The Relationship Between Values and Religiosity in Adolescents

Paul F. Russell
Edith Cowan University

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The Relationship Between Values and Religiosity in Adolescents.

by

Paul F. Russell  BTheolMelbCollDiv, BEdNDA, BA(Psych)EdithCowan

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the
Requirements for the Award of
Bachelor of Arts (Psychology) Honours,
at the Faculty of Community Studies, Education and Social Sciences,
Edith Cowan University, Joondalup.

Date of submission: 29 October, 1999
DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Signature

Date 29.10.99
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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for Grandad
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by

Paul F. Russell  BTheol/MelbCollDiv, BEd/NDA, BA(Psych)/EdithCowan

Faculty of Community Studies, Education and Social Sciences,

Edith Cowan University, Joondalup.
Abstract

The current work examined the areas of religiosity, values and adolescent development. The recent literature with regard to the nature of religiosity as a measure of an individual’s commitment to a particular religion was explored. The issues of measurement and definition were outlined, and a position was taken as to the multi-dimensionality of religiosity. The recent work on values by Schwartz (1992) was also explored. Values were defined and the theory of a universal set of values, as well as the relationship of values to each other was outlined, along with the organisation of those individual values into value types. The relationship between values and religiosity was explored. The area of adolescent development, based on the theory of psychosocial development proposed by Erikson (1968, 1977) was also explored. This understanding of the nature of adolescent development has suggested that adolescents must explore issues such as politics and religion as part of that stage of development. It was suggested that adolescent development, therefore, had a significant possibility of impacting on the relationship between values and religiosity. This possible impact of adolescent development on both values and religiosity was suggested.
Whether or not students adopt an appropriate values system is a significant concern for any educational institution, but is particularly paramount for a religious school (Russell, 1997). The religious school is charged with the task of conveying the dominant culture no less than other schools, but in such a way that the entire curricula is enlivened and permeated with the values of the sponsoring Church. The effectiveness of the religious school, then, rests not only with exam results, university entrance or hours spent in religion classes, but rather the real formation of the young people within the school in the model of the sponsoring Church.

While only 16% of Australians profess having no religion, and the vast majority of Australians profess membership of one of the mainstream Christian churches, the amount of time spent in religious activity by Australians on average is decreasing (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1997, 1999). It may be suggested that attendance at worship services is seen as of secondary importance to the members who will accept the values and moral code of the church, but not the discipline of regular attendance at church services. Alternatively, it may be the case that the drop in church attendance is reflective of an alienation both from the church itself and the moral code and discipline that the church promotes.

The relationship between religiosity as a measure of how religious an individual is and the values that the individual holds is the focus of a number of studies. In particular, research by Roccas and Schwartz (1997) and Schwartz and Huismans (1995) indicate a strong correlation between religiosity and values, but do not address the strength of this relationship in younger people.
For those involved in education within a religious context, the correlation between values and religiosity is an important one, but the impact of adolescent development on this relationship adds another significant dimension. The area of adolescent development is one of particular importance in this area of school effectiveness. It is of paramount importance that all programmes of study, and indeed the arrangement of all school activity, be designed and modified according to what is known about the psychology of adolescent development so as to most effectively achieve the programme's objectives. In the area of religious development, all programmes of religious education, and all activity which seeks to inculcate the values of the sponsoring church, must also be designed with appropriate attention to adolescent development. In this way, the aim of the effective socialisation of the adolescent may be achieved.

In addition to the research in the three areas of religiosity, values and adolescent development, consideration must be made of the interaction between each of these. The current work seeks to review the significant literature and research in the areas of religiosity, values and adolescent development, and further seeks to make some theoretical connections between these three areas based on the previous research. Some suggested avenues for future research and study will be proposed.

Religiosity

**Definition and Measurement Concerns**

Any discussion on the impact of religiosity within psychology must first resolve the linked problems of definition and measurement. Without a clear and accepted definition of religiosity, an effective measure of the levels of religiosity
cannot be developed. A cursory glance at the literature on religiosity will demonstrate that even with a working definition, measuring religiosity is not a simple task. This is despite the fact that systematic research into the area of the psychology of religion has been conducted since the later part of the nineteenth century (Wulff, 1991). Measures of religiosity vary from crude single-item questions (e.g., Rocca & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) to more complex questionnaires (e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; Francis & Stubbs, 1987; Gorsuch, Mylvganam, Gorsuch, & Johnson, 1997; Plante & Boccaccini, 1997). These differences in the measurement of religiosity spring from differences in the conceptual understanding of the nature of religiosity itself.

In attempting to find a common definition of religiosity, a distinction must be made between a focus on motivation and on practice. It may be the case that a simple definition of religiosity is focussed on either church attendance or religious affiliation. In this way religiosity may be assessed with questions such as “What religion are you?”, “How often do you attend religious services?”, or even, “To what extent would you describe yourself as religious?”. It is only the last of these which would come close to an attempt at assessing the extent to which an individual has internalised the religious beliefs and values of their religion, but may also just as easily be interpreted in terms of mere practice. Thus people may see themselves as more or less religious because of the number of times they attend church services, rather than the extent to which they accept the values of the Church and profess its creed.

Conversely, religiosity may be seen specifically as an attempt to measure the motivation for an individual’s attendance at church services. In this way,
people are more or less religious on the basis that they attend their church for 'religious' reasons, such as to worship God or to pray, rather than for perceived social benefit. This definition forms the basis of the intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity proposed by Allport and Ross (1967) in their investigation into religion and prejudice, and much replicated in later studies. It is important to note, however, that in that study the distinction was made between high extrinsic and high intrinsic motivation, rather than high religiosity on the basis of either extrinsic or intrinsic responses.

Finally, it may be possible to see religiosity as the measure of acceptance and knowledge of religious doctrine. Hence, the ability to recite biblical texts or church doctrine and the level of acceptance of specific doctrine would be seen as a reflection of the level of religiosity. This is at least part of the measure of religiosity examined by instruments such as the Shepherd Scale (Pecnik & Epperson, 1985). According to one author, however, while this assessment of religiosity through creedal assent forms part of a number of instruments, the method should be seen as a "serious shortcoming of the majority of existing scales" (Wulff, 1991, p.215).

The difficulties in the area of the psychology of religion are therefore two-fold: the lack of a widely accepted definition of religiosity, and the too common practice in the research literature of failing to provide an operational definition of religiosity. A brief discussion on the major avenues of research into the psychology of religion and religiosity follows.
Multi- Versus Uni-Dimensional

The simplest conception of religiosity is that of a single dimension factor, and is usually measured by a single-item on a larger questionnaire. Often it focuses on behaviour, with the measure being that of church attendance. While there would seem to be some support for this position (Wulff, 1991), the greater amount of research literature argues for a multi-dimensional understanding of religiosity (see e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; DeJong, Faulkner, & Warland, 1976; Donahue, 1985; Francis, Lewis, Philipchalk, Lester, & Brown, 1995; Francis & Stubbs, 1987; Gorsuch, 1984; Gorsuch, 1988; Gorsuch et al., 1997; Joseph & Lewis, 1997; Plante & Boccaccini, 1997; Trimble, 1997). Many studies have utilised factor analytic methods in an attempt to determine the number and kind of the dimensions of religiosity (for a review see DeJong et al., 1976), with the number of dimensions of religiosity varying from three to ten. Often the dimensions suggested are similar, giving further credence to the theoretical position that religiosity is multi-dimensional.

The case for the multi-dimensionality of religiosity begins with the assertion that, even at its face value "religion seems far too complex an area of human behaviour - as diverse and heterogeneous as human behaviour - not to include many different and unrelated types of variables" (Dites, 1969, cited in DeJong et al., 1976, p.889). Cross-cultural studies (DeJong et al., 1976) have suggested support for the multi-dimensional position. Indeed, at the most basic level, Allport and Ross (1967) noted that the motivation for attendance at religious services suggested significant differences in religiosity.
The nature of religiosity, however, is often determined by the research. It is possible to conceptualise religiosity as a single dimension when religiosity is not the central focus of the research. It is clear that it is possible to separate people along a single dimension of religious or not-religious (Benda & Corwyn, 1997; Gorsuch, 1984) should that be desirable. Similarly though, it is possible to separate religious people into at least two dimensions (Allport & Ross, 1967). The current work conceptualises religiosity in a multi-dimensional manner.

Religiosity is viewed as a measurement of the extent to which an individual has internalised the doctrines and practices of the religion.

Extrinsic versus Intrinsic

Throughout the literature, there is considerable reference made to the early work of Allport and Ross (1967) on religion and prejudice, from which came the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity. In many ways this research can be seen as the progenitor of those current theories based on the multi-dimensional nature of religiosity. In that research, the authors reviewed numerous earlier studies all of which noted that on average churchgoers were more prejudiced than non-churchgoers. This would seem to have been a surprising result, as the mainstream Churches in the United States during the time of the civil rights movement were taking an open stand against prejudice, and were losing both members and financial support because of that stand. On a more theological level, Allport and Ross (1967) noted that the message of equality and common humanity which was representative of all great world religions, in addition to the example of numerous and varied religious leaders, seemed to contradict the message of prejudice that was being lived at least by some religious people.
In addressing that apparent contradiction, Allport and Ross (1967) came to suggest that a distinction could be made between the type of religiosity that was being demonstrated. That study found that the relationship between church attendance and prejudice was curvilinear. In essence, while seldom attenders were seen to be more prejudiced than non-religious people, frequent attenders were less prejudiced than infrequent attenders, and often less than non-attenders (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.433). It is beyond the scope of the current study to review the literature which is focussed on the levels of prejudice. It is important, however, to see that a distinction was drawn between formal behaviours, such as attendance at church services, and involvement or commitment to religious values. That difference was characterised in the following way:

It seems obvious that the regular attenders who go to church once a week or oftener are people who receive something of special ideological and experiential meaning. Irregular, casual fringe members, on the other hand, regard their religious contacts as less binding, less absorbing, less integral with their personal lives. ... Perhaps the briefest way to characterise the two poles of subjective religion is to say that the extrinsically motivated person uses his [or her] religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated person lives his [or her] religion (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.434).

