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Investigating insurgency and counter insurgency and attaining a monopoly on violence

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One Step Forwards, Two Steps Backwards

Investigating Insurgency and Counter Insurgency and Attaining a Monopoly on Violence

Bryn Lacey

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of**

**Bachelor of Arts Honours (Politics and
International Relations)**

in the Faculty of Education and Arts, Edith Cowan University

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Abstract:

This thesis is an investigation of insurgency and counterinsurgency, how actors from within and without a country combat instability and how the security apparatus, coupled with peace building measures, can attain a monopoly on violence. The thesis uses Afghanistan as a case study to carry out this investigation, covering the time period from 2002 – 2011. Ultimately the thesis provides an assessment of the nation building project in Afghanistan in light of the research into insurgency investigating why the efforts of the security actors have, ultimately, failed to attain a monopoly on violence.

Declaration

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Glossary of Terms

Afghan Local Police (ALP)

Afghan National Army (ANA)

Afghan National Police (ANP)

Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)

Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A)

Counter Insurgency (COIN)

Department of Defense [sic] (DoD)

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA)

Improvised Explosive Device (IED)

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB)

Ministry of Justice (MoJ)

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

Village Stability Operations (VSO)

“Strange as it may seem, the military victory is the easiest part of the struggle. After this has been attained, the real challenge begins: the reestablishment of a secure environment opens a new opportunity for nation building.”

George Tanham, Associate Director for Counterinsurgency for the U.S Agency for International Development
1960

Chapter 1: Ongoing Quest for Security

1.1 Introduction

The investigation of the security apparatus in Afghanistan throughout the early 21st Century is extremely important to developing an understanding of nation building in the modern era. This thesis is an investigation of insurgency and counter insurgency (COIN), how external/internal actors can use peace building and the security apparatus as mechanisms for COIN. Importantly, this thesis focuses on the impact of insurgency on approaches to nation building using Afghanistan as a case study. Nation building as a theory is “...the most common form of a process of collective identity formation with a view to legitimizing public power within a given territory” (Planck. 2005 p.586; MacGinty. 2010). The process can have many goals, ranging from Haiti, where “...the objective was to reinstall a president and conduct elections according to a pre-existing constitution” (Crane et. al, 2003 p. xv), to Kosovo, where “...it was to establish a democratic polity and market economy virtually from scratch” (Crane et. al, 2003 p. xv; Doyle & Samabanis, 2000). As the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) was created and developed after the intervention in 2002, crises continually erupted particularly in the rural provinces of Afghanistan. What became a steadily recurring theme in Afghanistan was that the government had little to no control outside of major urban centres, and that aid and development was focussed largely on the more urbanised areas – in particular the capital Kabul (Jones, 2009b). Insurgency festered in the countryside and finally in 2006, this insecurity transformed into a drastic increase in violence and catapulted Afghanistan once again into the world stage as an area of significant instability and concern, and is shown in Figure 1. (Jones, S 2009a p. 129).




Figure 1: Of note is the massive increase in attacks from 2006 onwards (Associated Press, 7/7/2008).

But what exactly is an insurgency? Insurgencies are typically complex affair resulting from intense ethnic and geo-political conflicts resulting in an embedded force within a country, often fighting violently against a government force. Jones writes that insurgency is essentially established in four main pillars:

The first are *insurgents*, those hoping to overthrow the established government or secede from it... The second is the *local government*, which includes the government's security forces, the army and police, as well as key national and local political institutions... The third group consists of *outside actors*: external states and other nonstate [sic] entities, which might support either side... Finally, the *local population* is the most important group; it is for their hearts and minds that the war is being fought in the first place (Jones, 2009a p. 152 – 153).

These four pillars will form the basis of the groups that will be discussed in this thesis. Hence, 'external actors' is a term that will refer to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Coalition, and the U.N efforts at nation building in Afghanistan. 'Internal actors' will refer to the local government as defined by Jones in the previous quote.

1.2 Building the Context: Afghanistan after the Intervention

In 2001, the Taliban government was overthrown by the Northern Alliance and a combination of CIA and Special Forces soldiers acting as an insurgency (against the Taliban's rule). Importantly, external actors then considered the Taliban defeated; a centrist approach was taken that described the main power structures as being under the external actors control and by default, the Taliban was no longer able to be a force in Afghanistan (Jones, 2009a; Jones, 2009b). Thus peace building initiatives were begun such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams under the control of US forces, the Afghan National Police programme was passed to the control of Germany and the judicial system placed under the control of Italy (Fielke, 2010; Jones, 2009a; International Crisis Group, 2010 p. 1). Yet despite the construction of these civil institutions in Afghanistan, insurgency was still able to develop and eventually increase significantly in reach and capability. More than 13,000 Afghan National Security Force personnel have been killed since the forces inception, with the majority of these deaths occurring since 2006 (Tigner, 2015). A trend quickly appears in regards to security in Afghanistan, that since 2006 security in the nation has steadily been getting worse, with more violent incidents, higher levels of violence taking place, a marked increase in abductions and executions as well as a steadily growing narcotics trade funding much of the rural insurgency in Afghanistan (ANSO 2012; UNODC, November 2014). As a result, the drive for nation building in Afghanistan has undergone a major change, addressing regional instability and attempting to establish regional centres of power and control in Afghanistan (Jones, 2008). 2014 was declared Afghanistan's deadliest year; significantly, the greatest number

of casualties resulted from battles, not Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's) or other forms of explosives (Triple Canopy, 2015). This thesis is focussed on investigating how and why this change has occurred. What progress has there been and what failures have been made. Ultimately this thesis will aim to undertake an analysis of this key issue aimed at providing possible policy improvements or changes that would benefit the potential for nation building in Afghanistan.

1.2 A realist perspective on international relations and Afghanistan

This thesis will utilize realism as the key theoretical perspective in its analysis. Realism as a “...concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics” (Morgenthau, 1978). Realism focuses on state interests, actions and power in the international arena (Korab-Karpowicz, 2010). Effectively, as there is no higher power in global politics then the system is anarchic; there is no world police or executive to monopolise violence (Walt, 1979). The theory does not necessarily indicate, however, that the world is in a constant state of violent contest but rather that should violence break out between powers there is no established authority to quell such tensions or to resolve disputes without regard to the respective powers sovereignty. Therefore, realism theorises that states act purely in self-interest, and successful policy is essentially policy that strengthens the state against its regional and global competitors (Walt, 1979). Nation-states are in a constant state of contest with one another, which may not necessarily involve violence but will involve one or more states attempting to gain an advantage over other states. The theory usually runs in contest with the ideas behind liberalism, which espouses cooperation between states to achieve higher goals, which is realised in international functions such as the United Nations (Korab-Karpowicz, 2010). Crucially, realism essentially regards states as having a single a fundamental interest, that of survival (Walt, 1979). Realism is an appropriate approach to an analysis of Afghanistan and nation building then in that the theory will help to explain the various actors competing for control, as well as explaining the self-interest involved in these actions. For example, the United States is not involved in nation building for the sake of Afghanistan alone, but developing weak, failing or failed states is now considered crucial to the ensuring US security from terrorism (Bush, 2006).

According to a realist perspective, nation building cannot be fully addressed without first ensuring a monopoly on violence. In addition the nature of counter insurgency will hamper any effective means at establishing a monopoly on violence and hence nation building especially in

the rural areas of a nation (Hulslander & Spivey, 2007; Walt, 1979). Yet despite this acknowledgement by experts in the field, as well as the executive, strong security and a monopoly on violence remain elusive in Afghanistan (Bush, 2006). Therefore the security situation must be investigated, in order to fully understand why the counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan are not making significant ground and in fact, have regressed in many areas of the country.

1.3 Research Questions

Security in Afghanistan has remained one of the most enduring challenges - hampering nation building efforts in the country for over a century (Gombert, Kelly, Lawson, Parker, Colloton, 2009; ISAF PRT Handbook, 2007; Hulslander & Spivey, 2007). Throughout this time Afghanistan has gone through many systems of government including monarchy, democracy, communism, anarchism into religious fundamentalist rule until once again democracy at the beginning of the 21st century. One of the most enduring issues that all these different forms of government faced was rural insurgency and the challenges of containing, controlling or limiting the effectiveness of that instability. Therefore the investigation of control over the countryside will be crucial to this theses investigation, which will revolve around two key research questions:

1. How did a realist international relations perspective influence nation-building approaches in Afghanistan between 2002 – 2005 and between 2006 – 2011?
2. How successful have security actors been at creating effective state infrastructure that ensures long-term stability in rural Afghanistan?

These questions will provide a clear, direct path to analysing nation building and security in Afghanistan. The investigation of security is critical to nation building efforts – governments build legitimacy by attaining a monopoly on violence and the effective rule of law. It stands to reason then, that COIN in Afghanistan is important to nation building processes. Importantly, these questions will analyse the necessity of a security apparatus working concurrently with peace building mechanisms as a method of attaining a monopoly on violence. These questions will then be discussed from a realist perspective using comparative methodology between two distinct time periods 2002 – 2005 and then 2006 – 2011. These time periods have been selected, as there was a significant alteration in the policy perspective between these two time periods, which enables a useful and interesting comparison point.

1.4 Methodology

This thesis, as a study of nation building theory will use case study methodology, specifically looking at Afghanistan. As Johansson (2003) states case study methodology should “...have a case which is the object of study. That case should:

- Be complex functioning unit [Village Stability Operations, for example]
- Be investigated in its natural context with a multitude of methods and [such as content analysis and textual analysis]
- Be contemporary” (Johansson. 2003, p. 2)

Thus the purpose of this research is to investigate Afghanistan as a case study in order to analyse the success of nation building theory, in particular the methods employed to attain a monopoly on violence. Case study research is necessary for a complex investigation. Stake writes “[a]s a form of research, case study is defined by interest in individual cases, not the methods of inquiry used” (1995). Therefore this thesis will utilise case study methodology, and apply nation building in Afghanistan as an investigation of nation building theory itself.

