Pressure groups and the state homelessness taskforce: An investigation of the insider/outsider model of pressure group theory

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Pressure Groups and the State Homelessness Taskforce: An Investigation of the Insider/Outsider Model of Pressure Group Theory

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Bachelor or Arts (Politics and Government) Honours

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USE OF THESIS

The Use of Thesis statement is not included in this version of the thesis.
Abstract

This research investigates the activities and experiences of two pressure groups involved in the State Homelessness Taskforce. The aim of the research is to critique the predominant understanding of insider and outsider pressure groups within the Australian literature, which is based primarily upon the sectional/promotional typology. The applicability of the Aberdeen insider/outsider model of pressure group theory within the Australian context is also determined. Due to methodological difficulties inherent in attempting to quantify the success or effectiveness of pressure groups, this research focuses specifically upon the strategies employed by each group in their attempt to influence the findings and recommendations of the Taskforce.

A preliminary review of pressure group literature indicated that Australian works contained little reference to critiques of the various understandings of insider and outsider groups that are exhibited within the British literature. The revised typologies that have been advanced by British authors to circumvent these criticisms are similarly under-explored within the Australian literature. The improved insider/outsider typologies do however offer a framework for a more in-depth investigation into the role and influence of pressure groups in the policy process. In response to these initial findings, the research aims were adjusted to incorporate the Aberdeen model, one of the improved insider/outsider models, into the analysis of the pressure groups’ activities.

A case study approach was utilised to enable the exploration of the activities and experiences of two of the groups involved in the Taskforce process. The
pressure groups studied in this research are the Western Australian Council of Social Service (WACOSS), the peak body for the community services sector in Western Australia, and the Tenants Advice Service of Western Australia (TASWA), a community legal centre dealing with tenancy matters. These two organisations were chosen as case study subjects as preliminary research indicated that the activities and experiences of these groups during the State Homelessness Taskforce would enable a thorough critique of the insider/outsider models of pressure group theory.

Analysis of the case study data, and of the literature, enabled the existing understanding of insider and outsider groups in the Australian literature to be compared and contrasted with the Aberdeen model. Findings from this analysis indicate that the existing model is ineffective in categorising pressure groups in a meaningful way. The understanding of insider and outsider pressure groups in Australia would therefore benefit from a greater awareness, and wider application of, the improved insider/outsider typologies that have emanated from Britain.
Declaration

I certify that this thesis does not, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

(i) incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education;

(ii) contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text;

(iii) contain any defamatory material.

20.1.04
Bianca Blake
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- my second mum and dad, Vicky and Warren McKinney - also for their love and support; and to
- Tabetha Browne, Kelly Pattison and Rachel Salmon-Lomas - thanks girls.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>Australian Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACOSS</td>
<td>Australian Council of Social Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFHO</td>
<td>Australian Federation of Housing Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIHW</td>
<td>Australian Institute of Health and Welfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>CACH</td>
<td>Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Homelessness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSHA</td>
<td>Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HREOC</td>
<td>Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>HTHC</td>
<td>Housing the Homeless Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>National Association of Tenants Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHTF</td>
<td>State Homelessness Taskforce</td>
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<tr>
<td>TASWA</td>
<td>Tenants Advice Service of Western Australia</td>
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

In the late 1970s, Sir Charles Court, the Western Australian Premier, stated that 'democracy won't last unless elected governments govern and look to the ballot box, and not the pressure groups' ("Premier", 1979). Decision-making processes have however changed considerably since this time, and government consultation with pressure groups is now more routine than during Sir Charles' premiership. Importantly, input from pressure groups is often considered vital to the development of relevant and meaningful public policy, as the groups provide knowledge and expertise not always held by politicians and bureaucrats. Consequently, comprehension of the role and influence of pressure groups is integral to the study of Australian politics.

Pressure groups, also commonly referred to as interest groups, are non-party associations or organisations that are independent from government, and which aim to inform and influence the way in which public policy is devised and implemented (Abbott, 1996, p.10; Henderson, 1989, p.180-181; Matthews, 1989, p.211; Singleton, Aitkin, Jinks, & Warhurst, 2003, p.341; Solomon, 1988, p.153; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, p.159). Estimates of the number of pressure groups in Australia vary from 3750 (ABS, 1997) to 7000 (Marsh, 1995). These groups span the policy spectrum and attempt to influence decisions in a broad range of areas including business, labour relations, health, agriculture, welfare and the environment (Abbott, 1996, p.13; Marsh, 1995, p.56; Matthews, 1989, p.211).
Despite the proliferation of pressure groups, debate continues as to whether they enhance or detract from the quality of Australia's democracy. Supporters of pressure group activity assert that the groups improve participatory democracy by enabling more citizens to become involved in the political process which has become far removed from individual involvement. Pressure groups also inform government of the viewpoints of their members, and offer specialist knowledge (Abbott, 1996, p.xix; Beresford, 2000, p.126; Howlett & Ramesh, 1995, p.57; Singleton et al., 2003, pp.341,345; Solomon, 1988, p.153). It is also asserted that pressure groups promote stability. Abbott (1996, p.xix) remarks:

> pressure groups act as mechanisms through which peaceful political discussion and action can take place, and in doing so are an important mechanism that helps to promote social cohesion and popular acceptance of political decisions that govern society.

Critics of pressure group activity argue that the groups' role in the political process brings a range of problems. Of primary concern is that some pressure groups are more powerful and influential than others. Government may heed to the wishes of economically or culturally powerful groups, or to those with large memberships, at the expense of wider consensus and/or good public policy (Abbott, 1996, p.xviii; Beresford, 2000, p.126; Solomon, 1988, p.154).

Other concerns include the suggestion that pressure groups are self-interested and not motivated by the national interest. Moreover, the influence that pressure groups assert can be unaccountable because agreements and policy decisions may be made behind closed doors and outside the formal decision-making process (Abbott, 1996, p.xviii). Additionally, policy stagnation may
occur when two equally prominent groups are in opposition on an issue, paralysing government decision-making (Beresford, 2000, p.128).

An improved appreciation of the role and influence of pressure groups in policy development and implementation is therefore vital to a greater understanding of the operation of political and decision-making processes. In order to better comprehend this role, various British authors have attempted to categorise pressure groups. Beer (1956, cited in Baggott, 1995, p.13) divided pressure groups into four categories: producer groups; welfare state client groups; welfare state provider groups; and professional groups and organisations. A second and more influential classification model was put forth by Stewart (1958, cited in Grant, 2000, p.18), who divided groups into sectional and promotional categories: sectional groups work in the best interests of their members, whilst promotional groups advance causes for the good of society (Baggott, 1995, pp.13-14; Grant, 2000, pp.18-19).

A third classification model, the insider-outsider typology, emerged in the 1970s in the work of Grant (1978, cited in Baggott, 1995, p.18; and in Grant, 2000, p.19), from the University of Warwick. This model has since been critiqued and revised by Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin (1994), collectively known as the Aberdeen group due to Maloney and Jordan's association with the University of Aberdeen. This model describes groups as either 'insiders' or 'outsiders', with their status reflecting the group's choice of tactics and level of influence upon decision-makers. Due to the compelling contributions of the Aberdeen model to the understanding of pressure groups in Britain, it is the theoretical model upon which this research is based.
This research utilises a case study approach to investigate the attempts of two pressure groups to influence the Western Australian State Homelessness Taskforce. The pressure groups studied were the Western Australian Council of Social Service (WACOSS), and the Tenants Advice Service of Western Australia (TASWA). WACOSS is the peak community services body in Western Australia, and has played an increased role in the policy process since the election of the Gallop Labor Government. It was selected as a representative example of an insider group, TASWA is a community legal centre specialising in tenancy issues and the rights of tenants. It was selected due to its controversial actions surrounding the Taskforce, including the resignation of its Co-ordinator from the Taskforce, and the formation of an alternative taskforce on homelessness, both of which strongly suggested outsider status.

Although several case studies of pressure groups have been conducted in Australia, few studies at either the state or federal level have investigated the insider/outsider model of pressure group theory in detail. The case studies conducted for this research aimed to determine:

- the activities and experiences of two pressure groups during the Western Australian State Homelessness Taskforce;
- what the groups' activities and experiences revealed about the on-going relevance of the insider/outsider model represented in the Australian literature; and
- the applicability of the Aberdeen model in the Australian context.

1 For examples of other case studies conducted at the federal level see Abbott (1996), and at the state level see Halpin (2002), Power (1996) and Scott (1980).
The studies of WACOSS and TASWA were conducted in accordance with case study method protocols as prescribed by Yin (1994, p.49), and focused primarily on the analysis of documentary evidence. In-depth interviews with a key informant from each organisation (Appendix 1), and a survey (Appendices 2 & 3), based upon the one conducted by Abbott (1996), supplemented the documentary evidence.²

Limitations of the case study method are well recognised, and precautions were taken to address the issues raised within the literature. It may be difficult to ascertain an accurate picture of a pressure group's operations solely from documentation for several reasons: the group may not have filed all correspondence; relevant information may have been filed incorrectly, or in files that the researcher is unaware of; or the group may deliberately choose to limit the researcher's access to documentation, without the knowledge of the researcher (Yin, 1994, p.80).

Key informant interviews and a survey were therefore used to broaden the sources of the information collected. However, these research tools may have their own set of limitations. The information gathered in interviews may be biased depending on the questions asked, or whether or not the interviewee is completely truthful in their responses (Yin, 1994, p.80). Further, the survey may be answered differently, depending upon which person from the organisation completes it.

² Leanne Barron, a former employee of WACOSS who was the Social Policy Manager at the time of the Taskforce, was interviewed about WACOSS' activities and experiences. The key TASWA informant interviewed was Dr Jeannine Purdy. Purdy is no longer employed by TASWA, but was its Co-ordinator during the Taskforce. The current Executive Officers of both organisations gave their consent for the documentation relating to the groups' activities during the Taskforce to be accessed, and for the involvement of their current and former staff members (Appendix 5).
To strengthen the research, several strategies, as detailed within the case method, were implemented. To ensure that the groups had not been misrepresented due to gaps in the documentary evidence, or to misinterpretation of data, the key informants and organisational representatives read and commented upon the analysis of their relevant group's activities. The project supervisor also commented on the plausibility of the research findings. Additionally, the validity of the research was improved via the analysis of multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1994, p.33). Documentation from the groups, key informant interviews, survey data, Taskforce documentation and newspaper clippings were used in the study.

Yin (1994, p.33) and Gillham (2000, pp.20,23) also suggest that a case study database be created to increase the reliability of the research. Subsequently, a database for this research (Appendix 4), consisting of a collection of data, evidence and notes, was created. The collection is indexed to allow for the easy retrieval of documents. A chain of evidence is also maintained within the thesis bibliography in which the individual references are directly linked to the relevant document within the database.

This thesis is divided into seven chapters, including this introduction. In Chapter 2, the current understandings of insider and outsider pressure groups are discussed in detail. Chapter 3 offers an overview of the State Homelessness Taskforce, including reasons for its formation and its key findings and recommendations, and Chapter 4 provides a synopsis of WACOSS and TASWA. Chapter 5 details the strategies used by the groups in their

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3 Gillham (2000, p.32) and Yin (1994, p.33) suggest that these steps be undertaken.
attempts to influence the Taskforce, and Chapter 6 explores the factors underlying the strategic choices made by the two organisations. In conclusion, Chapter 7 provides a discussion of the effectiveness of the existing understanding of insider and outsider pressure groups in the Australian literature, and the applicability of the Aberdeen insider/outsider model in the Australian context.
Chapter 2 - The Insider/Outsider Model of Pressure Group Theory

The role and influence of pressure groups within the policy process has emerged as an important area of political science research. Recognition of the impact of pressure groups upon policy and decision-making processes has resulted in the analysis of groups, and the subsequent development of several systems of categorisation that aim to provide clarity about pressure group activity. This chapter examines in detail one of these categorisations: the insider/outsider model of pressure group theory.

Australian understandings of the operation and influence of pressure groups are based primarily upon theory developed within the British literature. While Beer's classification model is sometimes referred to (for e.g. Beresford, 2000, pp.120-124; Marsh, 1995, pp.57-71), the sectional/promotional typology is the most prevalent model in use (for e.g. Henderson, 1989, p.184; Jaensch, 1997, pp.172-173; Kingsley & Farnsworth, 1993; Matthews, 1989, pp.211-212; Singleton et al., 2003, pp.342-350; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, pp.156-159). However, the Australian literature does not refer to an insider/outsider model per se. Rather, basic notions of insider and outsider groups have tended to be integrated into the sectional/promotional typology: that is, sectional groups are likely to be insiders and promotional groups are likely to be outsiders (Singleton et al., 2003, pp.342-350; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, pp.159-160). For the purposes of this thesis, this basic understanding of insider and outsider pressure groups will be referred to as the 'existing model'.
Under the existing model, groups are classified as insiders if they have access to decision-makers; are consulted by government; are seen to be influential; and if they use 'appropriate' tactics to achieve their goals. These groups tend to be important either economically or culturally, with groups who represent economic interests being particularly powerful (Abbott, 1996, p.xi; Henderson, 1989, p.196; Jaensch, 1994, p.180; Matthews, 1989, pp.212,216; Singleton et al., 2003, p.350; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, p.162). Moreover, insider groups tend to share the ideological and political beliefs of government (Beresford, 2000, p.119).

Further, the existing model stipulates that insider groups tend to have significant economic and human resources; a large membership base; an organised administration; and an advanced level of understanding of the processes of government and decision-making. They also provide policy solutions as well as critiques; are united on aims and strategies to achieve those aims; have expert knowledge; and produce well-researched information and advice (Abbott, 1996, p.21; Jaensch, 1994, p.178; Matthews, 1989, p.216; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, p.165).

