Speaking Magic Realism: Selected short stories of Peter Carey

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Speaking Magic Realism:
Selected Short Stories of Peter Carey.

by

Raymond Dreihuis.

A Thesis submitted as Partial Fulfillment
of the requirements for the Award of

Bachelor of Arts (Honours).
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USE OF THESIS

The Use of Thesis statement is not included in this version of the thesis.
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Abstract.

This thesis is an analysis determined by the investigative proposition, what is a magic realist speech act? Of the schools of thought available to any philosophical undertaking in literature, this thesis makes particular use of the principles of speech act theory, genre theory, and poststructuralism. With genre theory, the emphasis is on the subgeneric construction of the narrative structure, and this thesis will incorporate three short stories from Peter Carey's *The Fat Man in History* as the most overt evidence for what the thesis is proposing to analyse and illuminate. But on the whole, readers will understand that, while the short stories analysed contribute to the specific concepts and notions of the thesis, the thesis itself is written with the purpose of being able to determine some of the conditions and indicators that make up the larger structure of subgeneric magic realism in narratives other than Carey's.

With speech act theory and poststructuralism, the thesis will focus essentially on the dialogue between John. R. Searle (1979) and Jacques Derrida (1979) on the work of the founder of speech act theory, John. L. Austin (1962). The impetus of that dialogue is the distinction made, by Austin and Searle, between serious discourse, or ordinary language, and non-serious discourse, or fictional discourse. This distinction is argued to be, by speech act philosophers, a necessary condition of being able to establish a general theory of speech acts, or felicitous performances, that can be classified according to their illocutionary forces in ordinary circumstances. Derrida, however, proposes that such felicitous performances, in any circumstance, can be established if, and only if, one considers their infelicitous, or parastic, counterpart in fictional discursivity as an object of analysis to speech act theory rather than an object of exclusion. In what may generally be considered a Derridean approach, this thesis will place such an exclusive binary opposition 'under erasure' to show that the principles of speech act theory are wholly applicable to non-serious discourse and subgeneric narrative structures, which in our case is magic realism. Indeed, this thesis will take, as its point of departure, the notion that the erasure between serious and non-serious discourse is already in place, thereby allowing the argument to concentrate on the principles of speech act theory in
fictional discourse as well as its wider applicability to the construction of any subgeneric act in genre theory.

Finally, a considerable focus is given to the notion of closure in fictional discourse between Author Function and Reader Function. Using Carey as an example, the thesis will look at how subgeneric magic realism foregrounds both poststructural play and narrative closure, entertaining the possibility of the two, according to the respective contexts of each condition on the quantum level and larger structure of a narrative's performance. Furthermore, this possible duality of language, this aporia, is, in this thesis, held to be common to all subgenres, known and unknown to genre theory, as well as to the performances of language in both the literary and extra-literary realities.
Declaration.

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief that it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Signed:

Date: 1/11/1995.
Introduction: "Positions".

Because our position, in this thesis, engages in an analysis which consists of the principles of speech act theory and genre theory, it will be beneficial for readers to bear in mind the familiar model of the Functions of Language theorised by Roman Jakobson (1960). This model, and its six basic functions, is schematically reproduced as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{context} \\
\text{addresser} & \rightarrow \text{message} & \rightarrow \text{addressee} \\
\text{contact} \\
\text{code}
\end{align*}
\]

(Jakobson, 1960:353).

Jakobson offered this model of linguistic functions, at a conference on style in language, within the context of establishing the poetic function as a viable extension of the linguistic enterprise. Poetics, for Jakobson, 'deals primarily with the question, What makes a verbal message a work of art?' (1960:350), and it is this principle that he sought to illuminate and apply to linguistic evaluations of artfulness. Because literary studies and linguistic studies focus on the nature of the verbal message in its relevant contexts, the poetics that is the 'focal portion' (1960:352) of literary studies, in analysing the verbal message, is wholly applicable to the linguistic enterprise as a function, just like the other functions in the above schema.

However, Jakobson states that, '[b]efore discussing the poetic function we must define its place among the other functions of language' (1960:353). The model of the six basic functions, therefore, is no different from the popular ordinary language approach, undertaken by many philosophers, in their attempt to draw distinctions between communication in ordinary circumstances and 'literary' circumstances. For Jakobson, its purpose is to set up a dividing line between the ordinary message and the literary message, so that the poetic function is shown to be responsible for the crossing of that communicative line when poetics is applied to linguistics as it is used in literary studies. Thus Jakobson's schema is designed to explain the functions of language in ordinary circumstances before he can explain the operative nature of the poetic function amongst these
ordinary language functions.

The moves that follow, in Jakobson's argument, are designed to produce a further schema, similarly based on the six basic functions of ordinary language in communication, that illuminate the poetic function's operative nature not only in an appropriate sense to literary studies, but also as a methodology wholly applicable to the analysis of poetic communication in linguistic studies. The conclusion is that the poetic function in the literary model is equivalent to the message function in the ordinary model.

Jakobson argues that 'the poetic function is not the sole function of verbal art but only its dominant, determining function, whereas in all other verbal activities it acts as a subsidiary, accessory constituent' (1960:356). And because the poetic function is dominant, verbal art, as object of analysis in literary and linguistic studies, has its message wholly determined by the hegemony of the poetic function over the other functions. Jakobson states that '[t]he set...toward the MESSAGE as such, focus on the message for its own sake, is the POETIC function of language' (1960:356). Jakobson's second schema (1960:357) tries to show this relationship by structuring a model that does not implicate the same, ordinary, functions, where the function of the message is equal to the other functions, but special literary derivatives of those functions, centred on the importance of the message, even though they are grounded in a model designed to explain ordinary circumstances. Jakobson's second schema is, in part, the structuralist answer to the problem of distinguishing ordinary language use and poetic language use by the implied difference in the way messages are constructed.

While I do not disagree with Jakobson's first schema, as reproduced in this introduction, I find the notion of his second schema of poetic language rather problematic to literary studies and linguistic studies. Indeed, this implied difference is one that creeps up in speech act theory when Austin (1962) and Searle (1970) are both adamant that ordinary language, as the object of analysing performatives and their illocutions, must be considered first and foremost over their fictional derivatives, or non-serious representations. We will have recourse to this difference later in the introduction, and the thesis in general. But, for the moment, we can state that the notion of a poetic language has been proven to be a fallacy due to the poststructural strategy towards language, and the
postmodern condition of pastiche in the extra-literary reality. Jakobson’s second schema, therefore, cannot but collapse its implied difference into the ordinary language model on which it is based, and from which it tries to escape.

The notion of trying to determine the artfulness of a verbal message, as different from an ordinary message, cannot be removed from the other basic functions of the first schema, and cannot be removed from the ordinary circumstances of language, from the langue and parole, in which literary discourse is intrinsically grounded and of which it is a part. Furthermore, to argue that verbal art produces messages for its own sake, without any recourse to the conditions that make up the message, is to say that verbal art exists in a communicative vacuum of its own making, and cannot be analysed beyond such an isolated existence. This has, of course, been proven to be a fallacy by such schools of thought as Marxism, feminism, and postcolonialism. The literary message and the ordinary message, like the fictional speech act and the ordinary speech act, are inextricable from each other because of their interdependency on the dialogic nature of speakers who use them.

Let us, then, bear in mind Jakobson’s first schema as we investigate textual utterances by speech act principles and genre theory throughout this thesis. But first we must rewrite the schema somewhat in order to show the applicability of one model to both the literary and extra-literary performances of speech acts. Indeed, the changes that follow are minor, given the argument of this thesis and the nature of thought in current philosophical schools on literature and language. Consider the following as a comparison between our schema and Jakobson’s schema:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>context</th>
<th>Author Function [\rightarrow] production/transference of meaning [\leftarrow] Reader Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[\rightarrow] genre/subgenre [\leftarrow] code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At first glance, our schema may be considered as just another derivative of an ordinary language model in a literary circumstance. This, I will argue, is misconceived. Both Author Function and Reader Function are interchangeable with addressee and addressee, but serve to illuminate the functions to which both the addressee and the
addressee are committed in the production and transference of meaning. Indeed, the notion of Author Function is based on Foucault's (1986:119) proposition that the author is a constraining figure through which the potential of fictional discursivities pass and are organised according to the copyright of the proper name, the stylistics associated with that proper name, and the body of work that constitutes the proper name as an existence separate from the actual person. In this sense, Reader Function is its complementary literary position in determining those processes that sanctify the name and the body of work, as well as being a position committed to producing and transferring a message that is considered to have a meaning relevant to the text in question, or work in general. As Iser (1989:78) has stated, the reader climbs aboard the text and in doing so, accepts certain given perspectives which interact with themselves and with him or herself.

This acceptance, or commitment, is further based on the Bakhtinian concept of dialogism (1981) so that the message is both the product of the other functions as well as the ongoing commitment of the speakers to each other in the dynamics of a public dialogue. As we can see in our schema by the representative arrows, the message is not unidirectional, as in Jakobson's schema, but dialogic and interdependent on all the functions of the model. This amendment, while being based on the philosophy of M. M. Bakhtin, further benefits from its ability to incorporate both poststructuralism and the Saussurean model of language, or langue.

Genre and subgenre are also important to both the literary and the extra-literary realities because they help to generate and maintain a level of contact that is appropriate to a particular performative interchange, or, once again, a dialogue. In the literary reality, this is quite common and generally accepted, even if it is challenged from time to time, but in the extra-literary reality, the genre and subgenre play a particular role in the underdeveloped theory of speech genres. Furthermore, the notion of genre and subgenre as the contact function complies with the requirements of genre theory, where genre implies the medium, in our case the short story, and subgenre implies its propositional content, which in our case is magic realism. Depending on the genre and subgenre being used, this process is equally applicable to the notion of contact in the extra-literary reality. For us, however, it is important in the sense that our future discussion on
appropriateness conditions and subgeneric indicators is based on the notion that such conditions and indicators function to maintain a contact between the Author Function and the Reader Function in order to communicate the felicities and infelicities of an illocution in a specific narrative performance.

While the code and context do not, in general, alter their conceptual functions from Jakobson's schema to our schema, we must include the postructural strategy towards language to which Jakobson had not been exposed at the time of theorising his structural model. With regard to the code, the ability for the Author Function and the Reader Function to check up on the signifying nature of the language used can amount to closure if, and only if, as Bakhtin would argue (1981), the potential of the word is realised in the context of another speaker, namely either the Author Function or the Reader Function. Thus the possibility for closure in a speech act, in both the literary and extra-literary realities, will depend on the awareness of the dialogue that will follow. Even though there is a gap in the production and transference of meaning of a literary context, one cannot conclude from the existence of this gap that closure cannot be obtained in the face of play. There is a variety of methods in which a Reader Function can check up on the possible messages of the Author Function in order that he or she may complement the strongest closure of those messages in a dialogic state of Authority. This will be discussed in chapter three of the thesis.

With respect to the context, the change that occurs to the schema is also poststructural. As we have already discussed regarding the code, and as Jacques Derrida (1979) had originally pointed out in terms of speech act theory, an indeterminate amount of play occurs by the ever-shifting grapheme from context to context prior to its being classified as a signature, or mark, in the locution. This is particularly useful when examining the subgenre of magic realism, as we shall do in this thesis, but it does not imply that a multiplicity of contexts has the predominant influence over the inability to obtain closure in a larger structure, or the plethora of acts in a subgeneric narrative. Indeed, in the extra-literary speech act, a multiplicity of contexts shifts through the dialogue of two speakers but these contexts do not necessarily imply that closure is an impossibility. We may argue that closure is tentative between two speakers at any given time, but this still does not sacrifice closure to the plurality of contexts in
graphematic play. Once again, the notion of code can help to close off such play, even when a closure contains, as it does in magic realism, the appropriateness conditions of multiple contexts extracted from the ever shifting grapheme. This combination of code and context forms much of the assumptions and arguments on closure and play throughout this thesis when we examine both the quantum level and the larger structure in three of Carey's short stories.

All in all, our schematic model, based on Jakobson's *Functions of Language*, is useful to readers of this thesis as a point of departure for the arguments that are yet to come. I will have only minor recourse to the model because of word economy, so readers are here made aware that, while it is more or less absent in a lexical sense, its conceptual presence should always be noted.

I have already mentioned the poetic language distinction made by Austin. For Austin (1962), the distinction specifically takes the form of non-serious discourse, such as fiction, poetry or theatre, as opposed to serious discourse, or ordinary language. The object of analysis for speech act theory is, according to Austin, the illocutionary force of ordinary language because its semantic performance is determined by the social conventions that classify it as a certain performative type. Austin states (1962:22) that non-serious discourse falls under the classification of the etiolations of language, and, therefore, illocutionary force cannot apply to the parasite of an ordinary performance because, under those circumstances, we do not hold the speaker responsible to the speech act he or she had just uttered.

However, a few pages later, when Austin (1962:27) discusses the notion of a performative misfire, he refers his readers to *Don Quixote* as an example of how and why a misfire may occur within the context of the code of honour and challenges laid in duelling. If non-serious discourse, or fictional discourse is an etiolation, then why invoke a parasitic example to explain the performative misfire in an ordinary circumstance? It is my contention that a parasitic discourse, such as prose narrative, poetry or theatre, is just as capable of issuing an illocution in both the literary and extra-literary realities as is the ordinary, or serious discourse of speech act theory. But let us continue with this problem.

Searle (1979:68) argues for much the same end as Austin when it comes to the distinction between serious and non-serious
discourses, but he is generous enough to give the non-serious, or the parasite, the illocutionary force and act of pretending as long as it is grounded within the intentionality of the author's written utterance. Thus a difference between Austin and Searle, on the notion of an illocution, is foregrounded by the fact that Austinian illocution is determined by the social conventions of public speakers, whereas Searlean illocution is determined by the intentions of the individual speaker to the codes and conventions of language use.

We will return to this problematic difference in chapter three, but for now it will suffice for readers to understand that, within the context of Searlean illocution and fictional discursivity, the most an author can do is pretend rather than promise, or pretend rather than command, or pretend rather than any of the other illocutions that apply to serious discourse. As Searle argues, 'the author of a work of fiction pretends to perform a series of illocutionary acts, normally of the assertive type' (1979:65). And 'what makes it a work of fiction is, so to speak, the illocutionary stance that the author takes toward it, and that stance is a matter of complex illocutionary intentions that the author has when he writes or otherwise composes it' (1979:65-66).

Searlean illocution in fictional discourse is the act of pretending, first, last, and always. This is what Searle (1979) termed as the logical status of fictional discourse in the essay of the same title. Thus the hidden assumption being made by such a conclusion is that speech act theory can only speak of the illocutionary force and act of pretending when it comes to its analytical application to non-serious discourse. Even when Searle (1979:73-74), citing the opening utterance of Anna Karenina as an example, admits that an author can inject serious utterances into a novel, he concludes that while the opening sentence is a genuine assertion and not a fictional pretence, under such circumstances, it serves as a part of the novel but is not a part of the fictional story.

I find Searle's conclusions, regarding Anna Karenina and fictional discourse in general, an attenuation of the scope of the theory within the total use of language between the literary and extra-literary realities. It may be right to argue that speech act theory has its limitations, but I do not think that the non-serious, the parasite, or fictional discourse, is one of them, because its illocutionary status in the extra-literary reality can often exceed that of mere pretence. The problem is, of course, a classic dilemma in the history of both western
philosophy and literary theory. Searle foregrounds this problem quite neatly with his desire to build up knowledge of the illocution on the underlying force of Platonism, or the western appropriation and interpretation of Plato's Theory of Forms by its grandeur as a system made up of pure things and their variants. Thus, from the outset of establishing a body of knowledge called speech act theory, Searle states that while 'concepts in ordinary language lack absolutely strict rules', he will direct his analysis 'at the center of the concept of a performance and will ignore 'marginal, fringe, and partially defective' variants of the performative in question (1970:55). This is, of course, an open invitation for a rigidly playful attack on Searle through the poststructural strategy towards language, and brings us to the further problem of the binary opposition in systems of knowledge and processes of thought.

Both Searle and Austin allow for the felicitous performance of an act within the strictly hard and fast structure of a binary opposition. Searle argues that 'the pretended illocutions which constitute a work of fiction are made possible by the existence of a set of conventions which suspend the normal operation of the rules relating illocutionary acts and the world' (1979:67). And Austin, as we have already stated, argues that '[language in such circumstances is in special ways -intelligibly- used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use -ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolatrons of language' (1962:22). For Austin and Searle, what is at the left of the binary opposition has a relevant, platonic purity, of which the right side cannot but be its parasitic variant that will corrupt the body of knowledge they are trying to establish. Thus serious/ non-serious discursivity is akin to the ordinary/ parasite distinction that marks the need for purity and rigour on the left, and marginal exclusions, or etiolated corruptions on the right. Their distinction of serious/ non-serious discursivity is no different from the structuralist desire, which we discussed concerning Roman Jakobson, for a poetic language system that has distinctions from the langue of everyday use, or ordinary speech.

