotent where fashioning change in society is concerned. Freire believes that the first step to redressing this centres on reforming the power differential which exists between pupils and pedagogues. There is no reason for the pedagogue to wield so much authority, not even on the grounds of superior epistemological expertise. For there are many domains of experience, especially relating to the local community, about which pupils are much more expert than teachers. Yet the traffic in learning, in most classrooms, is one way; from the pedagogue to the pupil. Recognising that the pedagogue can learn from the pupil, just as much as the pupil can learn from the pedagogue represents a profound revision of the classroom paradigm. (Freire 1974). As does the notion that the epistemological experiences of the pupil should generate the curriculum. For Freire’s whole approach to education moves away from the liberal-humanistic notion that there is a universal set of educational experiences, of benefit to all communities and societies. He believes education needs to be localised and designed to meet the requirements of particular social exigencies. The subjects of Freirean education then, are those of importance to the subjects who are involved in that education. (Freire 1978). The epistemological experiences of the Freirean classroom are determined by the pupils, not the pedagogue.

The threads of Gramscian and Freirean thought can be discerned in the woof and warp of much recent educational theory and practice. The reconstruction of society along more just lines and the eradication of inequality might almost be the mottoes of the modern school, to judge by the tenor of much of this theory and practice. The Freirean notion that education is a political act, which can either work in the service of keeping society as it is (as it mostly does) or work towards its overhaul, write the rhetoric particularly of radical pedagogy. (Eg Giroux 1981). There is a recognition that education in the past was in the service of conservation, of maintaining the societal status quo. This cased social
divisiveness and a high degree of educational failure among disadvantaged groups in the community. Both the “democratic curriculum” (Ashenden, Blackburn, Hannan & White 1984) and the “socially critical school” (Kemmis, Cole and Suggett 1983) are attempts to remedy these problems. Though each claims to be working towards a socially more just society, wherein the problems of disadvantage will be minimised, the road each takes towards this end is rather dissimilar, especially when it comes to the epistemological domain. For whilst there is a broad agreement about the need to give the classroom a human face and for teachers to drop authoritarian practices in their relationships with pupils, there is less agreement about the actual subject matter of learning. The designers of the democratic curriculum appear to take a Gramscian stance, albeit a rather weakened one. They advocate a basic core of subjects for all pupils, subjects mainly drawn from the liberal-humanistic canon: “language and humanities, science and mathematics, cultural activities and institutional practices”. Of these subjects, only the latter, institutional practices, which concerns itself with metacurricular matters, such as assessment and teacher-student relationships, marks a real departure from the standard curriculum. Indeed, apart from the commitment to non-competitiveness and participation in decision-making, the democratic curriculum is not noticeably different from those which currently grace many a high school. Even the philosophy which underpins the curriculum content, with its mention of “worthwhile knowledge” and commitment to “teaching and learning of our best validated knowledge” smacks of R.S. Peters and Matthew Arnold.

If that sounds ungenerous, it needs to be pointed out that, unlike their high sounding mentors, the authors of the democratic curriculum believe that a curriculum based on the general culture is an essential element of everyone’s education, to which no person should be denied access. Most schooling starts off on the premise that a substantial proportion of pupils will never complete high school, and much of the energy of teaching seems to go into ensuring that this is the case! The democratic curriculum takes issue with an ideology of teaching which allows an “elite to ride on the back of the rejects”. In the democratic curriculum there are no rejects; everyone is a success. The subjects of the curriculum might be traditional, but they are styled so as to maximise participation in schooling, to ensure that “more people get more out of schooling”.

Turning now to the “socially critical school”, it is possible to observe the same concern for the fate of society and the contribution schooling can make to its amelioration. The major difference between the two ideologies is that the socially critical school is less prescriptive about the epistemological domain. There is no core curriculum outlined, nor either any subjects specified. The socially critical school seems to be much more informed by the ideas and practices of Paulo Freire than the democratic curriculum. The curriculum is purposely free and open, and responsive to pupil need. Its overall objective is to nurture the spirit of critical inquiry which will lead to social action. Vacuous intellectual activity, leading nowhere except to more of itself, has no place in the socially critical school. The whole emphasis is on praxis, on “working knowledge”, in which the knower interacts with knowledge in such a way that it illuminates the tasks and projects upon which he or she is working. Underscoring all this is the belief that society itself is problematic, and that nothing in it should be taken for granted. This marks a significant departure from traditional teaching, which rarely questioned the structures and fabric of the society for which the school was preparing its pupils. Contrary to traditional practice, those advocating a social-critical approach argue that the school should supply a grounding in experiences such that the pupil will be able to conceptualise the kind of society he or she would like to live in. The school cannot hope to change society, but it can provide the experiences and intellectual skill with which people can work to change society. That is the goal of the socially-critical school.

And in Conclusion

In this paper I have attempted to examine the changing emphases in the ideology of pedagogy. I have suggested that whereas once teachers were almost exclusively concerned with teaching subjects and knowledge, the emphasis now, at least amongst a number of influential theorists, is on changing society and on producing schools which are more sensitive to pupils’ needs and interests. The pupil as subject is as much a concern for the pedagogue as the subjects they teach. Teachers have become teachers of subjects and teachers of subjects! The whole emphasis is on extending the involvement in education, especially by those groups traditionally lost to education: the economically disadvantaged, girls, Aborigines, migrants. Teachers are becoming sensitive to the needs of pupils who do not conform to the academic mould and whose talents might not immediately reveal themselves in the classroom. There is also growing hostility to models of education which emphasise competition and individual merit, which are academic versions of the survival-of-the-fittest ethic. Instead, there is a growing emphasis on co-operative patterns of learning, designed to promote the virtues of communalism and interdependence as opposed to more egotistical approaches, which allow the individual to obtain education success at the expense of his or her peers. But, above all, the new pedagogy seems to be committed to building a better society, one based on altruism
and co-operation, one in which all citizens can labour productively and participate actively in the formation of a better future. There is a realisation that the first stage of the creation of such society begins in the classroom, with the teacher, like the hero of Alan Upward's classic novel, In the Thirties, "propagating humane ideas and getting his pupils to think". If that can only happen, it matters not what sort of pedagogy the teacher finally adopts.

Footnotes
1. There is a clear continuum between the Karmel Report of 1975 and the Participation and Equity program of 1984; as there is with all intervening Reports produced by the government and the Commonwealth Schools Commission.
2. The Commonwealth Schools Commission (1984) has been especially prominent in promoting this view, as was Labor's Minister for Science, Barry Jones (1981).
3. See the views of, amongst others, the Australian Council of Education Standards (A.C.E.S.), and the future created by Greg Sheridan in a series of articles on schools he wrote for The Australian in February 1984.
8. See the views of G.H. Bantock, T.S. Eliot and other "cultural elitists".
9. If Hobbes and Burke were the philosophical precursors of liberal pedagogy, then Jean-Jacques Rousseau fulfills that role where libertarian pedagogy is concerned.

References
p. 550-551.