In addition, the existing model defines insider groups as those which attempt to influence decisions via interaction with consultation processes. Activities of pressure groups which involve them in consultation processes include research-based submissions; representation on government advisory boards and committees; participation with a policy network; and lobbying ministers and their advisors. Insider groups may also provide bureaucrats with information upon request, and have formal and/or informal meetings with ministers and their
advisors (Henderson, 1989, pp.189-192; Singleton et al., 2003, p.344; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, p.162). Matthews (1989, p.218) notes that these activities further reinforce a group’s position as an insider, as they improve their contacts and strengthen their position as a responsible group.

Conversely, under the existing model outsider groups do not have direct links to decision-makers, either because they choose not to, or because they are not seen to be legitimate. Outsider groups also find it difficult to exert influence, and are perceived to employ inappropriate tactics and be at ideological odds with government (Beresford, 2000, pp.119-120; Jaensch, 1994, p.181; Matthews, 1989, p.212; Singleton et al., 2003, p.350). In addition, outsider groups tend to have limited control over the actions of their memberships, and exist outside of the policy network (Abbott, 1996, p.26; Singleton et al., 2003, p.351).

Examples of tactics used by outsider groups include: public protests; letter/fax/email campaigns; use of talk-back radio; letters to the editor; boycotts; strike action; litigation; and publicity stunts (Henderson, 1989, p.185-189; Matthews, 1989, p.215; Singleton et al., 2003, p.344; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, p.163). Singleton (2003, p.355) notes that outsider groups tend to have minimal resources, and subsequently rely heavily upon media attention as it is difficult for government to ignore issues once they are discussed heatedly within the public domain.

However, this understanding of insiders and outsiders remains a very generalised account of the role of pressure groups in the policy process, and is
unable to account adequately for the diverse roles and influence of pressure groups (Baggott, 1995, pp.15-17). More complex and insightful models have therefore been developed, which focus exclusively on the insider/outsider dichotomy. Several British authors, including Grant, and Maloney et al. have developed these models.

Grant (1978 & 1989, cited in Baggott, 1995, p.18; and in Maloney et al., 1994, pp.27-28) recognised the inadequacies of other pressure group typologies and created a model that aimed to offer greater clarity by dividing pressure groups into insiders and outsiders. Insider groups were further divided into three sub-categories: 'high profile' groups that use the media to raise public support on an issue; 'low profile' groups that use the more 'acceptable' channels of influence; and 'prisoner groups', whose activities are curtailed due to their dependence upon government funding and/or support. Outsider groups were also divided into three sub-groups: those who may become insiders providing they use acceptable strategies; those who are outsiders due to the lack of skills and expertise required to be an insider; and groups who are outsiders based upon their ideology.

Grant's work was influential, and has made significant in-roads into an improved understanding of pressure groups. Nonetheless, his model has attracted criticism. Some authors dispute the inference that only insider groups will be effective, and that all groups will aim to achieve insider status (Baggott, 1995, p.19; Maloney et al., 1994, pp.32,38).
A thorough critique of Grant's model has been offered by Maloney et al. They built upon the work of Grant and other authors, and developed an even more comprehensive insider/outside model. Grant (2000, p.29) has since remarked that the former understandings of insiders and outsiders "might usefully be replaced by that offered by the Aberdeen group". Maloney et al. recognise that pressure groups may use an array of strategies; that the types of strategies employed are not necessarily dictated by the insider or outsider status of the group; and that there are varying levels of access and influence amongst insider groups. The Aberdeen group's reworked model offers the greatest insights into the insider/outside typology, and has therefore been selected as the basis for classification of the pressure groups investigated in this study.

The Aberdeen group's main criticism of Grant's model, and of the other understandings of insiders and outsiders, is that they fail to separate strategy from status. Strategies are the tactics employed by pressure groups in their attempts to influence the policy process, and Maloney et al. (1994, p.28) emphasise that "strategy is a matter selected by the group". Conversely, the status of a pressure group is determined by the decision-makers it attempts to influence, and reflects the level of legitimacy of the group amongst decision-makers (Maloney et al., 1994, p.30). Maloney et al. note that "the status position is conditional upon government granted legitimacy: it is ascribed by policymakers to the group" (1994, p.28). The distinction between strategy and status is integral to an improved understanding of pressure groups, and is required to reduce the analytical confusion created by other models (Maloney et al., 1994, p.29).
The Aberdeen group therefore separates strategy and status in their classification model. Further, they argue that any group with access to the consultation process has insider status. They believe that access is not difficult to achieve, and consequently there are many more insider groups than other insider/outsider models suggest (Maloney et al., 1994, p.19). Hence, they divide insider status into sub-categories. This reflects the reality that some groups have minimal levels of access, whilst others enjoy a more advantaged position of access and influence (Maloney et al., 1994, p.25).

Page's comments (cited in Grant, 2000, p.30) indicate how important this distinction is:

> to characterise a group as an 'insider' or an 'outsider' in the process of making policy is at best an oversimplification and at worst possibly misleading...the apparent dichotomy implicit in the whole notion of an 'insider' is a false one; there is rather a graduation of access to executive decision making.

The Aberdeen group also assert that there is a greater divergence amongst insiders than between insiders and outsiders (Maloney et al., 1994, p.37).

In contrast to the assumptions inherent in the former understandings of insider and outsider groups, Maloney et al. argue that consultation occurs with a wide range of groups regardless of which party is in government. This occurs as a variety of perspectives require consideration if good public policy is to be formulated (Maloney et al., 1994, pp.19-23,27). Of course the input from some groups will have more weight and be considered in greater detail than others, but nonetheless almost any group can be involved in the consultation process (Maloney et al., 1994, p.27). The Aberdeen group therefore postulates that ideology is less important in defining whether a group is ascribed insider or outsider status than the existing model suggests.

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4 Page (cited in Grant, 2000, pp.24,27) also makes these points.
Importantly, the Aberdeen model is based upon the 'quality of access' that groups have to decision-makers, rather than how successful or effective they may have been (Maloney et al., 1994, p.26). This distinction is made as it is methodologically difficult to determine the effectiveness of individual groups (Grant, 2000, p.193; Henderson, 1989, p.195; Maloney et al., 1994, p.26). Rather, Maloney et al. use the term 'influence', and define it as the significance of a group's input into the policy process. Groups can therefore be classified as 'influential', even if they have not achieved their stated aims (Maloney et al., 1994, p.26).

The four sub-categories of insider status articulated by the Aberdeen group are core, specialist, peripheral, and failed insiders. These levels of insider status are based upon the quality of access that groups possess and their level of influence. Groups who are willing to 'consult', negotiate' and 'bargain' with decision-makers, and whose aims can be achieved via gradual shifts in policy, qualify for some level of Insider status, although few actually have significant influence (Maloney et al., 1994, p.36).

Core insiders are the most respected and influential of groups. They have secured a position that enables an ongoing role in policy development and decision-making across whole areas of policy. However, they are only likely to be significantly influential within their recognised area(s) of expertise (Maloney et al., 1994, pp.30-32).

Decision-makers also hold specialist insider groups in high esteem, and these groups are involved in the highest levels of consultation with government.
However, they have a narrower policy focus than core groups, and consequently their involvement in the policy process is more intermittent (Maloney et al., 1994, pp.30,32). The commonality between core and specialist groups is that in addition to access to the consultation process, both types of groups are in the position to bargain and negotiate with decision-makers (Maloney et al., 1994, p.25).

At the third level of insider status are peripheral insider groups. These groups are perceived by decision-makers to be legitimate, and they participate within the insider realm, however they are not groups that policy-makers actively seek to consult. These groups tend to have a minimal overall level of impact upon policy decisions, although they can, at times, be influential (Maloney et al., 1994, pp.31-32).

The fourth level of insider status contains the failed insiders. Groups who fall within this category are the least effectual insiders. They are recognised by decision-makers, and adhere to the rules of insider politics, but their activities are essentially superficial in nature and have virtually no impact upon policy (Maloney et al., 1994, p.32).

Groups not involved in the insider realm are defined as having an outsider status. Maloney et al. divide outsider status groups into two sub-categories: outsider status by ideology or goal; and outsider status by choice. Groups within the first category do not believe they can be influential within the insider realm, as their aims are not focused upon conventional approaches that seek gradual changes in policy. Their aims, habitually in conflict with government
positions, result in the groups resorting to outsider strategies in the hope of having their opinions aired (Maloney et al., 1994, p.32). As such, they are at odds with the insider process both ideologically and methodologically. Maloney et al. argue that it is the type of strategies these groups employ, rather than their beliefs, which result in their exclusion from the consultation process (Maloney et al., 1994, p.37).

Groups within the second category choose to have an outsider status. The very existence of these groups is dependant upon the support and involvement of their members. Supporters are in turn attracted to these groups by the uncompromising stance that the groups assume. These outsiders therefore cannot afford to utilise insider methods even if their issue can be more readily addressed that way. Consequently, their chances of influencing policy are often minimal (Maloney et al., 1994, p.32). However, the Aberdeen group (1994, p.38) dispute the assertion within the wider pressure group literature that outsiders never play a role in the development or amendment of policy: outsiders can, they believe, at times be influential.

Maloney et al. assert that the value to decision-makers of the resources of a particular group will ultimately determine the level of access and influence that the group attains (Halpin, 2002, p.490; Maloney et al., 1994, p.36). The resources a group has to offer may lead to an 'exchange-based' relationship with government:

government offers groups the opportunity to shape public policy, while groups provide government with certain resources (eg. knowledge, technical advice or expertise, membership compliance or consent, credibility, information, implementation guarantees) which it needs to secure a workable policy. (Maloney et al., 1994, p.36)
Maloney et al., of the Aberdeen group, (1994, pp.29-30) note that while the strategies used by a group are important, it is the resources of a group that govern its status. They doubt that 'resource rich' groups would be ignored even if they have acted outside accepted guidelines in the past. Group resources therefore play a significant role in determining status, particularly when groups are competing with each other for influence.

Resources include economic position; expertise; level of understanding of government and the decision-making processes; membership base; strength and level of organisation of a group's administration; and the degree to which the membership is united and supports the administration and its decisions (Maloney et al., 1994, p.23). Other authors similarly emphasise the importance of resources for groups seeking to have significant influence upon the policy process (for e.g. Abbott, 1996, p.21; Grant, 2000, pp.195-196; Henderson, 1989, p.195; Howlett & Ramesh, 1995, p.57; Jaensch, 1994, p.178; 1997, p.350; Matthews, 1989, p.216; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, p.165). The wider pressure group literature suggests that economically powerful groups are the most influential. However, in some instances, less well-financed groups may also be effective. Maloney et al (1994, p.21) note that "the development of (some) technical expertise, or political sophistication, may give them credibility with decision makers".

The Aberdeen model also divides pressure group strategies into insider and outsider categories. Insider strategies are the tactics used by pressure groups that fall within the realm of activities that are deemed to be 'acceptable' and 'legitimate' by decision-makers (Maloney et al., 1994, p.29). These tactics
involve consultation, bargaining and negotiation (Maloney et al., 1994, p.25). Dunleavy describes these activities as 'low cost actions' (cited in Maloney et al., 1994, p.26). Groups who use both insider strategies, and achieve insider status, are more likely to accomplish their desired outcomes than other groups (Jordan & Maloney, 1997, p.2; Maloney et al., 1994, p.29).

Outsider strategies are referred to as 'high cost actions' (Dunleavy, cited in Maloney et al., 1994, p.26), and are usually touted by decision-makers as 'inappropriate' behaviour. These activities are frequently focused on 'showing up' the government, often take a confrontational approach, and are usually employed with the objective of gaining maximum media coverage and public attention. Wilson (1990, pp.92-93) comments that "in large part, such choices reflect a realistic assessment of the improbability of achieving the group's objectives through dialogue with ministers and civil servants". Groups may also need to employ outsider strategies in order to recruit, inspire and maintain members (Jordan & Halpin, 2003, p.314; Maloney et al., 1994, pp.34-35).

Additionally, the Aberdeen model recognises that pressure groups exist which alternate between insider and outsider strategies, or which use a combination of both types of strategies (May and Nugent, cited in Baggott, 1995, p.20; and in Maloney et al., 1994, p.28). Jaensch (1994, p.180) comments that the ability to change strategies and tactics may underpin the success and durability of a group. Page (cited in Grant, 2000, p.30; and in Jordan & Halpin, 2003, p.318) asserts that, providing there is no encouragement of violent forms of protest, the use of an amalgam of strategies will not affect insider status:

Government departments know and understand the aspirations of and constraints operating on group leaders and expect groups to
make a loud noise on some things, and they will still invite them to participate in working groups and other participatory forums.

Maloney et al. (1994, pp.34-35) contend that organisations often do not have a choice in the types of strategies they pursue, even though the standard pressure group literature implies otherwise. They note that the type of policy change a group aspires to achieve will ultimately dictate the strategies it uses. For example, groups that aim to achieve incremental policy change will generally employ insider strategies. Groups that aim to achieve more radical policy change often attempt to do so via outsider methods. Other factors that determine the strategies an organisation employs include its history, the expectations of its members, and its funding sources.

Therefore, the Aberdeen model classifies pressure groups according to both their status and the strategies they employ. There are four categories of insider status group and two categories of outsider status group. The level of access a group achieves is ultimately dependant upon the resources the group has to offer government, although the strategies employed by a group may also affect its status. Strategies can similarly be divided into insider and outsider categories, and groups are constrained in their choice of strategy due to a variety of factors. A brief comparison of the key features of the existing model and the Aberdeen model is offered in Table 1.
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The underlying assertion of the Aberdeen model is that Britain is a 'post-parliamentary democracy', in which policy communities, comprised of senior bureaucrats, pressure groups and other individuals and groups with expertise, negotiate and often formulate policy (Richardson and Jordan, 1979, cited in Laffin, 1989, p.39). In this scenario, almost any group can be involved in the consultation process providing they show a 'serious interest' (Maloney et al., 1994, p.27), and ideological positions will not play a major role in whether the group is influential (Maloney et al., 1994, pp.22-23).