The writing of this thesis will employ content analysis and textual analysis as the methods within the methodology. These methods will add a significant amount of information to my research, and importantly will incorporate an established academic body of work in nation building as well as insurgency and counter insurgency. Content analysis will be vital to determining the progression of nation building, using statistics provided by the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to determine the progress made so far in Afghanistan. This will then require textual analysis, as analysing the existing literature will be important to identifying problems encountered in Afghanistan so far, as well as prior analysis and ideas. This will be important to ensuring original analysis and ideas in the thesis.

1.5 Timeframes for analysis

The timeframe being investigated will be split into two parts, 2002 – 2005 and then 2006 – 2011. The split is essentially based upon the rapid escalation of violence from 2006 onwards, as the Taliban and other insurgent forces began to exploit power vacuums throughout the Afghan countryside (Jones, 2009a p. xxi). As Jones posits in his text *In the Graveyard of Empires* (2009), insurgency developed in Afghanistan after the Taliban government was toppled in 2002. It is necessary, then, to investigate why insurgency took place throughout the countryside despite the apparent open dislike of insurgent groups such as the Taliban. Why did insurgency develop, and

how did internal and external actors react to or address this crisis? The two time frames indicated above are interesting as comparison point as they reflect a marked difference in responses both from the international community and GIRoA. From a centralised, top down “light footprint” (Jones, 2009a) approach from 2002 – 2005 to the new approach from 2006 - 2011, with the Obama led troop surge and acknowledgement that it takes the villages to address the crisis inflicting itself upon Afghanistan (Jones, 2008).

1.6 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis will begin in Chapter 2 by investigating the differing types of insurgency identified in the literature. The importance of this chapter is that the thesis will then be able to determine how differing insurgencies affect the various arms of the security apparatus in Afghanistan and importantly, how external and internal actors can address these insurgencies in order to enact more effective nation building efforts. Chapter 3 will then address how peace building methods were intended in Afghanistan to maintain peace throughout the countryside and investigate how PRT’s and the court system were utilised as mechanisms for nation building during the first period under review. Finally, the thesis will investigate changes made to the security apparatus in chapter 4 since 2007, in particular the construction and development of security mechanisms and how the evolution of insurgency in Afghanistan has affected the security apparatus’ development in Afghanistan. Chapter 4 will investigate how external and internal actors have responded to a growing insurgency in Afghanistan, critically analysing successes and failures in the suppression of violent insurgents in Afghanistan. Finally, this thesis will also attempt to discuss possible solutions to these problems at the end of each chapter, in order to offer analysis beyond simple historical recollection.

This thesis is aimed at investigating the importance of correctly identifying insurgency and establishing nation building mechanisms appropriately in light of the type of insurgency. It will investigate whether external and internal actors in Afghanistan utilized nation building theory in the correct order, and whether the level of response was appropriate given the nature of the insurgency. Effectively, was a realist influence ever pervasive in Afghanistan, in particular from the 2002 – 2005 period?

Chapter 2: Insurgency

2.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to discuss the nature of insurgency, firstly from a theoretical perspective then focusing on the case study of Afghanistan specifically. The purpose of this is to establish the most commonly accepted forms of insurgency, then to identify whether these forms of insurgency have been taking place in the current Afghan conflict. Once this has been explored, the chapter will then identify the best definition of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the ramifications of which will inform a more in-depth investigation of nation building in Afghanistan in later chapters. This chapter will in particular contribute to answer the second research question focussed on how successful security actors have been at creating effective state infrastructure that ensures long-term stability in rural Afghanistan. In particular, this chapter will analyse how the nature of how the type of insurgency affects the response of external and internal actors, and assess whether these actors failed to address the type of insurgency in Afghanistan properly resulting in the crisis the country now faces.

2.1.1 Realism and Insurgency?

As there is no higher power than the state in global politics then the system is anarchic; there is no world police or executive to monopolise violence at the international level. Realism does not necessarily indicate, however, that the world is in a constant state of violent contest but rather that should violence break out between powers there is no established authority to quell such tensions or to resolve disputes without regard to the respective powers sovereignty, “Anarchy, or the absence of central authority, is for Waltz the ordering principle of the international system” (Korab-Karpowicz, 2010 para. 3 of 3.1; Jones, 2008 p. 8). Therefore, realism theorises that states act purely in their own self-interest, and successful policy is essentially policy that strengthens the state against its regional and global competitors (Walt, 1979). Nation-states are in a constant state of contest with one another, which may not necessarily involve violence but will involve one or more states attempting to garner advantage over other states. Realism is applicable to Afghanistan and nation building then in that the theory will help to explain the various actors competing for control or the monopoly on violence in Afghanistan, as well as explaining the self-interest involved in these actions (Morgenthau, 1978). Whilst Waltz discusses states themselves, the theory can easily be applied to actors within the state. “Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so – or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbours” (Waltz, 1979 p. 102). Realism effectively posits that violence can take place at any time and it is well within reason for states to be prepared for violence. The very nature of insurgency, in particular violent insurgency, requires states to be prepared to carry out military

actions and legitimately use force in as an act of suppression, or as Jones writes “[a] key aspect of governance... is enforcement” (2008, p. 16).

2.2. Insurgency

For the purpose of this thesis, insurgency shall be defined as “a political-military campaign by nonstate [sic] actors who seek to overthrow a government or secede from a country through the use of unconventional - and sometimes conventional - military strategies and tactics” (Jones, 2008). Kalyvas argues, “Insurgency can best be understood as a process of competitive state building rather than an instance of collective action or social contention...” (2000, p. 218). In Afghanistan, the main source of insurgency is the Taliban, who often use IED’s, suicide bombings and other forms of unconventional warfare in order to attack the ISAF and the Afghan government itself. Insurgency is important to the study of nation building as it can be a key source of instability and violence, and can also contribute as a major inhibitor to rebuilding efforts such as the Helmand Province’s Kajaki Dam (Jones, 2009a p. 186 – 189). It is also important, however, to identify the specific type of insurgency taking place, in order to better address the issue. The three major types of insurgency will be investigated in this thesis – grievance, greed, and ideological insurgency. The purpose of investigating insurgency will be to add a critical layer to the discussion on nation building theory, and how insurgency can affect the response of external and internal actors.

2.2.1. Grievance Insurgency

The first theory of insurgency is tied to the population itself. Ethnic grievances being directly tied to warfare is common amongst insurgency analysts and civil war literature, and stipulates that a history of violence between differing ethnicities heavily influences ever escalating violence (Horowitz, 1985; Figueiredo, & Weingast, 1999; Kaufmann, 1996; Lake, & Rothchild, 1996). In many places around the world grievance insurgency has taken place and can be directed either at the government or at rival ethnicities within the nations borders, or even between differing age demographics where one may hold a superior advantage over another (Jones, 2008; Mokuwa, Voors, Bulte, Richards 2011). Age demographics refers to Sierra Leone in particular, as “Farm labour rate, not land rents, become the fulcrum of exploitation linking village elites and an underclass, and thus a factor plausibly predisposing exploited young male farm labourers towards insurgency” (Mokuwa, et. al, 2011 p. 341). Effectively, in many countries age can be tied to ownership of the means of production, which can lead to exploitation and later resentment from the youth of a nation. Sierra Leone was once regarded as a greed based insurgency due to the prevalence of conflict diamonds, but new literature establishes that the country was rife with

internal grievances that led to insurgency, and diamonds simply became an economic factor in the continuing conflict (Mokuwa et. al, 2011).

Ethnic differences are especially prevalent in Afghanistan; the nation has a major ethnicity in the Pashtun tribe but then many smaller ethnicities, which contributes to tribal and ethnic clashes (Jones, 2008). Ethnic grievances are also significantly heightened by factors such as extremist rhetoric, historical context i.e past atrocities committed, as well as perceived ethnic dominance and control. For example, many Afghan citizens feel that there is an overriding sense of bias in favour of the Pashtun ethnicity in political power structures (Saleh, 2012). If these were the reasons for conflict then insurgency in Afghanistan would be categorised as grievance – competing cultures have ethno-political grievances that can be addressed by developing civil structures and nullifying the insurgencies concerns. Grievance insurgency began to form in Afghanistan as early as 2001, as the CIA posited that there were “...serious rifts and competition between the Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. Afghanistan is a truly zero-sum game. Anytime anyone advances, all others consider this to be at their expense” (Berntsen & Pezzullo in Jones, 2009a p. 159). Competition between ethnicities in Afghanistan played into the hands of those desiring insurgency and was able to exacerbate tensions, contributing to a rejection of the federal political authority based in Kabul. This theory, whilst in some ways applicable to Afghanistan, is however not comprehensive as an assessment of insurgency in Afghanistan. The Taliban is a destabilising force in the country, but it is not a nation-wide phenomenon with a comprehensive level of support from the people; many Afghan citizens support the government and are genuinely interested in a peaceful, prosperous Afghanistan (Jones, 2009). Thus what has motivated insurgency in Afghanistan, and why does it continue to proliferate?

2.2.2. Greed Insurgency

The second theory of insurgency is influenced by greed. Kevlihan goes so far as to argue that greed is ultimately good – “...insurgents are always greedy – they will always look for ways to garner resources or support themselves, including ways of maximising gains from aid” (2012). Commodities especially can influence the call for war – the ability to move and sell commodities makes stealing them far more attractive to potential insurgents, and this has been seen across the world particularly in areas such as the diamond trade (Feldman, 2003 p. 835). If commodities contribute a significant portion to a country’s GDP, the risk of insurgency increases dramatically (Collier, Hoeffler, Sambanis, 2005). Not all commodities are suitable for greed based insurgency, however. Commodities such as oil or iron ore would prove too difficult for such an insurgent force, therefore “*Lootable* [sic] resources such as alluvial diamonds and narcotics...” become the

more desirable commodities that can then influence insurgency (Ballentine, & Nitzschke, 2003 p. 4). Effectively greed based insurgency is the pursuit of resources and material wealth. It is important then to identify how this affects Afghanistan.