In this way, the extrinsically motivated person would be seen to use their religious contacts for personal gain, such as for social contact, to provide security and solace, status or self-justification, whereas the intrinsically motivated person would find in the religious values of their church a “master motive” for living (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.434).
While the extrinsic and intrinsic distinction is maintained in more recent literature, a further clarification is offered. This later research has developed the concept of extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity, and a number of authors (e.g., Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989; Gorsuch, Mylvaganam, & Gorsuch, 1997) have suggested that extrinsic religiosity can be further defined into two categories: personally- and socially-orientated extrinsic motivation. In this way, the extrinsic motivation for church attendance was separated into those extrinsic items that were oriented towards personal gain, such as the solace achieved through worship, and the social benefit gained, such as maintaining friendships. The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, seen as being personally committed in the way conceptualised by Allport and Ross (1967), remains. Indeed the later research shows support for the intrinsic conceptualisation, in addition to that support offered for the two types of extrinsic motivation. While this clarification is seen by some researchers as being significant enough to warrant a renewed examination of the extrinsic/intrinsic research (e.g., DeJong et al., 1976; Gorsuch et al., 1997), it remains that the distinction is inherent in the Allport and Ross (1967) conceptualisation of religiosity, who defined the extrinsically religious as those who found religion “useful in a variety of ways” (p.434). Both those who found solace and those who found social status and contact were seen to be extrinsic, and it was the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic which was seen to be significant. As that study notes, “to know that a person is in some sense ‘religious’ is not as important as to know the role religion plays in the economy of his [or her] life” (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.442). In the same way it can be conceptualised that knowing which extrinsic motivation is
stronger is not as important as knowing whether a person is extrinsically or intrinsically motivated.

In later research, a further distinction is also made between the current understanding of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity and the original Allport and Ross (1967) conceptualisation of those terms. In that earlier research religiosity was seen as something of a single continuum and individuals were located somewhere on it at either the extrinsic or the intrinsic end. Further, that research tended to conceptualise religiosity in an almost categorical manner, suggesting that people were either intrinsic or extrinsic in their religiosity. Allport and Ross (1967) found it difficult to see people able to vacillate between the two extremes, or indeed to locate people in the middle with traits of both extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity, and so these indiscriminately proreligious were effectively excluded from the category of being religious, or at the very least seen as “obscuring” the results (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.441).

The current research conceptualises a far greater fluidity in the motivations. It is both possible for people to have some of each of these three motivations, and to change the ‘level’ of their motivation. At any given time, therefore, an individual may be more or less intrinsically or extrinsically motivated. This does not necessarily suggest that people change the basic motivation randomly; it is still possible to conceptualise individuals who are predominantly extrinsically or intrinsically motivated. It does, however, allow for the possibility that even the most intrinsically motivated person may also be a little extrinsically motivated, and that this level of extrinsic motivation may change slightly from time to time. As one study notes (Gorsuch et al., 1997), it is
the nature of accepting a multidimensional understanding of religiosity that it is also necessary to accept that one person's motivation may not be identical to another’s, and that each person may be religious for multiple reasons. While the original research did not conceptualise this level of fluidity, it would seem to be common in more contemporary studies to accept that a person may participate in a religious ritual for any number of reasons, both extrinsic and intrinsic.

One further clarification about religiosity must also be made. In the early work by Allport and Ross (1967) church attendance was assumed and religiosity was measured was, in the first instance, by the level of church attendance. The research focus then shifted to an examination of the motivation for church attendance. In later research the focus moves again, and a significant debate has been waged on religiosity as either a multi- or a uni-dimensional concept. The multi-dimensional position is argued on the basis of Allport and Ross’ (1967) original work, and focuses on the motivation for church attendance (e.g., Gorsuch, Mylvaganam, Gorsuch, & Johnson, 1997). Clearly in this model, people at a worship service might be there for either intrinsic or extrinsic reasons, and the primary motivation of one may be of little concern to another. Similarly, an individual may attend religious service to worship God (intrinsic), receive grace (extrinsic personal) and enjoy community fellowship (extrinsic social). Indeed, these three things might well motivate people at the same time, each ‘taking turns’ at being the primary motivation.

This confusion about the distinctiveness of religiosity and motivation for church attendance may have overly complicated the research in this area. Following the work of Donohue (1985), a distinction is made between attendance
at church services and personal religious commitment. In each of the major studies reviewed, attendance at church services has been assumed, and it is the motivation for attendance which is measured and conceptualised as being either extrinsic or intrinsic. An effective conceptualisation of religiosity as a multidimensional concept, however, must be able to incorporate a religiousness which is not tied to church attendance.

The current work seeks to conceptualise religiosity in a way which moves beyond mere church attendance because, for example, it is postulated that church attendance may well be coerced in younger people and will thus fail to reflect any sense of religious commitment. Conversely, while a strong belief in a deity will impact on behavior, the experience of the divine and a sense of being a religious person may well not be connected to attendance at church services, especially for young people who, it will be argued later, are able to experience being religious before they are able to commit to a particular religious tradition. Hence, religiosity is neither mere church attendance nor the reasons for church attendance. It must be conceptualised as an experience of being a part of a universe that is created by a deity, to whom it is possible to relate in some way.

Values

The concept of value is central to a number of theories of the nature of the human person, and thus has a wide range of meanings both within psychological literature, wider academic literature and in common usage. Possibly the first significant attempt to explore and define values within a psychological framework was that conducted by Rokeach (1960, 1968, 1975). Here we find an attempt to differentiate between related concepts such as belief, attitude, value and value-
system. For Rokeach, a value is seen to be akin to a disposition a person may have. It is similar to an attitude, which in that study is defined as “an organisation of beliefs ... [and] a set of interrelated predispositions focussed on an attitude object or situation” (Rokeach, 1975, p.120), however, a value is more basic than an attitude, and may underlie the attitude.

A value is also distinct from but related to a belief. In its simplest definition a belief is a proposition which can be preceded by the phrase ‘I believe that ...’ (Rokeach, 1975, p.113). A belief is seen to have three components: a cognitive component, reflecting what is known about the focus of the belief; an affective component, reflecting the commitment the person has to the belief; and the arousal the person will experience if the belief is challenged; and a behavioural component, because the belief a person holds will motivate a particular behaviour. In this conceptualisation, a value is defined as:

a type of belief, centrally located within one’s total belief system, about how one ought or ought not to behave, or about some end-state of existence worth or not worth attaining. Values are thus abstract ideals, positive or negative, not tied to any specific object or situation, representing a person’s beliefs about ideal modes of conduct and ideal terminal goals (Rokeach, 1975, p.124).

It is in the nature of the object that is seen as important that we find the difference between a belief and a value: beliefs are specific, while values are a special type of belief which are abstract and focussed on ideals. In this way a person might be seen to have “tens or hundreds of thousands of beliefs, thousands of attitudes but only dozens of values” (Rokeach, 1975, p.124).
In more recent times, a number of studies have advanced the theory of values and values research, most notably those of Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) and Schwartz (1992). While Rokeach (1960, 1968, 1975) examined the relationship between values, beliefs and the values system, he made little attempt to organise values into a coherent structure. This is the focus of the later studies. The definition of values offered in the later studies is drawn from earlier work. In this way values are seen as consisting of five features, and are defined as “concepts or beliefs, about desirable end states or behaviours, that transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour or events, and are ordered by relative importance” (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, p.551).

An immediate similarity may be seen between this definition and the earlier one offered by Rokeach (1975), in that this definition also contains specific cognitive and behavioural components, and infers a level of commitment suggested by the affective component. The final part of this later definition of value focuses on the manner in which the value fits into a wider value structure, which is inherent in the earlier Rokeach definition and which finds its expression as Rokeach describes the concept of the value system. There is one immediate difference, however, between the two definitions: the distinction between belief and value made by Rokeach seems to be lost.

It is not in the subtle definitional changes, however, that these later studies differ from the earlier ones. The advancement is made in the way these later studies attempt to organise individual values into a typology of value groups, which are initially called motivational domains, according to the content of the individual value. This arrangement is done initially on the basis of the theoretical
position that values are cognitive representations of one of three basic and
universal human requirements: biological needs, social interactional needs, and
social institutional needs (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). As the original theory is
developed, the motivational domains are relabelled as personal types, the
seven initial domains are extended to eleven, and then reduced to ten, and the
definitions and names of the domains themselves are sharpened (Schwartz, 1992).
The ten domains are listed, along with short definitions, in Table 1. The specific
arrangement of values into value types as suggested by Schwartz (1992) is to be
found in as an Appendix.

In addition to the suggestion that individual values may be grouped into
different types, the recent literature (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz &
Huismans, 1995) has also suggested that a relationship between the value types
may be found. Essentially, the achievement of one value type through a range of
action is either compatible or incompatible with the attainment of another value
type. In the example offered by Schwartz (1992), actions in support of Obedience
will be likely to conflict with actions in support of Independence, but be
supportive of those aimed at Social Order. In this new theory of values, an overall
structure is suggested for the various value types, outlining the relationship
between the value types. This structure is represented by Figure 1. Values
adjacent to each other are suggested by Schwartz (1992) to have actions
compatible with the attainment of both value types. Greater distance suggests
decreasing compatibility, and those values opposite each other are seen to be in
direct conflict. In this way, actions that would lead to the satisfaction of the
power values are also those that would lead to the satisfaction of achievement or
security values, but would be contradictory to the satisfaction of the values of universalism.

