Representation and symbolic politics in Indonesia: an analysis of billboard advertising in the legislative assembly elections of 2009

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Representation and Symbolic Politics in Indonesia: An Analysis of Billboard Advertising in the Legislative Assembly Election of 2009

By Eva Leiliyanti

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO EDITH COWAN UNIVERSITY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN COMMUNICATIONS AND ARTS

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USE OF THESIS

The Use of Thesis statement is not included in this version of the thesis.
Abstract

The overarching characteristic of the 2009 legislative elections lay in the legislative candidates’ politics of image. It stemmed from the amendment to the election Law no. 10/2008 article 214 that ostensibly cut off the parties’ power in determining their candidates without the public’s “direct” consent. The public was then given a direct opportunity to choose and vote for their preferred candidates in the 2009 elections. This marked the emergence and proliferation of the candidates’ image construction, especially in the “outdoor” political arena. Billboards were chosen as the most effective outdoor advertising medium to introduce the candidates and propagate their slogans and platforms. However, at the same time, this mode of introducing and propagating reveals itself as an ideological map that demonstrates the contestation and synthesis of the two major ideological camps in the Indonesian political arena, i.e. the nationalist and Islamic. The candidates were co-opted into and by this framework. They themselves could not escape as their political dispositions were unconsciously defined by this framework. Their billboards speak loudly the ideological contestation and synthesis.

The investigation of the contestation and synthesis needs Bourdieuan analytical tools, such as capital, dispositions (habitus) and field. These are used not merely to show how the mechanism of the contestation and synthesis operated and was defined by the rules of political “game”, but also to show how this mechanism involves the intricate inter-relationships of various capitals, such as the political, social, economic, cultural and symbolic, that reflect the candidates’ (read also: the parties’) dispositions within the field of Pancasila discourse. Pancasila becomes not only an ideological basis for the state but also the bastion of the contestation and synthesis. The twin roles arguably derive from the dominant cultural root (Javanese) that highly values the concepts of harmony, tolerance and appropriateness as the essences that allow the ideological contestation and synthesis of the nationalist and Islamic strands as the dominant ideological markers in the Indonesian political arena.

This thesis aims to demonstrate how the candidates’ billboards represent ideological contestation and synthesis as the billboards can also be perceived as the candidates’ visual “responses” which reflect their political dispositions and the process of taking stances amidst the contestation and synthesis. Therefore, this study was conducted in the form of a layered case study. Using a Bourdieuan lens, the first layer explores the historical background of the contestation and synthesis, their proliferation in the political arena and the mechanism of deploying these strands in the political parties’ branding. Using a social semiotic lens, the second layer investigates how the billboards as the products of the candidates’ political articulation represent not only these contestations and syntheses but also their dispositions. I found that the system of representation (on the candidates’
billboards) operates within the Javanese ideals of “equilibrium” in *Pancasila* discourse. These ideals frame the power relations between the nationalist and Islamic factions in an ostensible “consensus” in order to maintain the harmony and dilute ideological friction.
DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis does not, to my best of my knowledge and belief:

(i) in corporate without acknowledgement material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher educations;
(ii) contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text; or
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I also grant permission for the library of Edith Cowan University to make duplicate copies of my thesis as required.

Eva Leiliyanti

Submitted on 20 March 2013
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DEDICATION

To my parents, husband and daughters, with all my love and thanks
Contents

Use of Thesis i
Abstract ii
Declaration iii
Acknowledgements v
Dedication vii
Contents viii

Part I Introduction and Methodology 1
1 Indonesia’s Political Framework 5
2 The Significance of the Candidates’ Billboards in the 2009 Legislative Election 15
3 Methodology 25

Part II Indonesian Political Arena: Contesting and/or Synthesising Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese Strands 34
4 Indonesia’s Political Background: the Upheaval in the Islamic/Nationalist Parties 36
5 The Synthesis and Contestation of Islamic/Nationalist Strands in the 1955-2009 General Elections 43

Part III The Political Branding of the Nine Winning Parties 76
6 Pancasila 80
7 The Political Branding of the Nationalist Parties 86
8 The Political Branding of the Islamic Parties 141

Part IV Reading the Narratives of the Candidates’ Billboards 169
9 Reading the Candidates’ Billboards of the Nationalist Parties 172
10 Reading the Candidates’ Billboards of the Islamic Parties 208

Conclusion 238
References 244
PART I

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Following the downfall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, the Indonesian political arena has experienced marked political resilience. Mietzner and Aspinall (2010, pp. 1-5) argue that Indonesia’s success in transforming its democratic system from guided democracy (Soekarno’s era), through authoritarian rule (Soeharto’s era or New Order regime) to electoral democracy (the Reform era) marks the rise of democratic politics in the post-New Order period. Diamond (2010, pp. 30-32) notes that when the 1997 Asian financial crisis hit, Indonesia successfully improved its democratic performance. This can be seen from the trend in Indonesia’s score on political rights and civil liberties based on the U.S-based leading think tank of Freedom House’s measurement that shows Indonesia’s score gradually escalated reaching 2.3 in 2006-2009 from 6.4 in 1998. This is against the numerical rating of 1 for highest degree of freedom and 7 for lowest degree of freedom. In Diamond’s view, this achievement is far better than the achievements of Indonesia’s neighbouring countries, such as Philippines (4.3) and Thailand (6.4) in 2008.

This outstanding result stems from Indonesia’s success in rectifying its democratic system, especially in the Reform era (1998-present). Habibie’s government (1998-1999) was noted for “peacefully” turning this transition era away from the authoritarian rule to the democratic system that paved the way for freer democratic elections by employing the combination of district and proportional systems. The baton was then given to Megawati after the elected President, Abdurrahman Wahid, was impeached due to allegations regarding a financial scandal. Megawati’s administration (2001-2004) successfully initiated the first direct Presidential election in Indonesia’s history. However, prior to the Presidential election, the parliamentary election conducted by her government employed a new election system called an open-list system (a system that allowed the voters to directly read the names of the legislative candidates on the ballot paper prior to their casting a vote) that reinforced the party’s oligarchy. Haris (2005) argues that this system positions the parties as the determiners that organise the positions of their cadres into the list of a ranking number on the ballot papers. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) government annulled this system. On 23 December 2008 the Constitutional Court acceded to a judicial review of Law no. 10/2008 article 214 which stipulated that the decision to determine the elected legislative candidates based on the ranking number on the ballot paper (as in the 2004 legislative election) was against the 1945 Constitution. This imposed
a necessity for the legislative candidates to present themselves directly to the public for the first time. It also led to the construction of a new political culture which relies heavily on the politics of image in Indonesia, in this case the billboard.

The billboard held a significant position in the 2009 Indonesia’s legislative election due to the fact that during the campaign, streets all over Indonesia were dotted for the first time with the candidates’ billboards. The billboard itself represents a convoluted web of representation which involves the complexity of historical polarisations of Nationalist/Islamic and Javanese/non Javanese strands\(^1\) in the political discursive practices. The research aims at addressing the following questions:

1. What does the billboard culture represent?
2. How is the complexity of the polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese strands expressed on the billboard?
3. How much scope does the billboard’s genre give the candidates to express their political dispositions?

As the historical polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese strands play a dominant role in mapping the Indonesian political framework, these polarisations also significantly influence the candidates’ dispositions. These dispositions can be seen from the candidates’ billboards on which these strands contest and synthesise. Thus, this thesis explores the mechanism of how the candidates’ billboards represent the meanings’ contestation, as well as the synthesis of these strands. This is conducted by examining the scope the billboard’s genre gives the candidates to express their political dispositions. In other words, deciphering the representation of the candidate’s billboard culture means tracing the signifying practices of these strands.

This thesis is organised into four parts and one concluding chapter. Part I addresses the historical background underlying the operation of the Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands and discusses the methodology in order to unravel the candidates’ dispositions as represented on their billboards. This part is organised into several chapters. Chapter one examines the Indonesia’s political framework in which the aforementioned ideological dichotomies (Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands) are polarised and overlapped. This entails an elucidation of the positioning of the Islamic and Nationalist strands\(^2\) in the Indonesian political realm that illuminates

\(^1\) The next chapters will elaborate the historical background of the polarisations that not only map Indonesian politics but also influence the candidates’ political disposition.

\(^2\) An explanation about Javanese/non-Javanese strands positioning in the political realm in a specific section is seen to be unnecessary as their presence is arguably not as obtrusive as the Islamic and Nationalist strands in the candidates’ image construction as represented on the billboards. However, their presence in the ethnic/regional (political) domain not only colours Indonesian political realm, but also influences Indonesian political disposition (habitus) in the political arena, especially as Javanese culture becomes one of the
the convoluted web of these polarisations. Chapter two outlines the 2009 elections and the significance of the candidates’ billboards in the legislative election not merely as the outdoor advertising medium and cultural/visual artefacts, but also as the representation of the (candidates’) branding. Previous related research will be discussed after the section that explores how semiotic reading practices help to decipher the candidates’ image construction on the billboards’ narratives. This is followed by the third chapter that discusses the methodology.

Part II illuminates the synthesis and contestation of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands in Indonesian political arena. This is organised into two chapters, examining Indonesian political history, the ideological debates surrounding the polarisations of these strands and the visual representation of the parties’ logos based on their historical context. Chapter four delineates the birth of Islamic and nationalist parties and the friction between them in the context of Indonesian Islam. Chapter five elaborates how this friction (the ideological debate) is perpetuated and proliferated based on the periodical division of the general elections in Indonesia (1955-2009). The visual transformation of the parties’ logos exemplifies the ideological synthesis and contestation.

Part III discusses the political branding of the nine winning parties in the 2009 legislative election. This is organised into three chapters. Chapter six elucidates the state ideology, Pancasila, as the ideological basis that not only influences the candidates’ dispositions but also frames the ideological framework of both the Islamic and nationalist parties (also read: factions). As Pancasila is highly influenced by (Javanese) paternalistic culture, the branding of these parties (especially the nationalist ones) cannot be dissociated from the political branding of their key figures. Within this framework, how the parties’ branding is constructed is based on their vision and mission (as written on their statutes) and framed by the image construction of their paternalistic figures. Chapters seven and eight address the branding of these parties based on the factions they are affiliated with.

Part IV discusses the reading of the candidates’ billboards’ narratives and is organised into two chapters. Chapter nine deals with the candidates’ billboards from the nationalist faction whilst the chapter ten deals with the Islamic faction. This is followed by a section that compares the reading of the nationalist and Islamic factions’ billboards and that examines the differences and similarities between how the candidates in these factions express their dispositions in the Pancasila-based political framework.

significant cultural elements that influence the formulation of the state ideology, Pancasila, which is seen as the central ideological entity that unites Indonesian pluralism and multiculturalism (see chapter III). In this sense, these ethnocentric strands implicitly pervade the political as well as socio-cultural arenas.
The concluding chapter sums up that the “neither-nor” philosophical basis of *Pancasila* opens itself to inclusivity and ambiguity. This means the system of representation on the candidates’ billboards operates on an unstable ideological basis.
Chapter One

Indonesia’s Political Framework

Mapping politics in Indonesia is a challenging task. There have been numerous instances of research that endeavoured to map Indonesian political frameworks which have evolved prior to Indonesia gaining her independence. However, from all the research that has been conducted, the dominant political strands that emerge, circulate, and proliferate are around the historical polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist (Baswedan, 2004; Fealy, 2008, 2009; Shihab and Nugroho, 2008; Bubalo, Fealy and Mason, 2008; Platzdasch 2009a, 2009b; Mujani and Liddle, 2010; Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 2012) and Javanese/non Javanese strands (Suryadinata, 2002; King, 2003; Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata, 2004; Geertz, 2004; Kingsbury, 2005; Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 2012). This chapter aims to outline these ideological polarisations as the dominant markers that structure the Indonesia’s political framework. This is organised by examining the Islamic/Nationalist strands and their positioning in the Indonesian political realm. As in the Pancasila discourse, the operation of these strands is closely related with the imperceptible ethnic polarisation of Javanese/non-Javanese. The next section elucidates the historical background that illuminates the Javanese/non-Javanese strands which heavily influence the political dispositions in the Pancasila-based state.

Islamic/Nationalist Strands

Discussing the Islamic/Nationalist strands in Indonesia, we cannot detach this dichotomy from the classic categorisation of Javanese (Muslim) society Geetz (1960) posited. Geetz (1960) classified Javanese society into three religious groups: abangan, santri and priyayi. Many scholars (Hodgson, 1974; Koentjaraningrat 1975, 1985; Nakamura, 1984; Gaffar, 1992; Suryadinata, 2002; Assyaukanie, 2009; Azra, 2009; Pranowo, 2009) disagree with Geertz’s classification as priyayi denotes a social group (Javanese aristocracy class), not a religious one. Azra (2009) argues that Geertz overlooks the classification by focusing merely on “the conventional anthropological polarisation of big tradition/small tradition” or the “pure” Islam/Javanese Islam as his theoretical basis and “treats the phenomena merely within the socio-cultural context which is plausibly detached from the Islamic

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3 I used the term “Muslim” to refer to the religious identity whereas Islamic, as the sociologist, Gole (2002, p. 173) argues, “is a social movement through which Muslim identity is collectively re-appropriated as the basis for an alternative social and political project”. In this light Gole perceives Islamism as “a critique and even a discontinuity with the given categories of Muslim identity; it is an endeavour to rename and reconstruct Muslim identity by freeing it from traditional interpretations and by challenging assimilative forces of modernism”. This perspective is challenged by Graham Fuller (2003), a political analyst, who defines the word Islamic as referring to “anyone who believes and actively attempts to implement the notion that the Qur’an and the tradition of the Hadith should be to help guide the ways societies and governments are run”. Based on these, I regard the parties having political orientation with Islamic nuance as Islamic. However, since no parties with Islamic orientation in the 2009 elections explicitly and/or (in)directly declare their objectives in transforming Indonesia as an Islamic state, the word “Islamist” is seen as infelicitous analytical category.
scripts”. Geertz defines abangan as the group who strongly holds Javanese animistic elements and seldom performs any religious formal practices. One of the abangan variants, abangan Muslim or syncretic Muslim, is usually held by the peasants who live in the rural areas and perform animistic rituals (Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 2012, p. 18). On the contrary, santri are the devout Muslims who are mostly traders. However, as Kingsbury (2005, p. 28) contends, aside from this stark distinction between abangan and santri which lies on their level of acceptability of Javanese animistic belief, this accommodating act can arguably be seen as the capacity of Indonesian Islam to adopt the local culture.

Notwithstanding this difference and common ground, Pranowo (2009) argues that Indonesian Muslimness cannot merely be seen on the basis of being a Muslim. He found that one cannot suggest that nominal Muslims (either fully or partially) contradict the devout Muslims on many occasions (local, national or even private); simultaneously they preserve, perpetuate and develop Islamic values. Javanese Islamic religiosity is not merely about the state of being (that A is a Muslim and B is the nominal Muslim) but more to do with the religious state of becoming (although B is reluctant to practise the Muslim’s five-time prayer, B will one day fulfil that religious obligation and support all socio-cultural practices in developing Islam).

In the context of the development of political Islam in Indonesia, the notion of santri develops into the Islamic faction whereas abangan becomes the nationalist faction. The transformation itself is not rigid. Assyaukanie (2009, pp. 5-7) notes that the santri sphere then splits into Islamic and nationalist in the second quarter of the twentieth century. The abangan transforms itself as religiously neutral nationalist (Noer, 1973) or secular nationalist (Anshari, 1981). The notion of santri then proliferates in accordance with the development of the socio-historical context in Indonesia: from radical (Fealy, 2009, p. xii) or fundamentalist (Samson, 1972) or idealist (Hassan, 1980), through traditionalist (Fealy, 2009, p.xii) and modernist (Fealy, 2009, p. xii), to neo modernist (Woodward, 2001). Hefner (2000) argues that these polarised notions can be seen in two general perspectives: civil Islam (the Muslims who promote the concepts of democracy and civil society) and the opposite group, regimist Islam, which was perceived as in line with Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, especially in the 1990s.

Baswedan (2004, pp.669-690) argues that notwithstanding its lack of precision, Geertz’s dichotomy still operates in Indonesian political life. He posits his version of Indonesian political dichotomy as Islamic and the Islamic-friendly. The latter comprises the secular inclusive and the secular exclusive parties. The Islamic party is the party which formally asserts Islam as its platform. The two secular camps are identified through their willingness to accommodate the development of Islamic society.
The secular inclusive accommodates the development without having the necessity to transform the country into an Islamic state for they all eventually come to believe in Pancasila’s compatibility with Islamic values. On the contrary, the secular exclusive, which on one hand welcomes the Islamic-inspired agenda, at the same time still conjectures that the government’s accommodating act towards the Islamic society’s development will merely lead to the beginning of the Islamisation of the state.

Not wanting to be trapped in the endless academic debate of these notions, Assyaukanie (2009) proposes three Muslim utopianist models of polity in Indonesia which uphold the following notions: Islamic Democratic State (IDS), Religious Democratic State (RDS) and Liberal Democratic State (LDS). IDS emerged in Soekarno’s time, when the Islamic bloc wanted to make Islam the basis of the state and urged the active participation and role of Muslims in social and political life. RDS, which emerged at the end of Soeharto’s time, denoted the rising awareness of Pancasila in the Muslim sphere and that it did not contradict the basic principle of Islam. RDS is perceived as the state model that guards all religions in Indonesia. The model of LDS is inspired by liberal Muslim figures, such as Nurcholish Madjid and Aburrahman Wahid or Gus Dur, who wanted to liberate religions from state domination and proposed secularisation as its philosophical basis.

**Positioning the Islamic and Nationalist Strands in Indonesian Political Realm**

The polarisation of the Nationalist and Islamic strands within the major parties, especially since the time Indonesia gained her independence, has defined the Indonesian political framework. Fealy (2009, p. xii) argues that although this factional polarisation no longer gains “academic accuracy” in the present day, it remains the dominant ideological marker to map the Indonesian political framework. Sukma (2010, p. 65) and Platzdasch (2009b) argue that the status of accuracy has been detached since each faction attempts to adopt the ideological values of its adversary which obscures the ideological framework of the factions. At the same time, this obscurity validates the basis of investigating the contestation and synthesis between the Nationalist and Islamic strands which are reflected on the billboards of their legislative candidates.

The contention between the Islamic and Nationalist strands does not always reach a compromise especially in the political arena. Their relation is invariably in a state of flux. The overt ideological contestation in the 1945 to 1960s stemmed from the perennial disputes between the Islamic and Nationalist camps over the state ideology, Pancasila. The Islamic faction wanted to stick with the initial proposition to include the phrase “with the obligation to live according to Islamic law for the
Muslims” in the first principle of Pancasila of the Jakarta charter⁴. Platzdasch (2009a, pp. 124-125) notes that the act of effacing this phrase was seen by the Islamic faction as violating Pancasila’s democratic principle of musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus). The Islamic faction argued that the members who drafted the charter (the Investigatory Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI)), which comprised secular nationalists, Muslims, Christians, Javanese and non Javanese elements, was regarded as representative. Due to this, the charter was perceived as representing a political compromise, especially between the two dominant camps (nationalist and Islamic). In this sense, amending the first principle of Pancasila was seen as equivalent to disregarding the initial consensus and the Islamic faction’s aspirations. However, although Mashad (2008, pp. 55-61) notes that the Islamic faction eventually agreed not to amend it as they realised that it was too early to urge such notions as Indonesia had only recently gained her independence, this, as Platzdasch (2009a, pp. 14, 125) further argues, fosters “cross-religious suspicion” which “echoes the intrinsic position of shari’ah (Islamic law)-minded Muslims in the early to mid-twentieth centuries”.

This shari’ah-minded-ness ostensibly ran parallel with the pan-Islamism propagated by Indian-Pakistani Abu al-A’la al Maududi and Sayyid Qutb. It found its channel in Indonesian polity in the mid-twentieth century through an Islamic party, Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), led by Mohammad Natsir. However, Platzdasch (2009a, pp. 30-32) argues that the amalgamation of Islamic values with the western-concept of democracy distanced Masyumi from pan-Islamism. He found that Masyumi believed in the compatibility of Islam with the western democratic concept by coalescing the Paskitani “Islamic republic” model with the “democratic and constitutional based state” which placed the state as the core institution to uphold Islamic law (shari’ah).

Due to an allegation of mutiny made against Masyumi, Soekarno issued the Presidential Decree number 200/1960 that dissolved the party in 1960. Aside from the popular perception that the mutiny was triggered by the dissatisfaction of the Islamic faction towards the imbalance in

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⁴ The Jakarta Charter, which was signed in Jakarta on 22 June 1945, was the first design of the state philosophy that the members of the Investigatory Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) produced prior to Indonesia’s Independence on 17 August 1945. Mashad (2008, p. 57) notes that Soekarno, a member of BPUPKI who later became the first President of Indonesia, perceived the charter as a political compromise between the nationalist and Islamic camps that would not make Islam into the state ideology (which would turn the country into an Islamic one), but rather would be the result of the modus vivendi that bridged the deadlock between the two camps.
development between Java and Outer Islands, Mahendra [n.d.]
adds that the ideological reason lies in the fact that Soekarno’s administration oriented itself more to the leftist camp as PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) dominated the government (see chapter five) which intervened in the nationalist direction, which was dominated by Soekarno’s PNI (Indonesia Nationalist Party). Moreover, Kingsbury (2005, p. 51) notes that Soekarno’s act of dissolution was due to his fear of the alleged establishment of the counter-government initiated by PRRI (Revolutionary Government of Republic of Indonesia) in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. Notwithstanding his suppression of this (the largest Islamic party), Soekarno attempted to synthesise the nationalist, Islamic, and communists under one concept NASAKOM (Nationalist, Religion, and Communist) in order to perpetuate the, and his, status quo. In the present era, however, Platzdasch (2009a) found that the Masyumi tradition has been perpetuated by Islamic organisations such as ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), MUI (Indonesian Ulama Council), HMI (Islamic Students Association) and Islamic parties such as the defunct PBB (Cresent Star Party), PPP (United Development Party), and most possibly PKS. Fealy (2001) views the perpetuation of the Masyumi tradition through Islamic organisations, such as ICMI, as constituting the embodiment of Islamic proselytisation.

However, the downfall of Soekarno’s regime due to the so-called communist coup in 1965, according to Mahendra [n.d], marked a new hope for the Islamic faction to rehabilitate its name. History records a different reality. Instead of rehabilitating the Islamic faction’s name, Soeharto’s administration attenuated the polarisation of Nationalist and Islamic strands under the slogan of developmentalism. People’s freedom to actively participate in politics was circumscribed by Soeharto’s regime for it was perceived as the source of a separatist movement and political turmoil. The President deployed Golkar (the functional(ist) group)
6 as his electoral machine and imposed Pancasila as the sole ideology for all political parties. He held the same ideological belief as Soekarno that Pancasila, which reflected the Indonesian soul, could unite the people. The fusion of Pancasila and developmentalism muffled people’s opposition. The Islamic camp finally accepted Pancasila and perceived Pancasila’s first principle (Belief in One Almighty God) could accommodate the Islamic aspiration. This, as Kingsbury (2005, p. 86) argues, is possibly due to the Islamic faction’s view that Pancasila’s secular (religious) notion is seen not as quite “illegitimate”, as it does not totally contradict “Islam’s social and legal claim”.

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6 See chapter seven for further elaboration of Golkar as a functional(ist) group.
In the Reform era, the ideological contestation re-emerged during the Presidential election in 1999. PDI-P had to concede to the Central Axis group’s (the Islamic faction) political maneuvers in putting up Abdurrahman Wahid as the President although PDI-P won the assembly election. However, the ideological contestation did not appear in the same form as in the period from 1945 to the 1960s. It has been transformed and shifted into a pragmatic one due to the cartel system or the fluid coalition that attenuated the ideological contestation (Ambardi, 2009).

**Javenese/non Javanese Strands**

As previously suggested, the political polarisation of Islamic/Nationalist strands in Indonesia originated from Javanese culture. This phenomenon is quite judicious for there is no discernible clear-cut explanation that a certain ethnic group (Javanese) occupies the hegemonic position in Indonesia. However, the appreciable number of the Javanese population (41.71 per cent)\(^7\) or (42 per cent)\(^8\) compared to other ethnic groups indirectly renders the possibility that the Javanese have quantitatively a bigger influence in Indonesia. Kingsbury (2005, pp. 18-27) reinforces this domination by presenting his argument that Indonesia is a “reinterpretation of traditional Javanese empire” not by quantitative measurements, such as the number of Javanese descendants who occupied strategic positions in the past and present governments or the number of Javanese people who migrated from Java to Outer Islands. His argument was based on his research in which he found that Indonesia’s (former) centralised governmental system was predominantly influenced by the (Javanese) Hindu-Buddhist conception of *mandala*, “a circular figure symbolising the perceived universe”, which made the concentration of power lie at the center and “diffuse at the periphery” (Kingsbury, 2005, pp. 24-27). He further argues that people’s loyalty to “this mandalic conception of the state” is bound up with “the participation of local functionaries, soldiers, and civilians in the provinces” under a (unitary?) socialist conception coined by Supomo (one of the founding fathers of *Pancasila*), i.e. the prime task of an individual is to serve society (see chapter six).

This conception was reinforced by the first President, Soekarno, who spread the belief that the concept of nurturing between the father and the children in the family is in accordance with the nurturing concept of Javanese kings towards their people: the father (the king or *gusti*) as the leader nurtures the children (the people or *kawula*). At the same time the children are burdened by an absolute obligation to obey the father (Adityawan, 2008, p. 81). This reinforces the glorification of the (Javanese) paternalistic system which, according to Somantri (2006, p. 9), becomes the

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foundation for the socio-political/cultural basis of Indonesian society. Although Supomo (1952) found that these family principles were also found in other ethnic groups’ social systems, Somantri (2006, pp. 1-32) refuted this as he found that this cultural conformity does not mean that the roots of Indonesia’s socio-cultural democratic system⁹ make Indonesian society completely familiar with the notion of representative democracy (Pancasila’s fourth principle, see chapter six). The operation of these principles arguably needs the guidance from a paternalistic figure. Soekarno brought in this paternalistic system in the form of Guided Democracy (Somantri, 2006, p. 12).

The second President, Soeharto, preserved this system by way of positioning himself as the central paternalistic figure who guarded and protected Pancasila¹⁰. Adityawan (2008, pp. 112-113) argues that Soeharto’s policies in fusing the political parties into three and putting Pancasila as the sole ideology of the state and parties¹¹ represent the implementation of Soeharto’s Javanese ideals of harmony and calmness (stability). Soeharto’s attempt to “Javanize” Pancasila continued, as Ramage (1995, pp. 34-35) notes Soeharto’s controversial remark in his meeting with Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI) or Indonesian National Youth Committee on 19 July 1982 that tolerance and appropriateness as the essences in Pancasila stemmed from Javanese spirituality and religious belief. However, Ward¹² notes that this meeting was controversial as Soeharto’s talk “was never published in Indonesia but was surreptitiously recorded on tape and then transcribed”. Despite this controversy, Geertz (2004, pp. 45-76) considers the tolerance and appropriateness in Pancasila position this state ideology as a “civil religion” that represents an Indonesian cultural (read: Javanese) product coined by a Javanese leader (Soekarno) and imposed by Soeharto’s Javanese-centric government as the sole ideology for the state and political parties. He asserts that although Pancasila is dominated by these ethnic nuances, Soeharto’s imposition successfully positioned Pancasila as a “soft” reference that is able to revitalise other ethnic cultural (non Javanese) sentiments due to its pluralist democratic notions (see chapter six). Due to this capacity, Geertz further notes, Soeharto misused (if not exploited) Pancasila as an unbreakable “fence” that ideologically fortified people’s apolitical attitude towards his government as he used Pancasila as his political banner for developmentalism (see chapters five, seven and nine).

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⁹ Reeve (1985) argues that the root of Indonesia’s democratic systems is largely based on Pancasila’s “family” principles such as sharing burden/mutual assistance (gotong royong), deliberation (musyawarah) and consensus (mufakat).
¹⁰ Reeve (1985) found that the five principles in Pancasila are influenced by its founding fathers’ Javanese disposition, especially Ki Hajar Dewantara, Supomo and Soekarno (see chapter six).
¹¹ See Part II for further elaboration.
Even though the antinomy of Javanese/non Javanese strands never overtly unravelled, the issue still continued during the 2009 political campaign and after the 2009 elections. The emergence of Sultan Hamengkubuwono (HB) X, the Governor of Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY) province as well as the King of Yogyakarta sultanate\textsuperscript{13} as one of the Presidential candidates from Partai Golkar (beside the incumbent Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, a non Javanese), during Golkar’s political campaign engendered an assumption from one member of the Partai Golkar elite that the true candidate that suited the position was Sultan HB X merely because he is Javanese (Firmanzah, 2010, p. 236). The assumption was reinforced as the political response from Ruhut Sitompul (non Javanese) in Santosa (2011)\textsuperscript{14}, one of the Partai Demokrat\textsuperscript{15} politicians, who stated that the opportunity was nil for non-Javanese politicians who desired to be the Presidential Candidates to represent Partai Demokrat for the next election.

However, this Javanese influence merely played a marginal role in influencing the voters’ preferences in choosing the legislative candidates, the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the 2009 elections (Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 2012, pp 204-216). For instance, although some parties have their power base outside Java such as Golkar (Partai Golongan Karya or Functional(ist) Group Party) and PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional or National Mandate Party), Golkar obtained 35 per cent of votes from Javanese voters, whilst PAN dominated Yogyakarta and Central Java (Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 2012, pp. 208, 210). Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi also found that from the total vote (7.89 per cent) PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party) obtained from Java and Outer Islands, 46 per cent came from Javanese voters. This indicates that the element of regionalism (Java/Outer Islands) does not, without exception, correlate with ethnicity, although, as Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi further note, the latter element is frequently perceived as one of classic elements (besides religion) the parties use in determining the nomination of the candidates for President and Vice President. This ostensibly reflects a political effort in embracing ethnic pluralism in Indonesia under an ethnocentric dichotomy of Javanese/non Javanese as many Indonesian political elites and analysts suggest (Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 2012, p. 213). This can be seen, for instance, from this conventional ethnic-based formation of the President and Vice President candidates, such as Jusuf Kalla (Bugis) and Wiranto (Javanese) representing a political coalition of Golkar and Hanura (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat or People’s Conscience Party) in the 2009 Presidential election, which proved to be unsuccessful. This failure arguably indicates the obsolescence of this classic ethnocentric foundation in coupling the President and Vice President candidates. Mujani,

\textsuperscript{13} Yogyakarta province was formerly a Javanese kingdom.


\textsuperscript{15} The winning party in the 2009 Legislative and Presidential Elections
Liddle and Ambardi (2012, p. 215) further argue that this obsolescence is due to the imbalance in the dispersion of Javanese and non-Javanese ethnicity throughout the archipelago which makes ethnic sentiment into a “relatively constant variable” in influencing voters’ preferences and behaviours.

However, Javanese leaders’ domination in the Indonesian political realm will likely meet its challenges, especially in the forthcoming elections in 2014. Aritonang (2013) notes that the emergence of non-Javanese politicians as Presidential Candidates for the 2014 elections, such as Jusuf Kalla (Bugis), Mahfud MD (Maduranese), Aburizal Bakrie (Lampung), Surya Paloh (Acehnese), Hatta Rajasa (Palembang) opens the possibility for the non-Javanese to take over the Javanese-centric domination in the Indonesia political realm. However, this does not mean that Javanese domination will soon be emasculated as these candidates still consider the ethic-based polarisation as one of the significant elements in influencing voters’ behaviours. For instance, Aburizal Bakrie from Golkar is considering choosing Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono (HB) X or Kristiani Yudhoyono, the first lady, as his running mate (Aritonang, 2013). This indicates that this ethnic sentiment still holds a major role in Indonesian politics. Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata (2004, pp. 367-368) reinforce this as they perceive that the existing ethnic association (Javanese/non Javanese) reflects the popular perception in Indonesian society. Dwipayana (as cited by Aritonang, 2013) argues that this association is often used as a rallying call for the politicians to influence voters. However, this ethnic association exists almost imperceptibly on the billboards as the candidates’ explicit textual declaration of their ethnic orientation will impede them in gaining their ultimate goal.

These polarisations become the basis in outlining the mechanism of how the legislative candidates’ billboards represent the images of Islamic/Nationalist strands as well as the imperceptible ethnic orientation in their politics of image. I argue that the signifying practices of the image construction on the billboards not only show the contestation of these strands, but also obscure the polarisations. I limit the analysis by examining the billboards of the nine political parties that won seats in the 2009 legislative election, not focusing on how voters respond to the billboards, but on how the billboards narrate the polarisation and contest two dominant political camps as well as the imperceptible ethnic orientation which obscure the construction of the parties’ and the candidates’

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identity. Prior to discussing this, an elucidation of the significance of the candidates’ billboards in the 2009 legislative election is needed and will be addressed in the next chapter.
Chapter Two

The Significance of the Candidates' Billboards in the 2009 Legislative Election

This chapter aims to discuss the candidates' billboards in the 2009 legislative election as political commodities, cultural/visual artefacts and the representation of (the candidates') political branding. This is conducted by analysing the mushrooming of the candidates' billboards as a new political/cultural phenomenon as the result of the aforementioned amendment to the election laws in the 2008. However, prior to discussing this mushrooming we need to examine the significance of the candidates’ billboards as political commodities, cultural/visual artefacts and the representation of (the candidates’) political branding and outline the 2009 elections. This chapter is organised by firstly discussing the political dynamic of the 2009 elections vis-a-vis the ideological polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands. The second and third sections respectively discuss the positioning of the candidates’ image-building on the billboards as political commodities and cultural/visual artefacts in the framework of (Javanese) paternalistic culture. The fourth section discusses how the candidates’ billboards represent the political branding of the candidates and the parties’ key figures as their images are used to support the candidates’ image construction. Previous related research is incorporated in the fifth section as these figures indirectly position the significance of this research in relation to the existing research that mainly concentrates on the political branding of the parties’ paternalistic figures.

The 2009 Elections

As noted in chapter one, Indonesian democracy in the post-Soeharto era has improved quite significantly. Mietzner and Aspinall (2010) note that this improvement positions Indonesia as one of the countries in Southeast Asia region that successfully practised electoral democracy with some defective implementation of individual rights and the rule of law, such as in the 2009 elections. Sukma (2010) and Sardini (2011) argue that in the 2009 elections the defects lay in its technical and logistical problems which led to flawed results. However, Mietzner and Aspinall (2010, p.7) argue that the flaws were obscured by the triumph of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) from PD as the current Indonesia’s President which stemmed from “his unrivalled success” in constructing his personal popularity (see chapter seven). Such construction had been developed, especially since he became the Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs in Megawati’s government (Haris, 2008).

Nothwithstanding SBY’s popularity as the key element of his victory (and PD’s), what was also interesting to note from the 2009 Presidential election was that the victory of SBY (Javanese) and his running mate, Boediono (Javanese), suggested the impracticability of the classic formulation that
President and Vice President candidates represent Java and Outer Islands (Javanese/non Javanese). However, SBY deployed this formulation in the 2004 Presidential election in which he paired with Jusuf Kalla (non Javanese) from Golkar. This duo was frequently perceived as an “ideal” couple not only because they represent Javanese/non Javanese as well as Nationalist (SBY) and Islamic (Kalla) dichotomies, but that their personality traits (SBY is known as a very cautious person whilst Kalla is known for his effective and efficient actions) which seemed to fulfill each other also enhanced this perception (Takwin and Karim, 2004).

The political “divorce” between SBY and Kalla in the 2009 Presidential election might also suggest the impracticability of the Nationalist/Islamic and Javanese/non-Javanese dichotomies. However, as Mietzner (2009a) and Sukma (2010) found, the victory of SBY and PD in the 2009 Presidential and legislative elections was primarily derived from the success of SBY’s image construction rather than the impracticability of these ideological polarisations. SBY’s personal popularity made PD obtain 20.85 per cent in the 2009 legislative election compared to 7.45 per cent in the 2004 legislative election, the first such election in which the party participated.

Other nationalist parties such Golkar and PDI-P found difficulty in competing with PD’s achievement (read: SBY’s popularity). Golkar obtained a mere 14.45 per cent against PDI-P 14.03 per cent as the second and the third runners-up17 in the 2009 legislative election (see chapter five). Golkar’s votes declined quite significantly as this party obtained 21.58 per cent in the 2004 legislative election as the first winner.18 As for PDI-P, the party suffered a drop of 4.5 per cent from the result of 18.53 per cent in the 2004 legislative election or 19.71 per cent difference from the 1999 election (see chapter five). The Islamic parties such as PAN, PPP, and PKB also respectively suffered a drop of 0.43 per cent, 3.19 per cent, and 5.63 per cent in the 2009 legislative election as against the total votes they obtained in the 2004 legislative election (see chapter five). Mietzner and Aspinall (2010, p. 10) perceive this downward trend not as the representation of people’s trust towards the parties, but more as fluctuated numbers that prove the parties’ strength in their longevity compared to other parties in Indonesia’s neighbouring countries such as South Korea, Thailand and Philippines that “often disappeared after one or two elections”.

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18 Compared to its drop in the 2009 legislative election as against the 2004 election, Golkar experienced a more drastic plunge in the 1999 election (22.44 per cent) from 74.51 per cent in the 1997 election, as people perceived the party as the representation of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, especially in the beginning of the Reform era (see chapter five).
New (nationalist) parties, such as Gerindra and Hanura, emerged as the result of Golkar’s internal friction (see chapters five and seven). They gained a mere 26 seats and 18 seats of the House of Representatives at the national level in this election out of the total of 560 seats (see chapter five).

Candidates’ Billboards as Mobile Market Commodities

The downward trend in the parties’ votes previously mentioned did not run parallel with the freedom the candidates received after the Constitutional Court decree liberated them from the constraint that the candidates were not allowed to make individual promotions, let alone campaign. This political constraint arguably restrained the candidates from articulating their platforms in conjunction with the parties’ vision and mission. The phenomenon of the candidates’ billboards mushrooming, as earlier mentioned, arguably marked this freedom as well as the candidates’ inadequate capabilities in expressing their platforms. This can be seen, for instance, from the way the candidates present themselves on the billboards which are dominated by their close-up pictures without sufficient visual/written expressions that illuminate their platforms (see chapters nine and ten).

In order to conceal this insufficiency, the candidates used the parties’ key figures not merely to support their image, but more importantly also to reinforce their position as nationalist and/or Islamic candidates. In this sense, the candidates’ reliance on these figures indirectly perpetuate the (Javanese) paternalistic hierarchical pattern of gusti and kawula. However, such reliance cannot be seen as solely connoting the candidates’ passivity and/or submission to the parties’ key figures as their appearance on the candidates’ billboards reflexively produce mutual benefit for both the candidates and the key figures’ branding. In this light, symbolic mutual exchange operates.

However, this does not mean that all candidates deploy the key figures’ images on their billboards. The absence of these figures on their billboards cannot be seen as a complete negation of the candidates’ reliance as the key figures are perceived as the embodiment of the parties’ ideology (see chapters seven and eight). Although this status arguably positions the key figures at the center, their existence on the candidates’ billboards does not constitute a fundamental element for as long as the candidates’ billboards are in accordance with the party’s ideology, the absence of these central figures is permissible. In this sense, the candidates’ subservient position to the party’s ideology holds sway on defining the position the candidates take. This taken position derives not necessarily from the ossification of the party’s ideology as Pancasila, the ideology most parties adhere (especially the nationalist ones), allows the candidates present themselves as nationalist and/or Islamic figures. This position-taking process reflects the candidates’ political dispositions (as represented on the
billboards) towards the contestation and synthesis of Nationalist/Islamic strands in the political realm. In other words, these billboards narrate how the candidates position themselves in the factional polarisation, which is possibly different from the ideological position the parties take in the polarisation within *Pancasila* discourse.

The above notions in their entirety constitute the items that are transacted on the billboards. This transaction implies the process of reifying the candidates’ platforms (which represent their dispositions) and transforms them into commodities the candidates sell via the billboards (see chapters seven and eight). In this sense, the billboards embody the art of constructing and selling the candidates’ images. This research focuses on the construction phase of the candidates’ images as the mushrooming of the candidates’ billboards in the 2009 legislative connotes a new billboard culture.

This new culture implies the art of marketing the candidates’ image through billboards as outdoor advertising mediums. Gudis (2004) argues that the challenge in the billboard marketing art lies in how the billboards are able to capture the spectators’ attention during their rapid mobility. She asserts that the logic of the candidates’ billboards operates like the mechanism of a mobile market or the “buyway”. Not only does the billboard trespass the political boundaries of provinces, municipalities and villages, but it also allows the spectators to conduct “self-analyses” towards so-called “street-level museum art paintings” (Gudis, 2004, pp. 50-58). However, due to the rapid mobility of the spectators in the public space, the billboards merely hold a temporary psychological status in the spectators’ minds that distract their attention. Furthermore, as a self-content narrative, the candidates’ billboards visually communicate the messages quickly and silently. Their ubiquity, especially beside the roads during election time, becomes a marker of habituation as people pass the billboards at all times. This (un)consciously forges a certain impression on the spectators which, according to Harrington (as cited by Gudis, 2004, p. 70), does not require any “intellectual attention”. At the same time, this also reinforces the argument that Indonesian politics is more symbolic in nature than substantive (Platzdasch, 2009a).

In alignment with Gudis, Cronin (2008, p. 110) argues that the spectators’ rapid mobility impedes the spectators from seeing this symbolic representation on the candidates’ billboards in a semiotic coherence. In order to prolong the spectators’ attention span, Cronin (2008, p. 103) suggests that the billboards contain “contrasting colour schemes, noticeable ad colours, fewer rather than more words, clear, concise branding and a simple proposition”. With these qualities, the spectators are expected to view the billboards for longer. However, this longer glimpse does not guarantee a complete transference of the intended message to spectators. Rapid mobility impedes such
transference. Thus, placing the ads in many different places and putting them in various modes becomes the best possible ways to attract spectators’ attention.19

The billboards gained enormous public attention in the 2009 legislative elections as the result of the aforementioned amendment of the election law which arguably put the candidates into a state of political exaltation (if not euphoria). This can be seen from the ubiquity of the candidates’ billboards in the 2009 elections and the clamorous, excited public response towards the billboards’ mushrooming all over the streets in Indonesia. This ubiquity seems to refute the common marketing practitioners’ proposition that the billboards’ (specific) locations determine the market segmentation and becomes the core factor for capturing potential voters (Cronin, 2008, pp. 99-101). The candidates did not seem to consider these aspects as their billboards were scattered along the streets (see the image below).

Source: author’s collection

They did not take into account that strategic locations contribute to determining the level of their electability. They seemed to be trapped in a simplistic premise: the more you put your ads (the billboards on the streets), the more likely the spectators are to be exposed to your image. This disorderly visibility possibly produced a rebound effect on the candidates.

19In this sense, television becomes the most likely preferable mode of advertisement. However, this medium has its own lack, especially in regard to the way the candidates advertise themselves (read: their image) on television through the use of various entertainment programs, such as a singing-contest-like program. Heryanto (2010) found that when politics enters the domestic sphere in the form of television programs similar to ‘Indonesian Idol’, the process of “domesticating” politics implicates it in the domestication of the spectators themselves. The spectators are not aware that sending their opinions as an active response regarding the political issues on television potentially “domesticates” their own participation. Billboard as an outdoor advertising medium arguably liberates the spectators from this constraint.
Candidates’ Billboards as Cultural/Visual Artefacts

The above subheading indicates that reading the candidate’s billboard not only can be seen from the viewpoint of cultural theory in which many consider the visual artefact is embedded and conceived as the same as the cultural text, but also from the lens of visual culture (Evans and Hall, 1999, p. 2). However, seeing from the perspective of putting the candidate’s billboard as the centre or the point of departure in order to study the political realm in Indonesia, especially during the recent election, cannot be seen merely as transposing the theme of the analysis (from analysing the legislative candidates’ billboards to the analysis of the legislative candidates’ billboards as the visual artefacts which represent Indonesia’s political realm). This, at the same time, saliently affirms the significance of the candidate’s billboard as a visual artefact to refer to the discursive practices in the political world during the election. Therefore, the billboard is located within visual culture and vice versa. They are stitched together with the political antinomies of Islamic/ Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese as a political advertisement.

Reading the candidate’s billboard entails reading the narrative of its visuality. It is about an arrangement of signs as a “unit/narrative” to codify the knowledge of sight to power (Barthes, 1977; Foucault, 1999, pp. 61-71) through a semiotic reading practice which results from the relation between the candidates’ dispositions and position in a field within the 2009 assembly election as the political arena. Barthes (1980, pp. 91-93) implicitly recognised that the practices of looking represent the act of seeing the candidates’ dispositions, especially at the moment of transmitting the social meaning through the candidate’s photograph on the billboard. It is transmitted through deep motives, the style of life – the ideology – as reflected on the billboards. The mechanism of reflection does not act mimetically. Through the system of signs we can decipher how the candidate constructs her/his disposition as the embodiment of her/his desire, consciousness, perception, thought and action, not to sell the political programs via the billboard, but more to influence the voters’ disposition in perceiving her/his persona as something the voters are familiar with, such as seeing the same likeness of herself/himself on the billboard. This is aligned with the Althusserian notion of “interpellation” or “hailing”. How does this occur? Barthes continues that the photograph is the ellipse of language, a condensation of the social whole, for it suggests not merely physical fetishism, a way of dressing, a set of daily choices, a posture, the social setting but more saliently the glorification of the photogenic20 which is capable of inviting the voters’ disposition to perceive the candidate’s veritable physical transference as the act of delegating himself to plausibly reflect voters’ aspirations.

20 The photogenic quality, according to Guy Cook (1992), can be seen from the visual text, such as the facial expression, gesture, facial type, ways of dressing, which he calls paralanguage.
Candidates’ Billboards as the Representation of the Political Branding

As political commodities, as well as cultural/visual artefacts, the candidates’ billboards also represent the political branding of the candidates, of the parties’ key figures and most likely of the parties themselves. The candidates’ and key figures’ images are sold as intangible, symbolic political products, which according to O’Shaughnessy (2001, p. 1048), are value-heavy. Holts (2004, p. 3), on the contrary, perceives them as empty markers that need to be filled with meanings. These two discrepant views cannot be seen as contradicting each other. Holt arguably perceives the product from a denotative level which makes the product appear as a signifier in the first level of signification (denotation). O’Shaughnessy, on the other hand, transcends this step and directly perceives the marker loaded with values. However, these perspectives go in the same direction. They both agree that the product’s values play a significant role in transforming a product into a brand. The values are not merely confined to the Marxist notions of exchange or added values, but also refer to the quality of self-expression (or “identity value” in Holt’s term (2004, pp. 3-4)) derived from the process of branding. The process starts by filling the product’s logo, symbol, and design with meanings. They are filled with what Lee-Marshment (2009, pp. 111-112) calls “impressions, images, attitudes and recognition”. The impressions, images, attitudes and recognition are constructed in the form of narratives/stories on the billboards. And the stories narrate these through plots, characters and settings on the billboards. These all form an identity myth.

Holt (2004, p. 9) asserts that in order to gain visual credibility, the identity myth constructed by candidates’ billboards should be set in a populist world which illustrates the lives of real people who share the same ideological belief (Pancasila). Many billboards, especially from the same faction, however, adopt similar forms, patterns and content in the narratives. The candidates’ images function as a differentiation factor in the stories which are heavily influenced by the parties’ ideologies. The process does not end in image construction. It reflects, as O’Shaughnessy (2001, p. 1048) further argues, the candidates’ dispositions which reflect their consciousness, desires, and style of life. This identity construction contains in itself an ideological disposition that connects the parties and the candidates with the voters.

This connection is established by the presence of the parties’ key figures as the presence of these figures in paternalistic culture, not only supports the candidates’ image construction, but also arguably signifies the candidates’ subservient position (as previously mentioned). These figures are often perceived as the role models that represent the parties’/factions’ ideologies. However, the presence of these central figures can be read as twofold. Firstly, the key figures’ presence is designed to reinforce the image construction of the candidates because juxtaposing the key figures’
images with the candidate’s image implies a symbolic exchange between the key figures’ identity values, the vessel of self-expression, to borrow Holts’ term (2004, p.3), and the candidate’s values. The juxtaposition enables correlating the key figures’ identity values with the candidates and projects them on the billboards. This affirms a contingent status between the candidates and the key figures. In a Bourdieuan lens, this contingency signifies a submissive code that reflects the candidate’s disposition as they visually engage in the dominant ideological framework of the party as represented on the billboard. Bourdieu (1991) argues that symbolic power operates due to one’s acknowledgement and willingness to be involved and controlled in a dominant discourse. In this sense, the candidates’ act of juxtaposing his/her image with the key figure’s image affirms the code because they are willing to be controlled by the party’s ideology. This engaging process does not follow a linear pattern for it works in the political arena where the rules of the game delineate the process of position-taking and the position taken by the candidates (see chapters nine and ten). The Bourdieuan principles (habitus/dispositions, capital and field) become the basis for this political branding. Habitus constitutes a subjective structure that represents the candidates’ socio-historical dispositions. Bourdieu (1977) asserts that habitus bridges the “objective” structure of the parties and the subjective structure of the candidates’ actions and thoughts. This produces the candidates’ sense of self or subjectivity by correlating their images with the constructed images of the party’s key figures. This also reflects the candidates’ understanding of their positions in the dominant discourse. The key figures’ images are deployed as the visual capital that represents the candidate’s disposition in the field of power (the political arena).

Secondly, another way of regarding the presence of the key figures on the billboard is to see it as the candidates’ participation in symbolically underpinning the constructed image of the key figures. For instance, the deployment of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s image (SBY), the key figure of PD and Indonesia’s current President, on one of the candidate’s billboards from PD, can be conceived as the candidate’s invitation to voters that by choosing him/her in the 2009 Elections they indirectly support SBY. If the candidate succeeds in winning the ticket to the parliament, s/he will, without exception, support SBY’s administration. The act signifies a symbolic exchange in that the candidate is no longer trapped in a passive situation by relying heavily on SBY. SBY also needs his/her support which makes his/her image significant to the PD’s (and SBY’s) success. On the other hand, the candidate’s contingent success is heavily relied upon irrespective of how “skilful” the candidate is in deploying SBY’s public persona as visual capital. However, this skilfulness does not guarantee the success of the candidate because many factors need to be taken into account. The significant part of analysing this political branding vis-à-vis the degree to which the candidates’ billboards represent their political disposition is the mechanism of representation itself. The representation cannot be
detached from the parties’ (and also the candidates’) slogans and the key figures’ images as they all
direct the narrative structure of the billboards.

**Previous Related Research**

Previous research specifically investigating the political branding of the nationalist parties (PD,
Golkar, PDI-P, Gerindra and Hanura) and the Islamic parties (PKS, PAN, PPP, PKB) via billboards is
scarce. A few examples can be found, such as *Signifikansi Iklan Politik dalam Pemilu 2004: Analisis
Semiotika Iklan PDI Perjuangan Dalam Kampanye Pemilu 2004* (The Significance of Political
Advertisement in 2004 General Election: a Semiotic Analysis of PDI-P Political Campaign), by M. Edy
Susilo and Prayudi (2004, pp. 250-263), which offered a semiotic reading of PDI-P’s political branding
in the newspapers during the 2004 general election. They found that the ads did not offer sufficient
understanding for the voters to choose PDI-P. They merely sold Megawati’s (PDI-P’s key figure)
image as the woman who was believed to be inheriting her father’s (Soekarno) charisma. Van
Wichelen (2006) conducts a more in-depth investigation into Megawati’s image\(^\text{21}\) and finds that this
former President’s image was located in the intersection of nationalist, Islamic, and feminist
discourse. In the beginning of the Reform era, people perceived Megawati as the symbol of their
resistance against Soeharto’s regime. This made her become “the mother of nation”. In van
Wichelen’s view (2006, p. 53), this status de-sexualised her. However, when she was to replace
President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001, Indonesian Islamic conservatives challenged her nationalist
( secular) image by putting her in the debatable perspective of Islamic discourse that a female
Muslim cannot be the nation’s leader. Van Wichelen further views this challenge as the
representation of the Islamic conservatives’ attempt to emasculate Megawati’s image as a female
(Muslim) leader. She then appeared wearing *kerudung*, a loose headscarf\(^\text{22}\), to reinforce her religious
disposition.

Ajidarma (2009), on the other hand, offers an in-depth semiotic reading of the candidate’s billboards
in the 2009 legislative election and finds that they are merely about the morphology of structure
which represents the socio/linguistic erosion of what is untold in the social world (in order to
achieve the socio-moral status that co-exists in the political arena). As Ajidarma concentrates on
seeing the candidates’ billboards as a new phenomenon detached from the ideological polarisations
in Indonesia, he does not see that the socio-linguistic erosion represents the emasculation of the
polarisations. My research will explore this aspect.

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\(^\text{21}\) not mainly through advertisement mediums

\(^\text{22}\) See chapter ten for the discussion about *kerudung*.  

23
While Ajidarma portrays the candidates’ billboards as a new phenomenon, Nugroho (2009) offers a closer examination of SBY from the perspective of the fan and popular culture. He investigates SBY’s corporeal/political body and finds that fans perpetually glorify SBY as the paternalistic figure who represents the fusion of codes: power (military with civility); intellectuality (he earned a doctoral degree); beauty (good-looking); and manner. In alignment with Nugroho, Haris (2008) suggests that SBY’s politics of image entraps him (and his government) into ceaselessly constructing other images in order to perpetuate his popularity.

Whilst the researchers mentioned above engage in exploring the politics of the parties’ central figures’ image construction and mapping of Indonesian politics, Dienaputra (2010, 2011) offers an investigation regarding the parties’ logos. He found that the dynamic of the visual transformation of the parties’ logos to represent their political identities in General Elections from 1955 to 2004 was due to the political constraints and amendment of government policies in accordance with socio-political changes. What Dienaputra has overlooked is the coding aspect of the logo. He does not show explicitly how the similar Nationalist/Islamic codes contest and synthesise within themselves and against one another. He also fails to consider how the symbols in Pancasila are reflected to delineate the party’s ambiguous position. In order to fill this gap, this research will also explore how the contestation and synthesis of the Nationalist/Islamic codes in the logo illuminate the ambiguity, and possibly the covert Javanese domination.

Thus, the candidates’ billboards played a significant role for the candidates to promote themselves during the 2009 legislative election. However, they are not aware that the strategic locations determined their success in capturing voters as these locations indirectly defined the segmentation of the voters. Seeing these billboards as street-level-art paintings, as Gudis (2004) argues, as cultural/visual artefacts and commodities brings us to the reading of the billboards’ visuality in Pancasila discourse which glorifies the (Javanese) paternalistic system. The next chapter will discuss the research methodology.
Chapter Three

Methodology

For the research for this thesis, I conducted a nested case study in two stages. The first stage explored the historical background of the polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands as they significantly influence the candidates’ political dispositions. This background will provide a descriptive analytical account that illuminates the ideological ambiguity in the candidates’ image construction as the result of the historical contestation and synthesis of these strands. The second stage will analyse what is represented on the billboard deploying social semiotics in order to assess how far the billboard can express the candidate’s political dispositions and contrast them with the political dispositions of the candidates in socio-political discursive practices. The techniques of data collection and data analysis will be based on these two stages.

The examination of the first stage of the data analysis is primarily viewed with a Bourdieuan lens. Bourdieu’s concepts of capital, (political) arena, dispositions (habitus) are deployed in order to analyse the intricate relation of how the candidates’ dispositions are heavily influenced by the Pancasila-based political framework which defines the Indonesian political arena. These dispositions are seen as the product of chain reactions of the past (political) conditions vis-a-vis the candidates’ (current) position in the field (capital) within the state of play of the political arena. For instance, examining the candidate from PDI-P requires us to check the historical political orientation of this party as this element becomes the core point in PDI-P’s branding. This means we need to trace the signifying practices of how the Islamic/Nationalist strands emerge, circulate, synthesise, contest and proliferate as the construction of the party’s image shows that these strands no longer overtly polarise. They synthesise and contest in the framework of Pancasila discourse. This makes the candidate ostensibly free in expressing their ideological orientation. Thus, the way the candidates express themselves on their billboards reflects their political dispositions. This leads us to the reading of how these billboards’ narratives represent the candidates’ dispositions at the second stage.

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23 Bourdieau (2006, pp. 105-106) defines the meaning of capital not solely referring to the economic exchange that leads to the “maximation of the profit”. He relocates this conventional economic meaning by arguing that the term of capital can also be perceived symbolically. This relocation does not produce variants of meaning deducted from economic capital but rather “tran-substantiated forms”. This means that the economic capital is seen not as fundamental value that conventionally perceives as defining the relationship between the “bourgeoisie” and the subordinates. This relationship involves divergent dispositions and roles (of the candidates) which are realised through the operation of other capital, i.e. the social capital (such as social network), the cultural capital (such as language) and symbolic capital (such as prestige, acknowledgement, recognition).
Reading the billboard’s visuality at the second stage requires some further procedures. The focus will be on the formation, relevance and function of the image in the discursive, political practice of the billboard, as Barthes (1980) suggested. Jenks (1995, pp. 9-13) contends that the selection, abstraction and transformation processes are the stages to dismantle visual practices, though the risk in doing so will possibly result in the partial envisioning of the billboard. Notwithstanding the risk, this procedure is needed to focus the analysis of the billboard on the particularly significant elements. The selection involves the process of choosing, sorting and classifying by concentrating on the particular aspects of the phenomena of the candidates’ billboards. The abstraction entails extracting the essences that imply a removal of an element from one level to another, such as the system of the image representation of the billboard in which it cannot dissociate itself from its context. Due to the rhetorical qualities of an image in the system of representation, the image transforms itself as a re-ordering of the vision into an interpretation.

Schirato and Webb (2004, pp. 21-24) developed narrative procedures as a more detailed technique of reading in several stages: selection, omission, frame; signification and evaluation; arrangement; differentiation and connection; focus and context. It begins with the selection of the raw material of the candidate’s billboard (the object, angle, property, setting) whilst focusing on the chosen focal part. When focusing, the omission process starts by disregarding the insignificant components. The spectators will see this process within the frame of a narrative arrangement. At this stage the evaluation process begins along with the process of signification. Barthes’s semiotic operates here. As a unit of sign, a billboard comprises a plethora of signs, which is bound up with a relational and contingent status. There is no arbitrariness since the sign is defined within cultures. However, since the sign is characterised by the concept of difference and connection, the system of distinguishing one entity from another, according to Schirato and Webb (2004), lies in the psychological level which reflects spectators’ dispositions. Drawing on the work of Wittgenstein, Schirato and Webb develop this concept by focusing on its quality to distinguish one entity by differing it from its anomaly even though the two entities are connected with, or belong to, the same family resemblance. In the denotative level, due to the sum of denoted signs (diegesis) the spectators can choose and direct her/his attention to focus on the particular aspects within the candidate’s billboard as the context for the second level of reading, the connotative. Barthes (1977, pp. 46-51) called the latter level ‘the rhetoric of the image’ in which myth is produced and consumed as the ideology. Schirato and Webb’s technique stops at this stage.

The system of difference and connection in the process of signification which shows a systematic choice and pattern indicates the mode of power production. The first through to the final stage of
the procedure attests that the choice, sorting, classification, signification, evaluation, and arrangement reflect how power upon sight operates. They are all selected, chosen, evaluated and arranged in the manner in which visual capital operates in relation to power so that the symbolic capital, prestige and recognition, can be achieved. However, since the focus of my research is on the textual level, the mode of power production will be investigated based on how the procedure operates within the framework of the polarisations. This leads to an argument that the borderlines of the Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands on the billboard are almost imperceptible as these are woven so tightly together (see Parts II, III, and IV).

To investigate the function of the visual text, we need to identify the genre of the candidate’s billboard as visual as well as written texts. Gripsrud (2002, p. 115) asserts that the genre of the billboard contains a relative stable pattern of codes that regulate the group of signs within the billboard. In alignment with Gripsrud, Schirato and Webb (2004, p. 91) add that this stable pattern closely relates to the notion of intertextuality for they both secure the meaning of the text by the ways in which genre corresponds intertextually with the familiar text we are already conversant with.

Bernstein (as cited by Martin and Rose, 2008, pp. 18-19) develops the idea that by examining the genre of the billboard, the ideological construction that “regulates, conditions our access to power and control, and shapes our coding orientation” can also be revealed. They all configure in the forms of register variables of tenor, field and mode (Halliday, 2004). These variables are constituted in the genre and used to dismantle the myth. For instance, the billboard as a genre depicts the nature of participants (tenor) in the social action taking place (field) and employs the symbolic organisation of the text or the part the language is playing (mode). The participants (tenor) define the division of labour in society which constructs the hierarchies of power, control, status, authority, and prominence evolving in the social actions (field) as can be overtly seen in the part of language (mode) involved in the text. The analysis of the social function or purpose of the billboard, its generic structure and the lexico-grammatical features circulated in the durable set of social relations will reveal how the billboard genre expresses the candidate’s dispositions.

In order to reveal the mechanism of how this genre analysis helps to reveal the candidates’ dispositions represented on the billboards, we need social semiotics (Hodge and Kress, 1988), or in O’Toole’s (2011) Hallidayean terms “systemic-functional semiotics”, as the theoretical framework in order to investigate the level of coherence and cohesion in the interplay of the visual and written

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24 Schirato and Webb (2004, pp. 81-90) argue that the visual narrative follows the literary formula of narration: plot, character, point of view, events, time and place.
texts of the billboards. The coherence and cohesion of these two texts will demonstrate the textual consistency of the candidates’ claimed positions and dispositions as Nationalist and/or Islamic figures (see chapters nine and ten).

In order to conduct this investigation, we need to put our perspective into a proposition that the grammar of the visual text reveals similar aspects as the written one (Hodge and Kress, 1988; Kress and van Leeuwen, 1990, 2006; O’Toole, 2011). The similarity is due, as Hodge and Kress (1988, p. 4) argue, to the fact that they both are bound with the same logonomic system, i.e. the “set of rules that prescribe the conditions for production and reception of meanings which specify who can claim to initiate (produce, communicate) or know (receive and understand) meanings about what topics under what circumstances and with what modalities (how, when, why)”. In other words, the grammar of the visual and written texts express a similar system of meanings as they both refer to the same textual entity (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 19), i.e. the candidates’ billboards. Based on Hallidayean linguistic metafunctions, Kress and van Leeuwen (1990, 2006) and O’Toole (2011) posit that the visual and written texts share the same metafunctions, i.e. the ideational function (what is being depicted or written about on the billboards), interpersonal function (ways in which the billboards are engaged with the spectators) and textual function (ways in which the billboards are composed). Thus, in reading the visual text of the candidate’s billboard we need to specify the actions and portrayals of the represented participants involved on the billboard (representational function), the gaze, perspective, angle (interpersonal function) and the frame, scale, colour of the billboard (textual function). As for the written text, the candidates mostly used this text to illuminate their slogans, platforms, names and nominations as candidates to become national or regional parliamentary members (see chapters nine and ten).

Research Subjects

Two examples each of male and female candidates are taken from the nine winning parties. The research will use these eighteen examples of the candidate’s billboards from the nine parties that met the parliamentary threshold (2.5 per cent). This is due to the similar patterns in which the candidates present themselves on the billboards. However, since 35.25 per cent of legislative

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25 Halliday (2004, pp. 29-30) argues that language construes meaning in three metafunctions, namely ideational, interpersonal and textual functions. The ideational function is concerned with how the language (read: grammar) represents our experiential “goings-on”. The interpersonal function deals with how the language is used in the interaction (i.e. between interlocutors), whilst the textual function is concerned with the cohesion and coherence of the text.

26 As my research focuses on the textual analysis of the billboards, the active participants, such as the interaction between the sender/the addressee of the billboard (the candidates) with the addresseees (the spectators) will not be taken into account.
candidates from all parties (44 parties)\textsuperscript{27} were female and only 17.49 per cent of them became legislative members in the parliament (compared to 82.51 per cent of the male legislative members)\textsuperscript{28} from the nine parties, it leads to the conclusion that the number of female candidate’s billboards is less than the males. This results in the ratio (1: 4.7) between the female and male legislative members. Therefore four examples of female legislative candidates from the total of eighteen samples are considered representational.

Notwithstanding the similarities they possess, the differences between them show not merely the individual style but also the candidates’ dispositions. In order to decipher how the candidates’ billboards represent their dispositions, several procedural steps need to be taken starting from the phase of data collection to the phase of data analysis.

**Techniques of Data Collection**

In the first stage, the data pertaining to the 2009 legislative election, including the candidates’ and their parties profiles, was collected from reliable sources, such as books, journal articles, monographs, theses and mass media reports (national/local newspapers, magazines, political parties’ official websites, national election commission websites and official websites of the House of Representatives). Interviews with the candidates regarding their political dispositions in relation to their billboard advertisement was considered unnecessary as the research focuses on investigating the candidates’ political dispositions as represented on the billboards.

In the second stage, I identified the elements on each billboard to collect the data. This was conducted in order to identify the similarities and differences between all the elements in the eighteen billboards based on the visual and written texts. As a result, a picture of the billboard’s variables which indicate the genre was obtained.

The visual elements’ identification started by tracing all the visual signs: the background colour, the picture(s) of the candidate, the use of the party’s key figure(s), the use of other figures to support the candidate’s image, the use of setting and props, the party’s logo, the background picture, the candidate and the party’s number. It is mainly viewed horizontally from the left to the right of the billboard. This mechanism was designed to determine the visual similarities and differences between each billboard vis-a-vis the billboard’s genre.


As for the written text, I identified the linguistic elements that denote the register variables of the genre: tenor, field and mode. These variables later define the characteristics of the billboard’s genre based on the social function or the purpose of the billboard, the generic or the schematic structure and the dominant lexico-grammatical features of the billboard.

**Techniques of Data Analysis**

The data of the first stage was analysed by examining how the candidates took certain political positions in the social and political discursive practices and was contrasted with the position taken as represented on the billboards. Prior to this, tracing how the Islamic/Nationalist strands contest and synthesise in the Indonesian political realm was conducted. In a macro lens, this historical background contributes to defining the Indonesian political framework which leads to the construction of the political dispositions circulating in the Indonesian political arena. These dispositions were examined by seeing their representation through the parties’ branding. The branding of the parties’ key figures was analysed in conjunction with the parties’ branding. Paternalistic culture in Indonesia also significantly contributes to constructing this branding. The examination of this branding was conducted by investigating the parties’ statutes as the point of departure. These statutes reflect not only the parties’ vision and mission but also the parties’ dispositions which influence the candidates’ position-taking process. In a Bourdieuan lens, this process represents not only the candidates’ dispositions but also the symbolic exchange of various capitals in the Indonesian political arena. This exchange arguably defines the candidates’ dispositions.

In the second stage, based on the elements of the billboard genre (both visual and written texts), the analysis started by examining the grammar of the visual and written texts. As they both arguably share similar pattern of metafunctions, i.e. interpersonal, ideational and textual, the analysis firstly classified the elements of the visual and written texts based on these three metafunctions. Based on these, we needed to draw imaginary lines (mainly horizontal and vertical) on the billboards’ frames to examine the interplay of the visual and linguistic elements. Based on these lines, the examination started by concentrating our vision on the way in which the represented participants (mainly the candidates and the key figures) gaze on the spectators. Their gaze, facial expressions and the light define the level of interpersonal intimacy (function) the candidates build via their billboards. The reading pattern then starts from left to the right. The symmetrical arrangement of the billboards helps us to decipher the ideational function, i.e. the narrative themes. In examining these, we need to check the gestures of the candidates (and the key figures) and re-examine their facial expressions as these elements demonstrate their visual actions in conveying the written slogan. Besides these
elements, the candidates’ attire, the setting of place, the party’s logo and other props also represent the candidates’ dispositions and positions. They help to build the story lines the candidates use in promoting themselves by disseminating their platforms on the billboards. The colours and space proximity define the billboard’s textual function.