Since, however, both fictional discourse and ordinary discourse share the common denominators of rules in the expressing and understanding of messages, we must consider how great the difference actually is between serious and non-serious divisions. Thus one of the underlying forces that directs this thesis is based on the notion that
when Searle and Austin exclude the non-serious for fear of corrupting the serious, they will find their thought marked by the stain of the parasite, and they will find their theories continually slipping into the corruption from which they think they have escaped. To speak magic realist is to speak by the rules, rigour, and illocutions of the non-serious, and to be able speak in those non-serious illocutions reflects our ability to speak in the ordinary speech that exists in the totalizing forces of language. There may be a marked difference in the way we apprehend and understand the literary and the extra-literary reality, but that difference is only minor when it comes to the illocutions that constitute it in a linguistic sense.

Furthermore, we must ask to what degree both Austin and Searle participate in the poetic language fallacy that plagued structuralism in its desire for an holistically separate system of poetics, or fictionally orchestrated language. As Pratt states, '[t]he fact that...there is a real langue shared by literary and non-literary utterances alike is quite overlooked and seems almost irrelevant to the line of argument these quotations indicate' (1977:10). Equally, she argues that '[a]ll utterances take place against the background of a whole range of contemporary norms governing what styles, what subject matter, what degrees of formality, politeness, and so on are appropriate in different contexts' (1977:10). While this problem of the poetic language fallacy is well-known to literary theory when it comes to discourse and criticism, it seems to have gone unnoticed in speech act theory, and gone unnoticed in the philosophy of language in which Austin and Searle were writing. I will not elaborate on the problem any further because, in its current simplicity, the notion of a poetic language fallacy allows readers of this thesis to understand its implications to speech act theory in much the same way as it plagued structuralism and its predecessor, Russian Formalism.

Derrida (Limited Inc., abc., or Lim. 1979:240) argues that, while Austin and Searle both recognise that the parasite is part of ordinary language, it did not stop them from excluding it in their analysis of serious discourse. Thus for Derrida, Austin's concept of ordinary language, as it is formed in the context of speech act theory, 'is clearly marked by this exclusion' (Lim. 1979:241), even though the object of exclusion, the parasite, is clearly a part of the concept of the ordinary from the outset. In both 'Signature, Event, Context' and 'Limited Inc., abc...', Derrida is adamant that such an exclusion of the parasite is
liable to put the question of felicities and infelicities, applicable to illocutionary acts and the purity of performatives, under corruption when classifying serious types of discursivity, since the parasite can and will always return to corrupt the health and happiness of the performance and the theory.

In his answer to Searle's notion of a logical status for fictional discursivity, Derrida (Lim. 1979:239) points to Searle's own admission that the Scarlean theory of speech acts is but a part of an overall theory that does not yet exist and, for Derrida, this is evidence enough that Searle's treatise on parasitism and its logical status of illocutionary pretending is but a parasite itself of the whole theory of speech acts. The problem for Searle, as seen by Derrida, is that the parasite cannot be excluded from speech act theory, and cannot be excluded from the notion of an ordinary language and its illocutions in any circumstance. The conclusion is one that dismisses the performance of any performative unless it is the deliberation of both its felicities and infelicities, rather than an illocutionary type decided by exclusion. As Derrida states, '[t]he parasitic structure is what I have tried to analyze everywhere, under the names of writing, mark, step [marche], margin, différance, graft, undecidable, supplement, pharmakon, hymen, parergon, etc.' (Lim. 1979:247).

Derrida (Signature, Event, Context., or Sec. 1979) can thereby argue that to classify writing as a parasitic dependant of speech illuminates the fundamental position which Austin holds to the truth value of speech over writing, a belief upheld in a history of western philosophy where speech is closer to the real than writing, and where speech is the proper vehicle for the delivery of knowledge and truth, as well as being that which is the most fruitful investigation for understanding communication. But, as we are aware by the poststructural strategy towards language, both speech and writing function in a relationship that is dependent on the iterability of the grapheme in a multiplicity of contexts because both speech and writing are the products of signatures, marked and remarked, in a system of différance rather than the singular purity of signs and concepts. And so, in the hierarchy (speech/ writing), both performative modes exist by the warring forces of signification in a playful system, or langue, where such warring is equal to the shift that can mark a felicity an infelicity.

What Derrida wants to affirm is that parole, or speech,
functions no differently from writing due to the grapheme's ability to play within, and reiterate, a multiplicity of contexts. Petrey states that 'parts of "Signature, Event, Context" repeat Derrida's conviction that problems on the locutionary level must be addressed before the illocutionary level can be productively approached' (1990:139). Because writing is first and foremost a graphematic, or quotable, signifier in a narcissistic performance rather than a locutionary one, speech itself, by its signatory tie to its graphematic state, is able to be extracted from codes and contexts only to be injected, with surgical precision, into other codes and contexts, thus acquiring a multiplicity of meanings by a potential play in a multiplicity of illocutions.

Norris (1987:178) makes this point quite clear when he has recourse to Derrida's ability, in 'Limited Inc., abc...', to extract, and inject into other contexts, large sections of Searle's essay, 'Reiterating the Differences: a reply to Derrida', so he can prove his point that performativity in language, whether written or spoken, is always faced with the danger of slipping back to its graphematic level rather than maintaining, as Searle would have it, the illocutionary level of a single context. Thus the analysis of a serious performance must acknowledge its debt to its non-serious counterpart if it is to avoid a performative misfire, or infelicity, as discussed by Austin (1962). What this further means for us is the need to address the quantum level of language alongside our investigation of its larger structure, the subgeneric narrative, in order to maintain a closure that is relevant to the common denominators between the two. As I have said earlier in this introduction, closure is based on a dialogic state of Authority.

Much of Searle's 'Reiterating the Differences: a reply to Derrida' is an argument that plays directly into Derrida's hands. Searle reads Derrida in the same way as he had read Austin, and tries to dominate his authority in the realm of speech act theory. Searle's downfall is due to his overt desire not to understand the implications of poststructuralism and language, writing it off as a misreading of Austin. In this sense, Searle (Reply. 1979:204) remains quite adamant that, if one is to construct a general speech act theory of ordinary language use and its felicitous and infelicitous performances, then one should not be analysing the parasites, such as fiction or theatre, of ordinary language.

Aligning himself with Austin, Searle (Reply. 1979:204) reiterates the problem of an actor making a promise on stage by stating that an
audience does not hold the actor responsible for that promise, once the performance is over. To say that the actor is logically pretending to make a promise is not the same as saying that the rules of making a promise in speech act theory are inapplicable to literature. The audience knows that the performance of the play will end within a specific, linear, timespace, and that in this sense it may be pretending, but this does not preclude the audience from understanding that the character has made a promise of a certain illocutionary type, and that he or she is liable to social conventions during the timespace that marks the literary reality of the play. This is equally Derrida's point (*Ltm.* 1979:231) and to this end, speech act theory needs to include, as I have continually suggested, the parasite within its explanatory scope and power.

Ommundsen (1993:3), discussing the self-reflexive status of texts, also points out that some texts clearly have an impact on the extra-literary reality, the most recent being Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses.* That is rather an impossible feat for a non-serious parasite in the Searlean scheme of things where its logical status is simply that of illocutionary pretending. In such a case, the binary opposition of ordinary/parasite, or serious/non-serious, is clearly demolished and speech act theory must include fictional discourse, its felicities and infelicities, to the very same doctrinal rigour that it carries out in classifying the illocutionary force and act of serious discourse in the extra-literary reality.

Finally, the charge made by Fish (1980:221, 227, 244) that speech act theory is only applicable to speech act texts, seems to both Petrey (1990:101) and me to be an enforced limitation placed on the potential scope and power of the theory's explanatory principles. Fish argues that while 'a speech-act analysis of such texts will always be possible, it will also be trivial (a mere list of the occurrence or distribution of the kinds of acts), because, while it is the conditions of intelligibility that make all texts possible, not all texts are about those conditions' (1980:245). Fish proves his point by a rigid, Searlean, speech act analysis of Shakespeare's *Coriolanus,* concluding that *Coriolanus is about these conditions,* and it goes the theory one better by also being about their fragility* (1980:245).

Readers will note the emphasis I place on the Searlean aspect of Fish's analysis, with which we are familiar enough by now to know that it places many restrictions not only on the literary text, but also
on the theory in general because of the exclusion of the parasitic performance. If Fish is convinced that not all texts are about speech act conditions, then is he also convinced that not all ordinary utterances are about speech act conditions? Speech act theory is more concerned with illuminating the types of illocutionary forces issued during particular utterances in a performance rather than just analysing speech acts which overtly display their felicitous conditions. Furthermore, this type of investigation does not necessarily need to be wholly confined to a list of illocutions in ordinary language circumstances, because such a confinement will generally be based on an exclusion of other possible felicities and infelicities, or appropriateness conditions, of an act in its variant performances.

Indeed, my position is marked by the applicability of speech act theory to literary discourse and the subgenres in which it participates. It is my contention that speech act theory is more applicable to, and identifiable with, fictional discourse than it is with ordinary discourse. This is because the 'appropriateness conditions' (Pratt, 1977) for a particular performance are readily identifiable with the subgeneric narratives from they seem to play originally, and because the narratives under investigation tend to be much more conducive to the felicities and infelicities needed as evidence prior to classifying an illocution.

A speech act theorist has more accessible information when he or she is dealing with a text than when he or she is dealing with classifying an act in a social circumstance between two unknown speakers in the immediacy of dynamic performances in a conversation. Thus the text bears a multiplicity of appropriateness conditions, both of a practical type and a subgeneric type, which will determine the illocutions of subgeneric indicators. We will begin our journey with the subgeneric type of appropriateness conditions as a rich source of identifying and qualifying the types of illocutions in parasitical utterances. This amounts to a multicontextuality in performance that is not only foregrounded in the subgenre called magic realism, but also common to all subgenres, known and unknown.

While I will not debate Fish's point any further here, I hope that readers will find sufficient evidence in the thesis as to why speech act theory is useful in a literary context, and why the authority of the theory should not be placed just in the hands of a select few, such as John. R. Searle. Under such circumstances, the theory is in danger of
dying in a rather narrow context and, if the current state of literary criticism is any indication, the death of speech act theory in a fictional, or parasitic context, has been rather swift and well sustained. Speech act theory should be placed in an interpretative environment where Austinian principles can be openly debated within the context of both the ordinary and parasitic performances as they apply to the authority of interpretative communities.

Having outlined our position as to the principles of speech act theory in parasitic discourse, we must address another important preliminary. We need to define a subgeneric concept insofar as we can explore both its 'graphematic' playfulness and its ability to execute closure by nature of the appropriateness conditions in its construction. It is only until we have come to some agreed upon understanding of the concept of magic realism, by its 'shadows', that we can proceed to discuss its operative nature as one type of parasitic speech act in the myriad of subgeneric acts and their appropriateness conditions. Pratt states that '[o]ne of the most obvious kinds of contextual information we bring to bear in confronting a literary work is our knowledge of its genre....[G]enres and subgenres can to a great extent be defined as systems of appropriateness conditions' (1977: 86).

And Todorov argues that '[a] new genre is always the transformation of an earlier one, or of several: by inversion, by displacement, by combination....There has never been a literature without genres; it is a system in constant transformation...' (1990: 15).

Todorov's notion of genre and subgenre differs from our usage of the two terms as outlined in the Introduction. For Todorov (1973), the notion of genre is synonymous with both media and propositional content, whereas his subgenre is a mixture of the conditions of two genres that combine to form an interactive variant of the main genre under investigation. This scenario will be further illuminated in chapter two when we discuss the fantastic indicator. For us, however, the term genre is synonymous with the notion of media, and the term subgenre with propositional content. Thus what we are proposing to investigate in this chapter, and also the thesis, is how subgeneric magic realism, as the propositional content of the contact function, can place certain demands on the Author Function's intentions in narrative, and how those intentions translate to the Reader Function by way of indicators and appropriateness conditions in the narrative. As Sage states of the Carey narrative, '[w]hen the whole collection is laid end to end...[t] is striking how continuous, and continuously familiar, the basic terrain is' (1995: 19. My italics).

Furthermore, this chapter examines, through magic realism, how subgenres constitute themselves, by way of appropriateness conditions, because the system undergoes constant transformations.
And since it is a system in constant transformation, the conditions can slip from the larger subgeneric structures into the graphematic, or quantum, level of language, only to reinstate themselves in other larger structures as subgeneric indicators. This notion is of primary importance to this thesis.

Dealing, then, with magic realism as a subgeneric concept, our focus is to illuminate its appropriateness conditions and how they are grounded in the multiplicity of subgeneric acts, rather than existing as exclusive conditions of some idealistic subgenre. Instead of defining the concept in a reductive sense, I intend to explore some of its capabilities as a subgenre by the techniques it appropriates and validates in the course of its narrative potential. One important point to bear in mind with the concept of magic realism is illuminated by Linda Kenyon (1985) who argues that both words in the term must have equal weight in order for one to understand that the subgenre is firmly grounded in realism, and not some type of magical writing of and for itself. Because there is no firm definition of magic realism, the term tends to be considered problematic. The majority of critics and theorists do not specialize in attempting to illuminate its principles, and use it, as they use most polemic labels, as a casual reference.

Since confusion of the term occurs, casual references cannot but construct magic realism's infantile conceptuality into a less than attractive, subgeneric package for people, like Peter Carey, who do not intend to do battle on the polemic field of literary theories. In these circumstances, the concept generally tends to be either forgotten or abandoned altogether, and an Author Function's ability to use the subgeneric concept can become seriously damaged. As Carey states, 'I liked the term magic realism when I first heard it....Then later it became a tag that was thrown around so much that it started to get soiled. In my mind it became a sort of cheap cliché. I became wary of being labeled a magic realist. In a funny way I no longer feel that I am writing in this way....It's less magic, more real (Willbanks, 1991:55-56. My italics). Although Carey's statement is relative to a discussion of his novels, it can also be considered appropriate to his short stories. In an earlier interview with Craig Munro (1977:186), Carey is quite adamant about liking to begin with either reality, or an extension of reality, in his short stories, so that he can work his way into fabulism. And in a later interview with John Maddocks, Carey states that:
As far as I'm concerned my stories are all set in the present, with little tricks and mere excuses to make people accept them. Basically I'm always writing about how the world is now. Often characters are drawn from real life, and they are in the relatively surreal, less naturalistic stories as much as in the more naturalistic ones...It's just my way of looking at the world. I'm just trying to look at it more clearly. Like if you put your head between your legs and look at the world upside down, everything seems at once the same and yet the colours seem more intense. You see it slightly different, and that's all I'm trying to do in the short stories (1981:38-39. My Italics).

For our purposes, both these statements made by Carey come as close to an understanding of magic realism as any. When Carey states that his writing is 'less magic, more real', and so removed from the constraints of a clichéd label like magic realism, it is hard to agree with Carey that he has actually moved beyond the subgenre he believes to be 'soiled'. This seems to be particularly apt when we consider that his working principle is to begin with reality, or an extension of reality, in order to move toward a technique used in magic realism, namely fabulation, which I will discuss later in the chapter. Indeed, the fact that the stories portray both character and situation in a combination of surrealism and naturalism indicates that the appropriateness conditions work to broaden the Reader Function's understanding of his or her individual perspectives to reality. The stories, therefore, ground themselves, by the demands of magic realism, in the dual semantic importance, stressed by Kenyon, of magic and reality.

Nevertheless, Carey does allude to the legitimate point about the way in which critics can misunderstand their positions vis-à-vis the subgenre, or any categorical term for that matter, by preferring to validate their own critical position of the term rather than attempting to understand it. For, if one employs categorical labels, then one must equally explain their usage, not only in one's own discourse, but also within the discursive context of another. As we stated in the introduction, with the help of M. M. Bakhtin (1981), our notion of the production and transference of meaning is based on a dialogic state of Authority. An absence of investigative thought by the dialogic state of Authority can lead to an equal absence in understanding that
concepts and utterances do have conditions which render them particular to a group, type, or larger structure. This has added to the current confusion not just over magic realism, but also every other term. When terms such as fabulism, metafictionality, postmodernism, and postcolonialism are taken to be synonymous explanations of magic realism, literary critics are, in fact, articulating quite separate concepts and practices in their casual references to explain Carey’s subgeneric performances.

What, then, are we dealing with? Let us consider first an extract from Carey’s ‘Report on the Shadow Industry’ for an understanding of magic realism as subgenre and concept;

“You see people in dark glasses wandering around the supermarkets at 2 A.M. There are great boxes all along the aisles, some as expensive as fifty dollars but most of them only five. There’s always Muzak. It gives me the shits more than the shadows. The people don’t look at one another. They come to browse through the boxes of shadows although the packets give no indication of what’s inside...” (1974:91).

De Reyna states that ‘[the magic realist approach holds a “mirror up to nature” to record the minutest detail...It doesn’t “deceive the eye”; it enchants the eye (1973:9). It is this attention to ‘meticulous detail that is the hallmark of magic realism’ (1979:9). From De Reyna’s position, magic realism does not seem far removed from the traditional understanding of realism. However, it is this focus on ‘meticulous detail’ that allows the magic realist speech act to indulge in the fantastical nature of the environment depicted by the narrative while simultaneously grounding such a movement wholly within the literary and extra-literary boundaries of both Author Function and Reader Function. It is this movement, this synecdochic enchantment, that captures the mind’s eye of the Reader Function by the narrative potential laid down by the Author Function. The synecdochic enchantment of magic realism is the quality by which a meticulous attention to detail refines both realism and its microcosmic magic, represented in the narrative, through the artistic substantiation of culture, as the base principle of the subgenre. It is by the demands of this base principle that the enchantment within the narrative structure is an orchestrated reflection of the structures and culturalisms, both popular and traditional, which occur in the
heteroglot of the social strata. This indicates that what is common to the 'real' of the Reader Function is also common to that which constitutes reality within the text. As Baker states, '[r]ealistic detail is essential to magic realism, for, without the presence of a realistic framework, the story would become pure fantasy' (1991:58).