Hence, in the recent work Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) and by Schwartz (1992), values are seen to be motivational, related to evaluation about the worth or otherwise of various beliefs or events, abstract and universal. Further, individual values can be seen to be related to other individual values, and may be grouped into similar motivational value types. Finally, these value types may be seen to be more or less related to each other, in as much as the actions which either support or contradict the attainment of a given value type may be seen to be more or less either supportive of, or in conflict with, another value type.

Values and Religiosity

Just as a relationship between the different value types can be observed and explored, a relationship between specific behaviour and the various value types can also be hypothesised. In this way, a relationship between religious behaviour and the various value types can also be examined. The strength of the value for religion and associated behaviour cannot be underestimated. In Schwartz (1992), spirituality is added as a possible eleventh domain, and then rejected because of insufficient empirical support. While the data did not suggest this to be the case, the theory behind the support of spirituality is sound and should be briefly explored. In proposing the eleven motivational value types to be explored, Schwartz (1992) suggested that the search for meaning is an inherent force in the human life, and this would be reflected by a value type of spirituality. In the way that spirituality was defined in that study, its existence as a value type was not supported. Two reasons are offered as to why this was not the case.
Firstly, as Schwartz (1992) notes, it may be that people are finding meaning through other types of values. Specifically:

The pursuit of meaning and coherence as described by theologians and philosophers may entail a level of sophisticated, effortful thought that is beyond that in which most people typically engage. Instead, most people may satisfy their need for coherence through pursuing tradition, security, and conformity values (Schwartz, 1992, p. 10).

By defining spirituality as a search for meaning, it may be that the value may not be robust enough to survive on its own. Secondly, it may be that spirituality finds its expression through a number of different and specific values, rather than through a distinct value type of its own. Interestingly, this is much more in line with other work in the area of spirituality, which suggests that this is the case (e.g., Chandler, Holden, & Kolander, 1992; Westgate, 1996). Regardless of which of these two are accepted, it is obvious that spiritual concerns are likely to have a significant impact both on values, and by valuing spirituality, on behaviour. In later studies Schwartz and Huismans (1995) and Roccas and Schwartz (1997) examined the hypothesised relationship between values and religious behaviour, suggesting that a clear relationship between religiosity and value types may be maintained. This relationship is outlined below.

The original values theory discussed above (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990) suggested a relationship between value types, with behaviour advancing one value type being seen as either supportive of, or contrary to, the advancement on another value type. This same relationship can be seen to exist in the behaviour exercised in advancement of the value of 'being
religious', which is suggested forms part of several value types, and is the focus of
the study conducted by Schwartz and Huismans (1995) and Roccas and Schwartz
(1997). In exploring the relationship between religiosity, which is defined simply
in that study as the “degree of commitment to religion” (Schwartz & Huismans,
1995, p.98), a brief examination of the theological, sociological and philosophical
aspects of religiosity were compared to the contents of the value types.

This later study suggested that the activity of all religions was the search
for meaning beyond the immediate through belief and worship, and that this was
achieved through the function of religion in encouraging its members to “temper
self-indulgent tendencies and to foster transcendental concerns and beliefs …
[through] promulgating religious creeds, moral proscriptions, and ritual
requirements” (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.91). Higher religiosity, measured
in that study by a simple single-item question, was seen to reflect acceptance of
those requirements and proscriptions. Therefore, a clear relationship between
higher religiosity and various value type could be hypothesised. For example,
high religiosity was seen to be closely related to the value type Tradition, as it was
that value type that contained values that emphasised acceptance of traditional
rituals and customs, and submission to transcendental authority (Roccas &
Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). The hypothesised relationships
between religiosity and the different value types are listed in Table 2.

The findings of the study conducted by Schwartz and Huismans (1995)
and later replicated (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997) seem to suggest support for the
general theory that a relationship between religious behaviour and value types
exists, and for the most part that the relationship was as predicted by the
researchers. In all cases where a direction was predicted for the correlation, that
direction was observed, although not always with the predicted strength. The
actual correlations between value types and religiosity is displayed as Table 3.
The researchers also claim that their data suggest that the relationship between
value religiosity is a two-directional one: specifically, being religious both
influences value priorities and is influenced by already developed value priorities.
They summarise their findings in this way:

The overall pattern of consistent religiosity-value correlations suggests
that valuing certainty, self-restraint, and submission to superior external
verities inclines people to become more religious in general; valuing
openness to change and free self-expression inclines people to become less
religious (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.105).

Adolescent Development

While Schwartz and Huismans (1995) outlined a theory which explored
the relationship between values and religiosity, that theory has not been applied to
the adolescent. The relationship between religiosity and values for adolescents
may well reflect the relationship found in adult samples, however, the impact of
adolescent development may change the shape of that relationship, and so a brief
examination of adolescent development as suggested by Erikson (1968, 1977) is
now offered. The basis of Erikson’s theory of development is threefold. Firstly,
it suggests that the development of the person and the personality continues
through the life-span. Secondly, this development proceeds through a series of
stages, the successful navigation of which is both presupposed by previous stages
and necessary for subsequent ones. Thirdly, each stage is characterised by a
'crisis', the successful resolution of which is necessary for the development of the
'virtue' associated with that stage, and for successful progress to the next stage.

The way that each stage builds on the successful resolution of the previous
stages, and the successful resolution of which is necessary for subsequent stages,
is a significant part of the theory of development offered by Erikson (1968, 1977),
and is called the "epigenetic principle" (Erikson, 1968, p.92). The theory suggests
that development is properly achieved only when the stages are reached "in the
proper rate and the proper sequence" (Erikson, 1968, p.93). The adolescent stage
is concerned with resolution of concerns about identity. The resolution of identity
issues is not attempted before adolescence, but must be resolved before
subsequent stages can be successfully attempted, although there is some
suggestion that a certain fluidity is possible. It has also been suggested that
gender differences may have a significant impact on development at this time
(Hodgson & Fischer, 1979; Marcia & Friedman, 1970), however, this has not yet
received as wide support as the original theory, and it is beyond the scope of the
current work to include a detailed review of the possible impact of gender. For
Erikson, however, the epigenetic principle remains central. He describes it in the
following manner:

The principle states that anything that grows has a ground plan, and that
out of this ground plan the parts arise, each part having its time of special
ascendancy, until all parts have arisen to form a functioning whole
(Erikson, 1968, p.92).
Hence, each stage has an over-riding focus specific to that stage alone, but which is a vital part of the whole development of the person and is necessary before the successful resolution of the subsequent stages may be achieved.

The notion of the ‘crisis’ of each stage has also had significant attention, with the ‘adolescent crisis’ and the ‘midlife crisis’ receiving common acceptance. The specific understanding that Erikson (1968, 1977) had about the crisis of each stage is worthy of clarification. Firstly, the crisis is not specific to these two times, but is a vital part of each stage. Erikson (1968, 1977) argues that as each stage has a specific focal point and is part of a predetermined ground plan, this focal point is brought sharply into focus at the appropriate time. This crisis is not seen by Erikson (1968, 1977) as a negative, but rather as a “radical change in perspective” (Erikson, 1968, p. 96). Ochse and Plug (1986) summarize it in this way:

In each stage conflict arises between newly emerging personal needs and social demands, and culminates in a crisis. A crisis is a normal event. It represents a turning point in development, rather than a catastrophe, and leaves both positive and negative residues that influence the course of future development (p. 1240).

The crisis is seen, therefore, as a normal and necessary way in which the primary focus of each stage is brought to the attention of the developing person, so that it might be addressed. It is this understanding of crisis, and attempts to avoid overly negative overtones, that have led some to rename crisis with less loaded terms such as ‘issue’ (e.g., Miller, 1993).
The successful resolution of the crisis results in the achievement of a specific virtue. Just as each crisis is characterised as an opportunity for growth and as a change in perspective, the resolution of each results in the development of a new function or characteristic. For example, as the adolescent achieves a sense of personal identity, the virtue of fidelity is also achieved, by which the adolescent is able to express a commitment to the ideals now part of their identity and a loyalty to the people now regarded as important. Despite some clarifications and the fact that the majority of research has focussed on the adolescent stage (Ochse & Plug, 1986), Erikson’s theory is widely accepted and has been replicated in other cultures and situations (see, e.g., Wang & Viney, 1996; Ochse & Plug, 1986).

For Erikson, the period of adolescence is a particularly critical one, for it is in this period that the significant crisis of identity is faced. The adolescent struggles with attempting to define a sense of identity and to avoid identity-diffusion. The concerns for the adolescent are focussed on how they appear to themselves and to others and their attempts to define who they are and what they believe. The central preoccupations of the adolescent are therefore their desire to find someone or something in which to freely believe, their need to freely assent in areas of duty and service, their development of trusting friendships, and their choice of occupation, which “assumes a significance beyond the question of remuneration and status” (Erikson, 1977, p. 129).

As the adolescent struggles with the old accepted beliefs and tries to refocus on what is important and worthy of acceptance, an impact on the adolescent’s religious activity and expressed values is to be expected. It is a
necessary part of attempting to achieve resolution of the identity crisis that adolescents examine, and later make, a commitment to occupational choices, political beliefs and religious attitudes (Marcia, 1966; Craig-Bray, Adams & Dobson, 1988; Markstrom-Adams, Hofstra & Dougher, 1994).