This requires further contemplation if the Aberdeen model is to be applied within the Australian setting, where, it is argued, political party ideology does impact upon the status of pressure groups. Matthews and Warhurst (1993, p.95) argue that in Australia, strong parties rule the roost at both state and federal levels, and a change in government increases access and influence to some groups, whilst minimising the role of previously privileged groups. They remark:

"It is a safe prediction that party politics will continue to influence not only the strategies of many groups but also their access to government and their chances of success in the policy-making processes at both the Commonwealth and State levels in Australia."

Alternatively, Laffin (1989, p.39) contends that the Australian situation is very similar to that which exists in Britain. He argues that the degree of separation between the ideologies of the two major parties has decreased significantly. He also states that even if there appears to be policy differences during an election campaign, once in government, the former opposition experiences intense pressure to maintain the status quo, often resulting in the alteration of policy positions. Further, he agrees with Richardson and Jordan's assertion (cited in
Laffin, 1989, p.39), that due to the existence of policy communities, changes in government do not overly impact upon pressure group access and policy stability.

This debate does not overly impact upon the applicability of the Aberdeen model in the Australian context. However, the role of ideology in the ascription of status will need to be considered by those who use the Aberdeen model to de-construct pressure group activity in Australia. Nonetheless, there will be groups who are included and others who are not in both environments. This is the fundamental similarity between the British and Australian systems that underlies the applicability of the Aberdeen model to the Australian setting.

The Australian pressure group literature pays credence to the traditional pressure group classification models but affords little investigation into the more contemporary insider/outsider models. The Aberdeen model is directly applicable to the Australian setting, and offers a framework for an in-depth investigation into the role and influence of pressure groups in the policy process. Both the existing model in Australia, and the Aberdeen model, will be applied to the case studies and critiqued in detail in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. Chapter 3 provides an overview of why the State Homelessness Taskforce was formed, and its findings and recommendations.
Chapter 3 - The State Homelessness Taskforce

The State Homelessness Taskforce was formed in July 2001 by the Western Australian Government as a joint project between the Department for Community Development and the Department for Housing and Works. This chapter explores several key developments that put homelessness on the policy agenda and resulted in the establishment of the Taskforce. These developments included the increase in research on the extent of homelessness in Australia and Western Australia; the formulation of homelessness strategies by the Howard Federal Government and other State Governments; and incessant lobbying by agencies and representative bodies within the community welfare sector.

The academic literature reports a steady increase in the incidence of homelessness in Australia since the late 1970s. This increase is attributable to a combination of a wide variety of structural and individual causes. Structural causes include poverty; unemployment; low income levels; inadequate services; and the lack of affordable, secure and appropriate housing (ACOSS, 2001; AFHO, 2001; AIHW, 2001, p.322; T. Burke, 1994, p.7; Neil & Fopp, 1994, pp.38-47,170-177; Raper, 2000). Individual causes include poor physical and/or mental health; intellectual disability; drug and alcohol abuse; family and relationship breakdown; gambling problems; domestic violence; and physical and sexual abuse (AIHW, 2001, p.322; Leech, 2001; Raper, 2000).

Data collected in the 1996 Australian Bureau of Statistics census indicated that the rate of homelessness in Western Australia was comparatively higher than in
its eastern counterparts. It was reported that there were 12,252 homeless people in Western Australia on census night, which is 71.5 per 10,000 head of population. In comparison, in New South Wales there were 49.4 homeless people per 10,000 and 41.0 per 10,000 in Victoria (Chamberlain, 1999, pp.43-44).

In the lead up to the establishment of the Taskforce, reports from welfare agencies in Western Australia indicated that there were growing numbers of people in crisis. In March 2001, the Salvation Army in Perth noted an increase in the number of people with mental illness seeking assistance, and the difficulty in finding long-term accommodation in either public housing or the private market for people who had been in crisis care. Also at this time Mission Australia’s regional manager claimed that up to 80% of young people who sought accommodation assistance could not be helped (Miller, 2001, p.4). In November 2001 WACOSS released its Australians Living on the Edge 2000/01 report, which concluded there was an increase from the previous year in the number of people seeking assistance, and in those who went unassisted. This was attributed to the sheer demand for services, the increase in the number of people with complex needs, and the lack of resources across the sector (James, 2001, p.29).

The high proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people who were homeless in Western Australian was also cause for alarm. Even though Indigenous people comprise only 3.1% of Western Australia’s population, they represented approximately half of the homeless people (Chamberlain, 1999, pp.22,40; Crevatin & Pendergast, 2002, pp.7-8), and 18% of public housing
tenants (SHTF, 2001a, p.2). TASWA estimates that in 2001 there were more than 1000 homeless Indigenous families in Western Australia, and Ted Wilkes, a former Director of the Derbarl Yerrigan Health Service, commented “every Aboriginal family I know has told me of experiences of having homeless family members sleeping on lounge floors...” (Boase, 2001, p.3).

Features of Indigenous homelessness include removal from family and country; housing in which personal safety is compromised; and the absence of any form of shelter (AFHO, 2000; Lai & McDonald, 2001, p.3). Issues that contribute to the high proportion of homeless Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people include low incomes; overcrowding; high rates of unemployment; and the misunderstanding of rules and regulations applicable to public housing which may result in eviction (Berry, MacKenzie, Briskman, & Ngwenya, 2001, pp.11-14; Neil & Fopp, 1994, p.99). Alleged discrimination within the public housing system and the private rental market is also charged with directly contributing to the high rate of Indigenous homelessness (O'Brien, 2001, p.5; WACOSS, 2001a, p.6).

The prevalence of literature on the nature and extent of homelessness at both national and state levels provided the basis upon which pressure could be exerted on governments to develop policies and programs to prevent and ameliorate homelessness. Additional precursors to the formation of the State Homelessness Taskforce in Western Australia were the establishment of the National Homelessness Strategy by the Federal Government in May 2000; the launch of the Victorian Homelessness Strategy in July 2000; and the

Also integral to the establishment of the Taskforce was the pre- and post-election lobbying by community welfare pressure groups including WACOSS, Shelter WA and the Community Housing Coalition of Western Australia (SHTF, 2001b, p.7). Prior to the announcement that an election was pending, homelessness was not on the policy agenda. In the Taskforce’s Final Report, it was stated that through intensive lobbying, the community welfare sector managed to convince the major parties that homelessness was a significant social problem that required immediate government action, and subsequently the issue shifted onto the policy agenda during the 2000/01 election campaign (SHTF, 2002, p.25).

The State Homelessness Taskforce was formed as a result of the Labor Party’s pre-election promise, and the continued pressure placed upon the newly elected Gallop Labor Government by interested parties. Its first meeting was conducted in late July 2001 (SHTF, 2001c). Initially, the Taskforce was comprised of 13 members, although this was reduced to 12 due to the resignation of one of the members. Selection of Taskforce members was based upon their experience in, and knowledge of, homelessness issues (SHTF, 2001a, p.3). The Taskforce’s panel included people from community organisations; government departments; the Aboriginal community; and a representative from outside the metropolitan area. The Taskforce also had a secretariat that consisted of a staff member from the Department for Housing
and Works, and from the Department for Community Development, and a non-
government employee (SHTF, 2001a, p.3).

The terms of reference for the Taskforce included the development of a holistic
approach to addressing homelessness in Western Australia, via wide
consultation with the community and relevant government departments. In
particular, the Taskforce was developed to devise a plan that addressed the key
issues underlying homelessness: that is “access to appropriate, affordable
accommodation, access to supported accommodation and access to support
services” (SHTF, 2001a, p.5). Moreover, the Taskforce was to provide an
overall understanding of homelessness itself; how people become homeless;
and how to assist homeless people back into accommodation. Prevention
strategies and service provision issues were to be identified, and benchmarks
and social indicators devised (SHTF, 2001d, p.2).

The Taskforce had two formal consultation periods prior to the publication of its
final report. The first was after the circulation of its Issues Paper in September
(SHTF, 2002, p.1). The communication and consultation strategies of the
Taskforce also involved regular informal contact with interested parties. These
included community welfare organisations; service providers; homeless people;
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people; and organisations representing
youth, migrants, and people with special needs and/or mental health problems
(SHTF, 2001a, p.3; 2002, p.i). Consultation occurred via meetings in
metropolitan and regional areas; newsletters; personal contact; and the
Taskforce website (SHTF, 2001c; 2001a, p.3). Overall, the Taskforce received
100 written submissions, and held 43 group consultations and 58 individual interviews (SHTF, 2002, p.i).

One of the aims of the Taskforce was to formulate an improved understanding of homelessness. A long running debate exists over a proper definition of homelessness, with the common perception being that it equates to 'sleeping rough'. However, this is not a realistic description of the homeless population (Chamberlain & Johnson, 2001, pp.35,44). As such, the definition adopted by the Taskforce acknowledges that people are homeless if they do not have access to safe and secure accommodation. It also recognises that there are several forms of homelessness, categorised at primary, secondary and tertiary levels (SHTF, 2002, p.1). This definition was originally an outcome of the Technical Forum on the Estimation of Homelessness in Australia (see Strategic Planners, 2001), and is the definition promoted by the Commonwealth Department for Family and Community Services, and the Commonwealth Supported Accommodation Assistance Program National Co-ordination and Development Committee (AIHW, 2001, p.326).

The Taskforce also identified groups at particular risk of homelessness, and its findings mirrored those found by the Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Homelessness (CACH, 2001). The West Australian Taskforce also reported that there were higher numbers of homeless Indigenous Australians in Western Australia than in most other states, and identified gay, lesbian and transgender

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5 Primary homelessness is sleeping without shelter; secondary is living in crisis accommodation or temporarily with friends and relatives; and tertiary is living in caravan parks and in boarding houses for example, where there is no security of tenure.
people as being at risk of homelessness. This group was not specifically recognised in other states' reports, nor in the CACH report (SHTF, 2002, p.63).

Further, the Taskforce outlined what it considered to be the primary causes of homelessness. These causes include a lack of access to affordable and appropriate housing; and the low rate of income support payments in comparison to the pension, particularly for independent young people. Problems with access to services and support services for people who are homeless, who are making the transition into accommodation, or who are leaving institutional and long-term care, are also major areas of concern. The need for prevention and early intervention programs was also highlighted, as was the requirement to address the high rate of homelessness amongst Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (SHTF, 2002, pp.89-109).

In addition, the Taskforce found that an all-encompassing approach was required if homelessness was to be addressed. As a result, many of its recommendations require joint initiatives between departments, and State and Federal Governments. An Implementation Committee was therefore established to oversee the necessary coordination and cooperation. Collaboration between Western Australia and the Commonwealth on this issue is essential, as the federal nature of the Australian political system impacts upon the ways in which homelessness can be tackled. To illustrate, there are many issues that contribute to homelessness that the State does not have control over. This is highlighted in the Taskforce's Final Report (SHTF, 2002, p.85):
as a State, Western Australia does not have the ability to direct initiatives that relate to income support, economic and employment generation, [and] refugee and migrant policies.

There are also other areas for which both the State and Commonwealth Governments are dually responsible. For example, the Commonwealth State Housing Assistance Program (CSHA) is jointly funded, with two thirds contributed by the Commonwealth and the remainder by the States. The CSHA includes public and community housing; crisis accommodation; Aboriginal rental housing; and home ownership schemes (McIntosh & Phillips, 2001). A situation therefore exists where the Western Australian Government is partially dependant upon Commonwealth policy and funding to develop and implement programs aimed at addressing homelessness.

By and large, the recommendations of the Taskforce encapsulate the responses required to tackle homelessness that are suggested in the Australian literature reviewed for this research (for eg. ACOSS, 2001; AFHO, 2002; P. Burke, 1998; T. Burke, 1994; Chamberlain & Johnson, 2001, 2002; HREOC, 1989; Neil & Fopp, 1994; Raper, 2000). The Taskforce also examined the experiences of overseas Governments that are actively attempting to tackle homelessness, including France, Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom and Canada (SHTF, 2002, pp.17-22).

The Taskforce presented its final report to Government at the end of January 2002. In May, Premier Gallop announced that an additional $32 million would be allocated to programs aimed at addressing homelessness, on top of the $34 million which was already being delivered to ongoing programs (Government of Western Australia, 2002).
The State Homelessness Taskforce was created in Western Australia following the development of homelessness strategies by the Federal and some State Governments, and after a sustained lobbying effort by community welfare organisations. A wealth of academic research and evidence, and the ripe conditions of a pending election, enabled the welfare organisations to convince the major parties that homelessness was an issue that had to be tackled by government. The final report produced by the Taskforce provided a detailed account of strategies to address homelessness in Western Australia. However, a more detailed analysis of the Taskforce's findings is outside the scope of this research, as is an analysis of how closely the Government's responses reflected the recommendations of the Taskforce. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the WACOSS and TASWA organisations, and the activities these groups undertake. The ways in which these two groups attempted to influence the findings and recommendations of the Taskforce are explored in Chapter 5.
Chapter 4 - Overview of WACOSS and TASWA

Many pressure groups attempted to influence the findings and recommendations of the State Homelessness Taskforce. Two of these groups, WACOSS and TASWA, were selected as appropriate case study subjects. Preliminary investigations suggested that information provided by the groups could form a framework within which it was possible to effectively compare and contrast the existing model in the Australian literature with the Aberdeen model. This chapter provides a synopsis of the two organisations, and focuses upon their aims; key functions; organisational structure; funding; staff; membership; the general strategies employed by the organisations in their attempts to influence government policy decisions; and the status of the groups.