If we consider the extract from Carey's story with this in mind, we can see how the realist aspect of magic realism makes space for a detailed focus on the reality of the supermarket, on the 'great boxes all along the aisles', and the fantastic nature of the shadows within, not only as a commodity for people to consume, but also as a synecdochic enchantment of that which is 'normally' the comfortable and unquestioned position of the Reader Function to the 'real'. This synecdochic enchantment creates a timespace where the thing, which, in the case of Carey's story, is the product or 'shadow', is necessarily foregrounded by the fact that it is capable of having a reality equal to our own, and can assume as many positions to the 'real' as our own. Patterson argues that 'the viewer, so illuminated, receives affirmation of an equal reality, sees and therefore is. Magic realist art, sometimes, shows us the world this way' (1986:29).

Thus it is not just the notion of consumers consuming shadows that is reified by the synecdochic enchantment of the supermarket and its aisles of products, but also the knowledge that Reader Functions can themselves be consumed by the shadows in exactly the same circumstances. For is it not true that supermarkets, in the extra-literary reality, are lined with a myriad of boxes which advertise their own appeal as commodity, and equally their own reality, above all else? In fact, the focus on shadows as an unquestionably acceptable commodity seems to indicate that the subgenre, while depicting the magic of the scenario, is not far removed from that which occurs in the 'real'. One might say that magic realism gets closer to the 'real' than realism within the context of narratology.

While the above argument identifies the base principle of Magic realism, there is still some confusion within the subgenre that needs to be addressed. In particular, those concepts and practices which are often considered to be synonymic equivalents of magic realism, but which are, in fact, more accurately described as literary techniques or extra-literary conditions which the subgenre can employ as subgeneric indicators, based on their appropriateness conditions, for its specific type of speech acts. Hancock identifies, for our purposes, the following
features which are central to an understanding of magic realism as subgenre: 'a labyrinthine awareness of other books; the use of fantasy to cast doubt on the nature of reality; an absurd re-creation of "history"; a meta-fictional awareness of the process of fiction making; a reminder of the mysteriousness of the literary imagination at work; a collective sense of folkloric past (1986:36).

Primarily, the main terms which are equivalent to Hancock's list of features, and which I believe have been misunderstood not only as a synonymic equivalent for magic realism but as subgenres in themselves, are postmodernism, postcolonialism, fabulation, and metafictionality. It is my contention that the first two are conditions specifically related to the extra-literary environment and its narratological apprehension by the subject-centred consciousness, and that the remaining two are techniques which an Author Function can use within a literary reality by choice, but he or she does not necessarily need to do so in order for the narrative to be magic-realist.

A discussion of subgeneric techniques almost always precedes the search for a subgeneric definition. Although I am putting forth the proposition that Carey's short stories are magic-realist by the techniques discussed above, I must also address the notion that Carey's short stories could be mistakenly considered by some as products of subgeneric science fiction. This mistake has been made by Mellors, who categorizes The Fat Man in History as 'a collection of sci-fi short stories first published in Australia in 1974' (1991:89). Rabkin states that 'a work belongs in the genre of science fiction if its narrative world is at least somewhat different from our own, and if that difference is apparent against a background of an organized body of knowledge (1976:119). Turner argues that Carey falls under his neologism of 'parafiction' (1988:15) and is therefore a 'user of science fiction, not a [subgenre writer' (1988:21). And Van Ikin states that, 'Carey's subject matter is similar to that which one would expect to find in science fiction. But unlike the average science fiction writer, Carey does not strive to prove the scientific validity of his extrapolations (1977:20. My Italics).

If a work is to be considered science fiction, it must validate that which is not known on the basis of that which is. In other words, the fantastic nature of the narrative must not only be validated within some existing body of knowledge, but must also be able to exist by the logical explanation of that body of knowledge. Although Carey is not a
science fiction writer, but a user of the subgenre. It is important to bear this in mind because such a use forms the base principle of the inferentheme. Besides an affiliation with the epistemological factor of science fiction, another reason for my formulating the concept of the inferentheme comes from two interviews with Peter Carey. In both Van Ikin (1977:31) and Attwood (1988:56), Carey speaks of developing themes and characters to progressive, logical extremes. That is to say, the inferentheme is the progression of a narrative theme pushed to a logical extremity by the presence of accepted bodies of knowledge.

The theme itself is not validated by those bodies of knowledge, but reified in much the same manner as the base principle of synecdochic enchantment reifies the common ground between literary and extra-literary realities through an equal representation of realism and magic that exists in both. For the narrative theme is still essentially served on a metaphoric platter to the Reader Function, but it is garnished with that type of knowledge with which the Reader Function is familiar, and can therefore accept as the logical accompaniment which makes comfortable the progressive distance between him or her and the inferential spatiality of the theme in question. The objective is to make the theme mysteriously palatable. Examples of the inferentheme can be found in the following extracts from the 'Report on the Shadow Industry', where the narrator states that:

There are a few who say the smoke is dangerous because of carcinogenic chemicals used in the manufacture of shadows (1974:91).

Others argue that the shadow is a natural product and by its very nature chemically pure (1974:92).

The Bureau of Statistics reveals that the average householder spends 25 per cent of his income on these expensive goods and that this percentage increases as the income decreases (1974:92).

There is...research to indicate that the high suicide rate in advanced countries is connected with the popularity of shadows and that there is a direct statistical correlation between shadow sales and suicide rates (1974:92).

The above quotations indicate that, while Carey does participate in scientific explanations of the perlocutionary nature of the shadows,
he does not validate the fantastic nature of the shadows themselves. What we have, therefore, is the ability for an Author Function to participate, by degree, in the techniques normally associated with science fiction through the inferentheme's ability to reify the realism of the narrative while simultaneously leaving the central, thematic, element, the shadows, in a state of metaphoric play. If we consider the synecdochic enchantment of magic realism as subgenre, the mirroring of the extra-literary reality in the narrative occurs by the focus on specific and meticulous details which accompany the event. This, in turn, qualifies both the realism of a thing through the scientific explanation of its effect, and the fantastic nature of the thing-in-itself by the total acceptability of its incomprehensible essentialism in both the literary and extra-literary environments.

The inferentheme, therefore, makes the mysterious mysteriously palatable, and organizes the metaphoric quality of the shadows against an acceptable body of knowledge. As Van Ikin states, 'Carey establishes that the shadows are produced by a technological process, but he does not allow his account to become bogged in “pseudo-technical jargon” (1977:20). Magic realism thereby allows the Author Function to get ‘away with labyrinthine constructions by unifying the narrative with a voice that never questions what it [fantastically] tells’ (Hancock, 1986:42).

Since magic realism never questions the fantastic essentialism of its narrative, we must consider the notion of fabulation. Both Green (1975) and Graeme Turner (1986) seem to see Carey's short fiction as fabulation. While Green does not cite a definition for the term, he does state that Carey's fiction has 'an autonomous “reality” which adds to our commonly perceived reality (1975:74.). I find this explanation of fabulation unsatisfactory simply because it seems to be an applicable possibility for all subgenres known to the Reader Function in the history of narrative. Turner, however, grounds his use of the term in the definition of Robert Scholes by stating that 'fabulation is defined, unhelpfully...as “ethically controlled fantasy”, revealing the contemporary “plunge back into the tide of the story”' (1986:432. My italics). Both uses of the term fabulation, especially in Turner's case, are unhelpful simply because one cannot distinguish between technique or subgenre. Even Scholes himself, by the definition of 'ethically controlled fantasy' (1979:3), would seem to argue for fabulation as subgenre, and he does so by invoking the Fable
as an example designed to illuminate that subgeneric status. However, the mistake made in this definition of fabulation is one that is also quite common to fantasy and the fantastic, and can be simply rectified by an appropriate recourse to the base principles of the actual subgenres, namely Fable and Fantasy respectively.

I have therefore proposed that fabulation is a technique, and not a subgenre in itself. In fact, when one considers it as a technique, the confusion surrounding the term itself becomes less problematic and so renders the term more accessible. Scholes argues that '...modern fabulation, like the ancient fabling of Aesop, tends away from direct representation of the surface of reality but returns toward actual human life by way of ethically controlled fantasy' (1979:3. My italics). This is the 'plunge back into the tide of the story' (Scholes, 1979:25) that Turner (1986:432) considered so confusing as a subgeneric definition. And Turner is quite right to be confused simply because technique has been mistaken for subgenre. If we consider, for the moment, the relationship between Fable and fabulation, in comparison with Fantasy and the fantastic, then we can see that one is axiomatically dependent upon the base principles of the subgenre.

Indeed, what we consider to be fantastic in magic realism, science fiction, or any subgenre for that matter, is dependent upon our knowledge, as Reader Functions, of the base principle of that subgenre called Fantasy. It is my contention that fabulation works in more or less the same manner by its axiomatic dependency on the subgeneric Fable and the art of fabling. In that sense, then, it is a technique that exists for the Author Function's use by a dialogic link to the base principle of the subgeneric Fable, and in this manner can the Author Function ground the narrative, by the value question inherent in all ethical deliberations, firmly within the extra-literary environment of the Reader Function. Magic realism, when it uses the fabulist technique, makes its connections between literary and extra-literary environments a definitive process of consideration, and can thereby force the Reader Function to consider the ethics of the inferentheme.

Let us consider an extract from 'Report on the Shadow Industry':

My own father left home because of something he had seen in a box of shadows. It wasn't an expensive box, either, quite the opposite - a little surprise my mother had bought with the money left over from
her housekeeping. He opened it after dinner one Friday night and he was gone before I came down to breakfast on the Saturday. He left a note which my mother only showed me very recently. My father was not good with words and had trouble communicating what he had seen: "Words Cannot Express What I Feel Because of The Things I Saw In The Box Of Shadows You Bought Me." (1974:93).

While in the previous extract we discussed the science fictional validation of the shadows' perlocutionary effects, it is here that we enter another realm of the shadows' perlocution, through the fabulist technique, in both the literary and extra-literary reality. That is to say, the value of a shadow, as an inferentheme, is questioned by the fact that its effect on individuals, who both encounter and use them as a commodity, tends to fragment what was previously considered to be a stable element of the 'real'. Indeed, the shadows' abilities to implicate the individual in some sort of metaphysical struggle between good and evil, between known and unknown, and between hopes and fears indicate an educative quality and dialogic link to the classic moralisms and illocutionary force of Fables. For fabulation, this indicates the technique's ability to orchestrate the performance of its speech acts with the aim of achieving a specified ethical closure in the production and transference of meaning.

It is this potential of the fabulist technique, within magic realism, that has led critics like Bliss (1991), Mellors (1991), and Sage (1995), as Reader Functions, to approach Carey with the possibility, as well as the intention, of producing moralist readings of his narratives. And it is the fabulist technique, in magic realism, that creates a space for Carey, as Author Function, to inject his narratives with a moral flavour that is 'moulded out of the Christian mode' (Sibree, 1991:5). As Carey has stated in an interview with Tausky, 'even though I am not a Christian, there are many things about Christianity which are attractive' (1990:34).

There is another dimension to fabulation of which Scholes makes us aware, and which we must discuss here. Scholes states that 'In the present volume [Fabulation and Metafiction], I have tried to attend more thoroughly to the experimental or metafictional dimension of modern fabulation' (1979:4). With metafictionality defined as 'fiction about fiction' (Turner, 1986:432), it would seem that, for Scholes, fabulation is a subgenre where the Author Function can participate in
that dimension of modern narrative called metafictionality.

However, as I have already argued, fabulation is appropriately classified as a technique. We can, therefore, perform the following move. Because Scholes classifies metafictionality as a dimension, we can take it one step further and propose that metafictionality is a technique based upon the reflexivity that is present in all texts and central to all literary analysis; a function which, by analysing literary processes, enables us to understand the processes by which we read the world as text' (Ommundsen, 1993:4). The reason we may call it a technique, or function, or even a dimension, is simply because metafictionality is an inherent property of all texts and all narratological processes. But because it can be deliberately employed by the Author Function as a narrative stratagem, it is a technique that overtly determines the direction in which the Reader Function reads the intentionality of sense and reference within the context of a production and transference of meaning from text to Reader Function.

Ommundsen warns, however, that 'if we restrict the category 'reflexive fiction' to texts that are overt or explicit in their reflexive commentary, and the adjective 'reflexive' to statements about writing and art only, we impose serious limitations, not only on 'reflexivity' as such, but also on the fictional text's potential for meaning' (1993:18). Nevertheless, metafictionality is a dimension common to all subgeneric texts, and generic media. But within a text that does not overtly employ the metafictional technique, or does not overtly foreground its metafictional status, the Reader Function can only consider the text's metafictionality if he or she has the theoretical competence to do so. Otherwise, the text's metafictional status will go totally unnoticed. In the text which overtly plays with its metafictionality, such metafictionality is foregrounded by the Author Function's Intentional injecting of the metafictional technique within whatever subgeneric stylistics he or she is writing.

Consider the following from 'Report on the Shadow Industry' within the context of metafictionality:

My own feelings about the shadows are ambivalent, to say the least. For here I have manufactured one more: elusive, unsatisfactory, hinting at greater beauties and more profound mysteries that exist somewhere before the beginning and somewhere after the end (1974:94).
Ommundsen argues that a metafictional text 'may refuse to comply with expectations set up by the subgenre to which it belongs' (1993:9). In the case of Carey and magic realism in the above, the metafictionality complies exactly with the base principle of the subgenre, one in which both synecdochic enchantment and the ground rules set up by the narrative are reversed at some point during the narrative. As Rabkin states, 'every work of art sets up its own ground rules. The perspectives that the fantastic contradicts are perspectives legitimized by those internal ground rules (1976:4-5). I will discuss Rabkin's notion further in Chapter Two when we explore Carey's 'Peeling'.

In the case of 'Report on Shadow Industry' and the inferentheme, such a reversal occurs in the above extract when the narrator logically transgresses from reporter of the shadows as commodity to the metaphysical status of manufacturer of shadows. And on the metafictional level of the narrative as written signatures, the narrator transgresses from being a Reader Function of those signatures, the shadows, to an Author Function of their production in much the same way as the shift that occurs from Reader Function to Author Function when we write our 'reports' of the narrative. Thus the metafictional technique, in this instance, allows the Author Function to invoke the appropriateness conditions necessary for the reversal to occur. And if we consider the fabulist technique within this context, the narrative of 'Report on the Shadow Industry' becomes a magic realist speech act which demands that we, as Reader Function, consider the ethical value of such a manufactured product. Hancock (1986:47) states that magic realism does nothing simpler than produce an alternative to the question of reality, asking readers not to consider what is before them but what they want before them.

One may begin to wonder why all the information relayed in the above argument is not simply considered as a minute breakdown of that which characterizes the postcolonial and postmodern narrative, rather than that of magic realism. It is a rather difficult distinction to make if one persists in categorizing every stylistic execution occurring in narrative as a subgenre in and of itself. Within the context of postmodernism, Hawthorne states that 'two related terms describing postmodernist fiction are fabulation and surfiction. Both terms imply an aggressive and playful luxuriation in the non-representationa

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using writing to describe or make contact with a perceived extra-fictional reality' (1992:111). For Hawthorne, the subgenre is postmodernism, and its synonymic descriptions are fabulation and surfiction. Indeed, with fabulation, Hawthorne is quite adamant that it helps to solidify that break with an extra-fictional reality which is the hallmark of postmodernism. This is, of course, plainly false. If fabulation is ethically controlled, can it not but make contact with some aspect of an extra-fictional reality?

One can begin to see the distance between what is postmodernist, and what is magic realist. Indeed, the distance between postmodernism and magic realism is such that they rarely meet in the boundaries of a critical discourse, and when they do, there tends to be more confusion than understanding. The problem is one that stems primarily from a categorical misappropriation, by the critics, of postmodernism as both condition and subgenre, rather than as a condition alone. I do not deny that postmodernism can filter through, or be invoked intentionally, within a narrative structure, but it tends to lend itself to a variety of subgenres rather than one of its own making. While Lyotard (1992:124) will argue that the postmodern writer does not work with any singular base principle, and cannot be read, therefore, with a definitive set of rules in mind, his argument is based on the hidden assumption that postmodernism does not function as a subgenre, and has no inherent intention of being constructed as one because it rejects the singular and organizing operativeness of a base principle. This is, of course, far removed from the subgenre of magic realism, because it does have an organizing base principle of synecdochic enchantment, which stipulates and regulates the primary direction of the narrative and its speech acts.