There is certainly cause for consideration of a greed based analysis of the insurgency in Afghanistan. Significantly, during the early periods of western intervention (post-2002) there was a substantial amount of funds being invested throughout the Afghan economy however – “[a]s one World Bank study concluded, the primary beneficiaries of assistance were ‘the urban elite’” (Jones, 2008 p. 20). This caused significant consternation among the rural Afghan population, as the focus on urban populations in a country dominated by an agricultural economy and rural population seemed inequitable. Aid in Afghanistan was quickly establishing a two-tier economy that had the potential to boil over into a greed based insurgency. However greed based insurgency seems not applicable to Afghanistan; the nation has lootable commodities but these commodities became a part of the Afghan insurgency after it began, indicating that the initial motivation for insurgency is something other than greed. Yet neither of these forms of insurgency seem conclusive to describing Afghanistan; both can perhaps play a part in insurgency as would be expected, yet do not accurately provide an explanation for what is occurring.

2.2.3. Ideological Insurgency

Seth Jones posits that there is in fact a third form of insurgency that correlates with the situation in Afghanistan, insurgency fuelled by ideology. When governments weaken, the capacity for quelling insurgency, particularly rurally, becomes significantly reduced (Fearon & Laitin, 2003 pp. 75 - 76). As a result there is a power vacuum in the region or nation, and so ideologically based powers supersede legitimate government authority, in an attempt to institute themselves as a regional authority. An exceptionally important distinction between ideological insurgency and the greed/grievance forms of insurgency is the political and religious will that remains unaffected by both monetary attractions as well as developed civil structures – ideological insurgency is invested in overthrowing a current government rather than competing with it for control of a country (Jones, 2008 p. 9). Effectively, ideological insurgency is less receptive to nation building programmes and instead wishes to institute a government that supplants the legitimate government. In Afghanistan, there were and are power vacuums occurring in many places around the countryside and insurgent forces have exploited this, instituting shadow governments in an effort to erode the GIRA's legitimacy in Afghanistan.

In this instance, insurgency in Afghanistan starts to become clearer. The Taliban, in particular, is a regional insurgency deliberately attempting to not only destabilise the Afghan government but

also to replace it, with the Taliban instituting a taxation system, judiciary and civil structures in territory that the Taliban holds (Kilcullen, 2014). Not only this, the insurgency in Afghanistan has continued despite continued successes, albeit hampered successes, that have led to significant development in many sectors of the country (World Bank, 2013). A rejection of women's rights and education has fuelled much of the Taliban's insurgent needs, as well as a pathological rejection of western intervention and ideas (Jones, 2009a p. 19). This is because the Taliban "...were motivated by a radical interpretation of Sunni Islam derived from Deobandism" (Jones, 2009a p. 161). Effectively, the Taliban believe that the reason Islamic societies have fallen behind the West in prominence is because "...they have been seduced by the amoral and material accoutrements of Westernization, and have deviated from the original pristine teachings of the Prophet" (Global Security, 2015). It is clear that the Taliban does not wish for greater amenities and services, nor is there ethnic cleansing or competition (Jones, 2008 p. 11). The Taliban desire a control over Afghanistan due to religious and ideological reasons, and this is where insurgency in Afghanistan becomes extremely difficult to address. It is, however, extremely important that ideological insurgency be recognised in Afghanistan and the ramifications for nation-building efforts fully understood.

2.3. The Effects of Insurgency on Nation Building Approaches

Any investigation into the causes and functions of different insurgencies is instrumental in the effectiveness of nation building programmes within any nation state. This has particular relevance to nation building in Afghanistan, and the use of peace building and the development of the security apparatus in order to attain a monopoly on violence. How an insurgency responds to state efforts to nullify its causes, and also the states responses to insurgency, has a marked effect on the proliferation of violence and the capacity of that violence to escalate. Perhaps one of the most poignant examples of an insurgency not being properly defined and addressed is Boko Haram in Africa. Boko Haram is an insurgent force ideologically opposed to western education but is also exacerbated by exceptional corruption and the distribution of resources garnered from oil revenue to the Nigerian populace (Brun, 2015 para. 2). In 2009, when Boko Haram were still transitioning from regional terror group to full-blown insurgency, the group was only armed with bows and arrows, as well as other primitive IED's and homemade weaponry (Brun, 2015 para. 10). Yet due to a heavily armed response by the Nigerian government, combined with an incorrectly identified insurgency and failure to address local grievances, Boko Haram turned into a full-blown insurgency with large-scale recruitment capable of raiding police stations and arming themselves with heavy weaponry. Due to a heavy handed response by the Nigerian government that attempted to address secondary problems rather than the primary issue – poor education and corruption – Boko Haram transitioned into a powerful, multi-national insurgency capable of

terrifying violence that grew so large the group is openly supported by al Qaeda and now ISIS (Brun, 2015 para. 5; Simcox, 2014; Freeman, 2014).



Figure 2: A map of northern Africa, the Middle-East and South-East Asia showing the links and growth/decline of terrorist groups throughout the regions (Freeman, 2014).

What makes this information so critical to the study of nation building is that the data shows an effective and efficient identification of insurgency within a nation can and will greatly influence the effectiveness and appropriateness of the response. This has serious ramifications for Afghanistan. By identifying ideological insurgency as the primary form of insurgency in Afghanistan, the nation building approach then must be investigated in order to analyse whether internal and external actors have operated appropriately – could these responses have been improved, and even were these responses correct?

2.4. Conclusion

The nature of insurgency in Afghanistan is one of the most critical factors to an effective and proper analysis of nation building in the nation. The ability to identify the causes and motivations for violence and violent actors is especially significant in constructing an appropriate response. Significantly, insurgency in Afghanistan took far too long to be properly addressed by policy makers particularly in the United States, which has led to a delayed response and has hampered nation building efforts since 2001. Perhaps most significantly is President Bush's own admission that "[w]e were not ready for nation building" (Bush in Miller, 2010). When the leader of the leading country in a coalition effort to undertake an extensive peace keeping mission in a foreign failed state explicitly states that nation building efforts were beyond the readiness of those involved, the nature of failure in Afghanistan becomes more apparent. Without adequate political will there becomes a malaise in military direction, which directly affects sustained peace keeping

efforts. Prior to this there was a dearth in specific insurgent information on Afghanistan, perhaps also hampered by the distraction of the burgeoning war in Iraq. As a result it appears that the first six years in Afghanistan were hampered by a lack of political will that translated into poor results in nation building efforts and parallel bureaucracy, eventually creating a scenario where the Taliban could recover and eventually exploit a lack of international focus (Ghani, 2004). In his statement as Governor of the Bank of Afghanistan, now President Ashraf Ghani bemoaned the creation of parallel bureaucracy inhibiting development, and misdirected policy combined with poor economic funding. Tellingly, Ghani also predicted that should development in Afghanistan not be given attention by the international community, the country may "...once again, fail the hopes of its people and threaten global security" (2004). Therefore, due to external and internal actors not addressing insurgency theory correctly, as well as the assumption that once the Taliban was toppled then they were no longer a force as outlined in chapter 1, nation building processes in Afghanistan were severely hampered due to the extreme difficulty in attaining a monopoly on violence in rural Afghanistan.

Chapter 3: A Peace Building Approach to Nation Building in Afghanistan: 2001 – 2005

3.1 Introduction

Peace building is the development of civil structures in order to placate the populace and reduce the potential for violent insurgency within a country. As the U.N defines peace building:

Peace building involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peace building strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives (Sec. Gen. Policy Committee, 2010)

Effectively, peace building is the process by which internal and external nation building actors prolong peace and justify the violent efforts of armed forces in removing insurgency. Peace through peace building is a concept that investigates states as if they were biological forms that were either healthy or ill (Galtung, 1996). Essentially, violence is seen as a disease and peace as a sign of health for state actors, and as such a nation such as Afghanistan would be considered very ill due to the extreme rates of violence occurring there on a daily basis. Crucially, successful peace building operations rely on the successful reconstruction of legitimate state authority (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). Thus there is a strong similarity between the two chains, peaceful security and security through force in nation building; both streams regard the state as an important if not essential component to the nation building process and for further enabling long-term peace, and both streams are essential to the internal actor attaining a monopoly on violence. Civil strife can arise when the failures of authority undermine the authorities legitimacy; police or political corruption, corporate power becoming too great or too predatory, or perhaps those who control force over-exerting their power and thus generating civil disillusionment and subsequently, strife (Doyle & Sambanis 2006).

All these factors for civil strife, importantly, can come under the umbrella of grievance insurgency; a form of insurgency that could feasibly be well addressed by peace building mechanisms. However, as Afghanistan is – according to the conclusions outlined in Chapter 2 - in the throes of ideological insurgency, peace building processes were significantly weakened by an insurgency ideologically opposed to everything that peace building operations seek to implement. Within Afghanistan it has become quite clear that there were power vacuums appearing throughout the countryside during the 2001 – 2005 period, as the GIRoA was unable to maintain

a monopoly on violence in rural Afghanistan – as a result the attempts at building civil society were doomed to failure (Jones, 2008).