This reading practice continues with reading the vertical pattern of the texts. This is conducted as the candidates mostly deploy this pattern in expressing their written slogans and platforms. The written texts were scrutinized by focusing on the identified elements of register in the genre. How are the dominant parts of the language played (mode) in constructing the tenor and field of the billboard? How can these critically show the nature of the participants (tenor) in the social action (field) they are engaged in? In analysing the nature of tenor, the focus was on the status and the role of the relationship every participant engaged in the billboard and what visual and written codes the visual and linguistic capital represented in their correlation with the nature of their social action. These determined the characteristics of the billboard genre: the social function, the generic structure and the dominant lexico-grammatical features.

At this stage the intersection of the horizontal and vertical readings demonstrated the level of synchronisation between what was represented on the visual actions with the written expressions. Not only did this practice demonstrate the level of contradiction, as well as synchronicity, but this also reinforced the scope the candidates’ billboards gave to express their dispositions.

These metafunctional readings were conducted based on the denotative and connotative levels. The analysis of these two orders cannot be segregated for their interaction and cannot be detached from one another due to the chain relation they have, such as the visual and the written texts of the billboard. The strategies in deciphering signs (postulated by Schirato and Webb, 2004) was deployed and developed in scrutinizing the image construction and the myth in the billboard at both levels.

For the first level of signification, I read the visual signs syntagmatically and paradigmatically to check whether commuting the arrangement of sign in a sequence (syntagmatically) will alter the image construction on the billboard or substituting the sign with another sign within its family resemblance (paradigmatically) also produces an alteration. The syntagmatic test created the shifting priority of the sign the candidate employed in order to construct her/his own identity in the billboard.

As for the paradigmatic reading, it involved substituting the sign on the billboard. For instance, If I were to substitute the key political figure (SBY) on one of the candidate’s billboard from PD with

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29 The tenor and the setting of place are represented on the visual text.
Megawati and juxtapose his image with Megawati, it would not produce an alteration in the image construction, because substituting the image of SBY with Megawati or juxtaposing the candidate’s image with Megawati merely effaces the characteristic transference the candidate tries to correlate with SBY (well-mannered, diplomatic, and calm). This paradigmatic relation reinforces that SBY is significant in the candidate’s billboard sign system. The analysis of juxtaposition cannot be undertaken at the literal, or denotative, level. The comparison operates at the connotative plane for the juxtaposition espouses the meaning transference as the candidate’s image correlates with SBY’s. Thus, after revealing the myth in the connotative level, a question of why similar elements in the genre produce different images arises. What causes the difference? What effects can be produced? The interweaving of signs in the paradigmatic axis helped to explain it. The next questions will be about the point of intersection of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations of the sign system on the billboard and the results produced in the intersection. This was conducted by tracing the chain relation of signs that correspond with one another in order to check whether intersecting the borderlines of the dichotomies (Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese) affirm the segregation or obscures them.

The interaction with other dispositions (read: on other billboards) also determined the inclination towards using the billboard genre as the preferred propaganda medium in the 2009 legislative election. Do all the billboards have the same quality in conveying the candidates’ dispositions? What is the visual and linguistic capital that influences not only the candidate’s disposition as expressed on one billboard but also the interaction with other billboards in the textual social field? Do the candidates’ billboards of the same party show the same inclination to propagate the party’s ideology? How do all candidates’ billboards interact textually in order to convey a similar message? Does the interaction produce frictions or obscure the borderlines in the polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands? Do they really represent the political dispositions or simply introduce the candidates to the public? In order to answer the above, Bourdieu’s (1990a, 1990b) notion of capital will help to measure how far the linguistic and visual capital represents the candidates’ dispositions in its field of interaction.

The above mechanism determined how the billboard’s genre represents the religious as well as ethnic identity based on existing polarisations. Arguably at the same time it affirmed the obscurity of the tenuous border in the polarisations of Nationalist/Islamic and Javanese/non-Javanese strands. Thus, after classifying the candidates’ billboards based on the party, the ideological classification of the billboards based on nationalist/Islamic antinomies was addressed. The ethnicity elements can be
seen from the use of local language or other local attributes, such as the visual codes or linguistic elements.

The following diagram sums up the analysis procedures of the second stage:
PART II

Indonesian Political Arena: Contesting and/or Synthesising Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese Strands?

Introduction

Analysing the candidates’ billboards in the 2009 legislative election in Indonesia means investigating not only what’s inside the billboard, but also tracing what lies behind it. As mentioned in part one, these billboards represent the historical polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese strands in the political discursive practices, especially during the elections. The national elections represent a battle field for the Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese strands in the Indonesian political arena. The election does not merely show the political practices that espouse the relation between divergent dispositions and the role in the game, within the election itself, but also subtly shows the mechanism of symbolic exchange within the political camps or against one another. It means that investigating one single moment in the election, i.e. reading the visualisation of the candidate’s billboard advertising, demands examining the interaction between the stakeholder’s dispositions and the capital involved within the election. However, since I limit my research by focusing on reading what lies behind the representation and symbolic politics of the candidates’ billboards, a closer investigation into how the political parties position themselves in the Indonesian political framework is needed. This investigation illuminates the background of the polarisations of the political camps in relation to the ideological debates that leads to the positioning of the parties and the candidates as represented on the billboards. For instance, the party’s logo on the billboards can be seen as the visual medium which represents the ideological debates in Indonesia’s political history. Tracing the visual (ideological) transformation of the logo leads to the positioning process of the party which circumscribes the candidate’s image construction.

As a visual medium which was solely deployed, especially in Soekarno’s era, the logo signifies the party’s political identity. As mentioned in chapter two, Dienaputra (2010; 2011) found that the visual transformation of the parties’ logos was heavily influenced by the political constraints and amendment of government policies. These resulted in a similar pattern of shapes and colours the parties used in order to denote their political orientation. They adopted and adapted similar shapes of a star to connote religiosity, a buffalo to Pancasila-based democracy, the colours of yellow for nationalist prosperity, green for Islamic prosperity, and red for nationalist courage. The proliferation of these shapes and colours exemplifies the contestation and synthesis of Nationalist/Islamic codes.
in the parties’ logos that illuminate ideological ambiguity in Pancasila, and possibly covert Javanese domination.

This part discusses Indonesian political history, the ideological debates\(^\text{30}\), and the visual representation of the political parties’ logos. It aims to demonstrate that these three strands are interwoven and cannot be understood separately as the party’s logo visual transformation reflects the ideological debates in Indonesia’s political history. The transformation also signifies the contestation and synthesis of the Islamic/Nationalist strands, especially in the national elections. This investigation becomes a foundation to understand what lies behind the ideological debates as reflected in the visual transformation of the parties’ logos. A Barthesian lens is deployed to check the signifying practices of the visual symbols.

This part is organised into two main chapters. The first chapter discusses Indonesia’s political background based on how the distinctions and polarisations between Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands develop in the Indonesian political realm. These indirectly influence the candidate’s political branding. The candidates’ branding cannot be dissociated from their parties’ image that delineates the contestation and synthesis of these ideological cleavages as they live in the diverse context of Indonesian Islam, a moderately tolerant Islam with the leverage of the local (Javanese) culture. This religious cultural context constitutes the first section of this chapter as it functions as the background that illuminates the upheaval of the Islamic and Nationalist parties in the political sphere. The next chapter outlines how the Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands synthesise and contest in the first general elections (1955) to the most recent one (2009). The synthesis and contestation of these strands can be perceived from the visual transformation of the parties’ logos which will be discussed based on the periodical division of the general elections. This discussion of the parties’ logos is embedded within the discussion of the general elections as these two entities are intertwined in portraying the ideological debates of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands in the political arena.

\(^{30}\) especially surrounding the state ideology (Pancasila). Pancasila represents the contestation and synthesis of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese polarisations. How and why Pancasila represents the ambiguity can be traced as this part develops.
Chapter Four

Indonesia’s Political Background: the Upheaval in the Islamic/Nationalist Parties

This chapter aims to demonstrate how the ideological polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands synthesise and contest in the Indonesian political sphere. This is arguably due to the form of Indonesian Islam which is heavily influenced and characterised by Javanese tolerance and equilibrium (read: harmony). Not only does this inclusive notion open itself to the synthesis and contestation of these strands, but it also leads to the upheaval of the Islamic/Nationalist camps in the Indonesian political sphere, especially in the phase before Indonesia gained its independence and the early phase of the independence. These two phases mark the emergence of these strands. Thus, this chapter is organised by outlining Indonesian Islam, followed by the discussion of the upheaval of the Islamic/Nationalist camps. The latter sections are divided into three sub sections: the birth of the Islamic parties, the birth of the nationalist parties and the Islamic/Nationalist friction.

Indonesian Islam

The development of Islam in Indonesia since its emergence has constructed a new form of Islam, Indonesian Islam. Azra (2010, pp. 83 – 91) asserts that Indonesian Islam indicates the blending of the local wisdom (as represented in Pancasila) with the Islamic teachings, which produces a moderate tolerant Islam in Indonesia. It derives from the concept of ummatan washatan, i.e. the Islamic society or the ummat functions as the balancing force to bridge the internal conflict between the two extreme poles within Islam. However, Mulia (2010, pp. 98-99) argues this inclusive notion merely appears at the (political) elites’ level for in practice (such as the case of Ahmadiyah, a sect which believes in the existence of the other prophet after the last prophet, Muhammad) Indonesian people are still not able to segregate religion (Islam) as the ethical basis from the political one, especially when the case is brought to court. People are still confused when the pluralistic notion collides with their Islamic belief that Muhammad is the sole last prophet. They need to respect the different perspective in interpreting Islam, not seeing the issue as a blot on the pluralist principles.

31 My focus is not on how Indonesian Islam emerged and developed in accordance with Indonesia’s socio-cultural context, but more to investigate the mechanism of how the notion becomes the site of contestation between Islamic/Nationalist parties interweaved in the political realm which is substantially influenced by the Javanese culture.

32 Eklof (2003, pp. 26-40) argues that the concept substantially adopts the Islamic notions of Musyawarah (deliberation) and Mufakat (consensus) as the embodiment of the basic principle in Pancasila, known as family principle (kekeluargaan), for the people’s collective interest. Such notions represent Indonesian political culture rooted from the local wisdom (Javanese) as the form of resistance against the Western (Dutch) democratic model.
(Indonesian) Islam upholds. Notwithstanding the debate and the confusion, Azra (2010, pp. 89-91) still believes that the concept can be the archetype that mediates the internal conflict within Islam (the extremist versus the liberal) and liberates Islam from the stigma of terrorism and radicalism, especially after the 9/11 incident.

The classic example of the embodiment of Indonesian Islam is the assimilation between Islam with the local culture, such as in the Javanese tradition, Slametan. Forshee (2006, p. 37) asserts that Slametan is perceived as a sustainable method in preserving communal harmony while celebrating a family event. The objective is to seek protection against evil spirits by offering food and reciting Al-Qur’an, the Islamic Holy Book. In slametan, all members of the community participate and assist mutually (better known as gotong-royong) to help the host in the phases of preparing the ritual, during the ritual and after slametan. Each person will feel that they owe something, not necessarily in terms of money, but to the moral obligation of helping one another in any way. The tradition indicates the Javanese concept of equilibrium. Presenting two different things at the same time, in offering food while reading the holy Islamic scripture, can be seen as a Javanese way of life seeking to maintain the harmony - balancing the yin and yang elements in life. This spirit is the basic foundation of the Indonesian people and a salient part of the Indonesian Islamic (political) practices which regard local wisdom highly.

Javanese culture has become deeply rooted in Indonesian political life, especially in the early twentieth century. Dahm (1969) in his classic book, Soekarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, argues that in Soekarno’s period Indonesian political history was closely related to the Javanese utopianist dream of the Javanese Messiah’s (Ratu Adil or the just prince) advent to liberate the country from colonialism (Dahm called it alien domination). He found that the embryo of the Islamic/Nationalist parties were in line with the fulfilment of the Jayabaya prophecy. Jayabaya foresaw that Java would meet its ruin (the unjust age) and revive when the Javanese Messiah came to the Island. This cultural feature should be taken into account for historians note that the emergence of Islamic/Nationalist parties was centred in Java. This made the Javanese culture a pervasive influence in Indonesia. Arguably the notions of Islamic/Nationalist then synthesise and materialise in Indonesian (Javanese-centric) political practices.

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33 Jayabaya was the Javanese King of Kediri, a kingdom which was closely related with Majapahit, the largest and prosperous kingdom in Java. Kediri is located in East Java. Jayabaya ruled Kediri kingdom in 1135-1157.
34 Hisyam, et.al (2004) and Kaligis (2009) noted that the three Indonesian Presidents (Soekarno, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) claimed to be the descendants of Majapahit kingdom. Kaligis (2009) argues that the claim signifies their attempt to revive their Javanese romanticism, to seemingly bring back the prosperity to the Indonesian people, in order to fulfill the Jayabaya prophecies.
negative is forbidden because it will ruin the equilibrium. In other words, Javanese culture allows the contestation, the assimilation, and the harmonious equality of the Islamic/Nationalist strands at the same time. These cultural/political features represent the collective dispositions in the political arena as the impetus for devising the Indonesian Islam construct. The coalescence of these notions becomes crucial as their intersection forges an unstable construction.

The birth of Indonesian Islam follows the same path as the history of its emergence in the archipelago. History records that commerce peacefully brought Islam to Indonesia by Indian, Chinese and Arab merchants, reaching the coastal regions. It effaced the caste system and peacefully dispersed in the twelfth and thirteenth century. In the 1920s and 1930s Islam grew primarily heading in two directions: the traditionalist versus the modernist (Mashad, 2008). However, since all of them represent pious Muslims, Geertz (1960) simplifies them into one category, santri. It is one of Geertz’s findings in his investigation of what he called the religion of Java. As discussed in chapter one, he found that Islam in Java constituted polar ideas: the pious Muslim (santri) and the nominal Muslim, abangan. Geertz fails to look deeper into what constituted the discrepancy, not between santri and abangan, but within themselves. As noted in chapter one, the notions of santri/abangan interweave in their proliferation. They intertwine as Indonesian Islam moved forward in its development and diversify into ostensibly discrepant directions: the Islamic and nationalist (see chapter one).

The Upheaval of Islamic/Nationalist Parties in the Political Sphere

The contestation between the Islamic/Nationalist camps does not always reach acquiescence in the political sphere as they evolve in accordance within the socio-historical/political context in Indonesia, especially during the elections. The election is the crucial democratic event that is not merely significant for the circulation of the ascendancy but also for unravelling the identity of its participants (in this case the political parties and the legislative candidates) from their politics of image. How the Islamic/Nationalist strands contest and obscure the identity of the participants in

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35 The modernist camp desires to purify Islam by returning to the Islamic scriptures and perceives the traditionalist act of solely adopting the old Islamic tradition needs to be purified. However, a significant shifting had been made by the traditionalist leader from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Abdurrahman Wahid, in the context of pluralism, when his government in 1999 liberated the Chinese from their repression by allowing them to practise their religion and culture publicly. Sonja van Wichelen (in Cara Aitchison, Peter Hopkins and Mei-Po Kwan (eds.), 2007, pp. 96-97) proposes her five analytical categories of the Indonesian Islamic groups: the modernist (such as Muhammadiyah), the traditionalist (NU), the Tarbiyah movement (campus-based movement, such as KAMMI or Indonesian Muslim Student Association Front, PKS or Prosperous Justice Party), the Mujahidin (the group that wants to fiercely implement the shariah law such as FPI, Laskar Jihad, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Hizb-al-Tahrir), and the Liberal left (such as Jaringan Islam Liberal or JIL that wants to counter the radical Islam).

36 and priyayi (see chapter one).
the elections deserves a close investigation. Prior to that, we need to check how the political parties were born and how the friction occurred.

**The Birth of the Islamic Parties**

Prior to the first general elections in 1955, the map of Indonesian politics was marked by the birth of Islamic parties. It was in 1911 during the Dutch colonial era that the first political (Islamic nationalist) party/organisation, *Syarikat Dagang Islam* (SDI) or Islamic Trading Union[^37], in Indonesia was born. It later changed its name into *Syarikat Islam* (SI) or Islamic Union. Raden Umar Said Cokroaminoto, the most prominent SI’s leader, promulgated the idea of liberating Indonesia from colonisation as the party’s campaign. Kahin (1997, pp. 23-24) asserts that this revolutionary mission became the shared purpose that united Indonesian people, especially in Java. Dahm (1969, pp. 15-70) reinforces the argument when he conjectured that SI’s highest membership (510,788 members) in 1918 was due to the Javanese’ inadequate knowledge of Islam as they frequently associated themselves with the word Muslim. Moreover, Indonesian people at that time perceived SI as the symbol of self-reliance, anti-Westernism and anti-imperialism. Cokroaminoto was also perceived as the representation of the Javanese Messiah. Dahm (1969) also noted that when socialist ideas penetrated the country, SI’s leader amended his orientation by transforming the idea of national independence into a socialist one of effacing the segregation between the rich and the poor.

The actual impetus of the Islamic parties was *Majelis Islam ‘Ala Indonesia* (MIAI) or Indonesian Islamic Council, which was born on 21 September 1937. Seven Islamic organisations joined the council and the number then rose to twenty one in 1941. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah were amongst them. In the Japanese occupation, MIAI was transformed into *Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* (Masyumi) or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims. Almost all Islamic parties and Islamic organisations joined MIAI. They were bound with the same ideological vision to fight against colonialism. The new Masyumi was born when it declared liberation of itself from the Japanese colonial influence, as the corollary of 7-8 November 1945 Congress. It received political support from all Islamic organisations in Indonesia and was led by the representatives from NU (the traditionalist) and Muhammadiyah (the modernist).

[^37]: SDI had 50 branches all over Indonesia. It then transformed into a political party named *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* (PSII) or Indonesian Islamic Union Party.
The Birth of Nationalist Parties

The birth of nationalist parties was marked by the establishment of *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI)\(^{38}\) or Indonesian Nationalist Party on 4 July 1927 formerly known as *Perserikatan National Indonesia* or Indonesian Nationalist Union. This aimed to struggle for Indonesia’s independence by resisting the Dutch colonial practices with *Marhaenism*\(^{39}\) as its ideological basis. The self-help and non-cooperative ideals adopted from SI was nourished in PNI. The adoption indicated that the establishment of a nationalist party could not be dissociated from Islamic influence. Soekarno, one of the party’s founders, learnt this non-cooperative ideal from Cokroaminoto, his former father-in-law. However, the desire of Javanese culture to seek and maintain harmony through negotiation made the non-cooperation concept collapse. Cokroaminoto’s negotiation with the Dutch triggered friction inside the SI which allegedly led to the withdrawal of Semaun, the founder of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Eklof (2003, p. 26) argues that the ideological differences made Indonesian politics in 1920s fragment into two major political parties: Islamic and Communist\(^{40}\) with the latter being banned in 1966 due to its rebelliousness. The PKI’s abolition triggered the unification of the nationalist parties under PNI.

Fearing PNI’s radical movement, the Dutch captured its key figures: Soekarno, Maskun, Mangunprojo and Supriadinata. During Soekarno’s imprisonment in 1931, PNI dissolved itself and re-established into two parties: *Partai Indonesia* (Partindo) or Indonesian Party led by the former founder of the old PNI, Mr. Sartono, and new PNI led by Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir and this marked the split inside the nationalist camp. Soekarno was then perceived as the representation of the Javanese (PNI) Messiah. Sjahrir (1947, p. 56) states that Soekarno frequently portrayed his struggle as a holy one, conducted fasting as part of his habitual activities, and believed in *jimat*\(^{41}\) to gain more (mystical) power. The new PNI was highly influenced by Marxist thought because the

\(^{38}\) It was established as the cadre party in which the cadres undertook courses and final examination in order to become the trained members.

\(^{39}\) Dahmn (1969, pp. 143-154) and Eklof (2003, pp. 28-30) argue that *Marhaenism* reflects Soekarno’s socialist conception which connotes the equation between the struggle for independence with the traditionalist Marxist class struggle. *Marhaenism* promotes a classless society in order to gain a just social order through social revolutionaries. Soekarno (as cited by Adams, 2011, p. 75 and ajaran Bung Karno II [module], 2011, pp. 29-37) believed that the class struggle was not needed as the ultimate goal of Indonesian struggle for independence was to achieve freedom. In Soekarno’s view, *Marhaenism* represents Indonesia’s truest nationalist/socialist identity because he found that 99 per cent of the population at the time were low class peasants/groups who owned and worked on their land, but were incapable of having a decent life. He further defined and refined the concept at *Partai Indonesia* or Partindo’s conference in 1933 and at the 30th commemoration day of PNI in 1957, arguing that the Marxist egalitarian ideology positions the *Marhaen* as the foundation of the Indonesian revolution against capitalism and imperialism.

\(^{40}\) It had a great influence over Soekarno. Like Cokroaminoto, Soekarno also attempted to maintain the harmony by later propagating the concept of NASAKOM (nationalist, religion and communist) in his administration (see chapter five).

\(^{41}\) A magical charm
exponents, Hatta and Sjahrir, promoted the class struggle as the ideological instrument to liberate itself from Dutch colonisation.

Approaching the first general elections in 1955 other nationalist and communist/socialist parties sprang up. The ideological polarisations at this period did not primarily stick with the Islamic/Nationalist camps, notwithstanding the fact that the two currents dominated the political arena. The nationalist camp developed with the emergence of other nationalist parties such as Partai Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia (Permai) or Indonesian Marhaen People Party, Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI) or Indonesia Independence Vanguard Party. The communist/socialist parties such as PKI, Partai Buruh (Labour Party), Partai Rakyat National (National People Party), Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) or Indonesian Socialist Party, Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (Partai Murba), Partai ACOMA emerged as the parties who adhered to a similar ideological vision that Soekarno promulgated: nationalist and Marxist/socialist. Having a similar vision as the nationalist parties, other religious parties such as Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo) or Indonesian Christian Party, Partai katolik (Catholic Party) later fused into the nationalist camp after the first general elections.

**The Islamic/Nationalist Friction**

The Islamic parties’ harmony met its challenge when they had to determine Indonesia’s philosophical foundation with the nationalist camp. Prior to independence, the Islamic and nationalist factions debated the appropriate form of state ideology and the Constitution as the Islamic camp suggested Islam be the foundation of the state. The debate eventually reached an accord known as the Jakarta Charter on 22 June 1945 as the preamble of the 1945 Constitution. On 17 August 1945 Soekarno and Hatta, the two Indonesian nationalist activists who later became the first President and Vice President, proclaimed Indonesia’s Independence. A day after independence, the Nationalists demanded some amendments. They wanted to replace the phrase “with the obligation to live according to Islamic law for the Muslims” in the Jakarta Charter with the phrase “Belief in One Almighty God” as the first principle of Pancasila. The word “mukaddimah” in the 1945 Constitution which derives from Arabic language was amended into “pembukaan” (Indonesian language), although the two words have the same meaning, i.e. preamble. Article 6 Section 1 of the 1945 Constitution was also amended by erasing the provision which stipulates that Indonesia’s President be a Muslim. Mashad (2008, pp. 56-61) notes that the Islamic camp eventually assented to the amendments considering the fact that it was too early to proclaim Islam as the state ideology in the early phase of Indonesia’s independence. The incident later became the impetus for endless conflict between them.
The Islamic parties’ cohesion again met its challenge, especially when Indonesia transformed herself into *Republik Indonesia Serikat* (RIS) or the federation. This new form was the corollary of the Round Table Treaty with the Dutch on 27 December 1949, when the Dutch acknowledged Indonesia’s sovereignty. The negotiation forged the 1950 provisional Constitution. However, becoming a federation instigated the internal conflict of the political parties for the federation required positioning the group interest above others. The internal conflict inside Masyumi began. SDI (or later PSII) decided to withdraw from Masyumi in July 1947 and joined the Amir Syarifudin Cabinet, which was dominated by the leftist camp. In May 1952, NU followed PSII’s lead and obtained seats in Ali Sastro Amidjojo Cabinet in mid 1953. NU’s withdrawal from Masyumi indicated the overt fragmentation between the traditionalist and the modernist camps at that time. The traditionalists feared the modernist’ domination over Masyumi and frequently felt that their roles was gradually attenuated, especially when Masyumi’s highest advisory council (*Majelis Syuro*) dominated by NU leaders no longer had the right to make the final decisions. Hakim (1993, p. 26) notes that Natsir, Masyumi’s former leader, suggested these NU clerics mainly focus on religious matters instead of political ones.

At this stage the emergence of Islamic and Nationalist parties cannot be dissociated from the inclusive form of Indonesian Islam which is influenced by Javanese values (if not culture). The upheaval of the Islamic/Nationalist camps in the early phase of Indonesia’s independence shows not only the ideological contestation but also the synthesis of Islamic, Nationalist, and Javanese strands in the inclusive framework of Indonesian Islam. The pervasive Javanese values in this ideological framework arguably allow synthesis as well as contestation in order to maintain equilibrium. The next chapter will investigate how both ideological synthesis and contestation circulated and evolved, especially during the general elections (1955-2009).
Chapter Five

The Synthesis and Contestation of Islamic/Nationalist Strands in the 1955-2009 General Elections

This chapter aims to examine how the polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist strands in the Islamic/Nationalist camps contest and synthesise during the phase of general elections. This is highly important as not only do these mark the milestones of Indonesian politics, but these historical episodes also demonstrate the fluidity of these strands as the result of the ideological synthesis and contestation. Thus, this chapter is organised into one main section, i.e. the general elections. This is divided into five sub-sections: the 1955 elections (Soekarno’s era), the elections in Soeharto’s era, the 1999 elections (transition era), the 2004 elections and the 2009 elections.

General Elections in Indonesia

Indonesia has had ten general elections from 1955 to 2009. The first one was during Soekarno’s regime in 1955. The second to the seventh general elections (1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997) were conducted in Soeharto’s administration, whilst the eighth to the tenth (1999, 2004, and 2009) were held in the Reform era.

I. The 1955 Elections

The initiation of the first Elections came on 3 November 1945 when Mohammad Hatta, through (Maklumat42 no. X), acceded to the emergence of the political parties prior to the establishment of the People’s Consultative Assembly and the House of Representatives, which was initially planned in January 1946. Ten political parties registered: Masyumi, PKI, Partai Buruh Indonesia (PBI) or Indonesian Labour Party, Partai Rakyat Jelata (Commoner’s Party), Parkindo, Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) or Indonesian Socialist Party, Partai Rakyat Sosialis (PRS) or Socialist People’s Party, Partai Katolik Republik Indonesia (PKRI) or Republic of Indonesia Catholic Party, Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia (Permai) or Indonesian Marhaen People Party, PNI.43 The number of contestants escalated to 172 parties in the first general election.

The first election in Indonesia was held by employing pure proportional with the closed list system (adopted from the Dutch) in which one parliamentary seat represented a proportion of the

42 Political announcement

43
population. Suryadinata (2002), Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata (2004) and Sardini (2011) perceive this election as the most democratic election in Indonesia due to its democratic liberal principles, notwithstanding Indonesian people did not have any prior experience regarding the election. The judicial laws underpinning the execution of the first election were frequently amended. The initial Law for the election (Law no. 27/1948) was amended by the Law no. 12/1949 and later by Article 57 of the 1950 provisional Constitution. It was the Wilopo Cabinet that produced Law no 7/1953 which later brought Indonesia to her first election.

The 1955 Election was conducted consecutively in Burhanudin Harahap Cabinet (from Masyumi) on 29 September and 15 December 1955, espousing 15 constituencies with the pure proportional system. The first election aimed to elect the members of the House of Representatives, whereas the second one was to elect the members of the Constituent Assembly. The result showed that PNI obtained 22.32 per cent (57 seats), Masyumi 20.93 per cent (57 seats), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 18.41 per cent (45 seats), PKI 16.36 per cent (39 seats), PSII 2.89 per cent (8 seats) for the House of Representative Election. As for the election of Constituent Assembly members, PNI received 23.97 per cent (119 seats), Masyumi 20.59 per cent (112 seats), NU 18.47 per cent (91 seats), and PKI 16.47 per cent (80 seats), PSII 2.80 per cent (16 seats).\textsuperscript{44} Setiawan (2008) notes that the total votes of the nationalist camp were 46.86 per cent, whereas the Islamic camp was 43.71 per cent in the election for the House of Representatives.\textsuperscript{45} Unlike Setiawan, Antlov (2004, p. 5) classifies the winning camps into the four political blocks: modernist Muslim (Masyumi), traditionalist Muslim (NU), nationalist (PNI) and communist (PKI).

Kristanto (2009) notes the pattern of the 1955 elections in Java and Outer Islands. He found that the Islamic parties in Java merely obtained 39 per cent whilst the nationalist gained almost 50 per cent. The Islamic camp dominated the Outer Islands whereas the nationalist obtained less than 20 per cent. He noted that if one party were to win completely the votes all over Java, it would win the election at the national level. The arguments are quite simple: Java is the place where almost 60 per cent of the voters reside; it is the place where the government is centralised; Javanese culture


dominates Indonesian politics; the dichotomy of Java and Outer Islands influences the determination of the presidential figures.\footnote{Kristanto (2009) notes that the only non Javanese who succeeded in becoming the President was B.J Habibie from South Sulawesi. He was the former Vice President (21 May 1998 – 20 October 1999) in Soeharto’s cabinet. He became the third President (in the transition era) after Soeharto’s downfall for one year and five months. The other non Javanese figures (starting from Mohammad Hatta to Jusuf Kalla) merely occupied the Vice President seats.}

The visual construction of the political parties’ logos affirms the above polarisations. Dienaputra (2011) found two frequent visual images in the election’s visual realm: the Indonesian buffalo (\textit{Banteng})\footnote{The Indonesian male buffalo.} and the star and three colours (yellow, red and green). The nationalist camp mostly employed the image of the buffalo and the red colour whereas the image of the star and the green and yellow colours were commonly employed by the Islamic camp. The Javanese influence can overtly be seen in the political parties’ logos of the 1955 elections. Dienaputra (2011, p. 114) notes that the 1955 elections employed twenty eight visual variations in the logo. The image of Semar, the Javanese mythical puppet, was deployed by two political parties: \textit{Partai ACOMA (Angkatan Comunis Muda)} or a communist youth group party and \textit{Persatuan Rakyat Desa} (Village People Union).

![Semar](http://www.karatonsurakarta.com/semar.html)

Semar signifies a peculiar combination of deity as well as worker, and of female and male in one character. S/he appears in every \textit{wayang} (Javanese puppet) show or story as the descendant of God who comes to nurture the children of her/his own relatives. Semar’s face indicates that he is a male. However, the large bosom signifies that she may be a woman. The Javanese perceives Semar as the symbol of the selfless religious role model who guides them in conducting their everyday (religious) practices.\footnote{See “Semar” (n.d). Retrieved from \url{http://www.karatonsurakarta.com/semar.html}} As a two-sided element in one body, Semar signifies the symbolic embodiment of Javanese equilibrium and wisdom. By deploying Semar in its logo, ACOMA constructed its identity as the communist youth group party which visually claimed to have Semar’s (Javanese) quality of
wisdom and neutrality as the character represents the religious model without certain religious orientation\(^{49}\). The deployment of Semar to plausibly represent the neutral side of ACOMA does not correlate with the party’s name which indicates its ideological (communist) orientation. However, it seems that its deployment is intended to construct the party’s neutrality by providing a character that is familiar to the visual memory of Indonesian society. At the same time, the image of Semar not only indicates the party’s orientation to a certain ethnicity but also indirectly shows its visual acknowledgement of Javanese hegemony. The ACOMA party obtained a mere 0.17 per cent of votes for the House of Representatives election and 0.15 per cent for the Constituent Assembly.\(^{50}\)

The meaning construction of Semar then shifted when *Persatuan Rakyat Desa* (PRD) employed it. The party’s name indicates socio-nationalist orientation. Since PRD gained 0.21 per cent from the total votes in 1955 and did not participate in the next elections, the record for the party was extremely poor. However, the name indicates the possibility that the party is one of Soekarno’s *Marhaenism* variants for the phrase “Rakyat Desa” (village people) is aligned with *Marhaenism* which puts the peasants/villagers as the motor that actuated the revolutionary movement of independence. With a similar perspective, Semar is exploited to represent the religious neutrality and wisdom of the communist/socio-nationalist camps. In this sense, the adoption of this Javanese symbol on the parties’ logos demonstrates the political attempt to synthesise local wisdom with the parties’ ideologies (in this case communism and *Marhaenism*). This also suggests that the party wanted to exploit Semar’s popularity. However, at the same time, this synthesis signifies ideological dilution as this synthesis arguably does not operate in an arbitrary manner.

This visual ideological dilution coloured the ideological contestation in the multiparty system of the 1955 elections. This system then met its end, especially when Soekarno decided to deploy the guided democratic system by issuing the Law PnPs no. 7/1959. He constrained the political parties that wanted to amend *Pancasila* and dissolved Masyumi in 1960 based on the Presidential Decree no. 200/1960. Soekarno also reduced the number of the parties from fifty two to ten. These maneuvers were perceived not as his attempt to appease the ideological friction in the multiparty system, but as a political scheme to perpetuate his status quo (1959-1965). This was conducted by synthesising the nationalist, Islamic, and communists under one concept NASAKOM (Nationalist, Religion, and Communist) in his government. As noted in the previous chapter, it proved to be a failure as his government oriented more to the communist side as Soekarno embraced PKI and the

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49 Semaun, PKI’s former chairperson, in Dahmn (1969, p. 74) stated that the party was neutral to religion although it was formerly assimilated in Syarikat Islam.

military in his administration and this ruined the (Javanese) equilibrium. This was clearly seen in 1956-1959 when the 1945 Constitution was to be amended\textsuperscript{51} but met a deadlock in terms of determining \textit{Pancasila} as the state ideology for the Islamic parties opposed the idea. They disagreed with the implementation of separating religion from the state as implicitly stated in \textit{Pancasila} (van Wichelen in Cara Aitchison, Peter Hopkins and Mei-Po Kwan (Eds.), 2007, p. 95). Instead of seeking an alternative solution to the problem, Soekarno, in fact, affirmed his actions by returning to the 1945 Constitution due to the Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959 which dissolved the People Consultative Assembly. This act gave him tremendous power for it contained the flaws of Presidential system. The entire power of the state was centralised in the President (Nasution in Azra and Hudson, 2008, p. 17). He then designated the parliament members, named as MPR/DPR Gotong Royong. This led to totalitarian government.

The so-called communist coup on 30 September 1965 marked the fall of Soekarno. Soeharto began his era, known as the New Order, by setting up an obscure political organisation, Golkar (\textit{Golongan karya} or Functional(ist) Group) which represented the political arm of the Indonesian army.

\section*{II. General Elections in Soeharto’s Regime}

Political scholars (Eklof, 2003; Haris, 2004a; Rizkiyansyah, 2007; Antlov and Cederroth, 2004; Antlov, 2004; Suryadinata, 2002; Crouch, 2010) are of the same opinion that the six national elections conducted in Soeharto’s era were systematically manipulated. This was initially due to a grand scheme to liberate the country from its socio-economic and political crisis of Soekarno’s legacy by establishing and maintaining the social order and economic development employing an authoritarian approach.

As previously noted, Soeharto gained his power not by national elections. However, his government promised to hold the next election on 5 July 1968 as stated in the provisional People Consultative Assembly’s provision no. XI/1966. Rizkiyansyah (2007, p. 30) and Haris (2004a, p. 20) note that Soeharto) felt the need to stabilise the condition of the country prior to the general elections and believed that the social unrest, the threat of national disintegration, the unstable cabinet, and economic decline\textsuperscript{52} in Soekarno’s administration, stemmed from the people’s freedom to actively participate in politics, which were alleged as the source of the separatist movement and political turmoil. Antlov (2004, p. 7) notes that Soeharto then deployed Golkar\textsuperscript{53}, which was the socio-

\textsuperscript{51}It was the mandate stated in the 1950 provisional Constitution.
\textsuperscript{52}The inflation reached 600 per cent.
\textsuperscript{53}In 1964, Soeharto’s government established the Joint Secretariat of Functional(ist) Group (known as Golkar) as the embodiment of the 1945 Constitution which stipulated the existence of the functional(ist) group
political organisation that consisted of military and bureaucrats, as his political machine to stabilise the dynamic forces in Indonesia.

Haris (2004a) and Rizkiyansyah (2007) note the systematic procedures to promote Golkar in securing its seats with the espousal of the state/administrative and repressive apparatus. They found that Golkar (central advisory) members had penetrated the election system from national to village level. The Minister of Home Affairs, the member of Golkar’s Central Advisory Board, as the head of Lembaga Pemilihan Umum (LPU) or the Institute of General Election and Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia (PPI) or Indonesian Election Committee, acted as the political parties’ tutor. The Governors, District Heads, Mayors, Village Headmen, who were Golkar cadres and functionaries, headed the election committee at their respective levels (province, district and village). The election monitoring committee from the national to the village level was chaired by government officials (from Golkar). The regulation continued in the screening process in which the legislative candidates of other parties needed an official clearance from the armed forces to participate in the election. Haris (1997) further found that this procedure was intended to ostensibly screen the candidates from PKI’s influence, whilst the fact was that they prevented the participation of the outspoken candidates. However, it indicated Soeharto’s fear of the remaining influence of PKI. Dienaputra (2010, pp. 95-101) notes that Soeharto prevented the use of the visual symbol for the PKI as the Law no 15/1969 promulgated a ban on employing communist countries’ (such as the former USSR) national symbol, hammer and sickle, in conjunction with the PKI’s logo (hammer and sickle) during his regime.

The procedure then continued in minute detail. Eklof (2003, pp. 48-54) notes Soeharto’s strategies to emasculate his opponents prior to the 1971 election. He deployed the repressive apparatus (such as the military intelligence body Special Operation (Opsus or Operasi khusus) headed by Brigadier General Ali Moertopo) to intimidate the PNI’s Semarang congress participants to choose Hadisubeno Sosrowerdjojo, Soeharto’s associate. A decoy was also set up to shift the position of Mohammad Roem, as the elected chairperson of Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi) or Indonesian Muslim Party by having Djaelani Naro, the member of the party’s central board who had a close relationship with Moertopo, to rule Parmusi. Naro claimed that he had taken over the party. The government then interfered in this conflict and made M.S. Mintaredja, the Minister of Home Affairs, the party’s appointed general chairperson.

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54 In April 1970
55 He was associated with Masyumi mutiny in 1950s.
56 The Islamic party which represented the defunct Masyumi.
Adityawan (2008) dismantled Soeharto’s propaganda and found that it reflected Soeharto’s Javanese\textsuperscript{57} militaristic\textsuperscript{58} disposition which affirmed his image as a Javanese king with \textit{Pancasila} as the ideology he deployed to maintain his power. The People Consultative Assembly (MPR) in Soeharto’s era issued a provision no. II/MPR/1978 regarding the elaboration of \textit{Pancasila}’s five principles (\textit{Eka Prasetya Pancakarsa/Pedoman Penghayatan Pengamalan Pancasila} or Guidance for Understanding and Practising \textit{Pancasila}) as the sole interpretation of the state ideology. It became the ideological means for Soeharto to coerce the political parties to adopt \textit{Pancasila} as the sole ideology\textsuperscript{59} based on Law no. 8/1985. Ideological uniformity was also applied to all (government) sectors including \textit{Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia} or KORPRI (Indonesia’s Civil Servants Corps) established in 1971 and \textit{Ikatan Dharma Wanita}. \textit{Ikatan Dharma Wanita} is an organisation of the civil servants’ wives which is deployed to provide guidance and counselling services to the housewives through \textit{Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga} (PKK) or Family Welfare Education program. While giving the services, they promoted Golkar (read: government’s programs) and persuaded housewives to vote for the party in the elections.

In a Foucauldian\textsuperscript{60} lens, the guidance the government provided in order to interpret \textit{Pancasila} signifies not only the reduction of meaning in \textit{Pancasila} but also shows how power relations define the constructed meaning. Imposing \textit{Pancasila} is conducted not merely by promulgating the law to legalise the act but also organises it systematically so that coercion appears as normalisation. \textit{Pancasila} was taught at all levels of education, from primary to tertiary education. The systematic

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{57} Adityawan (2008, pp. 74-132) found that Soeharto adopted the Javanese values from the 18th century Javanese kings of Mataram Kingdoms (Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat and Surakarta Hadiningrat). He adopted the Javanese values: a leader is the symbol of truth for he reflects God’s will based on the divine inspiration (\textit{wahyu}) the leader receives (Soeharto learnt Javanese mysticism, meditation and Islam from Kiai Darjatmo); the leader’s task is to protect and maintain (social) harmony through \textit{musyawarah} (deliberation), \textit{mufakat} (consensus) so that social order and justice can be achieved (see chapter six); showing excessive emotion is forbidden; the communication pattern between \textit{Gusti} (the ruler) and \textit{Kawula} (the ruled) should be in one direct hierarchical line (\textit{kromo inggil, kromo ngoko}); Respecting the elders is conducted in accordance with Javanese philosophy, i.e. \textit{mikul dhuwur, mendem jero} (memikul setinggi-tingginya, memendam sedalam-dalamnya) or valuing/respecting the elders by not revealing their flaws (see Soeharto Pikiran, \textit{Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya Otobiografi}, Dwipayana and Ramadhan K.H (1989, pp. 165-169)).
  \item \textsuperscript{58} Soeharto (cited in Roeder, 1976, p. 170) perceived his coming to military life by becoming KNIL (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) soldier during Dutch colonisation as the moment “that opened the door to his happy life in the future”.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} Adityawan (2008, pp. 77-113) argues that in Javanese perspective, the sole ideology reflects the embodiment of social harmony (\textit{kerukunan}) which is needed to maintain stability of the country. The social harmony is not seen as an active notion in Javanese culture but more like a process of not disturbing the pre-existing harmony.
  \item \textsuperscript{60} The discussion does not fully concentrate on deploying a Foucauldian lens. This sub section merely aims to show how Soeharto attempted to control the ideological interpretation of \textit{Pancasila} with an expectation to prevent the proliferation of meaning within the ideology itself. Thus, it is not necessary to elaborate on how Soeharto’s ascendancy produces resistance as one of the focuses of this chapter is to show how visual transformation reflects the ideological debates within the Islamic/Nationalist camps in Indonesia’s political arena which is heavily influenced by Javanese culture.
\end{itemize}
procedure Soeharto deployed also signifies the use of the surveillance mechanism. The discipline was dispersed within the framework of *Pancasila*. Adityawan (2008, p. 95) notes that in muffling his opponents, Soeharto frequently deployed “Indonesian way”, i.e. *musyawarah* (deliberation), to handle the contention. Euphemism was dominantly deployed in this disciplinary discourse, for Soeharto wanted to maintain his image as a calm (Javanese) leader that did not want to show an excessive emotion (anger) which merely violated his Javanese values. When he deployed military force, he directly attached his act with the euphemistic jargon *pemulihan keamanan dan ketertiban* (restoring security and order).

This deployment of *Pancasila* to gain people’s consent for the government proved to be successful in gaining Soeharto and Golkar a series of wins in the elections. With all the government’s (read: Soeharto) support to Golkar, it would not be a surprise to find that Golkar won 62.82 per cent of the total votes in the 1971 Election. However, it failed to win in Aceh and Maluku for the former was the domain of the Islamic front whereas the latter was that of the Protestants. Golkar also failed to dominate Jakarta due to the domination of the minor parties over the capital city, although Golkar claimed itself as the representation of the modernised development-oriented party (Mackie, 1974, p. 70). The operation of the *kawula-gusti* concept (see chapter six) as reflected in *Pancasila* possibly influenced Golkar’s victory.

In this election, the parties deployed the image of star as the dominant symbol (Dienaputra, 2011, pp. 99-210). Dienaputra found that the image of the star dominated the Islamic camp (except for *Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak* (MURBA) or People’s deliberation), the image of buffalo was solely employed by PNI front *Mahaernisme*, whereas the image of the candle, pine tree, and rosary represented the Catholic and Christian parties (*Partai Katolik* and *Partai Kristen Indonesia* or Parkindo). The Joint Secretariat of Golkar deployed the image of a banyan tree, conjoined with rice and cotton plants to illuminate its nationalist orientation.

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62 Sardini (2011, pp. 15-16) asserts that the proportional system in the 1971 Election based on Law no 15/1969 became the effective tool to reduce the number of seats the parties obtained. Further elections (1977-1997) employed the same proportional system as in the 1971 election.

63 Golkar was perceived replacing the position of PNI as the government party. Bourchier (1997, pp. 157-185) argues that the essences of *Pancasila* (*Musyawarah* or deliberation, *Mufakat* or consensus and *Gotong Royong* or mutual assistance) as “the product of diverse customary law in Indonesia” especially Java, stemmed from “the traditional ethos of the inseparable entities of *kawula* (ruled) and *gusti* (ruler) with the total obligation of the ruled to the ruler”. The words *kawula* and *gusti* are Javanese. Thus, according to Mackie (1974, p. 71), “it would be unwise for the peasant not to follow the government party”.

64 Mura is considered as the national-communist party propagated by Tan Malaka. The party then joined the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) in 1977.
IPKI) or Indonesia Independence Vanguard Party employed the image of conjoined rice and cotton plants and also the image of a tower in the middle of the paddy and cotton. In this sense, the visual attributes the parties deployed in the 1971 Elections indicated their religious political orientation. For instance, MURBA’s deployment of the image of the star signifies that although this party was perceived as a national-communist party, its logo (the star) visually demonstrated the party’s religious side compared to its political (communist) orientation, which was generally represented by hammer and sickle. This visuality shows that MURBA attempted not only to show the party’s religiosity, but also indicates that a visual attempt had been made to integrate/synthesise communism and Islam as Tan Malaka, the party’s prominent figure, was known as the one who promoted socialist Islam.

In 1975 the government issued Law no 3/1975 to fuse nine parties into three (except Golkar) based on the ideological polarisations (Islamic/Nationalist): the Islamic parties such as NU, Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi) or Indonesian Muslim Party, Partai Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti) or Islamic Education Party and Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) or Indonesian Islamic Union Party, were merged in Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) or United Development Party, the nationalist parties (PNI, Parkindo, Catholic Party, IPKI, Partai Murba) were fused into Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) or Indonesian Democratic Party, and Golongan Karya (Golkar). However, prior to this law enactment, Islamic parties had already fused under PPP in 1973.

Below are the logos of the parties’ fusion (PPP, Golkar, and PDI):


The party’s fusion has implications for the visual transformation of the parties’ logos. The images the parties deployed show their ideological orientation of Islamic/Nationalist and reflect the nationalist vision as the images correlate with the five principles of Pancasila. The deployment of ka’bah as

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65 Except for PPP. PPP later amended its party’s logo to star to correspond with the government coercion to implement Pancasila as the sole ideology in Indonesia.
the image of PPP indicates that the party desired to be the centre of Muslim political aspirations for it implies the centre of Mecca, the Muslim holy city and also the direction for all Muslims to pray. Ka’bah also represents the cohesion of the four Islamic parties under one central direction. The logo above demonstrates Soeharto’s strategy to fuse the Islamic faction’s heterogeneity into a homogeneous Islamic entity to emasculate the Islamic power. This disposition stemmed from the fact that Soekarno indirectly taught him that the ideological cleavage potentially became a latent danger and a political fusion would be the best solution before it gnawed at his ascendancy. On the other hand, the logo can be perceived as a code of resistance since it does not completely signify submission, for the party decided not to adopt the religious symbol from Pancasila, i.e. the star.

Golkar deploys the images of the banyan tree and the conjoined rice and cotton plants to correlate with the third and the fifth principles of Pancasila, viz. nationalism and social justice, the two overarching visual elements which represent the party’s ideological vision. The tree is perceived as the Indonesian symbol of the nation’s integrity, whereas the conjoined rice and cotton plants signify the mutual assistance (gotong royong) and the family principle (kekeluargaan) to establish social justice. This visuality demonstrates that the party’s deployment of the ideological ideals of gotong royong and kekeluargaan is to achieve its main goal, the nation’s integrity66. The absence of the democratic nationalist sign (the buffalo’s head) in Golkar’s logo can be perceived as Golkar’s symbolic act of accentuating the symbolism of collective harmony67 (the banyan tree) which is achieved by upholding social justice within the framework of the nation’s integrity. The buffalo’s head that signifies the democratic principle does not need to be explicitly visualised in the logo as the nation’s integrity is achieved by democratic means of kekeluargaan and gotong royong ideals. Kleden (2009) argues that these concepts operate artificially. Gotong royong has been transformed from the former notion of cooperation into the notion of working together following the pattern of patron and client. This visual symbol implicitly reinforced Golkar’s contingent status over Soeharto, the party’s patron in the New Order era, and defined the concept of social justice within the framework of the nation’s integrity based on the patron’s (family) instruction (kekeluargaan).

The presence of the buffalo’s head appears in PDI’s logo. PDI employed the images of the buffalo’s head as the centre, the conjoined rice and cotton plants encircled the head, and the imperceptible image of the banyan tree behind the head connected with the rice and cotton. The head is perceived as the symbol of musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus) which represents the Indonesian model of democracy. The deployment of the images visually affirmed PDI’s image as the party which upheld democracy imbued with the almost complete Pancasila values of democracy and

66 The banyan tree is positioned at the center.
67 The nation’s integrity (persatuan Indonesia) demands a collective harmony of the diverse ethnic groups.
social justice (*musyawarah*, *mufakat*, *kekeluargaan*, and *gotong royong*), except for the nation’s integrity (the banyan tree), which is covertly present on the logo. The obscure employment of the banyan tree as the background became a differentiation marker of PDI from Golkar. Latif (2011, pp. 45-46) argues that the combination of the fourth and the fifth principles of *Pancasila* position them in the line with the deliberation (*musyawarah*) and consensus (*mufakat*) as these factors of rationalism and wisdom became the centre of PDI’s ideological vision, encircled by the principle of social justice which values the fulfilment of balancing “the civil rights of politics, law, economics, social and culture” through the notions of *gotong royong* and *kekeluargaan*. In other words, the banyan tree’s imperceptible image as the logo’s background indicates that PDI adopts the democratic notions of the fourth and the fifth principles of *Pancasila* and signifies that the adoption is to sustain the integrity of Indonesia.

If we look closer at the similar nationalist ideals the two parties uphold above, we will find that the absence/obscurity of the nationalist symbols (the buffalo’s head and the banyan tree) renders almost the same result. They both accentuate the notion of integrity with a different emphasis. *Gotong royong* and *kekeluargaan* appear at the same time in Golkar’s and PDI’s logos encircling the center visual symbol of both parties. *Gotong royong* shifts its meaning into the mutual system of patronage as in the case of Golkar. *Kekeluargaan* (family principle) also gradually shifts its meaning in PDI, especially when Megawati Soekarnoputri, the first President’s daughter, joined the political arena in 1992. Megawati then formed the politics of dynasty inside PDI, which later amended its name to PDI-P not long after Soeharto’s resignation.

The government’s coercion to fuse the parties at the visual level had a significant ideological effect, especially when the nationalist parties had to emerge under PDI. They (especially *Parkindo* and *Partai Katolik*) could no longer present their religious orientation in the logo and had to accept that PDI’s logo represented their nationalist side. Almost the same thing happened to the Islamic parties. PPP as the representation of the Islamic parties at Soeharto’s era had to amend its logo from *ka’bah* to the star in 1986 to resonate with the first principle of *Pancasila* that reflects (nationalist) religiosity. This agitated the party ideologically.

Haris (2004b, p. 32) also found that the fusion impacted on the escalation of votes for PPP (from 27.21 per cent in 1971 election to 29.29 per cent or an increase of 2.08 per cent in 1977 election) as it obtained votes from the former adherents of Masyumi, especially in Aceh and Jakarta. PDI still obtained the same number of votes as in the 1971 election (8.6 per cent) whereas Golkar’s votes descended slightly to 62.11 per cent. The result slightly fluctuated in the 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 elections especially for Golkar as it averaged 70 per cent of the votes.
The following is the results of the 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997 elections after the parties’ fusion:

![Graph showing election results](image)

Source: adopted from *Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (National Election Commission) 2011

The chart shows that PPP obtained its lowest votes (15.97 per cent) in the 1987 election. The government policy of ideological uniformity, *Pancasila*, as the sole ideology of the political parties was conjectured to be one of the causal factors. The party was obliged to amend its logo from *ka’bah* to a star to reflect the first principle of *Pancasila* which correlated with the religious orientation prior to the 1987 election. The amendment of PPP’s logo is as follows:

PPP's logo in 1982 election

PPP's logo in 1987 election

(Source: Dienaputra, 2010)

The image of the star which represents religiosity seems to attenuate the religious nuance for it signifies the neutral religious sense compared to *ka’bah* which eminently connotes the Islamic vision. The visuality also dilutes the visual leverage for the image of the star fails to distinguish PPP’s identity as the historic representation of the Islamic parties’ struggle to return to the basic Islamic principle inscribed in the Jakarta Charter. NU’s withdrawal prior to the 1987 election which broke

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the Islamic front’s votes also affected PPP’s votes. The number then rose gradually and reached 22.43 per cent in 1997 as the party received the benefit from PDI’s internal conflict.

PDI also amended its logo in 1987 as follow:


The omission of the conjoined rice and cotton plants and the obscure banyan tree in PDI’s logo indicates that the party no longer adopted the same principles as Golkar, the government political machine. It signifies that the reinforcement of PDI’s different position(ing) from Golkar by solely upholding the democratic notion from *Pancasila*. The efficacy of the third and the fifth principles accented that social justice and integrity can be achieved as long as *Pancasila* democracy is upheld. The visual transformation also shows that not only PDI’s new logo marks a distinctive visual nationalist expression to differ itself from Golkar, but also indicates the party’s endeavour to ossify its *Pancasila* democratic stance which visually defines the party’s identity. The focus on the buffalo’s head which represents the Indonesian democratic notion is chosen as the sole symbol that signifies that the nationalist stance PDI takes is different from the nationalist Golkar which highly regards the integrity of the nation. PDI’s logo distinctively demonstrates that Indonesian democracy should be the core ideological basis for the integrity of the nation.

Although this visualisation did not seem to have a direct correlation with PDI’s success in the 1992 elections, this party gained stronger support, especially when Megawati Soekarnoputri and Guruh Soekarnoputra, Soekarno’s children, joined the party in 1992. PDI’s votes increased from 10.87 per cent in 1987 election to 14.89 per cent in 1992 election. The condition agitated the government (read: Soeharto). With the Military’s support Soeharto then backed Soerjadi, the elected chairperson of Medan congress, to oust Megawati from her position as PDI’s chairperson at the 1993 Surabaya congress. PDI then merely obtained 3.6 per cent in 1997 Election. On the other hand, Golkar received the benefit from PDI’s internal conflict as the party obtained its highest percentage of votes (74.51 per cent) in the 1997 election. However, the party experienced a slight fall in 1992 (68.1 per
cent) after its gradual escalation from 62.11 per cent in 1977 election to 73.16 per cent in 1987 election.

The cleavage between Islamic and Nationalist camps in Soeharto’s era was not highly visible compared to Soekarno’s because the government policies diluted the polarisation. The ideological uniformity and the construction of a collective phobia in Indonesia plausibly engendered the obscurity. Haris (2005, pp. 20-21) contends that the government jargon, such as anti-politics, anti-party, and anti-ideology (except for Pancasila) attenuated the ideological polarisation of Islamic/Nationalist dichotomies, for Soeharto in the mid-1960s deployed the student activists’ slogan, of ‘politics no, development yes’ which brought him to power (Mahasin, 1989, p. 30), to attract people’s attention solely to the prosperity of the nation. In line with Haris, Adityawan (2008, p. 222) asserts that the above factors made Soeharto successfully construct his image as the father of Indonesia’s development. “Developmentalism” became the new ideology that could effectively muffle people’s opposition, but failed to synthesise the dichotomies of Nationalist/Islamic and Javanese/non Javanese.

However, when Soeharto felt that the power of his opponents and the military under the leadership of General LB. Moerdani became stronger, he approached the Muslims as his new ally during the 1990s, and established ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia – Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) and put B.J. Habibie, his later Vice President, in the chairmanship. Crouch (2010, pp. 131-136, 178) found that the two ostensibly discrepant mainstreams (the “red-and-white” and the “green”) inside the military institution did not correspond with either the nationalist or Islamic factions because the military officers were busy securing their own patronage network. The “red-and-white” which associates with the colour of the national flag represents the nationalist faction whereas the green associates with the Islamic one. However, the Islamic faction inside the military did not correlate with the Islamic line they underpinned as they had to secure their position especially when the institution was under the Javanese Catholic General Moerdani. In 1993 Soeharto dismissed Moerdani (especially after Moerdani questioned Soeharto’s family business (Conboy, 2004, p. 217)) and appointed General Feisal Tandjung, a non-Javanese Muslim, to fill in the position. What Soeharto did cannot be completely perceived as his shifting towards Islamic or non Javanese poles because he still kept the factional balance between the “red-and-white” and the “green” inside the military. Thus, instead of appeasing the dichotomies through his slogan “politic no, development yes”, he, in fact, sought security in the polarisation that benefited him to perpetuate his status quo.

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69 The Javanese dominated the military.
Soeharto’s maneuvers cannot also be solely seen to affect the failure of Islamic parties’ cohesion. Haris (2004, pp. 61-76) found that the root of its failure lies in the sharp political and leadership polarisation among the Islamic parties themselves as their leaders have a narrow sense of understanding the diversity of the Indonesian Islamic community. They are still bound up with the historic euphoria in which Islam played the cardinal role in constructing the national identity as well as the struggle for Indonesia’s independence, and dreamt of dominating the power structure. This cohesion is also challenged by the nationalist parties to ostensibly embrace (if not co-opt) the Muslim voters by establishing the Islamic institution to plausibly represent the party’s religious orientation,\textsuperscript{70} and by Soeharto’s actions in deterring the development of the Islamic political pluralism in Indonesia, as previously implied. The perennial abuse of religious teaching by the Islamic elites to justify their political maneuvers in order to undermine their rivals is seen to exacerbate the fragmentation. Haris (1991) notes how the chairperson of Nahdlatul Ulama amended his fatwa or ‘Islamic ruling’ from suggesting the obligation for NU’s adherents to vote for PPP in 1977 election (NU joined PPP) to the pragmatic action of permitting its adherents to vote for Golkar and PDI in 1987 (NU withdrew its political support for PPP).\textsuperscript{71}

Like NU, Soeharto also employed a pragmatic cultural strategy to secure his tenure. Antlov (2004, p. 6) found that the introduction of the term \textit{pesta demokrasi} or the festival of democracy in 1982 was part of Soeharto’s political, yet cultural maneuvers, to divert people’s attention. The deployment of the term which merely signifies the people’s festival (people were allowed to join the public crowd with the local/national celebrities espousal sponsored by the political parties during the campaign days) indicates the systematic effort to forge a ritual/cultural hoax to dupe and herd the people into the hegemonic political hocus-pocus.\textsuperscript{72} Thus via all political means, Soeharto successfully held his tenure for 32 years.

Suryadinata (2002, p. 45) outlines the downfall of the Soeharto New Order regime as being the result of his own product of a poor political and economic management system: “a large foreign debt, poor economic management, poor financial regulation, authoritarianism and cronyism”. Hadiz (2005) perceives that Soeharto’s downfall did not merely stem from this mismanagement. Rather it

\textsuperscript{70} For instance, Golkar employed its \textit{ Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah} (MDI) or Islamic Missionary Council as the Islamic institution to reflect the Islamic nuance \textit{vis-a-vis} its nationalist identity.

\textsuperscript{71} In 1999 election the abuse was heated when both the Islamic and nationalist factions deployed their own Islamic religious argument to justify the extent Islam permits the existence of female leader, at the time Megawati Soekarnoputri was nominated as the President from PDI-P.

\textsuperscript{72} This later marked the beginning of the emergence of politician celebrities in Indonesia, especially in the 2004 and 2009 elections. They would imitate the way celebrities enchanted the people in their campaign and alluringly present themselves as having a fresh, smart and inspiring appeal. Their billboards in the 2009 election represented this constructed image.
derived from the state domination, or “state capitalism” (Hadiz, 2005, p. 118), a system which was operated by a complex coalition Soeharto forged between the state and the dominant class\(^3\) in order to boost the so-called country’s economic progress, so that law and order could be maintained. The economic and financial crisis in 1997 eventually brought Soeharto’s administration into downfall. On 21 May 1998, Soeharto announced his resignation which put B. J. Habibie, the Vice President, into the chair.

### III. The 1999 Election (Election in Transition Era)

The fall of Soeharto’s regime commenced the Reform era. B.J. Habibie as the third President was considered as the President in Transition. He was stigmatised by his image as Soeharto’s former confidant. It was in his era that Pancasila was no longer imposed as the sole ideology of the political parties as the result of the Special Session of MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People’s Consultative Assembly)\(^4\) in November 1998. It annulled the Law no. 8/1985.

After the fall of Soeharto, political parties were mushrooming and 145 parties were formed. Only 48 parties were allowed to participate in the 1999 election due to administrative requirements. Suryadinata (2002, p. 77) contends that after the emasculation of the ideological cleavage in Soeharto’s regime, the old polarisations re-emerged when 48 parties participated and represented the Islamic/Nationalist camps. Golkar, PDI, and PPP transformed themselves. Golkar revealed its true identity as a political party which was comprised of nationalist figures and moderate Muslims. Golkar was fragmented into Partai Golkar, Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (PKP or Justice and Unity Party) and Partai MKGR. At almost the same time PDI was diffused into five parties: PDI, PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle), PNI-Massa Marhaenis, PNI-Front Marhaenis and PNI-Supeni. NU in the post-Soeharto’s era established PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or Nation Awakening Party), Partai Nahdlatul Ummat, and Partai Suni. New parties were born, such as PAN (National Mandate Party headed by Amien Rais, the former chairperson of Muhammadiyah\(^5\)), PBB (Partai

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\(^3\) They were the government officials, Soeharto’s family members and their business allies. They controlled the strategic departments such Department of Forestry, Department of Commerce, State-Owned Enterprises (such as Pertamina), and Indonesia logistics bureau (Bulog). They also had privileges in the protected sectors of non-commercial goods.

\(^4\) It is the Indonesia’s supreme sovereign body which drafts the state outline and amends the Constitution. The President was formerly elected by the MPR members. In the Soeharto’s era, MPR was seen as equal to the 1945 Constitution but after the amendment of the constitution, the sovereign body is placed equally with the Executive branch, Judicial branch and Supreme Audit Agency. Nasution (2008, p. 17) contends that MPR lost its power as the manifestation of the people’s sovereignty, for in the amendment article 1, paragraph (2) reads: “[t]he sovereignty is vested in the hands of the people and will be executed according to the Constitution”.

\(^5\) Muhammadiyah is the second largest Islamic modernist organisation.
Bulan Bintang or Crescent Star Party), and Masyumi Baru (New Masyumi) and PK (Partai Keadilan or Justice Party).

Habibie’s government accelerated the period for the election to gain stronger legitimacy from the people by appointing the Team of Eleven to draft the laws of the political party, the election, and the legislative structures. The team wanted to adopt the district system but lost its battle with the majority of new parties still favouring the proportional system because the district system would wipe out the small parties. The election system itself could not be called a pure proportional system as it combined some elements of the district as well as proportional systems. It also employed the ranking system of the candidates on a closed list which was previously determined by the political party. The system not only implies a covert mechanism of prioritising certain candidates, but also indicates the efficacious domination of the (large) parties in determining the election system. This system arguably marked the beginning of the party’s oligarchy in the Reform (transition) era.

The outcome of the 1999 general election resulted in the victory of wong cilik or the grassroots. It was shown that PDI-P led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of Soekarno, was preferred by 33.74 per cent of Indonesian citizens, especially at the grassroots, after the party suffered from the long and continuous repression of the Soeharto regime. Golkar secured a mere 22.44 per cent, a drastic decline compared to the 74.51 per cent of votes it obtained in the 1997 election. PKB obtained 12.61 per cent, whilst PPP and PAN gained 10.71 per cent and 7.12 per cent.76

The following are the logos of the five winning parties:

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The employment of the buffalo’s head (PDI-P) and the banyan tree and the conjoined rice and cotton plants images (Golkar) affirms that these two major nationalist parties consistently retained their historic adoption of the nationalist expression of *Pancasila*. The consistent images on the Golkar’s logo affirm the visual ossification of the party’s nationalist concepts as previously discussed. Dienaputra (2011, p. 211) notes that the pentagon which frames the logo represents the five principles of *Pancasila*. Unlike PPP and PDI, Golkar never amended its symbol and frame. It reflects Golkar’s visual expression of a consistent position, although that its former patron (Soeharto) lost his power.

PDI-P’s logo, on the other hand, almost resonates with the former PDI’s. PDI’s fragmentation in Soeharto’s regime marked the inception of PDI-P led by Megawati Soekarnoputri. The party was born on 1 February 1999, with the ideological principles of *Pancasila* (nationalism and social justice) as stated in the party’s charter. The party’s symbolic affinity between PDI-P and PDI77 (PDI-P also employed the buffalo’s image), connotes the same ideological ideal that reflects *Pancasila* democratic model, especially the fourth principle (*musyawarah* and *mufakat*). However, the absence of the banyan tree and the conjoined rice and cotton plants to complete the nationalist symbols in *Pancasila* did not necessarily signify the party’s desire to comply with the legal ban as stated in Law no 12/2003 Article 8 Letter (e)78. It demonstrates PDI-P’s attempt to differentiate its identity from other nationalist parties, such as Golkar and PDI. PDI-P’s buffalo appears differently. Its focus is not solely on the head but also on the buffalo’s position, which according to Dienaputra (2011, p. 199), connotes the party’s alertness. The focus is still on the head in the centre of the logo with the red eyes and white mouth of a black buffalo. Triawan Munaf (as cited by Dienaputra, 2011, p. 201) from EURO RSCG Adwork advertising, the designer of PDI-P’s logo, states that the white and red colours were chosen to resonate with the socio-political climate of the time. The white mouth signifies the purity of the party to speak its ideals, whereas the red connotes the party’s bravery to fight for the aspirations of grassroots. This visuality makes the buffalo in PDI-P’s logo look aggressive compared

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77 See the image of PDI in Soeharto’s era.
78 It is prohibited to employ similar images and names to other parties.
to PDI’s buffalo’s image of Soeharto’s era. At this stage, it can be argued that as the party employs
this advertising company to define and design its logo, PDI-P gives political authoritisation to this
advertising agency to frame and “circumscribe” the ideological meanings of its logo.

The visual reading of the nationalist camp represented by Golkar and PDI-P in the 1999 Election
produces different results. PDI-P substituted the pentagon with the circle to frame its democratic
image (buffalo). However, this substitution of geometric shape cannot be seen as an act of disloyalty
by the party towards Pancasila. The circle can also be perceived to represent a holistic frame for
Pancasila democracy, as well as a symbolic attempt to break the New Order policy that prompted
the adoption of the geometric shape of the pentagon to represent the five principles of Pancasila.
Golkar’s visual fidelity towards the policy indicates that the party still keeps Soeharto’s legacy as part
of its identity. The visual transformation shows the (visual/ideological) contestation within the
nationalist camp.

Visual contestation also occurred in the (inclusive) Islamic parties’ logos (PPP79, PKB, and PAN) which
attempted to resonate with the conventional (Indonesian) Islamic associations, ka’bah (the symbol
of Mecca) for PPP and the star for PAN and PKB80. Dienaputra (2011, pp. 204-210) argues that the
star is no longer associated with the nuances of Indonesian Islamic culture and religion. He found the
star as the most frequent symbol in both Islamic and Nationalist/Socialist parties’ logos in the 1955,
1971, 1999 and 2004 general elections and that the Islamic association can be made if the presence
of the star appears at the same time with the crescent. However, the first principle of Pancasila
represented by the star, without exception, reflects the code of Indonesian religiosity, although the
other religious (such as Protestant or Catholic) parties never employ the symbol of the star. PPP
decided to return to its former logo (ka’bah) as they felt that the employment of that star merely
diluted the Islamic spirit within the party.