Easthope and McGowan state that 'while the forms of pastiche, self-referential and explicitly intertextual “style” of postmodernism owes something to the mode of modernism, they do, none the less, also break with the referent of the real (history, time, art and the artist) which modernism maintained' (1992:182). Once again it is apparent that postmodernism breaks with that which appropriates subgeneric distinctions by severing itself from a limiting base principle, and so lends itself readily to the potential of the pastiche of base principles, ultimately denying essentialistic truth and value to a single thing or process. Waugh (1992:3) states that postmodernism is a condition as well as a mood, characterized by the sense of an ending,
that has transgressed from the boundaries of the aesthetic and art into those traditionally believed to be stable areas of reality, namely science, cognition, and morality. As Hutcheon (1988) argues, postmodernism is a condition where the aesthetics of modernism leaves the boundaries of the text behind and transgresses uncertainty into all that which we had assumed was a stable, knowledgeable reality.

All in all, despite the fact that both the subgenre of magic realism and the postmodern condition may tend to exist by the same techniques, the sense of an ending and the textual affinity to an extra-literary reality are important distinctions between magic realism and postmodernism. The magic realist subgenre may invoke the postmodern condition but it does not wholly and exclusively participate in the apocalyptic elimination of both literary and extra-literary realities. To illustrate this further within speech act principles, magic realism operates and organizes itself specifically within the performativity of illocutionary force and closure, while the postmodern condition cannot but exist by the self-performativity of the grapheme, shifting the signatures from context to context.

To return to the extract from 'Report on the Shadow Industry', the narrator, stating he has manufactured one more shadow, the narrative of the report itself, says that it hints 'at greater beauties and more profound mysteries that exist somewhere before the beginning and somewhere after the end' (1974:94). If this were read within a postmodern perspective, the greater beauties could very well be existence of the signatures, as pastiche, in the endless and open performativity of a multiplicity of contexts. In magic realism, however, Carey is able to hint at possible realities which exist in a metaphysically transcendent state to the Reader Function's notion of time and space. This state is a type of reality which has an equal truth and and equal value, in a closed context, to that reality which is commonly perceived as 'the real'. And once again, it is the metafictional technique, in conjunction with the inferentheme, that qualifies this 'closed' sense and reference. For the story has both a thematic beginning and a thematic end which in themselves constitute a logically progressive reality by the ground rules of the subgenre, based on accepted bodies of knowledge in the social heteroglot, where the extra-literary reality of the Reader Function exists both before and after the narrative has ended. The point being
made by such a structural alignment between literary and extra-literary realities is that beyond the extra-literary reality we know may lie several other possible realities, as yet uncharted, which have structural affinities of some kind to our own, and so may hint at greater beauties and more profound mysteries not only in some transcendent state, but also, and more importantly, in our own.

One methodology of interpreting this multiplicity of realities, waiting to be charted and invented (or reinvented), is the postcolonial condition of both the literary and extra-literary realities. Much magic realist writings have been, at some point or another, considered wholly from the postcolonial perspective. And we may further state that, at times, the distinction between postcoloniality and magic realism is difficult to make. However, what is needed in order to make such a distinction is exactly that which I have been arguing within the context of postmodernism, and that is the distinction between cultural condition and subgeneric representation. Postcoloniality is a condition in the extra-literary reality which proceeds to reinvent, or bring to the forefront, those cultural realities which have been marginalized by the persistent manufacturing of truth from one dominant, empirical, culture. Ashcroft et al (1989:2) argue that the use of the term postcolonial is based on the notion that a multiplicity of cultural realities in the world has been dismantled by the European aggression of imperial processes. And Adam argues that the postcolonial is a practice that gains its impetus from 'social and political self assertion'(1991:79).

As a practice, it is the ability of individual writers to illuminate their condition of cultural marginalization primarily by narrative, and, in this manner, can the condition infiltrate the chosen subgenre of the Author Function. The fact that an Author Function can take magic realism as the subgenre of choice does not at all imply that magic realism is always driven by a primary concern for postcolonial issues. An example of this is some of the short fiction of Jorge Luis Borges. Although the content of his short fiction does make undeniable political statements about the nature of reality, it does not necessarily always consider itself with the question of imperial aggression and marginalization. As we can see in 'Report on the Shadow Industry', a variety of techniques make their way into the intentions and words of the Author Function but none of them overtly implies postcolonial politics as we have discussed in the above
argument.

Indeed, the issue of possible realities, borrowed from the principles of what is generally considered to be postcoloniality, in 'Report on the Shadow Industry', is an issue not of marginalization but of potentially greater understanding in the metaphysics of being if and when we chart the uncharted. In some sense, one could argue that this interpretation of the story reaffirms the question of imperialism into the unknown, but this would only be so if such an undertaking refused to deliberate upon the question of equal realities and their value inherent in all things that pass through our own 'real'. We must chart the uncharted by the base principle of magic realism, by synecdochic enchantment, in order for the nature of reality to achieve a broader scope of truth. The point to be made here is that not all magic realist narratives are postcolonial. While they may include the principles of the postcolonial condition, it is not necessary for them to be artefacts of postcoloniality in order for them to be examples of magic realism.

What does all this imply for the magic realist subgenre? Except for its base principle, they are all sufficient conditions for the speech acts of a narrative to be classified as conditions appropriate to the magic realist subgenre. Pratt (1977:204) states that readers expect and isolate the appropriateness conditions of a subgenre in order to begin their analysis of the speech act in question, decoding the text according to its directives, or indicators. This has been the fundamental principle of this chapter. Thomas reasons that the sufficient condition 'for some situation is any circumstance or condition whose existence or fulfillment, by itself, is enough to bring about or guarantee the existence of that situation' (1986:193). And, as such, these techniques and conditions function as subgeneric indicators when they are deployed within the narrative stratagem.

For example, both fabulation and metafictionality as magic realist techniques based on appropriateness conditions, and the postmodern and postcolonial extra-literary conditions or moods, reconstitute themselves within the larger structure, upon deployment in the narrative stratagem, as subgeneric indicators with a relative illocutionary force. That is to say, every one of the aforementioned techniques and conditions are enough, by themselves, to bring about the state or existence of a magic realist speech act, but they do not necessarily imply that such an act has occurred. What this means is
that the aforementioned techniques and conditions lend themselves readily to any subgenre and must be analysed according to the base principle and ground rule regulations of that subgenre. As Thomas argues, 'when a statement of sufficient conditions is made, it is very important that its context be clearly stated or understood' (1986:194).

Within the context of magic realism, the base principle is quite simply one that foregrounds a reification of realism by an attention to meticulous detail in order for the progression of synecdochic enchantment in that realism to occur. This progression allows the Author Function to deploy the fantastic in a reversal of the narrative ground rules on the basis of the sufficient condition of the inferentHEME. And the ground rule is whatever is thematically laid down by the narrative, hence the inferentHEME, in either the monoglot or heteroglot poles of literary and extra-literary acts. In this sense, then, the base principle of a subgenre is its necessary condition. Thomas states that a necessary condition 'for some situation is any circumstance or condition that needs to be fulfilled in order for that situation to exist' (1986:194). Magic realism, therefore, cannot be 'magic realism' unless its necessary condition, its base principle of synecdochic enchantment, is considered as the logical necessity for its existence, and is considered as the organizing factor by which all sufficient conditions, or appropriateness conditions, contribute to the formulation of the larger structure of the subgenre by their reconstitution as subgeneric indicators with illocutionary forces.

Thus the narrator in 'Report on the Shadow Industry', by the reconstitution of the previously listed appropriateness conditions in the larger structure of the magic realist subgenre, becomes a producer of shadows rather than a reporter of its consumption, and the logical progression towards the reversal of this ground rule has occurred through the subgeneric indicators and their illocutionary forces in the subgenre. The magic realist speech act is happily executed.

And by such an execution we cannot but analyse the act within the context of the performativity of an illocution unless we were to ignore the two following important points. Firstly, since magic realism partakes in the overt presence of a narrative organized around the close-knit intricacy of a sju/het, its closure of sense and reference, and its transference of meaning occurs primarily by its ability to ride the Scholean 'tide of the story'. Indeed, as Dovey (1983:202) has stated, the very presence of a sju/het in Carey's stories determines the need for
an analysis of indicators by the direction of the narrative's formal structure as well as its logically conclusive, but contradictory, ending. And secondly, when we consider the breakdown of Austin's (1971) classic constative-performative distinction as a principle that can lend itself to subgeneric indicators, we find that no subgeneric indicators are 'constative', and so none is either true or false within the context of their usage as an appropriateness condition for the magic realist speech act.

All indicators are performative, and so depend upon appropriateness conditions for their successful, or felicitous, performance as an act of a particular subgenre in question. For they can readily lend themselves to the variform genres and subgenres in both the monoglot and heteroglot poles. What is fixed, however, for the subgenre, is the base principle because of its status as necessary condition, and because it organizes the appropriateness conditions as subgeneric indicators, with illocutionary force, to formulate the larger structure of the subgenre itself. It is this factor of the magic realist subgenre, in combination with both Rabkin's and Todorov's theories of the fantastic, as sufficient condition, that I will discuss in the next chapter.
**Two: The Fantastic Indicator: ‘Peeling’**

We ended the first chapter on the note that our appropriateness conditions are in fact synonymous, because of their performative nature, with their functioning as subgeneric indicators. Let us discuss this in more detail. The appropriateness conditions, or subgeneric indicators, most common to the magic realist subgenre are the literary conditions of fabulation, metafictionality and the inferentheme, and the extra-literary conditions of postmodernism, and postcolonialism. Although this list will make do for the moment, there is nothing to stop the Reader Function from postulating another appropriateness condition if such a condition helps to illuminate the functioning of the contextual margins through its status as a subgeneric indicator.

As Derrida states, 'a context is never absolutely determinable [and] its determination can never be entirely certain or saturated' (Sec, 1979:174). Put simply, no context is able to be wholly determined by what is known about it, and no context is so full as to be unable to take on more than that which it already has within. The possibility of expansion and addition within subgenres will always exist because the appropriateness conditions are not contextually finite in themselves. This is, in fact, what we will be considering in this chapter when we discuss the fantastic as another appropriateness condition and subgeneric indicator within the magic realist subgenre.

Petzold (1986) argues that each and every narrative should be considered as a discursive mixture of both the realistic and the fantastic. If we remember Kenyon's statement, the notion of this 'discursive mixture' is important to our argument. We remember that there are no true centres to these concepts, and the ones we confront are the ones we have posited as centre. Indeed, because subgeneric indicators are logically sufficient, their corresponding appropriateness condition can lend itself readily to other subgenres. The subgenres themselves, therefore, can be seen as a 'mixture', or compilation of subgeneric indicators, based on the marginalism of their corresponding appropriateness conditions, where each indicator, with its own illocutionary force, works toward the greater perlocutionary effect. The subgenre should not be seen as an essentially totalistic body which is never impregnated with a foreign, subgeneric element.

With this in mind, it must be stated that the necessary condition, or base principle of magic realism, synecdochic
enchantment, like any other base principle, is not a subgeneric centre even though it may seem to function as one. It is an organizing principle by which all appropriateness conditions operating within the subgenre have their graphematic forces harnessed, as subgeneric indicators, so that a greater, 'ilocutionary' order is posited on to an always existing and microcosmic chaos. Wilson states that 'there seems to be no single, free-standing, uncontaminated, pure text - only the weaves and nets, the threads and the labyrinths of textuality. Similarly, there seems to be no pure, single-formed space in literature (1986:73). He proceeds to argue that the category of magic realism is a plurality of worlds that 'always approach each other but never actually merge' (1986:73).

By replacing 'worlds' with appropriateness conditions which, in turn, originate from a plurality of contexts, Wilson's point is rather similar to our own, except for the notion that these 'worlds', or appropriateness conditions, never actually merge. Indeed, on the level of the subgeneric indicator, they do appear to merge and actually sustain an order by being harnessed to the organizing influence of the base principle. An organizing factor allows for the creation of a larger structure by the intentionality of the Author Function. But it is right to consider that such a merger is not a once only event, and that the larger subgeneric structure is not an isolated entity because it has harnessed those 'graphematic' forces of the appropriateness conditions on the microcosmic level.

In this sense, then, the appropriateness condition functions somewhat similarly to the grapheme that precedes the locution. It can shift and play like the grapheme, executing a variety of semantic forces that can be harnessed by the base principle of a subgenre in order to constitute the appropriateness condition as a subgeneric indicator. As a subgeneric indicator, the appropriateness condition exists on a level similar to that of the locution. In its more graphematic state, it is nothing more than an iterable mark in a multiplicity of subgeneric contexts. An appropriateness condition does not exist in a singular and all-encompassing context, and so its status as subgeneric indicator is thereby always sufficient within one context. Derrida states that '[o]ne can perhaps come to recognise other possibilities in it by inscribing it or grafting it onto other chains. No context can entirely close it. Nor can any code, the code here being both the possibility and impossibility of writing, of its essential
And, even though we are dealing with one structure, namely magic realism, it is the base principle of that subgenre, the meticulous attention to detail, which indicates to us that its context is not an isolated occurrence but a compilation of all those contexts in which it has engaged. Such meticulous attention to detail, or synecdochic enchantment, indicates that appropriateness conditions can not only shift in a multiplicity of contexts, but can equally take with them the contexts in which they have played while they fulfilled a marginal role within another larger structure. Thus the inferentheme, for example, not only has a contextual affiliation with the subgenre from which it borrows its principles, namely science fiction, it can also extend those contextual principles, within its status as an appropriateness condition, to other subgenres, lending itself readily, and altering bodies of knowledge to logical extremes by its ability to repeat, in principle, that which it has done in a previous context, in a previous larger structure.

Bakhtin states that 'the word lives, as it were, on the boundary between its own context and another, alien, context' (1981:284). This Bakhtinian principle has equal weight in our discussion by the fact that the magic realist speech act illuminates that which is common to all speech acts because it is the sum total of its own philosophical position in both genre theory and speech act theory. It is what Austin (1962) and Searle (1970) classed as the 'parasite', not only because of its status as fictional, or non-serious discourse, but because it itself indulges in parasitism. Thus the felicity of a speech act’s performance in magic realism, in order for it to be magic realism, is not just simply a centripetal process. If we consider, as an example from 'Peeling', Nile’s declaration that she is 'soaked...to the marrow of my bones' with 'antiseptic', and that 'it has come to upset me' (1974:29), we can see that the illocution of her act is grounded in a parasitic performance and not in some centripetal process towards an idealized performative. Indeed, the implication of the word antiseptic is such that, in this context, the declaratory force of the act allows the alien context to become a part of Nile while simultaneously projecting her being into a multiplicity of parasitic contexts, all with disastrous perlocutionary consequences for the narrator's intentions, and thus eradicating the notion of her ability to speak and exist in performative essences.
And, if we further consider this status quo within the context of the narrator of 'Peeling', we find a rather surprisingly similar set of circumstances. Within a relatively short amount of time, the Reader Function is made aware of the narrator's position towards the colour white. While 'white hair' is his 'one distinction' (1974:22), the narrator states that 'I loathe white' (1974:23). Indeed, the colour white is initially given a rudimentary place in the performative essences of the narrator's existence, alongside all the other essentialist performatives he knows about himself. But, because he desires to be gratified by an equally idealized and essentialist performatives which classifies Nile, the one distinction that marks him is thrown into a multiplicity of parasitic performances. Because it is not centripetal, the colour white plays from context to context, from Nile's white bedroom to her white bedspread, from her white dolls to her white throat, and from 'her fears about the souls of aborted babies' (1974:28) to the narrator's feeling that he 'may drown in a million gallons of milk' (1974:31).

While the colour white itself 'has no appeal to [Nile], it is simply that it says nothing, being less dramatic than black', it foregrounds the narrator's continually frustrated efforts, throughout the narrative performances, to get at her 'true colour', or to find something that equates to his preference for '[s]omething a little more feminine. Something with...more character about it' (1974:23). For the narrator, this something is a 'pretty blue' (1974:23) and could be the difference in her character to the colour white, which he believes is one of his distinguishing, centripetal features, or one of his essences. However, Nile's predominant colour is one that falls into the multiplicity of contexts, not only making her speech performances and her existence a parasitic product, but also confronting the narrator with the ever-existing threat that his own essentialisms are nothing more than an illusion in the parasitism of the colour white.

As we can see, an illocutionary performance does not deductively appropriate to itself that which is its essence in some idealized state, as Searle (1970:55; 1979:204-5) wanted to do when he spoke of excluding marginal cases, and Austin tried to do during the course of How To Do Things With Words but could not because the purity of performatives 'gave trouble from the start...[and] has to be abandoned in favour of more general families of related and overlapping speech-acts' (1962:150).
It is by this notion of ‘general families’ of acts in which Derrida states that the system ‘I call graphematic in general...consequently blurs...all the oppositions which follow, oppositions whose pertinence, purity, and rigor Austin [and, later, Searle] has unsuccessfully attempted to establish’ (Sec, 1979:187). The felicity of the magic realist speech act lies in its margins, in its ‘infelicities’, in its ability to eradicate distinctions and incorporate the appropriateness conditions which belong to the extended families of subgenres and speech acts into its own ‘context’, while overtly pointing out that they equally play in the contexts of the other. The key is to isolate the thematic role played by the base principle in allowing the Author Function to harness the illocutionary forces of subgeneric indicators that are found in the appropriateness conditions. This culmination of harnessed forces can thus result in a type of subgeneric closure. Let us consider ‘Peeling’:

And she walks above my head, probably arranging the little white dolls which she will not explain and which I never ask about, knowing she will not explain, and not for the moment wishing an explanation. She buys the dolls from the Portobello Road, the north end, on Friday morning, and at another market on Thursdays, she has not revealed where, but leaves early, at about 5 A.M. I know it is a market she goes to, but I don’t which one. The dolls arrive in all conditions, crammed into a large cardboard suitcase which she takes out on her expeditions. Those which still have hair she plucks bald, and those with eyes lose them, and those with teeth have them removed and she paints them, slowly, white. She uses a flat plastic paint. I have seen the tins (1974:22).