This chapter will argue that there are significant strengths to peace building approach in the correct circumstances, not least of all the potential for a reduction in violence by taking a non-violent approach. By investigating peace building itself as a study, the chapter will then move into the most prominent form of peace building in Afghanistan during this period, the work of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). By analysing these bureaucratic forms of nation building, the chapter will then flow into an analysis of the court system in Afghanistan and whether the Italian led judicial effort in Afghanistan was effective in establishing rule of law, or if the effort instead was a failure and instead increased insurgent influence in rural Afghanistan. However the most critical factor of the chapter will be to deduce whether such a nation building approach was suitable to Afghanistan, and if the peace building methods that were employed there during this first period of nation building, such as PRT's, were in fact an appropriate response to Afghanistan's insurgency and promoting long-term stability.

3.2. A summary of success and failure through peace building.

Peace building across the globe has had a tentative history at best, as many states and non-state actors are remiss to attempt security through peaceful measures – the risk of failure can cripple arguments for a non-militaristic approach. A case study for such a phenomenon could be Boko Haram in northern Nigeria – what began as a regional insurgency armed with barely more than medieval weaponry and IED's has since transformed into a multinational terrorist army ransacking through many African nations and with recognised ties to other terror organisations such as al Qaeda and ISIS (Brun, 2015). As was argued in the previous chapter, insurgencies are particularly dangerous when the causes are not properly identified and subsequently, the insurgency itself was approached in the wrong fashion. What began in Nigeria as a grievance insurgency railing against endemic corruption and a lack of economic dispersion was met with violence. As a result, the insurgency garnered greater regional and international attention and transcended from an insurgency into terrorism; violence was met with even greater violence, devolving into a domino effect on regional instability (Brun, 2015; Waltz, 1979). From a realist perspective, states should act in a fashion that would increase the states strength both internally and regionally – Nigeria's response to Boko Haram has resulted in the complete opposite and subsequently escalated into considerable violence.

What can exacerbate these extremes can be religious or ethnic influence, such as the tracking down and killing of clerics in Nigeria (Brun, 2015). The more that civil society is eroded and

destroyed, the more violence and insurgency takes place – thus peace building is a deliberate attempt to cease violence through the successful construction of state entities that can then provide effective amenities and services. The intention being that with these services provided the populace will be placated and less likely to react violently to the authority of the state. Perhaps an indicator of the effectiveness of state institutions could be garnered by observing approval ratings of various governments, and the levels of violence within those states themselves in a comparative analysis. For example, the United States Congress at the time of writing has an approval rating of 16%, yet there is no insurgency taking place within the country (Dugan 2015). Conversely, President Ghani of Afghanistan has an approval rating of 84% (Schuster, 2014), yet is currently facing some of the greatest bouts of violence since the Taliban overthrow in 2001 (Tigner, 2015). Whilst the government of the U.S.A has an appalling approval rating, civil society remains relatively strong and the government is still providing sufficient amenities and services to placate the populace, effectively running a peaceful state building operation. What this correlates too is that successful peace building appears to be a strong mechanism for placating possible violent aspects of a society and reducing the capacity for insurgency.

As Galtung argues in *Peace by Peaceful Means*, should the state find itself ill, prognosis must discover how the state would best recover, often through a form of intervention. Galtung then stipulates that intervention need not come from externally, but can in fact be an internal recovery that can be most effective should the nation building actor “...provide positive conditions for these restorative functions” (1996, p. 1). Essentially, should the state develop sufficient civil procedures to provide effective amenities to its citizens then insurgency becomes far less likely to occur and in fact is nullified through peaceful methods. The argument for an internal restoration certainly bears weight in Afghanistan – the nation is notorious for resistance to outsiders, and often when International Security Assistance Forces institute nation building procedures the programmes are seen as an ISAF priority and are therefore not heavily invested in by the Afghan populace (Fox, 2013 p. 20). It therefore begins to become clear on why approval ratings do not necessitate influence the rule of law – peace building in Afghanistan has encountered sustained difficulties since its inception. The rule of law and its application, as well as the programmes that were put in place with the intention of creating this judicial system must be investigated in order to determine the successes, if any, and the failures of peace building in Afghanistan.

Thus the task of peace building is one that must be undertaken with the utmost care. The ability to appease potential insurgents and thus reduce the likelihood of violence in a country or region is exceptionally important to long lasting peace. Immediately after the fall of the Taliban government, however, external actors took insufficient action to prevent insurgency in rural

Afghanistan (Jones, 2009a). How, then, did peace building processes fail in Afghanistan and what could be done to rectify these errors?

3.2. Provincial Reconstruction Teams

PRT's were one of the most significant efforts in Afghanistan to enact peace building programmes. Effectively, PRT's consisted of external actors funds and manpower to construct a bureaucracy intended to assist the existing provincial government. The motivation for PRT's was straightforward; establishing and promoting continued security in Afghanistan would influence regional and global influence by limiting the proliferation of terrorist organisations in the rural areas of the country (Bush, 2006). "It is widely agreed that effective civilian relief, reconstruction and development work can help convince people to support their government against insurgency" (Gompert, Kelly, Lawson, Parker, Colloton, 2009 p. iii). Thus within this context the programme was initiated with the goal of promoting stable and effective governance in the provinces of Afghanistan. A PRT is a team constructed from various government and military departments, known as the "3Ds": Defence, Development and Diplomacy (Parker, 2007 p. 2). PRT's were a response to the inability of the Afghan federal government in Kabul to provide effective governance and security to regional areas. Therefore, as nation building continued in Afghanistan,

"...the operational center [sic] of gravity for security, reconstruction, and governance shifts to Afghanistan's provinces, national programs [sic] are beginning to adjust, but their geographic reach is still limited. PRT's, therefore, will continue to be one of the primary vehicles for...stabilization [sic] efforts outside of Kabul..." (Morris et al 2006 p. 7)

PRT's were employed to coordinate nation building efforts focused in Kabul with rural centres of population. Thus each province became a micro nation building effort in its own right. PRT's eventually had many successes tempered by many failures, most notably an inability to address rural populations at an effective and consistent level, as well as drastically poor funding (Parker, 2007 p.1).

3.3. The Weakness of Parallel Bureaucracy – PRT's

PRT's were an important step in nation building in Afghanistan, however the teams were limited by their structure, lack of economic support, an inability to address the needs of the Afghan people village by village, and finally geographic limitations coupled with weather limitations reduced the effectiveness of the team (Parker, 2007). When the programme was initially created, an immediate issue arose in that "...no process or doctrine of any kind existed to aid PRTs in programming funds to influence an active insurgency" (Parker, 2007 p.1). Due to this lack of

direction in many instances PRT's became almost mirrors of the local Government, hampering nation building efforts in Afghanistan due to misdirected funds, confusing policy makers and businesses on whether it was best to approach the PRT or the government for development projects, and reducing the aid that the Afghan regional governments acquired as these funds were instead diverted to PRT's (Karzai, 2011; Ghani, 2004). Effectively, "[f]lows of money outside the budget are undermining our efforts at creation of credible institutions" (Ghani, 2004). This could perhaps be caused by the very natures of PRT's and the reason for their inception; according to the ISAF PRT Handbook, "PRT's perform a vital role in occupying the vacuum caused by a weak government presence and are hence deterring agents of instability" (2007). PRT's were quickly at risk of developing into a parallel bureaucracy rather than a supporting member of the bureaucracy (Ghani, 2004). The PRT's mandate is to "...extend the reach of the central government, develop security sector reform, and conduct reconstruction and development activities" (Parker, 2007 p. 3). This three-pronged method of counterinsurgency would appear strong, yet by its very nature appears to take on the critical roles of government, in particular conducting reconstruction and development activities. The government itself would typically undertake these civilian projects, therefore if PRT's are to address security and the reach of central government, development should remain in the control of the internal actor, in this case GIRoA. This ties with President Karzai's criticism of the PRT's, in that the teams not only begin to replace the government but rather the programme insinuates itself as the key authority on development in the region (2011).

PRT's were economically hamstrung from the programmes inception, with funding for development too low to create credible nation building projects (Parker, 2007 p. 1). "As the operational center [sic] of gravity for reconstruction and governance shifted to the provinces, USG supporting programs did not keep pace" (Morris, et al 2006 p. 11). PRT's were being established throughout Afghanistan seemingly in name only; the ability to provide effective amenities and services to the Afghan rural populations was severely constrained by a lack of economic support and authority – in particular, due to legal parameters USAID was unable to fund "...religious or security related infrastructure... so structures such as mosques and police stations were excluded" (Parker, 2007 p. 10). Without sufficient funds to enable nation building programmes, counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy began to falter. Combined with the lack of direction on the spending of funds, the economic backing of the programme encountered crises that significantly affected the outcome and subsequently resulted in the teams attempting to execute too many programmes at once. The very definition on the role of PRT's is another factor that limits the economic potential, as noted earlier PRT's are intrinsic to the reconstruction and development of the provinces, yet the PRT Handbook posits, "...a PRT itself is not a development agency..." (2007), indicating confusion on the role that PRT's are to play in the

economic development of the provinces. Tellingly, PRT's "...were most successful within a limited range of security challenges. The teams proved most effective when instability precluded heavy NGO involvement..." (Morris, et al 2006), indicating that by focusing on specific tasks PRT's were able to be more effective. Therefore the decision to broaden the spectrum of tasks afforded to PRT's resulted in confusion and handicapped the team's effectiveness. The ability for economic development and reconstruction was never provided to PRT's at a sufficient level to have meaningful and long term effects on nation building in Afghanistan, and subsequently provided one of the greatest downfalls in peace building projects in Afghanistan.

3.4.1 What went wrong with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams?

Peace building in Afghanistan faced exceptional resistance. This failure and resistance in the 2002 – 2005 period, had ramifications for the post-2006 period when the Taliban and other insurgent networks vastly increased the rate of attacks and bombings (Jones, 2008). Despite peace building being a viable mechanism for addressing ethnic grievances in the population (Waldman, M 2008), the propensity for extreme violence combined with poor management in terms of funding and time frames resulted in a negative experience for the population in regards to PRT's (Parker, 2007 p. 12 - 13).