The inclusive Islamic/Nationalist party, such as PAN, employs the image of a white sun. Dienaputra
(2011, pp. 205-206) categorises the sun as belonging to the same group of celestial bodies as the
star and perceives the sun representing the party’s vision as the one that brings Indonesia into its
era of enlightenment81. It signifies PAN’s inclusive dual positions as both nationalist and Islamic,
especially when the party officially declared its position as an inclusive nationalist party. However,
based on what Dienaputra (2011) found that the white sun also resonates with the symbol of
Muhammadiyah; the party cannot solely claim to represent the nationalist camp. The logo’s

79 In the Reform era, PPP returned to the Islamic ideological symbol, ka’bah, as the party decided to re-adopt
Islam as its ideology.
80 PKB also employs a globe with the image of Indonesia’s map as the centre.
81 PAN’s statute chapter one article one.
visualisation affirms the dominant influence of modernist Islam, represented by Muhammadiyah which reinforces PAN’s ambiguous position.

Like PAN, PKB also shares NU’s elemental influence. PKB claims to be an inclusive party and the party’s statute elucidates how the logo is designed to resonate with the inclusivity and the party’s idealism. The espousal of the nine stars surrounding the globe in the logo’s image represents the notions of freedom, justice, truth, honesty, democracy, equality, simplicity, balance and brotherhood. The image of Indonesia’s archipelago, as the party claims, connotes PKB’s basis of struggle in Indonesia in order to achieve the prosperity for the nation and a pure democratic national order. On the other hand, the deployment of green as the background colour correlates with the Islamic notion of prosperity. PKB’s logo also resonates with NU’s logo in which the two employ the symbol of nine stars, a globe, and Indonesian map. These visual elements indicate the party’s (visual) act in perpetuating Islamic notions and affirm ambiguity in the coding system.

The above discussion of the logos demonstrates the contestation of the religious signs within the Islamic camp. PPP as the party that declares itself as the Islamic one refuses to adopt the star because they feel that it merely represents the New Order coercion of the party. PAN adopts Muhammadiyah’s organisation logo (the sun), whereas PKB adopts NU’s logo (the nine stars) omitting the Arabic words (Nahdlatul Ulama or the revival of Muslim Clerics), the image of rope circling the globe, and accenting of Indonesia’s map as the centre of the globe. The proliferation of meaning in the image of the star at one stage affirms Dienaputra’s argument that the star is no longer associated with the nuances of Islamic culture and religion. However, the inclusive Islamic parties’ deployment of the symbol shows that the sign’s fluidity of meaning attests the visual correlation with the Indonesian (Islamic) religiosity.

The fluidity of meaning of the logo shows that the obscurity of ideological orientation within the Islamic and nationalist camps is influenced by their political disposition. The state ideology, Pancasila, which is embraced by PDI-P, Golkar, PKB, PAN, does not immediately position them as nationalist. The historical background of PKB, for instance, constructs a perception that the party belongs to the Islamic pole, as well as the Javanese and Java-based pole, due to PKB’s connection with NU. As for PAN, Amin Rais’ (one of the key figures in PAN) background as the former chairperson of Muhammadiyah makes the party appear on both sides of the antinomies: nationalist and Islamic and non-Java base except for Yogyakarta, PAN’s power base. PDI-P and Golkar are

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82 PAN does not deploy the green sun as Muhammadiyah. This probably is due to the dual positions it embraces. White is chosen as a neutral colour to represent the ambiguity.
perceived as the nationalist parties with a Java and non-Java base. PPP, on the other hand, is perceived as the consistent Islamic party.

The contestation manifest between the Islamic and nationalist parties re-emerged at the time MPR had to elect the President and Vice President. Habibie’s success in conducting a “free” general election with the support of many parties did not guarantee him success in his nomination as President. Habibie withdrew his candidacy after MPR rejected his accountability speech, although he successfully “liberalised” the country by restoring press freedom and releasing political prisoners. Crouch (2010, pp. 132-136) argues that Habibie’s policy in allowing an East Timor referendum, which humiliated the military, triggered his rejection along with the stigma previously mentioned. Although Megawati’s party won the election, the election system did not allow her to become the President immediately because Golkar’s and its later allies’ (the Central Axis Group led by Amien Rais, which represented the Islamic parties such as PAN, PK, PBB) seats in the parliament outnumbered the PDI-P’s. This event shows the clear-cut political map of Indonesia between the Nationalist/Islamic fronts, especially when the Muslim legislative members at that time did not support Megawati as the President due to her secular image. The choice then fell to Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) from PKB who was perceived as a moderate Islamic nationalist but ambivalent in positioning himself either to support Megawati or to accept his nomination. Megawati then became the Vice President (see chapters seven and eight for further elaboration).

Gus Dur’s tenure was relatively short-lived. Suryadinata, (2002, p. 191) concluded that the allegation of Gus Dur’s involvement in the scandals of Bulog gate and the donation from Sultan Brunei as well as his perennially inconsistent political behaviour were the causal factors for his short-lived administration. This is supported by Crouch (2010, pp. 136-140) who contends that the political bargaining, especially between Gus Dur and the Central Axis Group which brought him into the presidency, proved to be frail; his commitment to reform the military did not meet the majority of military aspirations; and his dependence on his close associates and his unpredictable character aggravated the situation (see chapter eight). These all led to critical contempt towards his government. On 23 July 2001, MPR impeached Gus Dur and elected Megawati Soekarnoputri as the fifth President to complete the remainder of Gus Dur’s term (up to October 2004).

IV. The 2004 Election

The overt ideological contest between the Islamic and Nationalist fronts which re-emerged especially during the Presidential Election in 1999 seemed to gradually disappear. The focus of the

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83 Indonesia logistics bureau.
political parties was no longer on the ideological issues as in the 1950s but more on pragmatic reasons for securing their position (especially for the large parties) as the 2004 election system perpetuated the party’s oligarchy. It can be seen in the proportional system with the open list of the candidate’s names on the ballot paper. Megawati’s government employed the system to differentiate itself from the election law in Habibie’s era which used the proportional system with a closed list. In the open list proportional system, any eligible person can nominate as the legislative candidate. However, it does not mean that the large party’s domination is nullified because the party still determines which candidate occupies the best ranking number on the list. This actually was the pragmatic response to the Law no 12/2003 article 107 section 2 letter (b) which stipulates that the decision to determine the elected candidate will be based on the requirement for the candidate to achieve the minimum votes (minimum 30 per cent of Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih (BPP) or the number of legal votes divided by the number of seats contested in one constituency). If s/he cannot meet this requirement, the decision will be based on the ranking number in the list system set by the political parties. Not only does this produce legislators who merely obey the party’s elites (Haris, 2005; Kleden, 2005, p. xiii), but also reveals the similarities between the closed list and the open list systems (Crouch, 2010, pp. 63-64).

Another slight modification was introduced in the voting system. In 1999 election, the voters perforated the party symbols on the ballot paper using a nail provided in the voting booth. However, in 2004 they were allowed to perforate the candidate’s number above the candidate’s photo and the party’s symbol. If the electorate did not recognise any candidate on the list, s/he would be allowed to perforate the party symbol on the ballot paper. If s/he only perforated the candidate’s number, not the party symbol, it would be considered illegal. This slight difference was used to show the hegemonic endeavour to plausibly accommodate democratic aspirations in the Reform era. Megawati’s government perceived this as the representation of a (slightly) ‘transparent’ method. Unfortunately the party’s actions in declining to open the temporary list of the candidates to the public amplified the public’s skepticism regarding the governing bodies. This mechanism indicates that the political parties and Megawati’s government not only half-heartedly reformed the system but also attempted to perpetuate the system which represented the mode of power production in the oligarchy of political parties.

The result of the 2004 general election was beyond Megawati’s expectations. The result of the assembly election which was conducted on 5 April 2004 showed that Golkar obtained 21.58 per cent, followed by PDI-P 18.53 per cent, PKB 10.57 per cent, PPP 8.15 per cent, Partai Demokrat (PD)
7.45 per cent, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS\textsuperscript{84} or Prosperous Justice Party) 7.34 per cent, and PAN 6.44 per cent\textsuperscript{85}. The result indicates that the nationalist parties still dominated the political realm. The ratio between the Islamic and nationalist camps is (1: 1.5). This means that if three persons chose the Islamic parties, then there would be five persons voting for the nationalists. Beside the nationalist domination, Luwarso, *et al.* (2004, pp. 1-8) perceives Golkar’s victory over PDI-P as a pragmatic, manipulative, yet meticulous political product. He further argues that Golkar astutely observed the political arena in order to rehabilitate its image. It grabbed the moment when people started to outgrow their interest in the utopianist promises of the so-called reformed parties. It plausibly offered a secure place away from the fear of the re-emergence of “primordial” and religious-based politics\textsuperscript{86}. Golkar revived the New Order’s ideological jargon (security and prosperity) and rebuilt its image by attaching the old negative image of the New Order to Soeharto’s family, its former patron. Having the mass media tycoons as the party’s cadres such as Surya Paloh\textsuperscript{87} and Aburizal Bakrie, Golkar largely utilised the mass media to rebuild its democratic image\textsuperscript{88} through ceaseless live TV coverage. The party also used PDI-P’s political stagnation when PDI-P declared that it would perpetuate the politics of Soekarno’s dynasty and nominate Megawati Soekarnoputri as the party’s ultimate Presidential candidate. On the other hand, Golkar used a different strategy from Megawati’s party. It ostensibly provided the opportunity for anyone who wished to become the party’s Presidential candidate.

The two-round Presidential elections amplified Megawati’s loss in her battle. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (PD, Javanese) and Jusuf Kalla (Golkar, non Javanese), her two former ministers, beat her and her running mate, Hasyim Muzadi, the former chairperson of Nahdlatul Ulama, in two consecutive rounds. She gained a mere 26.24 per cent while Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono obtained 33.58 per cent in the first round. Since none of the two pairs obtained more than 50 per cent of the votes, the second round of the Presidential election was conducted on 20 September 2004. The result showed that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla gained 60.62 per cent whereas Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi only obtained 39.38 per cent.\textsuperscript{89} It also indirectly supported

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\textsuperscript{84} It was known as PK (*Partai Keadilan or Justice Party*) in 1999 general election.


\textsuperscript{86} PDI-P and PKB were seen as representing Javanese political parties.

\textsuperscript{87} Surya Paloh decided to leave Golkar on 7 September 2011 and forged his own political machine, *Partai Nasional Demokrat* (Nasdem or Nationalist Democratic party).

\textsuperscript{88} The owners of some TV stations and newspapers have emotional closeness with Golkar, such as TVOne, MetroTV, Anteve, Media Indonesia.

Suryadinata’s claim (2002, p. 172) that the Indonesian people perceived Megawati’s image as similar to Corazon Aquino, the former Philippine President, as the woman who suffered a long repression from the prior government. People then turned aside after watching her poor achievements in governing the country.

The second round of the 2004 general election also indicated the same thing. SBY-Kalla gained their additional votes from Wiranto-Salahudin Wahid’s previous supporters and from Amien Rais-Siswono Yudhohusodo’s supporters except for North Sumatra and Central Java who suddenly shifted their support from Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi to SBY-Kalla. Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi gained additional support from the Outer Islands of Maluku but lost their support in Java (Central Java) and Outer Island (North Sumatra).

The 2004 election result especially indicated the ideological contest within the nationalist parties. However, the party’s logos maintained the visual ideological contest. The following illustrates the logo of the seven winning parties. However, since I have discussed Golkar, PDI-P, PKB, PPP and PAN’s logos, I will concentrate on PD and PKS’ logos to indicate the contestation between the nationalist and Islamic parties. It is seen as follows:

(source: Kompas, 14 July 2008)

Unlike the other winning nationalist parties (Golkar and PDI-P) which adopt the visual symbols from Pancasila, PD designs its logo with blue colours to illustrate the party’s doctrines (nationalism, humanism, and pluralism), represented by the three red and white points of the star. PD provides guidance (the party’s statute article nine) on how to read the visual symbol. This indicates the party’s attempt to direct and control the spectators to decode the intended meaning. The light and dark blue colours are used to represent the party’s utopianist dream of Indonesia’s nation-state building, which is depicted as fresh and peaceful (light blue). The dark blue is deployed to signify the depth of the party’s struggle in achieving a democratic, just and prosperous society. The colours of red and white correspond with the colours of Indonesia’s national flag. They connote the bravery
and purity of the Indonesian struggle for independence. The deployment of these ‘sacred’ Indonesian colour qualities ostensibly coats the party’s struggle in upholding its doctrines and shows an attempt to attach the ‘sacred’ quality to the party’s struggle. The red and white three pointed star which represents the notions of nationalism, humanism, and pluralism does not arguably succeed to connote the party’s doctrines as it does not completely resonate with the symbols of Pancasila, PD’s ideology. The deployment of red and white colours which resonate with the national flag became the sole visual attributes which seemingly associate with the party’s nationalist vision. The official visual symbol that Pancasila\textsuperscript{90} employs to represent the humanist and pluralist spirit (the second principle) is the seventeen-gold-ring chain. It represents not only the date of Indonesia’s independence but also the humanist/pluralist concept of the people’s equality (the chain signifies the equal position and the seventeen connotes the date of the independence). The star which is conventionally referred to as the Indonesian notion of religiosity fails to acknowledge the pluralist and humanistic elements of the party’s ideology. Thus, the image of the star is deployed to represent PD’s nationalist notions of nationalism, humanism and pluralism, although it does not resonate with the official symbol of Pancasila.

Unlike PD, PKS, as an Islamic party, deploys the visual logo which almost resembles the image of ka’bah\textsuperscript{91} PPP employs. The visualisation of two four sided shapes (square and rectangle) which contain the golden yellow written and visual texts of the party’s name and the Islamic and prosperity symbols of the crescent and rice that are claimed to be associated with ka’bah, the central symbol of Mecca. PKS’ ka’bah appears slightly obscured (ka’bah is perceived as a black shield) compared with the overt ka’bah image of PPP. The black colour as the colour of the cloth that covers ka’bah in Mecca is used to reinforce the party’s Islamic connection. However, unlike the inclusive Islamic party, PKB, and the Islamic party, PPP, which deploys the green colour to signify Islamic prosperity, PKS employed the golden yellow colour to represent the nation’s prosperity. Like the nationalist party, PKS also deploys the rice plant to signify the notion of prosperity. The central position of a string of golden rice signifies the central goal the party wishes to achieve. The rice stands alone with the absence of the cotton’s image (much like the nationalist’s). It indicates PKS’ similar desire in achieving the nation’s prosperity, but within an Islamic framework. The rice lies at the centre between the golden yellow crescents inside ka’bah. The word sejahtera (prosperous) below the image of the rice and crescents reinforce the notion of prosperity the party tries to inculcate.

\textsuperscript{90} PD’s statute chapter 1 article 2 stated that ideological foundation of the party is Pancasila.

\textsuperscript{91} Article four of PKS’ statute depicts the party’s logo as the image of the two gold crescents with the upright gold string of paddy lies in center of a black square shield to represent ka’bah. Inside the top black rectangle is the written gold text Partai Keadilan, whilst the word Sejahtera which is also written in gold lies inside the ka’bah square.
The image of *ka’bah* proliferates inside the Islamic camp. It no longer solely means representing the cohesion of the Islamic camp (as in the case of PPP). It transforms it into an Islamic shield imbued with the PKS (Islamic) image of prosperity (the golden rice and cotton). However, these two Islamic parties cannot be seen as having a harmonious relationship. Febriyan (2012) notes that PPP’s chairperson, Suryadharma Ali considered PKS and PAN not as “Islamic” parties and stated that PPP attempted to unite the *ummat* under one roof at the commemoration day of PPP on 19 February 2012 at Istora Senayan, Jakarta. The Islamic cohesion represented in *ka’bah* then emasculates the signifying practices of Islamic religious symbols.

V. The 2009 Legislative Election

The politics of images in the 2009 Election was marked by the judicial review of Law no. 10/2008, article 214, concerning legislative elections for the House of Representative at the national, provincial and municipal levels. Sudibjo (2009, pp. 5-21) argues that the decree brings a fundamental change for it alters the design in the proportional system which reflects the mixture of the ranking system of the legislative candidates set by the political parties to a system that is designed to give an opportunity to the candidates who obtain the highest votes to win the chair. The new design primarily focuses on the latter notion, i.e. the candidates who obtain the minimum 30 per cent of votes of *Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih* (BPP) gets the ticket to parliament. This indicates the dilution of the political party’s oligarchy since they seemed no longer determine who could occupy a seat in the parliament.

This amended law is oriented towards the construction of the legislative candidates’ political branding for it requires the candidates to present themselves directly to the public. Priyadi (2009, pp. 22-29) argues that it also produces the politics of image construction which makes politicians elude the substance of democracy. He found that the political parties’ tendency in disseminating their messages circulates around their claims of achievement through the use of the following mechanisms: their political messages are conveyed through the employment of statistical data to reach the urban educated voters or symbolic narration to influence the voters’ emotion; they promulgate the spirit of collectivism to affect the public’s disposition through the notion of togetherness (which resonates with the family principle). It constructs a new set of cultural meanings, especially in political advertising. The deployment of billboards for the first time marked the emergence of the candidate’s politics of image in an outdoor media advertisement. It involves

the strategy of appearance by masking themselves through the system of representation in order to promulgate their ideology.\footnote{See the discussion of this mechanism in chapters nine and ten.}

The amendment of the law also brought to bear the phenomenon of celebrities and key party figure’s siblings, relatives, and children as legislative candidates. Firmanzah (2010) and Tim Litbang Kompas (2010) note the involvement of celebrities is used to boost a party’s votes. From 150 legislative members of PD in the 2009-2014 parliament, nine celebrities and key party figure’s sons became legislative members. Among 106 legislative members of Partai Golkar, two celebrities became legislative members. While from 94 legislative members of PDI-P, two celebrities and the key party figure’s sibling, daughter, niece and husband became members. From 27 members of Gerindra, two celebrities are noted as the legislative members. Of the total number (672 people) nominated as the candidates to represent PAN, 5 per cent were celebrities. However, PAN gained 43 seats in the parliament and two celebrities are noted among the list. PPP or United Development Party (37 legislative members) only has one celebrity in the cabinet. No celebrity occupies the seats to represent PKB (27 members), PKS (57 members) and Hanura (19 members).

The celebrity’s participation itself cannot merely be perceived as a strategy to boost the votes for it implies the value transfer in the utilisation of the celebrities’ social capital in order to affirm and challenge the cornerstone of the party itself. The participation hopes to determine the party’s success in the field of voting as it represents the success of the political advertising transaction. However, this political espousal which constitutes the right and obligation as part of the game’s rules in the political arena should also be followed by selecting and screening the right candidates to construct and boost the party’s image. As previously noted, no standard rules are set on how to select and screen the celebrities or the party’s members to be candidates. The ostensible political closeness and appointment between the celebrities and the party’s elites seems likely to be the determining factor in their nomination. However, it does not guarantee the existence of a fixed recruitment pattern. For instance, Marissa Haque\footnote{See Fawzi, M.H. (n.d). Marissa’s Political Activities. Retrieved from \url{http://www.marissahaque.net/political/}. She was formerly known as an actress who later decided to pursue her master degree and later doctoral degree. PDI-P’s discharge of her, according to her claim, was due to the plausibly unreasonable grounds.}, the legislative (celebrity) candidate from PPP in the 2009 Assembly Election, admitted in her blog that her prior political involvement as the PDI-P’s legislative member in 2004 was due to SBY’s implicit suggestion. It was suggested when she pursued her degree at Ohio University and became a reporter for the American-
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce in New York. The implicit proposal from the government representative indicates the plausible mechanism of targeting celebrities from a broad political perspective. However, this proposition is not entirely accurate for if we scrutinize the background of each celebrity who succeeded in winning a ticket to parliament, we will find that no overt academic/social/political background strongly supports the argument. Even if it exists, the candidates’ political background does not completely guarantee success. In the 2009 legislative election, Marissa Haque, who claimed to be proposed by many parties, chose to join PPP as the Islamic party’s legislative candidate. This shifting from the nationalist to the Islamic party indicates not merely an ideological transformation and her strategy to regain her prior political power in the legislative assembly arena, but also the degree of her astuteness in reading the political map in Indonesia. The proposal and ideological transformation indicates this affirmation and challenges the party that seemingly positions itself as the cornerstone for the legislative candidates. Their social/political relation, thus, is heavily defined by contingencies.

Santoso (2010, pp. xxiv-xxxvi) found that the iconic figures from the familial aristocracy who line up beside the celebrities dominate the Indonesian political arena, especially at the national level. They were from Soekarno’s, Wahid Hasyim’s, Soeharto’s, and Sarwo Edhie’s clans. As for the local (aristocrat) politicians, several families were noted to regulate several provinces/regencies. Yasin Limpo’s family, one of Golkar’s doyens, controlled the South Sulawesi province for three generations. R. Sugito Wiryohamijoyo’s family, the former PNI activist in Kendal, has dominated the Central Java province’s politics for three generations. Tubagus Chasan Sochib’s clan, the chairperson of Pendekar Banten and Banten Chamber of Commerce and Industry dominated this relatively new province. Mulyadi Jayabaya’s family, the former chairman of Lebak Chamber of Commerce and the recent head of Lebak regency in Banten, also dominated the region. Santoso (2010, pp. xxxvii-xxxix) also found a slightly higher percentage of the legislative members (2009-2014) were from the aristocracy line compared with the celebrities. The celebrities constitute about 3 per cent of the House of Representatives while the figures who have aristocratic relation with either the former or recent ex officio government officials and/or the key party’s figures in the House of Representatives are around 4.8 per cent. However, this slight difference does not indicate the power contrast between these two iconic groups. The aristocrats still control the arena while the celebrity legislative members eminently rely on their political astuteness in order to retain their political status.

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95 She lost her nomination.
96 The founder of Nahdlatul Ulama.
97 SBY’s father-in-law.
98 A communal martial art organisation in Banten.
This familial aristocracy that produces social/political capital offers a more solid ground for political perpetuation in Indonesia. It also operates as the celebrity’s social capital value transfer. The symbolic exchange occurs when the big names they inherit become the determining factor in the party’s success. A classic example can be drawn from the PDI-P phenomenon in its incapacity to detach the party’s image from Soekarno’s clan. As previously noted, in the 1999 election Megawati benefitted from her father’s name as a revolutionary figure and as the people’s collective symbol to counter Soeharto’s regime. She also enjoyed a plausible and solid hegemonic position, especially when the party declared that the chance to replace Megawati as the party’s presidential candidate with the other candidate was nil. However, as the euphoria of overthrowing Soeharto’s dictatorship gradually diluted, this symbolic value transfer and exchange seemed to lose its social enchantment. PDI-P’s votes gradually declined in the 2004 and 2009 elections.

The 2009 legislative assembly election was conducted on 9 April 2009 and 171 million people participated. Thirty eight political parties participated in the Election but only nine parties met the parliamentary threshold (2.5 per cent). They were PD (20.85 per cent or 150 seats), Golkar (14.45 per cent or 107 seats), PDI-P (14.03 per cent or 95 seats), PKS (7.89 per cent or 57 seats), PAN (6.01 per cent or 43 seats), PPP (5.32 per cent or 37 seats), PKB (4.94 per cent or 27 seats), Gerindra (4.46 per cent or 26 seats), Hanura (3.77 per cent or 18 seats). These groups fought over the 560 seats in the House of Representative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or People’s Representative Council), 132 seats for Regional Representative Council (DPD – Dewan Perwakilan Daerah), and Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD – Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah).

PD obtained its highest votes from five provinces in Java, except Central Java. In Jakarta PD obtained 31.59 per cent from the total number of 521,735 voters. In East Java province, the province with the highest number of the voters (29,514,290 voters), PD gained 21.99 per cent. PD also secured its place in West Java province (24.82 per cent), the second largest province with 29,002,479 voters. In Banten (6,581,587 voters) and Yogyakarta (2,751,761 voters), PD secured its place 22.65 per cent and 18.7 per cent consecutively. PDI-P dominated the third largest province of voters (26,190,629 voters), Central Java. It also dominated Bali (30.08 per cent) with the total number 2,667,065 of voters. The second winning party, Golkar, obtained its highest votes (25.1 per cent) in South Sulawesi which has 5,630,977 voters. This former ruling party dominated the Outer Islands such as Sumatra, Kalimantan, Papua and Maluku and also Nusa Tenggara Timur. The resulting percentages seem to prove the simple proposition that the one who dominates Java will likely win the election.

The result shows that the amount of the total support for the nationalist bloc (57.56 per cent from PD, Golkar, PDI-P, Gerindra, and Hanura) escalated 21.03 per cent from the 2004 Assembly Election.
whereas the decreasing number for Islamic parties’ total support (24.15 per cent) reached 25.7 per cent. The ratio between Islamic/Nationalist is (1:2.4). However, the result cannot be inferred to assume that the phenomenon guaranteed the re-emergence of the overt ideological cleavage as in previous elections. It can be argued that the 2009 election heavily exalted the politics of image. The Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese polarisations seemingly found a new channel for image construction, especially for the party’s key figures. The PPP’s Vice Secretary General, Romahurmuziy argues in *Kompas* (“Golkar Optimis Partai Berbasis Islam Tak Terganggu Partai Baru”, 2011) that the politics of the party’s key figures was the far-reaching factor for winning the election. Papua and Sulawesi were examples where the religious-based parties no longer became the determining basis for voting. This was due to the local culture which exalted the local community figure. People would follow the party in which their figure was involved (Sugiya, 2009 and Nainggolan, 2009). The result also indicates that Golkar dominated these two Outer Islands.

Although the cleavages seemed to attenuate in the 2009 election, they still existed in the party’s logo. No alteration in the content of the Law no 10/2008 Article 10, which regulates the visualisation of the party’s logo, was made in order to differentiate itself from the previous law in the 2004 general election (Law no. 12/2003 Article 8). The same rule is still enacted due to Soeharto’s successful obliteration of the visual political threat in the party’s logo. The parties employ the slightly different visual pattern in their logos to connote their identity. As noted previously, the (inclusive) Islamic camp consistently deploy the Islamic (nationalist) visual elements such as the stars, *ka’bah*, sun, globe, Indonesia’s map, blue, green, yellow/gold and black colours. The nationalist camps (PDI-P and Golkar) also adhere with the *Pancasila* visual symbols. Gerindra seems to follow suit by exerting the national emblem, *Garuda*, as part of the visual elements in *Pancasila*. PD deploys a different strategy (the three-pointed star and blue colours) in demonstrating its nationalist identity. Like PD, Hanura deploys the visual elements by not adopting them from *Pancasila*. They are as follows:

(source: *Kompas*, 14 July 2008)

Unlike Golkar and PDI-P, which employ the visual symbols illuminating the third and the fifth principles of *Pancasila* (Golkar) and the fourth principle (PDI-P), Gerindra deploys the upper part of Garuda (the head and neck) to signify its identity. The underlying philosophy of this national
emblem derives from Hinduism. The bird which denotes Wisnu’s vehicle, the Hindu God of preservation, connotes benevolence/beneficence, knowledge, power, bravery, loyalty and discipline. In employing this symbol, it can be argued that these are the values that the party wants to incorporate. In Indonesia, the colour of gold is conventionally used to signify the notion of prosperity. At this stage, we find a similar usage of gold as the prosperity colour in Gerindra, the nationalist party, and PKS, the Islamic party. This visual iconography shows not only the crossroads of the party’s prosperity symbol but also elucidates the same conventions in perceiving the concept of national prosperity. Like the national emblem, Gerindra’s bird also faces to the right. As the direction of right is conventionally perceived as indicating the “positive”/”correct” direction, the position of Gerindra’s bird bears the meaning of the consistent struggle to achieve the quality the symbol represents. Adopting the red and white of the national flag which connotes bravery and purity, the white background colour the party uses signifies the pure/sincere/clean struggle to achieve national prosperity. Gerindra’s statute provides the written guidance in reading the party’s visual symbol. The seventeen feathers in the neck denote the date of Indonesia’s independence. The crest feathers (eight feathers) define the month of the Independence whereas the four-side square and five-side pentagon denote the year. It thus configures 17-8-45. This visuality reinforces the nationalist identity (as with Pancasila) the party constructs.

Hanura deploys the image of an arrow to connote the linear left to right movement in which the party wishes to progress. Using a similar perspective to Gerindra’s, as Hanura’s slogan becomes the core part of the party’s name, i.e. people’s conscience, the horizontal movement of the arrow (to the right) indicates that the party will arguably bring the conscience to the “correct” progress of the nation (determined by the party). The light brown colour, which signifies the colour of the soil, becomes the target of the arrow. This can also be seen as Hanura’s target of achieving the people’s prosperity through a consistent linear regularity in progress. It resonates with the chronological structure of the military which indicates a rigid pattern to achieve progress. Thus, in order to achieve prosperity as the main goal, one should adhere to rigid chronological procedures. Any deviation will jeopardise this targeted progress. As in Pancasila discourse, the colour of red signifies bravery, the red colour in the arrow’s body in which the name of the party is written affirms the embodiment of military bravery inside Hanura. Furthermore, the absence of a vertical line seems to connote the absence of the first principle in Pancasila, Belief in One Almighty God. The omission of transcendence not only indicates the party’s negation of the notion of God’s transcendence in the progress towards the national prosperity, but also demonstrates that the efforts in achieving the

99 Wiranto, Hanura’s key figure, was the former Soeharto’s adjutant and commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces (see chapter seven for further elaboration).
progress must come under one straight command. However, although at this stage the absence of the vertical line in this reading suggests the negation of the transendence notion, this does not mean that it indicates the absence of the notion itself. The notion emerges in the party’s doctrine (see chapter seven, Hanura section). Hanura also uses the white background colour of the arrow to connote the pure, clean struggle of the party.

Some points can be drawn as a conclusion in illuminating the Indonesian political arena. First, the arena (in this case the symbolic one, such as the parties’ symbols) offers a signpost of which direction the political parties take in the process of position-taking and the taken position. It is a road sign that directs the parties to the multiplicity of courses which represent the proliferation of meanings due to the contestation and synthesis of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese binaries as the two dichotomies intertwine with one another. Not only does the pervasive Javanese culture (Pancasila is heavily influenced by Javanese paternalistic culture, see chapter six) arguably allow the synthesis as well as the contestation in order to maintain the equilibrium, but it also puts the parties in a position of ambiguity. They cannot claim themselves as belonging to one camp solely because, as the signifying practices in the party’s logo show, the free-play of signs (such as Islamic/Nationalist) not only contest but also proliferate in the discursive ideological debate especially surrounding the state ideology, *Pancasila*. Thus, we cannot perceive Golkar, for instance, as representing the nationalist camp per se, as reflected on the logo, for the party built *Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah* (Islamic Missionary Council) as a wing organisation that represent its Islamic (nationalist) orientation.

Secondly, transformation of the party’s logo delineates the proliferation as well as the fluidity of meaning. From this, we can infer that both nationalist and Islamic camps are in ambiguous positions in their symbolic exchange. The nationalist faction, which appears to deploy the nationalist visual images mostly adopted from *Pancasila* (the banyan tree, buffalo’s head, rice and cotton, *garuda*), cannot completely detach itself from the star-shapes image that conventionally connote the Indonesian notion of religiosity, generally the Islamic one. PD’s logo avers to be one of the examples that deploy the star-shaped image to illuminate its three nationalist pillars: nationalism, humanism, and pluralism. As Dienaputra (2011) argues that the image of star the parties used in the first election up to the 2004 elections closely correlated with the notion of religiosity, having the star-shaped image PD positions itself as a nationalist-religious party as written in the party’s statutes.

The (inclusive) Islamic camp is also entrapped in the ambiguity of its political position. PKB and PAN are the ones that indirectly state their ambiguous position. However, the inclusive notion they deploy as the party’s characteristic overtly put them in an ambiguous situation. Their logo affirms
such positioning as they both visually represent the nationalist notion within an Islamic framework. The Islamic party, PKS, encapsulates the visual ambiguity. The presence of rice and cotton in PKS’ logo seem to be analogous to the nationalist notion of prosperity, *gotong royong* and *kekeluargaan*. The gold colour of the rice and cotton images signifies not the Islamic nuance, but more so the nationalist one (the colour of gold is within the family resemblance of the yellow rice in Golkar). PPP seems to be the solid one that is able to detach itself from such (visual) ambiguity.

Thirdly, *Pancasila* becomes an ideological tie that not merely synthesises the Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese strands, but also encapsulates the multiplicity of meanings which can be seen from the signifying practices of the visual signs in the parties’ logos. Both Islamic/Nationalist camps adopt the (nationalist/religious) values from *Pancasila* to represent their political identity and positioning. This cultural strategy aims to reinforce the visual credibility of the party’s visual/ideological representation, i.e. through the logo. However, the credibility dilutes itself because *Pancasila* arguably represents not only the local wisdom but also the ideological ambiguity of the nationalist/religious sides.
PART III

THE POLITICAL BRANDING OF THE NINE WINNING PARTIES

Introduction

Part II portrayed the ideological debate within Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese polarisations as reflected in the parties’ logos. The debate continues to circulate on the billboards, especially in the slogans the parties and the candidates employ (represented by the visual and written expressions). The slogans reflect forms of branding as they constitute brand markers. Part III goes on to discuss the branding the parties construct via the slogans and platforms as stated on their statutes. Firmanzah (2008, pp. 74-82) argues that the statutes represent the party’s blueprint as they explicate the vision and mission as the party’s cardinal objective and the background behind the party’s establishment. The blueprint offers an in-depth look at the party’s ideological characteristics and framework. Positioning the statutes at the centre or at the point of departure to investigate the parties’ political branding affirms the significance of the statutes’ own right as intangible and as symbolic political products to referring to the discursive practices in the political world. The analysis of the political branding will demonstrate the fluidity of the ideological (textual) constructions in the parties’ statutes as grand narratives. The analysis will be organised not based on the order of winning of the party in the legislative election of 2009, but on the factions they belong to (see chapter five). The discussion will lead to position the nationalist and Islamic parties in regards to how they construct their political branding. The branding will demonstrate how the parties from the nationalist faction distinguish themselves from the Islamic one by analysing the identity markers they used. Prior to that, I will analyse each party’s branding and later compare and contrast them.

Firmanzah (2008, pp. 35-43) argues that positioning the statutes as the point of departure will position the voters as mere research objects. He equates the way the political elites disseminate the party’s ideology to society (top-down communication pattern) with the pattern the political marketing research uses when it chooses to concentrate solely on the party’s ideology. They both marginalise and position the voters as mere political (research) objects. Conversely, if the basis of the discussion is on the work programs, the voters will be the subjects. However, since my research is not about political marketing and as few billboards are found stating the work program of the candidates/the parties as written expressions (see chapters nine and ten), the discussion will not
position the voters as objects. The voters do not play important roles in this study because it aims to assess how the candidates’ billboards represent their dispositions and parties’ ideologies.

Below is a summary of the political parties’ slogans and platforms adopted from Firmanzah (2010) that illustrates the nine parties’ different branding. They are also the products of the parties’ statutes translation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the party</th>
<th>PD</th>
<th>Golkar</th>
<th>PDI P</th>
<th>PKS</th>
<th>PAN</th>
<th>PPP</th>
<th>PKB</th>
<th>Gerindra</th>
<th>Hanura</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slogan</td>
<td>Continue!</td>
<td>Giving Evidence not Promises, The Sooner the Better</td>
<td>The Grassroot s’ Party</td>
<td>Caring, Clean, Professional</td>
<td>Life is Action</td>
<td>Together revive to make a change</td>
<td>Defending the Right One</td>
<td>Towards a Better Change</td>
<td>People’s Conscience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform</td>
<td>Reducing poverty and the country’s debt</td>
<td>Law supremacy, ekonomi kerakyatan, nationalism, pluralism</td>
<td>supervising BLT, people’s prosperity, cheap price of the staple foods, creating millions of jobs</td>
<td>Clean governance</td>
<td>“education for free” program and 1.5 trillion rupiah for the underdeveloped villages</td>
<td>Reinforcing UMKM, “education and public health services for free” programs, the draft of Halal Assurance Law, Custom and Tradition Law, and Islamic banking</td>
<td>“easy and comfortable access to public services” and “prospering the people” programs</td>
<td>ekonomi kerakyatan, fighting against poverty, accentuating small-scale business, independence for the energy sector, education and health</td>
<td>the economic reform, cheap but good education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table indicates that the nine winning parties employed similar themes in their campaign. All of them were about how to reduce poverty and increase the prosperity of the same sectors: economic, social, education, and political. For instance, a similar construction of the Indonesian economic system under the banner of ekonomi kerakyatan was employed by both Nationalist and Islamic factions in their platforms. An examination of the similarities and differences between the parties’ platform (such as the platform of ekonomi kerakyatan) and slogans in the statutes are needed in order to assess the textual construction of the parties’ blueprints.
This similar economic platform, which reflects the ideological ambiguity of the factions, does not connote that the candidates from the same faction, let alone the party, share the same position as they have to establish differentiation markers in their image (read: identity) construction. Although Foucault (1989) argues that the same group bears a similar coherence and affinity in structures, identities and rules, this does not mean that the similarities put them in an ossified position. The similar visual/written expression on the billboard reveals different tactics. The use of logos and the parties’ role models as the brand markers in the same factional line/position on the billboards, for instance, forge an unstable relation as they need to establish differentiation in their position in order to create visual credibility. The logos and key figures cannot be seen as correlating with one fixed ideological meaning (the representation of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese camps). The interrelation of meanings in the signifying practices produces the variants in the polarisations. It indicates that the position-taking is not always consistent with the position taken.

Returning to the compliance of the candidates’ slogans with the party’s vision and mission, the examination of the form of branding is also conducted by limiting the discussion to how the Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands in the party’s vision and mission stated on their statutes circulate. The presence of ethnocentric (Javanese/non-Javanese) polarisation barely exists on the statute as it reflects the parties’ visionary plans which are arguably free from ethnosymbolism and/or ethno-orientation. However, although Pancasila is influenced by Javanese culture (see chapter six) and the parties from both factions arguably adopt Pancasila democratic values on their statutes, the overt presence of Javanese/non-Javanese polarisation emerge primarily embodying cultural political elements that colour the socio-political practices of the parties, the key figures and the candidates.

Part III aims to analyse these forms of branding. This is conducted by examining the mechanisms by which the parties’ image constructions operate, deploying the Bourdieuan lenses of dispositions (habitus), field and capital. The analysis aims to assess how the symbolic exchange occurs based on the parties’ slogans and platforms. This is thus organised by scrutinising Pancasila, the image of the nine winning parties and their key figures. As Bourdieu (1977, 1986, 1990a, 1990b, 1993) suggests, the examination of the key figures’ images begins by investigating the elements of habitus: education, experience, history and past and present socio-political practices. These subjective elements will show how the parties’ and the key figures’ identity constructions are moulded. This will later define the scope of how these images influence the candidates’ position-taking and the position taken. However, since not all parties completely rely on their key figures (due to the absence of paternalist role models inside the parties or the pragmatic ideals they uphold, the
analysis is confined to the political branding of the parties in relation to their key figures (if any) in the 2009 legislative election.

The procedure starts by investigating what lies behind *Pancasila* to delineate the political dispositions of Nationalist/Islamic parties. The two factions perceive *Pancasila* quite differently. The former adopts it as ossified values while the latter sees it as an accommodating entity representing a political compromise (Wahid, 1994, pp. 151-155) that can bridge the ideological discrepancy between the Islamic and nationalist camps. *Pancasila* itself, according to Reeve (1985), Bourchier (1997) and Mulder (1994), represents Indonesian (Javanese) “personality” or “soul”.

Thus, Part III is organised into three chapters. The first one addresses *Pancasila* not merely as the state ideology but more importantly as the ideological framework that “regulates” the synthesis and contestation of the Islamic and Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands in the politics of image of the nine winning parties and their central figures. The second one examines the political branding of the nationalist parties whilst the third one the Islamic parties. The last section of the third chapter compares the political branding of the nationalist and Islamic parties.
Chapter Six

Pancasila

This chapter aims to outline Pancasila’s ideological principles that encapsulate Indonesian (nationalist) ideals of religiosity, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy and social justice. These principles became the ideological basis of the parties, the key figures, and the candidates in their image construction. As an inclusive ideological framework, Pancasila’s principles allow them to be in an ambiguous and fluid position as these principles operate based on a “neither-nor” ideological basis (Somantri, 2006). Pancasila neither negates nor fuses the ideological differences/similarities of the Islamic/Nationalist factions. The state’s motto of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity), which is placed under garuda’s image, represents that Pancasila provides a shelter for ideological differences and similarities to live side by side. Below is the image of Garuda Pancasila and the state’s motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.

Source: http://ideologipancasila.files.wordpress.com/2007/06/garuda-indonesia.jpg

Latif (2011) argues that the bird (Garuda Pancasila) symbolically represents the Indonesian code of civic nationalism in that it becomes the static foundation (represented by the shield) of the dynamic five guiding principles underpinning the concept of Indonesia’s nation-state. This means that the bird represents a solid ground containing five ideological principles of Pancasila. The visual symbols in the shield, as discussed in chapter five, represent the dynamic characteristic of the principles that allows ideological ambiguity to exist in both Islamic and Nationalist factions. In other words, Pancasila functions as the code of nationalism that ideologically regulates the politics of image of the parties, the key figures and the candidates within this inclusive/ambiguous nationalist framework.

As this chapter does not aim to position Pancasila as an ideological site that represents the socio-political dynamic in Indonesia, it is not organised based on the historical moments of its birth to the present day (the Reform era). Rather it explores the ideological meanings of each principle that
illuminate the mechanism of how these principles work as the model for democracy. By this, the
discussion is organised in a narrative form outlining these principles.

As noted in chapter five, *Pancasila* constitutes the model of democracy that synthesise *musyawarah* (deliberation), *mufakat* (consensus), *gotong royong* (mutual assistance), and *kekeluargaan* (family principle), collectivism, and *kerukunan* (social harmony) as the national wisdom. The wisdom reflects a nationalist idea for the Indonesian model of the nation-state together with the fervent Javanese socialist influence of its founding figures. Reeve (1985, pp. 1-57) contends that the family principle and collectivism as the essences of *Pancasila* stem from the four founding figures: Ki Hajar Dewantara, Supomo, Soekarno, and Mohammad Hatta. He found that these figures’ thinking forged a concentric pattern illuminating the democratic values behind *Pancasila*. As part of a family structure one is bound with family principles. Due to Dewantara’s position as the prince of the second royal house which influenced his disposition, he used Javanese *priyayi* (aristocrat) paternalistic family principles as the basis of his proposition. As mentioned in chapter I, the nurturing concept between the father and the children in the family is parallel with the nurturing concept of Javanese kings towards their people: the obligation of the father (the king) to nurture the children (the people) are transacted with the absolute obligation of the children to obey the father (Adityawan, 2008, p. 81). As each family member has the same rights with different tasks, it makes putting the common interest above the individual inalienable for it represents ‘the unity of interest, strengths and soul’ (Dewantara, 1967, p. 167). It is achieved through democratic means of sharing burden/mutual assistance (*gotong-royong*), deliberation (*musyawarah*), consensus (*mufakat*) in order to achieve *kerukunan* (family/social harmony). The family principle also indirectly defines Indonesia’s humanistic values (like the above family/social just) that equate with the union of *kawula* (the servant/the ruled/the children) and *gusti* (the master/the ruler/the father)100 in order to achieve peace and order. The union indicates that the king (*gusti*) bears people’s mandate which legitimises his transcendent power (in Mulder’s term (1994, p. 63-64) “the quasi-religious status”) based on the divine inspiration (*wahyu*) he received.

Supomo (1952) supports the argument by asserting that these “domestic” principles are embedded in the local traditions for he found a systematic conformity amongst ethnic groups in Indonesia. Supomo (in Reeve, 1985, p. 22) asserts that “[i]n adat law it is not the individual who is primary, but society...the life of an individual is a life whose primary purpose is to serve society...[that] is not felt as the burdens...[because] the social obligations are no other than the most appropriate functions of human life”. Society as a unit regulates its members who are circumscribed by the same ideological

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100 Reeve (1985, p. 18) perceived it as a domestic harmony.
bond. Their positions in the unit structure enable them to acquire legal power to exercise their function and to gain free rights within the limit of their function and situation. Due to their position, their obligations to society are not seen as burdens but as appropriate responsibilities. *Gotong royong* (mutual assistance) is exercised in order to share the burden so that *kerukunan* (harmony) can be achieved. Deliberation and consensus will resolve disputes resulting from exercising those rights. However, Mulder (1994, pp. 57-71) argues that this regal doctrine makes the country a “family” institution in which it codifies not only the absolute obligation to obey the parents (the father/the king/gusti) as the caretaker and guardian of the family/the nation/kawula but also protects the common interest from those who do not comply with the family code.

Soekarno (1963, p. 187) developed Supomo’s and Dewantara’s ideals of the family principle or collectivism into the concept of socio-nationalism which values *gotong royong* as the essential character in *Pancasila*. Latif (2011, p. 19) notes that the term socio-nationalism stems from Soekarno’s viewpoint that the five principles in *Pancasila* lead to one cardinal goal, i.e. achieving collective harmony (*kerukunan*) and prosperity by upholding *gotong royong* ideal in *Pancasila’s* five principles. *Gotong royong* is embodied in the first principle, which reflects the concept of Indonesia’s religiosity, in the form of religious tolerance among different religious adherents. *Gotong royong* resides in the humanitarian principles of the second principle as anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. The motto of “*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*” (Unity in Diversity) which reflects the essence of the third principle (the nation’s integrity) foregrounds the spirit of mutual assistance. *Gotong royong* is also reflected as the ideal that upholds *musyawarah* (deliberation) and *mufakat* (consensus) as the essential characters of *Pancasila’s* democratic principles (the fourth principle). *Gotong royong* resides in the fifth principle that reflects Indonesia’s principle of upholding social justice and the nation’s prosperity. Thus, Soekarno’s socio-nationalism arguably demonstrates interdependency of the ideological notions which are cemented in mainstream Indonesian society.

Latif (2011, p. 17) also found that the etymology of *Pancasila* was strongly influenced by Soekarno’s disposition. The words “*Panca*” and “*Silá*” derive from Sanskrit which mean five principles. The language used does not merely connote an indication of certain cultural influence (in this case Indian) in the country, but also shows that its usage later signifies a mixture of cultural influences. In 1945 Soekarno especially associated the word “*panca*” (five) with the other five religious/cultural principles which greatly influence Indonesian culture. He started associating *panca* by juxtaposing the concept with five Islamic pillars, five fingers of human hand, *Pandawa Lima* (five Javanese wayang puppets/pandavas adopted from *Mahabharata*, an Indian epic), Javanese tradition of five bans (*Mo-Limo: maling* (stealing), *madat* (consuming illegal drugs), *main* (gambling), *minum* (drinking), and *madu* (drunkard)) as the essential characters of *Pancasila*’s democratic principles (the fourth principle).
(intoxication), madon (womanising), and Panca Dharma (five actions/obligations of Chuo Sang In or Central Advisory Council in Japanese occupation and of Taman Siswa or Javanese educational movement initiated by Ki Hajar Dewantara). The association does not merely indicate that Soekarno perceived panca as a “sacred” number which is closely correlated especially with Islamism, Javanese culture, Hinduism, and possibly Indian culture. It also demonstrates that associating Pancasila with other cultural/religious values gives a degree of flexibility in interpreting this shared belief. Pancasila cannot be seen as a close rigid system because the association implies a correlation with non-arbitrary cultural/religious constructs. This also indirectly affirms a pervasive Javanese and/or religious influence within the concept of socio-nationalism in Pancasila. When Soekarno formulated this ideal as the basis for his nationalist concept, Hatta developed the ideal as the basis of Indonesia’s socialist economic concept known as ekonomi kerakyatan. Reeve (1985, pp. 36-40) notes that Hatta draws the concept from Indonesia’s village democratic principle of mutual cooperation. This principle is adopted and translated especially in Article 33 of the amended 1945 Constitution, that stipulates: the system concentrates on people’s power based on the family principle (kekeluargaan); the state controls all productive enterprises that are essential to the lives of the majority of people; and the economic principles of collectivism, sustainability, justice, efficiency, independence, environment-oriented, and equilibrium are upheld. This Article indirectly means that Indonesia’s economic system is seen as a collective attempt with the family principle as its ideological basis. Swasono argues that the family principle does not equate with a kinship system for the term reflects the spirit of social solidarity and collectivism to empower people (especially the middle-lower class). He found that kekeluargaan was deployed by the founding fathers as the antithesis of individualism, the basis of the Dutch colonial economic system. The state’s control of productive enterprises does not directly indicate state domination of economic means. Mubyarto (1994) perceives the state control of essential economic enterprises as an attempt to empower small-middle scale businesses to compete with conglomerates. People who own small to middle scale businesses are encouraged to expand their business by using government initiatives through UKM (Usaha Kecil dan Menengah or small and medium sized enterprises) programs. This empowerment will encourage people’s emancipation in developing and managing economic resources. By this mean, it is expected that social prosperity can be achieved and equally distributed. Ekonomi kerakyatan is thus seen as the embodiment of Pancasila’s economic system.

In an alignment with the founding fathers, Latif (2011) and Rahardjo (2011) assert that the *Pancasila* democracy is arguably perceived as similar to “impersonal” public and state laws. *Pancasila* does not refer to any religious law and system because it functions as an ideological compass that constructs the nation’s identity as previously noted. Latif (2011, pp. 42-43; 55-121) found that the first principle of *Pancasila*, which represents Indonesia’s religiosity, positions the state and religion, not as separate entities, but as an inclusive one. It means that the state and the religion are in dual positions in which the state does not dominate or fuse with religion, but sustains pluralism and multiculturalism within a religious context. The second principle (*kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab* or just and civilized humanitarianism) encapsulates egalitarian humanistic notions that uphold the shared socio-morality of Indonesian society. The third principle represents Indonesia’s integrity which, according to Latif (2011, pp. 358-368), reflects a melting pot conception and which represents a political nationalism rather than a cultural one. Indonesia as a state was built with a united spirit to fight against colonialisation. It does not represent a certain ethnic consciousness, let alone domination of one by another. However, if we perceive the solidity of the ethnic groups in Indonesia as melting in one imaginary pot called the nation’s integrity, we will find that the dissolving process in one pot merely dilutes the essence of the state’s motto itself, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (*Unity in Diversity/Diversity in Unity*). Although Latif (2011) considers that *Pancasila*’s melting pot concept contained cosmopolitan and pluralist values, the concept does not show an integral sense of acknowledging ethnic groups’ distinctive rights in the public sphere because the melting pot merely leads to the fusion of ethnic and cultural diversity in the framework of hybrid identity. *Pancasila* stands on both sides. It affirms the pluralist notion of distinctive rights of each ethnic group (the egalitarian ideal) while acknowledging the hybridity of cultural identity. The fourth principle (*kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan* or popular sovereignty arrived at through deliberation and representation or consultative democracy) represents *Pancasila* democratic notion which encapsulates harmony between two governing aspects: politics and economy, as previously discussed. Latif (2011, pp. 458-459) argues that the family principle (*kekeluargaan*) is needed to balance the pluralist aspects of the socio-cultural with the socio-economic which is achieved by democratic processes of *musyawarah* (deliberation) and *mufakat* (consensus). The fifth principle (*keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia* or social justice for all Indonesia’s people) reflects the concept of an equitable socio-economic democracy as discussed earlier.

These notions in their entirety become the basis for the politics of image for the nine parties and the candidates as they, without exception, adopt *Pancasila* on their billboards. The billboards demonstrate that *Pancasila* democratic principles appear in all forms of visual and written
expressions of the billboards, including the images of the parties’ key figures. The key figures represent not only their personal images but also the images of the parties. These images narrate the system of representation that is framed in *Pancasila* as the working ideology of the state. The next chapter will demonstrate how *Pancasila* operates in the branding of the parties which is heavily relied upon in the politics of image of the key figures.
Chapter Seven

The Political Branding of the Nationalist Parties

This chapter focuses on how the socio-political practices of the nationalist parties and their key figures represent *Pancasila* as the form of their political branding. This chapter analyses the branding of PD, Golkar, PDI-P, Gerindra and Hanura. This organisation is based on the vote percentage of these nationalist parties. Gerindra and Hanura occupy alternately in the last two places, below the Islamic party’s votes, PKB. However, the analysis based on the parties’ factions will elucidate the subtle differences in their political branding as nationalist parties.

*Partai Demokrat* (PD) or Democratic Party

As the party of the incumbent President, PD’s political branding has never been dissociated from the image of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the “well-mannered General” (Denny, J.A., 2006, pp. 53-56). This can be seen from PD’s history from its establishment. This stems from the loss of SBY, the former Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs under Megawati’s administration, to become the Vice Presidential candidate in the 2001 MPR session, even though his popularity rose in the public. On a mission to make this retired General the President, PD was established as his political machine. SBY’s date of birth (9 September 1949) was deployed to mark the date of the party’s establishment. On 9 September 2001 (9/9 2001), forty six political elites out of ninety nine (99) who declared themselves as the party’s founders, signed the party’s establishment certificate in front of a notary at Graha Pratama Building 9th floor, Jakarta. The perennial deployment of this number (9 or 99) arguably affirms that the cardinal objective of PD is to become SBY’s political machine; and that the number(s) can also be perceived as a representation of the party’s heavy reliance on SBY’s Javanese image and also Javanese mysticism. SBY’s date of birth is a marker of the party’s fortune and life path (Hisyam, 2004, p. 142-143).

Besides this Javanese influence, the polarisations of Muslim/non-Muslim and Javanese/non-Javanese circulated as they became the core criteria in deciding the candidates for PD’s chairperson (Javanese Muslim) and secretary general (non-Javanese Christian) in the phase of PD’s establishment. This can arguably be seen as the embodiment of the party’s pluralist (inclusive?)

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102 The law on political party stipulates that minimum 50 people are needed to sign a party’s establishment certificate. However, instead of 50, 99 people were willing to be the party’s founders. The number of people (99) was designed to align with SBY’s date of birth.

103 In Javanese culture, it is believed that every (special) occasion should be held based on *tanggal baik*, a numerical key in form of a date that will sketch one’s fortune and influence one’s life path.

104 See sejarah pembentukan dan berdirinya partai demokrat (the history of the democratic party’s establishment) at [http://www.demokrat.or.id/](http://www.demokrat.or.id/).
ideals along with PD’s core ideological notions of nationalism, humanitarianism, and internationalism on the basis of believing in one God (the first principle of Pancasila).105

PD’s history records that the establishment of the party was based on the political intention to make SBY President, the preamble of the statutes does not demonstrate the same understanding. It shows that PD was established as a political reaction against the chaotic situation during Soeharto’s downfall. The situation was construed as a misappropriation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution though Soeharto made Pancasila the state’s sole ideology (see chapter five). PD perceives that the situation can be restored by upholding the three ideological notions of nationalism, humanitarianism, and pluralism. These three notions, according to the party, became the ideological characteristics that distinguish PD, especially from other nationalist parties.

As noted in chapter five, PD’s nationalism is constructed as congruent with Pancasila’s nationalism. It is arguably aligned with the second principle (humanitarianism), the third principle (the nation’s integrity) and the first principle (religiosity) of Pancasila. Article 3 of the statute stipulates PD’s ideology (“nationalist-religious”) which indicates PD’s ambiguity in defining its political identity. This is reinforced by Article 9 sub section (c) that defines pluralism as closely related to nationalism and that reflects the concept of Pancasila’s socio-cultural hybridity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). However, this hybrid identity positions nationalist and religious notions as having a parallel (if not equal) emphasis. This can be seen from the word order in the phrase “nationalist-religious”. Putting the word “nationalist” before “religious” indicates the priority of order in PD’s ideology. The accent can be seen as raising the pluralist notion of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika into a nationalist value of how to love one’s country in order “to achieve, sustain and immortalise the identity, integrity, prosperity and the spirit of the nation” (Soekarno as cited by Kirbiantoro and Rudianto, 2009, p. 13). This nationalist homogeneity, however, does not prevent pluralist aspects from growing. It merely stipulates that these aspects go through an ideological channel (nationalism) so that the national aspirations as stated in the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution can be achieved.

PD’s religiosity is represented in the phrases such as “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (One Almighty God), “ridha Allah Yang Maha Besar” (Blessing from Allah Almighty), “bermoral agama” (having religious morality), and “kepercayaan kepada Tuhan Maha Esa”106. The words “Tuhan” and “Allah” have the

105 PD’s statutes can be retrieved from http://www.demokrat.or.id/.
106 The phrase “Kepercayaan kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” emerged especially as a term deployed by Soeharto’s administration to accommodate Javanese belief of kebatinan. Mulder (1994, p. 66) indirectly
same meaning, i.e. God. However, as the word “Allah”, which derives from Arabic language, has a strong correlation with Islam, its usage is mostly deployed by Muslims in Indonesia in order to differentiate their religious identity from others. The Indonesian word “Tuhan” has more a neutral sense in referring to God in all religions. The phrase “Yang Maha Esa” (the One Almighty) is employed as a phrase that invariably goes with the word “Tuhan”. This is especially important in Pancasila discourse as it represents the Indonesian collective shared belief in One Almighty God (the first principle). The phrase arguably transcends religious boundaries in Indonesia. Adopting the first principle of Pancasila can be perceived as the party’s attempt to represent itself as a nationalist yet religious party that tries to embrace all religions. This also indicates the party’s fluid identity and position as the response to the circulating ideological polarisations. This, at the same time, signifies PD’s attempt to attract voters from different factions. By this, the party arguably positions itself in a similar ideological manner to Golkar as a “catch-all party” (see Golkar’s sub section). However, no information on the statutes can be found that indicates the mechanism by which the party faces political challenges from other parties. It simply correlates the notion with humanitarianism as the second cardinal ideological entity.

Humanitarianism is seen as an element that is closely related with Soekarno’s ideal of internationalism. Soekarno (in Ajaran Bung Karno II [Module], 2011, pp. 126-137) argues that humanitarianism stems from our consciences that become the basis for humanitarian evolution. Soekarno’s concept of nation is deployed to explain this evolutionary process. It starts from the proliferation of ethnic groups in nations which later effaces the boundaries between the nations due to the development of technology. He calls this as a historical paradox: when a nation politically establishes, it sets up its own boundaries to differentiate itself from others. However, as technology develops, it trespasses these boundaries which arguably opens a space for colonisation. Soekarno develops this raw concept into the notion of equal rights among people and nations. Colonisation and imperialism had taught Indonesia to uphold humanitarian values as the foundation of one of the nation’s ultimate aspirations, i.e. to maintain the world order as written in the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution and the first paragraph of the preamble of PD’s statute. In this sense, PD’s ideological characteristics are seen as attributes close to Pancasila’s nationalist principles of the nation’s integrity (third principle), religiosity (first principle) and humanitarianism (second principle).

defines kebatinan as “the cultivation of...a man inner life...that becomes the centre of experience and truth”, which is achieved by believing in One Almighty God.
If we relate these three aspects to the party’s decision about the requirements for the party’s Chairperson and Secretary General in the phase of the party’s establishment, we will find that the nationalist and religious values in PD’s ideology arguably seem to dilute. The decision can be perceived as PD’s political translation of its ideology (nationalist-religious). Determining a Javanese Muslim candidate as the party’s Chairperson and a non-Javanese Christian candidate as the Secretary General demonstrates a political affirmation of the dominant ideological polarisations in Indonesia’s political discourse. It also further shows that the significance of presenting these two camps in the party’s structure during the establishment reflects the mode the parties interpret the third and first principles of Pancasila. As the phrase “ridha Allah Yang Maha Besar” (arguably indicating PD’s inclination towards Islamic religiosity) comes before “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (indicating the party’s neutral religious position) in the last paragraph of the party’s statute, the phrase’s position reaffirms the party’s inclination in Indonesia’s religious discourse. The statement can be seen below:

“Meyakini bahwa perjuangan itu hanya dapat berhasil dengan ridha Allah Yang Maha Besar, Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, serta usaha-usaha yang sungguh-sungguh, kerja keras, penuh kebijaksanaan, dan berkelanjutan dan berkesinambungan, seraya memohon ridha Allah, Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, pada hari Minggu tanggal 9 September tahun 2001 didirikan Partai yang modern dan terbuka bagi segenap warga bangsa dengan nama “PARTAI DEMOKRAT”, untuk masa waktu yang tak terbatas dengan Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga sebagai berikut:” (the fourth paragraph of the Preamble of Partai Demokrat’s Statute, my own emphasis)

“Believing that the struggle can merely be attained with the blessing from Allah Almighty – One Almighty God [Tuhan] – and sustainable conscious efforts and wisdom, whilst invoking Allah’s Blessing, One Almighty God [Tuhan], on Sunday the 9th of September 2001 a modern inclusive party was established for all Indonesian people, by the name of “PARTAI DEMOKRAT” [Democratic Party], for infinite time with the statutes as follows:” (The fourth paragraph of the Preamble of Partai Demokrat’s Statute, my own emphasis)

The quotation above shows that two pairs of phrases: “ridha Allah Yang Maha Besar” (“blessing from Allah Almighty”) and “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (“One Almighty God”) and “ridha Allah” (“Allah’s Blessing”) and “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (“One Almighty God”), are deployed to represent PD’s ideal of religiosity. The word “Allah” has a stronger connotation with Islam than the word “Tuhan” as earlier discussed. However, Christianity in Indonesia also employs the word “Allah” to signify God.

107 See sejarah pembentukan dan berdirinya partai demokrat (the history of the democratic party’s establishment) at http://www.demokrat.or.id/.
108 I attempt to keep the sentence structure as intact as possible which possibly causes meaning fragmentation. It is conducted in order to keep the phrase “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” as the modifier of the phrase “Allah Almighty”.

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This arguably shows assimilation in Indonesia’s Christianity between the Christian word ("Allah") which derives from the Old Testament (Lewis, et.al, 1977, p. 32), with the concept of the Trinity which stems from the New Testament. This amalgam arguably constitutes the way in which Indonesian Christians deploy the word “Allah” as a religious term to refer to God as one entity. The linguistic difference of its usage in Islam and Christianity lies on its pronunciation: “Allah” is pronounced /ˈeːh/ for Indonesian Muslims, while Indonesian Christians/Catholics pronounce it as /ˈeːh/. The similar meaning of “Allah” signifies not only the shared linguistic term Islam and Christianity employ. Its usage in PD’s statute also positions this word as a political term that represents religious tolerance in the party, especially of Islam and Christianity.

However, if we examine this closer, we will find that the sentence structure of the quotation shows that the phrase “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (One Almighty God) merely functions as a modifier of the preceding phrase “Allah Yang Maha Besar” (Allah Almighty). This means that “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (One Almighty God) as a religious neutral term functions as an attribute that controls the meaning in “Allah Yang Maha Besar” (Allah Almighty). This linguistic “control” arguably signifies that the religious “egalitarianism” of PD is not merely limited to Islam and Christianity (Protestianism and Catholicism), but also embraces the three other official religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism). Thus, the order of these two religious phrases reinforces the ambiguous position in PD’s politics of image.

PD’s inclusive notion as a political signifier does not stop at its religiosity. It continues to correlate with the party’s name which reflects the political branding it constructs. The democratic values reflected in the name “demokrat” (democratic), which connotes freedom and equality, can be seen from the party’s pluralistic conception that is clearly defined in Article 9 sub section 2 (c) on the statute. It states as follows: “[p]luralisme bermakna mengakui dan menghargai serta merangkul berbagai ras, suku bangsa, profesi, jenis kelamin, agama, dan kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, serta keberadaan ciri khas setiap daerah yang menyatu sebagai bangsa Indonesia” (“[p]luralism refers to acknowledging, appreciating and embracing diverse races, ethnicity, professions, gender, religions, faith in One Almighty God and the distinctive characteristics of ethnic groups that unite in one nation, Indonesia). This definition emphasises the relating verbs (acknowledging and embracing) and thinking verb (appreciating), to borrow Hallidayan systemic functional linguistic terms which shows PD’s attempt to reinforce its inclusive image. These relating verbs show not only the party’s attempt to frame its socio-cultural-political aspects under the inclusive and/or pluralist notions. They also demonstrate the quality of relation in the definition between the word “pluralism” which acts as a carrier of the attributes “diverse races, ethnicity,
professions, gender, religions, faith in One Almighty God and distinctive characteristics of ethnic groups”. This quality is constructed by means of recognising and carrying the socio-religious elements within the concept of nation-state in the definition. The mental process represented in the thinking verb “appreciating” indicates that the party at this stage attempts to display its emotive essence in representing its ideology. The coalescence of these pluralist elements operates in the nationalist framework of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.

The last sentence of the third paragraph of the preamble states that “[a]uthoritarian thoughts and actions, power abuse, deprivation of people’s freedom and rights that result in injustice, social imbalance and economic collapse should be effaced with directed, planned, organised, smart and collaborative struggle”. It arguably reflects democratic values in PD’s discourse on pluralism. However, this pluralism is circumscribed by the deployment of the adjectives “directed, planned, organised, smart and collaborative”. Not only does this indicate that the adjectives function as the modifier of the word “struggle”, but they also connote that the party’s struggle needs direction in form of guidance so that it can be planned and organised. Well-planned strategy and collaboration will produce a smart struggle. However, a close examination of the qualities of the struggle shows that the party constructs a contingent struggle regarding guidance. Guidance as an intangible product is arguably constructed by heavily relying on the chairperson of the Advisory Council. This can be seen from the structure of the party’s organisation as follows:
The chart shows a hierarchical line of power which positions the Supreme Council at the top. Although the position indicates that the Supreme Council holds the highest power, a close examination of the structure shows an overlapping situation. The horizontal line, which indicates equality, normally puts the governing bodies/entities in parallel positions (the Advisory Council, the party’s chairperson and Board of Honours). However, Article 13 sub section (2) allows the positions of the chairpersons of the Advisory Council and the Supreme Council to be held by the same person. Article 15 sub section (3) also allows the chairperson of the Supreme Council and Supervisor Council to be the chairperson of the Board of Honours. At this stage it can be argued that the organisational chart not only indicates a centralised position of the party in one single person, but also contributes in affirming that the organisation of the Democratic Party is heavily dependent on its patron, i.e. SBY, the chairperson of the Advisory Council and Indonesia’s current President.

The patron controls the strategic positions of the party. As the chairperson of the Supreme Council, for instance, he, together with the council members, determine strategic policies at the national/local levels, such as appointing the candidates for President and Vice President for the Presidential election; the chairperson and faction members for the House of Representatives; the members of the parties’ coalition; the members of the Local Council; and the Governor and Vice Governors for the direct election for local leaders (known as Pilkada). The Supreme Council also determines strategic policies for the party’s five-year programs and the design of the party’s statutes. As the statutes reflect the party’s ideological values, Article 14 sub section (3) states that the duty to guard the implementation of the party’s ideological values is that of the Advisory

109 Article 13 sub section (1) stipulates that the Supreme Council consists of one chairperson, one vice chairperson, one secretary and six members.
Council. This “ideological” task cannot be seen as having an “obscure” responsibility. The action verb “guard” implies the power of the Advisory Council. Not only does the task mean to protect but also indicates subtle surveillance activities as this action verb bears the meaning of “to watch someone and make certain they do not escape from the place” (Walter, et al., 2008). The nominal group, “the duty to guard the implementation of the party’s ideological values”, arguably reflects the absolute power of the Advisory Council, which acts as the ideological state apparatus in Althusserian terms, because the party’s political practices cannot be dissociated from its ideology. The choice of words reflect the soft power the party (read: SBY) deploys (see SBY’s section).

Survelliance activities are officially conducted by the Board of Honours which is also chaired by SBY. Article 15 sub section (5) stipulates the duty and task of the Board of Honours, i.e. to “investigate, determine, and give sanctions to ethical misconduct, violations against the party’s rules and regulation conducted by the party’s cadres, who are assigned in the Executive and Legislature at the national and provincial levels, based on the reports issued by the monitoring board or other parties.” Article 23 sub section 2 (a) and (b) about the duties and tasks of the Monitoring Commission position the commission as a body that executes/implements the investigation under the coordination of the Board of Honours. The Monitoring Commission supervises the performance of the party’s cadres assigned in the Executive and Legislature at the national and provincial levels and investigates and verifies alleged ethical, moral and law violations against the cadres. No written rules or regulations on the statutes explicate the procedures of the surveillance.