True to the base principle of magic realism, much meticulous detail is given in the opening paragraphs of the short story. Indeed, as I have discussed in chapter one, synecdochic enchantment tends to allow for a rich focus on detail in order for that magic to occur and be exploited by the subgeneric indicators functioning within the larger structure of the subgenre. Although it is possible to delve into an analysis of such meticulous detail and produce a specific type of reading, it will suffice here to state, as I already have, that the base principle exercises an organizing force which stylistically orchestrates the literary environment to the intentionality of the Author Function.

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For our purposes, we will focus in this chapter on the synecdochic enchantment of the dolls because it is that which the appropriateness conditions, as subgeneric indicators, adhere to the most, and thereby generate a specifically tight relationship between the dolls and Nile.

And it is this relationship which is taken to a logical extreme in the sexual encounter between Nile and the narrator. Thus the inferentheme and the ground rule reversal have particularly strong influences here by their ability to adhere to the meticulous detail given in the above extract, especially that which communicates the state of the dolls. It will help, therefore, to remember their whiteness, their baldness, and their featureless state of existence as an organized product, through Author Function intentionality and base principle, which has a direct consequence in the *sjuzhet* of the narrative.

This leads us to the notion of the fantastic in magic realism. As I have stated in chapter one, the fantastic is also a sufficient condition because, as appropriateness condition, it can lend itself readily to other subgenres, and can thereby modify its illocutionary force as subgeneric indicator in conjunction with the requirements of the base principle in question. Within the context of magic realism, the fantastic indicator, like any other subgeneric indicator, merges with the meticulous detail in the narrative so that its perlocutionary effect may occur. This is the logical outcome of the harnessing of the fantastic as an appropriateness condition by the base principle of synecdochic enchantment. But what, then, characterizes the fantastic?

Rabkin states that 'the fantastic has a place in any narrative [sub]genre, but that [sub]genre to which the fantastic is exhaustively central is the class of narratives we call Fantasy' (1976:29). Despite our refutation of centrality, Rabkin is quite right in pointing out that the fantastic, as appropriateness condition and subgeneric indicator, is axiomatically dependent upon the base principle of that subgenre we call Fantasy. Indeed, we have mentioned before in our argument, in chapter one, when we spoke of a similar set of circumstances with the axiomatic dependency of fabulation to the subgeneric Fable. And we have mentioned in this chapter repeatedly that all appropriateness conditions lend themselves readily to other contexts, other subgenres, and can thereby constitute themselves differently in accordance with the base principles of those larger structures.

Since the fantastic adheres, in magic realism, to the meticulous
detail laid out by the base principle of synecdochic enchantment, it forces a ground rule reversal of the subgenre's necessary condition to occur. Rabkin argues that 'in most narratives, no matter where they fall along the scale of the fantastic, the ground rules of the narrative world accommodate paired opposites. In a Fantasy, the opposition is at the level of the ground rules themselves. In this, Fantasy is unique' (1976:38).

With magic realism, a ground rule reversal is both thematic, working in conjunction with the inferenthalme, and on the level of the structure itself. Rabkin's 'paired opposites' indicate that a reversal is somewhat similar to the hierarchal aggression that occurs in a binary opposition. And since appropriateness conditions cannot be enclosed by a single context, functioning rather in a multiplicity of contexts, it is always possible that a paradigm shift from subgenre to subgenre, context to context, takes with it the probability of reversal found in the trace of the other. Thus we return to the axiomatic dependency of the fantastic on Fantasy. In Fantasy, according to Rabkin, the ground rule reversal is at the level of the ground rules itself. In our words, the base principle of Fantasy is a continual 360 degree reversal of the ground rules at particular chronotopic points in the narrative. In layman's terms, Fantasy continually reverses its own narratorial propositions, and Rabkin (1976) himself validates this with the example of Through the Looking Glass, where the ground rules of the literary environment and the extra-literary environment are continually reversed, or contradicted, as the seemingly impossible becomes possible.

For us however, it is fair only to state that the fantastic, as appropriateness condition, has an axiomatic dependency on this base principle of Fantasy. Unlike Fantasy, magic realism does not make the impossible possible, it makes the possible extremely possible because that which is known, or that which is made clear by the base principle and the ground rules of the narrative, is taken to its logical extreme by the inferenthalme. Thus for our purposes, the fantastic (Rabkin, 1976:12) is characterized by a 180 degree reversal of the ground rules in accordance with the necessary demand of the base principle. In this sense, then, we have what Derrida would term as a 'non-present remainder [or] a differential mark cut off from its putative 'production' or origin' (Limited Inc., 1979:190). It is exactly like the Derridean 'trace' and is 'neither present nor absent' (Limited Inc., 1979:190). What this
means is that an axiomatic dependency is based on both the presupposed origin of a context for an appropriateness condition and the absence of such an origin because it falls into the multiplicity of contexts, whereby the origin itself is perhaps also the product of such multiplicity.

Thus Fantasy as a subgenre can itself be characterized as a product of contextual multiplicity on the graphematic level, and its base principle is a necessary condition of our ability to explore it as a product of stylistic difference in the larger structure. Consider the following description of Nile by the narrator:

She is, how to call it, artistic. She wears clothes of an ordinary person, of a great number of quite different ordinary persons, but she arranges them in the manner of those who are called artistic. Small pieces are tacked together with a confidence that contradicts her manner and amazes me. Pieces of tiny artificial flowers, a part of a butcher's apron, old Portuguese shoes, a silver pendant, medal ribbons, a hand-painted stole, and a hundred milk bottle tops made unrecognizable. She is like a magpie with a movable nest (1974:25-26).

Of all the performances that constitute Nile as a speaker in a magic realist context, she is to some degree a product of subgeneric Fantasy because of the illocutionary force of the fantastic indicator. Indeed, the figure described in the above passage seems to be both an image of singular, objectified artfulness as well as that which can readily slip out of her own artfully unified, larger structure into the multiplicity that characterizes her by way of a ground rule reversal. Hypothetically speaking, if this figure of Nile appeared in a subgeneric Fantasy, and not, as it does, in magic realism, then the multiplicity, in the above, that contributes to a ground rule reversal would help to contribute not just once, but several times during the narrative. That is to say, the base principle of Fantasy allows the narrative to indulge in its thematic multiplicity and so continually exploit the possibility of a ground rule reversal whenever the subgeneric context allows for a graphematic shift. Thus the narrative of 'Peeling', as subgeneric Fantasy, need not finish with Nile's metamorphic ground rule reversal into a doll that is shattered and lifeless, but could exploit this metamorphosis further by giving Nile life in a different context, thereby continuing to make the impossible possible through the
organizing factor of Fantasy's base principle.

However, since Nile is not a speaker of subgeneric Fantasy, she cannot partake in more than one ground rule reversal because the magic realist base principle deliberately invokes a reversal of a thematic and detailed set of related, binary oppositions. That is to say, the progressive logic of the inferentheme can foreground Nile's specific multiplicities because binary oppositions, such as *Nile/dolls* and *dolls/aborted babies*, initially pair up specific details for the sole purpose of collapsing them into each other's contexts. Thus Nile becomes a figure who is axiomatically dependent on subgeneric Fantasy because Carey, as Author Function, uses the fantastic indicator as a technique in the magic realist performance to instigate that once-only collapse, or reversal. And, because Nile is firmly grounded in this magic realist performance, her essentialism, which is so important to the narrator as a body of knowledge, remains in the constant state of multiplicities that confronted the narrator in the first place.

In the case of the fantastic as an appropriateness condition, or subgeneric indicator, or even as a technique that can be intentionally invoked by the Author Function, the axiomatic dependency indicates that such a harnessing cannot but invoke a contextual multiplicity, and cannot but invoke a probable reversal of the ground rules at some point in the *sjuzhet*. To write this as an algorithm would be state that \( X < Y \) (where \( X = \) appropriateness condition, subgeneric indicator, or technique, and \( Y = \) the putative origin, or subgeneric base principle). Thus the relationship between the fantastic and Fantasy is similar to that of fabulation and Fable. And in this similarity, there is always a probability that previous contexts filter through as a 'non-present remainder' or 'trace' by the fact that iterability reigns predominant in both the larger structure, or the subgenre, and the microcosmic level, or the appropriateness condition.

Before we continue, I would like to discuss the position of those readers who might lay claim to Tzvetan Todorov's notion of the fantastic rather than Rabkin's. I shall state from the start that I find Todorov's structural approach rather unsatisfactory. Todorov (1973:3-23, 44-57) argues that the fantastic itself is a genre which has not only, as its central proposition, the principle of hesitation, but also the possibility of several variant subgenres within its idealized form, something he would call the pure fantastic. Cornwell states that 'In
more Todorovian terms, the fantastic may be present in a work which ultimately turns out to belong (with the resolution of the fantastic issue - or the issue or quality of the fantastic) to the uncanny or the marvellous' (1990:31). By the same logic, the fantastic may be present in a work that ultimately turns out to belong neither to the uncanny or marvellous, but to magic realism, modernism, romanticism, or even realism.

From our position stated above, any notion of either an idealized generic form with a subgeneric varlancy seems simply superfluous, given the nature of the appropriateness condition. Indeed, to lay claim to the fantastic as a genre in itself seems rather weak, considering the fact that the term genre, in our argument, simply means medium, rather than propositional content or stylistics. Equally, such a claim for the fantastic as subgenre would just be another synonymous term for the subgenre of Fantasy itself. So it would seem better suited, as we have already argued, to retain the concept of subgenre to that which the fantastic is an axiomatic dependent, namely Fantasy, so illuminating a more broader scope of graphematic play within the appropriateness conditions and their participation in other larger structures.

Todorov's other proposition, the principle of hesitation, seems to me to be equally dubious. Todorov argues that 'the fantastic is based essentially on a hesitation of the reader - a reader who identifies with the chief character- as to the nature of an uncanny event' (1973:157). He then states that such a hesitation may be 'acknowledged' either as 'reality' or as 'the fruit of imagination or the result of an illusion', so ultimately it is up to the reader to decide whether 'the event is or is not' fantastic (1973:157). The problem with such a notion is primarily the following. So many appropriateness conditions can be characterized by a contextual hesitation for the Reader Function that they could find themselves in something other than a structural realm which signifies the Todorovian fantastic genre or subgenre. One can argue that Todorov's notion is so reader dependent that what may seem fantastic for one reader may not be fantastic for another. The same can be said for the notion of subgenre and structurality. What may seem structurally like the fantastic for one Reader Function, because of this principle of hesitation, may for another be, for example, magic realism! All in all, I prefer to incorporate Rabkin's principle on the basis of its axiomatic
dependency, and its ability (or iterability) to lend itself readily to other subgenres in the structural and contextual sense.

Let us consider the climax and dénouement from 'Peeling':

I take her hand, wishing to reassure her. It removes itself from her body. I am talking to her. Touching her, wishing that she should answer me. But with each touch she is dismembered, slowly, limb by limb. Until, headless, armless, legless, I carelessly lose my grip and she falls to the floor. There is a sharp noise, rather like breaking glass.

Bending down I discover among the fragments a small doll, hairless, eyeless, and white from head to toe (1974:32).

Leaving aside a general kind of literary analysis, one that serves to explain the nature of the narrative itself, we shall concentrate, as we have done, on the structural implications of the subgenre and our position to the narrative as a participant in that larger structure. We will begin by noting that our notion of synecdochic enchantment has allowed the Author Function to take the meticulous detail of the white dolls throughout the narrative to such a degree that the base principle has planted seeds, as it were, at carefully orchestrated points. This kind of planting, in conjunction with the *sjuzhet*, generally gives the Reader Function evidence of a type that seems to implicate them in a treasure hunt for clues which culminate in a type of reading which, in the case of Carey's stories, tends to be considered in desperate need of moral or ethical discussions above all else.

Hassall writes that 'the whole of 'Peeling' is indeterminate in status, and all the more unsettling as a result' (1994:14). He also states that '[i]t is impossible to determine with any certainty on what level the narrator's consciousness, or indeed of reality, these changes take place; but they are disturbingly suggestive' (1994:15). I will not go into the problematic nature of such a proposition here, but I will state that magic realism does seem to revitalize, as I have said before, the *sjuzhet*, the stringent requirements of adhering to a cause-and-effect structure that underlies the written narrative like a framework. Thus the earring in 'Peeling', as an element of meticulous detail, serves to signify the cause-and-effect movement into the climax and dénouement where the narrator, in *seemingly* normal sexual advances, peels away the woman he desires. It is a movement based on the dialogic importation of the ghost of the realist base principle.
Miller argues that '[t]he significant level in "realist" fiction is always local: local cause and effect operate within cosmic chance, unimpeded by gods and demons' (1986:4). Indeed, by such a structural requirement of locality, the white dolls exist perfectly within a narrative movement that dictates their importance at the beginning, and somewhat concludes their importance at the end. In this sense, then, the base principle of realism allows for the possibility of an explanation by a logic that is both local and natural, one does not need to search beyond these requirements to determine the movement of cause and effect.

However, the base principle of magic realism, that necessary condition which organizes all importations, whether they be of a dialogic nature, such as base principles, or of a graphematic nature, such as appropriateness conditions, demolishes this requirement by the fact that both the inferentheme and the fantastic indicator have a predominant influence on the way meticulous detail is discursively represented and received. Wilson states that 'in magic realism space is hybrid (opposite and conflicting properties are co-present)' (1986:70). Thus the Reader Function cannot but explain this importance by both a cause-and-effect explanation, especially at the end, when the dolls are rendered equal to their owner, and by the ability to transgress this local explanation through the metaphoric status of the dénouement, giving scope for variant readings.

Let us dwell upon the notion of the sjuzhet and the nature of the dolls. I mentioned that magic realism adheres to a stringent cause-and-effect structure, and 'Peeling' is no exception. It is important to mention here that this 'presence' of cause and effect is based on the dialogic importation of the base principle of realism, thereby complimenting the 'realism' in the 'magic realism'. This cause-and-effect structure is, of course, predominant in the climax where the narrator, in his sexual advances on Nile, sets into motion a series of causes and effects. These causes and effects are generally associated with their extra-literary counterparts, hence the realism, and so, on one level, seem to appear almost normal or natural, such as the undressing of the female in anticipation of penetration into a glorified essence.

The narrator himself had stated earlier that 'When I finally take her to bed (and I am in no hurry, no hurry at all) I will get some better idea of her true colour, get under her skin as it were' (1974:23).
Interestingly enough, the speech act ‘Did you get the pun?’ (1974:23), following this one made by the narrator, is grounded in the metafictional technique, and one can here speculate that what seems like a continuing narrative of the narrator is, in fact, quite likely to be the refracted words of Carey himself, setting the structure up for the events that will follow. Thus events that seem natural ultimately lead to the dismemberment not only of the female body, but also the solution to the mystery of her essence he so desires to uncover.

Petzold states that to participate in a qualification of “fantasy” (or more appropriately, the fantastic), fiction needs to express a conscious departure from, even a rebellion against, the principle of mimesis’ (1986:15). As we have seen in the above argument, even the base principle of another subgenre, as ghost or trace, can be imported on the basis of the demands of the subgenre in question. This we can see occurring in magic realism where the base principle of realism is an object on which the fantastic indicator can act in order to amalgamate its force into the context of the larger structure. The fantastic indicator functions, therefore, as a complimentary force in which the larger structure, namely the subgenre of magic realism, explodes the cause and effect that stipulates X as being realist, X being whatever narrative acts that may fit those characteristics on the basis of the subgeneric base principle, namely synecdochic enchantment, as a necessary condition. Van Ikin argues that ‘the story’s logic is that of life and human nature - a logic determined by processes more profound than mere cause and effect’ (1977:29). Thus ‘Peeling’, beginning with a woman who collects white dolls and organizes her life around them, ends its narrative with a ground rule reversal that stipulates her becoming a thing that is equal to the material evidence of her life, and that is to become a doll herself. Such is the nature of the subgeneric illocutionary forces which constitute ‘Peeling’ as a narrative act.

What we have discussed so far with ‘Peeling’ and the fantastic indicator can benefit from a brief discussion of the inferentheme. Consider the following extract from the short story:

I am in no hurry. There is no urgency in the matter. Sooner or later we shall discuss the oysters. Then it will be time to move on to other more intimate things, moving layer after layer, until I discover her true colours, her flavours, her smells. The prospect of so slow an
exploration excites me and I am in no hurry, no hurry at all. May it

We can begin by noting that the narrator's anticipating his
future gratification is only partly driven by the physical experiences of
the situation itself. Much of what amounts to the greater experience,
in the eyes of the narrator, is based on his desire for knowledge, and
for that knowledge to progress him logically to an even greater
understanding than before. We may remember the point we made,
earlier in the chapter, about the inferentheme and its ability, as an
appropriateness condition for magic realism, to borrow epistemological
principles from subgeneric science fiction.