Citing the logic of COIN doctrine, senior U.S military leaders insisted that there was no alternative to adopting a full-court press aimed at rapidly and simultaneously improving Afghanistan's security, governance, judicial system, economy, educational standards, health care delivery, and more (Eikenberry, 2013 p. 32).

This is especially problematic in that to encourage significant progress in nation building a number of measures must be engaged in order to be successful, and peace building is a significant factor in that attempt. Waldman argues that in order for insecurity to be appropriately addressed, there are a number of steps that are "...required in different degrees, such as to strengthen the rule of law, build professional security forces, reduce poverty, or improve governance" (2008, p. 3). The strength of these measures institutes control of the populace in the hands of the government, and thus from a realist perspective strengthens the state and constructs a stronger position in the country's region. After the investigation of insurgency in the previous chapter, what becomes clear to the failure of PRT's is that nation building projects without a monopoly on violence are doomed to fail. PRT's were underfunded, without a clear objective for development, and were trying to institute economic and bureaucratic development without having sufficient control of the countryside. In order for peace and stability to be maintained in Afghanistan, particularly through peace building measures such as a robust, efficient and efficacious court system, then the rural populace must be engaged and the motives for approaching or joining the Taliban addressed.

Ideological insurgency will not be addressed by implementing PRT's, but perhaps they are addressed by sufficient rule of law and 'boxing out' insurgent forces.

3.4.2 The court system and the application of law

In Afghanistan, it appears that the majority of peace building measures has taken place at the political level, leaving a dearth in the judicial system, which the Taliban has exploited (Waldman, 2008; Glass, 2015). As recently as 2011 the judicial system in Afghanistan was in a "...catastrophic state of disrepair" (Grono, 2011), in particular affected was the access to legitimate judicial systems as well as the strength and robust application of the law when it was finally approached and utilized in legal process. Of significance to the creation of an efficacious judicial process in Afghanistan is the lack of patience among the Afghan people for justice to be carried out via a western style court system (Glass, 2015). As a legitimate court is not an expedient process, the Afghan people experience disillusionment with the courts, an opening that has been exploited by the Taliban. Importantly, a dysfunctional court system that the Taliban is able to exploit results in the government losing legitimacy in the area, as well as establishing a Taliban presence which can lead to greater violence. This dysfunctional court system has been especially driven by a lack of judicial training and consistency in Afghanistan,

A number of factors stand in the way of effective judicial training. Many judges, especially senior judges, are resistant to new techniques and are opposed to statutory law; they frequently express the opinion that all relevant law comes from the Koran. Judges also have vastly different levels of education and experience, which makes uniform training programs difficult to administer. Most judges have no experience in producing written opinions, are unfamiliar with having defense [sic] attorneys in their courtrooms, and are used to making decisions without reference to the statutory law. The basic idea that judges should make decisions based on the law is the key concept imparted in most training programs. Finally, the programs suffer from a lack of trained interpreters familiar with legal language, which is often complex and difficult to translate (Jensen, 2011 p. 938).

Therefore the creation, maintenance and efficacy of a rural court system is important to peace building in Afghanistan. It is crucial that the training of judges in Afghanistan be addressed; consistency must be established in Afghan law so that there are no significant differences in the application of law between provinces. Whilst there are differences in law between provinces of nations across the globe, in many established and stable nations the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is used as the chief legal counsel for the government and can act as a federal intermediary between provinces however, the MoJ in Afghanistan's "...legal authority and effectiveness are considerably circumscribed by both the lack of direction and the lack of capacity" (International Crisis Group, 2010 p. 21). Being frequently in conflict with the Supreme Court and attorney general's office hampers the effectiveness of the MoJ acting as a unifying factor in the Afghan judicial system (International Crisis Group, 2010 p. 21).

Critically, corruption is also identified as a major blockage to a successful judiciary. “Many Afghan power holders – from President Karzai downwards – benefit from a patronage based system. It enables them to buy and maintain loyalty” (Grono, 2011). Effectively the legislative arm of government in Afghanistan has a remarkable influence on the judicial arm and thus, corruption hamstrings the ability for Afghanistan to maintain an appropriate court system, particularly rurally where patriarchal dominance is still rife. Also troubling is that these attitudes and accepted modes of thinking fly in the face of the Afghan Constitution in that “The citizens of Afghanistan – whether man or woman – have equal rights and duties before the law” (Afghan Const. art. 1 sec. 2). The Constitution in Afghanistan has come under fire, however, as not being a particularly strong legal document. “The strong presidential system adopted under the 2004 constitution has exacerbated the weakness of judicial institutions” (Grono, 2011). Effectively the Afghan constitution is not well constructed to act as a counter to the power of the executive branch. Power in Afghanistan is exceptionally centralised in a country notorious for its decentralised nature. This is particularly concerning to scholars such as Seth Jones, positing

...how, westernised the conception of nation building was in Afghanistan, how much of this was focused on building institutions from the centre as the only solution for Afghanistan, and that is building ANP, ANA...so as you travel to the rural areas of the country you hear ‘we don’t want the central government to play that role at our village level...its ok for security in tribal fights between tribes [sic]’ but there was some push back as the US visualising nation building in Afghanistan (Jones, 2009b).

For scholars like Jones, Afghanistan is far more suited to a regionally based power structure (Jones, 2009a). Rural courts and the ALP need to be a more effective source for the rule of law, rather than placing emphasis on large population centres such as Kabul. “Assistance is essentially a Kabul phenomenon” (Jones, 2009b).

3.4.3 The Taliban and Courts

After the Taliban overthrow in 2001, “...re-establishing their (the Taliban) judicial system rapidly emerged as their top non-military priority” (Giustozzi, & Franco, & Baczko, 2012 p. 5). The creation of courts, however brutal and medieval they may be, have been effective in Taliban areas in carrying out their own special brand in the rule of law. In Kunar province, the Taliban courts are in fact preferred over the courts created by the Kabul government (Glass, 2015). This is due to the Taliban systems speed, efficacy, and low costs. What this indicates, however, is that peace building measures are a possibility in Afghanistan; the institution of a court system that operates quickly and appropriately will garner local backing – it already has in the case of Kunar province, the problem, however, is that the Taliban has succeeded where nation building actors needed to instead. Effectively, due to the failure to create a successful judicial system in rural Afghanistan

the Afghan people have “...been forced to accept the rough justice of the Taliban and criminal powerbrokers in areas that lie beyond government control” (Grono, 2011). A power vacuum formed in rural Afghanistan, and insurgent forces have been able to exploit it. The GIRoA has lost control of the rural court system not due to any expertise or brilliance on behalf of the insurgency, but simply because an opening presented itself to insurgent forces.

3.4.4 Supplanting the Supplanters: Answering the Taliban Courts

One success in combating the efficacy of Taliban courts has been rapid response military night raids on Taliban targets (Giustozzi, & Franco, & Baczeko, 2012 p. 5). These raids have destabilised the Taliban court system and forced insurgent forces to adopt a mobile court system, which many Afghan citizens feel has resulted in the decisions passed down by these mobile judges as too quick and too volatile. However simply combatting Taliban and other insurgent courts through the utilization of the Afghan security apparatus does not address the rural court systems problems in the long term. “Donor countries should also begin to focus more heavily on long-term solutions to the dearth of legal professionals in Afghanistan by providing aid to legal education and law schools” (Jensen, 2011 p. 938 – 939). Combining the development of the judiciary along with the police, local and national, will enable a comprehensive legal structure that will be actually geared towards reducing crime and corruption in rural Afghanistan. Importantly, rural judicial development will also make a statement from the Kabul government in regards to rule of law across Afghanistan, establishing the GIRoA as an authority across the country. However the emphasis on the judiciary is a relatively recent phenomenon, “...the issue of rebuilding justice and rule of law institutions has, until recent years, been largely neglected” (Wardak, 2011). In order for peace building institutions to have an effect in Afghanistan then external and internal actors must place an emphasis on rebuilding infrastructure and training an effective judiciary, to populate the Afghan countryside with an efficacious court system.

3.5. Conclusion

Peace building in Afghanistan will eventually become one of, if not the most important method in ensuring nation building is carried out to a successful conclusion. As it happens right now in Afghanistan, the failure of the court system combined with parallel bureaucracy has resulted in peace building stalling in Afghanistan, which in turn has resulted in the Taliban reasserting themselves as a power in the rural provinces, in particular eastern Afghanistan as it borders Pakistan (Jones, 2009b). Peace building processes in Afghanistan have effectively failed, and even in some instances reversed what little successes external actors had found in Afghanistan

after the 2002 overthrow of the Taliban. The inability for external and internal nation building actors to institute a robust, efficacious and monetarily efficient legal system has allowed the Taliban to assert themselves once again into the rule of law in many areas of Afghanistan (International Crisis Group, 2010 p. i). What is most alarming about this, is the Taliban is simply selected for the judicial process as a matter of convenience (Glass, 2015) – there is little to no reason that the Taliban has supplanted the Afghan governments legal process other than by identifying peace building processes as having failed in rural Afghanistan. If the GIRoA is to attain a monopoly on violence in Afghanistan, and institute regional control, then the power vacuums that result from the poorly trained police and judiciary must be addressed. The judiciary especially is of concern to Afghanistan; training police patrols is simpler than training judges. The GIRoA must enforce a standard in the judiciary that incorporates consistency in laws across Afghanistan, and leave the finer details to the local provinces and districts. If external and internal actors could achieve this successfully then not only will the federal government have greater influence in rural Afghanistan, but the local tribes and ethnicities will retain some form of autonomy and control over their own laws, which throughout the years has proven essential to nation building efforts in Afghanistan.