WACOSS is the peak body of the community services sector in Western Australia. A non-profit organisation formed in 1956, WACOSS campaigns for a more equitable society. It is part of a federation of social service councils throughout Australia that attempt to ensure that the interests of low income and disadvantaged people are promoted and protected (WACOSS, 2001b, p.5). The group's mission is:

> to be an effective influence on policies that promote the wellbeing of Western Australians; to contribute to the existence of an effective and vibrant community services sector; [and] to contribute to an informed public opinion on social issues. (WACOSS, 2002b, p.1)

The organisation has several key functions. It aims to incorporate the concerns of its members into government policy via conducting research, formulating policy positions, and making submissions to government. It also liaises
between government and the community welfare sector, and provides training and information resources for its members across the state. Additionally, WACOSS holds seminars; runs consultancy and advisory services; and participates in capacity building projects and community business partnerships. WACOSS also distributes a range of publications; maintains a website; and sends a monthly newsletter to over 2000 email addresses (WACOSS, 2001b, p.3; 2002a, pp.5,16-17).

TASWA was founded in 1979 through Shelter WA, via Commonwealth Government funding in response to the recommendations of the 1975 Henderson Inquiry into Poverty. It is a non-government community legal centre whose main objectives are: to promote and represent the interests of tenants and prospective tenants; to address the issue of the lack of access to appropriate, affordable and secure housing for people in need; and to provide services to tenants who require assistance (TASWA, 2002, p.1). TASWA target their services towards a range of disadvantaged and/or marginalised groups, including “people on low incomes, Aboriginal people, people with disabilities, older people, young people, recently arrived migrants and refugees, sole parents and people with literacy issues” (TASWA, 2002, p.2).

The functions of TASWA include the provision of information and services to tenants and future tenants; to represent these people when necessary; and to act on behalf of the community interest. It provides education and training services to tenancy advocates; runs a telephone advice line; and publishes and distributes information (TASWA, 2002). In 2001/02, TASWA circulated over 30,000 publications covering a variety of tenancy issues (TASWA, 2002, p.32),
received 160,000 hits on its website and had 45,000 pages of information requested (TASWA, 2002, p.41). The organisation also distributes a bi-annual newsletter to its members (TASWA, 2002, p.10). Furthermore, TASWA undertakes research and prepares submissions in the interests of tenants, and shares information with the public and with other organisations concerned with tenancy issues (TASWA, 2002, p.2).

Bodies whose members are elected from the membership of the groups control both WACOSS and TASWA. However, the structures of each group are slightly different. WACOSS has a board, a finance committee and a governance committee, and an Executive Director who runs the organisation on a day-to-day basis (WACOSS, 2002a, p.21). TASWA has an Executive Committee, and a Coordinator oversees the functions of the organisation. A TASWA staff member sits on its executive body (TASWA, 2002, pp.7-8).

In addition, both organisations are members of national bodies. The dual responsibility of State governments and the Commonwealth for many policy areas, including homelessness and housing, means that these networks are essential to ensure that issues are addressed at both levels of government. WACOSS, and the other state and territory councils of social service, are represented by the peak body ACOSS, the Australian Council of Social Service. ACOSS is responsible for lobbying the Commonwealth Government on federal issues. In June 2002, ACOSS had a membership of nearly 400, comprised of national consumer and service provider peak bodies, welfare agencies, low income consumer groups, other associate organisational members and individual members (ACOSS, 2002, pp.26-29; n.d).
TASWA is a part of NATO, the National Association of Tenant Organisations, a federation of state and territory tenants' unions and tenants' advice services. NATO has seven members (NATO, 2003, p.2). It allows members to exchange information, data and ideas, and occasionally the collective works collaboratively on federal issues (J. Purdy, personal communication, September 8, 2003). In addition, TASWA is the Western Australian representative in the Federation of Community Legal Centres (TASWA, 2002, p.36).

Funding for both WACOSS and TASWA is derived primarily from government administered operating grants. Although government grants are a major source of revenue, WACOSS also collects substantial amounts of income by presenting seminars and providing consultancy services. Project management and membership fees, and the sale of publications, also contribute to the organisation's income. In the 2001/02 financial year, WACOSS' total operating income was $1,033,917, and it had accumulated savings of $139,906 (WACOSS, 2002a, financial statements, pp.9,14).

In contrast, TASWA essentially receives its entire revenue base from government-administered grants. The majority of its funding comes from the Rental Accommodation Fund, which is the account containing bond money paid by tenants in public housing. Under the relevant legislation, the interest that is earned upon these monies is directed towards the provision of tenancy and other services. Purdy notes that, in this sense, TASWA's key funding, although administered by government, is in fact tenants' monies and not government funds. This funding is provided to run the telephone advice line, publish tenancy materials, advocate on the behalf of tenants and to train tenancy
advocates (J. Purdy, personal communication, January 31, 2004). A smaller proportion of funds are supplied by the Commonwealth Government, via Legal Aid WA, in the form of a community legal centre grant. Other substantially smaller grants also contribute intermittently to the funding of the organisation. In the 2001/02 financial year, TASWA had a total operating income of $525,146, and had accumulated savings of $75,596 (TASWA, 2002, p.54).  

WACOSS therefore has twice the budget of TASWA, although staff numbers at the organisations are similar. In September 2003, WACOSS had eleven full-time and three part-time staff. The social policy team is a fraction of this number, and is spread thinly across a broad range of social issues (Appendix 2). In August 2003, TASWA had six full-time, five part-time and two casual staff, and the organisation focuses only upon tenancy issues. One person is employed as a policy officer, with the remainder tending to administrative duties and to the fulfilment of other obligations including the operation of the help-line and addressing tenants' legal issues (Appendix 3).

Both groups have strategic plans to ensure that financial and staffing resources are used effectively, and that the organisations fulfil their aims. At WACOSS, the Board, after consultation with members, decides upon priority policy areas. At the time of the Taskforce, the priority areas were poverty (including housing and unemployment), industry policy, Aboriginal issues and family policy (WACOSS, 2001c). These priority areas were developed via consultation with

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6 The author was unable to obtain figures that would indicate how the size and funding of WACOSS and TASWA compares with other pressure groups both within the community welfare sector and across the board. The ABS pressure group survey (1997) of 700 organisations, which was discontinued, does not supply mean or medium income or membership figures. Abbott's survey (1996) of 141 groups similarly does not provide the statistical data required to enable comparison.
community service organisations; sector peak groups and networks; and information from ACOSS and the other state and territory councils (WACOSS, 2001b, p.5). The priority policy area for TASWA is tenancy issues, and its strategic plan is amended annually following a full-day review of the plan by staff and the Management Committee. Feedback from members and service users is also considered at this time (TASWA, personal communication, November 23, 2003).

Both groups have a range of organisational and individual members. In June 2002, WACOSS had a total of 354 members. This membership is comprised of social service organisational members; associate organisational members including Centrelink and the Department for Community Development; individual members; and associate individual members including several senior State Government politicians (Member's Section, WACOSS, 2002a). WACOSS also has honorary life members. In addition, it has established partnerships with social research centres and schools at Edith Cowan, Murdoch and Curtin Universities (Member's Section, WACOSS, 2002a). TASWA had a total of 178 individual, organisational and life members in June 2002 (TASWA, 2002, p.10). A detailed list of TASWA's members is not publicly available, however four of its affiliates are members of the Legislative Council, and an individual from a TASWA organisational member was on the State Homelessness Taskforce, albeit in a personal capacity and not formally as a representative of their employer (TASWA, personal communication, 17 December, 2003).

In order to achieve their mission of influencing government policy, both organisations have employed a variety of methods. The use of these tactics
varies from issue to issue, and both organisations stress the need to use a range of strategies (L. Barron, personal communication, September 23, 2003; J. Purdy, personal communication, September 8, 2003). The assortment of strategies used by the groups include: representation on government committees and advisory boards; making submissions to government inquiries; consultation and negotiation with government; publication of research and of a newsletter; involvement with a policy network and in public and sector forums; and formal contact with ministers (Appendix 3; Appendix 2; WACOSS 2002a, p.9; 2001b pp.5-6). WACOSS also has informal contact with ministers and their advisors (Appendix 2).

In addition, both groups run pre-election campaigns in the hope of gaining commitments from the political parties, and facilitate meetings with other community organisations within the sector. WACOSS also holds pre-budget forums and lobbies government when the budget is drafted. Further, it provides general information, policy alternatives, research and feedback directly to ministers, ministerial advisors and bureaucrats. WACOSS also acts as a gateway between government, service providers and consumers to enable government consultation with these groups. In addition to the pre-election campaigns, TAWSA provides advice to electorate officers on the resolution of individual tenancy cases (Appendix 3; TASWA 2002, p.37-39; 2001a, p.55; Appendix 2; WACOSS 2001b, p.1).

Use of the media is a further strategy utilised by both groups, and it is aimed at informing the public and putting pressure on decision-makers. Both groups distribute media releases, and are consulted by the media for their point of view.
Between October 2001 and June 2002, WACOSS was interviewed 67 times by a range of newspapers, and radio and television stations. WACOSS was consulted about a broad range of issues, including homelessness; housing; state and federal budgets; tax increases; poverty; welfare; the funding and resources of community service organisations; and the impact of service charge increases on low income earners (WACOSS, 2002a, p.14). TASWA has received increasing recognition of its expertise on tenancy and housing issues, and has been interviewed several times by newspapers, and television and radio programs (TASWA, 2002, p.39). In their attempts to influence policy, TASWA also uses, when necessary, talk-back radio, public protests, letter and fax campaigns, and court action (Appendix 3).

Analysis of the groups’ documentation, and their responses to the survey (Appendices 2 & 3), makes it possible to categorise the status of the two organisations. Under the Richard Court Liberal Government, the input of WACOSS into the decision-making process was marginal in comparison to its experiences under the Gallop Labor Government (Appendix 2). Although many of the pre-mentioned strategies were utilised, their impacts were not widely felt (Appendix 2). However, the election of the Gallop Labor Government opened more channels of access for WACOSS, and its role in the decision-making process on social policy issues increased significantly (Appendix 2; WACOSS, 2001b, p.3). The upsurge in the representation of WACOSS on government committees and advisory boards from 13 in 2000/01 to 26 in 2001/02 is an indicator of its heightened position. The breadth of issues in which WACOSS was involved also increased and included water use; telecommunications in remote, rural and regional areas; sustainability; the regional development
leadership plan; and employment (WACOSS, 2001b, pp.8-9; 2002a, p.12). In addition, WACOSS, along with several other peak community organisations, established a regular meeting with the Director General of the Department for Housing and Works (TASWA, 2002, p.6).

TASWA's influence under the Court Government was limited, and this situation has remained unchanged under the Gallop Government (Appendix 3). The organisation has however had sporadic episodes of significant influence in policy debates. For example, it was instrumental in the reformation of the Residential Tenancies Act, and in the annulment of a former Homeswest media policy (J. Purdy, personal communication, January 31, 2004). TASWA is also represented on several government committees and advisory boards concerned with community legal centre issues, and housing and tenancy issues. In 2000/01 it was on four government committees (TASWA, 2001a, p.53), and on five in 2001/02 (TASWA, 2002, pp.36-38). TASWA also attends the meeting with the Director General of the Department for Housing and Works. The establishment of this meeting in 2001/02 is considered by TASWA to be a highlight of that year (TASWA, 2002, p.6).

To summarise, this chapter provides a brief outline of the two pressure groups that are the focus of this research. The organisations have many similar functions, and aim to protect the interests of disadvantaged groups within society. They do this by attempting to ensure that government policy adequately accounts for the wellbeing of these groups. Chapter 5 investigates the specific strategies employed by WACOSS and TASWA in their attempts to
influence the findings and recommendations of the State Homelessness Taskforce.
Chapter 5 - Pressure Group Activities and the State Homelessness Taskforce

The establishment of a government Taskforce into a complex public policy issue such as homelessness offers unique opportunities to study pressure group activities. In relation to the State Homelessness Taskforce, both WACOSS and TASWA took advantage of the process and developed strategies to enhance their influence upon public policy. This chapter details the activities in which WACOSS and TASWA were involved immediately prior to, and during, the State Homelessness Taskforce. The strategies of the groups included the pre-election lobbying of political parties; correspondence with Ministers; attendance at community sector meetings; and the formation of alliances with other organisations. Additionally, both groups made detailed submissions to the Taskforce in response to its Issues Paper and Draft Report. The attempts by the groups to influence the findings and recommendations of the Taskforce are presented in chronological order. WACOSS' activities are examined first, followed by TASWA's.

WACOSS' campaign for the State to devise a homelessness strategy began with the lobbying of political parties prior to the February 2001 election. All political parties responded positively, and WACOSS drew up a scorecard of the parties' election social policy promises (WACOSS, 2000, p.10; 2001c, pp.1-2,7). WACOSS established a line of communication with the newly-instated Minister for Housing, and conveyed the organisation's position that any move to address homelessness by the Gallop Government must incorporate an across
departmental approach (WACOSS, 2001d). Stephens (2001a), the Minister for Housing, agreed that this would be the most appropriate strategy.

WACOSS' plan for the Government to address homelessness, and for WACOSS to play a key role in the development of a homelessness strategy, was gaining momentum. However, its campaign was momentarily derailed when the Ministry of Housing, at the request of the Minister (Stephens, 2001a), convened a meeting with housing service providers in mid-March 2001. This was the first discussion held by the new Government about its intention to devise and implement a homelessness strategy, however WACOSS was not invited to attend (Ministry of Housing, 2001a).

WACOSS acted quickly to ensure that this was not to be a precedent for the involvement of the organisation in the development of a homelessness strategy. In a letter to the Housing Minister, dated one day prior to the scheduled meeting, WACOSS outlined its concerns. These included that many key consumer and housing service provider groups, including WACOSS, had not been invited to participate at the first meeting about the Strategy; that without the input of non-government groups and non-housing service providers, the focus of the Strategy would not be all encompassing; and that due to the short notice given about the meeting (two days), there was also a risk that some organisations would be unable to attend. This would impact upon the breadth of organisations represented at the meeting. In closing, WACOSS reiterated its commitment to addressing homelessness, and its willingness to work with the Government on this issue (WACOSS, 2001d).
In reply to this letter, Minister Stephens tried to placate the organisation. He stated that he specifically wanted feedback from housing service providers at the first meeting, and that a second meeting was to be held which would involve the broader sector. He also acknowledged the 'value', 'knowledge' and 'good work' of WACOSS and other non-housing service providers (Stephens, 2001a). In the end, WACOSS did in fact have a delegate attend this first meeting (Mould, 2001).