However, Syarafani (2007, pp. 100-101) found the surveillance mechanism to be operating at DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or Regional Representative Council) level. Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan (Balitbang or Research and Development Department) at DPD level has the role of supplying an “accurate” analysis of Indonesian society’s social condition and verifies the party’s internal conflicts. The procedure is conducted by analysing the causes of the problems, scrutinising them, and recommending appropriate solutions. This plausibly shows that not only has the party established its monitoring apparatus at the regional level, but also indicates that surveillance activities are ostensibly conducted in minute detail. However, as Syarafani (2007, p. 101) argues the detail is still at the preparation stage: “Balitbang still formulates its framework”.

At the national level, the power of the chairperson of the Supervisory and Supreme Councils and the Board of Honours does not stop at the surveillance stage. Article 14 sub section (5) stipulates that “the authority, duty, mechanism and relationship between the party’s Central Board (under the coordination of the party’s chairperson) and the Advisory Council shall be controlled in a regulation stipulated by the chairperson of the Advisory Council.” This sub section clearly demonstrates the
hierarchical relationship of the General Chairperson and the Advisory Council Chairperson. The General Chairperson (formerly held by Anas Urbaningrum) acts as the Vice Chairperson of the Supreme Council and Board of Honours (Article 13 sub section 3; Article 15 sub section 4). This dual role positions the chairperson of the party as the partner of the Supreme Council and Board of Honours’ chairperson in its day-to-day practices.

As the chairperson of the Supreme Council, the Advisory Council and the Board of Honours, Yudhoyono arguably holds absolute power in the Democratic Party. However, this power cannot directly be seen as representing an individual power, as the deployment of the word “council” on represents collectivism. A direct assumption about the party’s decision of an issue cannot be made and referred solely to as SBY’s political decision. PD’s “indecisive” decision on Nazaruddin’s case, for instance, cannot be considered as SBY’s sole political response. Every decision the party makes reflects a mixture of the political attitudes of SBY (as the core figure) and the party itself. However, as the mixture contains a heavy political element of SBY, correlating PD’s decision as SBY’s is arguably incontrovertible. In this sense, the word “council” is deployed as a linguistic marker to mask SBY’s absolute power.

However, the discussion of PD’s statutes merely portrays the form of ideological image PD constructs. Syarafani (2007, pp. 85-116) offers a micro investigation which focuses on how PD sets up its apparatuses at DPD level in order to construct a solid foundation of the party with an ostensible expectation that the party’s dependence on SBY can be reduced. His investigation is concentrated on DPD Central Java. He argues that the visible way for PD to detach itself from SBY is to become a cadre-based party. He found that as a new party, PD’s regional apparatuses are still trapped in their internal consolidation problems. The problems stem from the absence of tiered membership, irregular cadres’ trainings, and popularity-based criteria for the legislative/executive

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110 At the time this chapter is written, the post of the party’s chairperson is currently vacant. This is due to PD’s internal conflict between Anas Urbaningrum’s camp and SBY’s camp that ends up in SBY’s attempt to sack Anas from his post which arguably violates the party’s statutes (see the elaboration of the tasks and authorities of the Supreme Council). Anas is alleged to have involved in a corruption case known as Hambalang (see the analysis of Herlambang’s billboard in chapter nine for further elaboration), which is seen by SBY’s camp as the source of plunge in PD’s popularity from 21 per cent in 2009 to 8.3 per cent in 2012 (see Haryanto. (2013). Kecerdasan Anas vs Citra SBY [Anas’s intelectuality versus SBY’s image]. Kompasiana. Retrieved from http://politik.kompasiana.com/2013/02/17/kecerdasan-anas-vs-citra-sby-535075.html). However, Anas’ camp perceives this allegation as politically designed by SBY’s camp (also known as Cikeas).

111 Muhammad Nazaruddin was the former PD’s treasurer (2010-2011) who is currently alleged on several corruption cases, such as the building construction of Wisma Atlet (Athletes’ Village) in Palembang, South Sumatra, for Southeast Asian (SEA) Games in 2011. The case brought Angelina Sondakh, PD’s Vice Secretary General I, into KPK’s (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or Corruption Eradication Comission) investigation. Nazaruddin also mentioned Anas Urbaningrum, PD’s former chairperson, and Andi A. Mallarangeng, Secretary of the Advisory Council and the former Youth and Sports Minister, as the persons who also allegedly received money regarding the case, at the court.
candidates and the party’s inability to mobilise their masses. However, Syarafani also notes that PD’s success at the regional level is mainly based on the party’s community-service projects, such as leasing chairs and sunblinds, selling clean cheap water to the people in dry areas and the provision of public ambulances. These services are seen as more effective in promoting the party as this mode of branding can reach the grassroots’ level. The projects are supported by PD’s wing organisations, such as Perempuan Demokrat Republik Indonesia (PDRI or Democratic Women of Republic of Indonesia), Angkatan Muda Demokrat Indonesia (AMDI or Indonesian Democratic Youth Group), Komite Nasional Pemuda Demokrat (KNPD or National Committee of Democratic Youth Group) and Persaudaraan Istri Anggota DPR RI Fraksi Partai Demokrat (Association of Democratic Party Legislative Members’ Wives).

In a macro lens, the position of PD as a nationalist-religious party not only indicates an ambiguous identity but also places the party at the intersection of ideological crossroads. Platzdasch (2009b) found that the crossroads has been adopted and adapted not only by PD but also by the other eight major parties. He argues that the nationalist parties have gradually moved towards the Islamic mainstream to accommodate the Muslim voters, while the Islamic parties have attempted to reshape themselves by becoming more inclusive to attract both non-Muslim and Muslim voters. However, the movement does not indicate the state of becoming but more represents the state of accommodating. For instance, inside PD, the emergence of Majelis Dzikir Nurussalam SBY (SBY Nurussalam Dhikr Council) in 2000, a foundation which was alleged by George Aditjondro in his controversial book Membongkar Gurita Cikeas (Dismantling “Cikeas” Octopus) as SBY’s political/money machine, can be seen as a religious political means to accommodate the Islamic aspiration of PD’s Muslim voters.

The inclusive characteristic PD promotes does not guarantee the party’s durability. Mietzner (2009a) predicts that PD’s heavy reliance on SBY’s persona will trap the party in a situation where no figures in the party seem to be able to equal the President’s popularity. Although SBY’s family members such as Edhie Bhaskoro Yudhoyono (SBY’s son), the current PD’s Secretary General, Hadi Utomo

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112 Mujani and Liddle (2010, pp. 76–77, 97) argues that sociological factors of voters such as their religious, ethnic, regional, and social class inclinations play an insignificant role in determining their voting behaviour. They find that today’s Indonesian voters are more concerned with the government’s achievements, which explains how SBY won his re-election in 2009.
113 An Islamic way to remember God by repeating His names silently or loudly.
114 Aditjondro (2009) employed an octopus wearing a Javanese crown as an image especially to criticize SBY in relation to Century Bank Scandal. Cikeas is the name of the region in which SBY resides.
(SBY’s brother-in-law), the member of the Advisory Council or even SBY’s wife Kristiani Herrawati Yudhoyono actively engage in the party, they are seen as being far from reaching for let alone gaining the same popularity. Mietzner further argues that the reliance on SBY merely forges a generation gap and makes the party institutionally weak.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Partai Demokrat)

Representing the nationalist party, SBY also represents the Javanese camp. His name reflects Javanese subtlety (Susilo – the well mannered) and connotes the Javanese notion of aristocracy as in the concept of kawula-gusti (see Pancasila’s section) or the ruled and ruler. His middle name, Bambang, denotes literally a knight who equates with gusti or the noble person who wins the battle or war (yudho means war while yono means victory) against kurawa. Hisyam, et.al. (2004, p. 28) argued that SBY’s Javanese subtlety stemmed from his reading wayang books in which he learnt the Javanese way of paying respect, observing hierarchy and behaving with good manners. Furthermore, he was born as priyayi on 9 September 1949 in Pacitan, East Java. People often called him “Dik Sus” or “Mak Sus” to honour his social status (see Tempo magazine, “Lolos dari Persimpangan Jalan”, 2009). SBY’s status as the son of a priyayi constitutes the social capital which defines his position within the local community.

However, this social capital does not correlate with the economic capital of SBY’s family. As the military commander of a poor subdistrict in Pacitan, the first Lieutenant Soekotjo, SBY’s father, could not provide a fancy life for his only son from his marriage with Siti Habibah, a daughter of Tremas Kyai family. He was then raised by his uncle, Sastro Suyitno, the head of Ploso village in Pacitan,

116 See Hisyam, et.al. (2004). SBY Sang Kandidat Mini Biografi SBY (a magazine edition). It is a Javanese name which means the well mannered knight whose victory in the war is always in his hand.

117 The war is inscribed in Mahabharata, the Hindu (Javanese) epic book, which represent the war between good (Pandawa) and evil (Kurawa). The conflict between Anas’s camp and SBY’s camp has been depicted in alignment with this war. Anas deployed the word “Sengkuni” (Kurawa’s uncle that provokes Kurawa to fight against Pandawa) to indicate SBY’s accomplices to purge him. However, according to Suud (2013), if we draw an analogy between this war and the Javanese concept of harmony, we will find that the conflict between Anas’s camp and SBY’s camp will reach “the nadir point” prior to the state of “equilibrium”. (see Suud, D. (2013, February 20). Sengkuni dan Togog Demokrat [Sengkuni and PD’s Togog]. Detiknews. Retrieved from http://news.detik.com/read/2013/02/20/143652/2175100/103/sengkuni togog demokrat).

118 The Javanese social status/group to connotes the aristocracy. His father, Raden Soekotjo is the son of Raden Imam Badjoeri, the headman of Arjosari subdistrict. The last feature in SBY’s mini biography (Hisyam, 2004, pp.142-143) entitled Terawang or foreseeing shows an indication of equating SBY as the embodiment of Javanese Messiah as his birth is perceived to be the date of a born leader who represents the Javanese priyayi. He is said to be the descendant of Ki Ageng Buwono Keling and Sultan Hamengkubuwono III from Yogyakarta sultanate. The date of birth which denotes number nine is believed representing the drive to achieve mental and spiritual stability with the noble personality traits (based on Javanese mythology): compassionate, just, peaceful, discipline, and honest.

119 A muslim cleric
during his schooling. Takwin and Karim (2004, pp. 239-247) contend that the region’s poor geographic conditions, his father’s military discipline, and his status as the only child shaped SBY’s personality as a typical only child who wants to get attention from his parents and peers. His well-mannered personality was needed for he had to maintain the affection he received. However, his parents’ divorce when SBY was in grade ten of Senior High School made him a bit unkempt for he had not been well taken care of. The divorce became the turning point which stimulated him to leave Pacitan and later joined the military.

SBY’s military life becomes the significant milestone which not only influences his disposition but also (re)defines his identity. In 1970 SBY entered the military academy in Magelang. He successfully received seven awards during his study, including Bintang Adhi Makayasa, the highest award for the military’s best graduate in 1973. His achievement was embodied as the cultural capital elevated SBY’s social relation. His potential arguably made Lieutenant General Sarwo Edhie, the former Governor of the military academy, give his blessing to SBY to marry his third daughter, Kristiani Herrawati, in 1976. The marriage not only narrowed the social gap between the two families but also became the strategic milestone that plausibly influenced his military career. However, according to Tempo magazine (“Dari Bandung ke Yogyakarta”, 2009), this new status did not mean that SBY earned any privileges as his commander, Agus Widjojo who led the Seroja operation in East Timor (1976), said that SBY never committed any mistake during the operation.

Besides the military academy in Magelang, the American military academy shaped SBY’s educational experience. He attended the Airborne and Ranger Course in 1976 and Infantry Officer Advance Course in 1982-1983, at Fort Benning. In 1983 he had an On-Job-Training at 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, USA. A year later he joined the Skill Qualification Test at the US Army Infantry School. He attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1990-1991. He undertook Belgium and Germany military studies when he attended the Antitank Weapon Course in 1984 and Jungle Warfare School in Panama in 1983. With this overseas educational capital, SBY’s career was sky-rocketing. He started his career as the Commander of a platoon 3/A Bandung (1974-1976) to the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs (in Gotong Royong Cabinet) under Megawati’s administration (10 August 2001 – 12 March 2004).

As a Javanese military officer, SBY was perceived as a gentle commander. He fulfilled the benevolent image of a Javanese leader who executed power through perintah halus or “gentle hints” (Keeler, 1985), as a mask to display power (Antlov and Cederroth, 1994, p. 13). This is a Javanese style of subtlety that makes the subordinates fulfil orders without making commands direct and being harsh.
SBY considered “gentle hints” as the reflection of a soft power, at a dinner reception held in Washington DC on 25 May 2005 by USINDO (The United States-Indonesia Society). He argues that soft power lures the public. SBY deployed tolerance and patience to exemplify his soft power. He asserts that tolerance is above freedom because it controls diversity, especially in Indonesia, so that true peace can be achieved. He also believes that patience is needed for a nation to progress. This soft personality had been predicted by Takwin and Karim (2004, pp. 239-243) in their psychological analysis of SBY’s personality. They found that SBY’s choice of words reflected his cultural disposition towards harmony, appropriateness, and cooperation, which were arguably in line with Javanese spirituality (see chapter six).

However, like a two-side of coin, these (plausible) positive personality traits have their negative side. Haris (2008, pp. 222-243) argues that SBY’s ceaseless attempt to construct a positive image has entrapped him in endless image-building. His investigation focuses on SBY’s image-building in his administration with Jusuf Kalla (JK), his former Vice President (2004-2009). He argues that not only SBY’s positive personality determine the success of PD (as investigated by Mietzner (2009a) and Sukma (2010)), but also the negative traits contribute to the construction. He found that SBY’s image-building was constructed in alignment with his policy making. For instance, he argues that SBY’s act in reshuffling the cabinet in 2005 and 2007 was construed as a worthy entertainment for the public because SBY conducted fit and proper test for the candidates, a test that has never been conducted by his predecessors. SBY astutely employed the moment to demonstrate his government’s serious commitment in forming a strong cabinet. In fact, as Haris further notes, the reshuffle merely shifted, added and reduced some ministers’positions from political parties. Haris further accentuates SBY’s indecisiveness and disposition to embrace all parties in order to maintain a harmonious relation with the parliament became his major weaknesses that entrapped him in an unstable relationship with the Parliament.

Conversely, Ambardi (2009) perceives this not completely as a weakness, as he found that the “cartelized party system” in the first SBY’s Cabinet, known as Kabinet Indonesia bersatu I (United Indonesia Cabinet I), which espoused the political parties elites that joined the coalition, arguably helped to minimise the unstable relationship between the President and the Parliament. Instead of refuting this, Haris (2008, pp. 236-237) supports Ambardi for he sees that the lack of SBY’s government is the absence of a political “communicator” who can bridge the deadlock between the

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President and the Parliament. Backroom deals are frequently deployed as an effective lobby to overcome the problem. The coalition and backroom deals represent not only the soft power SBY’s government employs but also indicate the political disposition of the President.

SBY’s image building does not stop at his astuteness in solving political tension. Mietzner (2009a) and Sukma (2010) note that his astuteness in utilising the global economic crisis to produce social welfare programs, such as a direct cash assistance program for the poor (Bantuan Langsung Tunai), the compensation for fuel price hikes and schooling allowances, significantly contributed to the success of his re-election and also the party’s triumph, beside the political stability and the improved economic performance. However, Tomsa (2010, p. 148) and (Mietzner, 2008) find that in the law sector the corruption eradication program (one of SBY’s prioritised programs), surmounted by Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK or Corruption Eradication Commission), entrapped the political elites of all parties, especially the ones that were engaged in “illicit fundraising activities”.

Beside the increasing success of SBY’s government in the legal sector which also acts as a boomerang for PD’s elites (such as Nazaruddin’s corruption case), SBY also constructs his image through composing songs such as “Like the Wind”, “Coming Home”, “Mother Earth”, which were sung at Jakarta International Java Jazz Festival in 2012\(^\text{121}\). His song “Majulah Negeriku” (“Go My Country”) was also noted as one of the songs sung at the commemoration of the 63th Independence Day. These songs contribute to SBY’s politics of image-building not only because they represent the President’s cultural capital but also amplify the President’s soft power image. It can be seen especially at the time when “Majulah Negeriku” was sung by school students’ choir at Merdeka Palace, which was broadcast nationally. The lyric of “Majulah Negeriku”, which invites Indonesian people to unite and to live a harmonious life, not only represents SBY’s invitation but also arguably reflects a subtle inculcation of his gentle image through songs that reinforces his “soft” (if not melancholy) personality. Heryanto (2010, pp. 191-195) perceives these songs as the representation of SBY’s “empty rhetorical style” that lures Indonesian people into his influence.

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The lure continues as SBY watched the most successful Islamic romance film in Indonesia entitled “Ayat-Ayat Cinta” or “The Verses of Love”122 in a cinema together with his cabinet ministers and foreign ambassadors in 2008. These public appearances indicate a series of public staging in order to cement SBY’s popularity. They connote a myth making mechanism which espouses SBY’s cultural capital into the narrative that is designed to amplify his popularity. SBY “seduces” the public with his public appearances and possibly his creative work123 that signify his commitment and dedication to (popular) arts. This visual exposure becomes SBY’s self-expression which is expected to generate public impressions towards this PD’s paternalistic figure. As the expression is designed in a series of public appearances, his acts can be perceived as a series of events in his political branding. This public appearance (watching “The Verses of Love”) was conducted a few hours after JK, his former Vice President, watched the same film. Whether his appearance aimed to follow suit or counter JK’s public performance124, the action shows an event which is part of boosting SBY’s and/or JK’s image. This also demonstrates that the design of boosting SBY and/or JK popularity is based on the public performances in order to reflect the personality, not the character.

However, SBY’s popular image building was challenged especially when a series of books about him were circulated and consumed by primary and secondary students in West Java, Central Java and Banten provinces. Sugiharto (2011)125 suggests that the circulation and consumption of these books cannot be merely perceived as a political act designed to inculcate SBY’s image. It can be deployed as a means to challenge teachers in treating these textbooks in order to sharpen students’ critical thinking by examining the content and relating them to the socio-political practices of the government. Notwithstanding the way the teachers use them, the books’ content cannot escape

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122 The film was noted as having 3.58 millions of viewers in Indonesia, the second highest number in Indonesian film history. See “Data Penonton 10 Film Indonesia Peringkat Teratas dalam Perolehan Jumlah Penonton pada Tahun 2008 Berdasarkan Tahun Edar Film”.[n.d]. Retrieved from (http://filmindonesia.or.id/movie/viewer/2008#.T7Ni01LujU


from the widely constructed perception that the books act as an ideological tool to inculcate the ideology SBY promotes.

**Partai Golkar**

As an attempt to fix its political image, Golkar does not explicitly state its ideology on its official website. It narrowly states that the party avoids an ideological orientation for this will lead to primordialism\(^{126}\) and sectarianism. The notion *karya kekaryaan* or “functional” is chosen as the political doctrine which focuses on the political programs with the basis of problem-solving. Golkar’s cardinal principles are to regard highly the supremacy of law, *ekonomi kerakyatan*, nationalism, and pluralism in an all inclusive conception.\(^{127}\) However, a popular perception has been constructed; that the party’s ideology is *Pancasila*; it orients to either nationalist or Islamic blocs; it is a non Javanese party with its loyalist majority coming from the Outer Islands (Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata, 2004, pp. 6-8). Golkar’s logo reinforces this positioning (see chapter five).

Golkar’s statutes, which reflect the party’s identity, indirectly confirm the perception pertaining to the party’s position. The employment of the phrase, “*persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa*”, or the nation’s unity, in the first sentence of the second paragraph of the statutes’ preamble seemingly indicate its nationalist orientation towards the Islamic/Nationalist polarisation as it resonates with the third principle of *Pancasila*. Golkar perceives that the cardinal objective of the country\(^{128}\) as stated in the fourth paragraph of the 1945 Constitution can be achieved if Indonesian people uphold *Pancasila*’s third principle (represented by banyan tree)\(^{129}\), i.e. the nation’s unity. Stating the country’s cardinal objective in the first paragraph of the statute is seen as imperative for the nationalist parties, such as Golkar and PD.

\(^{126}\) Geertz (1973, p. 259) perceives that the connection based on ethnicity, religion, social practices, language and custom will trap one into subjective glorification of one’s group as they are embedded in the way one perceives the world.


\(^{128}\) The Ministry of Information in 1989 published a provisional version of the 1945 Constitution. It translated the cardinal objectives of the country (paragraph four of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution)as follows: “subsequent thereto, to form a government of the state of Indonesia which shall protect all the people of Indonesia and their entire native land, and in order to improve the public welfare, to advance the intellectual life of the people and to contribute to the establishment of a world order based on freedom, abiding peace and social justice, the national independence of Indonesia shall be formulated into a constitution of sovereign Republic of Indonesia which is based on the belief in One and Only God, just and humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations among representatives and the realisation of the social justice for all the people of Indonesia.”

\(^{129}\) See chapter five
Golkar perceives that the concept of unity needs to be materialised in a functional form. The party calls the form “masyarakat karya dan kekaryaan” or functional group (third paragraph of the statutes’ preamble). The phrase “karya dan kekaryaan” or “functional” which modifies the noun “masyarakat” or group, demonstrates Golkar’s attempt to identify itself as the representation of the group. This social group (Golkar) is construed as an idealist one as it becomes the political power that is able to enhance the prosperity and intellectual life of the people, democracy and social justice (third paragraph of the preamble). A close examination of the concept shows that Golkar harnesses the ideological meaning of functionalism and positions it as the party’s core value, especially when the party’s name (Golongan Karya or functional group) reflects the party’s pragmatic value of functionalism. Pope (1975, pp. 361-379) and Calhoun (2002, pp. 179-180) argue that the notion “functionalism” derives from Emile Durkheim who perceives that the social structure is analogous to a biological organism in that the party’s divisions cannot be perceived as separate entities as they are interrelated and function as a “skeleton” of the organisation (Golkar). What is overarching in functionalism is the actions of agents of the party rather than avowed ideology, though, of course, functionalism itself is an ideology to which they unwittingly adhere. The actions are of highest importance as they actuate the operation of the party. However, this does not solely mean glorifying the actions as a means to win against the competition. As the actions represent the significance of the contributions of the party’s divisions in maintaining the equilibrium of the party’s system, the actions should be present in the form of consensus as the basis of social order (Pope, 1975, p. 361). In this sense, as O’Sullivan, et al. (1994, pp. 124-125) view, the functional notion operates by smoothing over conflict as gusti (the patron) functions to maintain the party’s equilibrium and ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the party’s constituent parts. Maintaining the effectiveness and efficiency is conducted by performing practical actions that represent the party’s cohesion (equilibrium) as reflected on its logo. By this, the party’s actions are designed to underpin the system that represents the third principle of Pancasila. At this stage, the logo signifies the party’s dual system of sustaining the equilibrium through practical actions whilst positioning practicality as the modus operandi. Thus, the notion of “functionalism”, which highly regards the functionality of each division in the party, has been shifted into pragmatic actions as deploying the “karya kekaryaan” or “functional(ist)” notion arguably positions Golkar as a “catch-all” party.

The fourth paragraph of the statutes’ preamble, which briefly explains Golkar’s history, can be seen as the party’s attempt to rehabilitate its image. The paragraph shows the process of the rehabilitation starting from narrating the embryo of the party’s establishment to its current shape.

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130 The reason for translating the word “masyarakat” as “group” rather than “society” is due to its usage in the statutes that represents the existence of a social group that is bound with the common interests.
The paragraph opens with a statement that adumbrates the functional group’s initiation in 1945 prior to its official establishment: “masyarakat karya dan kekaryaan sesungguhnya sudah ada dan lahir...bersamaan dengan Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945, namun akibat perkembangan kehidupan sosial politik di Indonesia, masyarakat karya dan kekaryaan belum sempat menghimpun dan mengorganisir diri dalam satu wadah” (“the functional(ist) group existed as it born ...at the time Indonesia proclaimed its Independence on 17 August 1945. However, due to the development of socio-political life in Indonesia, the functional(ist) group had not had the opportunity to organise itself in an organisation”). The paragraph delineates the moment of initiation that stemmed from Soekarno’s thinking. However, the party’s claim for its presence in 1945 was arguably dubious as Reeve (1985, p. 116) noted that Soekarno suggested the conception (Joint Secreatriat of Golkar)131 in 1956 as a political organisation that intended to uphold Soekarno’s NASAKOM (nationalist, religion and communist) ideology (see chapter five). The employment of the existential verb “existed” above, arguably represents a political fallacy. This fallacy is obscured in a sentence that succeeds it: “...due to the development of socio-political life in Indonesia, the functional group had not had the opportunity to organise itself in an organisation”. The opportunity had not yet arrived until Soeharto came to power and used Golkar as his political machine. Thus, catering the information about the party’s embryo in the opening statement of the paragraph is necessary. Not only does it explicate the milestones of Golkar’s history, but also functions as the point that leads to the recounting events in the narrative of Golkar’s image rehabilitation.

The events continue in the third to the fifth sentences of the fourth paragraph, which state as follows:

“[b]ahwa dengan terjadinya penyelewengan-penyelewengan terhadap cita-cita Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 maka lahirlah tatanan baru yang menghendaki agar seluruh kehidupan bangsa dan negara Republik Indonesia diletakkan dan dilandaskan kepada kemurnian pelaksanaan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. Dengan demikian hakikat tatanan baru adalah sikap mental yang menuntut pembaharuan dan pembangunan yang terus menerus dalam melaksanakan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945....[D]alam rangka mengembankan hakikat tatanan baru tersebut maka masyarakat karya dan kekaryaan yang berhimpun dalam organisasi Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya memantapkan diri dalam wadah organisasi kekuatan sosial politik yang bernama Golongan Karya.”

“That the deviations from the country’s cardinal objectives and the 1945 Constitution have called forth a new order that requires the life of Indonesia’s nation-state be based on the ideal implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Therefore the nature of the new order constitutes the mental

131 Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya or Joint Secretariat of Functional(ist) Group was officially established on 20 October 1964.
attitude that demands a renewed ceaseless development in implementing *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution....In order to achieve the nature of the new order, the functional(ist) group, which was formerly constituted in an organisation called Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya, then solidified in a political party by the name of Golongan Karya."

The quotation shows the mechanism of reconstructing Golkar’s image – transforming its image as a “new” political party. With the transformation, the party is expected to rectify the country’s unstable conditions as the legacy of Soeharto’s administration. Golkar perceives that the instability derives from the corrupt implementation of *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. The image transformation is labelled under the nominal group “new order” which represents Golkar’s “ideal” mental attitudes which are based on the true implementation of *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. Thus, this identity reconstruction signifies Golkar’s act to be a resilient party. The employment of the relating verb “solidify” reinforces the process of resilience and cements its transformed image. This is conducted by effacing the label “political organisation” under the name Joint Secretariat of Golkar in Soeharto’s era. Moreover, the adjective “ideal” in the sentence “...[i]n order to achieve the ideal implementation the functional(ist) group, which was formerly constituted as a Joint Secretariat, has solidified in a political party by the name of Golongan Karya [Functional(ist) Group]”, functions as the modifier that connotes the utopianist quality of implementation the “new” Golkar needs to achieve. This utopianist goal is constructed as a differentiation element in Golkar’s new image. The new image/identity was officially declared on 7 March 1999.

A closer examination of the image reconstruction demonstrates that the clause “that the deviations from the country’s cardinal objectives and the 1945 Constitution have called forth a new order”, is deployed as a means to justify that the financial and economic crisis in 1998 as Soeharto’s legacy, was, in fact, the result of all practices that deviated from the 1945 Constitution and the country’s cardinal objectives. This can be viewed as Golkar’s attempt to overwrite the perception that the party was the prime political “suspect” behind the crisis. However, as noted in chapter five, Golkar managed to distance itself from this stigma by solely attaching the negative attribute to Soeharto’s family.

The image reconstruction does not touch the religious side of Golkar. Unlike PD that employs the word “Allah” and “Tuhan” to indicate its inclusive religiosity, Golkar as a nationalist party in which many Islami(c/st) modernist figures from ICMI132 joined, merely employs the word “Tuhan” in its

132 Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (see chapter five)
declaration statement as follows: “...dengan rahmat Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, Partai Golkar menyatakan diri sebagai Organisasi Partai Politik, dengan Anggaran Dasar sebagai berikut...” (“...by the grace of God Almighty One, Golkar declares itself as a political party, with the statutes as follows...”). This is possibly due to Golkar’s attempt of not wanting to be trapped in the image of obscure religious-based party (see chapter five). However, Golkar’s current chairperson and also Indonesian business tycoon and the former Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare (2005-2009) in SBY’s cabinet, Aburizal Bakrie, recently stated at the Centre for Muslim States and Societies’ Public lecture at the University of Western Australia on 23 May 2012, that a characteristic of Golkar resembles PD’s and PDI-P’s of being “religious-nationalist”. The presence of many Islamic figures from ICMI in Golkar, as discussed in chapter five, was initially due to Soeharto’s politics in subtly confronting the growing power of the Catholic General, L.B. Moerdani. These Islamic figures do not transform Golkar’s position as an Islamic one. The pragmatic notion “functional(ist)” arguably prevents it.

The functional notion is also deployed as an ideological means to differentiate Golkar from other nationalist parties. When the other nationalist parties claim that they uphold the democratic values such as equality, prosperity, freedom of rights, justice, independence, egalitarianism, Golkar adds the ideological ingredient of functionalism in its branding. However, the ingredient has been deployed as the differentiation factor in the party’s branding since its establishment. To restore Golkar’s image especially at the village level, Aburizal Bakrie launched a socio-political program in the late 2010 which plausibly aims to empower the grassroots. The following billboard narrates a testimony of a female vegetable grower named Khairiyah that indirectly indicates the success of Bakrie’s (also read: Golkar’s) program.

![Billboard](source: author’s collection)
The billboard illustrates a collective expression of gratitude for Aburizal Bakrie and Golkar party from small-scale enterprise entrepreneurs, represented by Khairiyah, a small-scale vegetable grower, due to Bakrie and Golkar’s “real” efforts in helping them. What is interesting from this billboard is the absence of Khairiyah, the agent that expresses the testimony. This indicates that the accentuation of this billboard, not on the portrait of the entrepreneurs, but on their collective statement of gratitude. The gratitude itself indicates the success of Golkar’s (Bakrie’s) *ekonomi kerakyatan* program, i.e. *Kredit-Mikro Golkar* or Golkar’s micro-credit. The program, which was perceived as the embodiment of Golkar’s real efforts, was launched under the banner of PT Bakrie Micro Finance Indonesia on 15 December 2010, owned by the Bakrie Group. It offers soft loans without collateral requirement for small-scale enterprise entrepreneurs, especially female entrepreneurs. The company and Golkar consider that placing women as their business (read: campaign) target not merely elevates and restores Golkar’s image but also indicates their strategy for ostensibly reaching at a domestic level. Women are perceived as more careful and disciplined than men in managing cash flow. In this sense, this socio-economic program has its dual targets: women who are placed at the centre of domesticity and their small-scale enterprises. Van Wichelen (2006, pp. 52-53) argues that these positions put women in dual gender roles: they are bound to so-called “female destiny”, i.e. domesticity (mothering), and the constructed notion of a careerwoman – a notion that is used, according to Brenner (1999), to signify Indonesian “public womanhood” at the end of the New Order regime. However, the absence of Khairiyah, as the representation of a female entrepreneur, emasculates not merely the billboard’s visual credibility but also demonstrates that this philanthropic act is merely a political campaign, not a long term program. The campaign slogan “Bersama Bangkitkan Usaha Kecil” or “Together Empower Small-Scale Enterprises” on the billboard, which linguistically indicates that their social act is free from gender inclination, engenders ambiguity. This is deployed as a campaign tactic, not to create gender discrimination, but more plausibly to embrace the grassroots’ level through utilising women as the figures that are able to penetrate the domestic as well as business domains.

Anderson (1996, p. 14) contends that this domestication reflects “the direction to the logic of electoralism”. It represents the Janus face of Golkar’s politics: the party’s political campaign is

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enveloped with the social welfare program with the hope that the voters remember that they owe Golkar for its help to empower them. In a Bourdieuan lens, Golkar’s social action involves not only the economic capital (the business fund from PT Bakrie Micro Finance) and social capital (the party’s networks at the village level), but also the cultural capital (skill competences, forms of knowledge and the symbolic content of the program) of Golkar’s cadres (including Aburizal Bakrie). It is conducted to gain symbolic capital, i.e. the people’s recognition of the party’s philanthropic acts. Prior to gaining this capital, a doxic relationship between the people and the party needs to be established. That is why Aburizal Bakrie in his public lecture further claimed that these acts have been conducted regularly. Creating this social “debt” as the mechanism to subtly make people cast their votes for Golkar/Bakrie should be conducted as normally as possible. However, the program’s sustainability itself is still questionable. In other words, selling Bakrie’s image to the grassroots needs a process to reify Bakrie’s appeal as a high-end, reachable, and familiar commodity. His appeal needs to solidify in an image as a philanthropic yet empowering figure. By this, it is hoped that Bakrie’s familiarisation process will result not merely in the elevation of his (and Golkar’s) popularity but also ultimately in winning the Legislative and Presidential elections. Thus, the loans from PT Bakrie Micro Finance equates with the commodification of Bakrie’s appeal by assigning the socio-economic political values to this corporeal body. The loans also signify the design to make Bakrie’s appeal as a fetish object. This fetishism is constructed not by means of “seducing” the grassroots to this philanthropic political praxis.

On the other hand, it is not surprising to find a larger font used in the written expression of the name of H. Aburizal Bakrie and Golkar party than the font used in the statement that indicates Khairiyah’s identity. The title Hajj in front of his name (H.) indicates another tactic used in Bakrie’s image-building. Not only does it reflect his religious identity (Muslim) but also indicates his use of the code of religiosity through this title. If we relate the deployment of Bakrie’s religious code of hajj with the religious code in Golkar’s statute, we will find that the religious code is embodied in two discrepant signifiers: “Tuhan” and “Hajj”. The title hajj in front of Bakrie’s name becomes an elemental part of his image-building as it represents what Ajidarma (2009) calls “socio-moral status”. In Indonesia this title represents one’s social and religious status as the cost of going to Mecca is relatively expensive. At the same time, this also connects to the populist perception that when one attaches the title “hajj” in front of one’s name (after conducting a pilgrimage), consequently people will perceive him as pious Muslim. However, as the title is now exploited in everyday (socio/religious-political) practices, the degree of piety is no longer completely seen as representing a comprehensive understanding of Islam or reflecting Islamic morality, but arguably indicates a social
status. In this sense, deploying this title connotes that Bakrie places himself in the ambiguity of the religious code in order to penetrate the grassroots.

Stating Aburizal Bakrie’s name before the party’s name in the testimony (the billboard) indicates the patron-client relationship between the party and its General Chairperson. At the same time the word order in the phrase demonstrates a priority pattern in which the written expression of gratitude firstly refers to Bakrie as the representation of his company’s community services and secondly to the party. However, as the leader of Golkar, Bakrie astutely wraps this service and projects it to Golkar. This is plausibly conducted to rehabilitate his image for people perceive him (Bakrie’s group) as the one who is responsible for the mudflow disaster in Sidoarjo, East Java135. Thus this linguistic “order” demonstrates the contingent status of the party towards its patron. Golkar cannot directly claim that the program belongs completely to the party’s since the money comes from Bakrie’s family.

However, equating Golkar’s image with Aburizal Bakrie’s solely would be an improper correlation. Since the resignation of Golkar’s chief patron (Soeharto) in the New Order era, Golkar attempts to detach itself from any association regarding its patrons. Moreover, Harjanto (2010) found that Golkar’s characteristic as catch-all party plays a cardinal part in its survival in the post-Soeharto era. Harjanto (2010) and Mietzner (2009a) argue that the party’s strong institution significantly secures Golkar’s position in the Reform era. Harjanto (2010, pp. 260-261) argues that the key elements of Golkar’s success lie on its contingency on “the patronage network at national and local levels; its linkage with mass organisation; and its ability to maintain its potential cadres such as businessmen, bureaucrats, or local oligarchies”. Tomsa (2010, p. 147) supports Harjanto by asserting that businessmen dominated Golkar, especially at the national level. These made the party able to secure its success: Golkar held the second place in the elections of 1999 (120 parliamentary seats); the first place in the legislative election of 2004 (129 parliamentary seats); and the second place in the

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135 The biggest shareholder of Lapindo Brantas, Inc. was owned by Bakrie Group. The company has been alleged as the one that is responsible for the disaster as it did not follow the standard procedure of drilling. However, Aburizal Bakrie claimed that he had used his own money (nine trillion rupiah or 950 million Australian dollar) not as compensation to the victims (for the court’s verdict stipulated that the company was not guilty) but as the embodiment of his family social responsibility. They bought the lands and buildings which were buried in the mud eruption area (see Amri, A.B and Aquina, D. (2012, May 3). Aburizal Bakrie: Masalah Lumpur Sidoarjo Tuntas 2012, Retrieved from http://us.politik.vivanews.com/news/read/310225-aburizal--masalah-lumpur-sidoarjo-tuntas-2012). However, this philanthropic action of buying merely offers a short-term solution. It does not solve the social problems entailed, such as empowering Sidoarjo people, as the mudflow is said as being inexorable.
legislative election of 2009 (106 parliamentary seats). Although Golkar won the legislative election in 2004, its Presidential candidate (Wiranto) did not win the Presidential elections. This is due, as Harjanto further argues (2010, p. 266), to the fact that “the party did not prepare for individual popular contest in the Presidential elections.”

Although Golkar did not win in the Presidential elections in 2004 and 2009, the party held its power both in the parliament and government in 2004-2009, especially after Jusuf Kalla (JK), Golkar’s former chairperson, succeeded in becoming the Vice President. However, as Vice President, JK (Golkar) cannot be directly perceived as completely dominating or controlling the parliament and the government. JK’s power was gradually increasing especially when SBY urged him to be the Chairperson of Golkar. The urging was due to SBY’s realisation that his political machine, (PD), had limited power in controlling the parliament in 2004-2009. This act had its political consequences: SBY had to give additional cabinet seats to Golkar which meant he was surrounded by Golkar’s elites, both in the government and parliament. However, SBY’s political move had its side effect on Golkar in form of internal conflict that arguably weakened the party institutionally (Harjanto, 2010, pp. 266-278). Kalla’s nomination not merely shook Akbar Tandjung’s group, Golkar’s former chairperson (1998-2004), but also triggered internal splits, especially when Wiranto and Prabowo Subianto decided to withdraw and formed their own nationalist parties. Wiranto formed Hanura whilst Prabowo Subianto formed Gerindra.

Harjanto (2010, pp. 271-278) further argues that the major causal factor of Golkar’s decreasing number of votes (from 21.62 per cent in 2004 to 14.45 per cent in 2009) was JK’s leadership beside the party’s internal conflicts. Unlike his predecessors who mainly played a passive role as the Vice President, Kalla was busy constructing his image as an active one. He successfully surmounted the socio-economic and political problems, such as three-time fuel price hikes; socio-religious conflicts in Ambon, Molucca and Poso, Central Sulawesi; and socio-political conflicts between the government with Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM or Free Aceh Movement). However, these achievements could not be solely claimed by JK, as people perceived them belonging to the success of SBY’s administration. In line with Harjanto, Mietzner (2009a, p. 9) adds that Golkar’s lack of a charismatic figure contributed to its drop in votes.

137 PD had a mere 7.46% of parliamentary seats (55 seats).
On the other hand, JK’s relationship with SBY was not always harmonious. Haris (2008, pp. 197-201) notes that the success of SBY-JK government carried internal conflicts between them. JK was perceived as the representation of the combination between businessman and politician, the image that made him look impatient and want to rush into making decisions. Conversely, SBY was well known as a considerate person who was cautious in making decisions. The situation was worsened with the limited explanation in the Constitution regarding the authority of the Vice President. At this stage, we can see SBY’s astuteness in securing his popularity and administration. Not only did he utilise JK to secure his position in the parliament but also to take credit for JK’s efforts in surmounting the socio-economic political problems and projected them to maintain his popularity (Mietzner, 2009a, p. 9).

As the party that supported SBY’s government (2004 to 2009), Golkar employed a similar political campaign surrounding the government’s achievements in the 2009 legislative election. To differentiate itself from PD, Partai Golkar employed its political jargon known as “Memberi Bukti Bukan Janji” or “Giving Evidence not Promises” and “Lebih Cepat Lebih Baik” or “The Sooner the Better”. The latter is mostly believed to criticise SBY’s slow, diplomatic approach in contrast to the bold, open, fast and handy Jusuf Kalla, the incumbent Vice President from Sulawesi (Firmanzah, 2010, p. 180, pp. 234–237).

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan (PDI-P) or Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle

The establishment of PDI-P derived from the internal strike on 27 July 1996 between two camps of PDI in Soeharto’s era: Megawati’s PDI (Megawati was the elected chairperson as the corollary of the PDI National Congress in Surabaya) and Soerjadi’s PDI (the elected chairperson based on PDI Congress in Medan). Soerjadi’s PDI loyalists attempted to take over PDI’s headquarters (which was governed by Megawati’s PDI) in Jalan Diponegoro, Jakarta, with the help of TNI, Indonesia’s National Army. The event elevated and affirmed Megawati’s image as the government opposition. Megawati’s PDI then transformed itself as PDI-P prior to the 1999 Election, i.e. on 1 February 1999. By declaring Pancasila as the party’s ideology and asserting the continuous fight for the grassroots’ aspiration as stated on the party’s charter, PDI-P, which was formerly composed of five secular parties (consisting of Nationalist, Catholic, and Protestant, see chapter five), positions itself as a secular nationalist party, which claims not to orient to any religion (Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata, 2004) but is friendly to Islam (Baswedan, 2004). Unfortunately the PDI-P’s claim as the representative of the grassroots merely appears on the ideological level, for in practice Megawati’s administration produced unpopular policies, such as selling state assets and arguably ignoring the
people’s suffering especially when the government took sides with capitalist interests (Mandan, 2009, pp. 441-442; Firmanzah, 2010, p. 119).

The image of PDI-P as the representation of “wong cilik” or the grassroots can be traced from its statutes, vision, mission and charter. The party claims that its cardinal objective is to fulfill the people’s mandate. The phrase used to describe the mandate is “amanat penderitaan rakyat” which literally means the mandate resulting from people’s suffering. This means that the party positions this suffering as the core selling point in its image-building as the party feels an obligation to fulfill this mandate (to erase the suffering). However, a close examination of the phrase shows that the phrase is deployed to represent the country’s cardinal objectives as stated in the fourth paragraph of the 1945 Constitution (see Golkar’s section). Whilst Golkar perceives that the realisation of these cardinal objectives can be achieved especially through upholding the third principle of Pancasila, PDI-P positions the objectives as the reflection of the suffering (first paragraph of PDI-P Charter). Not only does it signify different identity values between Golkar and PDI-P in their branding, but it also shows the deployment of discrepant markers in constructing their nationalist “identity myth” (Holt, 2004). PDI-P perceives that the party’s objectives as the spirit (“roh”) that actuates the political movement in the post-authoritarian era or better known as “gerakan reformasi” or the reform movement. Whilst Golkar and PD consider the movement as deviations resulting from the corrupt implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, PDI-P’s move in paralleling the objectives as the reflection of the suffering represents the party’s attempt to return the objectives to their utopianist position.

Returning to the discrepant markers, this discrepancy is found especially when PDI-P equates the word “suffering” with the adjective “lofty” in the phrase “cita-cita luhur [bangsa]” ([the nation’s] lofty ideals) of the party’s charter. Not only does this reinforce PDI-P’s position as the grassroots’ party, but also attempts to revive Soekarno’s nationalist/populist manifesto. Adian (2011, p. 33) argues that by imitating her father and following his footsteps, Megawati, attempts to change the present political systems that have been constrained recently in their pragmatic practices and/or politics of image. She especially asked PDI-P’s cadres to return to the party’s basic characteristic as an ideological-based party in her opening speech at the third PDI-P congress in Bali (6-9 December 2010).
The invitation reinforces the differentiation marker to distinguish PDI-P from other nationalist parties. At the same time, it indirectly criticises other (nationalist) parties which heavily relied on their pragmatic values.

The phrase “wong cilik”, which is used to represent the grassroots in the party's slogan, denotes a Javanese language borrowing. Arguably, this borrowing seems to neither connote the party’s ethno-orientation nor acknowledges Javanese hegemony (although Mujani and Liddle (2009a, p. 588) argue that Java has been PDI-P’s political base) for the phrase can be seen as the linguistic borrowing that is deployed to represent PDI-P's identity. At the same time, the adoption signifies the existence of the primordial tie of the party with Javanese culture. This can be traced from the party’s historical record which shows a strong ideological relation between PDI-P with Soekarno’s (Javanese) nationalist thinking (see chapters one and six). Soekarno’s concept of Marhaenism operates in parallel with the phrase “wong cilik”, as the Marhaen are perceived as encapsulating the nationalist ideal of uniting all Indonesian people regardless of class in order to achieve freedom and prosperity (see chapter four). Nuryanti (2007, pp. 176-177) notes that based on the historical record, the term “Marhaen” was coined as a substitute for the phrase “orang kecil” (literally refers to Indonesian lower class community) – a term used by Javanese priyayi to address the proletariat in Indonesia.

Claiming to be the representative of the “wong cilik”, PDI-P constructs a series of ekonomi kerakyatan programs as reflected in the party’s ten ideological directions (Dasa Prasetya). The directions are perceived as the cadres’ pledge of allegiance that accentuates PDI-P’s nationalist platforms. The party perceives the pledge as representing a precis of the party’s efforts to empower the people and equally distribute welfare. The pledge itself has been revised. It formerly constituted eight ideological directions which were called Hasta Prasetya Perjuangan. Nuryanti (2007, p. 165) argues that based on this pledge, PDI-P ideologically solidifies its cadres by binding them with a declaration stating that their commitment is the same as the party’s. The platforms are seen as follows:

1. upholding unity of the Republic of Indonesia, Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and protecting the nation’s pluralism;
2. strengthening people’s spirit of mutual assistance (gotong royong) in order to solve communal problems;

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140 See PDI-P’s pledge of allegiance (Dasa Prasetya), retrieved from http://www.pdiperjuangan.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=140&Itemid=99
3. strengthening *ekonomi kerakyatan* programs\(^{141}\) by restructuring production systems, reforming the agrarian rules and regulations, providing protection (*pemberian proteksi*), and expanding the market and capital access;
4. providing healthy, nutritious food and housing for the poor;
5. waiving medical and schooling expenses for the poor;
6. providing proper (*pasti*)\(^{142}\), fast yet cheap public services;
7. preserving the environment and natural resources and consistently applying the regulations of strategic environment planning;
8. reforming the bureaucracy in order to achieve good governance which is free from corruption, collusion and nepotism;
9. upholding the principles of participatory democracy in decision-making processes, and;
10. enforcing the law by upholding the principles of justice and human rights.\(^{143}\)

The list indicates that the party’s platforms are designed to encompass the socio-economic and political aspects. What seems to directly reflect the party’s social welfare programs especially for the poor, are statements number four, five and six. However, if we examine these statements by comparing them with previous versions as quoted by Nuryanti (2007, p. 165), we will find that the phrase “in accordance with the local government’s financial capacity” has been deleted in statement number five. This deletion indicates that the local government’s financial capacity cannot completely be relied on to waive medical and schooling expenses for the poor. The phrase, in fact, shows the party’s dependence on local government power which would lead to the party’s attempt to dominate the local government. At the same time, this also indicates PDI-P’s weakness, especially when there is no guarantee that the party can win seats in the local leaders’ elections. Thus, incorporating the phrase would emasculate the platforms and the need to delete the phrase was arguably necessary.

The statement denoting *ekonomi kerakyatan* programs is also obscure. Although statement number three, “strengthening *ekonomi kerakyatan* programs through restructuring production systems, reforming the agrarian rules and regulations, providing protection (*pemberian proteksi*), expanding
the market and capital access’, seems to directly represent *ekonomi kerakyatan* programs, but the programs are framed in procedural steps that do not completely focus on small-sized enterprises. The procedures are presented in specific material actions, as seen in the following sub clauses: “restructuring production systems; reforming agrarian rules and regulations; providing protection; expanding the market and capital access”. They are ostensibly designed to empower small-sized enterprises as the pledge is claimed as representing the party’s real efforts to empower the people. However, the nominal groups “production systems”, “agrarian rules and regulations”, “protection”, “the market and capital access” after the material actions (restructuring, reforming and providing), do not overtly indicate the empowerment. They merely denote the areas that need to be improved. Hence, the nominal groups can be seen as reflecting both big and small sized industries.

However, a close examination of the nominal groups in the pledge shows that their usage creates meaning fragmentation. For instance, the sub clause “providing protection” as one of the steps in empowering small-sized enterprises obscures the “protection” as it can be interpreted in different ways, such as protecting the domestic markets from imported goods or providing protection in the legal sector or any other sector. Another example can be seen in statement number six. The deployment of the word “*pasti*” as the adjective that qualifies public services in the phrase “proper (*pasti*), fast yet cheap public services”, obscures the meaning of the party’s public services. The adjective “proper” to translate the word “*pasti*” arguably represents more the public services’ quality than its literal translation. In short, not only does this create meaning fragmentation but also represents PDI-P’s act of presenting the precis in a loose manner. If this is deliberately designed, the pledge arguably fails to produce the intended meanings of the platforms.

The pledge also reflects a simple representation of the party’s commitment to empower the people. As earlier noted, three of the statements directly reflect social welfare programs (four, five and six). The first, second, ninth and tenth statements represent sequentially the third, the fourth144, and the second and fifth145 principles of *Pancasila*. Statement number seven reflects the party’s values of environmental preservation whilst the eighth statement accentuates the party’s platform of ideal bureaucracy. As discussed earlier, statement number three ostensibly shows the procedural steps in improving the economic well-being of the people. In other words, out of ten statements, three statements (thirty per cent) focus on social welfare; forty percent represent *Pancasila*’s nationalist principles (except *Pancasila*’s principle of religiosity); ten per cent describe the party’s economic principles; ten per cent relate to environmental planning and another ten per cent is about the

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144 Both the second and the ninth points represent the democratic principles of *Pancasila*.
145 Point number ten indicates the humanity and social justice principles of *Pancasila*.
party’s cardinal principle of governmentality. Based on this fact, the party’s pledge largely concentrates on paraphrasing Pancasila’s principles, whilst the social welfare programs become the second priority. The other three articles of ten per cent each reflect the socio-economic sectors the party focuses on. In this sense, reiterating Pancasila’s principles is seen as more crucial in the pledge than catering to pragmatic programs. This means that the content of the pledge cannot be completely seen as the representation of the party’s programs.

The reiteration also indicates PDI-P’s order of priority in positioning Pancasila’s principles. Positioning the nation’s cohesion as the first declarative statement in the pledge shows that the party shares a similar nationalist value with Golkar and PD. At the same time, this also indicates the party’s acknowledgement of the significance of other nationalist parties’ accents (Golkar and PD) in accentuating the nation’s integrity as their core ideological value. However, the acknowledgement merely indicates that these three parties share similar nationalist characteristics. As discussed in chapter five, the party’s logo reflects PDI-P’s identity as Pancasila democratic party as part of its branding. As discussed, the deployment of Pancasila democracy (the fourth principle of Pancasila) indicates a differentiation marker to distinguish PDI-P from other nationalist parties (see chapter five). This identity marker is reinforced by the statements number two and nine of the pledge that adumbrate gotong royong (mutual assistance) and participatory democracy as the core principles of Pancasila.

On the other hand, the absence of reference to religious code in the pledge is an interesting aspect to be examined. It arguably indicates the possibility that PDI-P put little emphasis on religiosity or that it de-emphasises its religious side in order to reinforce its secular image. However, such assumptions are not completely valid as the party presents its religious code on the statutes’ preamble. The presentation itself emerges, not in the form of a direct declarative statement, but rather in an adjective form of “berketuhanan” (religious). The word “berketuhanan” is deployed as part of a series of adjectives that qualifies the country’s objectives, i.e. actualising Indonesia as a free, sovereign, united, democratic, just, prosperous, civilised and religious country. Occupying the position as an adjective, the word “berketuhanan” functions as an attribute that defines the noun “country” (Indonesia). The last sentence of paragraph two of the charter exemplifies this

146 Governmentality in Foucault’s view (1991, pp. 102-103) espouses the play of the triangle of “sovereignty-discipline-government”. Foucault defines sovereignty and discipline as governance which embodies in a form of bureaucracy – a system that exercises control and surveillance in order to achieve “the apparatuses of security” or stable population.

147 I do not keep the literal translation of berketuhanan into belief in God, as it will create meaning fragmentation.
aspect as it defines Indonesia as a religious country: “*Indonesia yang berketuhanan adalah Indonesia yang menghargai keberagaman dan toleransi beragama dalam semangat ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*” (“as a religious country, Indonesia values pluralism and religious tolerance in the spirit of believing in God Almighty One”). By this, PDI-P constructs the religious branding of the party by upholding the notions of pluralism and tolerance in the framework of *Pancasila’s* first principle.

However, the first principle is not the only factor that shapes the branding. The explication of the party’s history as stated in the charter indirectly shows the rationale behind PDI-P’s religious branding. As noted in chapter five, PDI-P was established as the extention, as well as fragmentation, of PDI. PDI itself was forged as the fusion of two Christian parties (Parkindo and Catholic party) and of three nationalist and socialist parties (PNI, IPKI and Murba). The process of this political merging was started on 9 March 1970 with the establishment of *kelompok demokrasi pembangunan* or the democratic group of development consisting of these five parties. They officially declared the establishment of the group on 28 October 1971 and agreed to completely unite in one party (PDI) on 17 January 1981.\(^{148}\) PDI transformed itself as PDI-P in 1999 after the downfall of Soeharto’s regime. Adopting Soekarno’s nationalist conception, the party declares itself as an ideologically-based party with nationalism, *kerakyatan* (democracy?), and social justice as its main characteristics. Based on these historical characteristics, it is not surprising to find that PDI-P put little emphasis on religiosity in its political branding.

A declarative statement indicating PDI-P’s religiosity is found in the opening phrase of the charter: “*Dengan Rahmat Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*” or “By the grace of God Almighty One”. As previously discussed, the word “*Tuhan*” is used as a code word that can embrace religious pluralism in Indonesia. A similar greeting is also found in Megawati’s speech at the third PDI-P Congress (6-9 December 2010) at Denpasar, Bali. She employed, at the same time, the Islamic greeting (*Assalamualaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh*), the Indonesian greeting (*Salam Sejahtera bagi Kita Semua*), and the (Balinese) Hindu greeting (*Om Swastiastu*) in her opening speech. Roughly, these greetings have similar meaning of wishing peace upon the addressee. They signify a pluralist notion in that the party plausibly wants to embrace all religious groups\(^ {149}\). At the same time, the greetings also specifically address PDI-P’s Muslim and (Balinese) Hindu constituents. Bali is known as


\(^{149}\) The Indonesian greeting “*Salam Sejahtera Bagi Kita Semua*” is seen as a neutral greeting that is able to embrace all religions as it does not refer to any religious references.
PDI-P’s political base as Megawati has strong Balinese cultural ties. Van Wichelen (2006, p. 46) notes that this cultural disposition was contested prior to the 1999 election. Megawati’s image as the symbol of New Order resistance was contested by A.M Saefuddin, the former Minister of Food and Horticulture under the Habibie government, who argued that Megawati’s praying at a Hindu temple in Bali attenuated her Islamic credentials. This reinforces Megawati’s secular image. This character assassination received severe critiques, especially from the Balinese. However, Megawati’s cultural and political background becomes an unbreakable tie that represents political and cultural capital other (nationalist) parties lack.

What is also interesting from this branding is PDI-P’s secular nationalist image with Muslims as its supporters. The characteristic of Indonesian Muslim society can arguably be seen as one of the actors that influence Muslims to cast their votes for PDI-P. Adopting Geertz’s (1960) classical categorisation of Indonesian Muslims, van Wichelen (2006, p. 44) argues that although Indonesia is known as having the largest Muslim population in the world, its community is dominated by its nominal Muslim or abangan. In order to find the correlation between the degree of piety of nominal and pious Muslims with Muslim voters’ preferences, Mujani and Liddle (2009b) conducted a survey which was based on the frequency Muslim voters practise their everyday religious rituals. Mujani and Liddle found that the percentage fluctuated slightly. In 1999, 53 per cent of Muslims stated that they regularly performed the Islamic five-time daily prayers. The number slightly increased in 2004 when 58.1 per cent claimed that they regularly conducted prayers. The number dropped slightly in 2009 reaching 55.2 per cent. Not only does this percentage indicate a slight fluctuation in the ratio between pious and nominal Muslims in Indonesia, but also indirectly reflects the characteristics of Indonesian Muslims.

This is reinforced by Mujani and Liddle’s (2009b, pp. 589-591) further survey. They found that 33 per cent of Muslims supported the Islamic values whilst the vote for secular parties (PD, Golkar and PDI-P) in 2004 elections reached 48 percent. The percentage of support for secular parties (PD, Golkar, PDI-P, Gerindra and Hanura) increased (57 percent) in 2009. This factor, however, does not directly correlate with the fact that Muslims support PDI-P, a secular party. The preferences in choosing PDI-P, especially in the 1999 election (see chapter five), was primarily due to Megawati’s image as the symbol of people’s resistance against Soeharto’s regime (Mujani and Liddle, 2010, p. 96). They were “hailed” by her image and felt that supporting Megawati would contribute to the country’s development. Hence, the degree of Muslimness cannot be seen as representing Muslim voters’

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150 Soekarno’s mother or Megawati’s grandmother is a Balinese.
behaviours, as Mujani and Liddle (2010, pp. 75-99) argue that the sociological and cultural factors such as religion, regionalism, and social class play little part in influencing contemporary Indonesian voters.\(^{151}\) They now evaluate the party/the candidates’ performance and achievement. However, in the 2009 legislative election PDI-P gained merely 14.1 per cent of votes. This was arguably due to the poor achievement of Megawati’s administration (2001-2004) which made people lose confidence in her and her party (Suryadinata, 2002).

To rectify the situation, PDI-P amended its branding strategy. Instead of retaining its secular image in a rigid manner, PDI-P attempted to capture more Muslim voters by establishing an affiliate called *Baitul Muslimin Indonesia* (Bamusi) or Indonesian House of Muslim in 2011. Although Megawati in her speech at the inauguration of Bamusi’s Central Board on 13 October 2011 claimed that the cardinal objective of this wing organisation is to ward off Islamic radicalism in Indonesia, Mujani and Liddle (2009a, p. 578) argue that this affiliate’s establishment reflects PDI-P’s activities in adopting the same pattern of its predecessor (PNI) that also had Islamic affiliates in the 1950s and 1960s. Bamusi’s establishment is also seen as an attempt to make this party appear less secular, or arguably more Islamic.

As previously implied, PDI-P’s secular image stems from Soekarno’s PNI with Javanese nominal Muslims as its main supporters. Soekarno’s family influence is seen as the party’s core brand marker. Mietzner (2009a, pp. 10-12) asserts that this heavy reliance on the party’s patron (Soekarno’s and/or Megawati’s) charisma or *gusti* in Javanese framework\(^ {152}\) will bring the party to the same problem of leadership succession as PD. He notes that the potential candidates as Megawati’s successors, such as Andreas Pareira (PDI-P’s legislator on the defense and foreign relations commission), Ganjar Pranowo (PDI-P’s rising star), Budiman Sudjatmiko (leftist political activist), and Pramono Anung Wibowo (former PDI-P’s Secretary General) are not in the familial circle of Soekarno dynasty. Puan Maharani (Megawati’s daughter) and Puti Guntur Soekarnoputri (Megawati’s niece) are seen as too

\(^{151}\) However, Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi (2012) rectified their research findings. They found that from the total percentage of Muslim in Indonesia (88 per cent), most of them are *santri* (they do not include the exact ratio that compares the number of *santri* against the *abangan*). Their finding is based on their survey that identified the correlation between the Muslim voters’ behaviours and preferences and the frequency of their practising religious rituals (and obligations) such as performing five-time daily prayers, Ramadhan fasting, and reciting Al Qur’an. They adopted Geertz’s conception in distinguishing *santri* and *abangan* by positioning *santri* as the one who adherely performs Islamic religious practices whereas *abangan* as the Muslim who mixes the animistic rituals such as making a devotional visit to the grave of a religious leader, with the Islamic orthodoxy, such as reciting Al-Qur’an verses (whilst visiting the grave). Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi (2012, p. 201) further argue that the elements such as religions, Muslim voters’ characteristics, the voters’ involvement in Islamic organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah and the Islamic ideological orientation play a limited (if not marginal) role in determining the voters’ behaviours and preferences.

\(^{152}\) See the discussion about *Kawula-Gusti* in chapter six
young and inexperienced to be Megawati’s successor. However, as Kingsbury (2005, p. 313) contends that the greatest political asset of the party is Soekarno’s charismatic image. PDI-P has to maintain this capital in its branding as the 2014 elections are approaching.

**Megawati Soekarnoputri**

As the greatest asset of the party, PDI-P’s branding is heavily reliant on the image of Megawati. Van Wichelen (2006) investigates the representation of Megawati as the party’s icon that represents the intersection of the codes of nationalism, secularism and feminism in the 1999 and 2004 Elections. She found that Megawati’s body has been de-politicised for boosting PDI-P’s votes by selling her image as the symbol of Soekarno’s daughter, the mother of the nation (or in Suryakusuma’s term (1996, p.101) “state motherism”), (Muslim/secular) female leader and the resistance of the New Order regime. The de-politicising process of Megawati’s corporeal body was begun with the mechanism of exploiting woman’s traditional stereotypes (in this case as a mother and a daughter) as the symbols of innocence and virtue (Sreberny and van Zoonen, 2000, p. 2). Bearing these symbols, Megawati’s image becomes potent capital in PDI-P’s branding as she is seen as representing the “incorruptibility” of the Reform era (or in van Wichelen’s (2006, p. 50) language, “a clean figure”), with the combination of her status as the daughter of the founding father, Soekarno. Indonesian people perceived her as a mothering figure that could dilute the chaotic condition at that time by offering “security and comfort” (Aspinall, 2001, p.24). This image-building also reflects a reification of Megawati’s corporeal body as a political commodity in PDI-P’s branding. Since the commodity (Megawati’s image) is labelled under the secular notion of PDI-P, the selling of her image was challenged by the Islamic faction when she was nominated as President, especially in the 1999 Election. Her opponents sparked a (religious) debatable issue on whether Islamic teachings allow a woman to be President. However, according to van Wichelen (2006) the issue did not represent a religious block between Islamic and Nationalist factions, but more as a commodity that reflects a political “re-position of nationalist Muslim and Muslim santri”.

Returning to Megawati’s image as a female leader, Megawati ostensibly represents a feminist figure. Being the first Indonesian female Muslim President, Megawati’s image was designed to represent woman’s emancipation. I have noted previously that *Cosmopolitan* magazine in Indonesia (September 2001 edition) utilised Megawati as a commodity to represent the magazine’s ideology, i.e. “fun fearless female” – an ideology that ostensibly runs parallel with the notion of women’s emancipation (Leiliyanti, 2009, pp. 116-117). Her appearance in this woman’s magazine represents her “public womanhood” (Sen, 2002) that plausibly underpinned gender equality. This ubiquity is
signified by the plethora of public images showing her with her father. On almost every billboard, Soekarno appears standing behind his daughter. Van Wichelen (2006, pp. 49-54) argues that Soekarno’s appearance with Megawati signifies the party’s (also read: Megawati’s) attempt to revive the romantic past of Soekarno’s charisma. At the same time this also connotes a heavy reliance on this female leader, who had been married three times, and on Soekarno’s masculine charisma. In short, fetishising Megawati’s womanhood means returning to Soekarno’s masculinity.

Blitar exemplifies the return of Soekarno-ism. Rider (2001, p. 3) found that the glorification of Megawati’s (read: Soekarno’s) image as a nationalist icon has become a social norm in Blitar, Soekarno’s place of birth. People in Blitar decorated their houses with Megawati and Soekarno’s portraits in their front window. Their portraits became the sign that represents people’s loyalty to Megawati and Soekarno (read: PDI-P). However, Rider’s interviews with PDI-P supporters revealed that the foundation of people’s support was largely based on the “personalistic leadership” (Mujani and Liddle, 2010, p. 97) of Soekarno, who represents “charismatic traditionalist authority” (Kingsbury, 2005, p. 24). They were indifferent to the party’s platforms and simply see themselves as “the people of Megawati’s father” (Rider, 2001, p. 3). This claim indirectly shows the characteristic of PDI-P’s followers, which according to van Wichelen (2006, p. 48), resembles the notion of a floating mass – the term used by the New Order regime to indicate that this lower class community needs “guidance in articulating their political aspirations”.

In relation to the branding process, Megawati’s image can be seen in the framework of representing Megawati as a cultural icon. As discussed previously, Holt (2004, pp. 8-11) asserts that in order to become a cultural icon, Megawati needs to construct an “identity myth”, i.e. a myth-making process which is based on “everyday life narratives set in the populist worlds that resolves contradictions”. As implied, the process is conducted by projecting Soekarno’s image onto Megawati so that the projection of Soekarno’s image as the (Javanese) Messiah can be transmitted. The projection, as well as the inculcation of Megawati’s image, can be overtly seen in a short advertisement entitled “Teguh Berjuang Membangun Negeri” (“Determined to building the country [Indonesia]”), which is found in the party’s official website. The ad opens with a scene showing the party’s chairperson recounting the time when she governed the country. She is depicted sitting on a chair looking at a beautiful garden while saying “seni membangun negeri ini ibarat menyatukan berbagai sisi dalam sebuah rangkaian yang selaras” (“the art of building this country [Indonesia] is like bringing together various elements in harmony”). This scene marks a differentiation strategy in PDI-P’s branding. Although,

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PDI-P deploys a similar ideological jargon as PD and Golkar, Megawati’s position as the narrator arguably legitimates the party’s conception of its “art” in building the country. The art itself is presented in a simile, “like bringing together various elements in harmony”, which is symbolised by a scene showing Megawati arranging flowers in a vase. Flowers are used as signs to connote different elements personified as flowers. The arrangement of flowers in a vase represents the harmonious elements that resembles Golkar’s equilibrium, which requires that every part of the plant (read: Indonesia) work together to actualise the common goal.

However, the next scene depicting Megawati reading a book reiterates her image as Soekarno’s daughter. Her statement “ketika saya membangun negeri, saya belajar langsung dari pendiri republik ini” (“when I developed this country, I directly learnt it from its founding father [Soekarno]”) reflects the same tactic PDI-P used to sell Soekarno’s charisma. The action verb “directly learnt” indicates not merely the juxtaposition, but also the claim on Soekarno’s legacy as if it is solely hers. Megawati is noted as the first member of Soekarno’s family who decided to enter the political arena with the consequence of breaking the family’s commitment of not entering the political arena after Soekarno’s death. This political act is then perceived as the return of Soekarno’s family) into the Indonesian polity. Having been the first to revive the nostalgia, Megawati utilised this position to claim her father’s legacy solely as hers/PDI-P’s. In short, the status signifies the strategy and its tactic of claiming and reifying the legacy as the party’s best commodity.

Another compelling part in the ad is the voice over of Puan Maharani, Megawati’s daughter, in the closing scene. Maharani’s statement “konsistensi sikap kita akan selalu dicermati dan disikapi secara terbuka oleh rakyat Indonesia” (“the consistency of our attitude will always be observed and openly addressed by Indonesian people”) illustrates the scenes depicting PDI-P’s masses, Megawati’s smiling portrait and Maharani’s picture with Megawati. The statement was taken from Maharani’s speech at the plenary session of the Parliament. Her position as the one who closes this advertisement can be seen as twofold: first, PDI-P cannot dissociate itself from its own branding construction, relying solely on Soekarno’s family. Secondly, this duo (Megawati/Puan Maharani or mother/daughter) becomes the addressers who disseminate Soekarno’s ideology. Their performances also indicate Megawati’s endeavours in preparing her successor.