It is important to note that the adolescent does not attempt identity resolution in all facets at once. Marcia (1966) and others (e.g., Coleman, 1978) have noted that the adolescent is able to focus on individual areas, while putting others on 'hold'. In particular, Marcia (1966) has suggested that adolescents move through four areas, depending on the level of mature thought and commitment. According to Marcia (1966) an adolescent may be categorized into one of four groups according to the level of commitment and thought: from foreclosure, where a high degree of commitment is demonstrated although there has been no attempt at mature thought, through diffusion, with low commitment and low thought, to moratorium, with a high degree of thought but no commitment and finally to achievement, with a high degree of both thought and commitment. In this way, an individual may well have achieved a sense of identity in the occupational area, be working on the area of politics but not yet have even considered the area of religion. Indeed, Kroger and Green (1996) note that a range of events are associated with movement towards achieving identity in specific areas. In most cases an internal change is closely associated with achieving a sense of identity, especially in the religious area (Kroger & Green, 1996, p.483).
Conclusion

The relationship between this adolescent stage of development and the development of religious beliefs and activity can not be understated. Adolescent development should be seen as having the potential to impact on the relationship between religiosity and values. The period of adolescence is one which is, of its nature, focussed on the re-examination of issues of values and must include an examination of the individual's previous and possible future participation in religious activity. As the individual faces these religious issues, a mature commitment is able to be made to the religion which is seen to support that which the adolescent values. As Marcia (1966) notes, however, the period of adolescence is punctuated by a movement between the various stages of moratorium, foreclosure, and diffusion en route to identity achievement. In this way individuals are able to face the issues within the crisis of identity one at a time. Until the crisis of identity includes issues of religion, the individual will not necessarily display a mature and reasoned decision on religious issues. In this way it is possible that the adolescent may not demonstrate the relationships between religiosity and value types displayed in previous studies.

As value types are motivational, it may well be the case that the development of values is stable, and the task of the adolescent is to find organisations, people, and institutions which are seen as able to fulfil the already established values. A certain amount of stability may be observed (Erikson, 1968) as the individual resolves the crisis of each stage in a way which shows a certain unity with all that has been previously resolved. The task of development is not to constantly recreate the individual personality, but to develop, in harmony with all
that has been previously achieved, the new potential which is evoked by each stage’s crisis. In this way, the adolescent is seen by Erikson (1977) to be in search of “a new sense of continuity and sameness” (Erikson, 1977, p.235).

This understanding of the adolescent task of re-examining the issues in a sense of sameness is also reflected in Erikson’s (1968) claims that the activity of the adolescent revolves around the discovery of people and ideas to “have faith in, which also means men [and women] and ideas in whose service it would seem worth while to prove oneself trustworthy” (Erikson, 1968, p.128-129). It is not argued that the adolescent searches for new values, but rather that the adolescent searches for ideals, people, and institutions which align with the values they already have. It is only against an already reasonably defined set of values that something is able to be judged “worthy of service” and people are judged “worthy of trust”. The re-examination of people’s worth, personal career choices, and religious and political beliefs is undertaken in such a way that assent is given to these positions only in so much as these are supported by an already reasonably well established set of values. Schwartz and Huismans (1995) argue this when they suggest that “value priorities may influence individuals’ commitment to the religion they profess and (occasionally) their choice of a specific religion, because religions provide opportunities or pose barriers to the attainment of valued goals” (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.88). In this way, the choice to participate in a religious activity is determined by the already well-established value priorities held by an individual, as well as the impact of the individual’s stage of development.
In this way, an examination of the value priorities of adolescents may well provide some clue as to future activity, especially in the religious sphere. This is of obvious interest to those involved in the development of young people through religious schools. Clearly, while an individual may not be able to demonstrate the developmental ability to make a mature commitment to a particular religion by the end of his or her school life, the value priorities are somewhat established. These values will either be supportive of, or discordant with, current and future participation in religious activity. It is clearly of interest to the religious school, whose influence in the area of student participation in religion should not be underestimated (e.g., Hyde, 1990), to be able to better socialise the students with values supportive of future participation in religious activity.
Table 1

Value Domains and Descriptions (cf, Schwartz, 1992, p.5-12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivational Types of Values</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Direction</td>
<td>Derived from need for mastery and control, and autonomy and independence. Includes independent thought and action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>Derived from perceived need for variety and stimulation and has goal of excitement, novelty and challenge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>Derived from organismic need for pleasure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Defined by goal of personal success through demonstrated competence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Similar to achievement in the self esteem gained, but focuses on attainment of position within social system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Derived from need for security, safety stability or society and of relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity (earlier labelled restrictive conformity)</td>
<td>Derived from the requirement that individuals suppress behaviour that might upset or harm others, or violate social norms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Respect for the traditions and customs of society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence (earlier labelled prosocial)</td>
<td>Concern for the welfare of those close in everyday interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism (includes former type of maturity)</td>
<td>Concern for the welfare of all people and nature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

Hypothesised Correlations Between Value Types and Religiosity (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.92-92)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Type</th>
<th>Hypothesised Correlation with religiosity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Strong Position Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>Positive Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Positive Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Positive Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>Negative Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>Negative Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>Strong Negative Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Little or No Correlation: direction not specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Little or No Correlation: direction not specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Little or No Correlation: direction not specified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3

Actual Correlations Between Value Types and Religiosity For Mixed-Nationality Sample (n=1716) and For German Sample (n=1807) (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.98, 101)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Type</th>
<th>Correlation (n=1716)</th>
<th>Correlation (n=1807)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>-.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>-.39</td>
<td>-.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* All correlations statistically significant at alpha = .01
Figure 1. Theoretical structure of relations among motivational Value Types, where proximity indicates the degree of compatibility of Value Types. (Schwartz, 1992, p.45)
References


### Appendix

Individual Values and Associated Value Types (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987, 1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Self-Direction</strong></th>
<th><strong>Security</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>National security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creativity</td>
<td>Reciprocation of favours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Family security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choosing own goals</td>
<td>Sense of belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curious</td>
<td>Social order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-respect</td>
<td>Healthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Stimulation</strong></th>
<th><strong>Tradition</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An exciting life</td>
<td>Respect for tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daring</td>
<td>Devout</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Hedonism</strong></th>
<th><strong>Benevolence</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pleasure</td>
<td>Helpful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoying life</td>
<td>Responsible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Achievement</strong></th>
<th><strong>Universalism</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td>Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>Unity with nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable</td>
<td>Wisdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>A world of beauty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligent</td>
<td>Social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-respect</td>
<td>Broad-minded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Power</strong></th>
<th><strong>Conformity</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social power</td>
<td>Obedient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>Self-discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Politeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preserving my public image</td>
<td>Honouring of parents and elders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social recognition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Security</strong></th>
<th><strong>Benevolence</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National security</td>
<td>Helpful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocation of favours</td>
<td>Responsible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family security</td>
<td>Forgiving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of belonging</td>
<td>Honest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social order</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy</td>
<td>Mature love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean</td>
<td>True friendship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An investigation into the relationship between religiosity, values and adolescent
development in a co-educational Catholic secondary school, in Perth, Western
Australia.

by

Paul F. Russell BTheolMelbCollDiv, BEdNDA, BA(Psych)EdithCowan

Faculty of Community Studies, Education and Social Sciences,
Edith Cowan University, Joondalup.
Abstract

The current work examined the relationship between religiosity and values in an adolescent group. The participants ($N=103$) were students from a co-educational Catholic secondary school in Perth, Western Australia ($n=87$), and from one of four church-based youth groups ($n=16$). There were forty-one males, aged between 16 years and 4 months and 17 years and 11 months ($M=16$ years and 7 months), and sixty-three females, aged between 16 years and 4 months and 18 years and 9 months ($M=16$ years and 6 months). Each participant completed a values survey and a measure of religiosity. The correlations between the value types, as defined by Schwartz (1992), and religiosity were calculated. The correlation between values and religiosity reached significant levels for three values, Hedonism ($r = -.31$), Stimulation ($r = -.24$) and Tradition ($r = .37$). Comparisons were made between the current study and previous research, extending the research on religiosity and values into an adolescent group. The sample was then divided according to higher and lower religiosity, and comparisons were made. An assessment of the effectiveness of the school in conveying a specific values system was made on this basis. In light of the findings, suggestions for further research were made including an extension of the current study to include a wider and more diverse sample, and the use of both an extrinsic and intrinsic measure of religiosity with both adolescent and adult groups.
The primary aim of the religious school is not success of the sports field, university entrance rates or even simple academic achievement. While each of these is important, and welcome in all schools, the religious school differs from the non-religious school in that its primary aim is the socialisation of its students into the value system of the sponsoring church. This is not an easy task, and must include an understanding of the areas of the psychology of religion, values, and adolescent development. The religious school attempts to convey the dominant culture in the light of the sponsoring church's values. It is with this in mind that the current work seeks to briefly review the three areas of the psychology of religion, values, and adolescent development, as well as the relationship between them.

Recent work (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) has suggested that values are both universal and organised in a particular way. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) define values as having five features: they are "concepts or beliefs, about desirable end states or behaviours, that transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour or events, and are ordered by relative importance" (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, p.551). In this there is little deviation from previous work on values (e.g., Rokeach, 1960, 1968, 1975), however, this recent work has suggested an arrangement of values which is unique. According to recent studies (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990), values are both universal, and may be organised into ten motivational value types. This organisation of value types and individual values is demonstrated in Table 1. In this way, a relationship is seen between
individual values, which either support or oppose various other individual values, and between groups of values, which again either support or oppose other value types. Thus, the individual values of An Exciting Life, A Varied Life, and Daring are grouped into the value type Stimulation. This value type may be seen as opposing the value types of Conformity and Tradition, but is seen as being similar in content to, and therefore supporting of, the value types of Hedonism and Self-Direction. The proposed relationship between value types is demonstrated in Figure 1.

