The Perception of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Values: Is Value Incongruence Related to Social Distance?

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The Perception of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Values: Is Value Incongruence Related to Social Distance?

Lauren Breen

A Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of Bachelor of Science (Psychology) Honours

Faculty of Community Services, Education and Social Sciences

Edith Cowan University

Date of Submission: 29 October 1999
Declaration

I certify that this thesis does not, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education;

contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text; or

contain any defamatory material.

Lauren Breen
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Cognitive and Social Aspects of Intergroup Prejudice and the Function of Values

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Abstract

This review examines prejudicial actions directed towards outgroups as a function of personal values and the perception of the values held by other groups. Prejudice is a result of social and cognitive categorisation. Although it is well learned, prejudice is not inevitable, if individuals attend to and control their prejudicial thoughts. Pleasurable interaction, cooperation, equal status, and making humanitarian values conspicuous serve to reduce intergroup conflict. It was proposed that values motivate approach and avoidance behaviours directed at outgroups, and both belief congruence theory and expectance-value theory are relevant in explaining such behaviour.
Categorisation is an important cognitive process, enabling us to simplify the complexity of our world (Collins & Quillian, 1969). Without the ability to categorise and simplify information the social world would be too complex to process effectively and efficiently, particularly under taxing conditions (Berry, 1970; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). An example of a cognitive categorisation is a stereotype. Brigham (1971) defined a stereotype as a “generalization made about an ethnic group, concerning a trait or attribution, which is considered unjustified by an observer” (p. 29). Stereotypes are fundamental cognitive processes based on traits, physical characteristics, and overt behaviours of particular groups (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994).

Despite being necessary, stereotypes can also be harmful and incorrect. Minority groups, where members possess significantly less power, control, and influence over their lives than members of a dominant group, are prone to being stereotyped (Simpson & Yinger, 1985). It is evident that individuals make inferences about such things as the financial success, competency and intelligence of others that are in line with racial stereotypes (Hamilton, Sherman, & Ruvulo, 1990). Inferences based on racial stereotypes are brought into action even when people have only seen a photograph of a person (Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991; McCann, Ostrom, Tyner, & Mitchell, 1985). Prejudice is the negative (or positive) evaluations of members of a group because of their membership in that group (Simpson & Yinger, 1985) and discrimination is the behavioural manifestation of stereotypes and prejudice (D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). According to Wilder (1986), there have been many attempts to explain the development and maintenance of intergroup discrimination and prejudice. This review examines the social and cognitive roots of prejudice, with an emphasis on the role of values in explaining intergroup prejudice.

McDougall (1920) defined a group as an organised collective with shared experiences. Each member of the group is aware of the existence of the group and is influenced by the other members of the group (McDougall, 1920). The group we belong to acts as a reference for the acquisition of
norms and values (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). A minority group is a group of any size which, because of its racial or cultural characteristics, experiences unequal treatment at the hands of members of the dominant group (Simpson & Yinger, 1985).

Social Roots of Prejudice

The three main social theories explaining the roots of prejudice between groups are social learning theory (Bandura, 1977), Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al. 1987), and Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT) (Sherif, 1956).

Social learning theory.

Social learning theory, also known as observational learning and social cognitive theory, describes learning that occurs when the behaviour of others (models) and the consequences of the behaviour are attended to (Bandura, 1974; Bandura, 1977). Models provide an informative function in this process. Modelling behaviours relies on attending, accurately perceiving, and retaining the features of the modelled behaviour. The theory asserts that observation of behaviour and its consequences markedly affect cognitions, affect, and behaviour. Punished behaviour is less likely to be imitated than reinforced behaviour (Bandura, 1974).

The application of social learning theory is useful to explain how prejudice is learned. For example, the media portrays mentally ill individuals as free spirits and homicidal maniacs, and this in turn influences the audiences' perception of people with mental disorders (Hyler, Gabbard, & I. Schneider, 1991). Regarding race, Katz (1976a) argued that the acquisition of racial attitudes begins around the age of three years via direct and indirect reinforcements. Mosher and Scodel (1960) found a relationship between the ethnic attitudes of mothers and the social distance scores of their 12 year-old children. Williams, Tucker, and Dunham (1971) found that white college students evaluated white animals and objects more positively than black animals and objects. The colour of the animals and objects affected the participants' positive or negative evaluations of them. These examples show that in our society, positive evaluations are directed towards whites rather than towards minority members (Katz, 1976b).
Of course, social learning theory is not the only learning theory concerning the explanation of prejudice. For instance, operant conditioning is learning as a function of the rewards and punishments administered as consequences of behaviours (Skinner, 1974). This theory proposes that a behaviour (e.g., prejudice) is more likely to be repeated if it is rewarded and less likely to be repeated if it is punished. However, social learning theory goes one step further than operant conditioning by encompassing higher-level cognitive processes (Bandura, 1977), and therefore is a better explanation of the learning of prejudice.

**Realistic conflict theory.**

RCT proposes that the basis for intergroup conflict is inter-group competition for scarce resources (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Such conflict causes solidarity within a group and hostility towards other groups as sources of threat (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). This in turn leads to discrimination and prejudice. D. M. Taylor and Moghaddam (1994) outlined three assumptions of RCT; (a) people are selfish and endeavour to maximise their own rewards, (b) conflict is the result when individuals maximise their own rewards at the expense of rewards for others; and (c) the incompatibility of group pursuits determines ethnocentric behaviour. According to LeVine and Campbell (1972), ethnocentrism is more likely when there is competition over scarce resources, reciprocation of hostility, the use of stereotypes to accentuate group differences and societal complexity.