Aside from her reliance on Soekarno, Megawati is also noted as a character who is known for her “reticence and aloofness” (Aspinall, 2001, p. 23). Her poor communication skills in delivering government policies publicly and Megawati’s domination over the party (Nuryanti, 2007, p. 179)
were alleged as the factors that influenced the decline in PDI-P’s votes, especially in the 2004 elections. On the other hand, as Megawati’s former coordinating minister of security and political affairs, SBY, compensated for Megawati’s weakness in communicating government policies. Their relationship deteriorated, especially when SBY wanted to be the Presidential candidate in 2004 without Megawati’s consent. SBY was alleged to be utilising his position for his own advancement, especially when the ministry of security and political affairs launched a public service ad about a peaceful election. SBY then resigned from his position, which was in Megawati’s view SBY’s act of running away from his responsibilities154.

This uneasy situation continues especially when PDI-P decided to become the opposition party. It frequently criticised SBY’s policies, such as the government’s social initiative, *Bantuan Langsung Tunai* (BLT) or direct cash assistance program for the poor. The party viewed that the program would merely escalate people’s dependency on the government. However, when the counter attack from the government hit the party stating that PDI-P merely hampered the poor to receive BLT, PDI-P then abruptly shifted its position from criticising to supervising the program. PDI-P campaigns circulated through the issues of supervising BLT, fighting for people’s prosperity and for cheap prices for staple foods, and creating millions of jobs (Firmanzah, 2010, p. 240).

**Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) or Greater Indonesia Movement Party**

Like any other nascent (nationalist) party such as PD, Gerindra’s branding is heavily reliant on its patron (Prabowo Subianto), the former Commander of Army Strategic Reserve or Pangkostrad, the chief of Kopassus (Special Forces), and Soeharto’s former son-in-law. Having the similar pattern of branding with Megawati, Prabowo represents the intersection of codes of (“regimist”) Islam (borrowing Hefner’s term, 2000), militarism and nationalism/socialism. As Gerindra is established in order to be the electoral machine of Prabowo, dissociating the party from its patron’s image is impracticable. Thus, this sub section analyses the image construction of Gerindra by focusing on the image of Prabowo Subianto, especially his political disposition *vis-a-vis* the party’s statutes, slogan, and platforms, in order to assess the party’s nationalist/socialist image that arguably runs parallel with the other nationalist parties. This sub section is organised by examining the coalescence of this patron’s image: from representing Soeharto’s Islamic/military faction (at the end of Soeharto’s administration) to his resilient (?) image as a nationalist/socialist figure.

Prior to his being purged from the military by Wiranto, the former Chief Commander of Indonesian Armed Forces or TNI under Habibie’s government, Prabowo was formerly known as Soeharto’s “future family guardian” (McBeth, 1994). His military career sky-rocketed especially when he married Soeharto’s daughter, Siti Hediati Harijadi (better known as Titiek Soeharto). McBeth further notes that Prabowo’s familial background played a significant role in his military career. Aside from this marital and familial background, a series of military training exercises and operations Prabowo undertook cannot be seen as minor elements in his career. He was known as the leader of Mapenduma Operation, which succeeded in releasing twelve researchers (from Britain, Netherland, Germany and Indonesia) who were Free Papua Movement’s hostages in 1996. However, as Hefner (2000, p. 201) notes, a popular perception of Prabowo’s militaristic image has been forged since his first military operation in East Timor in 1976. Not only was this due to the assassination of Nicolao do Reis Lobato, the President of Fretilin, by Prabowo’s troops, but also at the same time, as Hefner further notes, Prabowo was also alleged to have organised “civilian vigilantes to commit acts of rape, torture, and murder against villages sympathetic to the pro-independence opposition”.

This callous image is reinforced by the fact that Prabowo was also known as the representative of the Islamic faction (or the green faction) of the military (Ecip, 1999; Hefner, 2000; Kingsbury, 2005, p. 12; Platzdasch, 2009a, pp. 122, 274). Platzdasch (2009a, p. 122) points out that Prabowo had a close relationship with Islamic hard-line organisations such as Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam or KISDI (Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of Islamic World) and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia or DDII (Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council) in the mid 1990s – the organisations, in Platzdasch’s view, inherited the Masyumi tradition. In an alignment with Platzdasch, Hefner (2000, pp. 151-152) argues that Prabowo’s Islamic disposition cannot be perceived as running in line with the mainstream of Indonesian Islam which is represented by the two largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (see chapters four and five). The establishment of the Centre for Policies and Development Studies (CPDS) as “regimist leading” think tank inside ICMI by Prabowo with the other military “green” supporters such as Syarwan Hamid, Feisal Tandjung and Hartono, and non military “regimist” Muslims such as Din Syamsuddin, Amir Santosa, and Fadli Zon, reinforces their stigma. Hefner further points out that the aim of this hard-line camp inside ICMI is not to dilute ICMI but to build a

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155 Prabowo is the third child of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Soeharto’s leading economist and the founder of the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) in Soekarno’s era. Djojohadikusumo funded a counter government known as PRRI (Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) in 1957 as Soekarno’s government was alleged to violate the 1950 Constitution.

“bridge” between ICMI “regimist” and the military “green” faction. In alignment with Hefner, Ecip (1999, pp. 130-132) argues that Prabowo’s closeness to the (regimist) Islamic faction can be seen as twofold: firstly, following the path of his former father-in-law, Prabowo forged an alliance with the Islamic camp as he disliked the growing power of the Catholic General, L.B. Moerdani. Secondly, he wanted to rehabilitate the relation between the Armed forces with the Islamic camp, especially after the 12 September 1984 Tanjung Priok tragedy when General L.B. Moerdani was alleged to have ordered the massacre of hundreds (or around 400-500157) of Muslims (Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003, p. 140). Ecip also further notes that Syafrie Syamsuddin, the current vice minister of defence, was the one that played an important role in shaping Prabowo’s Islamic credentials. He consistently reminded Prabowo to perform morning’s prayer.

Prabowo himself comes from a religiously mixed family: his father is a Muslim whilst his mother, brother and sisters are Christians. The military traits run deeply in Prabowo’s family. Tempo magazine (“Jejak Militer dalam Tubuhnya”, 2009) notes that his military bloodline derives from his parents’ lines. Prabowo’s uncles, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo’s late brothers (Lieutenant Subianto Djojohadikusumo and Sujono Djojohadikusumo), were the Indonesian soldiers who died not long after the Japanese surrendered to the Dutch in January 1946, while his grandfather from his mother side, Major Sigar, was a Dutch Colonial soldier. Although Prabowo was his mother’s favourite son (see Tempo magazine, “Sepotong Mimpi Anak Pelarian”, 2009), his closeness to his mother and the family religious background does not plausibly influence Subianto’s religious-political disposition. Hefner (2000, p. 151) contends that Soeharto was the figure that moulded Prabowo’s (regimist Islam) disposition.

Having this “regimist” military background, Prabowo was stigmatised by an allegation of his involvement in the abduction and disappearance of students and political activists at the end of Soeharto’s downfall. The May 1998 riot marked the fall of Prabowo’s military career. Defending his father-in-law’s regime158, Prabowo was alleged to “exceed” or “misinterpret” (borrowing the term of the Army Chief of staff, General Subagyo H.S, as cited by McBeth (1998) and Djarot, et al. (2006, p. 74)) the command of his chief in restoring the stability of the capital city. Ecip (1999) and Djarot, et al. (2006) conjecture that General Feisal Tanjung, the former Commander-in-chief of the Armed

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158 Prabowo’s loyalty to Soeharto at the end of his former father-in-law’s tenure was questionable. Eklof (1999, p. 219) argues that the downfall of Soeharto was conjectured as a conspiracy which involved his former confidants such as Habibie, Prabowo and Wiranto, rather than the result of “people’s power”. In alignment with Eklof, Lee (2009, p. 655) further notes that during the students’ demonstration in May 1998, the Armed Forces’ wives club “distributed food and snack to the protestors”.
Forces, and President Soeharto, were the two figures who had a direct command line to Prabowo as the Commander of the Strategic Army Reserve. Hefner (2000, pp. 205-207) argues that although the initiator behind the abduction and disappearance remained unclear, the evidence suggested Gerindra’s patron’s involvement in funding and mobilising the Islamic ultraconservative groups such as KISDI to face the pro-democracy demonstrators in May 1998 was evident. Facing the allegation of the abduction and disappearance, Prabowo claimed that he was ready to be responsible “if his men were found guilty” (Djarot, et al., 2006, p. 12; McBeth, 1998). Eventually, Prabowo was honourably discharged from his position due to an allegation of coup d’etat over the government in 1998. However, as Ecip (1999, pp. 42-48) notes, four of Prabowo’s allies: the late Achmad Soemargono (the former chairperson of KISDI), Fadli Zon (the director of Institute for Policy Studies or IPS\textsuperscript{159}), Farid Prawiranegara (the son of Sjafruddin Prawir anegara, the Prime Minister of PRRI), and Yanus Hutapea read Prabowo’s rebuttal. He stated that the security operation in the capital city, which included the residences of President and Vice President during the May 1998 riot, was in the accordance with security procedures. He also claimed that the allegation of his troop besieged Habibie’s residence on 21 May 1998 was a mere misinterpretation.

The purge of Prabowo from the military not only (plausibly) marks the end of his lineage with Cendana (read: Soeharto’s family)\textsuperscript{160}, but also, according to Lee (2009, pp. 656-659), reflects Habibie’s pragmatism. He notes that Habibie considered Prabowo’s military capital as the Commander of Special Forces and Strategic Army Reserve that controlled the Army Headquarters and the “strategic positions in and around the capital city”, was insufficient to narrow the gap between Habibie and the military compared to Wiranto, who “dominated the Armed Forces Headquarters”. After his discharge, Prabowo then moved to Jordan. He rejected the offer of citizenship from the Jordanian government and returned to Indonesia three years later.

The return of Prabowo arguably showed his political resilience. In order to rehabilitate his image and achieve his political ambition, he used Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia (HKTI) or the Indonesian Harmonious Farmer Union as his vehicle to represent and mobilise the grassroots. He became HKTI’s chairperson in 2004 replacing Siswono Yudhohusono, the former minister of transmigration during the New Order period. This new image is reinforced by his success in penetrating Kontak Tani\textsuperscript{159}. Hefner (2000, pp. 195-196) argues that the establishment of IPS in 1996 derived from Soeharto first daughter’s, Siti Hardiyanti Rukamana (Mbak Tutut), ambition as her father’s successor. In order to realise this ambition, she called a truce with KH Abdurrahman Wahid, NU’s former chairperson, and along with her aide, General Hartono, she suspended her support for CPDS. Dissatisfied with the condition, the other Islamic green military supporters (Prabowo Subianto, Feisal Tanjung, and Syarwan Hamid) established IPS as a rival think tank to back up Habibie and confront Tutut and Wahid.

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\textsuperscript{160} The divorce between Prabowo and Titiek Soeharto not long after Soeharto’s resignation remains a mystery.
Nelayan Andalan (KTNA) or the Association of Integrated Farmer and Fisherman and Indonesian Traditional Market Merchant Association (Asosiasi Pedagang Pasar Seluruh Indonesia or APPSI). Employing the reason that he could not represent the grassroots’ aspiration optimally, Prabowo then resigned from his position as the member of Golkar’s advisory board on 12 July 2008. This can be perceived as Prabowo’s motive to overtly engage in a new party (Gerindra) constructed by his tycoon brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, and Fadli Zon, on 6 February 2008. Not only does this denote Golkar’s internal split (Harjanto, 2010, p. 277), but also represents Prabowo’s political disposition in perceiving Golkar not as the right vehicle to represent the grassroots. This position marks Prabowo’s first political move to dilute Golkar’s nationalist image at the time of his resignation. At the same time, this also reflects his attempt to differentiate the branding between Golkar and his new electoral vehicle, Gerindra.

Although Prabowo’s attempt to differentiate Gerindra’s branding from any other party, this party’s branding appears to be similar to any other (nascent) nationalist parties. The similar features can be traced, for instance, from Gerindra exponents who claim that the ideological reason behind the establishment of the party derived from the phenomenon that Indonesian democracy has been hijacked and exploited by the elites, which victimised the people. This same ideological pattern is also deployed by all nationalist parties in the post-Soeharto era. However, the most striking resemblance between Gerindra and Golkar lies in the word-for-word account of their statutes. It can be seen from the exact copy of the following statements (paragraph four of Gerindra statutes’ preamble and the third and fourth sentences of paragraph four of Golkar statutes’ preamble):

“[Bahwa] dengan terjadinya penyelewengan-penyelewengan terhadap cita-cita Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 maka lahirlah [yang selanjutnya melahirkan] tatanan baru yang menghendaki agar seluruh kehidupan bangsa dan negara Republik Indonesia diletakkan dan dilandaskan kepada kemurnian pelaksanaan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. Dengan demikian hakikat tatanan baru adalah sikap mental yang menuntut pembaharuan dan pembangunan yang terus menerus dalam melaksanakan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945.”

“That the deviations from the country’s cardinal objectives and the 1945 Constitution have called forth a new order that requires the life of Indonesia’s nation-state be based on the ideal implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Therefore the nature of the new order constitutes the mental

attitude that demands a renewed ceaseless development in implementing *
Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution.”

The only differences from the quotation between Gerinda and Golkar are the employment of the phrases “*maka lahirlah*” (Golkar) and “*yang selanjutnya melahirkan*” (Gerinda)\(^{163}\) and the omission of the word “*bahwa*” or “*that*”. Aside from the fact that these statements merely indicate plagiarism, they, however, demonstrate the same (imitative) ideological principles of Golkar and Gerindra. When Golkar deploys the phrase “mental attitude” as the signifier of the party’s resilience, Gerindra simply imitates it to indicate that they both share the same perspective that Soeharto’s period constituted nothing but deviations from *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. At this stage the differentiation tactic Prabowo deploys on the statutes merely represents banality in the framework of *Pancasila*’s nationalism. The preamble does not elaborate the mental attitude and simply returns to note the governments’ failure in eradicating poverty since 1945; that the economic and political systems have enlarged the gap between the rich and the poor; and thus, a strong leadership (Prabowo) is needed to lead Indonesia to achieve fairness in prosperity.

If we examine these three points closely, we will find what Gerindra accentuates on its preamble is the glorification of socialism. Heywood (2002, pp. 105-117) argues that socialism positions the principles of collectivism, cooperation, equality, classless society and common ownership as the foundation to attain sovereignty and equal prosperity for all (Indonesian people). This runs parallel with *Pancasila*’s socio-nationalist principles: collectivism (*kebersamaan*), cooperation or mutual aid (*gotong royong*), equality (*keadilan sosial*), classless society (Soekarno’s *Marhaenism*), and common ownership\(^{164}\) (*koperasi/ekonomi kerakyatan*). In order to achieve this, Gerindra views that a strong leadership (Prabowo Subianto) is needed to regulate the economy and power, so that, as Heywood further argues, the state becomes “the instrument through which wealth can be collectively owned and the economy rationally planned”. However, in today’s Indonesia, the state neither completely plays its role in controlling the market nor becomes the sole determiner of the market. Market-based economics is at play in the framework of this socio-economic system.

In the party’s manifesto, Gerindra criticises the present economic system, which according to the party adopts a neoliberal system. This system is alleged as the main factor that plunges Indonesia

\(^{163}\) Since both phrases refer to the same exact meaning, I do not make any amendment in the English translation.

\(^{164}\) Arguably, the concept of common ownership in Indonesia does not completely run paralell with state ownership. The notion of collectivism in *ekonomi kerakyatan* put the ownership in the form of collective cooperation that empowers its members (see the discussion about *Pancasila* and Hatta’s *ekonomi kerakyatan* in chapter six).
into the situation where foreign investors dominate the economy in the Reform era. This is largely due to IMF’s formulation in restoring Indonesia’s economic system through privatisation of the state-owned enterprises and elimination of subsidies and protection. This critique reflects Gerindra’s position as the party that opposes such a system. The party exemplifies the everyday practice of neoliberal system through the image below:

The photograph above depicts a street vendor who stands in front of a convenience store named “Indomaret”, carrying a box of candies and medicine, in order to represent the grassroots. His presence in the photograph is deployed as a comparison with the convenience store, the embodiment of the everyday practice of the so-called neoliberal economic system. This pictorial act is deployed to reinforce Gerindra’s concern over the mushrooming of convenience stores that would gradually kill traditional merchants. Presenting this image on its official website reinforces the reification of the concept of ekonomi kerakyatan as Gerindra’s high-end commodity. This positioning arguably stems from Prabowo’s image – resilience as a successful businessman, most notably in the pulp and paper industry. However, a close examination of Gerindra’s platforms reveals a close
similarity between the platforms and Hatta’s concept of *ekonomi kerakyatan*. Halida Hatta, the daughter of Muhammad Hatta, contributed to shaping Gerindra’s manifesto.\(^{165}\)

However, the party’s propagation of *ekonomi kerakyatan* is arguably emasculating, especially when Prabowo decided to become Megawati’s running mate in the 2009 Presidential election. Megawati’s government was noted as the one that privatised many strategic state-owned enterprises, such as Indosat and Telkom, which led to her defeat in the 2004 Presidential election. People at that time began to question PDI-P’s concept of *ekonomi kerakyatan*. Tribune News\(^{166}\) notes that Prabowo’s support for Megawati in 2009 stemmed from PDI-P’s (Megawati’s) deal to support Prabowo in the 2014 Presidential election. This shows that although Gerindra realised Megawati’s track record, pragmatic deals became the key factor. Having claimed to share similar ideological platforms\(^{167}\), Megawati and Prabowo chose Bantar Gebang, waste disposal center, as the place for their declaration as the President and Vice President candidates in 2009. This place was chosen to signify and plausibly rehabilitate Megawati’s image as the one that ostensibly represents the grassroots. However, as Megawati’s popularity has gradually decreased since 2004 and Prabowo has not gained sufficient popularity, they lost their candidacy.

What is also interesting to note from Gerindra’s (Prabowo’s) image-building is the accentuation of poverty as the commodity to be sold to foster public sympathy. Such sympathy is needed to divert people’s attention from Prabowo’s stigma. This can overtly be seen from a series of Gerindra’s TV commercials that exploit poverty as its prime theme in the party’s socio-nationalist framework. However, unlike Megawati’s short ad on her party’s official website, Gerindra’s ads are not directly (if not ostensibly) centred on Prabowo. He mostly appears on the ads in the closing scenes delivering the final yet most important remark of the advertisements or at the opening scene propagating the party’s (Prabowo’s) socialist economic platforms. This strategy reflects the party’s tactic to rehabilitate Prabowo’s militaristic image and diverts people’s attention to the issue of poverty. This

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\(^{167}\) Such claim needs to be re-examined for if we trace the history back to the time when Sumitro Djohadikusumo’s (Prabowo’s father) party (PSI) was dissolved by Soekarno due to an allegation of Sumitro’s involvement in PRRI. This shows that the similar socio-nalitionalist ideology adopted by PSI and PNI (Soekarno’s party, see chapter four) did not guarantee any ideological alignment of these two parties. As PDI-P is seen as the contemporary embodiment of PNI and Gerindra arguably adopts the socio-nationalist ideology of PSI, Prabowo and Megawati’s alignment seems to be a tenuous and pragmatic one.
image-building seems to yield good results as *Republika* online\(^{168}\) notes that based on a survey conducted by Soegeng Soerjadi Syndicate, Prabowo’s popularity (25.8 per cent) is higher than Megawati and Jusuf Kalla. However, *Kompas* online\(^{169}\) notes that according to Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC), Prabowo’s popularity (78.8 per cent) is below Megawati Soekarnoputri (93.7 per cent) and Jusuf Kalla (88.9 per cent), whilst *Lingkar Survei Indonesia* (LSI) found that Prabowo’s popularity (18 per cent) is below Megawati (18.3 percent).

**Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura) or People’s Conscience Party**

As earlier discussed, the establishment of Hanura on 21 December 2006 by Wiranto, the former Commander-in-chief of Indonesia’s Armed Forces (TNI) and the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Affairs in Gus Dur’s administration, marked a split within Golkar. However, what was more interesting to note prior to the split was Wiranto’s political maneuvering, especially during the May 1998 riot and the 1999 election. Tracing Wiranto’s track record will unravel the image construction of both Hanura and Wiranto, as Syukur (2010, p. 3), Vice Secretary General of Hanura, argues that the party largely relies on its patron’s persona. This also arguably reinforces the perception that nascent nationalist parties in Indonesia are mostly established as the electoral machine of their elites and thus make them institutionally and ideologically weak. This sub-section discusses the branding of Wiranto as the representative of the Javanese “red and white” (nationalist) military faction and as Soeharto’s former adjutant, as well as his civil image as Hanura’s patron. This is structured by examining the familial and historical background of Wiranto in order to check the elements that shape his socio-cultural (Javanese) and political disposition for his decision to forge his own party.

Similar to SBY, Wiranto also represents the code of (Javanese) militarism. *Tempo* magazine (“*Satu Ayunan di Pintu Mercy*”, 2009) notes that not merely did Wiranto’s (Javanese) militaristic disposition stem from his educational background\(^{170}\), but also significantly from his experience as Soeharto’s


\(^{170}\) Due to the poor economic condition of his family, Wiranto decided to enroll at National Military Academy, as entering the academy merely required a small amount of money. His military achievement in the academy
former adjutant for four years (1989-1993). Coming from a Javanese aristocratic but modest family, Wiranto was educated in Javanese manners. However, he most notably learnt these hierarchical manners especially from the time he became Soeharto’s adjutant – a prestigious strategic position which later led Wiranto to the position of Indonesia’s Armed Forces Chief Commander. *Tempo* magazine employed the title “Satu Ayunan Di Pintu Mercy” (“One Swing at Mercedes Benz’s door”) as a metaphor to depict the methods Wiranto used in order to win Soeharto’s heart. Wiranto’s way of closing the Mercedes Benz’ door (the Presidential car’s door) signifies the way of how a (Javanese) soldier served and honoured his superior: at first, the door was swung slowly, and a little pressure was then given to the door before it was completely closed. This style of swinging was culturally and politically important. The slow motion in closing the car’s door represents a Javanese style of “halus” or subtlety. However, this subtlety does not correspond with weaknesses, as pressure is then applied. This act arguably runs parallel with Soeharto’s Javanese philosophy, *Mikul Dhuwur Mendem Jero* (*memikul setinggi-tingginya, memendam sedalam-dalamnya*) or valuing/respecting elders by not revealing their flaws (see chapter five). This Javanese servitude and subservience can be perceived as a mode of gaining Soeharto’s trust, so that a higher position will later be in Wiranto’s possession. At this stage, the power relation between Wiranto and Soeharto can also be seen as twofold: it runs parallel with the socio-political relation between *Gusti* and *Kawula*; whilst at the same time, it also arguably reflects a “culturally correct” maneuver for political purposes. When Wiranto successfully became one of Soeharto’s confidants, he started to build a political network with Soeharto’s guests and associates and learnt Javanese philosophy from Soeharto that “a leader should learn from nature in order to become a “role model”.” In 1998 Wiranto successfully became the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.

As earlier noted, Wiranto’s position as the Army Chief Commander was considered as representing the “red and white” (nationalist) faction (Eklof, 1999; Hefner, 2000; Lee, 2005, 2009; Kingsbury, 2005). This positioning seems to be closely related with his rivalry with Prabowo Subianto, who represented the (regimist) Islamic faction (or green faction) of the military, especially after Soeharto attempted to build a close relationship with the Islamic faction in the 1990s by establishing ICMI. At

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171 Although Wiranto’s family was noted as a poor family, *Tempo* magazine (see “Wiranto: Pemilu Bukan Menang-Menangan Survei”, 29 June-5 July 2009 edition, p. 106) notes Wiranto’s Javanese aristocratic (priyayi) title, Kanjeng Pangeran Wiranto Wirowijoto.

this point, Wiranto’s position plausibly contradicts his patron’s political maneuvering. Lee (2005, p. 97; 2009, p. 656) notes that to counter the growing influence of ICMI inside the military, Wiranto approached Yayasan Kerukunan dan Persaudaraan Kebangsaan or the Foundation of National Brotherhood Harmony in order “to draw support from nationalist-minded officers.” However, the establishment of ICMI could not arguably be seen as the only tactic Soeharto deployed to secure his power. Soeharto put his pawns not only in the Islamic faction, such as his former son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto, amongst the Islamic hard-liners, and Habibie in ICMI, but also in the nationalist (military) one, such as Wiranto. This strategy seemed to be ineffective, not only because the establishment of ICMI caused overarching dissent inside the Islamic and the military camps, but also the political ambition and rivalry of these three figures could not later shield Soeharto from the people’s demand for his resignation in mid 1998, as earlier discussed.

The political contestation between Wiranto, Prabowo, and Habibie arguably culminated in the May 1998 riot. As previously noted, Prabowo claimed that he had followed all the security procedures to secure the capital city during the riot. However, Lee (2005, 2009) notes that Prabowo, as the Commander of Special Forces and Strategic Army Reserve, was alleged as the person who orchestrated the riot at the time Wiranto, as the Army Chief Commander and the Minister of Defence and Security, wanted to implement a soft approach to the protestors. At the same time, Soeharto requested Wiranto to implement martial law – a request that was subtly rejected by Wiranto. On the other hand, Prabowo’s covert involvement, according to Berfield and Loveard (1998), was conjectured, especially when Wiranto ordered Syafrie Syamsuddin, the operational Commander of the capital city and also Prabowo’s close associate, to send troops to handle the riot. Having claimed that Wiranto’s order was equivocal, Syamsuddin’s troop dispersed not in the targeted locations. Seeing this, Prabowo then offered his help to Wiranto, but was repudiated. This repudiation ostensibly stemmed not only from their old rivalry but also from a conjecture that Prabowo wanted to indirectly show Wiranto’s incapability of tackling the riot, especially in front of Soeharto. Besides, another conspiracy theory also unfolds: employing Soeharto’s pattern in overthrowing Soekarno, Prabowo was alleged to be planning a similar scheme to topple his own father-in-law. Prabowo and Habibie were also conjectured to have had a backroom deal to make Prabowo the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, especially when Soeharto’s health started to

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173 Muhammadiyah supported the establishment whilst NU (represented by Abdurrahman Wahid) and Nurcholish Majid perceived ICMI as “sectarian” organisation that violated pluralism in Indonesia (Lee, 2009, p. 658-659; Hefner, 2000, p. 128).

174 The green (Islamic) faction versus the red and white faction. Hefner (2000) classified the green military faction (such as Prabowo Subianto, Feisal Tanjung) as regimist Islam (see chapter one and Gerindra’s section) in contrast to civil Islam, represented by NU (Abdurrahman Wahid) and Nurcholish Majid.
deteriorate in 1997. As the situation of the country became worse, Wiranto persuaded Soeharto to resign while assuring him that the military would continue protecting him and his family after his resignation. However, prior to that, Wiranto also made a backroom deal with Habibie. He requested that when Soeharto resigned, Habibie would retain Wiranto as the Commander-in-chief; reform bureaucracy; and dismiss Prabowo from his current position (Lee, 2005). On 21 May 1998, Soeharto announced his resignation and the people’s mandate was directly given to the Vice President, Habibie. Berfield and Loveard (1998) notes that not long after Soeharto’s resignation, Habibie diverted his support from Prabowo to Wiranto after hearing from Feisal Tanjung, Prabowo’s former associate in the regimist group (Hefner, 2000, p. 151; Mietzner, 2006, p. 7), that Prabowo was too dangerous to be the Commander-in-chief. Besides, Hadiz (2005, p. 231) further notes that Habibie’s stance on Wiranto was also based on the guarantee Wiranto gave that he would protect Habibie against any attempt to oust Habibie from the Presidency.

The contestation above shows not merely the political scheming and intrigues behind the riot, but more importantly discloses Wiranto’s position towards the nationalist/Islamic polarisation. A closer investigation of the scheme shows that Wiranto’s inclination towards the nationalist camp is primarily based on his rivalry with the “regimist” Prabowo. As McBeth (1997) and Lee (2005, pp. 656-657) note that as the son-in-law of Soeharto, Prabowo ignored “the military chain of command” and attempted to depose Wiranto in 1998 – a struggle which in the end was won by Wiranto. Lee (2005, p. 658) further notes that in order to confront Prabowo, Wiranto also sought the Islamic camp’s support from Gus Dur, as he knew that Gus Dur, his “long-standing business partner” (adopting Lee, 2005, p. 658), also opposed to ICMI. However, their relationship cannot be completely perceived as marking Wiranto’s disposition towards the Islamic camp (civil Islam, following Hefner (2000)). Mubarak (2007, pp. 117-118) conjectures that Wiranto was probably involved as the patron of one of the Islamic hardliners (Front Pembela Islam (FPI) or Islamic Defender Front)175 due to FPI’s demonstration against the National Commission on Human Right’s investigation of the 1999 East Timor massacre. As the Chief Commander of the Army during the 1999 East Timor referendum, Wiranto was indicted as the one who was responsible of the massacre of 1,400 people (McBeth and Hiebert, 2004; EIU ViewsWire, 2004). However, Wiranto denied such responsibility.

Instead, he was then reported releasing a love songs recording, auctioning the album and donating the money to violence victims across Indonesia, including the East Timorese (Adams, 2000). In a

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175 FPI was established on 17 August 1998. Collins (2004, p. 114) notes that in September 1999 FPI was mobilised to confront students’ demonstration against Habibie’s presidency.
Bourdieuian lens, not only does Wiranto’s act signify an attempt to rehabilitate his name (reputation) but also indicates an inequitable symbolic exchange: charity with reputation. At this stage, Wiranto ostensibly attempted to compensate the agony of the victims and families with money with the objective to ease their economic burdens after the massacre. In this sense, he simply equates his charity with all of the loss the victims and families suffered. However, as the symbolic exchange is conducted by gathering his powerful associates in one social event with the purpose of showing his concern towards the victims of violence, Wiranto indirectly shows not only his social capital (his relationship with “senior military and government officials”, Adams, 2000), but also ostentatiously the level of power connection he has. Inviting and involving his business acquaintances and associates in the event were politically important. Not only did they support his so-called philanthropic action, but also more importantly become the ones that legitimised his action176. At the same time, this gathering becomes the site of publicity gimmickry as releasing and auctioning the albums and giving charity were conducted at a time when he was nominated as a Vice President for the 1999 election. This is possibly also intended to demonstrate his compassionate side177 that softens his militaristic image.

Shari and Prasso (1999) note that on 7 and 8 July 1999, thus during the 1999 election, Wiranto invited a number of generals, excluding the ones from the green faction, to hold a secret meeting at the military headquarters in order to discuss a coalition government. At that time, his name was mentioned as one of the strongest candidates for Vice President. Shari and Prasso (1999) argue that Wiranto’s position during the 1999 election as the Commander-in-chief positioned him as the kingmaker, based on several factors. First, the 38 seats of the military in the parliament became one of the keys that determined military strategic position178 at that time. Second, Wiranto’s position as chief Commander of the Armed Forces enabled him to be the director of Indonesia’s “political drama”179 (read: Indonesia’s next government), especially during the election, for history records

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176 Adams (2000) also notes the comment from one of Wiranto guests: “I really do not understand why he’s singled out, why he’s being accused. He’s supposed to protect Indonesia, and that’s what he did.”
177 Priyambodo RH (2008) from Antara, Indonesia’s News bureau, notes that approaching the 2009 election Wiranto used the same branding strategy showing his compassionate side by eating nasi aking (the left-over dried rice) in Serang, Banten. This act is intended to demonstrate that he is not reluctant to go and observe the poor people and their villages and eat their staple food as this is similar to the poor conditions in which his family used to live. This public performance plausibly helps him to construct a populist image. However, this demonstration merely shows the same branding strategy as Wiranto once again shows a similar compassionate social act (such as auctioning his song album and donating the money to charity) leading to publicity gimmickry.
178 As the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, Wiranto determined which military officers who could occupy the seats.
179 Shari and Prasso (1999) argue that the word “drama” seems to suit Indonesia’s political condition at that time, especially as Wiranto and his accomplices seemed to pre-determine Indonesia’s next government. In this
that the winning party, in this case PDI-P (Megawati), always need the military’s support. Megawati was aware of this. Besides, with Gus Dur’s willingness to support Megawati’s candidacy and students’ acceptance of the military involvement in the next government as long as Megawati became the President made Wiranto’s position as the future Vice President feasible. However, as noted earlier, this nationalist coalition eventually had to admit the Central Axis group’s maneuvering (the Islamic camp) in winning the election. Wiranto then became Minister of Security and Defence. In January 2000, he became the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security affairs only for three months.

Wiranto’s relationship with Gus Dur gradually deteriorated as Wiranto declared martial law because of the political unrest in Aceh whilst at the same time Gus Dur suggested holding a referendum for the independence of this province. The military camp viewed this suggestion merely as Gus Dur’s private request, not in his capacity as the President. This then marked political tension between Gus Dur and Wiranto, as Wiranto seemed to hold a firm grip on the military. Using International pressure about Wiranto’s alleged involvement in the East Timor massacre, Gus Dur asked Wiranto several times to step down from his position. Wiranto refused to do so arguing that if he agreed to resign, this would mean he admitted his involvement. However, as McBeth (1999) notes, amidst the political tension between them, Gus Dur still allowed Wiranto to suggest a list of military officers to be promoted in his new cabinet. Prior to his retirement as the chief Commander of the Army, Wiranto reshuffled the military putting forward the most potential successors as the Army Chief Commander, Let. Gen Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the territorial affairs chief, as the Mining Minister, and Let. Gen. Agum Gumelar, National Defence Institute Governor, as the Minister of Transport. McBeth further argues that Gus Dur’s ambivalent stance towards Wiranto arguably derived from his need for Wiranto’s help to “counterbalance the influence of Amien [Rais]” (the Central Axis group) that dominated the Parliament. Deputy Admiral Widodo A.S replaced Wiranto’s position as Army Chief Commander. Gus Dur then sacked Wiranto from his Cabinet.

Wiranto’s next political maneuver was to dominate Golkar. McCawley (2004) argues that Wiranto’s victory in Golkar’s internal election over Akbar Tandjung, Golkar’s former chairperson, as Golkar’s Presidential candidate for the 2004 election, signifies the beginning of a new political trend in choosing its Presidential candidate. Wiranto’s victory came as quite a surprise as Akbar was known drama, following the Javanese tradition of seeking blessing from the respected elder, Wiranto was reported asking his former patron’s (Soeharto) blessing for the scenario he was playing. Unexpectedly, Gus Dur accepted the Central Axis’s proposal to nominate him as the candidate for President. Gus Dur’s nomination pushed Wiranto’s ambition aside for Megawati would occupy the seat of Vice President. This abrupt political change was intended to appease Nationalist and Islamic camps.
to be the figure who successfully restored Golkar’s image in the Reform era. However, the graft charges laid against Akbar in 2002 possibly impeded his path to victory. Golkar’s support for Wiranto’s Presidential candidacy for the 2004 election then split. This can overtly be seen from Akbar’s statement that he was ready to be nominated as Megawati’s running mate in the 2004 election. Although Wiranto was defeated in the election, Golkar dominated the parliament in 2004. Jusuf Kalla then became Golkar’s chairperson.

With this disappointment, Wiranto established his own electoral vehicle, Hanura, on 21 December 2006. Firmanzah (2010, p. 249) contends that the employment of the phrase *Hati Nurani Rakyat* (People’s Conscience) reflects Wiranto’s satirical statement about the government elites who work without conscience. This can be seen from the party’s doctrine\(^{181}\) that employs the phrase “kesadaran Ilahiyyah” (divine conscience) to contradict the elites’ corrupt performances which violated their own conscience. This, according to the doctrine, becomes the party’s basis for struggle. At this stage, the party perceives that the only way to fight against the elites’ corrupt practices is by returning to a divine conscience in order to listen and understand the people’s conscience. This denotes a personal transcendental reflection in order to carry the people’s mandate. Thus, not only does this reflection equate with divinity but also suggest an indirect parallelism of the party’s name with the sacredness of people’s mandate. With this equation, Hanura (read: Wiranto) constructs a political branding that the party’s struggle is a holy one as it represents the code of collective morality, i.e. the people’s conscience. However, this branding implies a vertical relation between the party and its constituents as Wiranto states in the doctrine that the way to rectify the country’s present condition is by choosing the right man as the leader (Wiranto). In short, Wiranto endeavoured to solidify the party’s reliance solely on him. Wiranto’s definition of the terms “sukses politik” (political success) dan “sukses kepemimpinan” (successful leadership) reinforces this solidification. Wiranto as cited by Syukur (2010) defines “sukses politik” as a collective success based on the charisma of the party’s central figure (Wiranto), whilst “sukses kepemimpinan” reflects the managerial skills of the chairpersons of provincial and municipal branches to run the organisation effectively. Thus, the achievement indicator of these collective works lies on the capability of all the party’s components and system to bring Wiranto to the Presidential seat.

The party’s vertical power relation arguably contradicts its logo (see chapter five). The image of an arrow in the logo connotes a horizontal line of the party’s movement in order to carry out the people’s mandate (Hanura’s statutes, chapter II, paragraph 3b). Like all nationalist parties, Hanura perceives the people’s mandate as the fulfilment of the country’s cardinal objectives, which is written in the first paragraph of the statutes’ preamble. However, paragraph two of the preamble indicates Hanura’s reliance on its key figure in order to achieve its objective. This can be seen as follows:

*Bahwa setelah memperhatikan kondisi lingkungan global, regional dan nasional selama ini, bangsa Indonesia belum secara sungguh-sungguh mewujudkan cita-cita tersebut, maka dibutuhkan semangat untuk lebih memahami hati nurani rakyat melalui kepemimpinan yang bertakwa, jujur, tegas, berani dan berkemampuan.*

Having observed global, regional and national condition over the time, the Indonesian people have not completely attained the country’s cardinal objectives. This needs a spirit to better understand people’s conscience through a pious, honest, resolute, brave and competent leader.

This paragraph indicates an attempt to cement the party’s reliance on its key figure. Stating the party’s reliance on its patron in paragraph two\(^\text{182}\) can be seen as inculcating a belief that without the guidance of the right leader, the country’s cardinal objectives (which reflect people’s conscience) cannot be attained.

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\(^\text{182}\) The opening paragraph of the nationalist parties’ statutes contains a replication of the country’s cardinal objectives.
Celebrating the year of 2012 and Chinese New Year, Hanura (Wiranto) placed its billboard on Lingkar Luar Selatan Street, East Jakarta. Like any streets in Jakarta, this street is known for its heavy traffic especially in the morning and afternoon. It is near the toll roads and next to a gas station. This strategic location enables the spectators to glance up and gain a temporary impression, which according to Harrington in Gudis (2004, p. 70), does not require “intellectual attention”. From the written expression of the billboard, the party attempts to address the spectator by the greeting of “Selamat Tahun Baru 2012 dan Tahun Baru Imlek 2563” (Happy New Year 2012 and Happy New Chinese Year 2563), written on the top of the billboard. However, the taglines “Hanura tak kan Khianat” and “Hidup Mati Bersama Hanura” (Hanura will not Betray and Live and Die with Hanura), which are written in larger font than the new year greetings, cannot be simply perceived as ordinary new year greetings. These become a reminder to spectators that welcoming this year, Hanura solemnly pledges not to betray (people’s trust?), and reminds its constituents of their loyalty. However, another way of reading this narrative is without abbreviating the name of the party, i.e. “Hati Nurani Rakyat tak kan Khianat” and “Hidup Mati Bersama Hati Nurani Rakyat” (People’s Conscience is not treasonous and Live and Die with [People’s] Conscience). This alternative reading brings a different meaning. These can be read as bandwagon as the slogans contain a highly valued concept (read: people’s conscience) that every individual subject cannot refute for it represents the code of collective morality. Thus, Hanura’s pledges can be seen as twofold: firstly, they represent the...
party’s attempt to declare that Hanura still commits to its political vows. Secondly, these pledges demonstrate a political hijacking of this highly valued phrase “people’s conscience” as Hanura’s propaganda expression. In addition, a special greeting for the Chinese New Year indicates Wiranto’s attempt to capture Sino-Indonesian voters, as it, at the same time, represents his pluralist image-building.

Beside the written slogans and greetings, the most important aspect this billboard accentuates is the smiling image of Wiranto, who is depicted putting his right hand on his left chest. Wiranto’s image occupies three quarters of the billboard. This party’s chairperson acts as the addresser of the slogans: pledging that Hanura will not betray its constituents and that the life and death of the party depends on their loyalty. As the addresser, the position of Wiranto’s hand connotes the solemnity of the party’s (Wiranto’s) pledges. However, this solemnity is delivered along with Wiranto’s smiling expression. Although his smile is intended to soften his stern face, it appears to contradict the solemnity of its pledges. At this stage, this pictorial act signifies Hanura’s attempt to communicate these pledges through this outdoor advertising medium quickly and silently. Wiranto’s appearance in almost all Hanura’s billboard marks the party’s act of glorifying Wiranto’s photogenic expression and is seen as capable of inviting the spectators’ disposition to perceive Wiranto’s physical appearance as plausibly representing their aspiration. Due to the rapid mobility of the spectators passing along this street, Wiranto’s ubiquitous presence becomes a marker of habituation as people pass this billboard at all times. Thus, Hanura gradually inculcates its ideology through its key figure’s public persona.

Hanura’s chairperson’s persona is also constructed with the employment of peci (a Muslim cap) and the title “haji” in front of his name on this billboard. As discussed, above the title “haji” represents the code of Islamic religiosity. Peci, on the other hand, is also used to be perceived as one of the pieces of attire for the Muslim man to wear whilst praying. Its meaning then shifted as Soekarno (as cited in Adams, 2011, p. 61) declared that to differentiate Indonesian people from the colonial Dutch, peci is worn as one item of Indonesian national attire. Peci then represents the mixture of nationalism and religiosity which reflects socio-moral status (Ajidarma, 2009). Thus, although Hanura belongs to the nationalist camp, the employment of peci and haj on the billboard connote the ambiguous position of the party (read: Wiranto). This ambiguity, however, is aligned with Hanura’s statutes (chapter four article twelve about the characteristic of the party as an inclusive nationalist religious party). In short, Hanura becomes one of the nationalist contenders to win “the cake of political power” using similar strategies. This is conducted especially by claiming that the party
struggles to actualize economic reforms to empower people and establish cheap but high-quality education as its platform. Hanura then succeeded in placing nineteen of its candidates in the House of Representatives in 2009.

To conclude, the nationalist parties are heavily reliant on their paternalistic figures. This reliance is primarily established as the nationalist parties are mostly utilised as the patrons’ electoral machines. *Pancasila* as the ideology the nationalist parties adhere to allow this clientalism to operate in the form of fetishising the parties’ central figures as the core factor in the parties’ branding. The next chapter will examine the branding of the Islamic parties in order to see how much scope *Pancasila*, as the state ideology, influences their branding.
Chapter Eight

The Political Branding of the Islamic Parties

In contrast to the nationalist parties that are largely reliant on their charismatic leaders’ branding, the Islamic parties arguably go beyond this fetishism. Saiful Mujani in Damarjati\(^{183}\) (2012) affirms this by arguing that the absence of key figures in the Islamic parties impedes the parties’ development, for the paternalistic culture still plays an important role in influencing the voters’ behaviours. However, this does not mean that the Islamic faction does not have role models. PAN (National Mandate Party) and PKB (Nation Awakening Party), for instance, their key figures, Amien Rais and the late Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), emerged not only as the leaders but also as the paternalistic figures whose thinking was deeply rooted in their respective parties. However, when Amien Rais’ term of office as PAN’s chairperson ended, his influence also arguably started to decline. Amien Rais’ image cannot also be perceived as completely representing Islamic aspirations. Mujani further argues that although Amien Rais attempts to construct an inclusive Islamic image, he is still perceived as heavily representing Muhammadiyah. Similar to Amien Rais, people perceived Gus Dur’s image as largely representing NU. Since his conflict with Islamic parties became exacerbated and internal conflict hit his party (PKB), his influence gradually declined. Gus Dur’s death on 30 December 2009 possibly contributed to this emasculation.

This chapter discusses the branding of the Islamic parties, which in Tomsa’s view (2012, p. 488) mainly positions Islam as a symbolic ideology. This is arguably due to the parties’ aim to “expand their constituency” (Shihab and Nugroho, 2008, pp. 233-267), which make both factions quickly (re)brand themselves in the framework of ideological ambiguity. This ambiguity is not necessarily in the form of an ideological synthesis of Nationalist and Islamic strands, as the ideological contestation occurs at the same time as the synthesis meets the mainstream ideology of the parties. As Tomsa (2012, pp. 486-498) argues when the parties synthesise these strands in order to achieve their pragmatic goals, the contestation between these strands shows a degree of ideological “moderation”. By this, and developing Schwedler’s thesis (2006), Tomsa (2012) posits that we need to focus our attention on ideational and behavioural change within the party (in this case the Islamic ones) that will justify its pragmatic actions. Thus, this chapter focuses on how the Islamic parties position themselves within this ideological crossroads in Pancasila discourse by examining its

ideological blueprint against their everyday political practices (in this case as reflected on their billboards). This position defines the way they market themselves, not by heavily depending on selling the image of their key figures, but more on catering to their non-religious actions in supporting democracy.

This chapter is organised into five sections. The first four sections discuss the political branding of the Islamic parties: PKS, PAN, PPP and PKB. This discussion is organised on the basis of the number of votes the Islamic parties obtained in the 2009 legislative election. Section five compares the political branding between the nationalist and Islamic factions.

**Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) or Prosperous Justice Party**

The focus of my investigation into PKS’ image is on the shifting of the party’s branding from an exclusive Islamic party to its moderate stance, especially towards the issue of *shariah* implementation. The branding of PKS has evolved in the polarised notions of a “hardline” (Shihab and Nugroho, 2008) versus “moderate” (Tomsa, 2012), or “normalised”, party (Bubalo, Fealy and Mason, 2008). However, as Bubalo and Fealy (2005, p. v) argue, this polarisation potentially traps us into perceiving that it represents an act of endorsing an ostensible simplistic dichotomy of “the western stereotyping of good versus bad Muslims”, which will simply lead to the reduction of ideological complexity behind it. Thus, the act of attaching certain labels to PKS indicates that an investigation into the ideological complexity behind this Islamic party’s branding is urgent. The investigation is primarily based on two phases: the party’s inception in 1980s and its name transformation from *Partai Keadilan* (PK) or Justice Party to *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS) Prosperous Justice Party. Not only do these two phases mark the party’s ideological transition (from exclusive Islamic party to an inclusive one), but also shows a process of ideological moderation or “normalisation” (Bubalo, Fealy and Mason, 2008).

The inception of PKS stems from the LDK (*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* or University Student’s Board for Islamic Predication) as the embodiment of the *tarbiyah* movement (a campus-based movement which aims to educate and give religious guidance to Indonesian students), that emerged in the early 1980s (van Wichelen, 2007, p. 96; Baswedan, 2004, p. 673). Shihab and Nugroho (2008, pp. 236-238) and Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, pp. 51-57) note that adopting the model of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwanul Muslimin*) founded by Hasan Al Banna, this movement represents an ideological closeness as the result of importing and adapting the application of this model into the Indonesian context. Sembiring (as cited by Hisyam, 2012) asserts that this model which resembles
the “multi-level marketing” system\textsuperscript{184}, especially in terms of proliferating the party’s cadres number and loyalty, helps to strengthen the party’s social and cultural capital of competent human resources and a strong institution. Similar to the pattern in “multi-level marketing”, the model follows the Muslim Brotherhood’s cell system of recruitment and training called \textit{usrah} (family). The primal strength of this system lies in its core activity of a discussion group (\textit{halaqah}) or religious circle which consists of one trainer (\textit{murabbi}) and five to ten trainees (\textit{muratabbi})\textsuperscript{185}. The system in \textit{halaqah} also resembles the method of training the trainer (ToT), as Sembiring (cited in Hisyam, 2012, p. 39) notes that after three years of training the trainees are seen as competent in becoming \textit{murabbi} and are obliged to recruit their own \textit{muratabbi}. Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 54) and Shihab and Nugroho (2008, pp. 237-238) argue that this systematic training and recruitment becomes the determining factor in the party’s institutional strength for not only does the system proliferate the number of the party’s cadres but it also guarantees the cadres’ competences in coordinating and “expanding its support base” (Hamayotsu, 2011, p. 972).

This training and recruitment system does not work in a static mode. Although campuses are chosen as the central sites of preaching and proselytisation, the mode of preaching and teaching students move not only from campus to campus, but also from mosque to mosque. These sites were chosen as they were seen as relatively free, especially from Soeharto’s policy of banning Islamic predication in the public sphere, at the outset of this \textit{tarbiyah} movement. Tracing the background of this ban reveals the ideological bond between PK(S) and Masyumi. As discussed in chapter five, both Soekarno and Soeharto saw Islam as a political threat following Masyumi’s (read: Muhammad Natsir’s) mutiny in Soekarno’s guided democracy era. Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 52) and Shihab and Nugroho (2008, pp.235-236) note that instead of reconstructing this former Islamic party, Natsir chose the path of education by establishing \textit{Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia} (DDII) or Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council in 1967, a year after he was released from gaol. DDII then

\textsuperscript{184} In Indonesia, this system is often associated with independent people who work without offices. It works like a web-cell system where every single component is connected and related. This system relies heavily not on selling the product solely, but more on how it creates a network which places loyalty and attachment to the system (and also the product) inexorable. It starts with introducing the product’s benefits while persuading the potential buyers to become the product’s members. As members, they will get additional financial benefit not only in a common form of discount but more importantly additional income, only when they are able to recruit new members, which are usually called as “downliners”. When the new members buy the products, the one that recruit them is entitled to earn certain credit points, which can later be converted into money. Thus, not only does this marketing system proliferate the number of members, but it also binds them in a net where loyalty and attachment are measured by money.

\textsuperscript{185} There is a slight different record about the number of \textit{mutarabbi} in one \textit{halaqah}. Machmudi (2006, p. 134) notes that each cell consists of five to ten students, whereas Sembiring, the former president of PKS, as cited by Hisyam (2012, pp.37, 44, 87) contends that the number of students in the \textit{halaqah} (five up to twelve students) follows the number of Prophet Muhammad’s close companions (twelve).
became the embryo of *tarbiyah* movement, as it adopted and developed the Muslim Brotherhood’s *usrah* system. Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 52) note that Hilmi Aminuddin, Imaduddin Abdul Rahim, Rakhmat Abdullah and Abdi Sumaithi (Abu Ridho) were Natsir’s leading successors in developing this cadre system on campuses and mosques. However, among these figures, Sembiring (cited in Hisyam, 2012, pp. 45-46) asserts that Hilmi was the one who approached Suripto, a former government secret intelligence agent and a deputy minister in the Ministry of Education and Culture, in order to secure the *tarbiyah* movement from Soeharto’s surveillance. This, according to Machmudi (2006, pp. 3-4), marks their stance as a group that distance themselves from (direct) confrontation with the government as their cardinal focus was on Islamic purification.

This apolitical *tarbiyah* movement was then consolidated and institutionalised on 28 July 1998 as a political party named *Partai Keadilan* (PK). Not only does this institutionalisation signify an attempt to transform Islamic ideological “guerrilla” tactics into political ones, but also marks an overt immersion of the group’s political resistance against Soeharto’s repression. Based on this Islamic puritanical background, Shihab and Nugroho (2008, pp. 233-267) regard PK as a hardline Islamic party, especially as the party’s platforms heavily focus on upholding Islamic law (shariah) in Indonesia. They argue that in addition to the party’s ideological affiliation with salafi Muslim Brotherhood, the absence of the state secular ideology, *Pancasila*, and the phrase NKRI (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*) or “(*Pancasila*-based) Unitary Republic of Indonesia” (borrowing Fealy’s translation of the term, 2004) on its 1999 platforms strongly indicates PK’s political agenda which was conjectured as transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state. Beside the absence of state ideology, which is refuted by Sembiring (as cited by Hisyam, 2012, p. 85), Shihab and Nugroho (2008, p. 238), in conjunction with Gunther and Diamond (2003, p. 182), perceive that the cell cadre system is the core factor that determines PK as a “religious fundamentalist party”.

However, such positioning needs to be re-examined as Fealy further argues that the demarcation line between “hardline” versus “moderate” Islamic parties is obscure. Fealy (2004) proposes two major characteristics that categorise fundamentalist/radicalist Islam: conformist application of

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186 Tomsa (2012, p. 488) employs the term “highly controversial” in positioning PKS in Indonesian contemporary political discourse.
187 Salafi is seen as a movement to return to “pure” teaching of Islam by rigidly following religious practices exemplified by Prophet Muhammad (Fealy, 2004)
188 Fealy (2004) argues that as the terms “radical” and fundamental can be used “interchangeably”, he proposes an elemental difference between radicalist and fundamentalist Islam. He argues that the difference lies on their emphasis on Islamic spirituality and politics. He found that the focus of fundamentalism is on their “commitment on religious teachings and practices”, whereas radicalist commitment more inclines to bringing the religious practices to the political realm. In this regard, although the word “hardline” resembles extremism,
Islamic teachings and practices based on the examples of Prophet Muhammad; and their antagonistic reaction towards Semitism and Western secularisation. As these issues are perceived as “fundamentally sensitive” in Islam, both camps arguably hold a similar stance but to different degrees. Muhammadiyah, an Islamic modernist and moderate organisation, exemplified this overlap as its former central board secretary, Goodwill Zubir, as noted by Fealy (2004), had once conveyed his radical outlook towards the Zionist movement and Christian missionaries in his Eid-al Fitr Sermon in 2003. However, his sermon cannot be completely perceived as representing Muhammadiyah, as the organisation is also known for its advocacy of religious tolerance (Fealy, 2004). In other words, this tenuous boundary marks ambiguity inside the Islamic camp. Using this as an analogy and standpoint in re-examining PK as a hardliner affirms that the absence of Pancasila and NKRI in its 1999 platforms cannot be completely seen as connoting its reluctance (if not rejection) of adopting the state ideology let alone immediately positioning the party as a hardline one. Similar to Muhammadiyah’s case, as an Islamic party that stems from Islamic purification movement, PK positions itself in the tenuous boundary dealing with the above sensitive issues with the absence of a radical movement. Machmudi (2006, pp. 165-168) argues that this boundary is accommodated by the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood for it perceives that “religious awareness is more important than religious difference” and to avoid dispute any forms of Islamic religious practice across Mazhab (school of Islamic jurisprudential thought) are seen as tolerable and permissible as long as they still are oriented towards Al Qur’an and Hadith (the Sayings and tradition of Prophet Muhammad).

An attempt to solidify this position can be seen in PK’s image building by assigning Nurmahmudi Ismail, a PhD graduate from A & M University Texas, to the top position as PK’s President (Sembiring as cited in Hisyam, 2012, p. 82; Machmudi, 2006, p. 2). Sembiring further states that instead of electing candidates for a certain post, the party employed a system of assignment, as in Islamic discourse being in a position equates with bearing certain mandates. Favouritism is absent in this system, as Fealy (2008, p. xi) found, as the system is based on merit, which reflects the party’s “internal democratic process”. Thus, in Sembiring’s view, giving the highest mandate to this American graduate was seen as demonstrating the party’s attempt to wrap up its Islamic image with a western nuance. This political coating was necessary as many PK’s cadres were Middle Eastern

in PK’s case, the label “hardline” attached is arguably aligned with salafi as the representative of Islamic fundamentalism rather than radicalism, as they both more orient to purify Islamic religious teachings and practices. However, this position needs to be re-dissected as Machmudi (2006, p. xvii) argues that PK’s origin, Jemaah Tarbiyah (tarbiyah movement), deploys “accommodative and flexible approach” in its religious and political praxis.

Fealy (2010) argues that western secularisation has been viewed as “corrupting Islam”.

189 Fealy (2010) argues that western secularisation has been viewed as “corrupting Islam”.

145
graduates, which entangles the party in a perception that PK is an extension of Middle Eastern fundamentalist Islam. However, this branding design did not bring electoral success to PK, although it declared itself as “partai dakwah” (Islamic predication party) with tarbiyah-based organisational structure as its backbone. The party then reconstitutes in a slightly different name, PKS, after PK failed to reach 2 per cent of the electoral threshold in the 1999 election. This reconstitution later marks the party’s overt “moderate” stance in the political arena and its re-branding design.

Many scholars (Bubalo and Fealy, 2005; Machmudi, 2006; Bubalo, Fealy and Mason, 2008; Shihab and Nugroho, 2008; Tomsa, 2012) focus their attention on PK’s transformation into PKS by assessing the party’s consistency towards the issue of shariah implementation. Bubalo and Fealy (2005, p. 69) argue that the transformation implicates the party in moderating its stance on the issue of shariah. In alignment with them, Shihab and Nugroho (2008, pp. 238-241) found that the inclusion of Pancasila and NKRI (which can also be found in Article 5 of the party’s statutes) in its 2004 and 2008 platforms signifies the party’s attempt to shift its stance from hardline to moderate one. This, as they argue further, downplays PK’s former stance on shariah issues. Tomsa (2012, p. 490) adds that this also signifies the party’s pragmatic and opportunist behaviours, as diluting Islamic rhetoric in its platforms and statutes merely shows ideological inconsistency with what is inside the party’s training manual. Based on this, Tomsa further argues, the escalation in PKS’s votes in 2004 (7.3 per cent) or 7.89 per cent in 2009 compared to 1.4 per cent in 1999, which meant the party succeeded in placing their three cadres in SBY’s 2004 cabinet and four cadres in SBY’s 2009 cabinet, indicates that PKS’ ideological moderation is superficial. Shihab and Nugroho (2008, p. 248) affirms this by adding that its superficiality can also be seen, for instance, in PKS’ stance on the Anti-Pornography Bill. Although PKS did not initiate the Bill, the party’s support on this issue demonstrates its ideological superficiality (if not moderation). Another indication of PKS’ pragmatic stance was when the party formed a coalition with the Christian party, Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS) or Prosperous Peace Party, in the 2005 gubernatorial election in Papua. This move was also conjectured as an equivocal ideological moderation that led to the action of penetrating one of Indonesia’s Eastern provinces with its Christian majority. However, Tomsa (2012, p. 491) also perceives this maneuver as part of the party’s attempts to construct a reformist image. This act also produced dissent between the two discrepant camps inside PKS, the pragmatist versus “ideologues”. The latter perceives that the party’s inclusivity potentially endangered PKS’ idealism of Islamic purification, whilst the former argues that prior to achieving the idealism PKS should expand its wing by opening itself up to the non-Tarbiyah and non-Muslims. This is not only conducted to demonstrate its shifting paradigm from an exclusive Islamic party to a moderate one, but also engineering a pretext that justifies its
imperatives (Tomsa, 2012, p. 492; Fealy, 2010). Thus, Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 73) sum up that PKS’ moderation indicates an act of “normalising”\(^\text{190}\) itself, as the party lies on the crossroads of “ideological purification and political expediency”. However, framing PKS’ religious moderate position in the framework of “normalisation” arguably suggests a perception that the party’s former stance is abnormal, whilst at the same time, when PKS moderates its religious political stance, the party is criticised as being pragmatic, opportunist and “less Islamic”. With this logic, this condition, on the other hand, is simply perceived as a normal one.

PKS itself interprets its moderation as running in line with the word “keadilan” (justice) as the party’s name indicates. In its vision and mission, the party argues that the word “keadilan” connotes a moderate path Muslims commonly take in order to resolve any possible disputes in life. In other words, the party equates the meaning of justice with moderation as these will lead to a balanced system for achieving prosperity (sejahtera). At the same time, these two words (justice and moderation) also connote a position in which one is situated not only in balancing but also acting towards her/his two-sided self. This analogy brings the party to a position in which it places itself in the ideological crossroads, which merely confirms its Janus face. However, as this face signifies transition and progression, it also connotes the party’s ambivalent stance.

Machmudi (2006, p.203) argues that this ambivalence is possibly due to Islam itself. He further states that Islam is a religion that does not segregate spiritual and secular life and PKS perceives Islam as “the totality of rules and norms guiding the daily lives of Muslims – embracing the religious, economic, social, cultural, and political dimensions”. In other words, not only does this connote the inclusivity of Islam, but also more saliently demonstrates that Islam accommodates the party’s ambiguity. Amien Rais, the former leader of Muhammadiyah and PAN, in his interview with Alfred Stepan and Mirjam Kunkler (2007, p. 205) of Columbia University’s Centre for the Study of Democracy, Toleration, and Religion (CDTR), affirms Islam’s inclusivity by arguing that as the source of law, no indications in the Qur’an suggest either the establishment of an Islamic state or the implementation of shariah. He further argues that the Qur’an offers universal guidance on morality and ethical principles and should be treated as a reference book, instead of as a book of law. However, Hodgson (as cited by Platzdasch, 2009a, pp. 6-7) argues that this understanding is merely traditional, as the universal scope of shariah (encompassing “civic law such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, penal law, and a number of religious laws and obligations”) is used to create “shariah-mindedness” (political) programs. Based on this, as Shihab and Nugroho (2008, p. 242) found, PKS

\(^{190}\) The term “normalisation” was often used by Soeharto’s government to signify his success in maintaining law and order by repressing his political opponents.
uses an Islamic legal maxim, *amar ma’ruf nahi munkar*, or enjoining good and preventing evil, to translate *shariah* into neutral platforms such as “clean governance, fighting corruption, eliminating poverty and unemployment, protecting human rights, fighting for democratisation, furthering economic development for all people without discrimination and pursuing equality before the law”.

The following examples illustrate PKS’ ambivalent position. In line with PKS’ stance on the Anti-pornography Bill, the party’s support for the implementation of *PerDa Shariah* (*shariah*-based district regulations) in Padang, West Sumatra, which was initiated by its mayor from Golkar, is seen as contradicting the party’s inclusive image. When PKS’ elites in the parliament declined to participate in the petition to remove *PerDa Shariah* (Shihab and Nugroho, 2008, p. 249), Machmudi (2006, pp. 206-207), on the other hand, found a rather contradictory perspective on the issue at the regional level. Machmudi further notes that PKS’ local cadres in Padang assert that *PerDa Shariah* implementation needed a gradual process as implementing *shariah* is part of *dakwah* (missionary) work, not a political commodity. By this, PKS’ ambivalent stance cannot be completely perceived as either contradicting its ideological moderation or its Islamic ideology, as the party positions itself on a tenuous boundary, as discussed earlier.

Machmudi (2006, pp. 195-202) found PKS’ modus operandi in revising the image of *shariah*¹⁹¹ as part of the party’s re-branding. PKS attempts to expand the meaning of *shariah* by not referring solely to Islamic jurisprudence but more by positioning it as part of Islamic predication (*dakwah*). PKS employs the strategy of propagating and inculcating Islamic way of life not by using a traditional top-down approach, but more by penetrating the private sphere of its constituents so that the urge to understand and implement *shariah* becomes a necessity, instead of enforcement. The party’s knit-cell religious system is expanded from university students to the smallest unit of society in the family. Hamayotsu’s ethnographic research (2011, pp. 971-991) found that PKS’ welfare machines, such as its national task force (People’s Welfare or *Kesra*), woman’s wing organisation (*Pos Wanita Keadilan* or Women’s Justice Station) and NGO coalition (women’s welfare association or Salimah, *Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu* (JSIT Indonesia) or Indonesian Network of Integrated Islamic School and *Rumah Zakat* or House of Zakat (Islamic tithe), become the supporting structures that can forge the constituents’ “collective allegiance and party-mass linkage”. They provide welfare services such as free healthcare, free maternity clinic, immunisation for children, book donations, “mobile” libraries for children, single mother empowerment training, women’s trainings on baby healthcare and nutrition, catering and sewing, microfinance services, youth development training programs,

¹⁹¹ *Shariah* has been perceived and confined as a political entity that is conjectured to lead Indonesia into a theocratic Islamic state.
and shariah-based cooperatives. In order to keep the allegiance intact, they impose “communal responsibility” (Hamayotsu, 2011, p. 987) in its microfinance services, known as Koperasi Syariah Serba Usaha Salimah (KOSSUMA) or Salimah Multi-business Shariah Cooperative. This communal responsibility is translated as a condition under which a recipient of a loan from KOSSUMA has the obligation of not only paying for her/his membership, but every member in the group also has equal responsibility to manage the loan.

However, if we examine this whole scheme more closely, we will find that it signifies PKS’ act of depoliticising day-to-day (philanthropic) activities in order to achieve the party’s goal, i.e. expanding its constituency by reaching the underprivileged rural voters. This strategy of indirect marketing is needed as the process to construct a solid allegiance requires habituation. As these services are regular, people will perceive them as part of their habits. This also forges a doxic relationship between the party’s cadres and the constituents. Furthermore, as this is part of dakwah, the cadres will perceive their services as “religious duty” (Hamayotsu, 2011, p. 985). This means that their services are beyond religious rituals as their day-to-day services reflect moral propagation that needs to be nourished and maintained. The constituents, on the other hand, will perceive this indirect moral inculcation as part of their faith. Thus, violating the allegiance means betraying their faith. By this, shariah is gradually indoctrinated. This also makes PKS’ lack of capital, such as money and prominent figures, mere glitches.

In order to surmount the problem of the absence of the party’s prominent figure, PKS relies on its institutional strength to run its programmatic actions as part of the party’s day-to-day practices. Below is Hidayat Nur Wahid (PKS’ former president) and Didik J. Rachbini’s caricature in the 2012 gubernatorial election of Jakarta province that illustrates such practices:
As part of the campaign’s visual aids, Hidayat and Didik depicted the party’s practices in the form of a caricature. Among Jakarta’s acute problems, such as mass transportation, dense population, flooding, pollution, and crime rates, they chose to concentrate on handling the mass transportation and pollution problems in Jakarta as represented on the caricature. This caricature uses the image of trees, skyscrapers, rail-based MRT (Mass Rapid Transit) and buses as its background. The image of a thin vertical line in the caricature which separates the main green image with the gloomy image depicting Jakarta’s congested traffic demonstrate the past and future condition of the capital city.

The presence of Hidayat and Didik on the green image connotes that these two candidates (number four on the list) are the figures that can realise the change Jakarta needs. The cartoon character behind them on the image endorses this visual claim, stating that these are nationalist populist figures (tokoh nasional yang merakyat) who are concerned with people’s needs. Not only does this linguistic expression plausibly acknowledge the claims Hidayat and Didik make, but more importantly it shows that they perceive themselves not as the representative of the Islamic party, but as more nationalist in this context. However, Hidayat’s statement (“this is the time for Jakarta led by santri”) when he visited his constituents at pasar kaget Koja (traditional market at Koja), North Jakarta192, affirms that Hidayat and Didik also represent the Islamic party. During his visit, Hidayat argued that the claim he made (santri should lead Jakarta) would revive the glory of the

city’s romantic past as Fatahillah, the city’s founder, was a santri. In short, presenting this ideological ambiguity in the framework of surmounting Jakarta’s acute transportation and pollution problems as Hidayat and Didik’s (read: PKS’) programmatic actions reflected in their display picture, becomes one of the branding tactics these PKS’ cadres employ to capture Jakarta’s urban voters. However, this dual identity failed to win them the gubernatorial seats.

**Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) or National Mandate Party**

The analysis of PAN’s branding is centred on its image as an inclusive Islamic Nationalist party. This image was constructed in 1998 as PAN became the electoral vehicle for Amien Rais, its former chairperson, who was also well-known as the architect of the 1998 Reform movement. However, unlike the nationalist parties such as PD, PDI-P, Gerindra and Hanura, PAN’s reliance on its charismatic figure is not as strong as them. Its reliance on Amien Rais gradually diluted as Amien failed in his Presidential candidacy in 2004. However, this does not mean that Amien lost his privileged position and influence in the party, as he is perceived as the founder of this party. Based on this, the discussion of PAN’s branding is firstly focused on Amien Rais’ image as its former leader. Amien Rais is known not only for his success in building his image as a reformist religious nationalist figure, but that also he represents a dual position which later leads to the contestation between Amien versus the Islamic faction and Amien versus the nationalist faction. Secondly, the discussion moves to focus on PAN’s image in post-Amien Rais chairmanship.