Another dimension to the religious school is the level of student participation in the religious life of the educational community. Participation in the religious rites of the sponsoring church is seen as a reflection of the level of assent to the values of that church. As can been seen from an exploration of adolescent development, however, it would be unwise to suggest that mere participation in the worship rituals of the church would necessarily be reflective of the acceptance of the values of that church. It may well be the case that participation is discordant with the student’s values, and is motivated by quite different values. Similarly, non-participation does not necessarily reflect a rejection of the church’s values. In both cases, the individual may well have not yet developed a deep commitment to the religious institution, but may well still be in the process of the exploration that is a vital part of this stage of development. Any understanding of religiosity must, therefore, be able to incorporate this flexibility.

The simplest conception of religiosity is that of a single dimension factor and while there would seem to be some support for this position (Wulff, 1991) the
greater amount of research literature argues for a multi-dimensional understanding of religiosity (e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; DeJong, Faulkner, & Warland, 1976; Donahue, 1985; Francis, Lewis, Philipchalk, Lester, & Brown, 1995; Francis & Stubbs, 1987; Gorsuch, 1984; Gorsuch, 1988; Gorsuch, Mylvaganam, Gorsuch, & Johnson, 1997; Joseph & Lewis, 1997; Plante & Boccaccini, 1997; Trimble, 1997). Arguably the most significant development in the understanding of religiosity has been the work by Allport and Ross (1967), which suggested that religiosity operates on two levels. Based on research about religiosity and prejudice, Allport and Ross (1967) suggested that a fundamental distinction could be made in religiosity: that of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity.

For Allport and Ross (1967) the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity was based on the motivation for participation in religious activity. Those motivated by personal gain were demonstrating extrinsic religiosity, while those motivated by more ideological reasons were demonstrating intrinsic religiosity. More simply put, the intrinsic 'lived' their religion, while the extrinsic 'used' their religion (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.434). While developments have been suggested since the early work of Allport and Ross (1967), the basic distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity remains.

Thus, while it may be possible to determine if a person is religious or not on the basis of a single question, it is far more useful to be able to understand the impact that an individual's religion has in the manner in which that individual lives out their life. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity is seen as useful as it enables a conceptualisation of the level of religious activity as well as some understanding of the level of religious commitment. While adults
are likely to differ in their motivation for participation in religious activity, adolescents are especially likely to participate in religious activity for a wide range of extrinsic reasons because of their level of maturity in the area of religious beliefs and commitment. This understanding of religiosity is, therefore, a useful one when addressing adolescent participation in religious activity.

The established theory of adolescent development stems from the work by Erikson (1968, 1977), which, while not specifically a theory of adolescent development but rather that of the whole lifespan, has none-the-less initiated a great deal of research on the period of adolescence. Erikson’s (1968, 1977) theory of development is based on the ‘epigenetic principle’, where by development of ego and personality is seen to follow a clear plan. The successful negotiation of each stage of development is both dependent on the successful completion on the previous stages, and necessary for the successful navigation of all subsequent stages. Similarly, the issues raised at each stage are part of a plan, and are raised only when appropriate, and not before. In the same way, the issues central to each stage of development are important foundations for subsequent stages.

Each stage is characterised by one important issue, for example the issue of identity for the adolescent. Successful personality and ego development is dependent on that issue being raised and appropriately dealt with at the right time. This process of sharply bringing the relevant issue into focus is called a crisis by Erikson (1968, 1977). This crisis is not seen by Erikson (1968, 1977) as negative, but rather as a “radical change in perspective” (Erikson, 1968, p.96). The crisis is merely the way that the issue central to that stage is brought into the attention of the individual so that successful resolution may take place.
The successful resolution of each crisis brings with it a virtue closely associated with that issue. For example, the adolescent is faced with the crisis of identity, where issues of self-identity are addressed. The adolescent must examine how he or she looks to themselves, and to significant others. Issues of occupation and of political and religious beliefs must be examined and decide upon. The virtue of fidelity is closely associated with this stage. Just as each crisis is characterised as an opportunity for growth and as a change in perspective, the resolution of each results in the development of a new function or characteristic. For example, as the adolescent achieves a sense of personal identity, the virtue of fidelity is also achieved. In this way, as the adolescent determines what is important, what is worthy of acceptance and what is to be taken on as part of the new identity, the adolescent is also able to develop the faithfulness to maintain those things which have been determined to be important. With this new forming identity comes the virtue of fidelity, by which the adolescent is able to express a commitment to the ideals now part of their identity and a loyalty to the people now regarded as important.

Hence, the period of adolescence is one characterised by issues of identity. Concern with how an individual looks to others is important. This period is a time during which the accepted rules and beliefs are re-examined. Occupational concerns are of great importance, well beyond the issue of mere remuneration. Political and religious beliefs must be challenged. The development of identity is, itself, a process with stages (see Marcia, 1966). Different aspects of identity, such as occupational and religious beliefs, are addressed at different times, and a suspension of thought about beliefs is observed (Erikson, 1959; Erikson, 1968;
Erikson, 1982; Marcia, 1966; Markstrom-Adams, Hofstra, & Dougher, 1994).

Towards the end of this period, the individual begins to show a mature commitment to those beliefs and people that have shown themselves worthy of acceptance and support. The development of fidelity is seen. For the school attempting to convey a set of values, the period towards the end of the school life is of greatest significance.

The current work, therefore, sees a direct connection between values, religiosity, and development. Clearly, as values are motivational, the level of religious involvement will be determined to a great extent by the value priorities of the individual. Similarly, as the individual may not have yet been faced with a crisis that demands a clarification of religious beliefs, or at least will not have yet resolved that crisis, it may be usefully assumed that the value priorities expressed by an adolescent will precede a mature commitment to religious activity, while being supportive of that commitment. While Hyde (1990) has demonstrated the significant impact of the school on student religiosity, it must be clear that factors other than the school impact on student values and religiosity, and this relationship is characterised by Figure 2. In this way, while the influence of family, society, development, and personal values can be seen to impact on individual religiosity, the complex way in which the school has an impact, both directly and indirectly, can also be seen.

The performance of the school as an institution which is charged both by the parents and by the sponsoring church to convey a particular set of values, however, cannot be understated. In as much as it can, the school must be able to justify its existence by asserting that it does have an impact on student values and
student religiosity. The current work, therefore, sets to examine the school’s ability to achieve its aim of impacting effectively on student values and religiosity.

In light of the understanding of religiosity outlined previously, it was decided in the current work to improve the procedure of the previous studies (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) with regard to the measurement of religiosity. Roccas and Schwartz (1997) argue that adopting a unidimensional understanding of religiosity is appropriate because that study measured a general sense, rather than specific components, of religiousness. The majority of research literature reviewed, however, demands an understanding of religiosity as a multidimensional concept (e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Donahue, 1985; Francis, 1989; Francis et al., 1995; Francis & Stubbs, 1987; Gorsuch, 1984; Gorsuch, 1988; Gorsuch et al., 1997). Further, Schwartz and Huismans (1995) argue that religiosity is the measure of the “degree of commitment to religion” (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.88). As that study sought to examine the relationship between this commitment and values, it can safely be assumed that the measure of religiosity used was at least implicitly measuring a degree of lived commitment, rather than a mere attachment to the religion for social reasons. Clearly, in light of the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity offered by Allport and Ross (1967), at least some attempt to differentiate between an intrinsic and an extrinsic commitment to religion is necessary.

The current work utilises a definition based on an assumption about the multi-dimensional nature of religiosity, and therefore seeks to measure the
religiosity of the participants on the basis of a more detailed questionnaire which includes an attempt to examine religiosity on an intrinsic scale. The reasons for this were three-fold. Firstly, somewhat in opposition to the previous studies, it was felt that it was not appropriate to measure religiosity as a single-item question in this case. Single-item measures of religiosity are seen to be useful in cases where religion has already been seen to have an effect but when it is not the central concern (e.g., Gorsuch, 1988; Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989). Clearly, in the current study, religiosity is the central concern and on this basis alone a single-item questionnaire would seem to be inappropriate. Secondly, the nature of the study demands that account be taken of the lived commitment to religion: in essence, the nature of the study demands that religiosity be measured in a way that includes an intrinsic dimension. The focus of the current study is that of the impact that a commitment to religion has on values, and vice versa. It is presumed that a purely extrinsic commitment to religion will not impact on values in the same way that an intrinsic commitment will, and it was therefore seen to be necessary to differentiate between a “general religious conviction” and an assessment of the “social importance of religion” (Miller & Eells, 1998, p.252). Thirdly, the focus of the current work on adolescents adds a new dimension. Erikson (1968, 1977) argues that the period of adolescence is one within which it is necessary for the adolescent to examine questions of identity. This examination of identity must include an examination of issues such as values and religious beliefs (Marcia, 1966). In light of this, a measure of religiosity must be sensitive enough to differentiate between a level of religious activity motivated by a genuine concern and commitment to the values of the religion, and a level of
activity motivated by parental or peer pressure. A single-item question about church attendance, as was the case in previous studies (e.g., Schwartz & Huismans, 1995), cannot capture the essence of a lived religious commitment, and this is particularly the case in the lives of adolescents.

Based on previous research, it is predicted that a relationship between values, as conceptualised and measured by Schwartz (1992), and religiosity will emerge. This relationship between values and religiosity is demonstrated in Table 2. On the first level, the current study seeks to extend that previous research to examine adolescents' values and religiosity. It is therefore hypothesised that, allowing for a small amount of variance due to the emotional immaturity of the participants, the relationship between values and religiosity within the adolescent group examined will not differ greatly from the relationship between religiosity and values found in the previous research (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995).