The classic RCT study is the ‘Robber’s Cave’ series of experiments conducted by Sherif (1956). White, middle class boys aged between 11 and 12 years who had never met each other went to camp at Robbers Cave, Oklahoma. The boys were randomly divided into two sets of 12 and settled into two camps. The boys quickly formed groups, with leaders, rules, punishments, jargon, secrets, and group names (‘Rattlers’, ‘Eagles’). The researchers, acting as camp staff, encouraged the groups to compete for prizes in games such as baseball, tug of war, and treasure hunts. Soon, each group had given their rivals names (‘stinkers’, ‘cheaters’), constructed threatening posters, and raided each other’s camps. The results emphasised the point that competition causes solidarity.
within a group, and stereotypes and hostility directed towards other groups. Other examples can be found in the research of Brown and Williams (1984), Hepworth and West (1988), and White (1977).

Two main criticisms of RCT stand out. Firstly, the definition of conflict has ranged from competition between participants in games (Axelrod, 1984) through to war (White, 1977). Extrapolations of findings from such discrepant conceptualisations of conflict are likely to be problematic (D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). Secondly, according to D. M. Taylor and Moghaddam (1994), researchers of RCT have concluded that all conflict is bad and should be avoided. However, conflict can elicit positive consequences such as having rights recognised through protest (Brewer, 1991). (For a more detailed review of the criticisms of RCT, see D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994).

Social identity theory.

In our society, groups are compared and evaluated with other groups (Turner et al. 1987). SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) postulates that people are motivated to evaluate themselves and the group they belong to in a positive manner. As a result, individuals evaluate their own group more positively than groups they do not belong to (Turner et al. 1987; Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, & Leve, 1992). This assists in the formation of a positive social identity, which is reinforced by maintaining self-esteem and motivation (Croker & Luhtanen, 1990). For example, features of a culture or group that is different is more likely to appear in the stereotype of that group than are features that are similar or the same between groups (Campbell, 1967). Further, traits shared by two groups are interpreted differently – a group may describe their own group as loyal, yet perceive the same trait in another group as clannish and excluding (Campbell, 1967; LeVine & Campbell, 1972).

SIT assumes that people are either members of a particular group or are not members of that group. However, group membership is a dynamic process (D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). A person could move from one group to another, such as from a low socioeconomic group to a middle class group. Further, an individual may be a member of many groups - a wealthy,
Caucasian, male, for example (Rothbart & John, 1985; Turner et al. 1987). The theory does not discuss group or role hierarchies or situations where membership in one group is dominant over membership in another group (D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). The theory postulates that behaviour is entirely regulated by the perception of the social world (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al. 1987; Turner et al. 1992), but does not mention emotional reactions (D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). (For a comprehensive critique of SIT, see D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994).

Theoretically, there is an overlap between social identity theory and realistic conflict theory (D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). Tajfel and Turner (1986) state that their SIT theory is not intended to replace RCT, but to complement it. For instance, many of the studies listed above can be explained using both social identity theory and realistic conflict theory (e.g., Brown & Williams, 1984; Hepworth & West, 1988; Hilton, Potvin, & Sachdev, 1989; White, 1977). In all of these studies, the groups have evaluated their own group positively (SIT) and are competing over scarce resources (RCT). Therefore, these processes supplement each other (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994).

Cognitive Roots of Prejudice

As stated previously, social categorisation causes the development of stereotypes and stereotyping leads to prejudice (Simpson & Yinger, 1985; D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). Conspicuous features like physical appearance (e.g., race) influence us when we categorise and form ideas of the people around us (McCann et al. 1985). The process provides a rich source of information about what a person is like, but is not always accurate (McCann et al. 1985). Cognitive theories of prejudice are based on heuristics, or rules of thumb (Feldman, 1995). They are ingroup-outgroup bias (Allport, 1954), outgroup homogeneity bias (Allport, 1954), illusory correlation (Chapman, 1967), and the ultimate attribution error (Pettigrew, 1979).

Ingroup-outgroup bias.

An ingroup is a group an individual believes he or she belongs to, whereas an outgroup is a
group an individual believes he or she does not belong to (Allport, 1954). The ingroup-outgroup bias is the tendency to perceive members of ingroups in a positive manner and members of outgroups in a less favourable manner (Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, and Tyler (1990) showed that pairs of ingroup pronouns (e.g., we, us) and nonsense syllables were rated more positively than nonsense syllables paired with outgroup pronouns (e.g., them). Such pronouns imply ingroup and outgroup status and influence peoples' perceptions, even of nonsense syllables (Perdue et al. 1990). Judd, Ryan, and Park (1991) reported that university students rated students of other majors in a stereotypical manner by describing business majors as extraverted and impulsive and engineering majors as analytical and reserved. The bias is also mediated by high collective self-esteem. Crocker and Luhtanen (1990) found that, after experiencing a failure, individuals with high collective self-esteem engage in ingroup-enhancing social comparisons. In a review of the literature, Brewer and Kramer (1985) found the bias to be present when individuals decide on the allocation of money and points to various groups. The finding of ingroup favouritism has been replicated many times and generalised across samples and cultures and with different conceptualisations of variables (Turner et al. 1987). Thus, the perception of an ingroup-outgroup distinction can be assumed to be an antecedent to prejudice.

Outgroup homogeneity bias.

The outgroup homogeneity bias describes the tendency to emphasise the degree of homogeneity within an outgroup, whilst being aware of the variability between members of one's own group (Brewer & Kramer, 1985, Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Quattrrone, 1986). For example, individuals are more able to discriminate among and recognise faces from their own race as opposed to faces from races they are less familiar with (Brigham & Malpass, 1985). Judd et al. (1991) demonstrated this effect in a university setting. Both business and engineering student groups perceived their own group to be more varied than each other's group, and rated the outgroup in a stereotypical manner, with business majors described as extroverted and impulsive, and engineering majors as analytical and reserved (Judd et al. 1991). The bias also includes the
underestimation of the degree of overlap between groups (Allport, 1954), despite there being greater
genetic diversity within racial groups than between them (Lewontin, 1972). Park and Rothbart
(1982) asked participants to estimate the percentage of men and women that would endorse various
attitudinal statements based on sex stereotypes. Both men and women believed the other group
would endorse a high percentage of the sex-stereotyped statements. The bias cannot be explained by
a lack of familiarity with the target outgroup, as men and women are probably the two groups with
the most contact with each other (Quattrone, 1986). Such studies have supported the notion that
individuals emphasise the homogeneity of outgroups, which leads to prejudice.