It is time to illuminate this point a little further with the help
of a few critics. Daniel reads Carey's 'Peeling' as a perfect example of
the 'fear that if we peel back the layers of the infinite onion of the
universe, there will be nothing, or only an image, without features'
(1988:153). Tate (1987) argues that 'Peeling' presents the female body
as both mystery and multi-layered text, where the act of peeling
becomes a celebration of the repression of the feminine and the
destruction of gender differences, demystifying the female body
through the knowledge that Nile is no longer a threat to the narrator's
masculinity. And Manning (1985:41) writes that 'Peeling' cannot but
explain itself psychoanalytically, but in order to do so, the text must
be inserted into an existing structure of reality, namely the body of
knowledge called psychoanalysis.

Although this comes across as a mélange of quotations, the
interesting thing to be learned from statements is the affiliation they
make with bodies of knowledge as the way in which the text is reified,
or explained in order to achieve a degree of comfortable
understanding. Once again, a cause-and-effect approach is strictly
adhered to, but each of the critics seems to understand that the
affiliation they make between bodies of knowledge and the text must
also include the logical progression of that knowledge towards an
extreme situation, and ultimately a fantastic scenario. The knowledge
itself represents part of that process which will eventually lead to the
illocutionary force of the fantastic indicator and the perlocutionary
effect of a ground rule reversal. I have earlier mentioned that the such
a ground rule reversal may benefit from a conjunctive involvement
with the inferentheme. Indeed, that is exactly what occurs in 'Peeling'
and what we have been alluding to in these two paragraphs. For us, and for the magic realist subgenre, this indicates the influential force of the inferentheme.

Carey himself, in interviews with Maddocks (1981:31-2) and Willbanks (1991:49) states that the mystery in 'Peeling' is the mystery of the dolls, they are there in the beginning and in the end, without any psychological explanation, and therefore constitute the mystery itself when the narrator discovers that the essence he was searching for is no different from that which he saw and knew of in the first place. This search for an essence is, as we have already stated, a search for knowledge, and by the inferentheme's function in the larger structure of the subgenre, this knowledge constitutes itself as a critical factor, for the Author Function, in the representation of meticulous detail that will lead to the ground rule reversal. Thus the oysters, for example, which the narrator will buy because 'She has revealed...a love for oysters' (1974:23) will lead to a discussion of that body of knowledge which defines them as aphrodisiacs, so leading to greater sexual delicacies and discoveries. The logical progression and manifestation of such a will to knowledge is the sexual advancements made in the climax of 'Peeling' by the narrator, only to be reversed by the ground rule of the white dolls that make up a part of the body of knowledge called Nile in the narrative act of the short story.

Although it borrows its operative principles from subgeneric science fiction, the inferentheme does not necessarily organise itself against a background of scientific knowledge on every occasion. It can also operate quite happily in such bodies of knowledge as sexuality, theology, or any other methodologies for that matter. Indeed, in 'Peeling', the body of knowledge taken to its extreme and logical extension is that which proposes not only to explore, but also to define, the essence of Woman, gender differences, desire, and gratification. What began as a mystery in 'Peeling' remains, by the illocutionary force of the inferentheme, as a mystery first, last, and always. That is to say, the narrator is confronted with various 'threads' of knowledge, supplied by Nile, which he tries to separate into 'loose kinds', or 'threads' of idle chit-chat, and 'the other kind', or the 'one that might unravel the whole sweater' (1974:26). It is important for the narrator to know which one he is confronted with because he 'would prefer to know [the idle] things, before [he] come[s] to the centre of things' (1974:27).
The narrator, therefore, would rather discuss her 'love for oysters' (1974:23) than 'the souls of aborted babies' (1974:28), peeling away the layers gradually, over the years, until he gets to the essentialism of her being. This slow act of peeling is based on his anticipation to gratify the desire for knowledge that will come into his possession, and is metaphorically characterized by his meticulous methodology 'in the art of sucking barley sugar' (1974:27). But, because Nile is an axiomatic dependent of Fantasy, both by the illocutionary force of the fantastic indicator and, perhaps, the sexual whims of the narrator, the illocutionary force of the inferent theme that is parasitically present in her speech acts spill over into the narrator's acts of idle chit-chat faster than he can control.

This onslaught of knowledge entices the narrator to progress faster than he would like with his intentions, and so the act of peeling, or sucking barley sugar, transgresses from an extended intellectual timespace to the immediate material reality. In this sense, clothes are removed with great speed, knowledge is taken to its logical extreme, and Nile's essentialistic beingness is literally shattered by the remaining pieces of a broken, white doll. The inferent theme has taken the narrator's desire for wanting to understand Woman's essentialism to its logical extreme, returning willy-nilly back to the multiplicities that mark her, and foregrounding the complexity of the larger structure called Nile. To return to the analogy of barley sugar, the knowledge, like the sweet, has been savoured to its logically progressive end, and the narrator is left with the aftertaste of a Socratic reductio ad absurdum.

Our topic in this chapter has been primarily concerned with how the appropriateness conditions, on a microcosmic level, shift from a multiplicity of contexts to the status of subgeneric indicators within a larger structure, namely the context of subgeneric magic realism. In this sense, then, we have been dealing with the notion of felicities and infelicities of an act. While Austin (1962) is constantly aware that the purity of a performance is an illusion because its potential as a definitive performance can be altered by the infelicity, Searle (1970) is quite adamant that the purity of performative is not only a possibility, but a necessary undertaking in order to classify acts as acts of a specific illocutionary type. For Searle, infelicities signify an unsuccessful performance rather than an alteration in performance. His preference to classify a successful performance is
done purely on the basis of central felicities in an idealized situation of the act, or the pure performative (Searle, 1970:55). We, like Derrida (1979), have tried to incorporate both the felicity and the infelicity into the classification of the performative, preferring to focus on the non-serious, the fictional, or an infelicitous performance like magic realism, on the basis that the infelicity can be as important as the felicity to an analytical and philosophical approach in speech act theory.

What has been our main concern, however, is a combined approach of genre theory and speech act theory by the notion that appropriateness conditions exist in a graphematic state, in a multiplicity of contexts, prior to their recruitment as subgeneric indicators with illocutionary forces. What I want to distinguish here is the duality of microcosmic chaos and order in the larger structures called subgenres. Daniel states that ‘[t]he Australian New Novel is a prismatic play of mind, ludic and absurdist, a fabric of hazard, paradox, contradiction, instability -the instability that quantum physics shows us is at the core of things’ (1988:21. My italics). Although Daniel speaks of the genre of the novel, we can transfer this notion of physics and quantum physics to language and the genre of the short story. We have, then, what might best be stated as the aporia of structuralism and poststructuralism, working together in a logical contradiction to produce chaos and order in the larger structures called subgenres which exist in generic media of language. Daniel also states that ‘[t]he logic of cause and effect has been replaced by Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. Reality is random and literature now has to contend with the inherent certainty of matter, a randomness subject to the role of the observer -the indeterminacy of the universe’ (1988:16).

Although we may have chaos, uncertainty, and randomness in both the quantum level of physics and language, we do have, to a greater or lesser degree, order in the larger structures. As we have seen in this chapter, magic realism, as one subgeneric example amongst many, has this duality by the appropriateness condition within the subgeneric structure, its indicators and their forces. Physicist Paul Davies states that ‘[a]lthough there is generally no certainty about the future states of a quantum system, the relative probabilities of the different possible states are still determined....on a macroscopic scale where quantum effects are usually not noticeable, nature seems to conform to deterministic laws’ (1992:31). Here we have a difference
between physics and language because, on a macroscopic scale, the quantum effect is noticeable in language if one understands the principle of Uncertainty, or, as it is most commonly known, the concept of différenc. Nevertheless, our larger linguistic structures can and do display a tendency toward signifying order, even if that order is, from time to time, disrupted by an infelicity. And when such a disruption occurs, when such a shift from context to context is brought into being, can we not say that such a shift is not the great leap into chaos but simply an ordered change of contexts?

Voloshinov states;

*Any utterance, no matter how weighty and complete in and of itself, is only a moment in the continuous process of verbal communication. But that continuous verbal communication is, in turn, itself only a moment in the continuous, all-inclusive, generative process of a given social collective....Verbal communication can never be understood and explained outside of this connection with a concrete situation. Language acquires life and historically evolves precisely here, in concrete verbal communication, and not in the abstract linguistic system of language forms, nor in the individual psyche of speakers* (1973:95).

Thus, while the graphematic stature of the appropriateness condition has the ability to invoke a multiplicity of contexts on the quantum level of language, the order of the larger structure incorporates such a shift into the verbal processes of its own narrative acts. The appropriateness condition is, like the grapheme, the major contender of play in the system, but the system itself exists within a state of order that comprises the context of the speech act, the mode of communication, and the transference of meaning in a concrete, social, context, or situation. In classing an act, the notion of infelicities and felicities should, therefore, be determined by a multiplicity of contexts, a multiplicity of potential speaking situations applicable to that act, and not, as Searle stipulated, by the felicitous conditions of some idealized act in some idealized singular context.

One might say that the base principle of a subgenre is its true felicity, organizing the appropriateness conditions almost centripetally so that they may function as subgeneric indicators. But even within this proposition, one must be careful of the dialogic importation of other base principles. For if one finds a base principle, one must
continue to search, by way of felicitics and infelicities, to see if there are any more, and to see, if there are, which ones have been dialogically imported to compliment the illocutionary forces of subgeneric indicators within the larger structure. And since we have discussed this in our current chapter, what lies ahead is a discussion of the total type of illocution, or the sum total of those forces, so to speak, and their relationship between Author Function, Reader Function, and the state of closure for the production and transference of meaning. Grounding ourselves in the structural analysis of chapters one and two, our next chapter will be a reading of the magic realist speech act. Our shift from the quantum level to the larger structure has, more or less, occurred.

In the previous chapter, we made the distinction between the signifying events at the quantum level of language and the subgenre of magic realism, as a larger structure, in order to accommodate and entertain, within a general scope, the apparentness of a semantic order and a semantic chaos. Indeed, we argued that every ordered context has the probability of being able to slip into a multiplicity of contexts because our subgeneric indicator, with its illocutionary force, is equally an appropriateness condition in a system of multiple forces. And in this multiplicity of forces, we have understood that the appropriateness condition, like the grapheme, ‘can be imitated, and...imitates itself’ (Derrida, Limited, Inc., 1979:167) in a performance of multiple contexts, erasing all strict semantic essences, and thereby opening up the text to numerous meanings in numerous contexts. Furthermore, this principle is based on the intimate relationship between the grapheme and the locution as ‘iterable marks’ (Derrida, Sec.,1979:187), and on the Derridean concept of différence.

To sidetrack briefly, I made the connection between différence and Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle in chapter two by stating that in language, this principle of Uncertainty, or différence, is noticeable in the macroscopic scale, or the larger structure. In the application of the Uncertainty Principle in quantum physics, Paul Davies argues that ‘at the subatomic level, where quantum physics is important, a collection of particles must be treated holistically. The behavior of one particle is inextricably entangled with those of the others, however great the interparticle separations may be’ (1992:158). This is indeed a proposition which Derrida, in ‘Signature, event, context’, would advocate as a necessity prior to any establishment of locutionary closure, and which we have, to the best of our ability, adhered to in chapters one and two. One must holistically examine the contexts, or the possibility of contexts, available to the appropriateness condition, especially when it is instituted as a subgeneric indicator with illocutionary force in a larger structure.

In this sense, I would like to extend the holistic proposition further because it is crucial to the notion of closure we are about to discuss. Barthes’ famous conclusion, ‘the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author’ (1977:148), has particular
importance here. In the same essay, Barthes also stated that 'a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination' (1977:148). Neither of these two quotations allows readers to participate in the holistic exercise which I deem essential to closure and meaning. For Barthes, the text means something at its destination when it is in the hands of the reader, not in a process of semantic regression back to the origin of its production, the author. The problem with such a proposition is one that will constantly resurface in this chapter simply because it is intimately tied up with the enigma that is the larger structure known as the subgenre. But one major flaw which Barthes does not account for is one that is hidden within the proposition of his speech act. That is to say, if the text's unity lies in its destination and not its origin, can we not say that the author, as a function of literary production, is aware of this factor and thereby consolidates his Authority with the understanding that his text will produce a mixed bag of meaning at its point of destination? From a Foucauldian perspective, Lamb points out, '[a]s our readings -of Carey's fiction, newspaper and magazine interviews with him, reviews of his work, and profiles of his life - intersect, we are caught up in a different kind of fabrication, or production, in which Carey is forced to play a part, though it is often difficult to gauge how active, or willing, a part' (1992:2).

Nevertheless, is it not true enough to say that this mixed bag of meaning, or interpretations, will have some common elements which account for a unity within that text at its point of destination, the social context, or the reader as a literary function in the production of meaning? Voloshinov states that the 'word is oriented towards an addressee' (1973:85), and that 'the printed verbal performance engages ...in ideological colloquy on a large scale: it responds to something, objects to something, affirms something, anticipates possible responses and objections, seeks support, and so on' (1973:95). If this is so, and to my mind it is, then the so-called death of the author surrenders all that which had been associated with the author to the reader, a surrender which ruthlessly destroys any conscious attempt to enter into the dynamics of the dialogue between author and reader as literary functions in the production and transference of meaning. Indeed, a Barthean approach is based on a closed and artificial dialogue between the Reader Function and the langue, projecting consciousness on to a non-conscious system.

Carey states that 'I know that I had all the different ideas and
arguments and threads of things and kept it all in my head, everything, as I was writing... but when the writing is over, very soon afterwards, or as soon as I begin to think about another book, all that goes away' (Willbanks, 1991:50). The point we can make here is that Carey writes with a destination, or semantic direction in mind. He writes with an intentionality suited to his holding both a position of Author Function and Reader Function. However, I do not want to advocate a type of analysis, for the Reader Function, that attempts to get at the total intentionality, the arguments, different ideas, and threads of things, which occupy the mind of the Author Function. Such an undertaking will undoubtedly take the Reader Function to the land of intentional fallacies. When it comes to the production of meaning, its transference, and the corresponding notion of an intentionality that directs textual semantics in the larger structure, we need to examine all that which is produced by the Author Function, and about the Author Function, as we search for the common denominators of a strong closure. Indeed, this is not so much an argument based on the existence of meaning as it is an examination of the existence of Authority, and the problem of who has Authority in their possession.

As Petrey states, '[t]o see the text as act, which an Austenian approach requires, does not at all force us to construe it as an act with one and only one sense. Like the illocutionary force of a given locution, the meaning of a given text derives from the protocols applied to it' (1990:82. My italics). Fish argues, '[t]he structure of meaning... is obvious and inescapable from the perspective of whatever interpretative assumptions [that] happen to be in force' (1980:viii). Earlier in his argument, Petrey contended that 'forces [make] literary words do things for readers [and] must be part of the reading, not the writing, experience' (1990:81). Like most theorists in the latter part of the twentieth century, Petrey's and Fish's positions are clearly marked by the poststructural preoccupation with open meaning up to the widest possible social context in order not to exclude the margins of meaning in the closure of a reading. Indeed, this is not so different an approach, as Petrey has indicated, taken up by Austin (1962) when he made the illocution in a social context the focal point of understanding meaning. This is, in our case, equivalent to the position occupied by the Reader Function. In the process of an analysis, this poststructural position can reap rich rewards from the
text by its inclusion of the reader as a Function in the production of meaning, but since it is not a process that occurs in isolation from a social context, it cannot be a process that excludes the Author Function from that social context as a producer of a text in the public sphere.

On the other hand, Searle argues that '[i]n speaking I attempt to communicate certain things to my hearer by getting him to recognize my intention to communicate just those things.... He understands what I am saying as soon as he recognizes my intention in uttering what I utter as an intention to say that thing' (1970:43, my italics). For Searle (1970:25; 1983:9), meaning is the strict performance of an illocutionary act with propositional content, whereby the corresponding intentional state is expressed with the uttering of the propositional content so that the intentional state, itself, is a sincerity condition of the speech act. This set of conditions cannot be separated from '[the] knowledge of how to speak the language [that] involves mastery of a system of rules which renders my use of the elements of that language regular and systematic' (1970:13). And this, therefore, cannot be separated from a clear transference of the addressee's meaning to the addressee because they both understand and share the regular and systematic mastery of language as a system of rules.

The problem with Searle is that he participates in that well-known fallacy of intentionality as it is understood in the sphere of literature. As I have stated earlier, this is not the type of intentionality I wish to advocate as the necessary byproduct of incorporating the Author Function into an analysis. When we speak of intentionality, Authority, and Author Function later in this chapter, we are speaking of the intentions that are equally applicable to the Reader Function but do not, in either case, speak of pure intentional states of mind of the human beings who fill those Functions in the dynamics of the dialogue. McDonough (1993) states that the production and transference of meaning should not be reduced either to a causal or mechanistic account of behaviouralism because what the speaker may say, what the speaker may mean, cannot be traced to the speaker's internal thought processes, but must be determined by what the utterance means in relation to its delivery in an environment.