The second meeting about the development of a homelessness strategy was held at the end of March 2001, and it was from this time onwards that WACOSS' involvement in the process became firmly established. Any interested non-government sector organisations were invited to attend the forum, which was co-hosted by WACOSS and two other community sector organisations. These three groups were delegated to be representatives of the community sector organisations who attended the meeting. A list of short-term strategies to address homelessness was devised at the forum, and this was presented to the Managing Director of the Ministry for Housing by the delegates in early April (Organisation A, 2001a).

At the second meeting it was also decided that another working party was required to focus on the long-term solutions to homelessness. The Long-Term Group, also referred to as the Non-Government Working Party, was to ascertain the views of the community sector about the best approach to formulate a homelessness strategy, and to feed these ideas directly to Government (Non-Government Working Party, 2001a). WACOSS took a lead role in the Long-Term Working Party, and it became responsible for the administration of its
meetings (L. Barron, personal communication, March 26, 2003; WACOSS, 2001b, p.7). The Executive Director of WACOSS became the liaison person between the Long-Term group and the Taskforce convenors (WACOSS, 2001e), and the President of WACOSS, who was also the Director of Centrecare, was appointed as the Chairperson of the Taskforce in June 2001, albeit in a personal capacity and not officially as a representative of his employer organisations.

The Long-Term Working Party held two meetings in May 2001. It called for a State Homelessness Taskforce to be formed that would take a whole-of-government approach to addressing homelessness. It further outlined why a homelessness strategy was needed; what the key outcomes of the strategy should be; and the types of organisations and government departments that should be represented on the Taskforce. Additionally, the Working Party charted what it believed should be the goals; terms of reference; time frame; and consultation process of the proposed Taskforce (Non-Government Working Party, 2001a; 2001b, pp.1-5).

WACOSS also attended the meetings of the Short-Term Working Party (2001) in early May, and the Party's meeting with the Ministry of Housing in mid-May (Ministry of Housing, 2001b). However, WACOSS' involvement with the Long-Term group became its primary focus (L. Barron, personal communication, March 26, 2003). WACOSS was also involved in consultation on homelessness issues at the local government level, and the organisation was represented at the Homelessness Seminar held by the City of Perth in August 2001. Service providers within the City of Perth, relevant government departments, and a
member of the Taskforce Secretariat were present at the seminar, which discussed how the City could be involved in the across-government strategy (Dunne, 2001).

Shortly after the first meeting of the Long-Term Working Party, WACOSS was approached by another organisation with the prospect of forming an alliance. In a letter from the Chairperson of that organisation, it was proposed that representatives from the groups should meet to discuss the formation of a loose coalition, whereby they could work together on issues of shared interest. The approaching organisation felt that working together, the groups would be a stronger force, and could have a greater impact upon social policy (Organisation A, 2001b). In response, the President of WACOSS commented favourably to WACOSS' Executive Director that "there would seem to be significant value in such a meeting given the current environment and the need for the sector to forge respectful alliances" (Organisation A, 2001b).

A sector consultation meeting was convened by WACOSS and another leading community sector organisation in late September, to discuss matters arising from the Taskforce's Issues Paper that had been released earlier that month. The outcomes of this meeting; previous research conducted by WACOSS; and consultation with other key stakeholders, were the basis for WACOSS' submission to the Taskforce Issues Paper (WACOSS, 2001a, p.2). According to Barron (personal communication, March 26, 2003), the sector, in general, was dissatisfied with the poor content and lack of analysis within the Issues Paper. WACOSS' submission reflected this scrutiny and highlighted the

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7 Consent has not been sought from the other organisations involved in the Taskforce process, and as such they have not been identified.
structural causes of homelessness which had not been adequately explored by the Taskforce to date (WACOSS, 2001, p.2).

The perceived shortcomings of the Issues Paper fuelled further discontent amongst those organisations that were already displeased with the Taskforce process. A number of groups had been disgruntled with the Taskforce process from the outset, as several key organisations had not been invited to sit on the Taskforce. In addition, it was argued that the Taskforce was primarily comprised of representatives of housing service providers, and failed to incorporate an adequate number of organisations or individuals representing consumers (L. Barron, personal communication, March 26, 2003). These events laid the foundation for the breaking away by some groups and individuals from the formal process, and to the establishment of an alternative taskforce. TASWA was amongst the groups who split away, however WACOSS chose to stay within the formal process.

The next documented meeting was the Homelessness Forum on 12 December 2001, which was jointly held by WACOSS and two other community sector organisations. This meeting was called in response to the release of the Taskforce's Draft Report. Twenty-five people, from a range of organisations including community legal centres, women's refuges and accommodation providers, attended the meeting. A representative from the Taskforce Secretariat was also present (Shelter WA, 2001). Discussions at the forum, and research conducted by WACOSS, informed the organisation's submission to the Taskforce's Draft Report. WACOSS viewed the Draft Report as a significant improvement upon the Issues Paper. However, it remained critical of
the insufficient analysis of the causes of homelessness within the Draft Report. WACOSS also asserted that, due to the extent of Indigenous homelessness, there should be a separate action plan specifically for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. A moratorium on evictions from public housing was also called for (WACOSS, 2001f, pp.1-5). In the period between the release of the Taskforce’s Final Report at the end of January 2002, and the Government’s response in May, WACOSS strongly lobbied the Government in an attempt to gain a favourable reaction to the Taskforce’s findings and recommendations (WACOSS, 2002a, p.8).

TASWA similarly ran a pre-election campaign in 2000/01 to raise awareness of tenancy issues amongst candidates. Specifically, it highlighted the need to address policy and legislation that has adverse impacts upon tenants and which contributes to the problem of homelessness in Western Australia. After the election, TASWA followed up its campaign by meeting with new Ministers and other members of Parliament. TASWA was also part of the push to establish a homelessness taskforce (TASWA, 2001a, p.55).

TASWA became involved in the non-government sector’s drive for a state homelessness strategy, and it attended the open meeting held in March 2001. The organisation became a member of the Long-Term Working Party (Non-Government Working Party, 2001b, p.1; WACOSS, 2001g), and also attended the meeting of the Short-Term Group at the Ministry of Housing in May. Furthermore, TASWA corresponded with the new Minister for Housing and acknowledged his willingness to address homelessness. The organisation also aired some of its concerns, which included the claim by the Ministry for Housing
that there had been a lack of demand for its accommodation. This claim, TASWA asserted, could not be substantiated, and the existence of long public housing waiting lists was proof of the absurdity of such a claim (TASWA, 2001b).

In addition, TASWA saw the formation of alliances as integral to its ability to influence the Taskforce outcomes. It contacted another community sector organisation\(^8\), which was one of the delegates of the Long-Term Working Party, to ensure it was informed of new developments, and to reinforce its willingness to contribute to the process (TASWA, 2001c). The two organisations provided feedback to each other for the duration of the Taskforce process (TASWA, 2001d; TASWA & Organisation B, 2001). The initial letter from TASWA to the second organisation was also forwarded to the Minister for Housing (TASWA, 2001c).

In July 2001, TASWA's Co-ordinator, Dr Jeannine Purdy, was invited to be a member of the Taskforce. Purdy accepted this invitation on behalf of TASWA, and not in a personal capacity as was outlined in her invitation. Purdy did this in recognition that, in reality, the Taskforce members' affiliations to their employer organisations could not, and should not, be ignored. Alliances and allegiances would, she argued, ultimately impact upon the findings and recommendations of the Taskforce, as the majority of Taskforce members were from housing service providers. TASWA was the only consumer organisation represented (J. Purdy, personal communication, September 8, 2003).

\(^8\) refer footnote 7, p.53.
In fact, it quickly became apparent to Purdy that her points of view on the causes of homelessness, being primarily of a structural nature, and the methods to address those issues, was outnumbered on the Taskforce. Purdy comments that even though housing service providers have a thorough understanding of issues relating to homelessness, they have a different perspective to the consumers of those services (J. Purdy, personal communication, September 8, 2003).

The TASWA Co-ordinator was also concerned that the soon to be released Issues Paper did not place a great enough emphasis upon independent research, or the academic literature on homelessness. Purdy believed the Issues Paper was too focused on the personal causes of homelessness, and ignored the structural causes. This reflected her view that the Government had chosen the composition of the Taskforce with the outcomes it wanted in mind. Hence, Purdy was concerned that the Taskforce lacked sufficient independence, and that the many personal inter-relationships between and within the Taskforce and its Secretariat would stifle discussion and co-opt consensus. Furthermore, many of the organisations represented on the Taskforce were reliant upon government funding which, Purdy argues, limited their capacity to be critical of government policies and decisions (Purdy, 2001a, 2001b).

Purdy made her concerns known to the Taskforce and its Secretariat in late August 2001, and provided a range of academic resources to support her claims. When none of the points she raised at the meeting with the Secretariat were incorporated into the final draft of the Issues Paper, Purdy, with the full
support of the TASWA Committee, resigned from her position on the Taskforce (J. Purdy, personal communication, September 8, 2003). After Purdy's resignation and the release of the Issues Paper, TASWA made a formal submission to the Taskforce. In its submission, TASWA reiterated the points which Purdy had raised with the other Taskforce members and its Secretariat prior to her resignation (TASWA, 2001e).

The next major development involving TASWA occurred at the Homelessness Forum in September 2001. At this meeting it was decided, by a number of organisations in attendance that were unhappy with the Government's Taskforce process, that an Alternative Taskforce be established. TASWA staff and committee members, including Purdy, were a driving force behind the formation of the Coalition (HTHC, 2001a; J. Purdy, personal communication, September 8, 2003). The Alternative Taskforce consisted of 12 individuals including employees of TASWA, a men's hostel and a church-based social justice group, as well as a tenant of Homeswect housing (HTHC, 2001b; J. Purdy, personal communication, November 11, 2003). A decision was made that the members of the Alternative Taskforce would not formally represent their employer agencies due to concerns that the agencies' funding could be impacted upon. However, two organisations, one of which was TASWA, agreed to help resource the Alternative Taskforce (J. Purdy, personal communication, January 31, 2004). In October, a meeting of these individuals was held and a draft Statement on the causes and responses required to address homelessness was composed. In early November, the Statement was agreed to by all parties involved, and the alliance named itself the Housing the Homeless Coalition (HTHC, 2001c).
The Housing the Homeless Coalition released its Statement in mid-November 2001. In the Statement, the Coalition outlined its charges against the Government Taskforce. These included that it placed too little emphasis upon the lack of access to affordable, secure and appropriate housing, and upon the absence of State funding for public housing in Western Australia. The Alternative Taskforce also believed that the Issues Paper placed too great an emphasis upon the personal factors that contribute to homelessness, and that the paper contained racist attitudes. In addition, solutions required to address homelessness were detailed (HTHC, 2001d). The group's Statement was sent to the Ministers for Housing and Community Development, and circulated to the Premier, the Minister for Indigenous Affairs, Taskforce members, and its Secretariat (HTHC, 2001a).

It should be noted that the Coalition did not regard its Statement as a submission to the formal Taskforce. Rather, the Statement was released to highlight the ability of the Alternative Taskforce to work effectively outside of the formal process, and to provide a detailed account of the causes of, and responses to, homelessness: a feat that the formal Taskforce seemed incapable of achieving. The Coalition members believed that as their input to the Taskforce had previously been ignored, this was the most effective way of influencing the Ministers responsible for the formulation of a homelessness strategy (J. Purdy, personal communication, 6 January, 2004).

The Ministers for Housing and Community Development replied favourably to the Coalition's Statement. Minister Stephens commented "I read the Coalition's statement with interest and share your concern about the lack of affordable
housing in Western Australia" (Stephens, 2001b). Minister McHale went further by stating that she had “asked the Taskforce to further consider the Housing the Homeless Coalition statement in their deliberations”, and that “it is inspiring to see the depth of commitment in the community to resolving the issues of homelessness” (McHale, 2001).

At the end of November, the Taskforce’s Draft Report was released and The West Australian approached the Coalition for its comments on the Report. The Coalition’s views were subsequently reported in an article about the Taskforce. The Coalition believed that the Draft Report was more comprehensive and an improvement upon the Issues Paper. However, it still had serious concerns about the lack of state funding for public housing (Casellas, 2001, p.40; HTHC, 2001e).

In December 2001, TASWA attended the Homelessness Forum which was held by WACOSS and two other community sector organisations. Shortly thereafter, the organisation made a submission to the Draft Report, to which it attached the Coalition’s statement. This reinforced the stance taken both by TASWA staff and committee members, and the other individuals involved in the Alternative Taskforce, and enabled TASWA to air some tenancy issues that had not been included in the Coalition’s Statement (J. Purdy, personal communication, September 8, 2003).

TASWA was pleased that the Draft Report had explored the issue of access to affordable, safe and appropriate housing, however many concerns remained unexplored. It was critical of the Taskforce’s failure to adequately consider and
analyse all causes of homelessness, even though this was a term of reference. There were also several issues that TASWA had lobbied for previously, which had not been included in the report. These included discussion of Homeswest policies and their contribution to homelessness, and the need for a moratorium on evictions from public housing (TASWA, 2001f).