Illusory correlation.

Illusory correlation describes the tendency to overestimate the relative frequency of
particular pairings of stimuli, resulting in a perceived correlation that exceeds the existing
relationship (Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Chapman, 1967). The bias maintains stereotypes when the
pairing involves a group with traits congruent with those expected of the group (Hamilton & Rose,
demonstrated the participants’ strong bias towards interpreting information in a way congruent with
stereotypic beliefs. For example, the participants perceived accountants to be timid and
perfectionistic even when there was no evidences to support the conclusion. Hamilton and Rose
(1980) also showed that when a relationship between a person and trait that confirms a stereotype is
presented, the participants perceived the relationship as stronger than that presented. Hamilton
(1979), Hamilton and Gifford (1976), and Mullen and Johnson (1990) reported similar data. Mullen
and Johnson (1990) demonstrated that an illusory correlation is more likely to be perceived when
the distinctive trait or behaviour is negative, as negative traits and behaviours attract more attention
and are more salient than positive traits. Thus, salient information that confirms expectations about
a group is more likely to be remembered. This explains the formation and maintenance of
stereotypes like ‘Blacks are lazy, Jews are shrewd, accountants are perfectionistic, Italians are
emotional’ (Hamilton, 1979, p. 61), which are prejudicial.
Ultimate attribution error.

The ultimate attribution error proposes that when people witness a member of an outgroup engage in a negative, socially undesirable behaviour, they attribute the behaviour to salient dispositional characteristics, such as race or ethnicity (Pettigrew, 1979). On the other hand, when people witness a member of an outgroup engage in positive, socially desirable behaviour, they attribute the act to characteristics of the situation (Pettigrew, 1979). Thus, Feldman (1995) referred to it as “Heads I win, tails you lose” (p.91). Pettigrew (1979) proposed four ways an observer may rationalise the positive behaviour of an outgroup member. Firstly, the observer may perceive the actor as an exceptional case, to differentiate between the ‘good’ actor and the rest of the ‘bad’ outgroup. For example, the observer may assert, “He’s really different; he’s bright and hard-working, not like other Chicanos” (Pettigrew, 1979, p. 467). Secondly, the observer may attribute the positive act to special advantage or luck. For example, the observer may say “he’s dumb like the rest of his group, but he won anyway out of sheer luck”. Thirdly, the observer may attribute the behaviour to high motivation and effort on the part of the outgroup member. For example, the observer may remark that the actor is a “credit to his race” (Pettigrew, 1979, p. 468). This explanation ‘proves’ to the observer that situational factors do not contribute to problems experienced by outgroup members. As Pettigrew (1979) stated “They [the outgroup member] made it didn’t they? So there must be something wrong with the rest of them” (p. 468). Lastly, the positive behaviour may be attributed to factors of the situation not controlled by the outgroup member. For example, “What could the cheap Scot do but pay the whole check once everybody stopped talking and looked at him” (Pettigrew, 1979, p. 468). Thus, if a member of an outgroup engages in a negative behaviour, the act is attributed to a dispositional flaw, and if the outgroup member engages in a positive act, it is because of situational factors not controlled by the outgroup member. These attributions maintain prejudice directed at members of outgroups.

Research has supported Pettigrew’s (1979) theory. For example, D. M. Taylor and Jaggi (1974) presented 30 Indian Hindu participants with a series of descriptions of an individual in a
social context. Each description involved either a (ingroup) Hindu or (outgroup) Muslim behaving in either a socially desirable or undesirable manner. The vignettes depicted either a generous or cheating shopkeeper, a person who either helped or ignored an injured person, a teacher who praised or admonished a student, and a householder who sheltered or ignored a person caught in the rain. The participants had to provide a reason why each character engaged in the behaviours. D. M. Taylor and Jaggi (1974) demonstrated a clear effect—respondents clearly favoured the members of their own group (Hindus) over the outgroup (Muslims). They also found that the participants were more likely to make dispositional attributions for the socially acceptable behaviour of the Hindu characters, but not for their undesirable behaviours. On the other hand, the participants attributed the negative behaviours of a Muslim character to dispositional characteristics, and the positive behaviours to situational factors.

Modern Racism and the Inevitability of Prejudice

Researchers have argued that, at least in the United States, Whites have apparently become tolerant in their attitudes towards minority groups (Greeley & Sheatsley, 1971; D. G. Taylor, Sheatsley, & Greeley, 1978). More recent evidence suggests that prejudice is less overt, but may still be manifested in more subtle ways (Katz & Hass, 1988; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981). This effect is termed modern racism, and arises because people may still be prejudiced towards certain groups yet want to see themselves as humanitarian and egalitarian (Katz & Hass, 1988). McConahay et al. (1981) asked participants to complete a questionnaire. The items were designed to measure overt and covert forms of racism. Overall, the participants scored less on the measures of overt rather than covert racism, indicating a preference for covert racism. Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) and McConahay (1986) reported similar results. The notion of modern racism was encapsulated by Allport (1954) when he wrote, “defeated intellectually, prejudice lingers emotionally” (p.328).

Modern racism suggests that prejudice is inevitable. However, Devine (1989; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerick, & Elliot, 1991) suggests that all people, regardless of whether or not they are
prejudiced, are knowledgable in regard to racial stereotypes. Usually, these stereotypes are learnt as children and maintained throughout adulthood (Ehrlich, 1973). The model proposed by Rothbart and John (1985) posits that changing stereotypes is difficult because many stereotypes resist disconfirmation, and that most contact situations between groups do not provide information that disconfirms stereotypes. Wilder (1986) demonstrated that even when a member of an outgroup behaves flawlessly, people holding negative stereotypes may still retain the negative views of the group to which the member belongs. Shiffren and W. Schneider’s (1977) automatic versus controlled processing model may explain why – stereotyping is an automatic process that exists in long term memory and is well learned. As a result, stereotypes are difficult to change once learned, and considerable retraining is required. People who operate at a low level of prejudice control the automatic activation of stereotypes (Devine, 1989). Devine et al. (1991) demonstrated similar result by reporting that many people are in the process of reducing their prejudicial thoughts and actions. According to Devine et al. (1991), low-prejudiced people experience guilt and self-criticism when they act in a prejudiced manner. These feelings serve to control prejudicial acts in the future (Monteith, 1993). This view demonstrates that although prejudice is learned, it is not inevitably expressed. Instead, it emphasises that people can overcome prejudice if they attend to and control their automatic prejudicial thoughts.