Founded by fifty national figures in Jakarta on 23 August 1998, PAN was led by Amien Rais, the former chairperson of Muhammadiyah (1995 – 1998) with the spirit of cooperation among religious adherents (Assyaukanie, 2009, p. 192). Baswedan (2004) classifies PAN as a secular inclusive party which not merely promotes pluralism, and Muslim aspirations, as stated in the party’s platform, but also accommodates non-Muhammadiyah and non-Muslim members. Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata (2004, pp. 6-8) agree with Baswedan’s classification of PAN and add that due to the party’s ideology (Pancasila) and Amien Rais as the former chairperson of Muhammadiyah, PAN is perceived as both Islamic and secular with a non-Java(nese) base, except for Yogyakarta, his political base. However, Firmanzah (2010, pp. 122-128) and Denny J.A (2006, pp. 25) categorise PAN as an Islamic party, despite PAN’s claim to be an inclusive party.

Before discussing PAN’s image as an inclusive party, an investigation into its historical and political background is needed, as it shows political fragmentation inside the Islamic faction. This

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fragmentation, at the same time, connotes that the same ideological root they have (Islam) does not guarantee a harmonious partnership in the political arena. The inception of PAN was largely reliant on Amien Rais’ persona, as previously noted. Originating from the political aspiration of many pro-democratic activists and also of Muhammadiyah members to establish an inclusive political party during the 1998 Indonesia’s political transition, PAN was established to capture both Muslim and nationalist voters. With the objective to attain support from these voters, PAN brought Amien Rais to prominence as the figure that was able to narrow the gap between nationalist and Islamic camps, or in Stepan and Kunkler’s language (2007, pp. 214-215), the figure behind “inter-religious cooperation and multi-religious pro-democratic coalition”. Such credit was given as Amien was perceived as a successful figure that could unite people across religions and mobilise them as people’s power to fight against Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998.

However, prior to PAN’s establishment, the activists of *tarbiyah* movement\(^\text{194}\) approached Amien Rais in order to forge a coalition, when the political situation in Indonesia was in a state of “chaos”. Sembiring, the former President of PKS, (cited in Hisyam, 2012, p. 80) recalled that in order to unite Indonesian Islamic society (*ummat*), they asked Amien Rais as the representative of Muhammadiyah to forge a joint faction under one political roof, PPP, as they both shared the same political roots of Masyumi\(^\text{195}\). He rejected the offer as it would make him lose his reformist “neutral” image. Amien perceives his image and popularity as symbolic capital that represents public acknowledgement of his political achievement. However, Platzdasch (2009a, pp. 64-67) views Amien’s positioning as his way to distance himself from his former political affiliates\(^\text{196}\). In a Bourdieuan lens, Amien’s former social and cultural capital was perceived as inhibiting factors for him to realise his political ambition to be President. Amien Rais (cited in Stepan and Kunkler, 2007) affirms this by indirectly arguing that a differentiation marker between PAN and PKS (read also: DDII) lies in their stance towards the issue of *shariah* implementation. PAN does not see the need, let alone urgency, to implement *shariah*, as it endangers Indonesia’s pluralism. By this, Assyaukanie (2009, p. 98) argues that PAN (Amien Rais) endorses the RDS (Religious Democratic State) model which sees that the role of the state is to protect all religions. Rejecting secularism is seen as exigent, not by means of implementing *shariah* as it potentially imperils inter-religious harmony. Conversely, from the viewpoint of PKS’ objective of gradually implementing *shariah*, PKS is arguably seen as making a close association with Mohammad

\(^{194}\) Mietzner (2009b, p.273) elaborates that these activists represent not only PK, but also Masyumi-based parties such as PPP and defunct *Partai Bulan Bintang* (Crescent Star party).

\(^{195}\) Muhammadiyah dominated Masyumi (see chapter four).

\(^{196}\) Platzdasch (2009a, pp. 64-65) notes that Amien once declared himself and his fellow DDII’s associates as “Natsir-ists”. This indicates his personal political devotion and attachment to Natsir’s teachings, as he was DDII board member since 1993.
Natsir’s (Masyumi’s) IDS (Islamic Democratic State) model, instead of a theocratic Islamic state model, as it perceives that Islam is compatible with democracy, and that gradual indoctrination of shariah will make Indonesian people understand the essences of this Islamic law. However, in alignment with Assyaukanie’s view (2009, p. 188) of perceiving Yusri Ilha Mahendra’s, the chairperson of defunct PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang or Crescent Star Party), and Deliar Noer’s, a prominent political analyst, stance towards the gradual implementation of shariah in Indonesia becomes an indication of their closeness to the liberal Muslim intellectuals who support the model of Liberal Democratic State. Thus, not only does it affirm PKS’ position on the tenuous boundary of the ideological crossroads, but that also attest to the ideological differentiation of PAN and PKS.

Returning to Amien Rais’ image as a reformist “neutral” figure, this image was arguably tarnished by Amien’s own actions as the architect behind Megawati’s loss in the 1999 Presidential election, at the time people perceived Megawati as the symbol of resistance towards Soeharto’s regime (see PDI-P section) and Amien Rais as the motor of the Reform movement. Platzdasch (2009a, pp. 269-270) notes that Amien put his symbolic capital at stake when he agreed to join the Islamic coalition proposed by PPP politicians, Zarkasih Noer and Faisal Baasir, to impede Megawati’s path to the Presidency. Mietzner (2009b, pp. 260-261) notes that the initiation came as her party rejected a power-sharing scheme proposed by the Islamic faction and her potential coalition partner if she were to become the President. PDI-P’s rejection was due to the party’s confidence that they were able to dominate the Parliament as the party obtained 33.78 percent of votes in the 1999 election. Megawati’s party had to pay a heavy price for its pride as Amien Rais decided to confront Megawati’s camp by establishing a Central Axis group that could unite all Islamic Members of Parliament’s (MPs) voices. Her camp had to admit that they were outnumbered. Platzdasch (2009a, p. 50) argues that Zarkasih Noer and Faisal Baasir’s initiative to forge a joint coalition was proven to be an astute strategy that Megawati’s camp did not expect. Their preference for Amien Rais to Hamzah Haz, PPP’s former chairperson, as the figure that could unite and mobilise the Islamic MP voices was due to the fact that Amien Rais’ image was more saleable to the MPs. In contesting Megawati’s image, Amien followed the dominant perspective that questioned Megawati’s Islamic credentials and intellectual capacity. However, his political move reveals his duality. Being in the position as the one who mobilised Muslim MPs, Amien could no longer retain his neutral image, as

197 Assyaukanie (2009, p.188) notes that they both perceive that the application shariah is not necessarily in the form of Islamic legal framework per se as shariah can be translated into codes and its insertion to the national law will transform the codes into positive law.
198 As discussed in chapter five, the 1999 election employed similar electoral systems as in Soeharto’s era, where the legislative members elected the President. In this election, Amien succeeded in becoming the chairperson of People’s Consultative Assembly, although PAN merely obtained 7.1 percent of votes at the national level.
his actions demonstrated his pragmatic side. From the viewpoint of Islamic faction and Megawati’s Islamic nationalist opponents, this pragmatism was beneficial as it led to the group’s domination in the Parliament (and later the cabinet). By this, Amien should also be able to restore his image in front of his former Islamic allies – a thorny mission that seems to be irreconcilable.

On the other hand, the person who benefited from this contestation was Gus Dur of PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or Nation Awakening Party). Gus Dur was seen as the figure that could represent both factions as he was seen as an Islamic figure with nationalist inclination. Gus Dur’s ambiguity easily puts him in the position of penetrating both Islamic and nationalist factions. Mietzner (2009b, pp. 261-263) argues that Gus Dur had predicted and anticipated where the Central Axis’ scenario began and ended. Gus Dur’s stance towards Megawati was largely due to PKB’s modest number of votes in the election. However, when Megawati gave no commitment to Gus Dur as the reward for their coalition, Gus Dur sought alternatives and accepted the offer of the former chairperson of Muhammadiyah to him. At this stage, Amien Rais’ offer can arguably be perceived as a symbol of a truce that potentially ended Muhammadiyah and NU’s perennial disputes (see chapter five). However, Gus Dur had a different interpretation. He did not perceive the offer as a gift, let alone charity, from Muhammadiyah or other Islamic parties, which in return put him in political debt. As Mietzner (2009b, p. 262) notes, Gus Dur would rather perceive his success as a matter of being politically astute. By simply putting himself in the ideological crossroads of representing an Islamic party, PKB, whilst siding with Megawati’s nationalist party, and patiently waiting for the Islamic faction to take actions against Megawati’s vanity, Gus Dur perceived himself as deserving of the Presidency. This shaky Islamic coalition brought temporary benefit to the Islamic faction as Gus Dur’s “rainbow” cabinet (consisting of many parties) lasted briefly, as Gus Dur kept reshuffling his cabinet members. Gus Dur was then impeached on the basis of allegations of “financial misconduct” (Mietzner, 2009b, p. 265) known as Buloggate and Bruneigate (see chapter five).

The aftermath of Gus Dur’s impeachment revealed a possible indication that underlay the relationship (if not a covert conflict) between PAN and PK(S). PK requested Amien Rais not to nominate himself as the candidate for Megawati’s Vice President as it would exacerbate conflicts between NU and Muhammadiyah, which would potentially fragment the Islamic faction (Semiring as cited in Hisyam, 2012, p. 112). The choice then fell to PPP’s (former) chairperson, Hamzah Haz, whom Gus Dur discharged a month after Hamzah’s appointment in Gus Dur’s Cabinet. The choice of Hamzah who has a NU background, arguably succeeded in mitigating the indictment of Muhammadiyah’s (PAN) involvement in “sacking” NU’s former chairperson.
The 2004 Presidential election also reveals another indication of PAN and PKS' unstable relationship. Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 61) argue that not only did PKS pragmatist group's preference for supporting Wiranto in the 2004 Presidential election, which was largely based on the involvement of Wiranto's son-in-law as PKS' cadre, bring about internal conflict within PKS, but also tarnished the party's relationship with PAN. Mietzner (2009b, p. 277), however, perceives PKS' support for Wiranto as the way PKS (read: the pragmatist camp) repaid their debt to this "red and white" General in protecting KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia or United Action Front of Indonesian Students), an organisation established by tarbiyah movement activists in March 1998. Amien Rais (cited in Stepan and Kunkler's, 2007, p. 213) affirms this and perceives that PKS' abrupt declaration to support him that was enunciated in the silent week of the 2004 Presidential election was only a “half-hearted” one. Based on ICG’s (International Crisis Group) report in 2003, Mietzner (2009b, p. 273) argues that Amien Rais’ loss in the Presidential election was mainly due to the absence of the Islamic parties’ support for him as Amien had declined forming a Masyumi-like coalition under PPP’s roof with PBB and PK. In addition to this, his actions in impeding Megawati’s path to the Presidency in the 1999 election were seen as violating his own nationalist image.

Nonetheless, PAN retained its dual image in the 2009 elections. As the party merely obtained 6.01 percent of votes at the national level, the party decided to join PD’s coalition in supporting SBY and Boediono as SBY’s new running mate. This coalition is reinforced by the marriage of Hatta Rajasa’s (PAN’s current chairperson) daughter, Siti Ruby Aliya Rajasa, with SBY’s youngest son, Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono, PD’s Secretary General, on 24 November 2011. However, this can be seen as neither rectifying nor solidifying the party’s image for the marriage also signifies the strategy the party (read: Hatta Rajasa) deployed to stay in the mainstream of Indonesian polity.199

As a political branding in the 2009 election, PAN claimed that the party would be the locomotive of the “education for free” program and allocate 1.5 trillion rupiah from the national budget to help underdeveloped villages. Using 5 per cent celebrities out of a total of 672 legislative candidates, PAN aimed to reach 15 per cent of the national votes with the slogan “Hidup adalah Perbuatan” or “Life is Deed”, (Firmanzah, 2010, pp. 128-129, 242-244). However, approaching the 2014 election, PAN is deploying similar political branding strategy as the nationalist parties – thus fetishising its prominent figures. On its official website, PAN declares that one of the strategies they are deploying for the

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199 As for PD, this wedding ceremony was expected to divert public attention on numerous corruption scandals by some PD’s elites such as Muhammad Nazarudin, Angelina Sondakh. Edhie Baskoro and Anas Urbaningrum are also alleged to have involved in these scandals (see PD’s section).
2014 elections is to reinforce its image through its current chairperson. The following billboard exemplifies such a practice:

As the visual reading pattern starts from left to the right, Hatta Rajasa’s billboard seems to firstly accentuate the party’s logo as it is situated on the left hand corner below the slogan “berbakti untuk negeri, mengabdi tiada henti, terus bekerja untuk kemajuan bangsa” (devotion to the country, serve relentlessly, continue to work for the progress of the nation). Next to the logo is the word “merakyat” (literary means populist), written in the red ink to contrast with the slogan. Below “merakyat” is the phrase “menunaikan amanat rakyat” (fulfilling people’s mandate). If we read the word and the phrase as a continuation we will find a linguistic expression of “[Hatta Raja] is a populist figure who fulfils the people’s mandate”. An alternative interpretation in reading the word “merakyat” is to treat the word as the abbreviation of “me-rakyat” which is equal to “menunaikan amanat rakyat”. Hatta Rajasa’s smiling image appears in the right hand corner occupying one eighth of the billboard. Behind him is the country’s waving flag with the blue colour backdrop as the billboard’s background. Below Rajasa’s image is his full name along with his academic title (Dr stands for Doctor whereas Ir stands for Engineer) and his Islamic identity (H which stands for Haji or hajj). The letter “M” following the title “Hajj” most possibly stands for his full name Muhammad Hatta Rajasa, as many Indonesian Muslim people abbreviate their first name of Muhammad (following the

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200 He obtained the title Doctor as the De Nitra University in Slovakia rewarded him the title of Doctor Honoris Causa. An honourary degree, not a PhD.
name of Prophet Muhammad) simply as “M”. His position as the chairperson of PAN is written below his name.

The reinforcement of Hatta Rajasa’s image on this billboard is conveyed by presenting his image, along with his nationalist commitment to dedicate himself to serving the country and continuing to work for the nation’s progress. However, his pledge seems to speak for itself as there is no visual supporting evidence for his pledge, although he further defines himself and the party as populist (\textit{merakyat}) in fulfilling the people’s mandate. The lack of this authentic visual setting of place (Holt, 2004) on this linguistic-heavy-loaded billboard merely dilutes the intended message the party’s chairperson attempts to disseminate: he is a Muslim inclusive party leader that pledges to dedicate, serve, and work for the country’s development if he is elected in the 2014 Presidential election.

If we examine this billboard closely, we will find that Hatta’s billboard does not use any visual attributes to denote his Islamic identity. He merely employs a faint linguistic attribute “hajj” to connote his Islamic credentials. As earlier discussed, the title hajj has not only been exploited politically to connote a high degree of piety and social status but also been employed as a notion to signify religious political attachment. At this stage, the act of reinforcing PAN’s chairperson persona is largely reliant on demonstrating the nationalist side of the party’s chairperson. Hatta also reinforces this indirectly in his biography written on his personal website (http://hatta-rajasa.info/profile/biography/41).

By juxtaposing his first name, Hatta, with the name of one of the country’s founding fathers, Mohammad Hatta, in the opening paragraph of his biography, the party’s chairperson attempts to correlate his reputation with Mohammad Hatta’s. Furthermore, the employment of Soekarno’s image and political jargon in the opening scene of Hatta’s advertisement video entitled “Kemerdekaan Pejuang Masa Kini 2012” (Freedom of Today’s Warriors 2012), which can be found on PAN’s official website, solidifies such an endeavour. In short, like PKS, PAN accentuates its nationalist characteristics as its political commodity, whilst ostensibly diluting its religious image.

\textbf{Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) or United Development Party}

As noted in chapter five, the establishment of PPP was due to the enactment of Soeharto’s coercive policy (Law no 3/1975) to fuse political parties based on their ideological orientation. PPP was officially established on 5 January 1973 with Islam as its ideology. However, Soeharto’s coercive

\footnotesize{201 See Biografi (Biography). [n.d]. retrieved from http://hatta-rajasa.info/profile/biography/41
decree that obliged all political parties to incorporate Pancasila as the sole ideology (asas tunggal), made PPP alter its ideology from Islam to Pancasila. It produced political anxiety, especially at the elite level (Haris, 1991; Mandan, 2009). In the post-Soeharto era, PPP decided to return to Islam in order to capture its traditionalist voters and to regain their trust. PPP is also perceived as a non-Javanese Party (Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata, 2004, pp. 367-368), although this party has a close bond with Javanese-based traditionalist Islamic organisation, NU. With these characteristics, the discussion of PPP’s political branding follows the critical junctures in the background of the party’s establishment, the party’s position in Soeharto’s era and its re-branding in the Reform era.

As mentioned, PPP’s establishment stems from the Soeharto’s government scheme to simplify the political system by requiring all parties, including the Islamic one, to merge. PPP was then established as the fusion of the Islamic parties in Soekarno’s era (Parmusi, PSII, Perti and NU). In alignment with the contestation of the modernist versus traditionalist groups inside the now defunct Masyumi (see chapter five), these four parties, which once were parts of Masyumi, also represent this contestation. NU represents the traditionalist group whilst the three other parties represent the modernist ones, as they, especially Parmusi, have a close connection with Muhammadiyah. As Soeharto required that these adversarial parties fuse, the fusion merely reinforced the fragmentation inside the Islamic faction. In short, not only does PPP become the symbol of the state repression towards Islamic faction, but it also represents the shaky relationship between these parties.

The coercion stemmed from the government’s perception of Islam as a political threat, especially after Masyumi’s mutiny against Soekarno’s regime. Moreover, the multiparty system Soekarno inherited was also seen as a threat to political stability. Thus, in response to the provision number XXII/1966 issued by Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) regarding the restructuring of the political system in Indonesia, Soeharto’s government drafted a Bill requiring simplification of political parties. Under this compulsion, the Islamic parties decided to fuse themselves despite their reluctance to merge. Hakim (1993, pp. 48-50) notes that the voices of dissent came from both traditionalist and modernist camps. As NU gained 58 Parliamentary seats, which made this party the second largest party after Golkar in the 1971 election, NU’s elites perceived the Bill as representing Soeharto’s actions in emasculating NU’s strength. Thus by merging itself with other Islamic parties, they perceived that these actions merely marginalised NU’s position in the political arena. Similar voices of dissent also came from Parmusi, PSII and Perti. At first, PSII and Perti refused to obey the

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203 Parmusi’s prominent figure, Mintaredja, was known as Muhammadiyah’s activist.
requirement. However, when Soeharto succeeded in placing Anwar Tjokroaminoto as the chairperson of PSII, both PSII and Perti were co-opted onto the fusion. On the other hand, in response to the fusion, Muhammadiyah officially declared its political dissociation from Parmusi, as the party merged with its rival, NU. These four Islamic parties finally agreed to fuse themselves under one political umbrella, named PPP. Hakim (1993, p. 52) argues that the name of the party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party), was chosen not to directly signify the party’s Islamic nature, but more to represent the unification of the Islamic parties. They managed to consolidate and produced the party’s statutes, programs and organisational structure.

Notwithstanding its success, PPP’s internal consolidation did not efface the traditionalist and modernist camps’ rift. Platzdasch (2009a, p. 48) argues that the existence of “double executive” (Central Board and President plus two Advisory Boards) implicates the internal friction between modernist (Parmusi) and traditionalist camps (NU). Although Hakim (1993, p. 50) found that NU elites dominated the Executive and Council Boards, Platzdasch further notes that since the time of its establishment up to 1998, NU cadres had never occupied the seat of PPP’s chairmanship. With this internal conflict, PPP hardly produces the political agenda that completely represent the Islamic parties’ solidity. For instance, the government’s coercive decree on “asas tunggal” (sole ideology) in 1983-1985 to all parties was perceived differently by traditionalist and modernist camps. Assyaukanie (2009, pp. 104-106) and Hefner (2000, p. 167) note that NU is the first organisation that accepted the state ideology, as it perceives that Pancasila is not contradictory to Islam for they both share similar moderate notions and are seen as complementing each other. This acceptance is important in defining NU’s political position, as Hefner (2000, p. 89) argues, that not only does this represent NU’s support for Pancasila pluralism but also shows NU’s “empirical reconceptualisation of Muslim politics”. On the other hand, compared to NU’s political astuteness in quickly reconceptualising its notion of Islamic moderation in responding to Pancasila pluralism, Muhammadiyah firstly showed its intransigent stance. However, as Assyaukanie (2009, p. 107) notes, Soeharto’s attendance at Muhammadiyah’s Surakarta congress in December 1985 marked a shifting perspective in the organisation, especially when Muhammadiyah eventually perceived Pancasila as the “best model of polity”, as it does not lead to de-Islamisation. With these discrepant reactions from the modernist and traditionalist camps inside PPP, the party positions itself in ambiguity. Radi (1984, pp. 151-152) found PPP’s ambiguous stance in responding to the People’s Consultative Assembly’s (MPR) provision number II/MPR/1978 regarding Pancasila’s five principles (Eka Prasetya Pancakarsa/Pedoman Penghayatan Pengamalan Pancasila (P4) or Guidance for Understanding and Practising Pancasila) as the sole guideline to interpret the state ideology. PPP’s
1984 statutes declared the party’s support of Pancasila’s indoctrination through P4 programs. However, in practice, PPP’s elites opposed the attempt. Hakim (1993, pp. 69, 76) notes that they (NU-affiliated elites) decided to walk out of the parliamentary meeting during the MPR Special Session in 1978 discussing P4, whilst the Parmusi and PSII-affiliated elites chose to stay in the chamber. This means that the PPP’s elites not only contradicted the party’s ideological blueprint as the representation of their internal consensus, but also signified ideational and behavioural inconsistency in practising the party’s political agenda.

However, Platzdasch (2009a, p. 47) argues that the aim of Soeharto’s ideological coercion was to suppress any formal political expression in relation to shariah implementation. This made PPP, as a single Islamic party at that time, mask its Islamic identity under Pancasila. Platzdasch (2009a, p. 47) found that the masking had been conducted in two ways: firstly, by combining Pancasila and Islam as the party’s ideology in 1973; secondly, by placing Islam as a mere attribute to Pancasila in 1979. Su’aidi (1999, p. 80) calls this stage the situation where in the party was caught up in a “double” ideological basis. In 1984, PPP had to alter its party’s logo from ka’bah to star, as the image of ka’bah was perceived as connoting Islamic-heavy-laden visual expression that Soeharto’s government repressed. As discussed in chapter five, although this visual coercion represents the political emasculation of PPP, the choice of a star impotently maintained the party’s branding of its cardinal religious characteristic.

In the Reform era, PPP decided to re-brand itself by returning to the use of ka’bah as its logo. In Islamic discourse, ka’bah is perceived not only as a sacred square monument at the Haram mosque of Mecca but more importantly also as the direction towards which Muslims face during prayers as it represents the “House” of Allah. By using this sacred religious symbol, PPP equates itself as the representation of the Islamic “house” for all the Islamic parties. This means that PPP attempts to resuscitate its former image as the political umbrella that represents the romantic past of Islamic parties’ unification. Hamzah Haz, PPP’s former chairperson (1998-2007), as cited in Platzdasch (2009a, p. 136), argues that the party’s image resuscitation does not necessarily turn PPP into a sectarian party as the party’s inclusive characteristic is maintained. However, such a rhetorical statement has never received a response from non-Muslims, as Platzdasch further notes, that in the last fifteen years non Muslims have never become members of PPP.

Returning to the image construction of PPP as the “house” of all Islamic parties, Suryadharma Ali, PPP’s current chairperson, (as cited by Setiawan, 2012), states that this “house” welcomes all Islamic
parties, except for PAN and PKS. Surydharma Ali further perceives PAN and PKS not as Islamic parties. This act of alienating PAN and PKS can be seen as twofold: ideologically and pragmatically. Ideologically, the alienation stems from PPP’s perception of seeing PKS’ Islamic doctrine as different from the mainstream Islamic strands in Indonesia. Platzdasch (2009a, p. 180) affirms this by arguing that PKS’ strong attachment to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood differentiates PKS from PPP’s Indonesian Islamic strands, which are dominated by NU and Muhammadiyah. However, as the trace of Muhammadiyah can also be found in PAN, PPP’s actions towards PAN possibly stems from Amien Rais’ rejection of joining and leading PPP in 1998. Furthermore, the different political stances of these three parties vis-a-vis shariah arguably contribute to this (covert) contention. When PPP positions itself as “a firm shariah defender” (adopting Platzdasch’s term, 2009a, p. 183), both PAN and PKS do not support this. Instead, they perceive PPP’s stance as unrealistic. As discussed earlier, PAN and PKS position themselves in a pragmatic mode. PAN rejects the idea of implementing shariah in Indonesia as it will endanger Indonesian pluralism, whilst PKS holds a different perspective that shariah should be implemented gradually. PKS also rejects being positioned as upholding the idea of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia as the party (formerly) supported the idea of adopting the Madinah Charter in Indonesia (Assyaukanie, 2009, p. 194).

Although PPP claimed to defend the Jakarta Charter and wanted to implement shariah programs as its main political commodity, the party did not completely concentrate its campaign on Islamic issues. Accenting the economic, education and health issues such as reinforcing the “Usaha Mikro, Kecil dan Menengah” (UMKM) program or Micro, Small, and Middle Scale Enterprises, “education and public health services for free” program, PPP expected that these programs would be saleable (not only for Muslim voters), beside its continuous fight for the draft of Halal Assurance Law, Custom and Tradition Law, and Islamic banking. The slogan “Bangkit Bersama Untuk Perubahan” or “Together Revive to Make a Change” wraps up the campaign (Firmanzah, 2010, pp. 244-245).

204 The party wants to insert the Jakarta Charter’s seven famous words “with the obligation to live according to Islamic law for the Muslims” in the amendments of the 1945 Constitution.
205 Prophet Muhammad employed the Charter as a constitution that guarantees religious pluralism in Madinah, Saudi Arabia. The reference to Islam, let alone the Quran and Hadith, was absent, as the Charter contains the right and freedom of the citizens to maintain their religious personal belief with an absolute obligation to defend the country from the outside intruders (Assyaukanie, 2009, pp. 164-165).
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) or Nation Awakening Party

Founded in July 1998, PKB cannot detach itself from Gus Dur’s figure as one of its founding fathers. It claims to be inclusive, pluralist, humanist, religious, nationalist, and non-sectarian. Since PKB received tremendous Islamic support from NU, the largest Muslim organisation mainly in Java, PKB is seen as the representative of the Islamic Javanese party, notwithstanding the fact that the party adheres to Pancasila (Ananta, Arifin, Suryadinata, 2004, pp. 6-8). This inclusive characteristic is arguably influenced by Gus Dur’s image as a “humanist, liberal and moderate” Muslim politician (Marks, 2010), who once governed the country with his “managerial inadequacies” (Barton, 2001, p. 275). Thus, the discussion of PKB’s branding primarily focuses on the image of its founding father, especially in relation to his conception of Pancasila pluralism. It can also be argued that Gus Dur used PKB as his electoral machine to reach the Presidency.

Gus Dur’s ideals of pluralism echoed widely, especially when NU officially accepted Pancasila as its sole ideology. For NU (Gus Dur) Pancasila is not a matter of ideology that unites Indonesian plurality as it accommodates the cultivation of religious tolerance, democracy, egalitarianism, and human rights. Bush (2002, pp. 119-160) found that when NU decided to withdraw from PPP in 1984 under a movement called “kembali ke khittah 1926”, this marked a political reconciliation with Soeharto’s regime. Soeharto perceived that NU’s attempts to develop civil society discourse by promoting pesantren-based community development programs emasculated the organisation’s resistance towards his government. NU’s official declaration of adopting Pancasila as its ideology reinforces the organisation’s attempt. Hefner (2000, p. 168) argues that Gus Dur’s appointment as a delegate from Golkar in the parliamentary session signifies Soeharto’s warm response to NU’s maneuver. This marked a honeymoon period between NU and Soeharto’s government. However, Bush (2002, p. 143) argues that the decision of declaring its adoption of the state ideology is not without political “profiteering”. She further found that NU’s decade long oppositional stance


207 Gus Dur headed the organisation in 1984-1998.

208 Roughly speaking, the word “kembali” (return) indicates a political retreat in which NU returned to its former form a socio-religious mass organisation, embracing its 1926 guidelines.

209 Literally means Islamic boarding school. Mun’im (2010, p. 62) found that one of Soeharto’s maneuvers in controlling pesantren is conducted by the standardising its curriculum, 70 per cent general subjects while 30 per cent the religious ones. However Hikam (as cited by Bush, 2002, pp. 173-174) argues that albeit the government’s intervention, pesantren as a social institution becomes the embryo of Indonesian civil society.

210 The period ended in 1990s as Soeharto approached NU’s counterpart, Muhammadiyah elites, in order to establish ICMI. Gus Dur then called ICMI as a sectarian organisation (Hefner, 2000).
towards the government had made NU suffer politically and economically. Thus, this political move is intended to gain political and economic capital.

Aside from NU’s reconciliation with the government, Bush (2002, pp. 168-169) also found the employment of the civil society notion in NU’s discourse indirectly signifies an attempt to reinforce its different stance from Muhammadiyah or the tarbiyah movement, for instance, in perceiving Indonesian civil society. The modernist camp often uses the phrase “masyarakat madani” to connote this civility. However, as the word “madani” has a close reference to the society bound by the Madinah Charter (see PPP’s section, fn. 207), this, in NU’s perspective, shows the modernist camp’s attempt at paralleling Indonesian civility with Madinah civility. The modernist camp conceives civil society and government as two inseparable entities, while NU perceives civil society as having “critical autonomy” over the government (Bush, 2002, p. 171). Bush further found that behind their different angles in developing the discourse, both camps share a similar ideal that their efforts in promoting civil society should be based on “fostering values of tolerance and pluralism”. This act of fostering is expanded into supervising acts towards the government.

As the acts of supervision need a formal political institution, NU cadres then felt the need to establish a party that could accommodate their political aspirations. With NU’s clerics blessing, PKB was established and Gus Dur became the first chairperson. Gus Dur’s image as a pluralist figure was maintained and adopted as the party’s prime characteristic. This can overtly be seen in PKB’s document entitled Mabda Siyasy (ideological principles), in which words that represent Islamic orientation such as “Allah” are absent. Instead, the party uses a neutral expression of “God Almighty One” to indicate its religious stance which resonates with Pancasila’s first principle. However, this does not mean that the Islamic nuance is completely missing. The (Arabic) Islamic expressions such as the Islamic legal maxim (amar ma’ruf nahi munkar or enjoining good and prohibiting evil), religious bond (ukhuwah diniyah), national bond (ukhuwah wathoniyah), and humanistic bond (ukhwuah insaniyah) are present as connoting the party’s religious identity. However, as these expressions are used in a non-religious political context, this document arguably represents the party’s neutrality. The absence of Islamic unifying phrase such as “ukhuwah Islamiyah” (Islamic bond) in the document also reinforces the construction of neutrality.

This branding strategy is also used by PKB’s Muhammadiyah-affiliated rival, PAN. However, as Assayukanie (2009, p. 143) argues, the elemental difference between Amien Rais’ notion of religious tolerance and pluralism vis-à-vis the state with Gus Dur’s lies in the issue of the “religion-state
relationship”. Amien inclines to support the view that the role of the government is to protect all religions, whilst Gus Dur perceives that the state should be segregated from religions as it potentially interferes in religious matters which belong to the private domain. In other words, following Nur Cholish Madjid, a prominent Indonesian liberal Muslim activist, people should be able to distinguish “what is essentially religious and what is not” (Ass yaukanie, 2009, p. 147). With this disposition, during his tenure as a President, Gus Dur was noted as making several contentious yet inclusive political moves. For instance, Gus Dur’s attempt to establish diplomatic relations with Israel attracted widespread criticism, especially from his Muslim counterparts such as PKS211 (Damanik, 2002, p. 297). His policy in giving the same opportunity for the Acehnese (as the East Timorese) to hold a referendum in order to end human rights abuses by the Military also attracted severe criticism, especially from the Military camp. However, his acknowledgement of Confucianism as one of the state’s official religions and his endorsement of Indonesian Chinese to celebrate Chinese New Year helped to reinforce his pluralist inclusive image. Siboro (2004) also notes that Gus Dur used this image to attract Indonesian minority groups to vote for PKB during PKB’s 2004 campaign. He brought with him PKB’s legislative candidates, such as A.B. Susanto, a Catholic Chinese Indonesian and a Catholic Maj. Gen. (ret) Ferry Tinggogoy as proof that PKB represents a secular nationalist party, despite the party’s affiliation with Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation.

However, this image-building needs to be re-dissected. Despite the fact that PKB is greatly influenced by Gus Dur who promoted the secular-exclusive view, he did not dissolve the Ministry of Religion in his administration (1999 – 2001), as many NU elites occupied the strategic positions in it. PKB did oppose the formal adoption of shari’ah but still inclined to an Islamic agenda such as the Basic Law of Religious Justice in 1989 (Law no. 7) and the Compilation of Islamic Law in 1991 (Presidential Instruction no. 1). Along with Golkar, PAN, and PKS, PKB also endorsed the National Education System Law no. 20, 2003 that required that religion be taught as a course at school according to the student’s religion.212 Thus, it can be argued that positioning PKB (Gus Dur) means positioning their pragmatic political actions.

PKB’s pragmatic actions no longer have tremendous leverage at the national level as in Gus Dur’s era. Prior to the 2009 Election, PKB was busy tackling internal conflict. Gus Dur decided to withdraw and leave PKB to his nephew, Muhaimin Iskandar. Firmanzah (2010, p. 246) contends that the

211 U.S former ambassador, Paul Wolfowitz (2010) notes, that Gus Dur almost became the adherent of Said Qutb and Hasan al Banna school of thought, the founders of PKS-affiliated organisation in Egypt, as he was attracted to their writings. However, his encounter with Aristotle’s writing, Nichomachean Ethics, changed his view about humanism.

conflict between Gus Dur’s rival camp, Hasyim Muzadi and Gus Dur’s allied camp, Muhamim
Iskandar, triggered the decline in PKB’s votes to 50 per cent in the 2009 legislative election despite
its simplistic, obscure political programs such as “easy and comfortable access to public services”
and “prospering the people” programs. The slogan “Membela yang Benar” or “Defending the Right
One” indirectly claims that Muhamim’s camp is the right one.

Political Branding Comparison between the Nationalist and Islamic Parties
As the state ideology, not only does Pancasila function as the ideological umbrella that guards and
protects Indonesian plurality, but it also allows the synthesis and contestation of the nationalist and
Islamic strands through the framework of Pancasila’s socio-nationalism. Soekarno coined and
propogated this nationalism which contains Indonesia’s unitary principle, i.e. gotong royong (mutual
assistance) as the essence to achieve the nation’s harmony (kerukunan). Within this framework,
Pancasila is thus perceived as a set of open-ended principles that accommodate the cultivation of
(religious) ideological tolerance. This tolerance resides in the form of a willingness to accept
differences, especially in Pancasila’s family principle and collectivism underscoring it. As discussed,
these principles are substantially influenced by the disposition of Pancasila’s founding fathers (read:
the (Javanese) paternalistic culture). Fetishising the prominent figures, thus, becomes a norm as the
leaders are mostly positioned as patrons. By this, the Indonesian political arena becomes the site
where the fame of the patron’s image is sanctioned as the instrumental basis of the party’s
branding.

The deployment of this branding strategy between the nationalist and Islamic factions is not
completely different in manner. Compared to the Islamic faction, the level of nationalist camp’s
fetishising their key figures is arguably higher than the Islamic one. This is most probably due to the
clientelism (Pancasila’s) paternalistic principles entail, which makes the branding of these parties’
key figures favourable. This fetishising becomes a common normative form in their politics of image.
For instance, the practices of clientelism during Soeharto’s administration made his electoral
machine, Golkar, deeply interlocked in the gusti-kawula pattern. However, this does not mean that
Golkar would vitiate due to Soeharto’s downfall since Golkar relished the political privilege during
Soeharto’s tenure, which means this party has a more solid institutional base compared to other
parties. Golkar still maintains this patronage system by invariably depending on its chairperson’s
figure. These figures present themselves in dual image construction – nationalist and Islamic – for in
Pancasila discourse such construction is permissible. Golkar’s claimed ideological position as stated
on their statutes and platforms (the nationalist one) does not impede their figures to be in the
tenuous boundary of ideological crossroads in representing their public image. Golkar does not need to explicitly state that Islam is an identifying attribute of its ideology (Pancasila), as Pancasila opens itself to ambiguity. In short, the flexibility in the image construction is practicable as Pancasila allows such praxis.

Gerinda and Hanura seem to adopt this pattern as they both represent the electoral vehicles of Golkar’s former elites. A faint difference can be perceived from their actions in forming a coalition with other parties that arguably share similar political platforms. For instance, Gerinda and PDI-P coalition becomes a differentiation marker that distinguishes themselves from Golkar, Hanura and PD. Not only does their coalition indicate that they plausibly construct and attach themselves to a similar nationalist image that heavily orients to Soekarno’s socio-nationalist conception, but that also signifies that Gerinda’s inclination towards PDI(-P), Soeharto’s Golkar “old” opponent, arguably reflects a degree of resistance as Gerindra’s central figure, Prabowo, was sacked by Golkar’s former elite, Wiranto, at the demise of Soeharto’s regime.

However, Gerindo’s inclination does not indicate the same degree of political attachment to Soekarno as PDI-P. PDI-P’s attachment represents more a political perpetuation of Soekarno’s dynasty than a mere ideological attachment to Soekarno’s teachings. Megawati’s image-building is constructed by reinforcing that a strong ideological attachment needs a living descendant to solidify that the party’s adoption of Soekarno’s teaching comes, in fact, directly from Soekarno’s eldest daughter. With this tie, PDI-P claims itself as the (sole) party that truly represents Soekarno’s ideals of wong cilik.

Similar ideals are seemed to be also employed by Hanura (read: Wiranto). The branding of this party’s patron circulates not only around his populist image, especially when he ate wong cilik’s staple food, nasi aking (see chapter seven), that represents his compassionate side for the wong cilik, but more importantly also the inculcation of his image as a retired General who successfully maintained security order during 1998’s political chaos. His decision not to accept Soeharto’s “unconstitutional offer” of power transfer to him instead of his Vice President, Habibie, became the highlight of his image-building, as it represents a “politically-correct” decision. This, however, contradicts his image as the former Army’s Commander-in-chief who was perceived as responsible for the massacre of East Timorese during its referendum. Wiranto’s populist and “politically-correct” images are reinforced by his attempt at demonstrating emotive associations through pledges as
represented on his billboard. However, Golkar’s fragmented support for Wiranto, as the party’s Presidential candidate, made this General establish his own party, Hanura.

As for PD, this party appears to adopt a similar branding strategy as Golkar, Hanura, Gerindra, and PDI-P, especially in the form of fetishising its key figure. The process starts from PD’s reliance on its patron, SBY. Using the organisational structure (which is centered on SBY) as the medium to cement PD’s institutional dependency on its central figure connotes the party’s vulnerability (if not fallibility). The branding then continues, reinforcing SBY’s image as a moderate figure who presents himself as a nationalist Muslim retired General with a strong Javanese background. Representing Islamic and Nationalist factions as well as showing his military side with Javanese civility, SBY succeeds in representing an all-inclusive image package as the form of his politics of image.

In a Bourdieuan lens, not merely does this fetishism connote the positioning of the key figures’ image as an asset to gain public acknowledgement (symbolic capital), but it also indicates a contestation of the figures’ images that leads to a capital transaction. For instance, when NU under Gus Dur’s leadership decided to adopt Pancasila, this was arguably perceived as a way in which the organisation transacted by way of adopting the ideology whilst gaining economic and political capital from Soeharto’s government. At the same time, this action indicates that this ideological adoption reflects not only the process of ideological reification but also the commodification of Pancasila. Thus, NU’s appreciable symbolic capital was transacted with the economic and political capital the organisation lacked.

This also demonstrates that the ossification of the parties’ ideological position, as stated on their statutes and platforms, cannot be seen as an indication of the parties’ inflexibility in positioning themselves in the ideological crossroads. Their ideational and behavioural practices demonstrate that these maneuverings indicate not the ideological transposition, but rather political ambiguity as well as ambivalence, for in Pancasila discourse such praxis is permissible. For instance, PPP and PKS, as the parties that officially declare Islam as their ideology, cannot consistently stick to represent themselves as Islamic exclusive parties. Not only does this exclusivity merely ossify their identity construction that impedes the expansion of constituency, but that also it constrains them to be in the tenuous boundary of the ideological crossroads. Thus, by also claiming that their political practices are characterised by Pancasila’s pluralist and inclusive principles, the attempt in expanding their constituency can be perceived as largely based not on the ideological challenge (if not contestation), but more on the political expediency.
In order not to be trapped in a position as exclusive Islamic parties, PKB and PAN’s political branding are constructed by way of encapsulating their inclusive religious nationalist image. However, as PKB and PAN affiliate with NU and Muhammadiyah respectively, this alliance reveals that the branding of these two inclusive (Islamic) parties are not simply directed to support political aspiration of their members or to expand the number of their constituents. These two main goals do not represent political ends of NU and Muhammadiyah (PKB and PAN), as history records that political amalgam between these two Islamic largest organisations in Indonesia in one political roof, PPP, merely reinforces the contestation of traditionalist versus modernist camps inside the Islamic faction. Similar inclusive pluralist branding used by PKB and PAN are deployed not only to compete for the share of the “cake of political power”, but also arguably to demonstrate which is gaining more public acknowledgement (symbolic capital) \( \text{vis-a-vis} \) the plausibly indissoluble ideological rivalry (traditionalist versus modernist Islam) of the organisations they affiliate with.

Thus, to conclude, in a Gramscian lens, the Indonesian political arena demonstrates that in order to attain the hegemonic position, a fluid dynamic coalition needs to be forged based on the marriage of convenience. This marriage reflects a system of alliance which is deployed not simply to capture and expand the constituencies or demonstrate political appeals to attract the constituencies. Rather, this system demonstrates that the nature of political and religious characteristics in Pancasila-based nation-state permits the act of shifting to middle ground in order to secure consent which reflects a collective (political) will, or “hegemony” in Gramscian term. Within this framework, not only do the party leaders’ billboards represent the image of their personalities and/or moral ideals that signify subjective conception of their political disposition, but that, the billboards also potentially fall into reflecting mere rhetorical statements, which ostensibly represent the leaders’ inclination towards the middle ground.
PART IV

READING THE NARRATIVES OF THE CANDIDATES’ BILLBOARDS

Introduction

Part IV discusses the reading of political branding of the legislative candidates in the 2009 legislative election as reflected on their billboards. This reading demonstrates that not only do the billboards represent the image construction of the candidates, but also shows that the candidates cannot dissociate themselves from the ideological ambiguity prevalent in Pancasila discourse. As discussed in chapters four, five, seven and eight, this dissociation is arguably due to the fluid and dynamic situation in Indonesian politics that demonstrates religious political alliances and that renders the fluidity of ideational and behavioural practices of the parties. In this light, these reading practices will concentrate on examining the ways the candidates construct their images that signify their ideological orientations towards the Islamic and Nationalist strands.

The descriptive analytical account discussed in Parts II and III cannot be merely treated as supplementary archival documents that elucidate and/or control the reading of the candidates’ billboards (or in Barthesian term “anchorage”), but are more importantly a text that represents the nature of the cultural/political practices of “represented participants”213 (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1990, 2006) on the billboards. This descriptive account can stand by its own as it demonstrates the complexity of ideological contestation and synthesis in the Indonesian political arena. However, although this can be treated as an ostensible separate case study that is closely connected to the billboards, this separation cannot be perceived as denoting the absence of the inter-dependence of the texts. These reading practices require an intertextual reading as the texts and images intimately engage in the same frame of reference of cultural/political practices. In this sense, O’Toole (2011, pp. 3, 5, 23, 121) argues that although treating the reading practices of the billboards as an independent entity suggests our dependence on our eyes to work for the reading, this “extra-textual knowledge” (the descriptive analytical account) provides us with a “con-text”, which functions as the “pre-text” prior to our reading of the billboards, in order to produce the “post-text”. This, as Kress and van Leeuwen further (2006) argue, would keep the totality of the billboard’s “coherence” intact.

213 Kress and van Leeuwen (1990, 2006) argue that productive and receptive communication activities (speaking, writing, reading and listening), without exception, involve two related participants: interactive and represented participants. The former denotes a direct interactive relation between the interlocutors (the writer and the reader, the TV anchor and the viewers, etc.), whereas the latter denotes an indirect relation as the participants become the topic of the discussion in the interaction.
However, this textual coherence does not circumscribe the possibility of conducting discrete analysis of, for instance, the visual text and later moves to the verbal text. Such analysis, argues O’Toole (2011), is permissible as the visual text itself is a self-contained grammatical text. M.A.K Halliday (1978, p. 192) contends that grammar does not signify codes of communication; it, rather, represents the “resource of making meanings”. Hodge and Kress (1988), Kress and van Leeuwen (1990, 2006), van Leeuwen (2005), and O’Toole (2011) tailor Barthesian semiotics and Halliday’s systemic functional grammar into social semiotics. Not only does this mode of analysis address the visual and verbal texts, but, more importantly, it also demonstrates the complexity behind and inside the story lines of the billboards. This does not mean that the sole employment of Barthesian semiotics or Hallidayian functional linguistics “impotently” demonstrate the complexity. This theoretical combination shows that not only does the code of the language the candidates use in constructing their public image on the billboards connect with the social situation the billboards foreground, but also demonstrates that the grammar of the visual text is congruent with the verbal one. The interplay of the visual and verbal texts on the billboard will also demonstrate the inadequacy of visual and linguistic capital.

I adopt Kress and van Leeuwen’s (1990, 2006) and O’Toole’s (2011) analytical procedure in examining the language of the candidates’ billboards as street-level museum artefacts (Gudis, 2004). Adopting Hallidayean metafunctions (see chapter three), O’Toole (2011) suggests that the practices of looking at the billboards deals with these three metafunctions, i.e. representational (ideational), modal (interpersonal) and compositional (textual) functions. Kress and van Leeuwen (1990, 2006) and O’Toole (2011) assert that the realisation of these metafunctions on the billboards can be seen from the symmetrical arrangement of the represented participants on the billboards (ideational), i.e. the narrative themes, facial expression, gestures, actions, clothing; the gaze of the represented participants, the framing, the light, the scale (interpersonal); colour relationship and pictorial space (textual).

Within this framework, Part IV is organised into two main chapters. The first one discusses the reading the candidates’ billboards from nationalist faction whilst the second one considers the Islamic faction. The reading comparison of the nationalist and Islamic factions will be incorporated in the second chapter. The analysis of each billboard\textsuperscript{214} will encompass these three metafunctions. However, as these metafunctions are dependent on each other, the analysis is conducted not by segregating the ideational, interpersonal and textual elements as separate classificatory or independent entities, but by directly connecting them into one single framework as they all appear...

\textsuperscript{214} Two billboards are used to represent each party.
at both the denotative and connotative levels of reading practices. Synthesising these elements into one reading reinforces the significance of the billboards’ own right to refer visually to the discursive practices in the political world, or in Mirzoeff’s (2002, pp. 3-8) terms, the billboards act as “the metaphor of verbalizing the enormity of what had happened”.

The last section of the second chapter in this part will compare and contrast the branding pattern of the nationalist and Islamic parties. I argue that this will show that the same register variables of the visual and verbal texts in the billboard genre do not simply signify that the interplay of the represented participants (tenor) in the language played (mode) demonstrates the same social/visual actions take place (field) although they plausibly connote similar political branding objectives. This is due to the ideological ambiguity prevalent in Pancasila discourse that enables the candidates to construct their image in conjunction with the parties’ identity. At the same time this also liberates them to construct a flexible image frame, for instance, deploying religious attributes in their nationalist image construction or vice versa.

However, as noted in Part I, prior to conducting the analysis, we need to be aware of the fact that the candidates do not have sufficient experience in presenting themselves directly to the public. This is due to the election laws prior to the current ones (especially the amendment of law no. 10/2008 article 214) that merely allowed the parties to campaign. These constraints on publicity imply a poor level of public recognisibility for the candidates, especially the new ones. In order to gain recognisibility (if not yet popularity), most of the candidates concentrate on presenting a close-up or medium shot profile pictures of themselves on their billboards. Thus, this plausibly makes checking the visual elements become the first priority in the discussion. However, the focus on the visual text does not necessarily imply that the verbal elements cannot dominate the billboards. This mode shows that not only does the candidate rely more on the linguistic aspects, but also signifies the candidate’s disposition in choosing to accentuate these aspects as the medium in defining her/his identity.
Chapter Nine

Reading the Candidates’ Billboards of the Nationalist Parties

This chapter discusses the reading of the candidates’ billboards’ narratives from the nationalist parties. It aims to examine the scope the candidates’ billboards express their political (nationalist/Islamic) dispositions. This reading will demonstrate textually how the candidates from the nationalist faction position themselves in the ideological polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands on their billboards. This is conducted by tracing the signifying practices of the visual and verbal attributes of their billboards.

This chapter is organised into five main sections based on the five nationalist parties. Each section is divided into two sub-sections. I will compare and contrast the image construction of the legislative candidates of the same party at the end of each sub-section. This is conducted by concentrating on the dominant visual/verbal elements of the billboards.

Partai Demokrat (PD) or Democratic Party

Munadi Herlambang’s Billboard

Examining Munadi Herlambang’s billboard for its metafunctions (ideational, interpersonal and compositional functions), we need to divide this billboard into three vertical frames. These frames represent the visual “modality” Herlambang uses in order to engage the spectators in looking at his billboard, such as the image of SBY, the national flag, the way Herlambang smiles to the camera, and the party’s official blue colour. SBY’s image as the party’s central figure, who frames the

215 Kress and van Leeuwen (2006, pp. 155-156) defines visual modality as textual cues in form of motivated (not arbitrary) signs. These cues determine the credibility and reliability of what is inside the text.
narrative line of Herlambang’s nationalist image, occupies the first frame. The second frame is filled with the verbal text starting from Herlambang’s slogan, a declarative statement which illustrates the way he promotes himself (*muda* (young), *objektif* (objective), *tampa prasangka* (without prejudice)) and most importantly the procedural text that denotes the ways to vote for him. The third frame captures his smiling image.

From the left hand side of the billboard, SBY emerges as the person who lifts his right hand as if to give instructions. Not only does this connote Herlambang’s visual tactic in deploying SBY to project his image (see chapter seven), but it also shows how this party’s paternalistic figure frames Herlambang’s nationalist image by way of showing himself as an authoritative figure as the lifting hand can be perceived as connoting an authoritative, militaristic style. At the same time, this hand can also be perceived as the vector that builds the interpersonal relation between the billboard and the spectator as it metaphorically “hails” the spectators to read Herlambang’s voting procedures. At this stage, not only is this lifting hand needed so that it resonates with the procedural verbal text of the billboard, but it also shows Herlambang’s disposition in constructing his image by way of affirming the authoritative quality of SBY. However, the degree of his authoritative militaristic style is challenged by his own image construction as soft Javanese militaristic leader. This conveys multi-accentuality (Volosinov in Hartley, *et al.*, 2002, pp. 150-151) as the image of SBY’s lifting hand represents an inversion of militarism, especially when it collides with SBY’s soft power image (see chapter seven). In other words, this hand represents a site of struggle between this retired General’s militaristic firmness and rigidity on the one hand and Javanese subtlety on the other. Instead of negating these two notions, this collision produces a preferable combination of characteristics as Nugroho (2009) found that SBY’s corporeal body had been fetishised, especially when his fans perceive his corporeal body as connoting sensuality (see chapters two and seven). Thus, this dialogic interaction enhances the capacity of SBY’s hand (also read: corporeal body) to signify multiple meanings depending on the circumstances of its social relation.

Besides the image of his lifting hand, SBY is also depicted gazing indirectly not at the spectators, but at a blank spot (as his image is off the eye-level). This visual distance, as Kress and van Leeuwen (2006, p. 120) argues, shows “a sense of disengagement”. Thus, when Herlambang uses this image to support his intimate nationalist image construction by smiling at the spectators (on the third frame), SBY’s image, on the contrary, attenuates this intimacy.

Returning to SBY’s militaristic image, much research has investigated his soft-image and militaristic construction. As discussed in chapter seven, they all revolve around arguing that the politics of image of the current Indonesian President has been circulated around his image as a Javanese
“gentle” patron, the way he governs the country, and his deployment of so-called soft power. For instance, Haris (2008) argues that SBY constructs his image as a charming President who cannot detach himself from his gentle characteristics in governing the country. In alignment with Haris, Kingsbury (2005, p. 20) argues that this gentleness reflects SBY’s disposition in adopting the Javanese normative behavioural form of halus (refinement), such as “patience, detachment, resignation and respect” (Geertz, 1993, pp. 52-53). As discussed in chapter seven, besides the subtleties of his characters, Haris (2008), Mietzner (2009a) and Sukma (2010) point out the punctilious side of SBY in utilising crucial moments, such as the global economic crisis, to amplify his image. SBY forged social welfare programs, such as direct cash assistance program for the poor (Bantuan Langsung Tunai), compensation for fuel price hikes and schooling allowances that, in Haris’ (2008, p. 230) view, merely reinforce people’s dependency on the government. However, such programs contributed to his re-election in 2009. Mietzner (2009a, p. 4) notes that the programs boosted SBY’s popularity from 25 per cent in June 2008 to 50.3 per cent in February 2009. SBY sees his own image as representing soft power. Such a claim was made especially when Utoyo (Indonesian Rolling Stone magazine, volume 5, 2005 edition) interviewed him about the connection between his musicality and the present political condition. This image construction is reinforced when he gave a speech at a dinner reception held in Washington DC on 25 May 2005 by USINDO (The United States-Indonesia Society) stating his accentuation of the Javanese gentle characteristics – patience and tolerance – as the soft power symbols that enable him to captivate the public. In this sense, not merely does the deployment of SBY’s corporeal body on Herlambang’s billboard connote the patron’s sensuality, but also signifies the metaphor which indicates the modus operandi of correlating Herlambang’s image with SBY’s Javanese “soft” masculinity. At the same time, the utilisation of SBY’s body as visual capital can be seen as twofold: it implies the submissive code, especially when Herlambang visually defines his disposition through SBY. Secondly, the condition can be reversed. Herlambang’s passivity cannot be seen as representing a submissive action per se. If he wins a ticket to parliament, he will, without exception, support SBY’s administration. This creates mutual dependency between SBY and Herlambang on the visual level. By this, the symbolic mutual exchange occurs. However, at the same time, this also implies Herlambang’s lack of recognisibility by depending largely on SBY’s image. Ajidarma (2009) argues that Herlambang’s dependence on SBY’s image is communally accepted, for in the paternalistic culture such a notion is allowed to reinforce the transmission of SBY’s charisma/sensuality as the paternalistic party’s figure to Herlambang.

Moving on to the second frame, this frame is opened by Munadi Herlambang’s slogan “Young, Objective, Without Prejudice” to illuminate his personal qualities. However, this Secretary of Youth and Sport Department of PD does not provide sufficient visual/written signs to support his claimed
qualities, except for his age. This insufficiency stems from the absence of the authentic visual setting of place (Holt, 2004) to support the party’s/Herlambang’s “distinctive” ideology which influences the billboard’s visual credibility. He merely provides the procedures to vote for him, his number on the ballot paper, the tick sign, his mobile number for sending SMS text messages and his personal website. The inclusion of the mobile number and website signifies open access for the public to reach Herlambang and connotes his quality as an open-minded person that can cope with input and critics. The voting procedure occupies almost half of Herlambang’s billboard which is positioned centrally. It indicates that he wants to remind the viewers about the new voting procedures.\textsuperscript{216} However, at the same time it represents his agitation for his electability.

Nonetheless, if we undertake a close examination of the second frame, we will find that this frame’s focus is not completely dependent on the way Herlambang conveys his declarative slogan (\textit{berjuang untuk rakyat, muda, objektif, tanpa prasangka} or fight for the people, young, objective and without prejudice), but more on bringing the spectators to vote for him as the procedural text is positioned centrally on the billboard. This occupies three quarters of the second frame. The instructive rubric (\textit{cara memilih saya} or the procedural steps to vote for me) is written in the capital white letters, which becomes the central point of this frame (and also the billboard), as it indirectly commands the spectators to read the steps that follow the rubric. The action verbs in the procedure (\textit{pilih} (choose), \textit{buka} (open), \textit{cari} (find), and \textit{cawang} (tick)) are deployed to direct the spectators’ eyes to read the name of Munadi Herlambang as the legislative candidate who represent East Java I constituency. Yellow is employed as the colour not to signify the Indonesian (nationalist) code of prosperity (see chapter five), but to accentuate Herlambang’s position as the candidate.

Furthermore, to reinforce this objective, Herlambang uses a rectangular box containing his candidacy number and full name which appears as an additional frame that trespasses the imaginary demarcation lines of the first, second and third frames. This box encapsulates the goal of the voting procedure and functions as the cardinal focus of Herlambang’s image construction. His other name, Munadi Muchayat, appears in the brackets below the box. Not only does this indicate that he wants people who know him by this name to vote for him, but it also represents his demonstrative act in introducing his nickname to the public so that a visual/linguistic familiarisation can be constructed. At the same time, if we examine this closer, we will find that this “linguistic” familiarisation demonstrates Herlambang’s reliance (not merely on SBY) on the social and political capital his father (Muchayat) has. Muchayat was known as the former Vice President of Mandiri Bank’s

\textsuperscript{216} the government amended the voting mechanism from perforating the ballot paper by using a nail in the previous elections with the tick sign. It was perceived as a breakthrough in the 2009 Elections to differ itself from the 2004 elections.
Commissioner, the largest Bank in Indonesia in terms of total assets and the former Deputy in the State-Owned Enterprises Ministry. The inclusion of Muchayat in the bracket does not indicate Herlambang’s attempt to subordinate his father’s reputation as he needs to “borrow” his father’s “good (?)” name in order to reinforce the level of public recognisibility towards him. This can be seen from the recent corruption case regarding the construction of National Athlete’s School, Hambalang. As the Deputy Secretary of Youth and Sport in PD, the son of Muchayat and the Commissioner of PT Dutasari Citralaras (the subcontractor of PT Adhi Karya, the company that won Hambalang’s tender from the Youth and Sport Ministry), Herlambang is alleged to have been (in)directly involved in arranging a scheme for amending the financial budgeting proposal of the school construction from single to multi years. He is alleged he utilised his father’s power in influencing Agus Martowardjo, the Minister of Finance to make such an amendment. Not only does Herlambang’s alleged involvement indicate the extent of his dependency, but this also indirectly demonstrates this ruling party’s modus operandi in strengthening and securing its social, economic and political networks.

Returning to the way Herlambang constructs his image on his billboard, his deployment of the action verbs (choose, open, find, tick) which are followed respectively by the nominal groups “kartu suara berwarna kuning” (yellow ballot paper), “kertas suara” (ballot paper), “tanda gambar partai Demokrat no. 31” (Democratic Party’s logo number 31), and “no. 5 nama saya” (my name on number 5), lead not only to Herlambang’s full name. At the same time, this voting procedure represents Herlambang’s mild instruction to the spectators as he represents the one who has appreciable capital. The inclusion of Herlambang’s academic titles (S.T. and M.A) following his name reinforces such an attempt as his academic titles not only illuminate his academic qualities but also indicate his cultural capital. This denotes his academic capabilities in handling the technological (S.T denotes a bachelor degree in engineering) and social/humanities issues (M.A connotes his academic quality of handling the social/humanities issues). At this stage, Herlambang uses this linguistically heavily loaded modus operandi in his nationalist image construction.

His image emerges on the third frame of the billboard. Situating his own image in the last frame, which occupies merely one third of the billboard, arguably dilutes the significance of his presence on the text. He appears in a personal way, smiling to the spectators while wearing the party’s blue.


218 Dienaputra (2011, p. 183) notes that PD defines its official blue colour as representing peacefulness, confidence, optimism, and resoluteness.
The donning of this jacket reinforces his nationalist inclination besides his reliance on SBY to represent his nationalist characteristics. At the same time, the jacket becomes the code that represents the party’s nationalist-religious characteristics as stated on its statutes. The party’s logo is crafted on the jacket with the red and white three pointed star that symbolises the party’s religiosity (see chapter five) and nationalist orientation (the red and white colours are associated with the Indonesian national flag that connotes the nationalist spirit, especially during independence). The flag is positioned as an entity that relates SBY’s medium shot picture on the first frame to Herlambang’s image on the third frame. This is needed to bridge this spatial proximity so that the act of image transference can be smoothly conducted. At the same time, this also defines Herlambang’s “reception regime” (Hodge and Kress, 1988, p. 55) which connotes his heavy reliance on SBY’s image. Thus, in order to dilute this reliance, Herlambang positions SBY’s image above the eye-level of the spectators and positions his own close-up image at the eye-level in order to construct a visual intimacy with them. However, as the intimacy is constructed by espousing SBY’s “authoritative” image, this arguably dilutes the intimacy itself. He failed in his candidacy.

Norbaiti’s Billboard

If we read Norbaiti’s billboard horizontally, we will find that her billboard has two main vertical frames. The first frame represents the image of SBY and his wife along with the nominal groups of democracy, religion, education, health and prosperity, whilst the second one is dominated by Norbaiti’s close-up, smiling image. The red and white “curtain-like” prop behind her resonates with Indonesian national flag. However, examining Norbaiti’s billboard leads us to prioritise the linguistic aspects of her billboard as it appears as the most intriguing factor that leads to the obscurity of Norbaiti’s slogan and the degree of her visual literacy. However, this does not mean that the visual text does not speak a thousand words. Her close-up picture defines her ideological stance as her
dress connotes her religious identity (Muslim). Also, the presence of SBY and his wife, Kristiani Herrawati Yudhoyono, as the two party’s key figures, signifies her reliance on their popularity to support her image-building.

As mentioned, the first frame depicts the image of SBY and his wife harvesting rice. Unlike Herlambang’s billboard that uses SBY’s hand as the vector to captivate spectators’ attention, SBY and Kristiani Yudhoyono’s image cannot be perceived as helping Norbaiti to build visual interpersonal relation with the spectators, as their gaze is directed at the rice, instead of facing the camera. Adityawan (2008, pp. 118, 209) found that not only does this harvesting image signify a close resemblance with the similar image of Soeharto and his wife harvesting rice as the symbol of Soeharto’s regime’s success, especially when Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) rewarded Soeharto a gold medal for Indonesia’s success transforming its position from the biggest “rice importer to self sufficiency”, but also indicates the same mode SBY and his wife use in perpetuating Soeharto’s Javanese mode of branding as the father of developmentalism. He argues that in reinforcing this image, one of the modes Soeharto deployed was through inculcating his feudal Javanese image as *gusti* who appeared in all forms of his ministries’ campaigns delivering their programs and achievements (including the image of Indonesia’s capacity to efface its status as the biggest rice importer). This ubiquity connotes that this success cannot be realised without the guidance of a leadership figure (Soeharto), who represents the code of Javanese power which lies centrally in the hand of *gusti*. Adityawan (2008, pp. 209-300) further argues that the substitution from Soeharto to SBY can be perceived as a “negative propaganda” that terminates Soeharto’s feudal image as SBY’s soft image contradicts Soeharto’s authoritarianism. However, we cannot completely perceive this paradigmatic alteration (from Soeharto to SBY) as a negative one as the resemblance of their image construction also connotes the perpetuation of Javanese paternalistic image construction. This substitution is highly important as in Javanese culture the role of *gusti* is to protect and maintain the order (Adityawan, 2008, p. 114). Thus, perpetuating this paternalistic image means preserving the image that SBY as Indonesia’s current President also brings prosperity to the people. In this sense, by incorporating this image, Norbaiti visually demonstrates her inclination towards the New Order’s Javanese conception of prosperity and welfare as the image harvesting the rice represents Indonesian agrarian symbol of welfare (*kesejahteraan*) and prosperity (*kemakmuran*). No visual/written signs are found on the billboard referring to Norbaiti’s conception of democracy, religion, education and health situated below the image of SBY and Kristiani Yudhoyono.

_219_ Further discussion about Norbaiti’s hijab (or *jilbab* in Indonesian term) in contrast to the other form of this religious clothing is discussed in the Effiendria and Sintoekwasito’s billboard (see PDI-P’s section of this chapter).
What is also interesting about SBY and his wife’s image is that they appear on the billboard of a candidate representing the constituency in the Outer Island (East Kalimantan). Not only does this indicate that the perpetuation of Javanese values have deeply penetrated and been internalised in the non-Java region(s), but it also exemplifies the visual practice of inculcating this Javanese paternalism. In this sense, Norbaiti not only functions as PD’s candidate, but she also represents the one who arguably endorses the perpetuation of SBY’s image as a Javanese leader (gusti).

In order to dissect the role of Norbaiti’s presentation, we need to relate these to the slogan she deploys which is situated on the top of her billboard. A vertical reading technique of the linguistic text is needed. Norbaiti uses the party’s blue colour on her slogan “Bersama Kita Bisa Mari Kita Wujudkan Organisasi yang Selama ini Tertunda” (Together We [can?/are capable?] [Let Us] Realise the Long-Awaited Organisation). As discussed, Dienaputra (2011, p. 183) notes that the party perceives this colour as the representation of its core values (optimism, confidence and resoluteness). The employment of this colour on Norbaiti’s billboard signifies a visual subservience to the party’s core values and also her disposition in framing her slogan within these values. The English translation of this slogan is slightly modified as the slogan itself contains an obscure idea of what Norbaiti attempts to achieve. Norbaiti does not provide a main verb which follows the modal verb “bisa” (“can”)\(^\text{220}\), which results in pausing the reading of her slogan. She then continues her slogan by simply adding that her aim is to realise a long-awaited organisation. This nominal group (“the long awaited organisation”) seems to have no linguistic or visual reference on the billboard. However, a close look at the billboard reveals that Norbaiti most probably uses a faint symbolic correlation that corresponds to her aim, i.e. the party’s logo (situated at the top right hand corner). This logo provides us with a clue to decipher the meaning of the adjective “long-awaited”. As this adjective modifies the organisation (PD?), we need to return to the moment when PD was established.

PD was established as SBY’s electoral vehicle as the result of his disappointment at his loss of his nomination as a Vice President in the 2001 MPR Special Session (see chapter seven). Having realised that he needed an electoral vehicle that could take him to the seat of Presidency, SBY waited patiently whilst arranging a strategic political scheme, especially when he became Megawati’s Minister for Political, Social and Security affairs. At this stage it is most probable that the adjective “long-awaited” corresponds with SBY’s patience in attaining his political goal. Thus, by supporting Norbaiti’s nomination, the voters also help SBY realise his goal, i.e. continuing his Presidential term to 2014. However, this reading practice reveals an oddity of the slogan itself. The correlation of the nominal group “the long-awaited organisation” with PD merely signifies an act of attaching the party

\(^{220}\) The first line of her slogan reads “Bersama Kita Bisa” (“Together We [can?/are capable?]”).
with the quality behind the adjective phrase “long-awaited”. As the party has been established since 2001, Norbaiti’s invitation to the voters to (together) realise the organisation (PD) in 2009 sounds “clumsy” (if not blundering). In other words, this also leads to the reading: supporting Norbaiti means supporting her “clumsy conception”.