As can be seen from the above analysis, there were key similarities and differences in the activities of WACOSS and TASWA in their attempts to influence the State Homelessness Taskforce. Both organisations were involved in lobbying the Government to establish the Taskforce; corresponded with the Minister for Housing; and attended a range of meetings and forums. Both organisations also recognised the usefulness of forming alliances, and made research-based submissions to the Taskforce’s Issues Paper and Draft Report. However, WACOSS and TASWA did pursue different paths: WACOSS chose to work within the formal process, while TASWA aligned itself with the Alternative Taskforce. Why the groups pursued the different strategies they did is explored in detail in Chapter 6.
Chapter 6 - Pressure Groups and Strategic ‘Choices’

Pressure groups aim to influence the policy agenda, and the way in which policy is devised and implemented. Groups utilise a range of tactics in their attempts to achieve these goals. An exploration of the motivations behind the strategies employed by WACOSS and TASWA in their attempts to influence the State Homelessness Taskforce is presented in this Chapter. The Aberdeen group’s contention that organisations do not have choices in the strategies they pursue will also be discussed.

WACOSS’ actions during the Taskforce typify the insider style under both the existing and Aberdeen models. Of prominence is the organisation’s decision to stay within the formal Taskforce process when other groups broke away to form the Alternative Taskforce. Firstly, WACOSS did not feel it could leave the formal process when its own President was chairing the Taskforce (L. Barron, personal communication, September 23, 2003), as this would surely sour its relations with the newly elected Government. WACOSS also recognised that building and maintaining a relationship with the new Government was integral to the future success of the organisation in influencing policy, and, due to having interests across the broad range of social policy issues, WACOSS could ill-afford to place itself offside on this issue and possibly adversely affect its level of insider status on other issues.

The new Housing Minister also appeared considerably more focused on addressing homelessness than his predecessor, and WACOSS did not want to

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9 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.
distance itself from a more amenable Minister. Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 3, homelessness had not been on the policy agenda. The organisation therefore saw the Taskforce as a strategic opportunity to have government acknowledge and address the causes and consequences of homelessness. WACOSS was also not convinced that the formation of an Alternative Taskforce would be an effective strategy, so it opted to stay inside the formal process and attempt to exert an influence from within (L. Barron, personal communication, March 26 & September 23, 2003).

TASWA similarly made use of insider strategies. However, when the organisation failed to have any impact upon the process, it switched to outsider methods. There were a number of factors that lead to TASWA's change of tactics. From the outset, the organisation was sceptical that the Taskforce would achieve outcomes that would effectively address homelessness, and, most obviously, the organisation felt that it would not have its views incorporated into the Taskforce's recommendations via the formal channels. This became clearly evident to the group after Purdy's input was ignored. TASWA also had less to lose by switching to outsider methods than some of the other groups involved in the Taskforce. It was a small group with a comparatively narrow policy focus; it had a low level of insider status; and it was not a group from which bureaucrats routinely sought information (Appendix 3).

The Aberdeen group would question the extent to which WACOSS and TASWA had real choices in the strategies they employed. As discussed in Chapter 2, the aims of the group; its history; the expectations of its members; and funding sources; are all determinants of the strategies an organisation pursues. When
these points are examined, it is clear that neither WACOSS nor TASWA had real choices over the strategies they employed in their attempts to influence the State Homelessness Taskforce.

WACOSS' primary aim of influencing government policy is best fulfilled by bargaining and negotiating with government. Its only real option therefore is to employ insider strategies (Maloney et al., 1994, pp.34-35). Pursuing a more antagonistic strategy is also not in line with the goals of the organisation. A further factor constricting the strategic choices of the group are its history. WACOSS does not have a record of utilising outsider methods, except for in once instance when it ran a campaign publicising the group's reduction in funding by the Richard Court Liberal Government (L. Barron, personal communication, September 23, 2003). This campaign involved the utilisation of a mixture of insider and outsider strategies (L. Barron, personal communication, January 20, 2004).

Furthermore, the organisation, for the most part, does not have a membership that solicits the use of outsider methods. On occasions where a member of WACOSS disagrees with WACOSS' strategy on a particular issue, that member is free to act in their own interests and to pursue their own, separate strategies. In addition, WACOSS is not reliant upon membership dues for the bulk of its income. Therefore, pressure from groups and/or individuals within the membership of WACOSS for the organisation to employ outsider strategies does not tend to impact upon the tactics that WACOSS utilises.

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10 For example, TASWA is a member of WACOSS.
However, WACOSS’ reliance upon government funding can, to some extent, affect the strategic choices made by the group. Barron (personal communication, December 2, 2003) notes that the possibility of the organisation’s actions resulting in funding reductions is always a consideration. Nevertheless, Barron remarks that the main factor which determines strategy is what the organisation believes will be the most effective method to achieve its aims. As a general rule, and as evidenced by the actions of the group, WACOSS believes that using insider strategies will result in the group exerting a greater influence upon decision-makers.

TASWA’s choice of strategy was similarly inhibited. While the organisation normally attempted to achieve its aims via insider methods, it had little choice but to make use of outsider tactics in its quest to influence the findings and recommendations of the Taskforce. Even though TASWA did have intermittent instances of high-level input into the policy process, as discussed in Chapter 4, it recognised that this would not occur with the Taskforce. Also, it was considered by its members, and within the wider sector, as an organisation that took a very principled approach in the pursuit of its aims. The group therefore had a history of occasionally employing outsider tactics when it was deemed necessary (J. Purdy, personal communication, 11 November 2003), and such tactics may have been expected in the case of the Homelessness Taskforce. Due to the importance of addressing homelessness effectively, and TASWA’s concern that the Taskforce’s failure to adequately recognise the structural causes of homelessness would reduce the effectiveness of a homelessness strategy, it concluded that its only option was to employ outsider methods.
Funding is an ongoing concern for TASWA, and strategies that may have negatively impacted upon funding are always considered carefully. Financial issues seem however to have had less of an impact upon TASWA's choice of strategies during the Taskforce than would be expected. As discussed in Chapter 4, the group is wholly reliant upon government-administered grants, and it has had its funding reduced in the past after involvement with the Anti-Section 64 Coalition during the America's Cup (J. Purdy, personal communication, 11 November, 2003). The group is therefore well aware that funding cuts are a consequence that must always be considered (J. Purdy, personal communication, December 3, 2003). An indication of the principled way in which TASWA undertook its role of representing the interests of tenants is that it made the decision to pursue outsider methods during the State Homelessness Taskforce regardless of these funding concerns. The group is therefore prepared to take calculated risks when it believes core principles, and the rights of tenants, are at stake (J. Purdy, personal communication, December 3, 2003).

During the State Homelessness Taskforce, WACOSS pursued an insider strategic style, whilst TASWA utilised a range of insider and outsider tactics. The strategic methods utilised by the two organisations amply demonstrate the Aberdeen group's contentions that pressure groups do not effectively have choices in the strategies they employ: in both cases, the strategic choices of the groups were inhibited by the aims of the group; its history; the expectations of

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11 The Anti-Section 64 Coalition was a group of community sector agencies in Western Australia who were concerned with Homeswest's use of Section 64 of the Residential Tenancies Act to evict public housing tenants without just cause (Ninyette, 1995, p.1).

12 Decisions to proceed with actions that may impact upon the group's source of revenue are made by the Management Committee (J. Purdy, personal communication, December 3, 2003).
its members; and the recognition that the use of outsider strategies may result in a reduction in government funding. Financial considerations do however appear to be less of an impediment to TASWA's use of outsider strategies, particularly when its core principles are at stake. In Chapter 7, the case study data will be used to determine the effectiveness of the existing model in the Australian literature, and the applicability of the Aberdeen model in the Australian context.
Chapter 7 - Conclusions: the Effectiveness of the Insider/Outsider Model

The aim of this research has been to determine the effectiveness of the existing understanding of insider and outsider pressure groups in the Australian literature, referred to throughout this thesis as the existing model, and the applicability of the Aberdeen model in the Australian context. Case studies of two organisations, WACOSS and TASWA, were undertaken, and the analysis of the case study data enabled the comparison and contrast of the existing model, with the more recently conceptualised Aberdeen model from the British literature. The results of this analysis indicate that the existing model is ineffective in categorising pressure groups in a meaningful way, and that the Aberdeen model is a more useful classificatory tool. As such, the Australian pressure group literature would be greatly enhanced by further exploration of the Aberdeen model.

Under the existing model examined in Chapter 2, WACOSS would be classified as an insider group. It has access to decision-makers; is seen to be influential; and uses standard, accepted methods to try to achieve its goals. This classification is not contentious. However, the existing model does not adequately address the reality that there are degrees of 'insiderness'. For example, the input of some groups may be seen as integral to the development of relevant and effective policy across a range of issues, or only upon a few issues. Others may simply play by the rules of the game but exert little influence.
To classify organisations, which fall into all of the above categories, into one definition, does not offer an in-depth understanding of the role of pressure groups in the policy process. The Aberdeen model, however, enables pressure groups to be classified with all of these points taken into consideration. Under the Gallop Labor Government, WACOSS could be classified not only as a group with insider status, but as a core insider in social policy circles (Appendix 2): that is, as a group at the top level of meaningful interaction with government on social policy issues. As per the definition of a core insider outlined in Chapter 2, WACOSS is not necessarily influential across the entire social policy area, but rather upon a range of issues in which the group is recognised to have particular expertise (WACOSS, personal communication, January 30, 2004). In greater detail, under the Aberdeen model WACOSS can be described as a group which has core insider status and which uses insider strategies.

The actions and experiences of TASWA during the Taskforce offer further evidence of the inadequacies of the existing model. Under the existing typology, TASWA would be classified as an outsider group, not necessarily because it completely fits this definition, but rather by default, as it does not fulfil the criteria of an insider group: it is not viewed as very influential and it does, at times, use outsider methods. Again, the Aberdeen model enables groups such as TASWA to be defined more accurately.

Even though TASWA resorted to an outsider approach in its attempts to influence the State Homelessness Taskforce, it is not actually an outsider group as the existing model implies: it is viewed as legitimate by decision-makers; is represented on several government committees and advisory boards; and does,
on the whole, participate in the insider style of politics. However, the group does employ a combination of insider and outsider tactics. This is amply demonstrated by TASWA's actions during the Taskforce: in addition to its involvement in the Alternative Taskforce and its loud criticism of the formal process, TASWA simultaneously made its own separate submissions to the formal process.

Therefore, rather than being incorrectly labelled as an outsider group, TASWA, under the Aberdeen model, can be classified as an organisation of minimal influence which has peripheral insider status, and which employs thresholder strategies. TASWA's use of different strategies illustrates the Aberdeen group's fundamental criticism of other insider/outsider models: that they 'conflate' status and strategy, equating insider status with the exclusive use of insider strategies, and outsider status with outsider strategies.

The existing model in the Australian literature also implies that decision-makers will generally be unresponsive to, and unswayed by, groups that use outsider methods. The positive responses by the Ministers for Housing and Community Development to the Alternative Taskforce Statement (refer Chapter 5) illustrate that this appears not to have been the case with the Alternative Taskforce. It is difficult to determine the level of the Coalition's influence, although the comments made by the Ministers indicate that the views of the Alternative Taskforce were not out-rightly disregarded, and Purdy (personal communication, January 31, 2004) notes that the Coalition itself was pleased that acknowledgment of the structural causes of homelessness were eventually incorporated into the official Taskforce's Final Report.
The experiences of WACOSS under the previous Liberal Government also highlight a further deficiency of the existing model. The literature on this model in Australia suggests that an organisation from the community welfare sector, which is on the centre-left of the political spectrum and is therefore far removed from the Liberal Party ideologically, and which is in no way economically significant, would be considered an outsider under a Liberal Government. However, this is misleading and does not adequately reflect the actual situation. WACOSS believes that under the Richard Court Liberal Government it was able to influence some social policy decisions, and bureaucrats and advisors did seek information and advice from WACOSS on some social policy issues (Appendix 2). WACOSS was also represented on a number of government advisory boards and committees during the term of the Court Government (WACOSS, 2001b, pp.8-9; Appendix 2). It should also be noted that the organisation tried to achieve its goals via the use of insider methods under the Court Government, and only resorted to the use of outsider strategies on one instance when its funding was reduced (L. Barron, personal communication, September 23, 2003; Appendix 2).

In contrast to the existing model, the insider/outsider typology articulated by the Aberdeen group would not classify WACOSS as an outsider group under the previous State Government. Rather, the Aberdeen model offers a more accurate definition of the organisation: as a specialist insider group. WACOSS was not very influential across the broad social policy area, but it did have influence in some key policy areas and its input was both canvassed and respected by decision-makers (Appendix 2). Furthermore, the organisation can
be classified as pursing insider strategies during this period, and as utilising a thresher strategy in one instance.

Although the Aberdeen model offers a more comprehensive and sophisticated understanding of insider and outsider groups than the existing model prevalent in the Australian literature, users of the Aberdeen model in the Australian context must be mindful of the impact of ideological differences upon status. The role of ideology in the ascription of higher levels of insider status is not highlighted within the Aberdeen model, as its authors believe that in the British setting it is the resources of a group which are a greater determinant of the level of insider status ascribed (Maloney et al., 1994, p.36). Group resources are important in the Australian setting (Abbott, 1996, p.110; Jaensch, 1994, p.178; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, p.165), however the experiences of WACOSS under the Richard Court Liberal, and then the Gallop Labor State Governments, indicate that ideology continues to be a factor in the level of access groups are permitted, and whether or not they are in the position to bargain and negotiate with government. This supports the assertions of Warhurst and Matthews, as examined Chapter 2. Nonetheless, the Aberdeen model’s recognition that ideological differences do not automatically result in a group being excluded from the consultation process and being exiled to the outsider realm, are important distinctions which do apply in the Australian context. In the case of WACOSS for example, changes in government have seen its level of insider status change, not its type of status.