Reducing Intergroup Conflict

Cooperation.

After Sherif (1956) collected his RCT data, he postulated that pleasant contact between members of each group would reduce the conflict. However, bringing the ‘Rattlers’ and ‘Eagles’ together for movies and meals served to increase name-calling and physical attacks. Sherif (1956) devised a solution – working in competition had produced conflict, therefore working towards common endeavours should reduce conflict. The common endeavours, termed ‘superordinate goals’, meant that both groups had to work together to achieve the desired outcome. Examples included working together to identify a break in a mile-long water pipe, putting money together to
afford a movie, and pulling a broken-down truck with a rope so it would start (Sherif, 1956).

Gradually, the series of common endeavours served to reduce conflict between the two groups, and by the end of the camp, both groups were actively seeking opportunities to interact with each other (Sherif, 1956).

**Equal status contact.**

According to Simpson and Yinger, (1985), no single factor regarding the reduction of intergroup prejudice has received more attention than the notion of contact. However, as Sherif (1956) demonstrated, contact is not enough. In the United States, the *Brown v. Board of Education* (1956) decision determined that segregation was a violation of equal rights (Stephan, 1986).

Stephan (1986) evaluated both the short- and long-term effects of desegregation on students in the United States, which mostly occurred between 1964 and 1974 inclusive (Stephan, 1986). The benefits of desegregation included the amelioration of the social stigma associated with attending a ‘coloured’ school (Stephan, 1986), and improvements in the verbal achievement and educational attainment of African American students (Hawley & Smylie, 1988; Stephan, 1978; Wilson, 1979).

Disadvantages of desegregation included an increase in prejudice towards African American students in 53 per cent of the studies reviewed and a decrease in prejudice in only 13 per cent of the studies reviewed by Stephan (1986). Thus, the effect of desegregation on racial attitudes was not as favourable as expected (Stephan, 1978), as equal status was not a characteristic of the intergroup contact.

**Favourable conditions.**

Reducing intergroup conflict is possible if the contact occurs under favourable conditions (Amir, 1969). Favourable conditions promote interaction, and include one or more of the following – cooperation, pursuit of a superordinate or common goal, intimacy, equal status, and the facilitation by an outside influence (Wilder, 1986). An interaction without one of the above factors does not lead to successful intergroup contact (Worchel, 1986). An example is the desegregation in schools in the United States (Stephan & Rosenfield, 1978). It is apparent that in many desegregated
schools, black and white children may not enjoy equal status and the contact may not be encouraged or include active cooperation (Aronson & Gonzales, 1988; Brewer & Miller, 1988; Wilder, 1986; Worchem, 1986). Gaetner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, and Pomare (1990) found that cooperation decreases intergroup bias by changing the participants' cognitive representations of two groups to one larger group. Desforges et al. (1991) demonstrated that cooperative contact reduced prejudice directed towards former mental patients. Allport (1954) summed it up when he wrote,

> Prejudice ... may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups (p. 281).

**The jigsaw technique.**

Using the reasoning outlined by Allport (1954) and Sherif (1956), Aronson and Bridgeman (1979) devised a method of reducing intergroup conflict in the classroom. They termed classes using the technique 'jigsaw groups'. In this method, students are randomly assigned into groups of six. The day's lesson is divided into six parts, and each student learns one part of the full lesson. For every student to learn, the students must interact and share the information. The technique was tested in the fifth grade of recently desegregated classrooms in Texas, United States (Blaney, Stephan, Rosenfield, Aronson, & Sikes, 1977). Students in the jigsaw groups exhibited greater increases in their self-esteem and liking for classmates than did students in the control classes, and this effect occurred for both majority and minority students. Lucker, Rosenfield, Sikes, and Aronson (1977) demonstrated that white students in jigsaw groups performed as well on tests of the material as white students in control classes, and minority students performed significantly better than the minority controls. This improvement occurred after only two weeks of learning with the jigsaw technique (Lucker et al. 1977).

The dissemination of positive information about a group does not serve to decrease
intergroup bias (Worchel, 1986). This may be explained by cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). Dissonant (positive) information concerning an outgroup will be distorted by prejudice members of the ingroup to fit their ideas of the outgroup (Festinger, 1957). Jecker and Landy (1969) demonstrated that doing a favour for someone increased liking for that person. Jigsaw groups decrease dissonance because each student in the group helps each other learn the material. Thus, positive information about an outgroup may cause a reduction in dissonance to occur, but only in a cooperative context.

**Making humanitarian values conspicuous.**

Situations where racism is condemned can reduce its occurrence. The model proposed by Fiske and von Hendy (1992) shows it is possible to motivate people to focus on information inconsistent with a stereotype using both dispositional and situational feedback. Participants who were told to focus on the uniqueness of an individual where more likely to attend significantly longer to information inconsistent with stereotypes than controls (Fiske & von Hendy, 1992). Similarly, participants are more likely to express more anti-racist opinions in the presence of a person who expresses anti-racist opinions than a person exposed to racist opinions (Blanchard, Lilly & Vaughn, 1991). Rokeach (1971) pointed out the discrepancy between the values participants thought were important (Freedom, Equality) and their level of sympathy with the civil rights movements. The participants' values, attitudes, and behaviours were measured at intervals of three weeks, three to five months, and 15 to 17 months. The results indicated a significant increase in value for equality and freedom over the period of the study. The participants were also significantly more likely to join a civil rights group than control participants, and were also more likely to choose university majors concerning ethnic intergroup relations than were controls (Rokeach, 1971). Thus, by making humanitarian values more conspicuous, people are more likely to change their stereotypes, schemas and prejudicial behaviours.