Chapter 4: A Monopoly on Violence

4. Introduction

“Every state is founded on force” (Trotsky in Wallis, & North, 2001). Trotsky’s statement rings particularly true for a realist – physical force is the most common form of control that a state employs over a country’s population. A monopoly on violence stipulates that the state has control over the only licit use of force in the country and/or region (Weber, 1954). The primary tools of force are broken into a police force and an armed military, the stipulation of the roles for these two arms being internal and external control of force respectively. Force is a necessary counter to the most prevalent form of insurgency in Afghanistan, ideological. As has been argued, ideological insurgency is particularly unique in that the motivation is not influenced by grievances or greed, but rather through education and propaganda, which eliminates normal methods of counter-insurgency (Jones, 2008). Ideological insurgencies are typically violent and sustained efforts that require a long-term solution coupled with extensive internal and external nation building efforts. Thus in respect to the propagation of ideological insurgency in Afghanistan, coupled with the extensive failures of peace building processes outlined in previous chapters, a monopoly on violence approach becomes even more important to nation building processes in Afghanistan. The ability to secure a monopoly on violence, particularly in rural Afghanistan where the majority of the population is located, is arguably one of the most important aspects of nation building in Afghanistan (Jones & Wilson & Rathmell, 2005).

The success of reconstructing internal security can be summed up as the establishment of security and a functioning rule of law (Jones & Wilson & Rathmell, 2005). This requires firstly establishing internal security after combat as a major and immediate policy for both external and internal actors. Secondly, the reconstruction of an effective police force must be combined with an effective judicial system, and the court system is also heavily reliant on an effective police force able to support the judiciary. Thirdly, the system must be well funded, be well manned, have a long-term approach and combine these elements with effective infrastructure, training and institutional development (Jones & Wilson & Rathmell, 2005 p. 7).

Thus the examination of the monopoly on violence approach in Afghanistan will be investigated via the inspection of Afghanistan’s military, local and national police services and the difference in approaches over the twelve years. This chapter shall first outline the tools utilized in an attempt to counter insurgency in Afghanistan, briefly discussing the successes and failures of these plans. From this broad spectrum the chapter will then focus into a discussion on the Afghan National Army (ANA) from 2002 – 2006, and providing a comparative analysis with the ANA from 2007

– 2011. I feel that this will investigate a sufficient length of time to determine the differences in approaches from the ANA and how effective the military has been in attaining a monopoly on violence.

Beyond this, the chapter will then discuss the fight for the countryside, in Village Stability Operations (VSO), Afghan Local Police (ALP) and the application of COIN in rural Afghanistan. By taking a comprehensive approach to the use of force in Afghanistan, this chapter will discuss the importance of attaining a monopoly on violence in Afghanistan towards nation building, discussing which methods were either not successful or even detrimental to nation building in Afghanistan.

4.1. Monopoly on Violence Approach

Attaining a monopoly on violence is considered one of the core principles of government (Jones, 2008; Trotsky in Wallis, & North, 2001; Chomsky, 2010; Weber, 1954). The chief mechanism for attaining a monopoly on violence is through militaristic means. The creation of a strong and effective military and police enables the government to create and maintain peace, and is one of the driving forces behind modern COIN theory (Eikenberry, 2013). The creation and subsequent retention of a monopoly on violence can lead to a more effective and sustainable government. In particular the establishment of a government capable of addressing the particular needs of governed peoples – even whether a strong central government is the answer or if a government with multiple centres of power is more suitable. Whilst the West is tied definitely to strong central governance there are a multitude of arguments that posit certain countries, such as Afghanistan, could benefit in from a fractured, multi-powered government, albeit still pertaining a central authority to tie relations between provinces (Jones, 2010). Common throughout the theory is that of establishing security in order to enable nation building to take place. In essence, without an effective military and police force that has secured a monopoly on violence, governments cannot hope to institute meaningful change and progress and will in fact regress back into insurgency relatively quickly (Dobbins, Jones, Crane, DeGrasse, 2007 p. xviii). Afghanistan was not always a target for sustained counter insurgency with the intention of attaining a monopoly on violence; in fact throughout the beginning of the U.S.A's war on terror in 2001, nation building was never a chief policy aim for external actors and by extension, establishing security within Afghanistan's borders was not either (Jones, 2009). Throughout the 2001 – 2006 period, in fact, U.S policy was geared more towards enabling a transition into a democratic government. It appears there was an underlying assumption that whilst the establishment of democracy in Afghanistan would not be easy, it would be attained without coalition forces committing to nation building in Afghanistan. It soon became apparent that the

Afghan government simply could not attain a monopoly on violence with relative ease like external actors expected it to, and the violent situation in Afghanistan became worse over time (Jones, S 2008).




Figure 3. Correlation between Afghanistan's GDP and Force Growth: Of importance is the significant growth between 2006 and 2010 of both GDP and ANA Force Size, indicating a response to an increase in insurgency (World Bank, 2013)

This has significant ramifications for nation building theory in Afghanistan. Policy from foreign actors as well as the Afghan federal government has seemingly decided that security has become crucial to construction in Afghanistan (Jones, 2009b). In a contrary vein, however, some argue that peace is better attained through peaceful methods and that simply pursuing security will never result in a successfully immersed or nullified insurgency (Galtung, 1996).

4.2. The security apparatus 2001 – 2006: The Afghan National Army

The ANA was re-established in 2002 and was originally constructed as an infantry based military (NATO, 2013 para. 1). The infantry based army was originally created “...to ensure political stabilization [sic] and security, country’s reconstruction, security sector reforms and creation of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) – armed forces and police” (Zagranicznich, 2012). The ANA was immediately created with the intention of asserting a monopoly on violence, a decision that is backed by the evidence provided in the previous chapter in addressing ideologically based insurgency and allowing the subsequent development of nation building in Afghanistan. However the speed involved in addressing this crisis is a serious failure of the ANA and in nation building

efforts in Afghanistan. Prior to 2006, the ANA was not under any sense of urgency to grow and quickly take responsibility for security in Afghanistan, but rather that ISAF would control the country side on behalf of the Afghan federal government, as shown in Figure 3.




Figure 4. Importantly, the graph shows that despite the numbers of ANA soldiers trained, relatively few are being used in active duties around Afghanistan. (American Forces Press Service, 10/1/2005; O'Hanlon, M & Lins de Albuquerque, A 23/2/2005)

Importantly, the ANA was never intended to be a large army – at an international conference in Germany in 2002, it was agreed by foreign powers as well as the interim Afghan government that the ANA should exceed no more than 70,000 personnel, and of these only 43,000 would be ground combat troops (Culture & Conflict Studies, 2007 Table 1). This is indicative that COIN and nation building processes were never an intention for foreign powers – once the Taliban was deposed from Kabul, it appears that foreign powers assumed that the mission was largely completed. In particular, figure 3 indicates that NATO and the ISAF also assumed Afghanistan would be capable of asserting its own monopoly on violence through a more traditional mechanism – the police force - in a relatively short amount of time, further reducing the urgency for the ANA to have active deployments within Afghanistan's own borders. What resulted was external actors not paying full attention to the security situation in Afghanistan, perhaps exacerbated by the war in Iraq, and the Afghan government not capable of acting on any changes in the security situation in Afghanistan due to an ineffective defence force (Jones, 2009a pp. 109 – 134). Without security in the country side, nation building programmes were unable to take place and Afghanistan quickly turned into a two-speed development, with the urban centres receiving more attention and care ahead of the rural areas of the country.

4.3.1. The security apparatus 2001 – 2006: The Afghan National Police

One of the acknowledged failures of the monopoly on violence approach in Afghanistan is the Afghan police. “A major reason (the Afghan government could not provide security outside of Kabul) was the inability of the US government to build competent Afghan security forces, especially the police” (Jones, 2008). This was caused by the lack of focus from international forces in the development of an effective police force, focusing instead on the development of the ANA (Dobbins in Jones, 2008). Significantly, it would appear that the lack of focus on the Afghan National Police (ANP) resulted in the Afghan governments inability to provide sustained support and protection to rural Afghani’s. “Policing goes to the very heart of state building, since a credible national institution that helps provide security and justice for the population is central to government legitimacy” (International Crisis Group, 2007 p. i). Concurrently, as was discussed in the previous chapter, the lack of police presence contributed to the erosion of the court system in the provinces, creating a legal vacuum that the Taliban were then able to occupy and reassert their presence. The task of developing the police in Afghanistan first fell to Germany, which in 2002 began with a force of 10 German police officers, and by 2006 had grown to a paltry 40 officers (German Federal Office, Ministry of Interior 2006; Feilke, 2010 p. 7). German police officers coordinated with PRT’s run by Germany as well as operating in Kabul, Herat and other provinces that the German security forces (*Bundeswehr*) had established security and control. “By 2003, however, U.S officials at the State Department, Defense [sic] Department, and White House began to argue that the German effort was far too slow, trained too few police officers, and was seriously underfunded” (Jones, 2008 p. 22). Thus, a partition took place in the responsibilities for the training of police in Afghanistan.

After establishing the Police Academy Kabul, the German police focused on training of Police Officers - *Satanman*, and the U.S began training of the police patrolmen, the *Satoonkai* (Feilke, 2010 p. 8). A significant issue with the development of a police force in Afghanistan appears to be the length of training; *Satanman*, the officer elite of the Afghan police force take 3 years to train under the German programme, and the *Satoonkai* – the patrolmen just 9 months. Whilst effective training and development of police is an important part of maintaining a monopoly on violence, the length of time in which there was a power vacuum in policing power in Afghanistan exacerbated an already lawless situation in rural areas. This was also made worse by the lack of rural influence by German forces – taking responsibility for the establishment of Afghanistan’s police force and instead only focusing these efforts in the capital and a small number of central establishments hamstringing the ability for federal police coverage in the many rural areas where insurgency eventually took hold. Afghanistan, a country with an estimated population of 30.55

million people has a rural population of 22.6 million (World Bank, 2014). In order for policing to be effective the geographic coverage must be extensive (Jones, 2008 p. 22).