The motivational nature of values suggests that value priorities will be adopted prior to any real commitment to a religious organisation is made, and that the value priorities adopted will influence the individual's religious commitment. As adolescents develop at different rates, it is assumed that some of the participants will have made a sincere religious commitment and others will have rejected religion, while others will not have come to a mature conclusion. The task of the religious school, however, is to socialise all its students into the value system of the sponsoring church. While the school may be seen to be successful in regards to those students that have made a commitment to a particular religion, there is a greater number of students for whom that mature commitment is not
possible during their enrollment at the school. As adolescent development theory suggests, the crisis of identity associated with religious issues must be faced, but may well be faced at a later point in the period of adolescence (Kroger & Green, 1996; Flum, 1994). Indeed, it may not be possible for many adolescents to make the mature commitment demanded of them prior to leaving the school (Flum, 1994, p. 490). The challenge before the school is therefore to ensure that the values of the adolescents who are not able to make this mature commitment to religion during their period at school are at least compatible with a commitment to religion which may be made later. In this way, the effectiveness of the religious school may be assessed by examining the differences between the value priorities of the students who have made mature religious commitment, and those who have not. If the school has been successful in its task of socialising its students into the value system of the sponsoring church, students who are able to make this mature commitment to their religion will have similar values to those students who are not able to make this mature religious commitment. Assuming the success of the school in socialising all of its students into a values system compatible with a mature commitment to the sponsoring church, it is hypothesised that no difference will be observed in the values of the higher and lower religiosity students.

Method

Participants

The participants (N=103) were senior school students from a Catholic co-educational secondary school (n=87), and from one of four Catholic church-based youth groups (n=16) in Perth, Western Australia. There were forty-one males, aged between 16 years and 4 months and 17 years and 11 months (M=16 years
and 7 months), and sixty-three females, aged between 16 years and 4 months and 18 years and 9 months (M=16 years and 6 months). All Senior students at the school were invited to participate, and the school was selected both because it was of average size and because of its convenience for access by the researcher. All youth groups located in the North of Perth were contacted, and all students in their final year of school were invited to participate. Youth group members were included to ensure that a range of religiosity scores including the higher end of possible scores could be obtained.

Materials

The participants were administered the Schwartz (1991) Values Survey (SVS), within which individuals note the importance of 56 values in their lives on a nine point Likert scale, from -1 meaning opposed to the participants' values, through to 7 for those values which are of paramount importance. These individual values are then organised into motivational value types, according to the arrangement of values proposed by Schwartz (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990) (see Appendix A). The mean of the individual values is obtained to give a score for each of the value types indicating its importance. The individual values and their associated value types are listed in Appendix B.

Participants were also administered the Francis Scale of Attitudes to Christianity (Short form) (FSAC) (Francis & Stubbs, 1987). In this participants mark, on a five point Likert scale, the level of their agreement with eight statements about the Christian faith, such as “I like to learn about God very much”, and “I know Jesus helps me”. Three statements (“I think the bible is out
of date”, “I find it hard to believe in God”, and “I think going to church is a waste of time”) were negatively coded (see Appendix C). Also on a five point scale, participants also indicated their agreement with a single question about their perception of their own religiousness (“I am a religious person”). Participants were also asked the note the level of church attendance on a five point scale (weekly, monthly, a couple of times a year, rarely, never), and their frequency of personal prayer (daily, weekly, monthly, rarely, never). Participants also indicated their religion, age, and gender.

Procedure

Following approval of the project from the University School of Psychology Ethics Committee, the Principal, and all senior teachers involved, the participants in the school group were given the information sheet in the week prior to being asked to complete the questionnaire. A notice was placed in the school newsletter, which goes to every home, indicating that a questionnaire would be completed, and requesting parents with objections or questions to contact the researcher or supervisor. There were no objections.

In the school, all questionnaires were administered in groups by the researcher in class time over two days. For the youth group participants the questionnaires were administered during their youth group meeting. All participants were given an information sheet prior to the questionnaire being administered (see Appendix D), and were asked to complete a consent form (see Appendix E). All participants were given the opportunity to ask questions before and after the administration of the surveys. The order of the SVS and the FSAC was varied with half the questionnaires having the SVS first and half having the
FSAC first. The front page, giving general instructions and with biographical questions about age and gender, remained the same.

In the case of the youth groups, the adult leaders of the youth groups were contacted, sent information sheets, and arrangements were made for the researcher to attend the youth groups over a six week period. The participants in the youth groups were given the information sheet and consent form, and completed the questionnaire immediately. All were given the opportunity to ask questions before and after the administration of the surveys.

Results

All data from the completed questionnaires were entered into SPSS for Windows. Individual values were summed to give value type scores following the procedure outlined by Schwartz (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990). For example, the mean of the scores for the specific values An Exciting Life, A Varied Life, and Daring is obtained to give a score for the value type Stimulation.

The mean of the individual FSAC items was obtained to give a religiosity score for each participant. The descriptive statistics for the FSAC scores, the responses to the questions about church attendance, prayer frequency, and agreement with the statement, “I am a religious person”, are indicated in Table 3.

The correlations between the value types and the religiosity scores, as well as between the value types and the three single-item religiosity questions, were obtained. With a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .005, four correlations reached statistically significant levels: Hedonism, and Stimulation, were correlated with the FSAC, Tradition was correlated with the FSAC, the Stated
level of Religious Feeling, and with Prayer Frequency, and **Conformity** was correlated only with Prayer Frequency. The range of correlations, indicating those that have reached a level of statistical significance, are displayed in Table 4.

Previous research (e.g., Francis, & Stubbs, 1987; Francis, 1989; Francis, Lewis, Philipchalk, Lester & Brown, 1995) has not provided any normative level to indicate a point at which high intrinsic religiosity is assumed. Similarly, data collected from an adult sample could not easily be compared as the measure used differed slightly from the version commonly used with adolescents. In order to be able to examine any differences between the value priorities of those who demonstrate a level of mature and lived commitment to their religion, and those who do not, the group was divided into two according to FSAC scores, with scores of 3.75 of higher constituting higher religiosity, and other scores constituting lower religiosity.

The cutoff point used to distinguish between high intrinsic religious commitment and low was based on reference to the scale labels. A mean score of four would be obtained if an individual indicated agreement with all statements of the FSAC. It was felt, however, that a certain degree of uncertainty could be expected and tolerated in an adolescent sample, without any real decrease in lived religious commitment. The score chosen could be obtained, therefore, if an individual indicated uncertain for two statements and agreement for all others. A series of independent t-tests were conducted (alpha = .01) and indicated that the groups differed significantly on the FSAC scores, $t(87.30) = -13.57, p < .001$, and the stated level of religious commitment, $t (98.85) = -7.63, p < .001$. The groups did not differ at a statistically significant level on the measure of church
attendance, $t(101) = -1.64$, $p = .11$, or level of personal prayer, $t(71.96) = -2.15$, $p = .03$.

Having divided the group into those with higher religiosity ($n = 42$, $M = 4.21$, $SD = .33$), and those without ($n = 62$, $M = 2.68$, $SD = .79$), a series of $t$ tests were conducted to determine the difference between value types for the two groups, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .005. All statistical assumptions were met. As shown in Table 5, only two value types were statistically significantly different, Hedonism, $t(101) = 3.48$, and Stimulation, $t(101) = 2.99$.

The correlations between FSAC scores and value types for the two groups were obtained separately. The results of the $t$ tests and the correlations between religiosity scores and value types are also displayed in Table 5. The value type Hedonism, (lower religiosity group $M = 5.52$, higher religiosity group $M = 4.71$) was negatively and non-significantly correlated for both groups, but a stronger negative correlation was observed for the higher group, while the value type Stimulation (lower group $M = 5.11$, higher group $M = 4.32$) was negativity correlated with religiosity for the lower group, but positively correlated for the higher group, although again these results were not statistically significant.

Discussion

An examination of the correlations between religiosity and value types for the whole group suggests some support for the first hypothesis, although in many cases the results fail to reach statistically significant levels. While individual differences may be observed, the similarities between this sample and previous studies does suggest some support for the theory proposed about the relationship
between religiosity and values (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995), although in only three cases were the correlations between religiosity and value type consistent with that predicted by the previous studies: Hedonism, Stimulation, and Tradition.

With respect to the differences observed between the current sample and previous research, some may be explained by reference to adolescent development theory. Others may be explained by reference to this specific sample, and may well not occur in other samples of adolescents. For example, in the previous study (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995), the correlation between religiosity and the motivational value type of Self-Direction was found to be a negative one. Schwartz and Huismans (1995) argue that Self-Direction is something of a threat to religiosity, because it "emphasises openness to change ... [and] may threaten social order and increase individual uncertainty" (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.92-93). In an adolescent group, however, openness to change, challenge of societal order and a sense of individual uncertainty is a vital part of the exploration necessary for the resolution of the identity crisis that Erikson (1967, 1977) suggests is indicative of that developmental stage. Indeed, a sense of individual self-direction is promoted in schools as the students struggle to select subjects and prepare for work and study at a post-secondary level. This independent thought and activity is a stated part of the curriculum. (Curriculum Council, 1998). Hence, rather than Self-Direction being seen in the adolescent as negatively correlated with an acceptance of religion, valuing Self-Direction should been seen as characteristic of all adolescents, regardless of their level of religiosity.
Differences are also observed in the relationship between Religiosity and Universalism (moderately negative in previous studies and positive in the current study), Conformity (moderately positive in previous studies and marginal in the current study), and Security (positive in previous studies and marginally negative in the current study). These can be explained by an examination of the issues of religiosity in subsequent paragraphs.