If we continue this vertical reading, we will find that Norbaiti’s accentuation of the elements her organisation emphasises, i.e, democracy, religion\(^{221}\), education, health and prosperity. However, as these elements are also situated at the bottom left hand corner next to her profile picture and below SBY’s and Kristiani Yudhoyono’s image, the practice of horizontal reading shows that the elements possibly indicate the fields she wishes to develop once she succeeds in her candidacy. The elements’ position also shows that we cannot correlate them with the actions SBY and his wife show on their image. Harvesting the rice connotes visual irrelevancy with democracy, religion, education, health and prosperity. The only faint correlation between the action of harvesting and Norbaiti’s fields is with the notion of prosperity. In other words, Norbaiti as the legislative candidate from East Kalimantan province (she puts this statement of identification at the top of her own name) merely presents linguistic clumsiness and visual irrelevancy that fatally led to her billboard’s discredibility. Moreover, instead of asking the spectators to support her, Norbaiti delivers her gratitude (“terima kasih anda telah bergabung bersama, Kaltim maju rakyatpun makmur” or “thank you for joining [us?], Kaltim develops people prosper”) as the symbol of her recognition for the spectators’ participation in developing the East Kalimantan province.

The second frame features Norbaiti’s smiling image. Compared to the first frame, her smiling, close-up image successfully invites the spectators to gaze at her profile picture. Her red lips correspond with the red colour of the national flag. However, we cannot perceive that her lips’ colour correlates with the nationalist conception of bravery as represented by the red colour of the national flag as her red-coloured lips simply represent a cosmetic application. No visual/written indication connotes Norbaiti’s nationalist courage. In this sense, her red smiling lips on her close up picture cannot be perceived as luring the spectators’ eyes as it merely signifies her attempt to visually establish an intimacy with the spectators.

Below her smiling image is a rectangular box framing her full name along with her number on the candidates’ list. Unlike Herlambang, she does not use this sub frame as the central point in her image branding as she only uses it to capture and introduce her name. When Herlambang uses a different colour to accentuate his position as PD’s candidate representing his constituency, Norbaiti

\(^{221}\) I need to change the translation of the word “religius” (literally means religious) with religion, as the word “religious” does not belong to the group of nouns she uses.
uses white capital letters embedded on her profile picture in order to identify herself as the legislative candidate representing the East Kalimantan constituency. Her choice of colour contrasts with the black colour of her Muslim dress. However, when these white letters meet Norbaiti’s white shirt inside her blazer, some letters appear to be absent as the colour of her white shirt absorbs them. This connotes the degree of her visual literacy. She failed in her candidacy.

**Herlambang’s Image versus Norbaiti’s Image**

If we compare Norbaiti’s and Herlambang’s billboards, we will find a slight difference in the similar construction of these two PD’s legislative candidates’ images. Their billboards arguably affirm the glorification of SBY as the paternalistic figure. However, behind this similarity we can find that this difference lies in the way Herlambang accentuates SBY’s soft militaristic image, whereas Norbaiti fetishes SBY’s image as a Javanese leader (*gusti*) in their publicity. What is also interesting to note from this difference *vis-a-vis* the polarisation of Javanese/non Javanese dichotomies is that representing an East Java constituency, Herlambang chooses not to deploy SBY’s image as the Javanese leader (*gusti*), whilst Norbaiti deploys this notion to support her candidacy in the East Kalimantan constituency. Not only does this visually aver the omnipresence of Javanese influence in the Outer Island (East Kalimantan), but it also ostensibly demonstrates the un-necessity of iteratively reinforcing SBY’s Javanese image in Java. However, if we relate this to Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi’s finding (2012) that this ethnocentric element merely functions as a constant variable in influencing the voters’ behaviours and preferences, we will find that the utilisation of SBY on Herlambang’s and Norbaiti’s billboards indicates not completely a nugatory visual practice, but a visual “reference” that indicates the similar “esprit de corps” of these candidates to PD’s patron.

At the same time if we relate SBY’s image on these billboards to the Islamic/Nationalist polarisation, we will find that both Herlambang and Norbaiti are more inclined to present SBY as a nationalist figure. Norbaiti then fills this empty side by donning *jilbab*. Herlambang chooses not to include any Islamic element on his billboard. However, this cannot completely be seen as Herlambang’s way to distance himself from PD’s religious identity. PD’s branding is heavily laden with nationalist characteristics with Islam as supporting characteristics (see chapter seven). In this sense, we cannot fully perceive Herlambang’s image as a nationalist figure completely deviating from the party’s ideology, as this ideology arguably inclines more to the nationalist side (see chapter seven). Furthermore, the domination of PD’s official colours (dark and light blue, red and white) reinforces the candidates’ nationalist construct (see chapter five).
Analysing Santoso’s billboard, we need to divide this billboard into three horizontal frames. The first frame features the slogan of this Golkar’s candidate as the main represented participant. He uses the relating verb “butuh” (need) to relate the participant “kami” (we) as the carrier of the attribute “synergy” for the purpose of keeping the ummat\(^{222}\) (“untuk membangun ummat”) united (jangan bercerai berai). Deploying the relational process in the slogan, Santoso relates the carrier “we” with the attribute “synergy”, which results in the equation of we = synergy. This equation implies Santoso’s invitation to the spectators for them to be willingly involved in the realisation of the goal of uniting the Indonesian Islamic community under one group (the Santoso’s?). In this sense, due to Santoso’s important role in ICMI\(^{223}\) (as one of its chaipersons), the noun “group” connotes his attempt to hail the spectators to join his group. This hailing act, or in Althusserian term “interpellation,” signifies both the act of addressing the spectators as part of the group (represented by the pronoun “we”) and the act of forging collective allegiance to Santoso’s group. With this social and cultural capital, Santoso invites the Indonesian Islamic community to join him as he represents both Islamic (ICMI) and nationalist (Golkar) factions. Moreover, the deployment of the slogan in the largest font compares with the other expression which occupies one third of the billboard and indicates that Santoso relies heavily on written expression to transmit the message.

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\(^{222}\) The noun – ummat – denotes the Islamic community, in this case in Indonesia.

\(^{223}\) Kingsbury (2005, pp. 12, 80) and Crouch (2010, pp. 131-136, 178) note that ICMI was established in 1990 as Soeharto’s think tank to face the growing influence of the Catholic General LB. Moerdani.
This relational process is realised on the second frame by showing Santoso’s smiling close-up image. The presence of Santoso, along with the four cartoon characters, can be perceived as connoting a symbolic attributive process (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006, pp. 105-113). His preference for deploying cartoon characters to describe the slogan instead of an authentic (non-cartoon character) possibly attenuates its visual credibility, for the characters represent the neutral symbols of the Islamic community as they merely possess a faint correlation with the ummat itself. However, this faint correlation does not efface the status of the cartoon characters as the vectors that build interpersonal connection between the spectators and the billboard. Santoso’s gaze reinforces such attempts as his gaze and smile invite the spectators to project their understanding of the actions the four cartoon characters conduct as his.

This projection is also realised by deploying the image of human hands arranging the puzzle as the image background in order to signify that the effort to build synergy is controlled, so that musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus) to unite the ummat (in order to reach kerukunan or social harmony) are achieved within the framework of Golkar. This also suggests Golkar’s nationalist notion of mufakat that reinforces the pattern of gusti-kawula in Pancasila. Kingsbury (2005, p. 50) argues that mufakat is not synonymous with “the open airing of differences of opinion”, but rather implies the subservience of social norms guided by gusti as the patron. In this sense, in O’Sullivan’s, et al. (1994, pp. 124-125) terms, the functionalist notion as reflected in Golkar’s name (Golongan Karya or Functional(ist) Group), operates by smoothing over conflict as gusti functions to control the operation of the Pancasila-based democratic principles the party upholds, i.e. musyawarah and mufakat, in order to maintain the party’s equilibrium, effectiveness and efficiency of its constituent parts. This control is conducted by performing practical actions that represent the party’s cohesion (equilibrium) as reflected on its logo (see chapters five and seven). Golkar’s logo, the banyan tree and the adjoined rice and cotton, represent the Pancasila principles of the unity of Indonesia and democracy through deliberation and consensus. At this stage, the logo signifies the glorification of practicality as the modus operandi, which means the function of each division in the party primarily operate to fulfil the party’s pragmatic goals.

Golkar’s position as the “catch-all” party (see chapter seven) opens the opportunity for its legislative candidates to adopt any ideological values as long as it resonates with the party’s vision and mission. As the representative of the “catch-all” party and one of ICMI chairpersons, Santoso’s billboard deploys Islamic symbolic attributes in the form of the noun “ummat”, Islamic attire (baju koko and peci), and his socio-political roles in Islamic society. As discussed, the deployment of the noun - ummat - in his slogan accentuates Santoso’s political disposition towards Muslim voters. It is very
important for Islam to build synergy within the nationalist framework of Golkar. This politicking is reinforced by his close-up appearance in wearing the white baju koko (the Muslim male shirt which is usually worn to go to the mosque) and a black peci (a male Muslim cap). Peci used to be perceived as one of the pieces of attire for the Muslim man to wear whilst praying. It has now become one of the pieces of national attire to be worn in state ceremonies, which, according to Ajidarma (2009), reflects the wearer’s socio-moral status. Below his smiling image is Santoso’s identity labels which indicate his social capital (the pioneer of TPA or the educational spot for children to study Al Qur’an; the counsellor of BKPRMI or the Indonesian Mosque Youth Communication Board; Chairperson of ICMI) in order ostensibly to convince the Islamic/ nationalist electorates to vote for him.

At the bottom right of the third frame, he invites the spectators to vote for him on election day for he represents the one who cares for the mosque, the Muslim children, Pesantren (Islamic boarding school) and struggles for the ummat aspiration. The invitation signifies taking the position of developing Indonesian Islam. This politicking also demonstrates the obscurity of polarisation between the nationalist and Islamic strands. Representing the nationalist party, Santoso cannot dissociate himself from his Islamic credentials. Joining Golkar, a strong-institutional-nationalist party, is arguably seen as a smart way to catch all Muslim voters (santri and abangan). With this social and cultural capital to catch the santri voters, Santoso can easily captivate the abangan Muslim voters as he represents the whole package of Islamic images with Golkar as his electoral machine.

Santoso also provides the ballot paper dummy and the tick sign on his number on the right bottom hand corner of the third frame. The one eighth portion of the dummy in Santoso’s billboard indicates, not the insignificance of the new system to be disseminated but moreover demonstrates his self-assurance in his electability for he was known as the most popular parliament member from 2004 to 2009. However, his billboard does not include any signs that indicate the written expression of uniting the ummat. Santoso succeeded in his candidacy.
Reading this visual domination brings us to concentrate not on the reading technique from left to right, but on its horizontal frames. However, as the size of Daeng’s portrait occupies almost half of the billboard, the analysis is firstly focused on the second frame depicting Daeng’s picture along with his affiliated organisations’ logos and the party’s logo and later moves to the third frame featuring his full name and constituency. I will analyse the first frame by concentrating on Daeng’s slogan written at the top of the billboard using smaller letters compared to the other verbal text. However, this does not mean that I will treat the analysis of each frame as discrete as the elements of these frames are interrelated.

Looking at Daeng’s billboard, the spectators are engaged with his soft gaze and smile, as these vectors are situated at eye level. Wearing a white shirt with a turban around his neck and a black peci on his head, Daengs presents himself as a pious Muslim legislative candidate from Golkar. As discussed, not only does peci represent the code of religiosity as well as nationalism, but also connotes the socio-moral status of the candidate. Wearing these attributes (turban and peci), Daeng reinforces his Islamic credentials as well as socio-moral status in his image construction. However, this turban does not merely act as a code that represents the degree of Daeng’s piety although many (Indonesian) Muslim clerics wear this clothing, especially during their missionary endeavours. His deployment signifies the modus operandi Daeng uses to expose the degree of his piety. Moreover, his wearing this turban around his neck can be perceived as not only adding the cosmetic (besides peci) attribute for his Islamic branding, but also representing his act in cultivating his religious image, as he deploys it along with the title (H.) or hajj in front of his name.
Representing this code, Daeng’s pictorial act demonstrates a similar branding strategy to his fellow Golkar’s candidate, Priyo Budi Santoso. However, unlike Santoso who reinforces his religious identity with the support of his roles in ICMI, Daeng frames his religious image construction by using Golkar’s wing organisations’ logos, i.e. *Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong* (MKGR), *Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia* (AMPI) or Indonesian Renewal Young Generation, and *Pemuda Panca Marga* (PPM), situated above the rectangular box denoting his full name. Ryter (2001, pp. 143, 148) found that these wing organisations not only represent the party’s activities in empowering its young candidates\(^{224}\), but also their political practices demonstrate the internal political rivalry, especially between AMPI and PPM with Golkar’s other affiliated organisation, *Pemuda Pancasila* (the Youth of *Pancasila*) headed by Yaptó Soerjosoemarno, Soeharto’s wife’s distant cousin and a (former) hoodlum. AMPI and PPM were established to counterbalance Yaptó’s influence in dominating Indonesian gangsters (if not “underworld”). AMPI and PPM were linked and supported respectively by Soeharto’s former loyalists, Abdul Gafur and Soeharto’s former son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto. In this sense, Daeng’s deployment of the organisations’ symbols not only dilutes (if not damages) his own religious image as the symbols contradict his religious pictorial act, but also leads to the reading that choosing Daeng also means supporting these organisations. In short, as these symbols represent Daeng’s social and cultural capital, their deployment on the billboard imperils his nationalist religious image construction.

However, this does not stop Daeng from continually reinforcing his dual image. He continues this visual politicking by positioning the party’s logo parallel to the image of his head covered with peci. This parallelism arguably defines his attempt at positioning himself in ideological ambiguity, as this, at the same time, connotes symbolic amalgamation of the Islamic and Nationalist strands into one corporeal body. Unlike Priyo Budi Santoso, who accentuates his religious image as the core element in his image branding, Daeng uses Golkar’s nationalist attributes, including its wing organisations, to support his image-building. Not only does the employment of the party’s logo (banyan tree and the adjoined rice and cotton image) as the background of his profile picture signify the reiteration of utilising Golkar’s nationalist emblem, but that also demonstrates his actual orientation, albeit the symbolic amalgamation. Thus, the plethora of Golkar’s nationalist visual signs on his billboard

\(^{224}\) Ryter (2001, pp. 126-127, 137-138) found that the meaning of “youth” (*pemuda*) had been exploited, especially by Soeharto’s regime. The first significant deployment of this signifier was when it was deployed as a code under a pledge known as *Sumpah Pemuda* (Youth Pledge) that represented Indonesian’s nationalist youth resistance against the colonial Dutch in 1928. Ryter further notes that this “revolutionary nationalism” was then shifted in the late Soeharto’s era into a single loyalty to the government (read: Soeharto). This shifting resulted not only in the removal of university students as well as teenagers from the “youth” classification as Soeharto’s regime constrained them to be involved in political practices, but that, it also made Soeharto’s former electoral machine (*Golkar*) full with “rather aged *pemuda*” (Ryter, 2001, p. 127), such as Daeng.
signifies that he uses the Islamic attributes as a mere cosmetic cover that beautifies his image construction. The party’s colour (yellow) which dominates Daeng’s billboard reinforces such a construction.

As noted, the third frame constitutes a rectangular box in which his full name is written and a declarative statement of the regions (Surabaya and Sidoarjo) he represents which are positioned below the box. Like Herlambang, Daeng puts this box right below his close-up picture. This positioning signifies an act of underscoring his name as it becomes the cardinal point of his image construction. At the same time, this frame also shows visual dependency on this verbal text in order to illuminate his close-up image as without this text it is probable that the spectators would not recognise him. However, this does not mean that effacing Daeng’s image and largely depending on the verbal text successfully transmits the intended message of his billboard. In other words, this dependency signifies the insufficiency of public recognition towards his achievements and/or identity. The absence of the information whether he represents himself as the regional or national legislative candidate aggravates this situation.

This visual aggravation continues as Daeng seems to attenuate his own slogan as it appears as an insignificant element as the small font he uses in the first horizontal frame of his billboard suggests. The black colour he uses to frame his slogan cannot be seen as reflecting his attempt at accentuating his own slogan as he gives a derisory portion to the slogan. This arguably damages his image-building as the slogan denotes not only Daeng’s political jargon, but also a short catchphrase that can make people remember him easily. This slogan occupies less than one eighth of the billboard and contains cliche-ridden political jargon (berkarya bagi bangsa, bersatu membangun negeri or work for the nation, unite [Indonesian people] in order to build the country). Although Daeng uses action verbs to illustrate his political aims in the slogan (“work” and “unite”), no visual/written signs support this claim. In this sense, not only does this make his slogan empty rhetoric, but it also suggests that deploying Daeng as the sole visual agent in delivering this slogan indicates his visual and linguistic illiteracy as the deployment of symbolic attributive process at the visual level to demonstrate the material actions of the verbal text proves to be inoperable. He failed in his candidacy.

**Santoso’s Image versus Daeng’s Image**

The core element in the image construction of Santoso and Daeng lies in the way they present themselves as Islamic figures. Santoso presents himself in an all-inclusive Islamic image package within Golkar’s inclusive (functionalist) framework. On the other hand, Daeng constructs his image within the contestation of nationalist (represented by the logos of Golkar’s wing
organisations)/Islamic (represented by his Muslim apparel) strands. At this stage, Golkar’s ambiguous/inclusive/functional(ist) framework is interpreted in a quite loose manner. However, we cannot make a direct assumption that a complete accentuation of Islamic/nationalist elements on the candidates’ billboards of the nationalist/Islamic parties at the visual practical level (as in the case of Santoso), or in Schwedler’s term (2006) the consistency between the ideational and behavioural actions, guarantee the candidates’ success with their candidacy. As Mietzner (2009a) and Mujani and Liddle (2010) argue, the candidates’ prior achievement and performance become the core influential factors (see chapter seven).

Unlike PD’s legislative candidate (Norbaiti) that perpetuate Golkar’s former patron’s (Soeharto) image, Santoso’s and Daeng’s billboards visually affirm their (Golkar’s) detachment from Soeharto. The absence of JK’s image as the party’s patron in 2009 on Santoso’s and Daeng’s billboards reinforces this dissociation. In this light, when PD’s candidates position their patron as the embodiment of the party’s ideology (see chapter seven), Santoso and Daeng frame Golkar’s nationalist characteristics by iteratively deploying the logo of Golkar (Santoso) and the logos of Golkar’s wings organisations (Daeng). The similar deployment of the party’s official colour reinforces this nationalist image construction.

PDI-P

Djarot Saiful’s Billboard

Seeing Djarot Saiful’s billboard at first glance, the spectators will be directly engaged with the way Saiful gazes and smiles at the camera. These vectors become the elements that build the visual “conviviality,” or in the Kress and van Leeuwen’s terms (1990, pp. 20-21; 2006, pp. 42-43), the
interpersonal function of the text. This “conviviality” is reinforced by his philanthropic act of handing a basket of star fruit to a peasant woman. This visual narration occupies the second horizontal frame of Saiful’s billboard. The analysis will start from investigating this visual text then move to the first and third frames denoting Saiful’s slogan and full name as the legislative candidate at the national level. However, this procedure does not treat the visual and verbal elements of the first, second and third frames as separate entities as they are interrelated. The left to right reading technique is deployed in analysing the second frame.

Prior to reading the second frame, it is important to look at the different compositional colours Saiful uses on his billboard. These colours are used in framing his philanthropic pictorial act on the second frame that suggests colour resonance as well as a “blockade” of PDI-P’s official colour. Not only does this also indicate a framing segregation of the main frame (the second frame) from the first and third frames, but this framing dimension also attests that Saiful’s philanthropic act operates within the PDI-P’s politics of colour. The party often uses the phrase “memerahkan” (make [the city or other location] red) as all the party’s candidates and sympathisers use, without exception, red-colour clothes during the campaigns. This uniformity suggests that red is used as a code that signifies not only a cultural construction in associating red with PDI-P but also the party’s demonstration of power. In other words, this framing indicates that Saiful’s visual narration is controlled by PDI-P’s secular nationalist framework as the party’s colour and logo suggest (see chapters five and seven).

Returning to the second frame that denotes the philanthropic act of this former mayor of Blitar, we will find that Saiful’s image in presenting a basket of star fruit to an old peasant woman represents his slogan: the leader’s task is to enrich the people, not to make them suffer. He smiles towards the camera while handing the fruit to her. She stares at him smiling and accepting the gift. Not only does this material process connote a transactional process between Saiful as the actor and the peasant woman as the beneficiary of this act, but it also signifies the perpetuation of hierarchical power relation between gusti-kawula in Pancasila discourse. Instead of showing the act of picking the fruit together, Saiful’s act in handing the fruit as a gift connotes the Javanese priyayi paternalistic action in which gusti helps to prosper kawula. This plausibly embodies Pancasila’s fourth democratic principle (“popular sovereignty arrived at through deliberation and representation”). This can be seen from this portrayal which occupies half of the billboard that accentuates Saiful’s actions as the representation of PDI-P’s democratic ideals, which is in line with the party’s logo of the buffalo’s head (the fourth principle of Pancasila). However, as this authentic portrayal also signifies that Saiful is fully aware that presenting this pictorial act to spectators will not merely promote himself as the
legislative candidate who is concerned with people’s prosperity, but also perpetuates his image as the one who successfully developed the star fruit business for the local people of the middle-low class in Blitar. This portrayal resonates with the party’s slogan – the grassroots’ party – for it demonstrates the philanthropic act of helping the poor people which connotes Saiful’s real action to visually materialise PDI-P’s platform, “prospering the people”. In this sense, not only does Saiful’s pictorial act signify visual reinforcement of the vertical relation between gusti-kawula, in which kawula perceives gusti as a transcendent symbolic figure, but it also demonstrates the way he, as the party’s elite,225, transcodes this hegemonic relation into visual language and exploits it for his image construction. At the same time, we cannot completely perceive Saiful’s act as connoting ideological exploitation at the visual level, as this can also be seen as signifying his act of demonstrating his success as Blitar’s former mayor. Thus, this portrayal suggests that without having to include verbal rhetoric indicating his promise to bring prosperity, Saiful freezes his success in bringing prosperity to the people of Blitar in this visual scene.

This scene also demonstrates the perpetuation of PDI-P’s politics of colour as Saiful’s red and white striped poloshirt rhymes with his nickname (Djarot), his number on the candidates’ list, slogan and the first and third frames. In Indonesian nationalist discourse as represented in the national flag’s colours, white is perceived as representing the purity and sacredness of the national struggle, especially against colonialisers such as the Dutch, whilst red connotes the nation’s courage against colonialism. In this sense, Saiful’s poloshirt connotes the incorporation of these nationalist symbols into his corporeal body. Furthermore, if we relate the utilisation of white colour on his nickname, candidacy number and slogan on the first frame, we will find that this colour application reflects Saiful’s attempt in positioning his name, candidacy number and slogan as sacred entities. This application is important, because if we compare this with the black colour Saiful uses for his full name which also resonates with the black colour of the party’s logo and number, we will find an obscure meaning discrepancy between white and black. Dienaputra (2011, p. 183) notes that PDI-P perceives black as the colour that represents the party’s honesty and sincerity in struggling for grassroots’ aspiration, whilst white is seen as connoting the purity of the party’s political conscience. Not only does this indicate PDI-P’s attempt to attenuate the stark difference of this binary opposition, but this attenuation also suggests the party’s obscure interpretation as the meaning of honesty and sincerity heavily correlates with the meaning of purity. This politics of colour then continues as Saiful uses yellow, which resembles the colour of the star fruit, to denote his candidacy (written on the third frame). In this sense, Saiful equates his candidacy with prosperity (represented

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225 Saiful’s watch also distinguishes his status from the peasant woman.
by the yellow star fruits), as choosing him means bringing similar benefits as those the Blitar people had when he became their mayor. This politicking also connotes a visual transactional process of the second and third frames.

What is also interesting to note on the third frame is the inclusion of the title hajj in Djarot Saiful’s image that signifies his political disposition towards Islam. Although Saiful’s Islamic nuance does not present as being as conspicuous as Santoso’s, Saiful’s title indicates his Muslim identity that joins the so-called secular nationalist party. As a linguistic attribute, the title haji merely signifies the status of Saiful’s Muslimness that faintly connotes the degree of his religiosity. As discussed in chapter seven, the title “haji” in Indonesia is seen either as representing one’s socio-moral status or the degree of piety. Thus, like any other candidates who attach this title in front of their names, the deployment of this title on Saiful’s billboard connotes that he places himself in the midst of ideological ambiguity as this religious code becomes a fundamental element to captivate the Muslim grassroots.

Like Santoso, Saiful does not include PDI-P’s key political figure on his billboard (Megawati Soekarnoputri) for they are both aware of their popularity at the national level (for Santoso) or the regional level (for Saiful). However, the absence of Megawati’s image on Saiful’s billboards does not indicate the absence of Soekarno-ism as reflected in Megawati’s image (see chapter seven). This shows that Saiful’s dependency on the patron’s image is not as heavy as Herlambang. As the former successful mayor of Blitar, Saiful believes that his image which demonstrates his philanthropic activities sufficiently represents the party’s platforms as a “wong cilik” or grassroots’ party. Megawati’s presence on his billboard as if to supervise a philanthropic act is seen as unnecessary. In other words, the second frame is seen as representational in framing the party’s platform – prospering the people which relates to Soekarno’s Marhaenist concept (see chapter four). No correlation can be made to suggest whether the absence of Megawati’s (and/or Soekarno’s) image influenced the success of his candidacy. Saiful failed to enter Parliament.
The spectators’ visual engagement on Suzie Effiendriaty and Luwih Sintoekwasito’s billboard is arguably similar with Saiful’s as the gaze of Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito constitutes a “semiotic code of picture” (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1990, p. 20) that captures the spectators’ attention. In addition to their gaze, the red colour saturation on this billboard also contributes in building interpersonal relationship between the spectators and this billboard. However, unlike Saiful’s billboard that successfully represents a visual “conviviality” due to the visual authentic portrayal, Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s billboard cannot arguably (if not completely) be perceived as bringing this same atmosphere of “conviviality”. Their close-up portraits, which occupy three quarters of the billboard, represent a symbolic attributive process, as their image signifies the identity construction of these PDI-P’s legislative candidates. They become the carrier (the bearer) of the party’s logo which connotes Soekarno’s Marhaenist conception. However, this symbolic attributive relation dilutes itself as their slogan (*Pastikan Kami Pilihan Anda..! Or Ensure [Yourself] that We are Your Choice..!) merely shows an effete concept in supporting the patron’s socialist conception as it simply represents a request to choose them.

However, if we conduct a close examination of this slogan which is framed at the top of the billboard and occupies one fifth of the billboard (the first horizontal frame), we will find that the exclamation mark in the slogan indicates not the urgency for the spectators to vote for Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito, but more a mild order for the spectators to assure themselves first before casting votes for them. Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s billboard provides visually re-assuring devices in the form of religious (Islamic) attributes indicating their Muslimness – headscarf (in this case *kerudung*),
peci, baju koko, female Muslim tunic, and turban on the second horizontal frame. Smith-Hefner (2007, pp. 390, 414) and Hamdani (2007, p. 8) asserts that kerudung represents a code of Islamic piety for traditionalist Javanese women. They argue that this “loose-fitting headscarf” which allows “the women’s neck and hair to be visible” has shifted into a new type of veiling like the one that is worn by Norbaiti (see Norbaiti’s billboard). This veiling no longer completely holds the status of representing the traditionalist Islamic attributes of Javanese women as it has developed into connoting Islamic resurgence as well as the code of democratic reform (especially against Soeharto’s authoritative regime that banned the use of veiling at schools and government offices) and later shifted to commodification of this Islamic attire. As noted in chapter five, the early phase of Soeharto’s tenure marked state repressive actions towards Islam as Soeharto perceived Islamic practices as a political threat. This was due to Soeharto’s political disposition in forging close affiliations with Christian and abangan bureaucrats (Hamdani, 2007, p. 1). However, as Smith-Hefner (2007, p. 397) notes, the 1991 regulation (SK. 100/1991) issued by the Department of Education and Culture regarding the official annulment of the veiling ban at school signified Soeharto’s changing attitude towards Islam in 1990s in order to face his Christian political opponents. Smith-Hefner further notes that hijab (or “jilbab”) played its significant political role in 1998 as it protected Muslim (student) activists from the “threat of violence” during pro-democracy demonstrations against Soeharto’s regime. Thus, at this stage not only does the wearing of kerudung by this female PDI-P’s candidate reflect Effiendriaty’s Islamic democratic political stance, but it also becomes the signifier of her act of distinguishing her religious nationalist notion (which is heavily influenced by her Javanese cultural background) from other nationalist parties such as PD (represented by Norbaiti).

Compared to Norbaiti’s jilbab, Effiendriaty’s presentation of her neck and hair indicates a debatable conventional view of aurat\(^{226}\) which reflects a range of different perspectives from “liberal, moderate to conservative and radical” (Millalos, 2007, p. 297). Largely drawing his arguments from Indonesian liberal Islamic proponents such as Ulil Absar Abdalla, Hamdani (2007, pp. 178-183) argues that the orthodox Muslim definition of aurat vis-a-vis the donning of jilbab needs to be recontextualised as this precept does not signify a “definitive, clear, and firm indication of the divine ruling”. Hamdani found that the donning of jilbab merely perpetuates the adoption of Arabic culture in Indonesia, as it represents the pre-Islamic practices that signified Prophet Muhammad’s political efforts in eliminating social classes as the demonstration of wealth by Arabic female elites often delivered by the exhibition of their finest jewellery on their bosom and clothes. In addition, Shibab

\(^{226}\) Rinaldo (2008, p. 24) and Smith-Hefner (2007, p. 399) further assert that aurat is conventionally defined as female body parts (except for their face and hands) which are prohibited to be shown publicly as they potentially invite the male gaze.
(as cited by Hamdani, 2007, p. 178) argues that no definite indications\(^{227}\) are found in the Qur’an and *Hadith* (the sayings of Prophet Muhammad) regarding religious obligations to wear veils in the public sphere. Notwithstanding this fact, the wearing of veils either a tight one as Norbaiti does or a loose one as Effiendriaty does, is seen as a sign of liberating women from unequal social treatment as the Arabic history in Prophet Muhammad’s era suggested. This also signifies the act of disciplining the body as the manifestation of their religious profession. At the same time, as the veil also represents an act of resistance towards Soeharto’s regime or in Smith-Hefner’s language (2007, p. 398) a religious sign of “pro-democratic reform”, the deployment of this visual symbolic attribute (*kerudung*) demonstrates the differentiation technique Effiendriaty employs to connote herself and PDI-P’s political stance in the Reform era. Furthermore, as *kerja* also connotes the Indonesian traditionalist attire (compared to Norbaiti’s modernist *jilbab*) that is usually worn by Javanese Muslim women, Effiendriaty also exhibits her disposition in positioning herself in the politics of veiling in Indonesia. Thus, if we compare the visuality of Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito (who wears *peci, baju koko*, and turban), we will find that this visual juxtaposition between these female and male PDI-P’s candidates shows that their Islamic attributes not only represent their Islamic religious stance at the personal level but also indicates their technique of branding by using these attributes to support the secular nationalist image of PDI-P.

The visual support operates as the Islamic attributes are also used on the third horizontal frame, which contains Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s rectangular boxes denoting their names as the legislative candidates at the regional level (for Effiendriaty) and at the national level (for Sintoekwasito). The different colours (light blue and yellow) are applied respectively in contrasting their candidacy (DPRD Jatim Dapil I for Effiendriaty) and (DPR RI Jatim Dapil I for Sintoekwasito). This colour difference does not connote differentiation technique in their identity construction. However, a faint difference is found as Sintoekwasito adds the statement of “alias H. L. Soepomo SW, SH., M.Si”. As the letter (H. or *haji*) in front of his name connotes the socio-moral status of this secular party’s candidate, his wearing of *baju koko, peci* and turban (which is similar to branding design of Santoso and Daeng) reinforces his religious image. This also connotes the degree of Islamic “piety” (if not propriety) between Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito, as the Muslim attire Effiendriaty wears (in contrast to Sintoekwasito) signifies a loose Islamic conception of her Muslimness. Like Daeng, Sintoekwasito deploys these Islamic attributes to construct an ostensible Islamic image. They failed in their candidacy.

\(^{227}\) The indications are merely indeterminate (Hamdani, 2007, p. 178)
Saiful’s Image versus Sintoekwasito’s and Effriendriaty’s Images

The stark difference between these three PDI-P’s candidates lies in the way they concoct the party’s (secular) nationalist characteristics. They deploy different strategies in framing this nationalist image. Presenting himself as the figure who upholds Pancasila’s notion of ekonomi kerakyatan, Saiful presents himself as a Javanese condescending figure (gusti) who successfully brought prosperity to Blitar’s people (kawula) during his tenure as Blitar’s mayor. He does not put too much emphasis on religiosity on his billboard as the party he is representing is a secular one. However, the act of showing one’s religious side/identity is still seen as imperative. Thus, by simply incorporating the religious title “haji” before his name on the billboard, Saiful demonstrates his Muslimness.

Conversely, in order to fill in the religious “cavity” in PDI-P’s image, Sintoekwasito and Effriendriaty choose to don Muslim attire. However, they forget to accentuate the “wong cilik” ideology as they are busy constructing their Islamic image. This is reinforced by the fact that they merely deploy PDI-P’s logo (buffalo) as a sole visual attribute to represent their position as the candidates of this “wong cilik” party. Not only does this make their billboards represent more the Islamic side, but it also indicates that Sintoekwasito and Effriendriaty’s disposition in seeing the Islamic attributes as a more saleable element compared to the nationalist ones. In this sense, this ostensible contradiction on Saiful’s and Sintoekwasito and Effriendriaty’s billboards attests to the ambiguity of PDI-P’s ideological framework as a (secular) nationalist party.

However, if we relate this ambiguity with the absence of PDI-P’s central figure in the party’s (Javanese) paternalistic discourse, we will find that fetishising Soekarno-ism is not demonstrated by directly deploying Megawati’s and/or Soekarno’s images on their billboards. What they accentuate is the glorification of Soekarno’s nationalist ideals in the form of material actions (Saiful) and the (ineffective) use of PDI-P’s logo (Sintoekwasito and Effriendriaty). This is then reinforced by the deployment of the party’s official colour which is perceived as connoting the nationalist notion of bravery. In this sense, although Saiful, Sintoekwasito and Effriendriaty represent East Java Constituencies, arguably, they do not completely allow themselves be co-opted in PDI-P’s Javanese paternalistic notions.
Gerindra

Haryo Seno’s Billboard

Looking at Seno’s billboard, the spectators’ attention will be directly engaged with the sharp gaze of Haryo Seno. His gaze, which is positioned on the left hand side of the billboard, becomes the element that catches the spectator’s eye along with the red colour saturation. These elements become the factors that construct an interpersonal relation between spectators and Seno’s billboard.

This billboard can be divided into two vertical frames. The first frame captures Seno’s image with his slogan above his image and the party’s logo and number on the top left hand corner. Haryo Seno was the legislative candidate from Gerindra representing Ngawi, Magetan, Ponorogo and Trenggalek constituencies. He is depicted wearing a reddish-coloured shirt which resonates with the red colour of the national flag. Not only does the red and white saturation on his billboard show that Seno is circumscribed by the framework of the party’s official colours (see Gerindra’s logo), but also represents his branding tactic in exploiting these colours in order to project the nationalist associative notions of bravery and purity of the national flag to frame his own image. This is needed to frame his slogan “Maju Membangun Bersama Rakyat” (”[Let Us] Move Forward to Build Together [the country?]”).
However, no visual authentic signs support this slogan except for the rising fist of Prabowo Subianto (on the second frame), the key party’s figure and a retired military General, which faintly indicates the nationalist spirit of building the country with Gerindra/Haryo Seno. He deploys the same slogan as the party’s, “towards change for the betterment”, which indicates the absence of his “distinctive” platform. He merely illuminates that such a change can be established within the framework of Gerindra which employs Garuda, the national emblem to illuminate Pancasila. Gerindra uses the upper part of the bird, the neck and the head, to ostensibly represent the holistic notion of nationalist identity. The inviting word “let us” fails to arouse the spirit to build the country because the invitation sounds plain with the absence of supporting visual signs. It appears parallel to Prabowo’s image which indicates the existence of vertical communication of the party’s central figure with the public. The message loses its meaning as the close-up shot of Seno occupies almost half of the billboard to introduce Seno without attempting to disseminate his personal program within the framework of the party’s platforms. The billboard merely introduces Seno as the newcomer in the political arena.

As a newcomer, Seno correlates his image with the party’s patron, Prabowo Subianto. Prabowo’s image appears in the right hand corner while Seno’s image lies under Prabowo’s but dominates the billboard. Juxtaposing his image with Prabowo’s merely shows his lack of recognisibility as a politician and indicates that Seno is trapped in the dominant (Javanese) paternalistic discourse (see chapters six and seven). This paternalistic pattern is reinforced by way Seno positions the ballot paper dummy with the tick on his number, not simply to remind the voters of the new election system, but to illustrate the way he positions himself towards the party’s patron. This dummy’s position (vertically below Prabowo’s image and horizontally next to Seno’s image) indicates its dual functions. Firstly, it represents visual evidence of the voters’ support for Haryo Seno. Secondly, this evidence vertically reinforces Prabowo’s role as Gerindra’s patron as well as the (indirect) beneficiary of the voters’ actions as choosing Haryo Seno means expanding Gerindra’s (Prabowo’s) power, which makes Seno, at this stage, a mere visual pawn. However, this power relation does not connote an absolute visual subjection. We cannot simply perceive that Seno’s image under Prabowo demonstrates a self-conscious-act of subordinating himself, as he realises that his lack of public recognisibility can be boosted by attaching Prabowo’s image on his billboard. He uses only one eighth of the billboard’s portion to present this regimist Islamic military figure (see chapter seven). By this, although he visually positions himself lower than Prabowo, the domination of his close-up image suggests that he positions Prabowo’s image as a mere supporting visual device to gain public recognisibility. At the same time, this merely reinforces his visual reliance on Prabowo to accelerate his nationalist image. He failed to enter the House of Representatives in Senayan.
Seeing Suhardi’s billboard, the spectator’s attention will be firstly engaged with the presence of Prabowo Subianto, which is situated on the left hand side. Unlike Seno who deploys Prabowo’s image as an additional visual attribute, Suhardi uses Prabowo as an active participant who is involved in the visual material action of shaking hands. This action denotes an interaction between Suhardi as the main actor and Prabowo, who functions not as the beneficiary, but as the patient (in Hallidayian term) or the one who is affected by this action. However, although having to function as patient in Suhardi’s billboard visual grammar, Prabowo’s presence represents the one who visually endorses Suhardi’s pictorial act – lifting his left hand to the spectators as if waving. This waving hand can also be perceived as a sign of him returning the spectator’s call and smiles to them whilst shaking hand with Prabowo. This interpellative act connotes the spectators’ symbolic acknowledgment of his image construction with the use of a paddy field as the visual background.

The paddy field becomes an important marker of place as Prabowo is known as the chairperson of HKTI (see chapter seven). This marker of place ostensibly resonates with Suhardi’s slogan written in Javanese language “Dahar Telo, Ganyong, Garut, Kangge Sehat, Pinter lan Mandiri” or “Eat Cassava, Yam, Taro will Make [You] Healthy, Smart and Independent”. However, as these type of root crops do not correlate with paddy, the use of this authentic visual setting of place can be perceived as irrelevant in supporting Suhardi’s slogan. This irrelevance arguably stems from Soeharto’s “developmentalism” ideology (see Norbaiti’s billboard) that solely frames the word “tani” (in this context “growers”) with the paddy field. This meaning condensation ostensibly indicates an arbitrariness which causes visual irrelevancy on Suhardi’s visual text. However, this association no longer connotes arbitrariness as its meaning directly refers to Soeharto’s ideological framework. In
other words, this visual irrelevance reflects a motivated sign as part of Soeharto’s successfully framing this notion of Javanese prosperity.

Nonetheless, this slogan connotes Suhardi’s political campaign of utilising cassava, yam and taro as the mediums to penetrate the grassroots. Promoting these foods as alternative nutritious staple food, besides rice, seems to be parallel with what Minarto in *tabloid Sinar Tani* website found that the nutritional value of cassava is greater than rice. Thus, not only does the slogan signify the paradigmatic replacement of rice, but also suggests that through this slogan Suhardi contests Soeharto’s long-term inculcation of his agrarian ideology that rice is the main nutritious staple food for Indonesian people (see Norbaiti’s billboard section). By this, Gerindra’s current chairperson’s slogan connotes, not his support of the party’s eight progammatic socialist (read also: *ekonomi kerakyatan*) platforms as one of these programs emphasises the opening of two hectares of agricultural land for the production of rice, corn and soy, but, more importantly, his personal propaganda contesting Soeharto’s homogeneous notion of prosperity with the ostensible help of Prabowo’s presence endorsing this action. In short, the contradiction of Suhardi’s slogan with the party’s platforms means that the authentic visual portrayals (which include a series of photos depicting his participation in empowering the farmers situated on the third horizontal frame) on his billboard fail to support Suhardi’s personal political aims. Thus, we cannot also perceive Suhardi’s shaking hands with Prabowo as connoting political endorsement as his slogan contradicts Gerindra’s platforms. This appears visually as Suhardi’s political hocus-pocus.

Another important aspect to note in his slogan is the deployment of Javanese language. Representing the central Java V constituency means Suhardi deploys Javanese language instead of Indonesian. Not only does this technique capture the addressees but that also connotes his disposition in promoting the use of local language as his fundamental medium in propagating his slogan in order to penetrate the grassroots. Drawing this as an indication of Suhardi’s ethnocentric inclination would be a serious misreading as there is no indication on Suhardi’s billboard that connotes the glorification of Javanese culture, except for his use of Javanese language in illustrating his slogan.

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228 See the article entitled *Kandungan Gizi Singkong bisa lebih Besar Dibandingkan Beras* or the nutrition of cassave may be greater than rice, retrieved from [http://tabloidsinartani.com/kandungan-gizi-singkong-bisa-lebih-besar-dibandingkan-beras.html](http://tabloidsinartani.com/kandungan-gizi-singkong-bisa-lebih-besar-dibandingkan-beras.html)

229 As arguably the embodiment of *ekonomi kerakyatan* (see chapters six and seven).

Delivering this Javanese slogan, Suhardi wears not traditional Javanese costume but the party’s official uniform, which visually distinguishes his appearance from Prabowo. Prabowo wears a white shirt whereas Suhardi wears Gerindra’s uniform along with his name tag hanging loosely around his neck. This different clothing arguably marks their hierarchical status, although the colour of their shirts does not speak much about the power relation between Suhardi as Gerindra’s chairperson and Prabowo as the party’s patron. The uniform Suhardi wears connotes his activism in the party whilst Prabowo’s white shirt represents him as the party’s patron as he becomes the symbol of the party’s struggle. Suhardi does not choose to present Prabowo’s image in his military uniform, as it will revive the patron’s former image as a regimist (Islam) militaristic figure (see chapter seven) which potentially harms the objective of Suhardi’s image construction.

This image construction is then reinforced with the slogan “Pemimpin Baru Haluan Baru” or “New Leader New Course”, which is positioned on the top of the billboard. Relating the nominal group “new leader” to Suhardi and Prabowo’s appearances cannot be read as an attempt to segregate Suhardi from the patron’s image. This does not denote a reference of choice as Prabowo’s presence is to support Suhardi. Thus, with the projection of Prabowo’s nationalist image, Suhardi transforms himself as a new nationalist leader that can bring Boyolali, Surakarta, Klaten and Sukoharjo to a new course, i.e. empowering these regions to be “independent” with the production of alternative staple food (Cassava, Yam, and Taro). The inclusion of his academic titles (Prof. (Professor), Dr. (Doctor), Ir. (Engineer), and M.Sc (Master of Science) connotes his attempt to convince the spectators of his ability to realise what he promises on the billboard. This politicking failed to bring Suhardi into the House of Representative in Senayan.

Seno’s Image versus Suhardi’s Image

The discernible similarities and differences between Seno’s and Suhardi’s billboards lie in the deployment of the patron’s image and the utilisation of Gerindra’s official colour. They both deploy Prabowo’s civilian image in a quite different way. Seno uses Prabowo as the figure that is positioned parallel with his slogan invoking the nationalist spirit to build the country together. This is reinforced by the dominant red colour to accentuate this nationalist notion. Moreover, to reinforce the party’s nationalist notion, Seno uses Gerindra’s logo (Garuda) to cement this invocation. This needs Prabowo’s civilian (read: resilient) image as Prabowo’s image as a (regimist) militaristic figure potentially damages the invocation as well as Seno’s nationalist image building.

In alignment with Seno, Suhardi accentuates Prabowo’s image as HKTI’s chairperson to support his ekonomi kerakyatan programs. However, as discussed earlier, his slogan which represents his target
of the agrarian sector contradicts the party’s agrarian sector. In this sense, as Prabowo is arguably perceived as the embodiment of the party’s ideology and possibly the one that determines and endorses the party’s programs and actions, Prabowo’s presence potentially damages Suhardi’s image. This is due to the contradictory agrarian sector Suhardi chose to emphasise. This also means that the use of paddy field as the background on his billboard becomes a marker that reinforces the contradiction. Instead, the field reinforces Prabowo’s image as HKTI’s chairperson. Moreover, the absence of religious visual/verbal attributes on Seno’s and Suhardi’s billboards reinforces the party’s nationalist/secular stance albeit Prabowo is seen as a regimist Islamic figure (see chapter seven).

Hanura

Like Haryo Seno’s billboard, Dosy Iskandar Prasetyo’s billboard adopts a similar tactic in his politics of image. From the left hand side on the first vertical frame of Prasetyo’s billboard, we can see the smiling image of Wiranto, the retired General who was the former commander of the Armed Forces in Soeharto’s era. The retired General’s smile is very important in his image for it is a strategy to soften his stern military face, which would then dilute not only Wiranto’s military rigidity but also the party which claimed to gain much support from the military camp. As discussed in chapter seven, not only is Wiranto’s militaristic image built on the contestation of the nationalist “red and white” versus the regimist Islamic “green” military factions (Wiranto versus Prabowo), but also behind his stern military face, Wiranto also possessed Javanese political subtlety as he learnt to use this device from his former patron, Soeharto, especially in arranging a political strategy to secure his position after Soeharto’s resignation (see chapter seven). No visual sign is found to indicate Hanura’s patron’s militaristic image, as the use of Islamic attribute, such as peci along with batik shirt, successfully
dilutes his military rigidity at the visual level. As frequently noted, the use of peci signifies the exploitation of this Islamic code that connotes the socio-moral status of the person who wears it. However, when Soekarno (as cited by Adams, 2011, p. 61) declared that peci did not merely represent one’s religiosity as it became one part of the national attire to differentiate Indonesian people from the Dutch coloniser, Wiranto’s use of peci together with a batik shirt reinforces his nationalist image instead of the religious one. However, this does not make peci lose its status as the bearer of the Islamic code, as peci is employed along with the title hajj (H.) in front of Wiranto’s name. Thus, by combining the nominal group “Jenderal TNI (Purn)” or Indonesia’s national Armed Forces retired General before the title hajj, Prasetyo frames the party’s patron’s image by fusing the nationalist and Islamic notions into one corporeal body.

Furthermore, the circular frame which delineates Wiranto’s image above the ballot paper dummy indicates not Prasetyo’s attempt to control the patron’s image to prevent Wiranto’s visual domination, but more importantly represents Prasetyo’s branding technique in equating Wiranto’s image with the party’s logo. This parallelism is highly important as the voters need to remember that choosing Hanura (Prasetyo) means supporting Wiranto. The party’s logo (an arrow) which signifies the linear thinking structure is positioned next to Wiranto’s image. The logo appears to be flowing and connotes the waving horizontal pattern to indicate the party’s target progress movement (see chapter five). The light brown colour which resonates with the colour of the soil becomes the marker of the party’s target (read: arrow, see chapter five). However, the real target is absent due to the absence of the authentic visual setting of place on the billboard that resulted in the visual discredibility to demonstrate his/the party’s “distinctive” platform: the economic reform and cheap but good education.

However, although Hanura’s logo is present at three different spots (on the ballot paper dummy; next to Wiranto’s circle frame; and on Prasetyo’s party uniform), it is the gaze and smile of Prasetyo that engage the spectator’s attention and thus becomes the vector of his billboard. His smile is also intended to rhyme with Wiranto’s smile. This smile which connotes friendliness ostensibly softens the party’s strong-willed slogan (see chapters five and seven). Prasetyo’s close-up portrait represents a symbolic attributive process in that Prasetyo becomes the carrier of the symbolic attribute “Hanura’s nationalist image” resulting from the image projection of Wiranto’s image to the party. The image of bright light surrounding Prasetyo’s body indicates a “halo” effect around his

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231 The batik shirt represents the (nationalist) notion of Indonesia-ness as UNESCO acknowledges batik as the world heritage cloth from Indonesia. The acknowledgement is of high importance to Indonesians as Malaysia, the neighbouring country, often claims Indonesian traditional art as its own.

232 The party stated in KPU’s website that the party’s logo is the arrow shape which inscribed the name of HANURA (see chapter five).
corporeal body that plausibly connotes his attempt at creating a “transcendent” (if not sacred) effect, as this appears along with party’s strong-willed slogan. Presenting this “transcendent” notion is important to exhort spectators to perceive him as the figure that can embody the (party’s) divine conscience (kesadaran illahiyah, see chapter seven).

This ostensible visual “divinity” needs the support of religious attribute, in this case in form of the title hajj in front of Prasetyo’s name. However, this tactic seems to lose its strength as the absence of Islamic attributes for Muslim males such as peci, baju koko and turban attenuates the demonstration of Prasetyo’s religious (Islamic) nationalist identity. Like most candidates, the rectangular name box below his name represents the accentuation of his billboard in demonstrating the tactic of borrowing nationalist and/or religious images from Wiranto in order to construct his identity as the legislative candidate at the national level representing Surabaya and Sidoarjo constituency. Although he failed in his candidacy, he succeeded in becoming the Secretary General of Hanura.

Agoes Suryadjaja’s Billboard

Unlike Prasetyo, Agoes Suryadjaja does not rely on Wiranto’s image. The absence of Hanura’s patron’s image marks this party candidate’s confidence of his recognisibility (if not yet popularity), as he believes that the inclusion of his role as the 1998 solidarity activism is sufficient to make voters
choose him. Suryadjaja’s reliance on this visual/cultural capital can be seen on the black frame (in contrast to white background colour) situated on the bottom of his billboard underscoring his visual appearance. However, no visual sign is found in supporting Suryadjaja’s claims as an activist. The absence of the authentic visual setting of place dilutes Suryadjaja’s image construction as his billboard merely represents the symbolic attributive process in which Suryadjaja becomes the main participant (the carrier) that solely bears his claim.

What is also interesting to note on his billboard is the linguistic domination, especially on the first vertical frame. This frame occupies almost three quarters of his billboard featuring the ballot paper dummy which dominates this frame. Suryadjaja’s dummy functions not only as the visual attribute that supports Suryadjaja’s image construction as the legislative candidate at the regional level, but also as the visual accentuation. The dummy merely illustrates Suryadjaja’s candidacy number on the candidate list. He uses the branding technique of using dots to metaphorically “disallow” the existence of his fellow Hanura candidates as the presence of their names would damage his image construction. However, a close look at this dummy reveals the difference between Suryadjaja’s techniques in presenting his name with other candidates. When most candidates use a rectangular name box as a frame to accentuate and underscore their image construction, Suryadjaja perceives that the presence of his name on the ballot paper dummy sufficiently illustrates his profile. However, he does not position his name as the linguistic element that underscores the image package. Instead, as mentioned, he frames and underscores his image package as the social and political activist using a black-coloured frame that trespasses the first and second horizontal frames of his billboard.

Besides this dummy domination, Suryadjaja’s slogan “Agoes...Agoes...Agar Esok Lebih Baik” or “Agoes...Agoes...in order to have better tomorrow” which trespasses the domain of the second frame indicates a hailing act as the first two words “Agoes...Agoes” suggests a name-calling. This represents the way Suryadjaja builds a linguistic interpersonal approach with spectators by demonstrating his first name that arguably dilutes the formality of Indonesian cultural greeting expressions such as “Bapak” (Mr.) or “Ibu” (Mrs.) preceding one’s name. However, this linguistic dilution holds a temporary status as the second line (“Agar esok lebih baik” or “in order to have better tomorrow) modifies Suryadjaja’s name calling. This line denotes that the deployment of his first name (Agoes) is used as an abbreviation (Agar esok lebih baik) that linguistically defines the way Suryadjaja constructs his identity. This technique demonstrates Suryadjaja’s attempt at “herding” the spectator’s gaze by deploying visual and verbal equation of Suryadjaja’s visual image with the verbal text of his slogan. This visual “herding” continues as the third line of this first horizontal frame
signifies that after perceiving Suryadjaja’s image as the embodiment of future betterment (“in order to have better future”), the eyes of the spectators are then escorted to the procedural rubric to vote for him. The blue font colour in the rubric “ambil surat suara warna biru” (“take the blue ballot paper”) indicates a mild order to the spectators to choose him by firstly taking the blue paper and ticking his number on the ballot paper on the election day, as his dummy indicates.

Another important visual aspect on Suryadjaja’s billboard is his smiling, close-up picture. As discussed, not only does his smile function as the visual vector that constructs visual “conviviality”, but it also represents that the sole appearance of Suryadjaja as the main participant in the visual text represents the utilisation of a symbolic attributive process at the visual level. This type of process illustrates the objective of Suryadjaja’s branding. The use of the party’s light brown jacket along with his tie resonates with the party’s official light brown colour which is perceived as representing the party’s wisdom in order to realise the nation’s independence and prosperity. The white background colour is perceived as representing Hanura’s sacredness of bearing the people’s mandate. Thus, embodying these colours, Suryadjaja attempts to construct a nationalist image that embodies the one who is willing to work for the nation’s future betterment.

At the same time, the colour deployment also suggests not merely that the party institutionally constrains the meaning of its official colours, but it also shows us that Suryadjaja’s image-building is operated within this framework. No religious signs are found in Suryadjaja’s billboard. He failed in his candidacy.

**Prasetyo’s Image versus Suryadjaja’s Image**

The difference between the image building of Prasetyo and Suryadjaja lies in the deployment of Wiranto’s image. Although Wiranto’s image does not dominate Prasetyo’s billboard, his reliance on this patron’s image is arguably self-evident. This can be seen from the way he deploys Wiranto’s civilian image as the marker to reinforce his nationalist image. At the same time, as Wiranto is seen as the embodiment of Hanura’s ideology (see chapter seven), Prasetyo’s employment of the party’s slogan on his billboard reinforces this reliance. By this, it can be argued that Prasetyo is completely co-opted into Hanura’s nationalist (paternalistic) framework as he does not include any visual/verbal complementary (if not prime) elements as his “signature”. He simply immerses himself in Wiranto’s (Hanura’s) image as a retired Javanese military General. Wiranto’s donning of batik and peci along with his smile and the title “hajji” on his name arguably represents a visual act of attenuating his

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stern Military image. At the same time, this also arguably represents his resilient image as a good Indonesian Muslim civilian.

In contrast with Prasetyo, as a former 1998 activist who fought against Soeharto’s government in the May riot, Suryadjaja, a Sino-Indonesian legislative candidate, does not include Wiranto’s image on his billboard as he is confident that he gains sufficient level of prominence as the 1998 activist. However, this exclusion cannot be seen as solely signifying Suryadjaja’s personal confidence. As Wiranto was known as the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces in 1998 who declared that the Army would protect Soeharto’s family after the resignation, Suryadjaja’s act of becoming Hanura’s legislative candidate can be seen as a way of showing to the public that Wiranto’s camp (versus Prabowo’s, see chapter seven) was the right one. However, this act needs a further re-examination as the possibility behind Suryadjaja’s candidacy could derive from the result of political lobbying. Whatever the reasons behind this, his candidacy connotes the way he positions himself within the party’s nationalist framework without necessarily co-opting into a complete glorification of Hanura’s patron image at the visual level.

To sum up, the candidates from the nationalist faction position themselves in the ideological ambiguity of Islamic/Nationalist and the imperceptible ethnic (Javanese) strands. A closer examination of these billboards shows that the ideological contestation of Islamic/Nationalist dichotomies (represented from the presence of the parties’ paternalistic figures on the candidates’ billboards) arguably derives from the perennial political intrigue between the nationalist parties’ central figures (SBY, Megawati, Wiranto and Prabowo), especially at the end of and during the post Soeharto era. As discussed in chapter seven, Soeharto used his military confidants, Wiranto and Prabowo, as his pawns in a dual strategy – Wiranto in the “red-and-white” (nationalist) military camp and Prabowo in the green (Islamic regimist) military camp – to secure his power. Instead of securing his position, this strategy brought about a rebound effect on Soeharto. Wiranto’s and Prabowo’s thirst for power as well as their conflict of interest (see chapter seven) arguably contributed to putting Soeharto’s position and power at stake. Soeharto’s resignation seemed to aggravate the conflict as Wiranto succeeded in making Habibie (Soeharto’s successor) oust Prabowo from his position. Wiranto’s failure in nominating himself as Megawati’s running mate before the 1999 election did not make him lose leverage on the military. Wiranto then succeeded in securing his position as the Chief Commander of the Army in Gus Dur’s administration. During his time as the Army Chief Commander in Gus Dur’s era, Wiranto ousted SBY and Agum Gumelar (the potential candidates for his replacement) from the military, as he realised that his relationship with Gus Dur

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234 Megawati’s camp had to admit the Islamic camp’s (the Central Axis Group) manuever in making Gus Dur the President after her camp refused to make a political compromise with the Islamic camp.
had deteriorated (see chapter seven). Wiranto then utilised Golkar as his electoral vehicle in order to win the Presidency in the 2004 elections. Two years after his loss in the 2004 Presidential election, Wiranto established Hanura. As for Prabowo, his return from Jordan arguably marked his political resilience. He then left Golkar in 2008 and joined Gerindra – the party that was constructed by his brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo and Fadli Zon, his long-time ally – as Prabowo’s electoral vehicle. As for SBY, he resigned from his post as the Minister of Political and Security Affair in Megawati’s government in 2004 and decided to actively engage in PD (the party that was long prepared as his electoral vehicle to win the Presidency (see chapter seven)).

As history taught them that the ideological/political contestation cannot be seen as simply reflecting the segregation between good and evil. They all realise that presenting themselves as the embodiment of the inclusive, democratic, nationalist and religious notions of Pancasila is not only imperative but more importantly also saleable. They perceive that Pancasila’s notion of harmony (equilibrium) achieved by upholding the mutual assistance/sharing burden (gotong royong), deliberation (musyawarah) and consensus (mufakat) notions found its best “actualisation” in the form of embracing both nationalist and Islamic strands (not necessarily to the same degree) within the framework of (Javanese) paternalism. Within this, the system of representation in the nationalist candidates’ image construction operates under this ideological subjection at the visual level. The next chapter will examine the candidates’ billboards from the Islamic faction in order to see the depiction of the candidates’ positions and dispositions at the visual level in Pancasila discourse.
Chapter Ten

Reading the Candidates’ Billboards of the Islamic Parties

This chapter aims to explore the scope with which the candidates’ billboards from the Islamic faction express their dispositions towards the polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands in the Indonesian political arena. This is conducted by reading the billboards’ narratives as signifying practices. The visual and written attributes the candidates use on their billboards will textually demonstrate their dispositions in Pancasila discourse.

This chapter is divided into five main sections. The first four sections discuss the candidates’ billboards from PKS, PAN, PPP and PKB whilst the last section compares the reading practices of the candidates’ billboards from the nationalist and Islamic factions. Each section comprises two sub-sections. I will conduct a reading comparison of the billboards of the same party at the end of every sub-section.

PKS

Hidayat Nur Wahid’s Billboard

![Hidayat Nur Wahid’s Billboard](http://www.kaskus.us/showthread.php?t=3928768)

This billboard can be divided into two vertical frames. The first one denotes the slogan “Rakyat Punya Selera” (The People Got the Taste) with an imperceptible background image. The second one denotes a clearer picture depicting several men in a rescue mission. In analysing this billboard, I will firstly concentrate on the second frame as it gives us clearer information of the participants involved.
in this rescue action which takes place in a flooded area. This reading will reveal the associative connection between the written slogan on the first frame with the rescue action on the second frame which is interrelated with the dark blue frame at the bottom of this billboard.

This is the billboard that depicts Hidayat Nur Wahid’s (the former chairperson of People’s Consultative Assembly in 2004-2009 and the legislative member from PKS) humanitarian activities. As this billboard does not provide any information regarding Wahid’s status as the legislative candidate, we cannot directly perceive it as Wahid’s medium to promote himself as the legislative candidate. However, it appeared during the campaign period. Wahid’s billboard merely captures his image from a slanting angle to show that it focuses more on presenting his seemingly altruistic action in helping the flood victims rather than facing the camera. He is depicted wearing a white cap that covers his facial expression. He is seen looking at a group of men helping the flood victims and giving his thumb-up to them, while sitting on a rescue boat holding an oar. This action signifies Wahid’s attempt to encourage the volunteers who were helping the flood victims. However, this also affirms the hierarchical power relation between him as the “gusti” and the group of men as the kawula. These volunteer activities signify the nationalist spirit of gotong royong (mutual assistance/sharing burden, see chapter six) of this Islamic party. Wahid’s presence seems more like an inspection of PKS’ candidates’ voluntary works.

In order to reinforce this construction of nationalist identity, Wahid is depicted wearing a black and white batik shirt and a life vest. With him are two male volunteers who wear long-sleeve black T-shirts, three male volunteers who wear short-sleeve black T-shirts, one male volunteer who wears a white T-shirt, and one male volunteer who wears no T-shirt. As discussed earlier, batik represents a nationalist notion of Indonesia-ness. Wearing this type of clothing means this prominent PKS’ figure represents more his nationalist side than his Islamic side. Moreover, the black and white colours that dominate their clothing cannot be perceived as merely connoting the contestation between good versus evil (as in the case of PDI-P), as the party frames the meaning of white as reflecting the party’s cleanliness and purity, whilst black is perceived as representing aspiration and certainty (Dienaputra, 2011, p. 171). Thus, representing these two colours at the same time connotes the party’s attempt to demonstrate visually that their humanitarian actions are based on the Islamic legal maxim: amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (enjoining the good, preventing the evil, see chapter eight). In this sense, the party offers a counter-narrative of not referring to the presence of black and white as solely connoting a binary opposition between good versus evil, as it controls the meaning of these official colours by relating them to a construction of the party’s nationalist (and/or Islamic) image. The party wants the spectators to perceive that this is a “pure” humanitarian action which reflects
the party’s “real” response to people’s suffering. This also represents the way the party materialises
the people’s aspirations, and thus, makes this billboard become visual evidence that will assure the
spectators of their *amar ma’ruf nahi munkar* platforms (see chapter eight).

However, a closer look at this image reveals that the male figures dominate the billboard. This
arguably reflects, as Rinaldo (2008) found, a labour division between PKS’ male and female
candidates, in which both parties agree\(^{235}\). Women are absent from this conspicuous voluntary visual
scene which occupies almost half of the billboard. One female figure appears solely and covertly as a
student wearing a white headscarf in the imperceptible background of the slogan (the first vertical
frame) which shows Wahid as *gusti* surrounded by *kawula* when visiting the location. Wahid’s
“philanthropic” action affirm the constructed segregation of the social, cultural and political roles of
males/females and *gusti/kawula* in Indonesian patriarchal society.

Nonetheless, if we compare the first and second frames, we will find that the plausible focus of this
billboard is on the second frame. However, if we examine this one closely, we will find that the focus
mainly lies in fetishising Wahid as *gusti*, as the first and second frames are connected by the same
thematic action, i.e. reifying Wahid’s “philanthropic” action (which positions him as *gusti*) as the
political commodity. This commodity becomes the “business” visual sample that exemplifies the
party’s abilities in ostensibly bringing “beneficence” for the people. This sample is wrapped up by
the presence of Wahid inspecting the work of PKS’ cadres in this philanthropic action (the second
frame). This inspecting event continues with Wahid’s presence in a location, possibly nearby the
flooded area. He is depicted surrounded by school students and most possibly the flood victims in the
first (imperceptible) frame. The imperceptibility of this frame does not connote the insignificance of
Wahid’s action although this frame is then covered by a slogan (“*Rakyat Punya Selera*” or “The
People Got the Taste”). Instead, this cover arguably makes the spectators see that Wahid’s action is
mere publicity gimmickry.

This construction is framed by imitating the cigarette’s ad “*Gudang Garam* International”, the
survivor version (see *Gudang Garam* International’s billboard). As mentioned, Wahid alters the
cigarette’s slogan “*Pria Punya Selera*” (The Man Got the Taste) into “*Rakyat Punya Selera*” (The
People Got the Taste). The product’s logo and name “*Gudang Garam* Internasional” is altered in the
logo and the name of the party, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Prosperous Justice Party). In the middle
of the first and second frames of Wahid’s billboard lies the party’s slogan: Clean, Caring,
Professional. This slogan is deployed to illuminate the qualities of PKS’ candidates. The typical
government’s warning attached at the bottom of the billboard for cigarette advertisements is

\(^{235}\) See the elaboration of this in the analysis of Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah’s billboard
altered into the people’s warning that choosing PKS will result in the prosperity of the people, the progressive development of the country, the annihilation of corruption and increasing pride in the nation and state. The word “warning” which connotes negative attributes is transformed into a positive one as Wahid transforms it into the medium to propagate the party’s mission. However, the mere direct correlation we can associate with the party’s platform, i.e. clean governance, is the employment of the phrase “the annihilation of corruption” which does not match with the visual signs the billboard provides. He succeeded in his candidacy.

**Kharisma, Adik Al Fajar and Azizah’s Billboard**

![Billboard of Kharisma, Adik Al Fajar and Azizah](http://yohanesss.multiply.com/photos/album/334/Aneka-baliho-caleg-di-Yogyakarta)

This billboard features three PKS candidates at the same time. Starting from the left hand side, the images of Kharisma, Adik Al Fajar and Azizah appear consecutively. Reading these three images brings the spectator’s attention to focus on the spatial distance between these male and female candidates. This distance signifies a visual gender segregation, which connotes the party’s disposition which arguably derives from an adoption of Arab’s (Islamic) culture (Hamdani, 2007, p. 10). The white curtain inside mosques exemplifies this cultural adoption as in reality Indonesian males and females are actively interacted without this “metaphorical” curtain. However, Rinaldo (2008, pp. 28-29) found that PKS seems to inherently adopt this gender segregation which can be seen from, for instance, the separation between males and females candidates during their rallies and the prohibition of males and females shaking hands. By this, the spatial distance between Azizah and Kharisma and Fajar reinforces this practice as their distance visually connotes the segregation. In Hodge and Kress’ (1988, p. 55) language, this distance represents a “proxemic statement” in which this visual proximity connotes a gender marker which defines not merely gender segregation and
labour division but also the party’s “specific reception regime”. In this sense, this distance becomes a
metaphoric visual marker that segregates the roles of men and women in PKS’ Islamic discourse. In
contrast to Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s billboard where visual distance between these PDI-P’s
candidates does not exist albeit they appear wearing Islamic apparel, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah’s
visual distance is very important to be displayed as it represents the ideological bound of the
candidates within the party’s Islamic discourse.

Rinaldo (2008, p. 28) further reinforces the party’s gender segregation as male candidates control
“the intellectual and ideological work of the party”, whilst the social and cultural realms such as
family and education are handled by the women. This labour division arguably resonates with the
pattern Soeharto used in constructing the regime’s notion of femininity in which women play their
significant roles in supporting their husbands by joining Dharma Wanita (see chapters five and
seven), a wing organisation of KORPRI (Indonesia’s Civil Servants Corps). Their main duty was to help
propagate Golkar’s platforms through counselling programs regarding family and education. This
labour division cannot be seen as completely undermining the roles of women as if to trap them into
dealing exclusively with the subjects of domestic welfare. Through this means, women penetrate the
private sphere of their constituents, a propaganda strategy which forges a durable ideological
attachment, especially when it is conducted consistently and effectively. PKS’ women embrace this
pattern without resistance for, as Rinaldo (2008, p. 32) notes, PKS women believe that “men and
women have different main tasks, but that they ultimately are both judged and valued equally by
Allah”. In other words, the visual distance on the billboard does not completely subordinate
women’s labour (as the presence of Azizah appears parallel as Kharisma and Fajar), but it more
represents female Muslim self-conscious acceptance of this metaphorical distance, even though
men’s and women’s spheres, without exception, overlap. Rinaldo further asserts that not only does
the party’s division of labour resonate with Soeharto and derive from the fact that most of PKS’
female candidates were brought up during Soeharto’s era, but this division is also perceived as not
contradicting the (party’s) Islamic precepts.