4.3.2. The Afghan Local Police 2002 – 2005

Critical to the maintenance of peace in the rural districts of Afghanistan is the maintenance of a strong and stable local police, who are personally invested in the outcomes of their own region and who personally attach themselves to the struggles and disputes taking place there (Jones, 2008). The creation of a local police force in Afghanistan, however, met difficulties before the force was even initiated. Perception of police in Afghanistan is of “...a coercive instrument of the state rather than public servants upholding – and bound by – the rule of law, a view exacerbated by years of conflict” (International Crisis Group, 2007 p. 1). The view of police as coercive elements of the law rather than the law’s champions was further entrenched in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, with external forces prioritising efforts in the defence force well ahead of that of the local police force. Even then, prioritising the Army ahead of the local police did not translate into a stable and safe security environment. “One of the major reasons is the low level of resources: Afghanistan continues to be one of the lowest staffed and funded U.S, U.N or European nation-building [sic] projects since World War II” (Jones & Wilson & Rathmell, 2005). This dearth in development created opportunity for many elements that sought control of Afghanistan – control of the security organs is considered one of the many spoils of war, a theory that held true in Afghanistan post-Taliban control (International Crisis Group, 2007 p.1). The lack of sustained effort in policing in the 2002 – 2005 period of Afghan development resulted in squandered nation building efforts in Afghanistan. A government that is unable to exert a monopoly on violence in its own country does not have control (Waltz, 1979). With an underdeveloped local police force the Afghan government was not able to maintain control of the countryside, in particular there was no coercive support of the legal system in rural areas of the country.

The rise of the Taliban in 2006 had a direct influence on the proliferation of the ALP. Importantly, the rise of the Taliban drove home the fact that nation building efforts in Afghanistan were failing, and that a focus on central power structures coupled with inadequate funding had hamstrung the ability for the Afghan government to attain a monopoly on violence (Jones & Wilson & Rathmell, 2005). Most notably, the subsequent escalation of force and the capabilities of the ANA were insufficient in halting the growth of the Taliban, and a new response was required (Jones, S 2008). It is important to note that “[i]nternal security is the responsibility of the Home Ministry and the police force” (Tripathi, 2009), however in Afghanistan the role of internal security remains firmly in the grasp of the ANA (Jones, 2008). It

is also important to note that relying on the army for internal security bloats the militaries budget (Tripathi, 2009), which can certainly be seen in Afghanistan, with the ANA budget taking up 6% of all GDP (World Bank Afghanistan, 2013). By comparison, the United States military budget, one of the largest in the world, costs 4% of GDP (World Bank USA, 2013). Whilst the United States may in raw figures spend many times more than Afghanistan, it is worth noting that the United States is in a far better position to have such high spending on its military apparatus compared to Afghanistan.

4.4. Afghan Local Police 2007 – 2011

With the rapid escalation of violence in Afghanistan, it became clear that a coordinated response was necessary from external and internal actors – thus the local police became a higher priority for external and internal actors. Thus as the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) “...approved a ‘temporary’ increase of the planned 62,000 police to 82,000 police, including 18,500 border police” (International Crisis Group, 2007 p. 10). It is worth noting, however, that 82,000 police for 33 million people remains one of the lowest per capita police forces in South Asia. Compounding the dearth in raw numbers was a shocking lack of ability in the police officers themselves, with some observers stating that the police “...were barely qualified mall guards” (International Crisis Group, 2007 p. 11). The capacity for the Afghan police to maintain rule of law, particularly against a violent and aggressive Taliban campaign was practically non-existent, and subsequently, rural Afghanistan slipped beyond the control of Kabul. The Afghan police had failed as a mechanism for the GIRoA to maintain control and consequently, nation building efforts targeted at the majority of Afghan people were unsuccessful. In 2009 President Obama deployed 4,000 additional soldiers to Afghanistan with the express purpose of training local and national police forces, to coincide with the troop surge in December 2009 (Bruno, 2010). Concurrently, training has become a far greater focus in recent efforts, with the realisation that numbers alone will not repel the Taliban, as senior military officials and NATO and non-NATO partners “...have embraced the concept that improving the capability of Afghan forces is the quickest way to draw down...” (Bruno, 2010). Ken Deane, chief police advisor for the United Kingdom expressed it as “I would rather have a force of 20,000 credible and effective police officers than 60,000 or even 80,000 men who have been through some nominal training process which is not fully fit-for-purpose” (In International Crisis Group, 2007 p. 10). It appears that whilst the training and effectiveness of police is now becoming more prominent in Afghan security policy the length of time to train and deploy these police officers means a rapid response to the Taliban resurgence was impossible, and a shorter term response was necessary.

4.5. The Answer to the Return of the Taliban – The Village Stability Operation

From 2006 onwards violence in Afghanistan undertook a drastic increase to the point where scholars such as Seth Jones posited it felt more dangerous visiting Afghanistan in 2006 than it did in 2002, immediately after the fall of the Taliban (2009). It became clear, not only in scholarly circles but also at top military and political circles that the establishment of security in Afghanistan since 2002 had failed, and a new perspective was required in order to enforce peace, particularly in the countryside (Jones, 2010). Recognising that failures of the court systems in the countryside, as well as an inability in the ALP's ability to enforce law and order, Afghanistan became a battle for the countryside rather than a development of central power structures in Kabul (Jones, 2009). Having investigated the PRT's and cognisant of the programmes shortcomings, the VSO programme was initiated as a method for securing rural Afghanistan. Initiating an in-depth coordination of local police development with civil infrastructure, as well as an army inspired defence initiative, VSO's are one of the main genuine attempts to attain control of the countryside without focusing on central power structures first. Rather, the VSO programme establishes control and development of the countryside, and afterwards transitions into coordination with the Kabul government (Hulslander & Spivey, 2009). However, the VSO programme was not initiated until long after the Taliban resurgence – the Taliban had an incredible rise in prominence from 2006 onwards and the VSO response was not officially begun until 2010 (Hulslander & Spivey, 2009). The backlash of this being that the Taliban established a strong foot hold in rural Afghanistan, which in turn has hampered the VSO's efforts to re-establish control. Thus a central question of this chapter is how has the VSO programme affected nation building and COIN in Afghanistan, and is the programme a potential solution to the security woes currently facing the Afghan government?

4.5.1. Village Stability Operation Structure and Effectiveness

VSO's are structured in a typical COIN blueprint: Shape/clear, hold, build and transition (Shreckengast, 2012). What this translates to is that in essence a Special Forces team will engage insurgent forces in an area around a targeted village and through the use of force remove the insurgents from the area. The team then establishes security in the hold phase, which is the establishment of stable defence. Within this phase the ALP are established and recruited from the local populace in order to encourage a more involved response from the village. The build phase begins once "...development and governmental initiatives are fully operational" (Shreckengast, 2012). Throughout this phase the village begins to be incorporated into the Afghan national government and is encouraged to embrace the sovereignty of the national parliament. Finally in

the transition phase, the Special Forces team is confident in the ability of the ALP to maintain peace and that the village has been successfully incorporated into the national Afghan government (Hulslander & Spivey, 2012; Shreckengast, 2012). Importantly, the programme incorporates a combination of military and civil mechanisms, with the intention of attaining a monopoly on violence through the use of force. The VSO programme is especially effective in that external actors are addressing Afghanistan's highly dispersed population and power centres throughout the country – "...decentralized [sic] government and localized [sic] security has been the cornerstone of stability in Afghanistan" (Shreckengast, 2012).

Whilst there is a strong correlation between VSO's and a reduction in coalition casualties, in particular in Helmand, Zabul and Kandahar provinces, there has unfortunately been an increase in civilian casualties (Shreckengast, 2012). Of significance is the reduction in violent attacks initiated by insurgent forces since 2009, in particular when comparing the "fighting season" of spring to summer (Department of Defense [sic], 2011 p. 74). The DoD believes that the decrease in violent attacks is "...a result of ANSF-ISAF operations" (Department of Defense [sic], 2011 p. 76), therefore whilst there has been an increase in civilian deaths there has also been a decrease in violent attacks. This would indicate that VSO's, ALP and a renewed focus on rural Afghanistan has resulted in a reduction in violent incidents, however these violent incidents have become increasingly dangerous towards civilians. The DoD posits that a major reason for the increase in civilian deaths is due to the IED's rather than actual gun battles, as gun battles in Afghanistan decreased by 40% between 2009 and 2010 (2011, p. 72). Thus there is a strong correlation that VSO's have in fact led to a reduction in insurgent based violence, in particular gun battles.

There is a strong correlation between VSO's and a reduction in violence in rural Afghanistan. In particular, some of the most violent areas have experienced a reduction in violence, as well as a decrease in gun battles since 2009 (Department of Defense [sic], 2011; Shreckengast, 2012; Huslander & Spivey, 2012). However many of these gains are tempered by the limitations placed on the programme by external actors and an insufficiency in funding (Ghani, 2004). VSO and ALP programmes were not intended to eventually replace the ANA as the main source of security in Afghanistan, but rather to supplement current efforts and act as an assistant to ensuring peace in the short term (Radin, 2012).