**The Importance of Values**

Augoustinos, Ahrens, and Innes (1994) conducted a study aimed at identifying the
Aboriginal stereotype. Examples of the stereotype include respecting the land, spiritual, lazy, and drunken. However, the researchers also found that being familiar with a stereotype has no bearing on whether an individual is prejudiced or not - individuals that agree with the stereotype are high in prejudice; those that do not agree with the stereotype are low in prejudice. Additionally, research has shown that approach and avoidance behaviours aimed toward or against a group of people may be a function of the similarity or difference in values people associate with that group (Feather, 1992; Rokeach, 1960; Struch & Schwartz; 1989).

Rokeach (1973) a major figure in value research, outlined five assumptions about the nature of human values – (a) the number of values a person possesses is small; (b) all people possess the same values, albeit to different degrees; (c) values are organised into value systems; (d) culture, society, and personality are the antecedents of values; and (e) the consequences of values are apparent in virtually all phenomena explored by social science researchers.

Rokeach (1973) defined a value as “an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state existence” (p. 5). As an individual matures, he or she is likely to confront situations where values conflict with one another (Rokeach, 1973). The situation requires a decision as to which value is paramount. Through such experiences, the individual learns to integrate isolated values into a complex hierarchy- a value system. A value system is “an enduring organisation of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conducts or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance” (Rokeach, 1973, p. 5). A value system is relatively stable over time, yet unstable enough to allow rearrangements of values relative to society, personal experiences, and culture (Rokeach, 1973).

The Value Survey developed by Rokeach (1973) includes 36 value constructs. Rokeach (1973) equally divided the values into two categories – instrumental and terminal. Rokeach (1973, p. 7) defined instrumental values as “desirable modes of conduct” and can be moral or competence related. Moral values are interpersonal and, when transgressed, stimulate our conscience and
feelings of guilt. Examples are Honest and Loyal. Competence values are personal and do not stimulate our conscience or guilt when violated. Examples are Ambitious and Intelligent. Rokeach (1973, p. 7) defined terminal values as "desirable end-states of existence". Rokeach divided terminal values into two types – personal and social. Personal values, such as Inner Harmony and Self-respect, are centred around the self. Social values, such as National Security and A World at Peace, are centred around society as a whole. Each participant ranks both set of 18 values from 1 to 18, 1 indicating the value of most importance and 18 indicating the value of least importance, as 'guiding principles in your life'.

Rokeach (1973) suggested that human value systems motivate behaviour in three ways. Firstly, value systems provide individuals with a behavioural code of conduct that facilitates the attainment of goals and ambitions. Instrumental values are the most important here. Secondly, they provide individuals with supergoals that motivate behavioural attempts to attain those goals. This pertains to terminal goals. Lastly, they enable us to maintain a required level of self-esteem by assisting an individual’s adjustment to the environment. Values, like needs, affect the initiation of behaviour, the amount of effort and persistence put into an action, and the choices made about competing activities (Feather, 1992; 1995; Rokeach, 1973).

According to Mueller (1984), many philosophers and theorists have distinguished between ‘means’ and ‘ends’ values. Rokeach (1973) believed the distinction between instrumental and terminal values is an important one as they represent two separate yet intertwined systems. For example, Rokeach subscribed to the notion of instrumental values being necessary to attain terminal values. It is important to note here that there is not a one-to-one relationship between any instrumental and terminal value. One instrumental value may be necessary to the attainment of a terminal value. Also, one instrumental value may be important in attaining another instrumental value or a terminal value may be important in achieving another terminal value (Rokeach, 1973). Gorsuch (1970) stated that the division between instrumental and terminal values may be poorly conceptualised because "any value which is not the ultimate value could be considered an
instrumental value” (p. 139). Nevertheless, Rokeach (1973) argues that the instrumental-terminal value distinction is important as a conceptual advantage when defining values because the attainment of instrumental values is necessary to attain terminal values. Current researchers studying values (e.g., Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995) have maintained this distinction, but have diminished its importance.

A number of problems with Rokeach’s Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973) have been identified. Firstly, because each value score is the result of a single item, respondents may interpret the same item differently. Mueller (1984) suggests the use of concrete situations to represent each value, rather than one or two abstract words. Secondly, because the survey is ranked, the data are at the ordinal level of measurement. Thus, real distances between values cannot be determined by the Value Survey (Miethe, 1985; Mueller, 1984). Thirdly, the Value Survey has an ipsative format, where each ranking decision automatically affects the values not yet ranked (Cooper & Clare, 1981; Mueller, 1984). Braithwaite and Law (1985) suggest multi-item instead of single-item measures to minimise these methodological problems. Next, some of the values (e.g., Obedient, Salvation) may have negative meanings for some respondents. According to Feather (1986), the Value Survey should allow for negative assessments of all the values by including positive and negative poles for each value. This becomes more important when assessing peoples’ perceptions about the values others hold, perhaps a greater difference would be found if negative poles of values were included. Lastly, Rokeach (1973) has been criticised for his subjective and intuitive judgements made in the formulation of his survey (Keats & Keats, 1974). In spite of these methodological and conceptual limitations, Rokeach’s (1973) Value Survey has been assessed as sufficiently reliable and valid (Miethe, 1985, Mueller, 1984), and the comprehensiveness of the Value Survey has been deemed satisfactory (Braithwaite & Law, 1985).

In the last 10 years, Schwartz and his colleagues (Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995; Struch & Schwartz, 1989; Schwartz, Struch & Bilsky, 1990) have been constructing a theory concerning universal values, as well as an instrument to measure
them. Rokeach (1973) wrote that values in a value survey should be “reasonably comprehensive and universally applicable” (p. 89). He also suggested that values should be classified according to societal structures related to the formation and maintenance of values (e.g., family values).