Following the partitioning of the sample into higher and lower intrinsic religiosity groups, a number of differences can be seen in the correlations between religiosity and different value types for the two groups. What is somewhat surprising, however, is the direction of a number of the correlations which are different to those predicted by Schwartz and Huismans (1995). For example, it is predicted that the relationship between religiosity and both the value types Tradition and Conformity will be strongly positive, and that the relationship between religiosity and the value type Stimulation will be strongly negative (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). It could be suggested, then, that the group with higher religiosity would show a strong reflection of these relationships. In fact, however, the reverse is the case. While the lower religiosity group conforms to the predictions made, the higher group does not. In this way Tradition has a strong positive correlation with religiosity for the lower group, but no correlation for the higher religiosity group. Similarly, Conformity has a strong positive correlation with religiosity for the lower religiosity group, but no correlation with religiosity for the more religious group. Finally, Stimulation has a negative correlation with religiosity for the lower religiosity group and an equally strong positive relationship with religiosity for the higher religiosity group, the
difference between the means but not the correlations for this value type reaching statistically significant levels.

In attempting to understand the differences between these two groups it is necessary to briefly examine the theological framework upon which Schwartz and Huismans (1995) have made their predictions about the relationship between value types and religiosity. It is well beyond the scope of the current work to do anything more than briefly glance at these issues, and the discussion will be somewhat specific to the sample. It is not possible, for example, to make assumptions about all religions, and therefore the discussion will focus only on Christian and specifically Catholic theology, as this is the background of both the school, and the vast majority of the students who form the sample.

Contemporary Catholic theology stresses the importance of personal conversion and a committed acceptance of the life-changing aspects of the Gospel message, although the theories of the stages of faith development would argue that individuals will not always be able to demonstrate this level of mature commitment to religion (e.g., Kohlberg, 1968; Fowler, 1981). Theologically, however, it is not enough that the Christian attends services or makes an assent to the major doctrines of the Church. A real commitment to Jesus and the Church demands an internalisation of the Gospel message of justice and liberation (e.g., Hogan, 1993; John Paul, 1989, 1993; Haring, 1978; Rahner, 1978). This is central to Hogan's (1993) work on morals and ethics. In it he writes:

[The Church] strives to help people grow beyond the level of role-conformity of a morality from outside, to the level of a truly loving response from a morality from inside. ... [Christianity] is not limited to the
transmission of a set of fixed moral truths, but is rather a process of stimulating an internal appreciation of the value that is to be realised, of perceiving it as a challenge or invitation to authenticity, so that one can realise it as part of one's true response to the neighbour and a genuine development of oneself (Hogan, 1993, p.43)

This is also clearly reflected in Haring’s (1978) treatise on morals and ethics. In it he writes that freedom, rather than a restrictive conformity to norms, is the key concept for understanding ethics and Christianity. His understanding of tradition, and its place in the religious sphere, is somewhat divergent to that of Schwartz and Huismans (1995). Rather than the respectful, moderate and accepting vision of tradition offered by Schwartz and Huismans (1995), Haring argues that “mature Christians are not only critical towards past traditions and mores but are extremely critical towards the present modes and fads. They also do their best to embody their informed and critical response to the signs of the times in new mores, new customs and new ways of thinking” (Haring, 1978, p.310).

There is nothing that theology can fault in Schwartz and Huismans’ (1995) assertion that religions foster transcendental concerns, however, their conceptualisation of the manner in which this is expressed is problematic. While religions seek to orient people towards the divine and the transcendent, it is not by “promulgating religious creeds, moral proscriptions and ritual requirements” (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.91) per se, but by encouraging a lived commitment to God, which may be expressed by behavior which is guided by these mores and proscriptions. In contemporary Christian theology the emphasis is on freedom, not slavish and unthinking submission, in opposition to the view
offered by Schwartz and Huismans (1995). If religiosity is a measure of a real, lived commitment to the religion and that for which it stands in the manner envisioned by Haring (1978), Hogan (1993) and others, it would be impossible to accept that religiosity will be positively correlated with "values that emphasise the status quo [such as] Tradition, Conformity and Security ... [and negatively to] values that emphasise change and following one's independent judgements ... [such as] Stimulation and Self-Direction" (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.91-92).

In this way the differences between the groups may be explained. Value types which reflect submission and limit freedom, such as Tradition, Conformity and to a lesser extent Security, will not be correlated positively with a religiosity which is lived and committed, only with a religiosity which is extrinsic, simplistic and legalistic, and 'fundamentalist' (Haring, 1978). Only those for whom religion is a set of rules to be followed, rather than a lived commitment, will demonstrate the correlations with value types which reflect submission. Religiosity, as conceptualised by Haring (1978), and which is based on freedom and not slavish submission, will correlate with value types which encourage independence, such as Self-Direction and Stimulation. In each of these cases, the higher religiosity group has demonstrated stronger positive correlations than the lower group.

With regard to the two value types concerned with care for others, Benevolence and Universalism, Schwartz and Huismans (1995) have suggested that the former will correlate only weakly, although positively, with religiosity, while the later will have a near zero correlation. In the current study, Benevolence is significantly correlated for the higher religiosity group, but not for the lower religiosity group, while Universalism has a positive correlation for
the higher group. The value type Universalism is of particular importance in illustrating the differences both between the two groups, and between different conceptualisations of religiosity. Schwartz and Huismans (1995) argue that Universalism will have a poor correlation with religiosity because "bringing the members into exclusivist, solidary groups, reduces the importance attributed to concern for all others" (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.102). This distinction between a care for those within the religion and a care for those outside of it was the basis for the original studies conducted by Allport and Ross (1967) on prejudice and religiosity which lead to the distinction between an extrinsic and an intrinsic religiosity. This distinction remains, and explains well the differences observed both between the two groups in the current study and between this study group and the previous studies.

The differences in the correlations between the two groups may be explained, therefore, by reference to the philosophical framework upon which the direction of the correlations are predicted, by reference to the intrinsic/extrinsic religiosity distinction, or even by merely suggesting that the relationship between these values and religiosity is not a liner one, although reference to the Scatterplots of the correlations between the FSAC scores and the value types do not suggest a non-liner relationship (see Appendix F). Regardless of the explanation, it remains that the relationship between values and religiosity would be clarified by taking these factors into account in further studies.

As to the second hypothesis about the success of the religious school: on the basis of the assumption offered about values, the data suggest support for the work of this religious school in its attempt to convey the values of the sponsoring
church. Only two of the value types were significantly different, indicating that, for the most part, the students did not differ significantly in their value priorities. The differences that were observed may be explained in the differences that would be expected to be observed between those with an intrinsic and lived commitment to their religion and those who commitment is more extrinsic. The work of the Catholic school would best be focussed on the provision of various opportunities for the adolescents to be challenged to think deeply about identity issues of religion, and in this way to encourage a movement from extrinsic to an intrinsic commitment in their students. As to values, however, it would seem that a general support for the values of the church are being conveyed, although a level of self-control would temper the high value for Hedonism in both groups.

Clearly the current study cannot be generalised widely. It is limited by the size of the sample, the possible geographic confounds, the culture of the single school used, and by the fact that only one religion was examined. The current study does, however, suggest avenues for further research. Certainly, the impact of adolescent development on values and religiosity is an area worthy of future investigation. While a theoretical basis may be argued for the links between development and values and religiosity, further study would develop the strength of this theoretical relationship.

Further study in the area of the definition of religiosity is also warranted. Clearly, the way in which religiosity is conceptualised and measured has the potential to have a significant impact in studies examining the relationship between religiosity and values. The current study would seem to indicate that a lived commitment to religion, as measured by an intrinsic measure, is a stronger
indicator of the values motivating an individual's behaviour than an extrinsic measure. In further studies on the relationship between religiosity and values it would seem that stronger effects would be observed using a measure of intrinsic religiosity rather than an extrinsic one. Similarly, it would seem appropriate to ensure that the level of religiosity measured is one motivated by a real involvement in, and support of, the values system of the church rather than a level of religiosity which may well have little to do with supporting the church and its doctrine, and more to do with social advantage. It would seem to be useful if an examination of the theoretical base upon which predictions about the strength and direction of the correlations between religiosity and values are made, in light of the differences observed in the current study.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivational Types of Values</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Direction</td>
<td>Derived from need for mastery and control, and autonomy and independence. Includes independent thought and action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>Derived from perceived need for variety and stimulation and has goal of excitement, novelty and challenge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>Derived from organismic need for pleasure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Defined by goal of personal success through demonstrated competence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Similar to achievement in the self esteem gained, but focuses on attainment of position within social system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Derived from need for security, safety stability or society and of relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity (earlier labelled restrictive conformity)</td>
<td>Derived from the requirement that individuals suppress behaviour that might upset or harm others, or violate social norms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Respect for the traditions and customs of society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence (earlier labelled prosocial)</td>
<td>Concern for the welfare of those close in everyday interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism (includes former type of maturity)</td>
<td>Concern for the welfare of all people and nature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

**Hypothesised Correlations Between Value Types and Religiosity** (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p.92)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Type</th>
<th>Hypothesised Correlation with religiosity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Strong Position Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>Positive Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Positive Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Positive Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>Negative Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>Negative Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>Strong Negative Correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Little or No Correlation: direction not specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Little or No Correlation: direction not specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Little or No Correlation: direction not specified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3

Descriptive Statistics for Religiosity Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Possible Range</th>
<th>Observed Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FSAC Scores</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>1 - 5</td>
<td>1 - 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stated level of religious feeling</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1 - 5</td>
<td>1 - 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1 - 5</td>
<td>1 - 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayer Frequency</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1 - 5</td>
<td>1 - 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>-1 - 7</td>
<td>3.00 - 6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>-1 - 7</td>
<td>2.86 - 7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>-1 - 7</td>
<td>1.50 - 7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>-1 - 7</td>
<td>2.00 - 7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>-1 - 7</td>
<td>0.40 - 5.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>-1 - 7</td>
<td>2.71 - 6.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Direction</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>-1 - 7</td>
<td>3.50 - 7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>-1 - 7</td>
<td>.50 - 7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>-1 - 7</td>
<td>0.60 - 5.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>-1 - 7</td>
<td>2.00 - 7.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4