Radin argues that this limitation is implied by the relatively low number of violent mechanisms at the Afghan governments disposal, comparing the current 12,000 Afghan Local Police to the 352,000 current personnel in the ANA (2012). Radin argues that this discrepancy in numbers results in the police being unable to maintain stability and peace in areas that the ANA and the

ISAF worked to remove insurgents from. However, others argue for the viability of the VSO programme in the long term. “By 2014, CFSOCC-A anticipates that ALP, supported by VSO, will be a major component of the ISAF/GIRoA ‘hold force’ used to consolidate strategic gains” (Fulcher & Higgins & MacKenzie, 2012). This is possibly the best option for attaining a monopoly on violence in Afghanistan; army’s by their nature are not created to maintain peace within their own country, which is the role of police (Jones, 2008 p. 22). Of even more significance is the fact that the ANA costs over 6% of Afghanistan’s GDP, and even has more personnel than the United States Military (World Bank, 2013). The sheer size of the ANA compared against the ALP and ANP indicates that the current violent approach focus is targeted at the military and furthermore, is not as effective as desired by nation building actors.

4.5. Conclusion

The construction and maintenance of a strong security apparatus, such as police and army, is the common method used to attain a monopoly on violence. However, one of the most critical aspects of a monopoly on violence is its maintenance phase, and nation building programmes in Afghanistan have failed to achieve this (Jones, 2008 p. 22). Army’s by their nature are not structured to maintain peace within a society over the longer term by retaining a monopoly on the use of legitimate force on a day to day basis inside the borders of a state. Rather, a national and a local police force is the mechanism most commonly employed for such an end. It is with this in mind that the use of force in Afghanistan must currently be read as a success followed by a swift failure. The creation of the ANA and its capabilities has been steadily increasing in potency since 2002, however the police force has been left in an absolute state of disrepair, concurrent with the breakdown in the efficacy of the rural court system in Afghanistan, as discussed in chapter 3. Essentially, every time the ANA makes progress in removing insurgency and establishing secure zones of control, there is an insufficient complementary response from the police force, or more notably an insufficient capacity for the police force to maintain these secure zones and ensure that insurgency does not return.

In order for violent mechanisms in Afghanistan to become more successful in attaining prolonged state control and suppressing insurgency in the countryside, it appears that a shift must occur between the ANA and the ANP/ALP. The initial impression that the ALP was going to be a short-term programme rather than a long-term solution speaks volumes on how violence is approached in Afghanistan. In order for violent mechanisms to become more effective in Afghanistan long term solutions must be investigated and employed, rather than simply turning to the ANA more and more as a response to insurgency. It is with this in mind that the VSO programme becomes

more significant to the proliferation of peace in Afghanistan, in particular in helping the GIRoA attain control over the countryside.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Conclusion and Summary

This thesis sought to answer two questions:

1. How did a realist international relations perspective influence nation-building approaches in Afghanistan between 2002 – 2005 and between 2006 – 2011?
2. How successful have security actors been at creating effective state infrastructure that ensures long-term stability in rural Afghanistan?

Question one has two parts for a very important reason – from 2006 onwards the security situation in Afghanistan devolved into violent insurgency and the government lost effective control over the countryside. A realist perspective would have placed emphasis on establishing first a monopoly on violence, particularly for traditional realism as written by Morgenthau (1978). However Waltz's interpretation of realism also places an emphasis on government control and authority (1979). Simply, neither of these dominant interpretations of realism were taken into account in planning the nation building project in Afghanistan from the outset in 2002 – 2005. A realist perspective had little to no influence, as external actors, crucial to counterinsurgency, simply felt that Afghanistan had already stabilised and that once the Taliban had fallen, the countryside would fall easily into a central authorities control (Jones, 2009a; Jones, 2009b; Waltz, 1979, Korab-Karpowicz, 2010). External actors focused too heavily on having a 'light-footprint' in Afghanistan and on peace building approaches to nation building. This approach ignored previous nation building successes such as Germany or Japan where initial efforts focussed fundamentally on security. Importantly, what these nation building efforts stressed first was boots on the ground and a large ratio of soldiers to civilians, which established a high level of security and enabled nation building efforts to take place; with these nation building mechanisms in place the populace was effectively placated and subsequently entered periods of effective peace building despite coming immediately after one of the most brutal conflicts in history (Jones, 2009a; Jones, 2009b; Crane et al, 2003).

Unfortunately for the nation building project in Afghanistan once a realist perspective was finally utilised in Afghanistan from 2006 and the establishment of a monopoly on violence became a priority in Afghanistan, an ideological insurgency had managed to entrench itself in rural Afghanistan. Once insurgency is established, it becomes a monumental task of countering,

removing and re-establishing law and order (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Eikenberry, 2013; Gombert et al, 2009). A realist perspective has eventually taken hold in the approach to Afghanistan. However by the time this occurred in 2006 the complexity of attaining a monopoly on violence in Afghanistan has increased significantly.

This leads into question two: how successful has the security apparatus been in this endeavour? The Afghan security apparatus has experienced a drastic increase in focus, funding, training and effort since 2006 however, attempting to establish a security apparatus during a violent insurgency is difficult, to say the least. From 2002 – 2005, it is evident that security actors have been largely ineffective at establishing state infrastructure in rural Afghanistan as quite simply it was not considered a priority. One of the most significant failures in the security apparatus in this period was the Afghan Local Police; as without a localised police force to act in a highly ethnically diverse nation, long term stability and security in Afghanistan were exceptionally susceptible to insurgency. Since 2006, with programs like VSO and ALP in place, external and internal actors have made significant progress in creating effective state infrastructure that ensure long-term stability in rural Afghanistan. It must be noted, however, that despite these subsequent gains Afghanistan is not likely to succeed in countering insurgency for a long time due to the failures of the nation building project in its early stages which allowed the insurgency to firmly establish itself (Jones, 2009a).

1.2 What can be done?

In looking at the massive costs associated with the ANA, taking into account the small size of the ALP, and finally investigating the lack of training and resources available to the ANP, a picture begins to form. It would appear that a smaller, more robust military that was initially proposed for the ANA may in fact be an effective policy solution, provided that these funds are then applied to the ALP in order to make VSO's more effective and importantly, more long-term. Concurrently, the rural court system is in drastic need of reform to reinforce the rule of law and also act as a symbol of the Kabul government. It is impractical, however, for this symbol to appear as a mighty act of power or control over the countryside. Rather, the GIRoA must branch out to the countryside and effect power in order to supplant the insurgency currently operating, particularly in southern and eastern Afghanistan, whilst enabling rural Afghanistan to maintain some autonomy and independence. Centralised western power structures will not only not work, they will be actively opposed. This is especially important for the function of the ANP. A well-developed ALP will allow the ANP to focus on other more national criminal institutions, such as counter narcotics, immigration and people smuggling, and maintaining border controls (Fielke, 2010). Border control along the Durand line with Pakistan would especially be beneficial, as a

counter to any insurgent forces that exploit the ability to cross the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan in order to avoid reprisal from military forces in Afghanistan.

In regards to the ANA, the operational capacity of the army is growing, and the effectiveness of its infantry alongside the ANA. Arguably, the ANA is one of the success stories of counter insurgency in Afghanistan. The difficulty lies in the fact that whenever the ANA carry out successful operations or remove insurgents from an area or region, the army has been unable to carry out an effective transition of control to the local police or authorities. Without being able to satisfy this final aspect of COIN theory, the ANA becomes hampered and must expand in order to address these failures from the ALP and ANP. Hence, the ANA has grown to almost 9 times what was originally discussed size in the Bonn conference as far away as 2002. Internal and external actors must look at how the ANA can be reduced in size and the subsequent freeing up of labour and resources redistributed into local police programs.

The ANP as an organisation should become better tasked towards acting as other national police forces in the region do: gather intelligence and work on federal policing matters. With the creation of the ALP and VSO, the ANP has since been less restricted in operation capacity and is better able to work on issues such as immigration, counter narcotics, organised crime and corruption, with Feilke argues are the original core tasks of the ANP (2010).

The ALP and VSO programmes could ultimately become the major mechanism for attaining a monopoly on violence in Afghanistan. Over the period examined, a recurring theme in terms of security was military forces clearing ground and insurgent forces, and then having to leave the area to address another flash point. Being tactically unable to enact transition phase of COIN, a power vacuum resulted that insurgent forces were happy to return to and fill. As Jones stated, shadow governments began to take place all over the Afghan countryside, directly supplanting the Afghan court system and parliament (2009b). The continued development, training and funding of the ALP and VSO programmes will be essential to attaining a monopoly on violence through the security apparatus.

Once the security apparatus has successfully established security, perhaps the most successful, long term plan for establishing and maintaining a monopoly on violence may take place: Peace building (Galtung, 1996). Peace building is a key responsibility of security actors in Afghanistan, and is an effective method of creating effective state infrastructure that ensures long-term stability in Afghanistan. Economic growth, the availability of health care, access to education (one of the few successes in Afghanistan), and an effective and incorrupt bureaucratic infrastructure will

ensure that Afghanistan remains stable for far longer than military might alone can guarantee. Effective peace building measures will institute strong court systems, capable of eradicating corruption in governance and encouraging more responsible governments. Importantly, peace building is the concluding step in nation building efforts, when local actors can assume responsibility for the monopoly on violence, maintain order within the actors own borders, and ensure the safety of the states citizens, arguably the core responsibility of government (Weber, 1954).

Ultimately the battle for the countryside begins with the military, and must eventually be carried out exclusively by the ANSF. It is equally important, however, that internal and external actors acknowledge that without sufficient peace building institutions, in particular court systems to enable the rule of law, power vacuums will continue to present themselves in rural Afghanistan and be exploited by insurgent forces hoping to usurp the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

A key finding of this thesis is that the experience of the failure of nation building in Afghanistan should teach us a number of key things. Firstly that before pursuing peace building it is necessary to ensure that a monopoly on violence has been established by the security forces in line with a realist understanding of the world. Secondly that it is necessary to correctly identify the nature of any insurgent risk in order to effectively counter its influence in the early days of a nation building project. Had these elements been identified in Afghanistan at the outset the outcomes of the nation building project as a whole would be very different.

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