Schwartz and his colleagues have elaborated on this notion and produced a theory of value types and structure (Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995; Struch & Schwartz, 1989; Schwartz, Struch & Bilsky, 1990). The theory postulates 10 motivationally distinct value types - Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-direction, Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, Security. Schwartz (1994) has argued that these types represent an exhaustive list of values from all cultures, although some are defined differently and value types related differently between cultures (Schwartz, 1994, Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). The values and corresponding value types are tabled in the Appendix.

The Structure of Values

Analyses of the compatibilities and contrasts of underlying motives between value types determine the structure of value relations. For example, a conflict is likely to arise when an individual pursues both achievement values and benevolence values (Schwartz, 1994).

Compatibilities occur in the pursuit of similar values (e.g., Benevolence and Conformity) (Schwartz, 1994). Thus, in the two-dimensional conceptual ‘map’ of values proposed by Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995), Achievement and Benevolence are opposite and Benevolence and Conformity are adjacent. The 10 value types are also organised on the map according to two dimensions – Openness to change vs. Conservation and Self-enhancement vs. Self-transcendence. The former contrasts independent thought and change with the preservation of tradition and self-restriction. The latter contrasts the concern for the welfare of others with the pursuit of success and dominance (Schwartz, 1994).

Schwartz (1994) constructed a value survey (the Schwartz Value Survey) to measure peoples’ universal values. Although values in the Value Survey designed by Rokeach (1973) were ranked, the SVS requires respondents to assign a rating of importance (from −1 to 7) to each value.
Rating is a statistical improvement on ranking as it allows for parametric analyses (de Vaus, 1995). It also allows a greater number of values to be tested, is not ipsative in nature, and enables participants to express values they do not believe are important to them (Schwartz, 1994). The SVS has improved on Rokeach’s (1973) Value Survey because the values can be organised into the value theory proposed by Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz, 1992; 1994; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; 1990; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). Thus, the SVS is a major improvement on Rokeach’s (1973) Value Survey both statistically and conceptually.

Values and Behaviour

Personal values.

Sagiv and Schwartz (1995) used Schwartz’ (1994) conceptualisation of value types to determine which values types are important predictors of social contact with outgroup members in Israel. The researchers found that readiness for outgroup contact was positively correlated with Universalism, Benevolence, and Self-direction. These value types emphasise independent thought and the protection and preservation of the welfare of others. Readiness for outgroup contact was negatively correlated with Conformity, Tradition, and Security. These value types emphasise commitment to traditional ideas and social norms. These six value types explained 39 per cent of the variance regarding the readiness for outgroup contact. Thus, personal value priorities are an important factor in accounting for variations in readiness for contact with members of outgroups.

Perception of outgroup values.

The relationship between values and behaviour has been clarified with two theories – belief congruence theory (Rokeach, Smith, & Evans, 1960) and the expectancy-value theory (Feather, 1992). Belief congruence theory asserts that the greater the perceived dissimilarity of values between groups, the less motivation the groups will have to initiate contact with each other (Rokeach et al. 1960). For example, in the majority of studies of attitudes towards or the perceptions about minority groups, it is assumed that people either think of the target group in a homogenous manner, as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (Rokeach et al. 1960). Rokeach et al. (1960) asserted
that prejudice is not based on race or group membership but on beliefs about members of that race or group. For example, a member of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) may have a negative view of an African American who disagrees with KKK ideology, but positively view an African American who does agree with the ideology. Furthermore, the KKK member may positively perceive a white person who agrees with KKK stand on African Americans yet negatively perceive a white person who disagrees with the KKK. This notion was supported by their study about beliefs held by white Americans. For all eight beliefs tested, the majority of the participants stated that they would prefer to be friends with an African American who agreed with their belief that a white person who did not. This effect occurred for racial and non-racial beliefs and across northerner and southerner participants. Thus, Rokeach et al. (1960) argued that prejudice is a function of beliefs and values, not group membership.

Expectancy-value theory explains a person’s behaviour in a situation as a function of his or her expectations of the situation and his or her subjective valuation of the outcomes that may follow from the behaviour (Feather, 1992). The outcome may be seen as positive, negative, or both. The relationship can be expressed as follows:

\[ \text{Action} = \text{expectancy} \times \text{value (or valence)}. \]

Expectancy encompasses efficacy expectations (beliefs about whether one can perform an action) and outcome expectations (beliefs about the positive or negative outcomes that may result from the action) (Feather, 1988). The subjective evaluations of alternatives, based on the individual’s values, are known as valences (Feather, 1995). The underlying abstract nature of our values influence the concrete valences allocated to alternatives (Feather, 1995).

Research conducted by Feather and O’Brien (1987) shows how values motivate behaviour in the expectancy-value framework. Their results showed that values were more important than expectations in motivating behaviour. Feather (1992) explained that positive valuations motivate approach behaviours and negative valuations motivate avoidance behaviours. This ties in with belief congruence theory (Rokeach et al. 1960), as both theories assert that values motivate
approach or avoidance behaviours directed towards or against members of other groups. Struch and Schwartz (1989) elaborated on this by asserting that the greater the perceived dissimilarity of values between groups, the more dehumanised the outgroup is perceived to be. Struch and Schwartz (1989) investigated this area using Rokeach’s (1973) Value Survey. Mainstream Israelis and ultraorthodox Israeli participants rated their perceptions about values held by their own group and their perceptions about the values held by the other group. The researchers found that intergroup conflict and aggression were mediated in part by the perception of value dissimilarity, which acted to dehumanise the outgroup. Thus, the results support belief congruence theory.

Future Research

Rokeach et al. (1960) criticised intergroup research by stating that researchers rarely attempt to contrast attitudes held towards a minority group with those held towards the majority group. The exception to this was the study conducted by Struch and Schwartz (1989) reviewed above. More research is required in this area to determine if values are an important factor in determining approach and avoidance behaviours aimed at other outgroups.