In both Austin and Searle, the problem of Authority and the
production and transference of meaning is clearly outlined by the well-known literary positions of Author Function and Reader Function. Without going into too much detail, we can safely say that many theorists and critics identify strongly with either one of the two basic positions. Indeed, Fish, taking a poststructural stance, sums the problem up quite well when he asks, 'Is the reader or the text the source of meaning?' (1980:1). However, the problem with Fish, and others like him, is that the Author Function, as a possible intentional force behind a percentage of the production of meaning and its transference, is safely eradicated for the notion of the text as the source of Authority. This, in turn, makes it easier to deny the text the status of Authority because it is a signifying chain in the poststructural sense rather than a product of the user of a chain in the Searlean scheme of things, and also because its appropriateness conditions ultimately deny the text a singular context where its privilege of Authority over meaning can occur. The production of meaning is thereby relegated to the status of the reader, who is said to write the text at the moment of reading.

Fish's notion is not entirely successful to my mind, simply because one can, as I have suggested in this chapter, debunk the reader with what one initially debunked the author, especially when the reader equally occupies the status of author. Furthermore, this scenario does not explain the possibility of both the reader's ability to read something and the reader's desire to want to read something in order to understand the signifying direction and message of the narrative. If no 'social' dialogue is entered into between an addresser and an addressee, regardless of the timespace gap between message sent and message received, then the only meaning produced is that which needed no indicators, or textual direction, in order for the transference to occur in the first place. As Bakhtin states, 'one may speak of another's discourse only with the help of that alien discourse itself, although in the process. It is true, the speaker introduces into the other's words his own intentions and highlights the context of those words in his own way' (1981:355).

If the addresser and addressee were one and the same person, then the message is derived wholly from a subjectivity that hears not the voice of the other in the social context of the word, even if the word were written, but hears the word as he or she wishes the word to be heard, producing the word as he or she wants it to be produced.
This may seem extreme, but why should a reader read an alien narrative when that reader has the Authority to the total proceedings within the context of its functioning as a larger structure? Petrey states that 'Searle makes authorial purpose the sole determining factor in identifying fiction; only pretending counts, and the author alone can make himself or herself pretend' (1990:67). Indeed, at its best, and borrowing Petrey's summation, Fish's argument seems to indicate a total reversal of the Searlean type of intentionality, giving exclusive space, time, and rights to the Reader Function rather than an Author Function.

The problem of Authority is, to my mind, a problem that cannot be resolved, or even considered, as either Austin, Barthes, or Fish do, by the exclusion of the Author Function when examining the nature of any subgeneric speech act. Neither can we exclude, as Searle does, the Reader Function from Authority without placing dialogism in severe jeopardy. Both Austin and Searle equally entertain valid points within the context of their arguments, but each philosopher excludes the position that their counterpart deems central to the notion of illocution and intention. As Petrey states, '[w]hen Searle allows a single person's will to invalidate a community's speech-act rules, he makes illocution radically different from what it is in Austin' (1990:68). This problem of Authority, of deciding whether Author Function or Reader Function can be the determining source of the production of meaning, is one that is mirrored in Carey's finest short story, 'American Dreams':

But one of us did something. We slighted him terribly in some way, this small meek man with the rimless glasses and neat suit who used to smile so nicely at us all. We thought, I suppose, he was a bit of a fool and sometimes he was so quiet and grey that we ignored him, forgetting he was there at all (1974:101).

What has happened is that we all, all eight hundred of us, have come to remember small transgressions against Mr. Gleason who once lived amongst us (1974:101).

We can begin by asking ourselves the following question: within the nature of either Author Function or Reader Function, where does the intention, or Authority, in the production of meaning lie, and if
we can find it, does it amount to closure and transference? We would have to state, as self-evidence, that any ability to pinpoint intentionality and Authority docs, in the sense of illocutionary forces, amount to an act of closure occurring within the larger structure. However, in all analysis. I do not give preference to an 'either/ or' distinction, preferring instead to remain as much as possible within the multiple forces of an aporia. The proposition of either an Author Function or a Reader Function, acting as exclusive agents of Authority is, to my mind, a fallacy simply because closure is an act that requires participation in the dynamics of the dialogue between the two positions. The subgenre of magic realism typifies this dialogism by its harnessing of appropriateness conditions from other contexts, and thereby demonstrates that the voice of another, which an appropriateness condition can carry within its graphematic performance, is a logical necessity to the direction of illocutionary forces, intentionalities, and Authority in the narrative.

In the extracts from 'American Dreams', the voice that is carried through the appropriateness conditions of the microtown is Gleason's. And we assume, through the narrator's belief in a Searlean scheme, that the voice, as the ghost of intention, comes from the site of origin and the will of the producer through an intentional act of revenge for having been slighted over the years by the American dreaming townsfolk. But the narrator equally states, 'My father, who has never borne malice against a single living creature, still believes that Gleason meant to do us well, that he loved the town more than any of us. My father says we have treated the town badly in our minds' (1974:101. My italics). By treating the town badly in their minds, an opposite reading to the narrator's Searlean scheme demonstrates that the site of origin may not be just Gleason, indicating instead that the intentionality of microtown's Authority in meaning, its production and transference, lies equally with the narrator and the townsfolk themselves.

In either case, there appears to be a dialogue emerging between the recipient of a coded message, or Reader Function, and its assumed producer, or Author Function. A message that further benefits from the subgeneric illocutionary force of the fabulist technique in the sense that the problem of Authority is a question that cannot simply be reduced to an 'either/ or' legislation, but needs to benefit from an approach that parallels the kind of investigation undertaken in
skeptics in ethics. As the narrator's father states, 'Gleason had built the model of our town just for this moment, to let us see the beauty of our own town, to make us proud of ourselves and to stop the American Dreams we were prone to. For the rest...was not Gleason's plan and he could not have foreseen the things that happened afterwards' (1974:108). This view, according to the narrator, is both 'sentimental' and 'insulting to Gleason' (1974:108). The narrator states that 'I personally believe that he [Gleason] knew everything that would happen' (1974:108), and on the subject of future proof to affirm the narrator's belief, he states that 'Certainly there are in existence some personal papers, and I firmly believe that these papers will show that Gleason knew exactly what would happen' (1974:108).

In the argument of the narrator, the notion of intentionality is, as I have said earlier, typically Searlean and deeply connected with the will to knowing, at all times, one's act and its closure in future contexts. What the narrator proclaims to know about the reason for the microtown's existence is only one half of the Authority in which he is an equal partner, and by excluding his own contribution, as literary Function, to the production and transference of meaning, he excludes one half of the performance. The problem with the narrator's view is that to know the act and its closure at all times, the intentionality and Authority one claims is simply one's own, and the repercussions associated with claiming such forthright knowledge is its exclusion of the social context, its exclusion of one's fellow speakers, and its exclusion of the conversation that brings life to the nature of the subject, the microtown, in relation to the macrotown.

It is an exclusion which Searle (1992) would later acknowledge as the factor which brings his theory of speech-acts to a deadening halt because the singularity of speech-acts and their constitutive rules do not conform to the sequence of speech-acts in a social context that we call conversation. This does not entirely exclude, as we have seen, Searle's initial intentions from the speech act scene, but it does amend that rather exclusive notion of an 'either/or' site of originality in Intentionality and Authority. As Austin had stated within the context of his written word, the uttered act is not 'the outward and visible sign... of an inward and spiritual act: from which it is but a short step to go on to believe or to assume without realizing that for many purposes the outward utterance is a description, true or false, of the occurrence of the inward performance' (1962:9).
Since the narrator does not see microtown as a speech-act performance but as a constative example of the inner will of an individual, namely Gleason, the nature of his predicament is characterized by an 'either/or' fallacy. It is either true or false that Gleason could not have foreseen the future events of his act. Since the narrator does not see that his entrapment within the cycle of tourism is grounded not in the will of Gleason but in his own, his conclusion is based on the exclusion of the social performative, of the diversity that marks his participation in the dynamics of the dialogue and an Authority that is both singular and his own. In this Searlean context, the narrator himself remains an act of singularity, a performance dictated by the constitutive rules of microtown where 'They [the Americans] come in search of me and my petrol pump as they have done for four years now. I do not await them eagerly because I know, before they reach me, that they will be disappointed' (1974:112-3). For the narrator, the performance that occurs daily in macrotown is marked by the constitutive rules of microtown, and not by the conventions of the social performance that make up the equal partnership of Authority between Author Function and Reader Function, between Gleason and the townsfolk.

Austin, however, argued that 'the act is constituted not by intention or by fact, essentially, but by convention (which is, of course, a fact)' (1962:128. My Italics). Thus where Authority in meaning is considered to lie exclusively with the townsfolk themselves, with conventions, the dialogue is one that is generated in the social context of a multiplicity of speakers, each tied in some way to the other by the commonality of having offended Gleason and bearing guilt for the offence. The problem with such a reading of the situation is that 'fact' is considered to be wholly determinable by a democratic agreement, and that the conventions which followed are based on the exclusion of the intentions of the Author Function, however small they might be. Gleason may never have been offended personally, but he may have been saddened by the public trials and tribulations that the town suffered in the minds and words of the townsfolk, thus manufacturing a model to illuminate the plurality of small scale beauty in the town by creating a dialogue between the two.

We must disagree with Austin that the act is not constituted by intention because to do so would be to exclude a percentage of the illocutionary force that drives the act in a direction towards closure.
Within the context of the townsfolk and the social conventions of what they consider to be fact, the tourism that imprisons their lives may very well be the product of their intentions and their Authority in transferring meaning from the closure of microtown to the social context of macrotown. To reiterate the statement made by the narrator’s father, Gleason’s Intentionality and Authority may just have been ‘to let us see the beauty of our own town, to make us proud of ourselves....(and that Gleason) could not have foreseen the things that happened afterwards’ (1974:108).

So, like the Austinian and Searlean opposition between society and individuality, both the positions of Author Function and Reader Function, within the context of the illocutionary force and the closure of the subgeneric speech act, determines the production and transference of a meaning. And because they are both equally valid, and because they are both more complimentary in the dynamics of a dialogue, it is much more appropriate to look for the common denominators, or closure denominators, such as the fabulist technique indicating a need for situation ethics in the above, that creep into the discourses of both Author Function and Reader Function as discursive positions. Just as appropriateness conditions can incorporate more than one context in the illocution of a subgeneric indicator, so too can appropriateness conditions incorporate both the Author Function and the Reader Function in the contextual closure of an illocution. In an interesting narrative strategy undertaken by Ryan-Fazilleau (1991), Carey, although divorced from the interpretative possibilities of his work in the public domain, is said to prolong his Authority of his short stories by his participation in conflicting symbols, or leads, and, being elusive to pin down critically, is thereby constantly overturning the Authority of the Reader Function over his texts.

What I find interesting about this reading is the notion that closure denominators are part of the tripartite structure in which both the appropriateness condition and the subgeneric indicator are its composites, that the leads, or subgeneric indicator, as a closure denominator by illocutionary force, can lead equally into the multiplicity that is foregrounded by the magic realist subgenre. But even so, the ability to shift contexts, if and when it does occur in a polemic exercise such as deconstruction, ultimately results in the play of an Authority that exists in another, affiliated, larger structure,
especially when closure is the deciding factor of the narrative. Ryan-Fazilleau's reading, therefore, best demonstrates the nature of the appropriateness condition to the illocution in the larger structure of the subgenre and in the dynamics of the dialogue between Author Function and Reader Function.

In that sense, the exclusive origin of intentionality that produces meaning within the illocutionary forces of 'American Dreams' is never resolved. Nor does it need to be. Leaving aside, for the moment, the narrative origin of Carey as Author Function and our receptive role as Reader Function, the question of intentionality and its origin is left clearly in dualistic play. Is it Gleason, in some act of revenge because 'we have treated the town badly in our minds' (1974:101), or is it the narrator and the citizens of the town who themselves have created the predicament of their dreams? Perhaps it is both.

In any case, the analysis can bear much fruit to the extensive play of meaning between the literary and extra-literary environments. The appropriateness conditions allow for a rich multiplicity of contexts to occur in a dynamic dialogue between Author Function and Reader Function, some of which will be closed, even if tentatively, by common denominators, and others which will remain speculative, but equally useful, by their ability to reiterate a further multiplicity of contexts. Nevertheless, what is clear is the simultaneous demand on both Author Function and Reader Function in a dialogue that shapes the dynamics of the production and transference of meaning. Intentionality and illocution are subject to the common denominators communicated by the narrative, irrespective of theoretical discipline. Variance from a common theme, or an inferenttheme, is the stuff of which disciplines are made, and for which narratives cater.

This example of microtown and macrotown leaves us with a paradox that needs to be addressed. Indeed, the base principle of the magic realist subgenre, synecdochic enchantment, within the context of 'American Dreams', allows us, in conjunction with the inferenttheme and the fantastic indicator, to discuss the microtown/macrotown construct as an analogy for the aporia between a system that keeps on playing and the acts of closure that occur as a result of that play. Like Petrey's protocols and Fish's interpretative assumptions discussed earlier in this chapter, Derrida argues, '[t]here is a labor -metaphysical or not- performed on conceptual systems'
It is in this labor towards closure that we must consider both the felicities and the infelicities of the larger structure because we need to be aware of the fact that subgeneric indicators, or words, can do more than one thing in one context at any given time. Thus we are well aware of the fact that the Reader Function can derive a multiplicity of interpretations from a magic realist narrative because the appropriateness conditions that make up the subgenre continuously play within a multiplicity of contexts, each, in turn, performing to the base principle of another larger structure.

Closure, therefore, is an act of labor that is momentary and contextual to the Reader Function's beliefs or reasons as to why a particular explanation of a subgeneric act is the way it is, or why a particular Author Function has written the way he or she has chosen to write. Once again, the narrative strategy of Ryan-Fazilleau, outlined in this chapter, is a particularly fruitful example of this set of circumstances. We can never close the system, we can only close our acts. Thus while a Reader Function may produce an act of closure on the work of a particular Author Function, such an act of closure, especially when it is a written verbal performance, institutes that Reader Function as an author in the position of Author Function. The dualism of such an institutional status is equally subject to the participatory action of the self-same Reader Function or another Reader Function ad infinitum. In Hegelian terms of the master and slave analogy, 'the master] has become aware of his dependence on his slave; that he himself is reduced to slave because he cannot be master without the second self-consciousness' (Rice, 1974:366). Such is the nature of Authority in the larger structure.

Let us examine this proposition further within the context of the microtown and macrotown analogy. Indeed, we can state that, while the two can be cited in a binary opposition, they do in fact exist in the forces that constitute the poststructural hierarchy. Such a master/slave interdependency is all pervasive when we consider that the townsfolk believe themselves to be imprisoned by the Authority of Gleason's model town. But we should also consider the fact that this interdependency is conditional. Gleason's position as the master is based on the dialogism that unites the macrotown with the microtown in the minds of the townsfolk. The unity is generated by the narrative that seems to explain the intentional origin of the current predicament. However, what the townsfolk fail to notice, and what the
Reader Function of 'American Dreams' can understand by the magic realist subgenre, is that the larger structure does not wholly determine the context from which the narrative is supposed to originate.

In the short story, the microtown is the narrative; it is the larger structure which can be read and analysed with closure of its meaning in mind. By the base principle of magic realism, the microtown is built on meticulous detail, and it harnesses the appropriateness conditions of the macrotown in its own terms in order to exert illocutionary forces onto the multiplicity of contexts that exist in the macrotown. But microtown does not wholly determine that which can possibly occur in macrotown because its narrative can only close specific contexts. If, and only if, microtown is conceived as the origin of Authority will it sustain a degree of specific closure in the Searlean scheme of things. Otherwise, it is subject to a deferral of closure in the differing contextual multiplicities until such time both Author Function and Reader Function implement a tentative closure on the basis of the dynamics of their dialogue.

For example, while the narrator's father is narrated in the microtown as having a fascination with bicycles and gears for time immemorial, the father in the macrotown not only runs 'a petrol station [but] he was also an inventor' (1974:102). In the macrotown, the multiplicity of contexts exists simply because of the self-performativity of the appropriateness conditions, namely its people and culture. We must remember that, unlike the narrator, his father is much more sympathetic to what he thinks Gleason's reasons might have been. Perhaps it was, after all, to let the townsfolk see the beauty of their own town rather than escaping into the towns, or cities, of American dreams. But because we are caught up in the word of the narrator, this small point made by the father, and perhaps a refracted word of Carey as Author Function, is relegated to the margins by the Authority and intentionality that is constructed through the narrator in his performing the cyclic and singular predicament of the larger structure in which he denies his equal partnership of Authority.

This analogy of the microtown as the larger structure, the subgenre, and the macrotown as the quantum level of language, is equally applicable to the other short stories that we have discussed in the previous two chapters. Consider the dolls in 'Peeling' and how they conform to the combined force of synecdochic enchantment and the inferenthieme in attempting to produce, for the narrator, the larger
structure, or the narrative, on Nile. At all times, Nile remains at the quantum level of language, and is thereby able to be thrown into the multiplicity of contexts by an act of peeling that brings the larger structure back to its graphematic nature of appropriateness conditions. Even in ‘Report on the Shadow Industry’, the analogy finds a place. It is the production of shadows that indicate the presence of some larger structure, and their consumption that determines the extent to which the larger structure relies on its appropriateness conditions that shift in a multiplicity of contexts.