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13 ACOSS had a similar experience when its level of status was reduced by the incoming Liberal Federal Government in 1996 (Beresford, 2000, p.120).
The experiences of TASWA are somewhat different. Its influence over policy decisions and its level of access to decision-makers has varied little over the terms of the two State Governments, and its insider status has remained at the peripheral level (Appendix 3). The consistency in TASWA’s low level of access may be attributable to a combination of factors. These include the organisation’s lack of resources; its willingness to resort to outsider strategies; and that the organisation may be considered too far left ideologically by both Liberal and Labor Governments for it to be given access to the inner sanctum of bargaining and negotiation. Purdy (personal communication, February 2, 2004) comments that it is not necessarily the group which is too far left ideologically, but the issue it represents, as neither Labor or Liberal Governments want to adequately fund expensive public housing schemes. TASWA is therefore not considered to be a key player in the policy process by either party, although it is accepted as a legitimate group which has access to decision-makers via consultation processes.

A further flaw in the existing understanding of insider and outsider groups in the Australian literature is its failure to account for the use of the media by insider groups. The Aberdeen model also does not offer insight into the use of this strategic tool. Use of the media by insider groups tends to be understated, and/or underestimated, within the literature on the existing model, which suggests that use of the media is, for the most part, solely within the outsider realm (for example Singleton et al., 2003, p.355; Willmott & Dowse, 2000, p.163). A brief examination of the websites of some prominent lobby groups with insider status in Australia, including the Australian Institute of Petroleum, the Business Council of Australia, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry and the National Farmers Federation, indicates that all of these groups use the media at the most basic level: that is they distribute media releases and have them available on-line.

Use of the media by some insider groups is an occurrence identified by Grant, who labelled insider groups who use the media to raise public support on issues as 'high profile'. Grant comments that since the 1970s, insider groups have increasingly used the media to reinforce their other strategies, and that this is a 'crucial skill' that pressure groups must acquire. He notes Whitely and Winyard's comments that use of the media by groups is now considered by decision-makers to be standard practice in Britain, and does not tend to result in an organisation falling out of favour with decision-makers (Grant, 2000, p.128). These comments reflect the reality that even core insiders do not have free reign over policy decisions, and there may be times when groups need to attract media attention in order to get issues onto the agenda or to raise public support for their view on an existing issue. Use of the media in varying ways, and to varying degrees, is therefore an important strategic tool for pressure groups with both insider and outsider status.

To illustrate this point, and as previously discussed in Chapter 4, both WACOSS and TASWA use the media in their attempts to influence decision-makers. Barron (personal communication, November 24, 2003) comments, "WACOSS places significant importance on use of the media". Due to the high profile of the organisation, and its role as a peak body, WACOSS' views are frequently cited in the press (WACOSS, 2002a, p.14). Purdy (personal communication, November 25, 2003; February 2, 2004) notes that when she
was employed by TASWA, media use, for the most part, was not a high priority strategy, although the organisation did engage in radio and newspaper interviews. The low priority placed on media use by TASWA may reflect the reality that the commercial media tends to ignore the views of more marginal groups and their attempts to publicise issues in which the causes of, and solutions to, the problem are complex. Homelessness is a prime example of such an issue (Tiffen, cited in Beresford, 2000, p.138). For both groups, the aim of their media strategies is to inform the public, promote debate about social issues, and to, at times, highlight government action or inaction with which the organisation agrees or disagrees (L. Barron, personal communication, November 24, 2003; J. Purdy, personal communication, November 25, 2003).

Although TASWA did not have a history of its views being widely reported in the commercial media, use of the media was nonetheless an important strategy for TASWA, via its association with the Housing the Homeless Coalition, during the State Homelessness Taskforce. In this instance it was an effective tactic. As discussed in Chapter 5, the West Australian approached the Coalition about its views, and reported them in some detail in an article about the release of the Taskforce's Draft Report. WACOSS on the other hand did not run a media campaign during the Taskforce process, as it felt it could achieve its goals without resorting to this strategy (L. Barron, personal communication, November 24, 2003). WACOSS did however distribute a media release at the completion of the process, congratulating the State Government on its response to the Taskforce's recommendations (WACOSS, 2002b).
Clearly, both insider and outsider status pressure groups do use the media, however this is not adequately reflected within the existing Australian literature, nor is it clarified by the Aberdeen model. Due to the range of different media activities that groups can utilise, (i.e. media releases, interviews, talk-back radio, letters to the editor), and the varying aims of these tactics (i.e. to inform the public, highlight government inaction, support a government action, be visible to its members), a clearer distinction between types of media use would be valuable. This would enable statements by pressure groups which support a government decision to be classified differently to those that are critical of government actions.

Although the Aberdeen model does not illuminate use of the media by insider status groups, its terminology is useful: certain media activities could be classed as ‘low-cost’ actions, and others as ‘high-cost’ actions. Use of the media could therefore be differentiated between activities that fall within the realm of insider strategies, and those that would be classified as outsider strategies. To demonstrate, WACOSS’ media release congratulating the State Government’s response to the Taskforce’s recommendations could be described as a low cost, insider strategy, which reinforces the group’s relationship with the Government. The Alternative Taskforce, on the other hand, was openly hostile towards the formal Taskforce and actively sought to publicly express their view that the process was flawed and was failing to address the real causes underlying homelessness (HTHC, 2001e). This type of media activity could be described as a high cost, outsider strategy.14

14 This is not to imply that groups with insider status cannot or will not be publicly critical of government. As discussed in Chapter 2, decision makers recognise that insider status groups will, at times, attempt to influence them via canvassing public support. Barron (personal communication, December 2, 2003) comments that the way
Therefore, neither the existing understanding of insider and outsider groups in the Australian literature, nor the Aberdeen model, adequately explore the relationship between insider status groups and use of the media. However, both models offer elements which, when combined, enable media use by pressure groups to be categorised more succinctly: the existing model satisfactorily reflects the need for outsider status groups to continuously attempt to use the media in order to raise their profile and to gain public support on issues; and terminology within the Aberdeen model is useful in defining types of media use.

In addition, the existing model implies that groups opt to use the media as a strategy when they feel on the 'outside' of core decision-making processes. This point continues to be of use when applying the Aberdeen model and attempting to determine why some insider status groups resort to high-cost media activities. Even insider status groups may not be invited into the inner sanctum on all issues, and may therefore feel outside the high-level consultation processes to which they are normally a party. Inside status groups may therefore feel the need, on such occasions, to aggressively use the media in order to publicise their points of view.

In conclusion, this research has incorporated a case study approach to highlight the deficiencies of the existing model in the Australian literature, and to illustrate the usefulness of the Aberdeen model in the study of pressure groups. The benefit of applying the Aberdeen model is that it enables a more specific government reacts to criticism depends upon its level of 'maturity' about the role of advocacy groups.
classification of pressure groups to be made, hence providing greater insights into the role and influence of pressure groups in the Australian policy process. In addition, the Aberdeen group's assertion that organisations are inhibited in their choice of strategy, and its explanation as to why this is the case, also prove to be useful analytical tools. It is important however to recognise that the Aberdeen model is not a 'cure-all'. Importantly though, it does at least recognise the complexities of the relationships between pressure groups, decision-makers, and policy processes, and is a vast improvement upon the understanding of insider and outsider groups which is currently dominates the Australian literature.

The findings of this research indicate that the Aberdeen model is applicable in the Australian context. However, users of this model must remain mindful that in Australia, it appears that ideological differences continue to play a role in the ascription of status to groups. The conducting of further case studies in an Australian setting, that explore the rival pressure group typologies, and the impact of ideology upon status, would enable greater appreciation of these theoretical models and further develop the Australian pressure group literature. A focus upon use of the media by both insider and outsider status groups may also be useful, as it would increase knowledge of the strategies used by pressure groups in their attempts to influence the policy process.
Bibliography


Housing the Homeless Coalition. (2001a, Nov 16). Letter from the HTHC, to The Hon Ms Shella McHale, MLA, Minister for Community Development and the Hon Mr Tom Stephens, MLC, Minister for Housing and Works. Perth: Case study database document No T3.


Western Australian Council of Social Service. (2001e, Jun 22). Email from President to Executive Director Re: Taskforce Membership. Perth: Case study database document No W14.


Appendix 1 – Interview Questions

1. What were the main aims of the organisation going into the Taskforce process?

2. Was the organisation happy with the Taskforce process?

3. Did the organisation feel that it achieved its goals and was successful?

4. Were there any issues that the organisation felt were not adequately addressed by the Taskforce?

5. Which strategies has the organisation found to be the most successful in influencing decision-makers?

6. Which strategies does the organisation believe were the most successful in influencing the outcomes of the Taskforce?

7. How does the organisation decide upon strategy and policy? Does the membership have much influence over these decisions?

8. Does the organisation have any comments to make on how responsibility for social problems such as homelessness are shared between the Federal and State Governments? Does this make it more difficult to have social issues addressed?
Appendix 2 - Pressure Group Survey

1. Name of organisation?
   WACOSS

2. How many staff are employed by the organisation?
   - full-time: 11
   - part-time: 3
   - casual: ___
   - contract: ___

3. Are there other organisations that also represent the interests of your members?
   - ✓ yes
   - ❑ no

4. Does the organisation have to compete with these other groups for membership?
   - ✓ yes
   - ❑ no

5. Has or does the Gallop Government/ministers/members of parliament seek your assistance or advice on policy?
   - ✓ yes
   - ❑ no
   If yes, indicate which of the following applies;
   - ✓ general information
   - ✓ policy alternatives/positions
   - ✓ research
   - ✓ other – representation on committees

6. Did the Court Government/ministers/members of parliament seek your assistance or advice on policy?
   - ✓ yes
   - ❑ no
   If yes, indicate which of the following applied;
   - ✓ general information
   - ✓ policy alternatives/positions
   - ❑ research
   - ✓ other – representation on committees. Bureaucrats did seek advice but not to the same level as under the Gallop Government. There
has been increased contact with Government since Labor was elected.

7. What strategies do you employ in the attempt to influence policy decisions?

✓ representation on government committees/advisory boards
✓ submissions to committees/advisory boards etc
✓ consultation and negotiation with government
✓ publication of research
✓ formal contact with ministers/advisors i.e. meetings
✓ informal contact with ministers/advisors i.e. phone calls, social events
✓ involvement with a policy network
✓ media
  ✓ media releases
  □ letters to the editor
  □ use of talk-back radio
  □ advertising
✓ other public actions
  □ protests
  ✓ public meetings
  □ letter and fax campaigns
□ court action
□ campaigning for/against candidates at elections
✓ other - pre-election documents/forum

8. Do the strategies you employ vary from issue to issue?

✓ yes
□ no

9. Under the Gallop Government, how influential would you say your organisation has been upon policy in your area(s) of interest?

□ very influential
✓ quite influential
□ not very influential
□ not influential at all

10. Under the Court Government, how influential would you say your organisation was upon policy in your area(s) of interest?

□ very influential
□ quite influential
✓ not very influential - influential on some issues but not others
□ not influential at all
11. Under the Gallop Government, which of the following categories (a-f) best describes your organisation?

✓ a) The organisation is able to influence policy.
   It is consulted with by government across a broad range of issues on a continual basis.
   The organisation is able to negotiate and bargain in its own area of expertise / in other policy areas as well (please indicate if either or both).

☐ b) The organisation is able to influence policy.
   It is not involved across a broad range of issues.
   The organisation tends to focus on key, selected policy issues.
   Consultation with government is sporadic in nature rather than ongoing.
   The organisation is able to negotiate and bargain in own area of expertise only.

☐ c) The organisation’s input into the consultation process is not seen as being integral by decision-makers.
   The organisation is seen as legitimate by decision-makers, but it is not very influential upon policy.

☐ d) The organisation’s involvement and influence in the policy process is largely cosmetic.

☐ e) The organisation doesn’t believe its aims can be reached via consultation with government.
   The organisation is often aiming for radical rather than incremental policy change.

☐ f) The organisation does not want to have, or be seen to have, a friendly relationship with government.
   Even though some of the organisation’s goals may be attainable via bargaining and negotiation, it chooses not to do so.
   This is often in order to attract/keep members.
12. Under the **Court** Government, which of the following categories (a-f) best described your organisation?

- a) The organisation was able to influence policy. It was consulted with by government across a broad range of issues on a continual basis. The organisation was able to negotiate and bargain in its own area of expertise / in other policy areas as well (please indicate if either or both).

- b) The organisation was able to influence policy. It was not involved across a broad range of issues. The organisation tended to focus on key, selected policy issues. Consultation with government was sporadic in nature rather than ongoing. The organisation was able to negotiate and bargain in own area of expertise only.

- c) The organisation's input into the consultation process was not seen as being integral by decision-makers. The organisation was seen as legitimate by decision-makers, but it was not very influential upon policy.

- d) The organisation’s involvement and influence in the policy process was largely cosmetic.

- e) The organisation didn’t believe its aims could be reached via consultation with government. The organisation was often aiming for radical rather than incremental policy change.

- f) The organisation did not want to have, or be seen to have, a friendly relationship with government. Even though some of the organisation's goals may have been attainable via bargaining and negotiation, it chose not to do so. This was often in order to attract/keep members.

13. Additional comments?

The organisation was able to influence policy under the Richard Court Liberal Government, however the influence was limited to a few very specific areas.
Appendix 3 - Pressure Group Survey

1. Name of organisation?
   
   TASWA

2. How many staff are employed by the organisation?
   
   full-time  6
   part-time  5
   casual  2
   contract

3. Are there other organisations that also represent the interests of your members?
   
   ✓ yes
   ✓ no

4. Does the organisation have to compete with these other groups for membership?

   ✓ yes
   ✓ no

5. Has or does the Gallop Government/ministers/members of parliament seek your assistance or advice on policy?

   ✓ yes
   ✓ no – however, the organisation does provide advice relating to individual tenancy cases to electorate officers

   If yes, indicate which of the following applies;

   ✓ general information
   ✓ policy alternatives/positions
   ✓ research
   ✓ other – representation on the Housing Advisory Committee

6. Did the Court Government/ministers/members of parliament seek your assistance or advice on policy?

   ✓ yes
   ✓ no – as above

   If yes, indicate which of the following applied;

   ✓ general information
   ✓ policy alternatives/positions
   ✓ research
   ✓ other ____________________
7. What strategies do you employ in the attempt to influence policy decisions?