Throughout history different ethnic groups have encountered trouble when interacting (Simpson & Yinger, 1985). An example in the Australian context is the relationship between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) and non-ATSI Australians (Augoustinos et al. 1994). Augoustinos et al. (1994) reported that, in general, Australians hold negative attitudes and stereotypes towards indigenous Australians. Other groups, such as Italians and Chinese migrants have fought hard and won acceptance in Australia but this has not been achieved by ATSI individuals (Heiss, 1971; Huck, 1971). If non-ATSI individuals positively perceive the values held by ATSI Australians, the ATSI individuals will be approached, and vice versa. Research has shown that ATSI and non-ATSI Australians do not mix freely in Australian society. The perception of the differences in values and attitudes each group holds may explain why this is so. Research is needed to compare the value system of a group of non-ATSI Australian adults with their perceptions of the values held by ATSI Australians.
Conclusion

Prejudice towards outgroups can be explained as a function of personal values and the perception of values attributed to the members of the outgroups. Personal values that emphasise independent thought and the welfare of others are associated with contact with outgroup members, values that emphasise tradition and commitment to social norms are negatively correlated with contact with outgroup members. Regarding the perception of values held by outgroup members, the literature demonstrates that the greater the perceived dissimilarity of values between groups, the less motivation the groups will have to initiate contact with each other. Both belief congruence theory and expectancy-value theory assert that values motivate approach or avoidance behaviours directed towards or against members of other groups. Outgroups are dehumanised when there is a perception of value dissimilarity between groups. Thus, readiness for outgroup contact is a function of both personal values and the perception of the values held by outgroup members.
References


Prejudice and Values


American Psychologist, 26, 453-459.


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### Table 1

The 56 Individual Values and the Corresponding 10 Value Types Measured by the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1994).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Type</th>
<th>Individual Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Social power, Wealth, Social Recognition, Authority, Preserving my public image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Successful, Capable, Ambitious, Influential, Intelligent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>Pleasure, Enjoying life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>An exciting life, A varied life, Daring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>Curious, Creativity, Freedom, Self-respect, Independent, Choosing own goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Protecting the environment, Unity with nature, A world of beauty, Broad-minded, Social justice, Wisdom, A world at peace, Equality, Inner harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Helpful, Honest, Forgiving, Loyal, Responsible, A spiritual life, True friendship, Mature love, Meaning in life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Accepting my portion in life, Devout, Humble, Respect for tradition, Detachment, Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>Obedient, Honouring parents and elders, Politeness, Self-discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Clean, National security, Reciprocation of favours, Social order, Family security, Healthy, A sense of belonging</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following research report, "The Perception of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Values: Is Value Incongruence Related to Social Distance?" will be submitted to the Journal of Intercultural Studies. Notes for contributors are included in the following pages.
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The Perception of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Values: Is Value Incongruence Related to Social Distance?

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Abstract

Similarity of values between groups and expectations concerning other groups rather than group membership was investigated as a fundamental mechanism to explain prejudice. Participants were 139 non-Aborigines who rated the Schwartz Value Survey according to their own values and how an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) would complete it. There were moderately low to medium correlations between the participants’ own value type ratings and their perception of ATSI value types. Overall, the individual value ratings supported 6 of the 7 negative ATSI stereotypes but only 2 of the 8 positive ATSI stereotypes. Multiple regression analysis showed that Security and Universalism value types and overall value difference were the strongest predictors of willingness to associate with ATSIs. The research contributes to a better understanding of prejudice and discrimination in the Australian context.
The Perception of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Values: Is Value Incongruence Related to Social Distance?

Categorisation is an important cognitive process, enabling us to simplify the complexity of our world (Collins & Qullian, 1969). An example of a cognitive categorisation is a stereotype. Brigham (1971, p. 29) defined a stereotype as a "generalisation made about an ethnic group, concerning a trait or attribution, which is considered unjustified by an observer." Prejudice is the negative (or positive) evaluations of members of a group based on their membership in that group (Simpson & Yinger, 1985) and discrimination is the behavioural manifestation of stereotypes and prejudice (D. M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). According to Wilder (1986), there have been many attempts to explain the development and maintenance of prejudicial attitudes and behaviours.

Rokeach (1973) argued that changing attitudes and behaviours requires changing the underlying values of those attitudes and behaviours. Rokeach (1973) defined a value as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state existence" (p. 5). As an individual matures, he or she is likely to confront situations where values conflict with one another (Rokeach, 1973). The situation requires a decision as to which value is paramount. Through such experiences, the individual learns to integrate isolated values into a complex hierarchy - a value system. A value system is "an enduring organisation of beliefs ... along a continuum of relative importance" (Rokeach, 1973, p. 5). A value system is relatively stable over time, yet unstable enough to allow rearrangements of values relative to society, personal experiences, and culture (Rokeach, 1973).

Rokeach (1973) suggested that human value systems motivate behaviour in three ways. Firstly, value systems provide individuals with a behavioural code of conduct that facilitates the attainment of goals and ambitions. Secondly, they provide individuals with supergoals that motivate behavioural attempts to attain those goals. Lastly, they enable us to maintain a required level of self-esteem by assisting the rationalisation of behaviour. For example, rudeness to a friend may be
rationalised as honesty (Rokeach, 1973). Values, like needs, affect the initiation of behaviour, the amount of effort and persistence put into an action, and the choices made about competing activities (Feather, 1992; 1995; Rokeach, 1973).

Rokeach (1973) gave impetus to the trend to explore universal values when he wrote that values in a value survey should be "reasonably comprehensive and universally applicable" (p.89). Schwartz and his colleagues have elaborated on this notion and produced a theory of value types and structure (Schwartz, 1994, Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995; Struch & Schwartz, 1989; Schwartz, Struch & Bilsky, 1990). Schwartz (1994) constructed the Schwartz Value Survey to measure the degree of importance people think each of the 56 values are as guiding principles in their lives.

The theory postulates 10 value types - Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-direction, Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, and Security. Each type is motivationally distinct. For example, a person who rates Security highly is likely to be motivated towards safety and stability; an individual rating Universalism highly is likely to be motivated towards tolerance and the protection of the welfare of others. Schwartz (1994) has argued that these types represent an exhaustive list of values from all cultures, although some are defined differently and value types related to each other differently between cultures (Schwartz, 1994, Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). The values and corresponding value types are tabled in Appendix A.