Correlations Between Religiosity Measures and Value Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Type</th>
<th>FSAC Score</th>
<th>Stated level of religious feeling</th>
<th>Church attendance</th>
<th>Prayer frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.28 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>-.31 *</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Direction</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>-.24 *</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>.37 *</td>
<td>.31 *</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.32 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates statistical significance. Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .005.
Table 5

**T-Test Scores of Differences Between Value Types, and Correlations Between FSAC Scores and Value Types, for Higher and Lower Religiosity Groups.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Type</th>
<th>T Score (df=101)</th>
<th>Higher Group</th>
<th>Lower Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.39*</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>3.48**</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Direction</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>2.99**</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.43*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>-.58</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistically significant results are indicated * (alpha = .05) and ** (Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .005).
Figure 1. Theoretical structure of relations among motivational value types, where proximity indicates the degree of compatibility of value types. (Schwartz, 1992, p.45)
Figure 2: Relationship of variables impacting on student religiosity, showing the impact of the student's values, society, ego development, the impact of the family both directly and through both the choice of school and through the influence on values, and the influence of the school itself.
References


Appendix A:

PERSONAL VALUES QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTRUCTIONS

In this section you are to ask yourself: "What values are important to ME as guiding principles in MY life, and what values are less important to me?" There are two lists of values on the following pages. These values come from different cultures. In the parentheses following each value is an explanation that may help you to understand its meaning.

Your task is to rate how important each value is for you as a guiding principle in YOUR life. Use the rating scale below:

0—means the value is not at all important, it is not relevant as a guiding principle for you.
3—means the value is important.
6—means the value is very important.

The higher the number (0,1,2,3,4,5,6), the more important the value is as a guiding principle in YOUR life.

-1 is for rating any values opposed to the principles that guide you.
7 is for rating a value of supreme importance as a guiding principle in your life; ordinarily there are no more than two such values.

In the space before each value, write the number (-1,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7) that indicates the importance of that value for you, personally. Try to distinguish as much as possible between the values by using all the numbers. You will, of course, need to use numbers more than once.

AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>opposed to my values</th>
<th>not important</th>
<th>very important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>supreme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before you begin, read values 1 to 30, choose the one that is most important to you and rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your values and rate it -1. If there is no such value, choose the value least important to you and rate it 0 to 1, according to its importance. Then rate the rest of the values (to 30).

VALUES LIST I

1 _____ EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
2 _____ INNER HARMONY (at peace with myself)
3 _____ SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)
4 _____ PLEASURE (gratification of desires)
5 _____ FREEDOM (freedom of action and thought)
6 _____ A SPIRITUAL LIFE (emphasis on spiritual not material matters)
7 _____ SENSE OF BELONGING (feeling that others care about me)
8 _____ SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society)
9 _____ AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences)
10 _____ MEANING OF LIFE (a purpose of life)
11 _____ POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners)
12 _____ WEALTH (material possessions, money)
13 _____ NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my nation from enemies)
14 _____ SELF-RESPECT (belief in one's own worth)
15 _____ RECIPROCATION OF FAVOURS (avoidance of indebtedness)
16 _____ CREATIVITY (uniqueness, imagination)
17 _____ A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)
18 _____ RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of time-honoured customs)
19 _____ MATURE LOVE (deep emotional & spiritual intimacy)
20 _____ SELF-DISCIPLINE (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)
21 _____ DETACHMENT (from worldly concerns)
22 _____ FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones)
23 _____ SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, approval by others)
24 _____ UNITY WITH NATURE (fitting into nature)
25 _____ A VARIED LIFE (filled with challenge, novelty and change)
26 _____ WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
27 _____ AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command)
28 _____ TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close, supportive friends)
29 _____ A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
30 _____ SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak)
VALUES LIST II

Now rate how important each of the following values is for you as a guiding principle in YOUR life. These values are phrased as ways of acting that may be more or less important for you. Once again, try to distinguish as much as possible between the values by using all the numbers.

Before you begin, read values 31 to 56, choose the one that is most important to you and rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your values, or—if there is no such value—choose the value least important to you, and rate it -1, 0, or 1, according to its importance. Then rate the rest of the values.

AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>opposed to my values</th>
<th>not important</th>
<th>of very important</th>
<th>supreme importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31____ INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
32____ MODERATE (avoiding extremes of feeling & action)
33____ LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group)
34____ AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)
35____ BROAD-MINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
36____ HUMBLE (modest, self-effacing)
37____ DARING (seeking adventure, risk)
38____ PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)
39____ INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events)
40____ HONOURING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect)
41____ CHOOSING OWN GOALS (selecting own purposes)
42____ HEALTHY (not being sick physically or mentally)
43____ CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)
44____ ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE (submitting to life's circumstances)
45____ HONEST (genuine, sincere)
46 ____ PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE (protecting my "face")
47 ____ OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations)
48 ____ INTELLIGENT (logical, thinking)
49 ____ HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)
50 ____ ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.)
51 ____ DEVOUT (holding to religious faith & belief)
52 ____ RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)
53 ____ CURIOUS (interested in everything, exploring)
54 ____ FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)
55 ____ SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)
56 ____ CLEAN (neat, tidy)
Appendix B

Individual Values and Associated Value Types (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987, 1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Direction</th>
<th>Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>National security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creativity</td>
<td>Reciprocity of favours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Family security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choosing own goals</td>
<td>Sense of belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curious</td>
<td>Social order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-respect</td>
<td>Healthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stimulation</th>
<th>Tradition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An exciting life</td>
<td>Respect for tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daring</td>
<td>Devout</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hedonism</th>
<th>Hedonism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pleasure</td>
<td>Accepting my portion in life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoying life</td>
<td>Humble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Achievement</th>
<th>Benevolence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td>Helpful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>Responsible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable</td>
<td>Forgiving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>Honest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligent</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-respect</td>
<td>Mature love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>True friendship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Universalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social power</td>
<td>Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>Unity with nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Wisdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preserving my public image</td>
<td>A world of beauty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social recognition</td>
<td>Social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Broad-minded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protecting the environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A world at peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conformity</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obedient</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-discipline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politeness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honouring of parents and elders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C
Measures of Religiosity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How often do you pray?</th>
<th>How often do you go to Church?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ daily</td>
<td>□ weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ at least once a week</td>
<td>□ at least once a month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ sometimes</td>
<td>□ sometimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ once or twice a year</td>
<td>□ once or twice a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ never</td>
<td>□ never</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What religion are you? (Please tick one)

□ Catholic
□ Anglican
□ Orthodox
□ Other Christian
□ Non-Christian
□ I have no religion

Do you belong to a church youth group (eg, Antioch)

□ NO
□ YES → please specify ____________________________
Below are a list of statements about religion and religious beliefs. On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is 'disagree strongly', 5 is 'agree strongly' and 3 is 'uncertain', indicate whether you agree or not with each statement.

Be honest. Indicate how true each statement is for you.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>disagree strongly</td>
<td>uncertain</td>
<td>agree strongly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- I know Jesus helps me
- I think going to church is a waste of time
- God helps me to lead a better life
- I like to learn about God very much
- Prayer helps me a lot
- I know that Jesus is very close to me
- I think the bible is out of date
- I find it hard to believe in God
- I am a religious person

(see, Francis & Stubbs, 1987; Francis, 1989; Francis, et al, 1995)
INVITATION TO BE INVOLVED IN A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY

Dear Year 12 Students:

As part of my honours year studies in psychology at Edith Cowan University, I am looking at what Year 12 students value in their lives.

I'd like some help!

What I'm after is a whole lot of Year 12 students who will agree to complete a questionnaire on values. The results will be completely anonymous, so no-one will see what you put. I'm not interested in the results of individual's - only in the results from different groups.

The questionnaire should take no longer than about 30 minutes, and probably even less. Afterwards I will be available to discuss the questionnaire with you if you want. Please remember, I only want to compare groups! Your individual names and results won't be seen by anyone except me. In the final report your names will not be included.

Naturally, you don't have to participate, and if you do, you can change your mind at any time (even halfway through). You may find it interesting - especially if you plan to go on to study next year in a research based course (eg social sciences, psychology, education), or if you are interested in psychological testing in general (like they do for the Police and Defence forces). Hopefully, the data I collect will go a long way to help make studying values (and religion) in school more relevant and interesting.

If you have any questions, please ask me. Or, you can call the University and speak to my supervisor, [Name] from the Psychology Department, on [Telephone Number].

I can't do this without your help.

Many Thanks,
Appendix E

Sample Consent form

CONSENT FORM

I, ____________________________ (STUDENT NAME)

✓ have read the information provided describing the study,
✓ have had any questions answered to my satisfaction, and

agree to participate in this study.

✓ I understand that I am under no obligation to participate,
✓ may omit individual questions, or withdraw altogether at any time,
✓ and realise that non-participation will not disadvantage me at school.

I also understand that the data is collected for research only and that, while the results may be published, neither my name nor the school's name will be used.

__________________________  _____________
Signature                  Date
Appendix F

Scatterplots of correlations between religiosity and value types

Figure F1. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the FSAC and the value type Achievement.

Figure F2. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the FSAC and the value type Benevolence.
Figure F3. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the FSAC and the value type Conformity.

Figure F4. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the FSAC and the value type Hedonism.
Figure F5. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the FSAC and the value type Power.

Figure F6. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the FSAC and the value type Security.
Figure F7. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the FSAC and the value type Self Direction.

Figure F8. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the FSAC and the value type Stimulation.
Figure F9. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the FSAC and the value type Tradition.

Figure F10. Scatterplot of the relationship between religiosity as measured by the FSAC and the value type Universalism.