Returning to the visual image of these three candidates, their outfit also marks the party’s
perspective on how PKS’ women frame their corporeal bodies in jilbab. In contrast to Kharisma and
Fajar’s images which feature them wearing the party’s uniform, Azizah’s image does not seem to
enjoy similar outfit as PKS’ men. PKS’ women wear a modest, white jilbab to connote not only their
obedience towards this (debatable) religious obligation, but this obedience also demonstrates a
collective moral precept in disciplining their bodies. The party’s modest style of jilbab with a simple
white colour (compared to Norbaiti) distinguishes Azizah (also read: PKS’ women) from other veiled
Muslim women. Rinaldo (2008) found that not only does this element mark a class distinction, but this distinction also represents “a collective pious identity” as all female PKS’ candidates perceive the donning of jilbab as connoting their fulfilment of this “religious obligation”. Moreover, Rinaldo (2008, p. 29) also found that this donning act also represents their resistance towards Soeharto’s “gender ideology” that restricted them in disciplining their bodies as Soeharto perceived this as part of political Islamic practices.

Besides the resistance in the politics of women’s clothing, the politics of colours becomes an important visual element that needs to be analysed. The first horizontal frame uses the violet colour which frames the name of the city as their constituency. The second frame uses red and white colours which resonate with the colours of the national flag (situated above these candidates’ images), golden yellow colour that dominates the billboard and the black and white colours of Kharisma and Fajar’s clothes. The black-coloured frame illustrates Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah’s candidacy as the legislative candidates at the regional level (Yogyakarta). I begin the visual analysis by firstly focusing on the dominant colour of golden yellow, black and white colours of the candidates’ uniform and the red and white colours on the second frame and later move to the third and first frames. As the dominant colour, the colour of golden yellow functions as one of the vectors (besides the way Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah gaze and smile) that establishes interpersonal relation between the spectator and the candidates. This interpersonal relation is built through projecting the notion of prosperity as the golden yellow colour suggests (see chapter five). This indicates the candidates’ reliance on how this colour transfers the notion of prosperity as the image of golden yellow paddy also appears on the background to reinforce this notion. By this, instead of accentuating the notion of sacredness through the use of white colour, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah accentuate the nationalist notion of prosperity (see chapter five) in their image. However, this does not mean that they dilute the party’s notion of sacredness as white appears on their uniforms.

Covering their bodies with white connotes the act of concealing their identity with purity/sacredness. This purity then visually “converses” with the colour of white of the national flag. This visual “conversation” indicates the creation of colour equation (also relation) in which the notion of purity/sacredness of this Islamic party operates in the same way as the nationalist ones. However, if we look at the use of red and white colours from a “high” angle, we will find that these colours constitute the nationalist code that attaches to Fajar’s vest. In short, instead of using peci, baju koko, and turban to reinforce their Islamic identity, Kharisma and Fajar deploy the party’s logo to speak for their religious identity and use the symbol of the national flag on their vest or jacket to

236 Kharisma wears the party’s jacket. Fajar wears the party’s vest whilst Azizah wear a modest jilbab.
indicate their nationalism. Thus, at this stage, without having to exploit the use of clothing and nationalist symbols, these candidates construct their religious identity with a nationalist nuance.

Besides the colours of golden yellow and white, black emerges as the second dominating colour of Kharisma and Fajar’s uniform. In contrast to PDI-P in perceiving black as the symbol of sacredness, PKS regards this colour as representing certainty and aspiration, as earlier mentioned. This different interpretation reflects not simply the ideological difference between these nationalist and Islamic parties, but connotes more how they control the ostensible “arbitrariness” of their official colours, such as black. As noted, black dominates the third frame which illustrates Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah’s candidacy, the area they come from (Danurejan), and the party’s logo at the bottom left hand corner of this frame. In illustrating their candidacy, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah use white to connote the sacredness of their roles (as the legislative candidates) and the party’s number at the bottom left hand corner and black (which connotes certainty and aspiration) to frame this sacredness. The golden yellow is also used to indicate the prosperity of the area they come from. A close examination of these colours’ saturation reveals that they represent the projection of the party’s logo which frames the way Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah construct and promote their identity through their billboard as a “mobile” advertising medium (Gudis, 2004). As for the colour of violet which appears on the first frame, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah simply use violet as the background colour saturating the frame which denotes the name of the province (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta).

Furthermore, no written slogan is found except for the party’s slogan “bersih, peduli dan profesional” or “clean, caring, and professional”. This indicates the candidates’ reliance on this slogan to project the party’s constructed qualities to them. At the same time, this absence also suggests their campaign programs’ obscurity, as they simply show their close-up pictures which indicate a construction of intimacy (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1990, 2006) represented through a symbolic attributive process. Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah become the carriers of the party’s slogan and active participants in the party’s Islamic discourse. This politicking failed to bring them into the regional House of Representative.

**Wahid’s Image versus Kharisma’s, Fajar’s and Azizah’s Images**

The dominant elements that distinguish the image of these three PKS’ candidates are gender, colour, and clothes. From the element of gender, these two billboards demonstrate the act of segregating PKS’ males and females. This can be seen from the degree of visual proximity between Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah and the obscure appearance of a female school student on Wahid’s billboard. Not only do these indicate a visual marginalisation of these female characters, but also the visual
proportion given to the male characters to be overtly and actively engaged in PKS’ *amar ma’ruf nahi munkar* discourse (see Wahid’s billboard). The appearance of Azizah in the same frame as Kharisma and Fajar, which plausibly negates this marginalisation as it connotes the act of equalising men and women, can be perceived almost in a similar way as the appearance of the female student. The student appears as the sole female character in the first frame, as when she appears in the second frame, she arguably disturbs the philanthropic act of PKS’ male cadres (see Wahid’s billboard). In this sense, the significance of her position and role at the visual level are defined by her function as a supporting participant who seemingly receives Wahid’s help in the first frame. In a similar light, Azizah’s spatial distance also indicates a similarly marginal position. However, for Azizah, her marginal position seems to be an indefinite one as she appears in parallel with the male candidates, Kharisma and Fajar. In this sense, the visual marginalisation of PKS’ female characters on these two billboards is an indeterminate one as an equal right is given to PKS’ women (such as Azizah) to nominate themselves. At the same time, as earlier discussed, Azizah’s spatial distance also connotes the party’s construction of femininity which segregates the tasks and obligations of males and females (see Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah’s billboard).

From the perspective of colours, the stark difference between their billboards lies in the different dominant colours they use. As noted, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah deploy PKS’ official colours to indicate that they are nationalist Muslim candidates, whilst Wahid uses a blood-red colour to signify his nationalist stance. This difference connotes the loose manner in deploying the compositional element of colour as Wahid’s billboard cannot be perceived as completely complying with the party’s colours code. However, although Wahid’s blood-red colour does not fully align with the nationalist notion of bravery (as represented by Indonesia’s national flag), Wahid’s billboard arguably connotes similar notion of “bravery” as his billboard imitates the cigarette ad (*Gudang Garam*) that signifies masculinity. Thus, arguably, within this framework, it is not surprising to find that Wahid gives a minor portion to the female student on his billboard. At the same time, this also demonstrates that Wahid chooses not to completely deploy the party’s colours (like in the case of Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah) as imitating the ad means adopting the popular publicity campaign that its spectators are conversant with. Not only does this arguably minimise the “distance” between him as a candidate and the spectators/voters, but it also traps him in the similar masculinity discourse of the ad.

Returning to the third dominant element, i.e. PKS’ candidates clothes, we will find that their similar/different attire position them as both Islamic and nationalist figures. As mentioned earlier, Kharisma and Fajar wear PKS’ official vest and jacket whilst Azizah wears a modest white *jilbab* in
order to connote their nationalist and Islamic stances. Wahid deploys a different strategy to 
reinforce this dual image. He wears batik, cap, life jacket, and peci (on the first frame), abstenting 
the presence of PKS’ official clothes’ attributes. In this sense, compared to colours, clothes become 
the marker that arguably attenuates the rigidity of the party’s ideological attributes.

PAN

Ahmad Firdaus’ Billboard

This billboard can be divided into two vertical frames. The first one features a close-up image of 
Ahmad Firdaus holding a gun, whilst the second one features a series of pictures capturing PAN’s 
former chairperson (Soetrisno Bachir) and his political activities. However, as Bachir’s pictures are 
presented in a series of small vertical pictures, we cannot clearly see who is represented in this 
series except for the first picture featuring Bachir’s close-up image. The verbal text (Fans 7) above 
these pictures indicates the way Firdaus perceives and positions them vis-a-vis his own image on his 
billboard. Prior to analysing this further, we need to return to Firdaus’ image as he emerges as the 
first represented participant on the left hand side of the billboard. Dissecting his image will later 
demystify the connection between the first and second frames. The way he gazes and poses holding 
his gun become the vectors that engage the spectator’s attention to his billboard.

Ahmad Firdaus was the former provincial legislative member of Banten (1999-2003). He was also 
known as a former TKI, an Indonesian migrant worker in Saudi Arabia. He worked in data entry in a 
hospital, then moved to the pharmacy division, and later worked in a printing company. Dissatisfied
with his income, he joined an NGO called Fostaki (a forum for TKI) which later brought him in as the chairperson of PAN in Banten. He transforms himself into James Bond (by wearing a black tuxedo and holding a gun) who declares war on corruption, stupidity and poverty (the use of pistol signifies this attempt). The association is merely made due to Firdaus’ number on the ballot paper (no. 7) which resonates with 007. His interest in how CIA and MI6 (CIA’s counterpart in Britain) allegedly intervened in the debatable G30S PKI/Communist incident inspires him to “become” the British secret agent, James Bond, in order to achieve his political goal as the legislative member who wants to eradicate corruption, stupidity and poverty.

However, Bond is never created to eradicate those three things. Thomas (2009, pp. 32-39) argues that the story-lines of James Bond’s films represent “a distorted circus-like” reflection that narrates historical changes of the world order from the “internationalist [the old Bond films] to globalist [the 1990s and 2000s Bond films] paradigm”. Thomas found that the shifting of this paradigm is in line with the contemporary perspective of the so-called “political correctness” in which the political agencies such as UN, IMF, and even CIA and MI6 are possibly (if not allegedly) in complicity with global capitalist crimes, such as inciting coup d’états in so-called third world countries. Relating this phenomenon with what Firdaus wrote in his blog about the possibility of CIA intervention in toppling Soekarno’s administration through the 1965 G30S PKI incident, leads us to see that Firdaus’ transformation as a British secret agent arguably indicates a bizarre contradictory action. However, what Firdaus wants to emphasise is not in the way he lets himself be co-opted into this contradiction. He seems to see himself as a contemporary Bond that will retaliate against these “crimes” by adopting Bond’s “maverick exceptional qualities, such as “legal standards, democratic decision-making and transparency to the public” (Thomas, 2009, pp. 32, 39). These qualities distance Bond from the ambiguous stance of those agencies (read: Bond’s employers) as they are often perceived as representatives of the world order. At the same time, these agencies cannot escape from their political interests which often trap them in the complicity of, for instance, the aforementioned coup d’états.

Returning to Firdaus’ adoption of Bond’s qualities, this adoption is arguably an absurd one, as the visual transference of these qualities cannot be simply conducted by wearing Bond’s tuxedo. The absurdity continues as what seems to be the basis of Firdaus’ visual transformation is not only on his

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fondness for this Western (imperialist?) hero’s characteristics, but also his abomination for the agency Bond represents (MI6).

What is also interesting is to note from this visuality is that it demonstrates the ways in which Firdaus resists and translates Bond’s films as the so-called global product penetrated Indonesia. These responses reflect, as Chapman (2001, p. 14) and Thomas (2009, p. 34) argue, the success of Bond films that have been watched “for half a century” by “at least half of the world’s population”. By this, it can be argued that seeing Firdaus’ billboard means seeing the mechanism of how this Islamic inclusive party’s legislative candidate interprets and positions himself in the so-called globalised phenomena of James Bond.

Besides James Bond, he also attaches a small image of Afatar\(^{239}\) (sic) and puts it between PAN’s logo and his own trademark (Firdaus 007 Bond). Incorporating this Nickelodeon cartoon character’s image, Firdaus attempts to reinforce his heroic quality as Avatar is seen as the representation of the Last Airbender who has to learn to master three other different elements (water, fire, and earth), besides the element of his tribe (air), in order to preserve the world’s equilibrium. This visual reinforcement cannot be perceived as having overt correlation with the image construction of the Islamic inclusive party\(^{240}\) he represents and James Bond. Firdaus simply deploys this Avatar’s image to reinforce his image construction as the candidate who has the heroic (cartoon) abilities to eradicate corruption, stupidity and poverty as his verbal slogan suggests (“Korupsi...?, Kebodohan...?, Kemiskinan...?, Perang...!!!!” or “Corruption...?, Stupidity...?, Poverty...? War...!!!!!”). Lasswell (2005) contends that Avatar represents the synthesis of Asian influences such as Japanese anime, Chinese Kung Fu, Korea, Indian Yoga. This makes its deployment on Firdaus’ billboard arguably contradict the Western (imperialist?) character Firdaus adopts when he presents himself as James Bond.

Firdaus then continues masking his identity by concocting an Islamic touch to his image. As an Islamic theology graduate, he includes one of Al Qur’an verses, Al Kahfi 107, under his name as his attempt to indirectly describe himself. He capitalised the words “sesungguhnya” or the truth, “beriman” and “beramal sholeh” or “faithful, pious and do good works according to Islamic values” and “Firdaus” (his name which means heaven). Relating those words implies that Firdaus attempts to define himself as the person who has those qualities written in the holy Quran. Associating himself with James Bond, Avatar, and the Qur’an verses not only affirms his obscure, yet fluid identity, as the legislative candidate who represents himself as the (British) Pious Muslim secret agent, but also demonstrates that pastiche is Firdaus’ tactic which unfortunately dilutes the visual

\(^{239}\) The Legend of Aang the Last Airbender, a Nickelodeon’s cartoon series.

\(^{240}\) See chapter eight for the elaboration
credibility of his image as a PAN candidate. He is trapped within the spiritual and heroic codes within the billboard “supernatural” lighting.

Returning to the second frame that captures a series of Soetrisno Bachir’s images and his political activities and a label (Fans 7) attached above Bachir’s series of images, this frame demonstrates how Firdaus positions himself in the hierarchical power relation between him as the party’s candidate and Bachir as the party’s (former) chairperson. The “Fans 7” label indicates that Firdaus perceives the presence of Bachir’s images functions as the visual evidence of the party’s support (Bachir as his fan) by way of not showing his subordinate position vis-a-vis PAN’s former chairperson, which indicates his challenge towards the concept of gusti-kawula. By this, he believes that he has sufficient social capital as he was the former provincial legislative member of Banten, and thus, the presence of Bachir’s image merely complements his heroic image. However, this visual complementary seems to lose its status as Firdaus positions Bachir’s series of image vertically. This vertical axis, as argues Kress and van Leeuwen (2006, p. 140), connotes “an insurmountable determinism” which visually defines the power relation between Firdaus and Bachir. In this sense, presenting Bachir’s images vertically indicates that Firdaus is caught in his own attempt to present an equal relation as in reality his position as PAN’s functionary was under Bachir’s chairmanship. Firdaus failed in his candidacy.

**Charles Honoris’ Billboard**

Source: author’s collection

Reading Honoris’ billboard attracts our attention to engage in the way Honoris sees us – the spectators. The way he smiles and the phosphorescent light as if appearing from his back make our eyes first meet with his close-up picture. The use of black as the background colour seems to be

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d241 That he is reliant on Bachir’s image.
chosen not to completely undermine the compositional value as the phosphorescent light seems to be centrally projected onto his image. This makes our vision focuses on this visuality.

Reading Honoris’ image, we need to focus on his close-up image although the reading technique from left to right makes our eyes firstly encounter the national flag as the billboard’s background. Honoris is known as a Sino-Indonesian legislative candidate from an inclusive Islamic party, PAN. His active role in this party becomes the proof of the party’s inclusivity. As the representative of PAN, Honoris wears a dark blue shirt which resonates with the party’s official colour. Dienaputra (2011, p. 183) notes that this party’s official colour is associated with the dark blue sea and sky which connote freedom and democracy. Thus, by wearing this official coloured shirt, Honoris represents himself as the carrier of the attributes of freedom and democracy. This also connotes his main role in the symbolic attributive process of his billboard’s visual grammar.

Another interesting element of this billboard is the phosphorescent light which results from the electric light projected onto the upper part of Honoris’ body. This arguably creates a “halo” effect around this corporeal body. As this halo is usually used in sacred drawings to accentuate the sublimity of transcendental figures, this light on Honoris’ body is arguably intended to produce a similar effect. Similar to Prasetyo, this projection onto Honoris’ corporeal body signifies his attempt to make him into God’s representative in disseminating freedom and democracy. In this sense, Honoris synthesises the Western (Christian) notion of transcendence in framing the (Islamic) inclusive party’s notion of freedom and democracy. The way to materialise these can be seen from his actions, especially during the campaign when he conducted an essay-writing competition in order to catch people’s attention and meet their aspirations. One of the winners in this competition, M. Subchan Sholeh242, suggested Honoris implement the Grameen model243 in order to empower the grassroots. What is interesting from Honoris’ action is not whether he is willing to strive for this model244 to be passed into law if he succeeds in his candidacy, but on the way he catches people’s aspiration, which reflects the democratic notion.

243 This model is adopted from Grameen bank system developed by Muhammad Yunus, the winner of the Nobel prize in 2006 from Bangladesh. Yunus empowered the Bangladesh’s grassroots not through training, but lending the women soft loans without collateral as (Bangladesh) women were perceived as more adaptive than men in restoring the family’s financial condition. He perceived that giving them “the fishing rod” without the bait would be a useless attempt. The western perspective in seeing the root of poverty derived from the people’s lack of skills and education was challenged, as when the fresh money was given, they would think of ways to pay off their debts, so that they could borrow some more money.
244 Abu Rizal Bakrie, the current chairperson of Golkar, adopts this model as part of his long-term political campaigns before the 2014 Presidential election (see chapter seven).
Moving to Honoris’ written slogan “Ijinkan Saya Mewakili Anda” or “Allow Me to Represent You” situated right under his image, this slogan does not reflect his platform, as it appears as a polite persuasive statement. Presenting this request along with his portrait, Honoris seems to forget that this politicking needs visual supporting evidence to convince the spectator prior to making their decision. Instead of presenting this, Honoris uses the national flag to reinforce his nationalist stance. However, this attempt seems to visually dilute itself as the black-coloured background absorbs the red and white colours of the flag. The white font used in his number (eight) with a red tick penetrating the number cannot substitute for the fading colours of red and white of the flag. However, we can read this as connoting Honoris’ attempt at representing that the white font of his name and his candidacy number somewhat represents the purity of his effort in becoming a democratic legislative member, whilst the red tick sign faintly connotes the bravery of the voters to transfer their aspirations to him.

Examining Honoris’ use of font, we also need to compare the font size Honoris uses for his slogan and name. He uses smaller font in denoting his role as the legislative candidate at the national level representing East Java province I (Surabaya and Sidoarjo) from PAN (the party’s logo is situated at the bottom right hand corner) than his name and slogan. This indicates that he wants the spectator to focus on his portrait rather than his candidacy, so that they are familiar with him prior to casting their votes for him. Honoris failed in his candidacy.

Firdaus’ Image versus Honoris’ Image

The distinctions between these PAN’s candidates lie in the elements of clothes and the presence of PAN’s chairperson on their billboards. Unlike Honoris who dons a neutral blue shirt to connote his stance as an Islamic inclusive party’s candidate, Firdaus wears a Bond-like tuxedo. Not only does this difference represent the way they translate the inclusivity of PAN, but it also signifies their disposition. Honoris uses PAN’s official colour as the code that indicates his democratic inclusive stance. As discussed, the way he catches people’s aspirations through an essay writing competition arguably exemplifies a democratic mechanism – a quality that he wants to attach to his corporeal body. Besides this democratic notion, Honoris also shows us his inclusive disposition that his religion (Christian) and Chinese descent do not impede him in becoming the legislative candidate of an Islamic inclusive party. At the same time, Honoris’ billboard reinforces PAN’s inclusivity. Within the party’s Islamic inclusive framework, Honoris deploys the “halo”-like light on his billboard to connote the visual immersion of Christianity (see Honoris’ billboard).
Conversely, Firdaus, an Islamic theology graduate, interprets the democratic and inclusive notions of PAN through transforming himself as James Bond along with the citation of one of the Qur’an verses that denotes his name. As noted, the adoption of Bond qualities on Firdaus’ billboard signifies his position as well as disposition in perceiving Bond as the representation of a political maverick who seemingly upholds “truth” and “justice”. However, we cannot perceive Bond as the representation of democratic figure, as although he is constructed as the secret agent protagonist of the Western countries, his shifting image from “cosmopolitan” to “street smart, pragmatic and alienated” figure (Thomas, 2009, p. 38) distances Bond (read: Firdaus) from the inclusive democratic notions (of the party). Instead of filling in the gap, Firdaus reinforces his religious side by espousing the Qur’an verse. Not only does this represent his disposition, but this disposition also connotes his (singular) way attesting PAN’s inclusive religious democratic notions.

Another interesting aspect from these distinctions is the presence of PAN’s chairperson image on these billboards. As discussed, the presence of the parties’ central figures indicates the reliance as well as the glorification of the paternalistic culture which is arguably influenced by Javanese values (see chapters four, six and seven). However, this notion cannot be seen as a rigid (if not ossified) cultural element as the espousal of the parties’ central images on the candidates’ billboards cannot be simply deduced from, for instance, the polarisation of Javanese/non Javanese dichotomies. As in the cases of Firdaus and Honoris, representing the region of Sundanese culture, Firdaus employs the image of Soetrisno Bachir in his publicity. On the contrary, representing East Java I constituency, Honoris chooses to appear solely absenting the presence of PAN’s chairperson. In this light, this visual difference connotes a loose interpretation of this dominant paternalistic culture.

PPP


Marissa Haque was the former legislative member of PDI-P during Megawati’s era. In the 2009 Assembly election she chose to join PPP as the candidate. She translated the party’s platform
(“education and public health services for free”) into her distinctive platform, “prioritize early childhood education”, which also becomes Haque’s slogan on the billboard. No visual sign indicating her candidacy appears. She seems to be busy introducing herself to the public, for her billboard merely presents a close-up shot of her smiling and the ballot paper dummy as the visual text. Her pose can be read as twofold: it was unnecessary for her to introduce herself because she possesses sufficient social and cultural capital as an actress/celebrity. However, it was also necessary because the public knows her as the former legislative member of PDI-P, the nationalist/secular party. The billboard reintroduces her newly taken position/identity/disposition so that the former nationalist/secular label from her previous party can be detached. Haque’s statement on her website (http://www.marissahaque.net/political/) reinforces her shifting to the Islamic party (PPP) as she regards it as the answer to her prayers after fasting for 40 days prior to her decision, especially when seven parties proposed that she become their candidate.

The image is placed on the left hand side which indicates her visual awareness of reading the visual pattern (from left to right). She places the slogan at the top of the billboard using the capital letters in a larger font compared to the font she uses in the statement accenting her identity as the legislative candidate representing the PPP for West Java 1 Region (Bandung and Cimahi). The statement is positioned in the middle of the billboard that bridges her profile image with the dummy image. Albeit the larger font and the position of the slogan indicate Haque’s emphasis on early childhood education, the accent loses its credibility because Haque does not provide any (authentic) visual attributes to support her claimed priority. Her track record in developing early childhood education is also relatively poor due to limited publications of her dealing with this issues compared to the news of her rivalry with the current Governor of Banten or her dispute concerning her doctoral degree with her fellow celebrities. To resonate with the Islamic nuances of the party, she wears a green headscarf, includes her hajj title and faces the camera from a slanting angle, smiling. Not only do these vectors become the elements that build the interpersonal relation between the spectators and Haque’s billboard, but they also function as representing a symbolic attributive process of what Haque presents on her billboard. For instance, Haque uses a light green colour to resonate with the party’s official colour (green) which connotes Islamic prosperity (see chapter five).

As Kress and van Leeuwen (2006, p. 229) note, green reflects a soothing atmosphere on the billboard, Haque’s sole presence in her green Muslim attire connotes that not only does she become the carrier of this soothing construction, but she also represents the notion of PPP’s Islamic prosperity as her image is bound up with the party’s framework. Her smile towards the camera reinforces this construction. Furthermore, like any other candidates who socialise the new voting rule on their billboards, Haque provides the ballot paper dummy which is placed on the right hand
side of the billboard and accentuates her name and number on the ballot paper with the tick sign beneath her image. Haque failed to reach Parliament.

**Damin Sada’s Billboard**

![Image of Damin Sada's Billboard](http://www.kaskus.us/showthread.php?t=3928768)

Looking at this billboard makes our eyes directly engage with the images of these three figures. However, the smile that completely captures our eyes is the smile of “Bang Obama” or Barack Obama. No smiles are seen from the other two figures (Bang Damin and Bang Osama) although the three of them are depicted putting their palms together indicating a peace agreement. Besides Obama’s smile and presence, the red peci and male Muslim tunics of Bang Damin and Bang Osama constitute the elements that create “intimacy” that suggests an interpersonal relation between the spectators and the billboard as discussed earlier.

Prior to conducting a left-to-right reading, it is interesting to examine the use of informal greeting expression on the verbal text “Bang Obama”, “Bang Damin” and “Bang Osama” as they are used to address these “focal” figures on Damin Sada’s billboard – Barack Obama, Damin Sada and Osama Bin Laden. The use of this informal expression is arguably intended to symbolically dilute “political conflict (if not rift)”, especially between the United States of America (Barack Obama) and extremist Islam of Afghanistan (Osama Bin Laden) at the visual level. Damin Sada, Indonesia’s legislative candidate from the Islamic party (PPP), becomes the one that is able to reconcile this violent conflict. Their “peaceful” visual encounter on Damin’s billboard metaphorically indicates the material action of putting together Obama’s and Osama’s palms with Damin’s palm on the top of them. This, without doubt, invites the spectators to smile as what Damin presents visually is a mere reconciliation facade. However, this visual “laxity” cannot be conceived as simply ridiculing the image of Damin as the peacemaker which leads to Damin’s self-embarrassment. He uses this visualisation to metaphorically construct his “distinctive” quality, compared to the other candidates.
from Islamic parties, as a peacemaker. He wants the spectators to conceive him as the candidate that is able to reconcile any horizontal conflicts.

In order to reinforce this image construction, Damin and Osama wear a similar Muslim white loose surplice-like garment whilst Obama wears a gray suit. This different clothing arguably connotes ideological and political differences as Obama’s suit represents Western notions of modernity, whereas their surplice-like clothing connotes religiosity. The similar clothing that Damin and Osama wear indicates an Islamic religious resemblance which visually positions Obama as the other. This positioning does not put Obama in visual subordination, because Damin positions Obama’s image at the left hand side of the billboard, which makes the spectators’ eyes firstly engage with his appearance prior to Damin and Osama. Their different clothing also negates the subordination as it signifies Damin’s disposition in perceiving the ideological/political conflicts between extremist Islam and the USA. However, the significance of Obama’s image arguably dilutes itself as his presence is controlled by Damin, the initiator of Obama and Osama’s (false) reconciliation. Obama’s grins towards the spectators while making the peace agreement connotes either the happiness or friendliness of this US President as he is depicted falsely reconciliated with extremist Muslims in favour of Damin. In short, this visualisation not only connotes a facade, but also a political utopianist comedy which reflects Damin’s disposition in utilising this political religious conflict in order to construct his religious image.

Returning to the religious resemblance between Damin and Osama, the surplice-like clothing can be perceived as connoting a differentiation marker between Damin’s Islam (Indonesian Islam) with Osama (Middle Eastern Islam). As discussed in Parts II and III, Islam in Indonesia is heavily influenced by Pancasila. Not only does this state ideology represent Indonesian nationalist habitus, but it also contributes to giving a local (traditional) nuance to Indonesian Islamic discourse. Thus, when Osama is depicted wearing turban on his head and having a long beard245, Damin appears wearing a red peci and turban around his neck. As peci becomes the entity that represents both the religious as well as nationalist identity of Indonesian people, Damin’s use of peci and turban visually differentiates the form of Islam adhered to by Damin and Osama.

However, the red colour of Damin’s peci seems to correlate with the red-coloured name of Obama. At the same time the green colour of Osama’s name resembles the green-coloured turban of Damin. This colour similarity suggests that as red is collectively perceived as representing the nationalist notion of bravery, it correlates with Damin’s audacious action in reconciling Obama and Osama. As

245 Many Muslim clerics perceive that keeping a beard as the manifestation of Muslim’s adherence to follow Prophet Muhammad’s daily practices (sunnah).
for green, this colour is perceived as representing calmness, peacefulness and (Islamic) prosperity (see chapter five). Bearing these two colours on his body, Damin presents himself as having the bravery to reconcile the red (read: courage) Obama with the green (read: calm) Osama. Thus, based on this colour association, Damin visually challenges the perception of positioning Osama as an extremist as the green colour contradicts this image. Conversely, the attachment of the red colour to Obama’s image signifies the Western (USA) courage (if not audacity). By this, Damin visually offers us a counter-narrative of challenging the occident’s perception (if not hegemony) of Islam in this visual comedy of manners.

This comedy is framed in his slogan “Damin itu Indah” or “Damin is beautiful”. The use of his own name on this slogan indicates a visual attempt of demonstrating that his name even carries a peaceful meaning. This can be seen if we treat his name “Damin” as an abbreviation of “DAMai Itu INdah = DAMIN” (“Peace is Beautiful”). In this sense, he puns his own name to reinforce his quality as a peacemaker. Damin’s notion of peace is then framed under a blue-coloured sky as the billboard’s background. The mixture of blue and white which saturates the action of reconciliation indicates the significance of this action. This visual circumstance of place reinforces the utopianist notion of this political comedy of manners. Damin also uses parallelism between the party’s logo and his slogan to reinforce his notion of peace on the first horizontal frame. Furthermore, as the party’s logo uses ka’bah as the symbol of Islamic unity (see chapter five), paralleling this symbol with Damin’s “peace” notion shows that this “peace” construction operates within the party’s Islamic unitary framework. Damin then underscores his image construction as a legislative member representing West Java using a rectangular box containing his name and number. He failed in his candidacy.

**Haque’s Image versus Damin’s Image**

Representing PPP, Haque and Damin deploy different branding strategies. They present themselves as Islamic figures with a different political agenda. Haque accentuates the written attributes in expressing her slogan/program, i.e. prioritising Early Childhood Education, with the absence of the authentic visual attributes. This absence dilutes the credibility of her program/billboard, although her presence alone on the billboard suggests her popularity as a celebrity. Her green-coloured jilbab and Muslim dress reinforce her new political stance as the candidate of an exclusive Islamic party. Haque’s current stance arguably represents the shifting of her ideological stand from a secular
nationalist party to an exclusive Islamic party after Megawati and her husband, Taufik Kiemas, sacked her from PDI-P.²⁴⁶

When Haque chooses to present her image as a celebrity as well as a politician, Damin chooses to demonstrate a political comedy of manners that visually demonstrates Damin’s attempt in becoming a “peacemaker”. By this, Haque’s and Damin’s different strategy not only produces different results but also indicates the deployment of a different branding approach in constructing an element of “conviviality” on their billboards. Haque follows PPP’ Islamic attributes rigidly, such as the party’s official colour, the ballot paper dummy and the green Muslim dress and jilbab. Damin comically plays with this code of practice by employing the blue-coloured sky as the dominant colour and translating the Islamic code into a scene that connotes a comedy of manners.

PKB

Soleh Hayat’s Billboard

H. Sholeh Hayat is the current legislative member at the provincial level (East Java) under the law and governance commission. He represents PKB and emphasises the greenness and calmness of Surabaya (the capital city of East Java province) as his slogan. From the left hand side, the logo of PKB appears a little insignificant since it merely occupies less than one eighth of the billboard which makes Hayat’s image a little less than convincing to represent the pluralist, inclusive, democratic

notions represented by PKB’s logo. The billboard focuses on Hayat’s smiling, close-up image. He puts his campaign slogan on the top using a smaller font than his name which indicates that Hayat accentuates his persona rather than his program. His slogan does not resonate with his role in Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the biggest Muslim organisation in Indonesia with (East) Java as its main base, as the coordinator of law and as Rukyah Hilal. Possibly, the greenness and calmness of Surabaya as the slogan was chosen because they matched with PKB’s Islamic green colour. The relating verb “songsong” or “welcome” indicates the informative (rather than persuading) statement that the public will have, or welcome, the greenness and calmness of Surabaya by his coming to the House of Representatives at the provincial level. The indirect statement also represents Hayat’s humble/diffident (?) tactic in communicating his program. He labels his role in NU with the word “identity”. Like most legislative candidates, Hayat puts his name and the identification label as the legislative candidate under his profile image. Albeit Hayat’s billboard does not provide the authentic visual setting of place to support his distinctive platform, Hayat gains sufficient social and cultural capital as NU’s public figure at the provincial level. He succeeded in his candidacy.

Muh. Takdir Faiz’s Billboard

![Muh. Takdir Faiz’s Billboard](http://sangattaku.multiply.com/photos/album/3/caleg_in_action#photo=20)

Muh. Takdir Faiz’s billboard can be divided into two vertical frames\(^\text{247}\). The first frame denotes Faiz’ close-up profile picture that is positioned on the left hand corner of this billboard. This positioning

\(^{247}\) Faiz’s billboard cannot be seen in discrete analyses of vertical or horizontal frames. However, as the vertical reading involves the interaction of the party’s logo and Faiz’s number (the content of the second horizontal frame), discrete analysis of this frame arguably produce the same result as the vertical ones. By this, the horizontal reading is seen unnecessary.
makes the eyes of the spectators directly engage with his smiling image along with his thick moustache and soft eyes. This visual engagement is reinforced by the turquoise background colour in which the logo of PKB is printed. The image of PKB’s stars encircles the globe as the background brings the association of brightness close to him. The image of nine stars encircling the globe as seen on the party’s logo represents the symbol of its nine ideological values: freedom, justice, truth, honesty, populism, equity, simplicity, balance and brotherhood (see chapter five). However, although the party perceives their nine stars as representing its nationalist stance, the visual correlation of these stars with Pancasila’s star that connotes religiosity (see chapter five) can be perceived as connoting a visual parallelism of these nationalist notions with the religiosity. In this sense, by utilising these stars, this regional legislative candidate of Kutai Timur regency attempts to correlate with PKB’s nine nationalist/religious values to his image. By adopting the nationalist/religious visual symbols of PKB, Faiz represents himself more as a nationalist figure who bears the party’s logo (situated on the top right hand corner of the billboard) which indicates the party’s position as an inclusive nationalist party with Islam as its important identifying character (see chapter eight). In order to represent the party’s ambiguous identity, Faiz wears a dark blue suit and a striped tie instead of baju koko, surplice-like clothing, peci and turban which contradicts his fellow PKB’s candidate, such as Sholeh Hayat who deploys Muslim attribute (peci) to reinforce his religious identity.

This nationalist construction is reinforced by presenting a slight colour difference in the party’s green colour and a turquoise background colour. The green colour of PKB indicates Indonesian (Islamic) prosperity (see chapter five), whilst Faiz’s turquoise cannot be completely seen as connoting the same reference. His use of turquoise detaches Faiz from the party’s Islamic visual framework. By this, although the stars and globe appear similar to PKB’s logo, the turquoise he presents arguably damages the notion of PKB’s prosperity, as the party uses green to connote the notion. This then potentially damages Faiz’s image construction as he does not completely adhere to the party’s visual framework.

Returning to the billboard’s frame, the second frame denotes his candidacy number (seven) printed in red along with a big white tick sign which appears behind his number. Although Faiz does not include the image of Indonesia’s national flag, the use of red and white colours can still be faintly interpreted as connoting bravery and purity similar to what the flag suggests. Faiz’s red-coloured number connotes his courage in becoming a legislative candidate representing constituency I of East Kutai regency, whilst the white tick sign signifies the purity of the voters’ action in voting for him. At this stage, the deployment of red and white can be perceived as twofold. Firstly, not only does it
connote Faiz’s attempt to encode his candidacy number using the colour red, but the encoding also indicates the transferring process of colour through projecting the conventional nationalist connotation of red, not to his corporeal body, but to his number. Secondly, he associates the voter’s actions of choosing him as the desired result from the spectator’s decoding process with the colour white. Thus, Faiz wants the spectators to feel that choosing him reflects the purity of their political decision. In this sense, this process demonstrates that although the projection of the nationalist notion of bravery is directed to his number, this does not completely dilute Faiz’ nationalist image building. However, the attachment of this “bravery” notion shows a faint correlation to the nationalist strand, albeit Faiz wears a formal suit to reinforce his nationalist and modern image.

The deployment of the red colour continues as he uses this for his full name in the statement about his candidacy (that he is East Kutai regency’s legislative candidate) and his slogan. The use of a similar technique of reading the deployment of red for his full name and candidacy arguably produces the same result. However, this deployment temporarily ceases as Faiz deploys a blue colour to ask for the spectator’s support (“Mohon Doa Restu dan Dukungannya” or [I beseech your] blessing and support”) prior to his slogan. In the nationalist parties’ discourse, the colour of blue is often associated with peacefulness, freedom, democracy (Dienaputra, 2011, p. 183). Thus, this deployment connotes the way Faiz conveys his political request. Moreover, the noun “blessing” reinforces Faiz’s cordial way of seeking support as this connotes that he places himself as a humble politician seeking the spectator’s approval. In this sense, he perceives himself not in an equal relation with the spectators as he is aware that without the voter’s support he cannot succeed in his candidacy. In Bourdieuan lens, this demonstrates Faiz’s lack of symbolic capital. At the same time, this type of request can easily be found in Indonesian wedding parties, such as when the guests enter the site of the wedding, they are usually greeted with a similar request (“mohon doa restu” or “[we beseech your] blessing”). Thus, this similar expression arguably makes his billboard sound like a “marriage proposal” in which he seeks the support of voters to choose him, not as a future bride, but as a legislative candidate who will fight for their aspirations.

This “marriage-proposal-like” politicking continues with the deployment of the red colour in his slogan “Kalau ada Saudara, Kenapa Harus Pilih Orang Lain”. Translating this slogan is not an easy task as the pronoun “saudara” usually functions as a formal greeting expression to address the interlocutors. Translating “saudara” into “brother/sister” will cause a misunderstanding as it does not fit the slogan itself. Thus, we cannot translate this slogan into “if we have you, brothers/sisters, why should we choose someone else”. This difficulty arguably stems from the slogan itself. The meaning of Faiz’s slogan in Indonesian is awkward (if not funny), as when the word “saudara” is
intended to solely refer to Faiz instead of the spectators as the visual “interlocutors”. This ostensible reference to Faiz derives from the clause “kenapa harus pilih orang lain” or “why should we choose someone else” following the clause “kalau ada saudara” (“if [we have] you, brother [Faiz]”). Thus, in order to make this linguistic reference sensible, the spectator should be the one who utters the slogan. By this, Faiz seems to mute his own billboard from speaking, as when it speaks the word “saudara” will refer to the spectators instead of Faiz. In short, Faiz’s linguistic inadequacy damages his billboard’s visual credibility.

Nonetheless, this visuality also demonstrates that what Faiz accentuates on his outdoor advertising medium is the way he wants the spectators to know him personally. This intimacy is constructed not only through the deployment of his close-up image but also in the appreciable size of the font he uses in denoting his name compared to the other written expressions. His sole presence on the billboard in a close-up image connotes a symbolic attributive process he uses to assure the spectators that he is the nationalist candidate representing the Islamic inclusive party. He failed in his candidacy.

Hayat’s Image versus Faiz’s Image

The distinctive elements of Hayat’s and Faiz’s billboards lie in the deployment of PKB’s official colour, clothes and the absence of the party’s central figure. Their billboards arguably use a similar narrative pattern in accentuating their images as the Islamic nationalist figures by way of representing themselves as the sole participant who seeks support/blessing from the spectators. Using turquoise colour which belongs to the same family resemblance as PKB’s green colour, Faiz differs himself from his fellow candidate, Hayat, who adopts the party’s official colour to connote his slogan, i.e. “the greenness and calmness of Surabaya”. Faiz’s use of turquoise to support his obscure slogan (“if we have you (?), why should we choose someone else”) proves to be a failure as the colour and slogan arguably violate PKB’s code of practice as they fail to present the party’s inclusive stance.

On the contrary, as discussed, Faiz’ use of a formal suit seems to reinforce the inclusive image as his suit arguably represents more nationalist and modern notions compared to baju koko, surplice-like clothes, peci and turban. However, compared to Faiz, the combination of suit, peci and batik Hayat wears reflects more PKB’s inclusive stance as a nationalist Islamic party. Moreover, the absence of the party’s central figure on these billboards reinforces the perception that the reliance of the Islamic parties (in this case PKB) is not as heavy as the nationalist ones. Representing Java region and Outer Island (East Kalimantan) respectively, Hayat and Faiz do not deploy the image of Gus Dur
Comparing and Contrasting the Candidates’ Billboards of Nationalist and Islamic Factions

In comparing and contrasting the image-building of the candidates from the nationalist and Islamic factions, we need to focus on the dominant elements of the billboards, i.e. the participants, the ideational process represented on the billboards, the visual markers of place, and the technical elements which connote the candidates’ ideological orientation, such as colours and clothing attributes. These elements do not merely appear as the recurring elements but also as the ones that define the genre of the billboards’ narrative texts through the deployment of repetitive codes in the plot lines (Hartley, 2002, pp. 96-97). The participants (tenor) define the power relation in the social actions (field) that are represented by the part of language (mode) on the texts (Bernstein as cited by Martin and Rose, 2008, pp. 18-19). These register variables (tenor, field and mode) along with the technical elements define the scope of the billboard genre or system of orientation. The ideational process is realised not merely in terms of linguistic devices such as the nominal groups and circumstance of place, but also in the visual representation of material actions and the symbolic attributive process. The focus in comparing and contrasting the candidates’ billboards are on the nature of the tenor involved in the billboards and move to the (visual) language variable (mode), i.e. the dominant ideational process of the billboards, and the represented field variable, i.e. the markers of place depicted on the billboard. The colour and clothing elements reinforce the candidates’ ideologically ambiguous positions.

As implied in chapter eight, the nationalist parties are more reliant on their key figure’s image construction than the Islamic ones. This is arguably due to the paternalistic characteristic of Pancasila which influences the way the candidates from the nationalist faction construct their image by espousing the images of their party’s paternalistic figures to support their nationalist image construction. Not only does their visual reliance connote the hierarchy of power between the candidate and the party’s key figures, but also indicates the perpetuation of the Javanese power pattern of gusti and kawula. The candidates need the image projection of the key figures as they are aware that juxtaposing their image with the parties’ leaders means co-opting the leaders’ symbolic capital as theirs. However, this does not completely mean that all candidates are reliant on their party’s central figures. The absence of the key figures on their billboards, as in the case of Saiful, neither connotes nor dilutes the insignificance of Megawati Soekarnoputri. As discussed, Saiful does not need Megawati’s presence to support his popularity for he was well-known as the former successful mayor of Blitar. Another factor that arguably leads PDI-P candidates to exclude
Megawati’s presence from their billboards is that Megawati’s secular image might damage the frame of their religious (Islamic) image on their billboards. This can be seen from Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s billboard as they accentuate their religious Islamic image under PDI-P’s (secular) nationalist framework (see chapters five and seven). In this sense, the inclusion of Megawati’s image\textsuperscript{248} contradicts Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s donning of Muslim apparel. At the same time, this absence can also be perceived as adhering to Soekarno’s nationalist ideals which are conducted not solely by presenting Megawati’s/Soekarno’s images as the translation of these ideals can also be in form of visual/verbal material actions (see Saiful’s billboard). On the other hand, the absence of Golkar’s central figure does not connote the party’s negation of the paternalistic values (if not culture), as Golkar keeps demonstrating this reliance (see chapter seven) but not necessarily in the form of presenting the patron’s image along with the candidates as Santoso’s and Daeng’s billboards suggest. As for PD, Gerindra and Hanura, these nascent nationalist parties arguably adopt similar paternalistic values as they become the electoral vehicles for the parties’ patrons.

On the contrary, the espousal of the party’s key figure on the Islamic faction’s billboards is seen as a mere complementary visual device. This can be seen, for instance, from Firdaus’ billboard as he marginalises Soetrisno Bachir’s image, the former PAN chairperson, as Firdaus positions himself as one of his fans. This detachment shows not the negation of the pattern of gusti-kawula in the Islamic faction but the futility of fetishising their charismatic leaders’ image. However, in maintaining the gusti-kawula conception, the Islamic candidates use supporting figures (such as the PKS’ male volunteers, male and female school students on Wahid’s billboard) not fully as minor interactive participants, but as intermediary elements (or in Hallidayian term “modal devices”, O’Toole, 2011, p. 14). Not only do they help in building intimacy or interpersonal relations between the spectator and the billboards, but they also represent the visual hegemonic relation between the party’s elites and the grassroots. If we relate this fetishism with the polarisation of Javanese/non Javanese strands, we will find the irregularity of the deployment of the patrons’ images on the candidates’ billboards. This is due to the fact that the candidates deploy these images regardless of whether they are representing the constituencies in Java or in the Outer Islands. At this stage, this reinforces Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi’s finding (2012) that the ethnocentric element is a constant variable (see chapter one).

Returning to the element of participants on the billboards, the other supporting participants, such as the old peasant woman, cartoon characters (such as Avatar), Barack Obama and Osama bin Laden are used in the material actions (except for Avatar) to illuminate the candidates’ image construction.

\textsuperscript{248} Megawati restored her image by wearing red kerudung. This image can be seen, especially on the (party’s) billboards during the Islamic religious celebration such as Eid-al Fitr.
These figures are deployed to illuminate the candidates’ ambiguous ideological orientation as the candidates exploit them by way of positioning them as the elements that represents both the nationalist and Islamic strands. Their supporting roles on the billboards reflect not merely the labour division between *gusti* and *kawula*, such as in the cases of the old peasant woman (Saiful’s billboard), the male volunteers and the school students (Wahid’s billboard), but also the practices of how the party’s elites frame their success (read also: their power and authority).

However, their interaction does not indicate that the material actions become the dominant ideational process, as fourteen billboards use a symbolic attributive process in introducing the candidates. This can be seen as the candidates mainly use their close-up pictures to represent themselves as the sole carrier of the nationalist and/or Islamic attributes in their image construction. In this sense, not only do their close-up images represent the “visual intimate modality” (Kress and Leeuwen, 2006, p. 149), but this modality element also demonstrates that the candidates position themselves as the sole carrier of the nationalist and/or Islamic attributes in their image construction. This dominant ideational process is arguably aligned with the fact that the candidates did not have sufficient experience in introducing (if not yet promoting) themselves on the billboards as they were not allowed to promote themselves prior to the 2009 legislative election. However, we cannot completely perceive this insufficiency as the underlying factor which foregrounds the candidates’ lack of visual literacy as this mode also reflects the candidates’ disposition in constructing their (ambiguous) image. In this sense, the symbolic attributive process can be perceived as reflecting the mechanism the candidates deploy to project their self-(political)-interest and transforms it into collective vested interest as they perceive themselves as the carriers of people’s aspirations. This projection dilutes itself, especially when the candidates use the symbolic attributive process at the visual level which contradicts the dominant material actions represented on their written slogan. This reinforces the quality of their visual and linguistic literacy which damages their image construction.

Returning to the ambiguous image construction, the candidates also deploy visual props such as clothing to connote their ideological orientation. The candidates from nationalist and Islamic factions use Muslim apparel such as *peci*, *baju koko*, surplice-like clothing, turban, *kerudung*, *jilbab*, and Muslim tunics to reinforce their religious identity. Not only does the donning of this Muslim apparel, such as *kerudung* and *jilbab*, represent Muslim females’ degree of piety by disciplining their own bodies, but it also becomes the markers that obscure their nationalist inclination. At the same time in order to reinforce their nationalist image, the candidates wear the party’s jacket, poloshirt, shirt, *batik* shirt, formal suit, and tuxedo. The “neutral” (non religious) attire reinforces the
ideological obscurity as they are also used to connote the nationalist orientation of the candidates from the Islamic faction.

However, if we examine the candidates’ clothes in a macro lens, we will find that from all the clothes the candidates wear, the tuxedo becomes a distinctive differentiation marker (see Firdaus’ billboard). Not only is this due to the associative relation between Firdaus and James Bond, but that the tuxedo also indicates the notion of elitism. This means that Firdaus’s attachment of this notion to his corporeal body represents his cultural/political disposition which connotes the predilection of this former legislator of Banten province. However, Firdaus’ predilection does not merely indicate his predisposition, as this, at the same time, demonstrates how Firdaus places himself in the globalisation discourse the Bond films represent (Thomas, 2009). In this discourse, the nation is seen as “one unit of analysis among many in a political and cultural network” (Thomas, 2009, p. 36). This means that the system of power relation is no longer seen as a centralised one, as the world is now defined by the complexity of transnational corporations/organisations/companies/institutions that operate across the borderlines of nation, state and culture in the new global capitalism (Negri and Hardt, 2000, 2004). By this, as earlier discussed, as the agencies Bond representing cannot detach themselves from the complicity of intervening in the status quo of the so-called third world countries vis-à-vis the socio-economical/political interest of these transnational corporations, Bond’s contemporary character cannot be easily escape from this association. However, as Thomas further argues, Bond represents “a globetrotting elite who benefits from the political bureaucratic infrastructures of the nation state”, whilst at the same time conceives himself as a self-legitimated agent who is above those infrastructures. In this light, Firdaus presents us a similar comedy of political manners as Damin’s as the transference of Bond’s cosmopolitan qualities to his image merely produces an absurd visual allegory.

Returning to the candidates’ Muslim apparel, their deployment does not merely connote the candidates’ religious identity let alone the level of their piety. The deployment of these religious attributes along with the nationalist one, such as Wiranto’s use of peci and batik on Prasetyo’s billboard, represent the codes of nationalism as well as religiosity as peci has a dual role as it is an attribute which represents Indonesian Islam, and at the same time Indonesia-ness. In this sense, peci becomes the signifier of an active struggle as its meaning has shifted from connoting Indonesian Islamic religiosity, through the nationalist code of resistance to colonisers, to the official code of Indonesian national identity (see chapter seven). Unlike peci, batik does not signify the Indonesian religious side. As discussed, it represents the nation’s struggle for its cultural pride as Malaysia, Indonesia’s neighbouring country, arguably often “hijacks” (if not claims) Indonesian traditional arts.
Not only does UNESCO’s acknowledgment of batik as a world heritage cloth from Indonesia reinforce the sense of Indonesia-ness but also arguably leads to indirect recognition of Javanese ethnocentrism in Indonesia as batik originated from Java. Thus, peci and batik connotes multi-accentuality as the represented participants who wear them interact in their social relation which opens up the potential of the proliferation of meanings and also the capacity of multiple meanings’ struggle (Hartley, 2002, p. 150).

This capacity also makes colours into technical “modality” elements (Kress and Leeuwen, 1990, p. 61, 2006, pp. 160-161) that reinforce the candidates’ positions to be in alignment with the party’s ideological orientation. At the same time this colour association also demonstrates the mechanism of how the parties frame their official colours as they are deployed not as arbitrary signs but motivated ones in illuminating the candidates’ image construction. For instance, PDI-P frames black as having a close (instead of a contradictive) relation with white, i.e. honesty and sincerity, whilst PKS frames black as having positive attribute as white, i.e. certainty. This mode of framing shows that this association demonstrates the “motivated” quality of colours as signs which reflect the way the party sets up (controls) the meaning of its official colours so that they resonate with their ideological orientation in their signifying practices. However, this does not mean that these practices conceal meaning contestation as they challenge the conventions of binary opposition, such as black versus white (good versus evil). In this sense, these colours function as the supporting component that illustrates the synthesis as well as contestation of ideological polarisation in the candidates’ image construction. Their motivated characteristic does not circumscribe the candidates to be in ambiguous ideological positions.

The candidates’ billboards represent the ambiguous position of Islamic and Nationalist candidates (read: the parties). The candidates need to demonstrate a strong attachment towards both the nationalist and Islamic orientation. They cannot represent themselves as the nationalist or Islamic figure per se in order to capture Muslim and Nationalist voters. Their positions as the candidates of the Nationalist or Islamic strands do not put them in an ossified situation for in the position-taking process they can flexibly adopt Islamic and nationalist notions as a symbolic exchange within the framework of demokrasi Pancasila. The billboards also show the (in)consistency of the candidates in resonating with the party’s platforms and slogans which is possibly due to the contestation in the politics of image between Islamic/nationalist camps that obscures the candidates’ ideological orientation. The Islamic and nationalist attributes on the billboard fail to construct an identity myth in their political branding.
The billboards of the nationalist camp demonstrate that *Pancasila* as the nationalist ideology is frequently presented along with the parties patrons’ images, which in themselves can be interpreted as representing the nationalist notion of *Pancasila*. However, the patron’s images on the candidates’ billboards represent not a complete glorification of the paternalsitic pattern of *gusti-kawula* but more that their image projection reinforces the pretext of the ideological ambiguity as the leaders perceive themselves representing both nationalist and Islamic strands. This fetishism holds a transient status as when the candidates feel that the leaders’ image arguably damages their visual image construction, they will not include the leaders’ image on the billboards.

Similar to the nationalist faction, the billboards of the Islamic parties also represent the obscurity of the ideological polarisation. Although the billboards are heavily loaded with the use of Islamic symbolic attributes such as *peci*, *baju koko*, turban, *kerudung*, *jilbab* and the citation of Qur’anic verses (as part of the candidates’ paralanguage), the ways in which the candidates deliver the message of their programs seem not to overtly connote an Islamic way. For instance, the dress code of Ahmad Firdaus and Hidayat Nur Wahid do not represent their religiosity. Firdaus transforms himself into an Indonesian James Bond whilst Wahid casually wears a short-sleeve *batik* shirt, black trousers and a white cap. However, unlike the Muslim male dress code, the female Muslim dress represents more religious rigour, although *kerudung* is perceived as representing a loose (traditionalist) religious attribute. The female Muslim candidates wear them to reinforce their religious inclination without diluting their nationalist disposition. In this sense, the donning of Muslim apparel does not completely represent the candidates’ ideological orientation.

Thus, the image construction of the nationalist and Islamic parties operates ambiguously. They both seem to adopt similar ideological values as they realise that capturing Indonesian voters is as difficult as dividing *santri* and *abangan*. Although Indonesia is known as having the biggest Muslim population of any country in the world, the Islamic characteristic of the dominant Muslim group (see chapter seven) does not allow the polarisation to operate as two distinctive poles as if absenting the ideological overlap between these two camps. In this overlap, the ideological contestation occurs which leads to the ambiguous position of the parties and the candidates’ branding.
CONCLUSION

The amendment of election law no. 10/2008 article 214 marked the emergence and profusion of the legislative candidates’ politics of image, especially in the 2009 legislative election. This amendment annulled the system in which the parties determined the candidates’ ranking number on the ballot paper. At the same time, this amendment liberated the candidates from the “imprisonment” in which they were not allowed to produce individual promotion and/or publicity. They could not expose their identity as they were co-opted in the framework of the parties’ image construction. In this sense, this amendment not only dilutes the party’s oligarchy, but also makes Indonesia’s political arena (represented by the candidates’ billboards) as a site where the candidates’ images are constructed, contested and transacted.

Billboards became one of the preferable outdoor advertising mediums candidates used in constructing their image. The ubiquity of the candidates’ billboards during the 2009 elections indicated this preference as the billboards dominated Indonesia’s rural and urban landscapes. At the same time, this also represents the candidates’ state of political euphoria. This can be seen from the compelling and titillating ways the candidates constructed their image on the billboards in order to lure the spectators (read: voters). The challenge the candidates faced using this outdoor advertising medium was not regarding the limitation the billboard placed on the intended meaning. It rather lies in the spectators’ rapid mobility which prompted the candidates to make eye-catching billboards.

These “eye-catching” qualities are then translated into numerous interesting and comic ways. However, a close examination of these qualities demonstrates that the operations of these image constructions were framed on the same ideological basis, i.e. *Pancasila*. *Pancasila*, as the state ideology, functions not only as the basis which defines Indonesian politics, but also as the ideological framework that controls the mechanism of the candidates’ image construction. These functions work as *Pancasila* is perceived as the ideological embodiment of cultural conformity in multicultural Indonesia. However, as Reeve (1985) found, this utopianist ideal was largely influenced by its founding fathers’ (Javanese) cultural dispositions, especially Ki Hajar Dewantara, Supomo and Soekarno. These founding figures found that the cultural resemblance of all ethnic groups in Indonesia lies in the paternalistic system (Somantri, 2006) which resonates with Javanese hierarchical paternalistic system of *gusti* and *kawula*. Adityawan (2008) asserts that Soekarno adopted this paternalistic pattern as he perceived his role as the first President synonymous with the symbolic serving function of a Javanese king (*gusti*) (as the father) in nurturing the people (*kawula*) (or the children). Using the principle of *kekeluargaan* (collectivism/family-ness), Soekarno transformed this paternalistic notion into a socio-nationalist concept, in which the collective interest...
of the family/society/nation is above the individual. In this sense, Soekarno ostensibly controlled the authority of *gusti* as valuing the collective interest is represented through the operation of *gotong royong* (mutual assistance/sharing burden) which becomes the basis of *Pancasila’s* democratic principles and the embodiment of social justice. *Musyawarah* (deliberation) and *mufakat* (consensus) reinforces this controlling attempt. Mohammad Hatta (non Javanese), one of the founding fathers of *Pancasila*, brought this concept into the Indonesian economic system of mutual cooperation (*ekonomi kerakyatan*). He found that, besides the paternalistic culture, this cooperation also represents the cultural conformity of Indonesian village life and became the basis of economic principles in *Pancasila* discourse. In contemporary Indonesia, this system arguably proliferates in clientelism which positions the patron as the central figure. The presence of this figure on the candidates’ billboards perpetuates this paternalistic system.

Besides this paternalistic system, *Pancasila* is also characterised by the logic of “neither-nor” (Somantri, 2006), which becomes the basis of its inclusivity. This logic can be seen in *Pancasila’s* first principle which accentuates the element of twin toleration as religiously essential. This means that the state guarantees religious tolerance among different religions without religion attempting to dominate the state. In this sense *Pancasila* becomes the ideological determiner that neither leads the country to theocracy nor reconstitute it as a secular nation. Not only does this first principle acknowledge religious freedom and tolerance but it also becomes the bastion of this inclusivity (also read: ambiguity)\(^{249}\).

This inclusive characteristic is needed, especially in controlling the understandable and indissoluble ideological friction between nationalist and Islamic factions, which historically stems from the exhortation of the Islamic faction that wanted the initial draft of *Pancasila’s* first principle of the Jakarta Charter to function. In order to control this friction, Soekarno then fused the contesting ideologies of nationalism, Islamism and later communism adhered to by the four major parties PNI\(^{250}\), PKI, Masyumi\(^{251}\) and NU under the concept of NASAKOM (nationalist, religion (Islamic) and communist) within paternalistic ‘Guided Democracy.’ Soekarno dissolved Masyumi as he perceived this party as the one that orchestrated a mutiny against his administration.

\(^{249}\) The candidates from nationalist faction translated this religious inclusivity by donning religious (Islamic)-based attire on the billboards. Whilst the Islamic candidates, especially the male ones, liberated themselves from this religious-loaded attire. This is done as they want the spectators to perceive them as embodying both camps.

\(^{250}\) The nationalist PNI was seen as the political embodiment of Soekarno’s nationalist concept, which was later perpetuated by Megawati’s (Soekarno’s eldest daughter) PDI(-P).

\(^{251}\) Platzdasch (2009a) argues that Masyumi tradition plays a major role in influencing the current Islamic parties, such as PPP, PKS, PAN.
As Soekarno’s guided democracy and NASAKOM failed to resolve this ideological friction, Soeharto exerted an authoritarian strategy in muffling the opposition groups. First, he used the so-called PKI’s coup against Soekarno’s administration as a pretext to justify the government’s action in positioning communism as an ideological and political threat. Soeharto then annulled the operation of Soekarno’s ostensible “legacy” of a multiparty system as he perceived this system as the one that imperiled the nation’s stability. In so doing, Soeharto fused the nationalist and Islamic parties under PDI and PPP and utilised Soekarno’s initiated functional(ist) group, Golkar, as his electoral machine. Soeharto’s reluctance in positioning this group as a political party marked the government’s subterfuge in distinguishing Golkar from the nationalist PDI and the Islamic PPP. This difference was delineated by the functionalist (pragmatist? yet unitary?) banner of developmentalism as Golkar’s (read: the government’s) central platform. This was conducted in order to divert people’s attention solely to the country’s development. Under this banner, Soeharto transformed Pancasila as a monolithic doctrine in the form of ideological uniformity through P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila or Guidance for Understanding and Practising Pancasila) programs. He framed Pancasila’s five inclusive democratic principles as the basis of his authoritarian regime’s version of democracy. At this stage, Pancasila was mystified in order to arguably construct “pan-Indonesian-ism”. This mystification seemed to meet its end in the aftermath of Soeharto’s downfall.

However, in the post-Soeharto era, especially during the current administration of SBY, this mystification has been resurrected and proliferates in the form of politics of image. The ideological friction which marked the segregation of nationalist and Islamic factions gradually becomes obscure, especially when each faction adopts the ideological values of its adversary (Platzdasch, 2009b). This process is highly important as it represents the shifting of the (winning) parties to the middle ground. In this sense, not merely does this lead to the obscurity of the polarisation but it also demonstrate the political attempt of synthesising the Islamic and Nationalist strands. This attempt arguably positions the parties in the tenuous boundary of the ideological crossroads. The establishment of the nationalist parties’ religious (Islamic) wing organisations exemplifies this positioning. The nationalist and Islamic parties’ fluid coalition in the government or the cartel system (Ambardi, 2009) reinforces such praxis. In a Gramscian lens, this praxis is not merely aimed at expanding the constituencies as this is conducted to secure collective consent in order to be in a hegemonic position. In a Bourdieuan lens, this positioning signifies the “objective agreement between subjects (consensus)” which results in “the domination of one party over the others (symbolic violence)” (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 165-167). However, in the cartel system this domination is not exercised in the form of ideological competition as it is largely based on the collusive practices. Through these, they obtain and secure the resources provided by the state. At this point, the modus
operandi of this consensus ostensibly reflects the futility of this factional/ideological classification/polarisation. However, at the same time, their legitimacy is attained from ideological competition/contestation through the use of political instruments to express the ideology, political programs and actions, such as the billboards.

Expressing the ideology and political programs, the candidates’ billboards represent the ideological contestation and synthesis of the Islamic/Nationalist strands circulated in the Pancasila-based political arena. Bourdieu (1991, pp. 169, 190) argues that this textual representation merely signifies the “euphemised form” of the magnitude of the ideological contestation and synthesis. This means that the textual analysis of the billboard from his perspective arguably reduces the significance of this magnitude. However, the billboard, as the cultural/visual artefact that represents the ideological production, signifies not only a euphemised form but also the candidates’ political dispositions as it is the product of the candidates’ political articulation. As the disposition operates beneath the level of consciousness and is structured by past circumstances, such as history, the examination of the candidates’ dispositions cannot be detached from Indonesia’s political historical practices governed by Pancasila-based dispositions (habitus). In other words, these entities operate based on this relational mode. Thus, the analysis of the operation of cultural and political elements that foreground the candidates’ dispositions is coupled with the textual analysis of the billboards for they are interrelated by the same cultural/political reference. However, this does not mean that the billboard is completely incapable of representing the candidates’ dispositions textually. The analysis of the candidates’ dispositions by referring to the ostensible “external” (read: political/cultural) elements outside the candidates’ billboards reinforces the representation of the candidates’ dispositions on the textual level.

Returning to the textual analysis, the three main elements of the billboard’s genre, i.e. the purpose or the social function of the billboard, its generic structure, and the dominant lexico-grammatical feature of the billboard, show that the function of the candidate’s billboard is not simply to introduce and advertise the candidates and propagate their slogan and platform. The billboard becomes the medium in which their political image is constructed, contested and transacted in order to gain public recognisibility (symbolic capital). The ideological markers in the form of visual and linguistic capital on the textual level are reified as a commodity which will be later exchanged or

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252 Examining the ideological production requires scrutinising the circuit of how these billboards are produced, consumed and regulated. However, as this research focuses on the reading of the billboards’ narratives which reflect the candidates’ dispositions, further studies are needed to investigate this circuit of culture (Du Gay, Hall, et. al 1997)
transacted, especially during voting. In this sense, the operation of this symbolic exchange is deferred as the transaction has to be carried out in the correct moment.\textsuperscript{253}

Prior to the symbolic exchange, the generic structure of the billboard shows that the billboard’s narration mainly involves the interaction of the represented participants (the candidates and the party’s paternalistic figures\textsuperscript{254}) which is mostly situated in the absence of the authentic visual setting of place. This reduces the level of visual credibility of the candidates’ billboards (read: image). The main participants are portrayed mostly in their close-up and medium shot pictures. This means that not only do the candidates show a visual intimacy but it also suggests the operation of the relational process as the dominant lexico-grammatical feature in the grammar of the visual and verbal texts. This dominance indicates that the candidates define themselves by relating their visual presentation with other visual/verbal attributes in order to construct the image of Nationalist and/or Islamic figures. The position of the material or action process as the second dominant grammatical feature indicate the level of the candidates’ visual/linguistic literacy as the effective use of this process reinforces the candidates’ image-building. In other words, the absence of the candidates’ “authentic” visual action represented on the billboard dilutes their image credibility.

Besides these features, the supporting visual attributes such as the dominant colours, clothing and other props define the candidates’ (fluid) position. The dominant colours demonstrate the visual/ideological constraint as the candidates are bound with the colours the parties use to construct the identity difference, especially among parties of the same faction. The dominant red and white colours, which resemble the national flag used by the candidates from nationalist and Islamic factions, represents that they all have the same nationalist dispositions within the framework of \textit{Pancasila’s Bhinneka Tunggal Ika} (Unity in Diversity) in nation-state building.

When the dominant colours indicate political constraint (as the candidates need to represent themselves free from ethnocentric orientation), the clothing they wear arguably liberates them from this sole orientation. This gives them freedom to construct their image as Nationalist and/or Islamic figures. This reinforces the obscurity of the candidates’ political stance which resonates with the fluidity of the parties’ identity construction. Such practices are permissible in \textit{Pancasila} discourse not only because this state ideology opens itself to ambiguity but these ambiguous (read: inclusive) characteristics also represent the collective utopianist goals of this nation amidst its cultural plurality.

\textsuperscript{253} As the focus of this researcher is not on this moment, a further study is recommended to investigate the transaction process and its results.

\textsuperscript{254} As noted, the presence of the party’s key figures represents the operation of the (Javanese) paternalistic culture at the visual level.
and fragmentation. This ideological “flexibility” in *Pancasila* arguably stems from Javanese culture which positions tolerance as its essence (Kingsbury, 2005).

The system of representation operating on the candidates’ billboards demonstrates that the candidates’ dispositions are defined by the discursive formation of how the dominant group arguably controls the ideological meanings in *Pancasila*. However, as this ideology lies in the power relation between nationalist and Islamic factions, this control does not represent a complete domination of one faction over the other, as they agree to bind themselves in the consensus in order to be in the hegemonic position. In a Gramscian lens, the ideational conflict (read: friction) in *Pancasila* discourse signifies the unstable historical bloc and becomes the basis of ideological struggle. In this sense, the candidates’ billboards as the cultural/visual artefacts become unstable as they represent the socio-cultural product of this political articulation.
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