- representation on government committees/advisory boards
- submissions to committees/advisory boards etc
- consultation and negotiation with government
- publication of research
- formal contact with ministers/advisors i.e. meetings
- informal contact with ministers/advisors i.e. phone calls, social events
- involvement with a policy network
- media
  - media releases
  - letters to the editor
  - use of talk-back radio
  - advertising
- other public actions
  - protests
  - public meetings
  - letter and fax campaigns
- court action
- campaigning for/against candidates at elections
- other

8. Do the strategies you employ vary from issue to issue?

- yes
- no

9. Under the Gallop Government, how influential would you say your organisation has been upon policy in your area(s) of interest?

- very influential
- quite influential
- not very influential
- not influential at all

10. Under the Court Government, how influential would you say your organisation was upon policy in your area(s) of interest?

- very influential
- quite influential
- not very influential
- not influential at all
11. Under the **Gallop** Government, which of the following categories (a-f) best describes your organisation?

- **a)**
The organisation is able to influence policy.
It is consulted with by government across a broad range of issues on a continual basis.
The organisation is able to negotiate and bargain in its own area of expertise / in other policy areas as well *(please indicate if either or both).*

- **b)**
The organisation is able to influence policy.
It is not involved across a broad range of issues.
The organisation tends to focus on key, selected policy issues.
Consultation with government is sporadic in nature rather than ongoing.
The organisation is able to negotiate and bargain in own area of expertise only.

- **c)**
The organisation’s input into the consultation process is not seen as being integral by decision-makers.
The organisation is seen as legitimate by decision-makers, but it is not very influential upon policy.

- **d)**
The organisation’s involvement and influence in the policy process is largely cosmetic.

- **e)**
The organisation doesn't believe its aims can be reached via consultation with government.
The organisation is often aiming for radical rather than incremental policy change.

- **f)**
The organisation does not want to have, or be seen to have, a friendly relationship with government.
Even though some of the organisation’s goals may be attainable via bargaining and negotiation, it chooses not to do so.
This is often in order to attract/keep members.
12. Under the Court Government, which of the following categories (a-f) best described your organisation?

☐ a) The organisation was able to influence policy. 
   It was consulted with by government across a broad range of issues on a continual basis. 
   The organisation was able to negotiate and bargain in its own area of expertise / in other policy areas as well (please indicate if either or both).

☐ b) The organisation was able to influence policy. 
   It was not involved across a broad range of issues. 
   The organisation tended to focus on key, selected policy issues. 
   Consultation with government was sporadic in nature rather than ongoing. 
   The organisation was able to negotiate and bargain in own area of expertise only.

✓ c) The organisation's input into the consultation process was not seen as being integral by decision-makers. 
   The organisation was seen as legitimate by decision-makers, but it was not very influential upon policy.

☐ d) The organisation's involvement and influence in the policy process was largely cosmetic.

☐ e) The organisation didn't believe its aims could be reached via consultation with government. 
   The organisation was often aiming for radical rather than incremental policy change.

☐ f) The organisation did not want to have, or be seen to have, a friendly relationship with government. 
   Even though some of the organisation's goals may have been attainable via bargaining and negotiation, it chose not to do so. 
   This was often in order to attract/keep members.

13. Additional comments?
Appendix 4 - Case Study Database

General documentation

G1. Notes from the literature on pressure groups
G2. Interview questions
G3. Research proposal
G4. Literature review on homelessness

State Homelessness Taskforce Documentation

Some documents (*) have been retrieved from files held at TASWA, being 2.1.5: State Homelessness Strategy and 2.1.6 #1 and #2: Homelessness Taskforce.

S1. Newsletter, Aug 2001 *
S2. Draft background paper *
S3. Communication strategies 1st draft, with Purdy's comments *
S4. Consultation strategies 2nd draft *
S5. Introduction to Taskforce from website
S6. Background on Taskforce from website
S9. Final Report to Government, Jan 2002 - including issues paper, list of submissions and questions
S10. Strategies - communication, research & info gathering & consultation strategies, draft *
S11. List of people/organisations contacted by Taskforce Secretariat Jul/Aug 2001 *
S12. Media statement - Government Response to the Taskforce, 14/5/02
S13. State Homelessness Taskforce Members Details *
S14. Miller article in The West Australian, Re: homelessness in Western Australia, 22/03/01

TASWA and Housing the Homeless Coalition Documentation

Some documents (*) have been retrieved from files held at TASWA, being 2.1.5: State Homelessness Strategy and 2.1.6 #1 and #2: Homelessness Taskforce.

T1. Purdy's notes on the SHTF Draft Issues Paper *
T2. HTHC letter to involved organisations re: previous meetings & statement, 16/11/01 *
T3. HTHC statement and letter sent to ministers, 16/11/01 *
T4. Email from Purdy to The West Australian Re: HTHC response to the Draft Report, 27/11/01 *
T5. TAS comment on the Draft Report *
T6. List of Alternative Taskforce members *
T7. TASWA annual report 2000/01
T8. TASWA annual report 2001/02
T9. Purdy’s paper *Danse Macabre*
T10. Email correspondence, 20/11/01 *
T11. Email correspondence, 21/11/01 *
T12. Letter from Geoff Gallop acknowledging receipt of HTHC Statement *
T13. Letter from Joanne to Organisation B, Re: Homelessness Forum 05/04/01 *
T14. Letter from Purdy to Ministers, confirming TAS’ acceptance of position on the SHTF, 13/07/01 *
T15. Letter from Taskforce Chairperson to Purdy welcoming her to the SHTF, 12/07/01 *
T16. Purdy’s comments on Draft Background Paper 06/08/01 *
T17. Emails between TASWA and Organisation B, Re: Taskforce’s composition, 22-23/08/01 *
T18. Article in *The West Australian* featuring the HTHC’s response to the Draft Report, 28/11/01
T19. Purdy’s notes on the Taskforce Workshop on the 06/08/01, dated 10/08/01 *
T20. Letter from Sheila McHale acknowledging receipt of HTHC Statement, 27/12/01 *
T21. Letter from Tom Stephens acknowledging receipt of HTHC statement, 27/12/01 *
T22. Emails between TASWA staff members, Re: SHTF Draft Report, 15-15/12/01 *
T23. Email between TASWA and Organisation B, Re: Organisation B’s issues Paper, 07/12/01 *
T24. Letter from Sheila McHale acknowledging Purdy’s resignation, 23/10/01 *
T25. Purdy’s resignation letter, 02/09/01 *
T26. Email from Purdy to Taskforce Members, Re: her resignation, 31/08/01 *
T27. Letter from Purdy to Tom Stephens, Re: general homelessness issues, 22/5/01 *
T28. Personal communication with Purdy, no date
T29. TASWA survey responses
T30. Transcript of interview with Purdy
T31. Personal communication with TASWA, Re: strategic plan, 24/11/03
T33. TASWA strategic plan, 2001/02
T34. TASWA response to the SHTF Issues Paper *
T35. Personal communication with Purdy, Re: identifying groups/individuals in the Alternative Taskforce, 11/11/03
T36. Personal communication with Purdy, Re: TASWA and government funding and use of the media, 25/11/03, 2 & 3/12/03
T37. Personal communication with TASWA, Re: members, 9, 17 & 19/12/03
T38. Personal communication with Purdy, Re: TASWA submission to the Issues Paper, 15/12/03
T39. Personal communication with Purdy, Re: dissolving of the Alternative Taskforce, 5 & 6/01/04
T41 Boase article from The Aboriginal Independent, Re: indigenous Homelessness, 24/02/01
T42 Analysis of Purdy interview
T43 Analysis of TASWA/HTHC strategies
T44 Purdy's amendments to the draft thesis, 31/01/04 & 02/02/04
T45 TASWA's amendments to the draft thesis, 01/02/04

WACOSS Documentation

Some documents (*) have been retrieved from files held at WACOSS, being H84-0064: Housing - State Homelessness Strategy and H84-0045: Homelessness - General.

W1. 1999/2000 pre-budget submission
W2. Pre-election submission to political parties, Dec 2000
W3. Letter from Boyle to Minister, Re: meeting with service providers, 15/3/01 *
W4. Minutes of meeting between service providers and the Ministry for Housing, 16/3/01 *
W5. Fax from WACOSS to Peaks, Re: meeting, 27/3/01 *
W6. Outcomes of community sector meeting on short-term strategies, list given to Greg Joyce, 30/3/01 *
W7. Minister's response to letter from WACOSS (W3), 17/4/01 *
W8. Report on the progress of community sector meetings on homelessness - short term and long term, 2/5/01 *
W9. Fax to Non-Government Working Party, Re: to clarify what should be in the strategy, 2/5/01 *
W10. Fax to Non-Government Working Party, Re: meeting for 10/5/01, outcomes of 2/5/01 attached *
W11. Minutes of homelessness strategy meeting at the Ministry of Housing, 3/5/01 *
W12. Draft outcomes of the Long-Term Working Strategies group for meetings 2 & 10/5/01 - to be ratified at meeting on 29/5/01 *
W13. Submission to the Minister on the state homelessness strategy by the Working Group, 6/6/01 *
W14. Emails between the WACOSS President and Executive Director, Re: Non-Government Working Party wanting to offer up names for the taskforce, 22/6/01 *
W15. Letter from Minister to Taskforce Chairperson, Re: his appt, terms of reference *
W16. Notes on Shelter Homelessness Forum 19/9/01
W17. WACOSS submission to the Issues Paper *
W18. Summary notes from Shelter Homelessness Forum, 12/12/01
W19. WACOSS submission to the Draft Report, 12/01 *
W20. Pre-budget submission 2002/03
W21. Pre-budget submission 2003/04 *
W22. Notes from informal chat with Barron, 26/3/03
W23. Social policy unit info from web
W24. Annual report 2001/02
W25. Annual report 2000/01
W26. Minutes from homelessness strategy meeting, Ministry of Housing, 18/5/00 *
W27. Survey
W28. Meeting of the Short-Term Working Group 11/5/01 *
W29. Letter from Organisation A to WACOSS proposing that they work together *
W30. WACOSS response to the Government response to the Taskforce 09/05/02 *
W31. City of Perth homelessness seminar *
W32. Transcript of Barron interview
W33. Notification of Homelessness Strategy meeting, from the Ministry of Housing, 14/3/01
W34. Analysis of Barron interview
W35. Analysis of WACOSS strategies
W36. Personal communication with Barron, Re: use of the media by WACOSS, 24/11/03
W37. Personal communication with Barron, Re: government funding, 02/12/03
W38. Barron's amendments to the draft thesis, 20/01/04
W39. Article in the West Australian about the WACOSS Australians Living on the Edge Report, 9/11/01
W40. WACOSS' amendments to the draft thesis, 30/01/04
Informed Consent Form for Organisations

Project Title: Pressure groups and the State Homelessness Taskforce: An investigation of the insider/outsider model of pressure group theory.

I, [Signed Name], the Executive Officer of [Organisation Name], have read the attached Statement of Disclosure and any questions about the aims and purposes of this study have been answered to my satisfaction.

The organisation agrees to participate in this activity and understands that it may withdraw consent at any time.

The organisation acknowledges that participation will involve allowing Ms Blake access to documentation relating to its role in the State Homelessness Taskforce, the completion of a survey, and an interview of a former or current staff member.

The organisation acknowledges that the research will be publicly available and that parts of the research may be subsequently published. The organisation also understands that it will be identified. Individuals within the organisation will not be identified without their informed consent.

Ms Blake agrees to provide a copy of her report to this organisation upon its completion.

Participant: ___________________________ Date: 21/8/03

Investigator: __________________________ Date: 19/8/03
Informed Consent Form for Organisations

Project Title: Pressure groups and the State Homelessness Taskforce: An investigation of the insider/outsider model of pressure group theory.

I, [Name], the Executive Officer of [Organisation Name], have read the attached Statement of Disclosure and any questions about the aims and purposes of this study have been answered to my satisfaction.

The organisation agrees to participate in this activity and understands that it may withdraw consent at any time.

The organisation acknowledges that participation will involve allowing Ms Blake access to documentation relating to its role in the State Homelessness Taskforce, the completion of a survey, and an interview of a former or current staff member.

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Ms Blake agrees to provide a copy of her report to this organisation upon its completion.

Participant: [Name] Date: [Date]

Investigator: [Name] Date: [Date]
Informed Consent Form for Individuals

Project Title: Pressure groups and the State Homelessness Taskforce: An investigation of the insider/outsider model of pressure group theory.

I, Leanne Cazón, have read the attached Statement of Disclosure and any questions about the aims and purposes of this study have been answered to my satisfaction.

I agree to participate in this project, and understand that I may withdraw at any time.

I acknowledge that the research will be publicly available and that parts of the research may subsequently be published. I also understand that I may be identified.

I understand that I will be interviewed and that the interview will be audio recorded. I also understand that the recording will be erased once the interview is transcribed, and that I will be provided with a copy of the interview transcript to vet.

Participant: ____________________________ Date: 22-9-03

Investigator: ____________________________ Date: 22-9-03
Informed Consent Form for Individuals

Project Title: Pressure groups and the State Homelessness Taskforce: An investigation of the insider/outsider model of pressure group theory.

I, [Participant's Name], have read the attached Statement of Disclosure and any questions about the aims and purposes of this study have been answered to my satisfaction.

I agree to participate in this project, and understand that I may withdraw at any time.

I acknowledge that the research will be publicly available and that parts of the research may subsequently be published. I also understand that I may be identified.

I understand that I will be interviewed and that the interview will be audio recorded. I also understand that the recording will be erased once the interview is transcribed, and that I will be provided with a copy of the interview transcript to vet.

Participant: ____________________________ Date: 8/9/03

Investigator: ____________________________ Date: 8/9/03