I mentioned earlier in the chapter that we need to undertake a search for the common denominators of a strong closure, and this would allow us to agree upon that which constitutes the closure denominators. Thomas, discussing the Principle of Charity, states that ‘when analyzing reasoning, always analyze it in the way that interprets it as the strongest possible reasoning compatible with the inference indicators in the discourse’ (1986:18). Although this Principle is derived from propositional logic, it does the Reader Function no harm to appropriate its directives to the analysis of subgeneric indicators in the larger structure of the narrative. Let us now consider, therefore, how closure denominators, as leads constructed by Carey, allow for two common readings of ‘American Dreams’. We are here, of course, returning to the extra-literary conditions of postmodernism and postcolonialism, outlined in chapter one, as a possibility for magic realism.

In an interview with Willbanks, Carey has stated that ‘we are a culture of fixing something up, making do with what’s available, rather than creating something new. Ours is a failure of confidence’ (1991:53). And in an earlier interview with Van Ikin, he stated that ‘most of my characters live in a spiritually impoverished world which they don’t feel part of’ (1977:33). In conjunction with the magic realist subgenre and its appropriateness conditions, both these statements allow for the Reader Function to perform an analysis that is strongly suggestive of the postmodern extra-literary condition. Lamb, therefore, is able to argue that “American Dreams” is a haunting parody of Australia’s eagerness to adopt the superficiality of American materialism as a banner of success’ (1992:18). This state of parody, or pastiche, so central to postmodernism is what allows the townsfolk of ‘American Dreams’ not only to adopt American materialism as the banner of success, but also to adopt the ‘romantic’ spiritualism that
accompanies such dreams of success in their spiritually impoverished world.

Selden argues that 'the postmodern experience is widely held to stem from a profound sense of ontological uncertainty' (1985:72). In 'American Dreams', the nature of being is constantly questioned by the intertextual uncertainty of the microtown's status of narrative and macrotown's multiplicity of contexts by its appropriateness conditions. In the concluding paragraphs of the story, the question of which town is real and which town is a 'clever forgery' (1974:113) is debated when the American tourists cannot see a similarity between the micro-narrator and the macro-narrator. Is microtown a parody of the dreams and people in macrotown, or is it the reverse? What had once been the dream that brought the community together in a transcendental state of perfection now divides that community by the fragmented playfulness of the dream's 'real' existence in both microtown and macrotown. That is to say, the dream of American materialism and spiritualism has become the recurring reality of what it means to exist for the extreme wants and needs of popular culturism, to exist as a product in both the physical and metaphysical worlds of commodity consumption. That is the logical extension of the inferent theme's illocutionary force and the ground rule reversal of the fantastic indicator in a postmodern context.

Indeed, the town exists as both closure denominator and commodity between Author Function and Reader Function, between Gleason and the narrator, and between Carey and ourselves. It is through the town's eventual classification as a tourist attraction that the postmodern condition exerts its strongest force in the text. In conjunction with the base principle, the town in all its meticulous detail, becomes the object of analysis, interpretation, and media classification to the extent that the larger structure is showing signs of being peeled away into its appropriateness conditions. As the narrator states, 'the next day we were all over the newspapers. The photographs of the model people side by side with the photographs of the real people. And our names and ages and what we did were all printed there in black and white' (1974:111).

Falgley argues that, in postmodern theory, 'the subject is an effect rather than a cause of discourse' (1992:9). This is, of course, most typified by the American dreaming that occurs in the short story. For the narrator and the townsfolk to dream of 'big smooth cars
cruising through cities with bright lights', 'expensive night clubs', making 'love to women like Kim Novak and men like Rock Hudson' is to dream the dream that is produced by Hollywood's motion picture packages. Subjectivity, in this postmodern sense, is the effect of a speech act that evolves with the increasing desire to produce new stimuli for gratification. However, the dream's potency at the level of tourist attraction is so predominant that at the level of the ground rule reversal, the inferent theme institutes the logic of another body of knowledge that causes dispute between the American tourists, who seek gratification, and the townsfolk, who are unable to gratify, as tourist attraction. As we have already discussed, what is analysed and interpreted in the macrotown is believed to be, as timespace is subject to change, an infelicity of the microtown.

Ross states that 'the wall that encloses Mr. Gleason's secret also has its parallels in the labyrinths that figure so often in Borges' fiction' (1990:53), and that 'for Carey, the metaphor of the labyrinth emerges not only as a metaphysical structure that turns inward and devours itself but also as a physical entity' (1990:54). Indeed, this notion of the labyrinth can be argued as the appropriate metaphor for the postmodern preoccupation with the parody or pastiche. Like the magic realist subgenre itself, the microtown acts as a metaphor for the increasing space that the larger structure occupies once the American tourist, as a Reader Function, enters its domain of appropriateness conditions. The townsfolk, however, cannot see this ever increasing space because they themselves are an effect of the timespace play of appropriateness conditions. When initially faced with their own labyrinth, all they can see is 'the big wall [surrounding the top of] Bald Hill' (1974:104) and the 'small blind wall that had been obviously constructed this special purpose' (1974:105). Once the walls come down, once the larger structure is peeled away, their ability to see past the blind wall into their own status as appropriateness conditions becomes so foregrounded that they collapse into the labyrinth of their own fragmented and displaced identities.

I have already mentioned in chapter one that postcolonialism, as extra-literary condition, reinvents that which is the focus of the narrative. Within the context of our argument, the opportunity is made available, through the appropriateness conditions, for the shift from one larger structure to another affiliated larger structure to occur. This is possible due to the multiplicity of contexts we have
already discussed, and because a single context must inadvertently have within itself the performativity of another, affiliated, context. Thus postmodernism, has at all times, the possibility of postcolonialism within the context of its extra-literary condition. What we might consider to be an infinite play of parody or pastiche can indeed form the basis of a cultural reinvention. Indeed, postcolonialism itself is marked by a contextual shift in the larger structure on the quantum level of language.

Fletcher (1991) argues that Carey uses his characters in a satiric manner as vehicles of exposure for the concepts of imprisonment and colonial hegemony which are prevalent in much Australian literature. Thus we could argue that an exposure in such a manner helps to give rise to an acceptance of historical multiplicities and may further help the move toward cultural reinvention in the face of the infelicities which continually play in our Anglo-Celtic national identity. In 'American Dreams', this type of reinvention by the incorporation of infelicities is avoided in order to keep the identity of the American dreamers, and the hegemony of the ministry of Tourism, intact in the face of the adulterous relationship discovered in microtown and macrotown. As the narrator states,

"We looked at the minister mistrustfully, wondering if he knew about Mrs. Cavanagh, and he must have seen the look because he said that certain controversial items would be removed, had already been removed. We shifted in our seats, like you do when a particularly tense part of a film has come to its climax, and then we relaxed and listened to what the minister had to say. And we all began, once more, to dream our American dreams (1974: 11). My italics.

The fact that Gleason knew of Mrs. Cavanagh and young Craigle Evans further triggers the possibility, in the minds of the townsfolk, that he knew of many more infelicities that played within the appropriateness conditions of macrotown. Indeed, the minister for Tourism's arrival in the town signals the relief townsfolk feel in the presence of an Authority, of an Author Function, that exceeds the intentional forces of Gleason through microtown. In the face of the idealistic prosperity that accompanies the word of the minister for Tourism, the narrator states, 'once more, we changed our opinion of Gleason' (1974: 11). What the townsfolk do not realise is that, in the
future, their fragmented and displaced identities are the logical progression of their own desire and gratification for a felicitous narrative that accommodates the wants and needs of a body of knowledge as well as the popular culturalism of their choice. At the level of the ground rule reversal, the inferentheme takes the townsfolk's choice readily to the level of a popular institution, tourism.

McSherry, commenting on the repercussions of this status quo in the extra-literary environment of the text, states that 'Australians have apathetically accepted the control by foreigners whether through industry or cultural ideals. Not only are the workers trapped in meaningless jobs but their labour is owned by foreigners and if they dream of escape they dream American not Australian dreams' (1983/84:86). While the implied conclusions in McSherry's argument come across as idealistic essentialism in the face of an everpresent dynamic of appropriateness conditions, or Australian multiculturalism, her allusion to cultural and industrial hegemony is an important precursor to the performances that make up a percentage of the illocutions in both 'American Dreams' and the extra-literary reality of the Reader Function. When Sage argues that 'Carey's people are ontologically dislocated' (1995:18), her proposition has equal force for the Reader Function within the context of 'American Dreams'.

That is to say, a challenge of origin, or beingness, is drawn between the Carey character in the literary reality, and the character of the Reader Function in the extra-literary reality. It is a metaphysical comparison designed to foreground the gaze of ontological uncertainty made by hegemonic tourists, demanding to be reassured by the townsfolk, as objects of the gaze, that no difference exists between their pseudo-Australian dreams of macrotown, generated by microtown as the origin, brochure, or guage, and the corresponding macrotown of the townsfolk's American dreams. 'On Bald Hill there are half a dozen telescopes through which the Americans can spy on the town and reassure themselves that it is the same down there as it is on Bald Hill' (1974:112). But the difference is, of course, that American tourists can step out of their Australian dreams while the Australian townsfolk are increasingly caught, as time progresses, in the lunacy of having to perform in the fixed ideals of an American dream that constructs them as products of the ontological gaze. As time progresses, it is the American tourist who controls the American dreams and ontology of the Australian townsfolk, and not the
Australians themselves.

In an interview with Wyndham, Carey states that ‘[m]ost of my work has been to do with what it means to be Australian, which is a bit 19th century but also, for me and for Australians, vitally important because [we are] still concerned about finding ourselves’ (1994:48). Once again, it is important that we understand that not all magic realist speech acts concern themselves with the postcolonial, but in the case of ‘American Dreams’, what we find is the forerunner to much of the postcolonial issues that thematically occupy the narratives of Carey’s later novels. Hassall states that ‘[I]n his two earlier volumes of short stories, Carey charts the lives of a collection of physical and/or psychological pygmies who seek to master “the system” but end up instead as its inmates and victims or on display as its clowns’ (1989:652).

Thus a combination of these two readings, of the postmodern and the postcolonial extra-literary conditions, forms the basis of an intentionality that belongs to Carey as Author Function, and to which we contribute as Reader Functions in the dynamics of the dialogue we have called Authority. Even the magic realist subgenre gives preference to this kind of dialogic interaction by the appropriateness condition’s abilities to produce infelicities in the larger structure. Closure in the narrative, therefore, is determined by both infelicities and felicities to the types of speech acts that theoretical disciplines illuminate in their methodological analysis. And, as we have stated earlier in this chapter, just as appropriateness conditions can incorporate more than one context in the illocution of a subgeneric indicator, so too can appropriateness conditions incorporate both the Author Function and the Reacher Function in the contextual closure of an illocution. Thus closure is not an impossibility within a system that continues to play as long as its explanatory scope is grounded in the Principle of Charity for both the felicity and the infelicity. In either case, one context leads to the multiplicity of contexts. If we recall the father’s statement mentioned earlier in this chapter, we can perhaps conclude that Gleason’s intentionality over macrotown through microtown is determined by the direction and message of microtown’s indicators pointing to the initial beauty of macrotown, rather than exerting a force of eventual imprisonment over the townsfolk in their American dreams.

Indeed, it could well be argued that Gleason’s microtown allowed for a postcolonial reinvention of macrotown, but the
townsfolk, treating the town badly in their minds, let their town and themselves slip into the logical status of microtown as a postmodern tourist attraction, or what Baudrillard (1983) would call the hyperreal. Thus 'American Dreams', as a narrative in the larger structure of magic realism, foregrounds the multiplicity and self-participation in the construction of an identity through appropriateness conditions in both the literary and extra-literary realities. Every appropriateness condition associated with a context has the ability to shift and be shifted, thereby altering the illocutionary force of the larger structure under examination. And, with such a shift, there will also be a reinvention of the infelicities, alongside the already known felicities, that institute the illocutionary acts and forces of the subgeneric speech act. Thus, by the larger structure of magic realism, the Reader Function, through an understanding of 'American Dreams', is left with an awareness of the multiplicity of appropriateness condition, of contexts and forces, that make up the Australian identity, the Australian speech acts, and ultimately, the Australian speech genres.
Conclusion.

While this thesis bears the title *Speaking Magic Realism*, it could equally be considered a pseudonym for the broader philosophical approach which we may categorize as a speech act theory of parasitic discourse. The point, which must always be considered, is that the analysis of illocutions does not need to be solely governed by either an Austinian or Searlean investigation, especially when it comes to the cross fertilization of illocutionary acts in both ordinary and parasitic circumstances. This is not to suggest that current and potential speech act theorists abandon Austinian or Searlean methodologies, but to remind them that the stance they take to parasitic discursivity reduces the analysis of, and conclusions on, the nature of ordinary discourse, or language as a philosophical field.

When Austin gives an example of a performative misfire in *Don Quixote*, he is not only contradicting his own conclusions on the distinctions between ordinary and parasitic, but he also demonstrates that his contradiction holds a viable truth for the inclusion of the parasite into the Austinian scheme of things. For us, this translates into the equal consideration of both ordinary and parasitic whenever we discuss the speech act. Although we have mainly concentrated on parasitic discourse in this thesis, further research could look at how the illocutions of speech acts are both the product of ordinary and parasitic circumstances, and how a combination of the two help to illuminate the act in question as well as the forces it releases during the course of a performance.

In this sense, then, the thesis has given, as already stated, a single, subgeneric example of a type of speech act in a myriad of acts. The choice to analyse magic realism was primarily based on its overt foregrounding of the multiplicity of appropriateness conditions, and thus helped to establish a methodology which is possibly much easier than existing ones. However, it is my contention that the methodology in this thesis is applicable to all subgeneric acts, although I do entertain the possibility that within each and every subgeneric act, the larger structure will change the methodology in a manner that is relevant to its conditions under examination. One must remember that this thesis is about the nature of the conditions in a subgeneric performance, and how those conditions translate into indicators with illocutionary forces. Each and every narrative participates in a
performance of some type or another. Thus all narratives are positioned in the propositional content of a subgenre where the base principle organizes the multiplicity of appropriateness conditions into a larger structure recognizable to the Reader Function. Further research is needed to take this methodology and seek to apply it elsewhere, illuminating the performances, or propositional contents of subgenres other than magic realism.

In the case of genre theory, the propositional content of the subgenre complements one half of the contact function in our model of the Functions of Language. Indeed, this thesis has mainly concerned itself with the types of illocutionary influences that the propositional content of a subgenre, namely magic realism, exerts during the course of a narrative performance. Further research needs to examine the influences of the other half of the contact function, namely the medium that enfames a particular narrative performance. That is to say, what type of illocutionary forces, if any, do the media exert on the types of performances under investigation? With respect to magic realism, we have made minor mention of one media influence, and that is the predominance of the short story's sjuzhet in the subgeneric magic realism of Carey's narratives.

We have not, however, had the opportunity to examine in full the effects and influences of the types of illocutions that such a component of the medium in the contact function exerts during the course of a narrative performance. Thus, an area of research that needs to be undertaken is that which pertains directly to the media employed during narrative performances in the contact function. One only needs to consider what types of influences make the short story different from other larger structures, such as the novel, poetry, or drama, in order to begin postulating differences between poetic illocutions, dramatic illocutions, and novelistic illocutions.

Furthermore, this notion of examining the media in the contact function simultaneously with the propositional content does not stop short of parasitic discourse. Indeed, ordinary language could benefit from such an analysis in order to establish the influences of speech genres in daily speech. Two parasitic examples of the influence of speech genres can be found in the classic characterizations of Emma Bovary and Don Quixote, where the performances of each character mirror the types of possibilities in the literary reality, during the cross-fertilization of ordinary and parasitic discursivities in the
performance of a single speaker. In the extra-literary reality, such a concurrence can occur between the socio-conventional understanding of illocutions and the particular illocutionary acts of a substratum of speakers. In layman's terms, the appropriation of a denotative word within the connotative circumstances and conditions of a vocational group could be traced back to the particular generic and subgeneric constructions of the *contact function*.

All in all, while one can always practise either an Austinian or Searlean method of speech act theory in ordinary circumstances, the pervasive nature of parasitic discourse, as evidence to the contrary, suggests that an Austinian or Searlean approach is not the apotheosis of the theory itself. Indeed, our model of the Functions of Language makes space for the Austinian and Searlean approaches in the function of the *code*, but, as the genre/subgenre alliance of the *contact function* implies, the illocutions of parasitic discourse are equally applicable to ordinary circumstances. If language is the organizing force of that entity we call consciousness, then it acts as a base principle for the architectonics between speakers and their stratified worlds. What characterizes language must characterize consciousness, and if language in ordinary circumstances creates and marks the conventions of our thought, then parasitic discourse cannot but do the same thing because of its colourful existence within and reliance upon the codes that mark 'ordinary' language. Without ordinary language, we cannot have the organized basics of linguistic thought, and without its parasitic equal, we cannot have the colourful multiplicity that marks variance in concepts, nor the stylistic variance of stratified speakers as living Author and Reader Functions.

The stratified speaker, whether literary or not, occupies a unique space and time within the word by the subgenre in which that speaker forges his or her name and signature. Who, then, is the narrator of 'American Dreams'? He is the ideologue of a bourgeoisie and a secular hedonism that has stylized the Australian social strata since Federation. He prefers the narrative of global culture, rather than the cringe of parochialism, under the hegemony of fashionable Americanism. He is the product of both parasitical and ordinary discursive circumstances. He is, like any other speaker, whether literary or not, a product of the *speech genres* that interest him and mark him. He is, in terms of consciousness, an illocution.
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