The relationship between values and behaviour has been clarified with two theories – belief congruence theory (Rokeach, Smith, & Evans, 1960) and the expectancy-value theory (Feather, 1992). Belief congruence theory asserts that the greater the perceived dissimilarity of values between groups, the less motivation the groups will have to initiate contact with each other (Rokeach et al. 1960). For example, in the majority of studies of attitudes towards or the perceptions about minority groups, it is assumed that people either think of the target group in a homogenous manner, as either 'good' or 'bad' (Rokeach et al. 1960). Rokeach et al. (1960) asserted
that prejudice is not based on race or group membership but on beliefs about members of that race or group. This notion was supported by their study about beliefs held by white Americans. For all eight beliefs tested, the majority of the participants stated that they would prefer to be friends with an African American who agreed with their belief that a white person who did not. This effect occurred for racial and non-racial beliefs and across northerner and southerner participants. Thus, Rokeach et al. (1960) argued that prejudice is a function of dissimilarity of beliefs and values, not group membership.

Expectancy-value theory explains a person’s behaviour in a situation as a function of his or her expectations of the situation and his or her subjective valuation of the outcomes that may follow from the behaviour (Feather, 1992). The outcome may be seen as positive, negative, or both. The relationship can be expressed as follows:

\[ \text{Action} = \text{expectancy} \times \text{value (or valence)}. \]

Expectancy encompasses efficacy expectations (beliefs about whether one can perform an action) and outcome expectations (beliefs about the positive or negative outcomes that may result from the action) (Feather, 1988). The subjective evaluations of alternatives, based on the individual’s values, are known as valences (Feather, 1995). The underlying abstract nature of values influence the concrete valences allocated to alternatives (Feather, 1995).

Research conducted by Feather and O’Brien (1987) demonstrated how values motivate behaviour in the expectancy-value framework. Their results indicated that values were more important than expectations in motivating behaviour. Feather (1992) explained that positive valuations motivate approach behaviours and negative valuations motivate avoidance behaviours. This is congruent with belief congruence theory (Rokeach et al. 1960), as both theories assert that values motivate approach or avoidance behaviours directed towards or against members of other groups. Struch and Schwartz (1989) invited ‘mainstream’ and ultraorthodox Israeli participants to rate their perceptions about values held by their own group and their perceptions about the values held by the other group. The researchers found that intergroup conflict and aggression were
mediated in part by the perception of value dissimilarity, which acted to de-humanise the outgroup. Thus, the results support belief congruence theory.

Sagiv and Schwartz (1995) used Schwartz’ (1994) conceptualisation of value types to determine which values types are important predictors of social contact with outgroup members. The researchers found that readiness for outgroup contact was positively correlated with Universalism, Benevolence, and Self-direction. These value types emphasise independent thought and the protection and preservation of the welfare of others. Readiness for outgroup contact was negatively correlated with Conformity, Tradition, and Security. These value types emphasise commitment to traditional ideas and social norms. These six value types explained 39 per cent of the variance regarding the readiness for outgroup contact. Thus, personal value priorities are an important factor in accounting for variations in readiness for contact with members of outgroups.

Throughout history different ethnic groups have often encountered trouble when interacting (Simpson & Yinger, 1985). An example in the Australian context is the relationship between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) and non-ATSI Australians (Augoustinos, Ahrens, & Innes, 1994). Other groups, such as Italians and Chinese migrants have fought hard and won acceptance in Australia but this has not been achieved by ATSI individuals (Heiss, 1971; Huck, 1971). Augoustinos et al. (1994) reported that, in general, non-indigenous Australians hold negative attitudes and stereotypes towards indigenous Australians. These stereotypes include being lazy, drunken, dirty, and disrespectful. However, Augoustinos et al. (1994) identified that being familiar with a stereotype has no bearing on whether an individual is prejudiced or not - individuals who agree with the stereotype are high in prejudice; those that do not agree with the stereotype are low in prejudice. In addition, research has shown that ATSI and non-ATSI Australians do not readily interact in Australian society (Augostinos et al. 1994). The perception of the values each group holds may explain why this is so.

For this study it is hypothesised that, because ATSI and non-ATSI Australians do not readily interact, there will be a difference in the value ratings and the summed value type scores
between the participants and their perception of the values held by ATSI Australians. It is also hypothesised that individual value discrepancies would be congruent with the Aboriginal stereotype identified by Augoustinos et al. (1994). Lastly, it is hypothesised that the participants self-ratings for the 10 value types (specifically Universalism, Benevolence, Self-direction, Tradition, Security, and Conformity) and an overall value-difference score would be important factors in predicting their willingness to associate and actual association with ATSIs and other outgroups.

Method

Participants

There were 139 participants in this study - 48 undergraduate university students, 38 adult education students from a TAFE (Technical and Further Education) campus, 12 high school employees, 9 supermarket employees, 23 bank employees, and 9 employees from a welfare agency. Of the total sample, 25.2 per cent were male and 74.1 per cent were female. One participant did not indicate his or her sex. The participants were aged from 16 to 72 years (M = 28.34, SD = 11.61). Two participants did not offer their age. Number of years of education ranged from 10 to 22 (M = 13.53, SD = 1.99). Three participants did not include their total years of education. Regarding ethnicity, 80.6 per cent indicated they were Caucasian, 6.5 per cent Asian, 7.9 per cent Mediterranean, and 5.0 per cent other. Participation was voluntary and no payments were made.

Materials

The Schwartz Value Survey (SVS, Schwartz, 1994) was completed by the participants. The survey consists of 56 values, divided into two lists, I and II. Each value is paired with a brief definition in brackets to aid understanding and limit different interpretations, for example, ‘Equality (equal opportunity for all)’. The participants were instructed ‘to rate how important each value is for you as a guiding principle in your life’. The participants were also instructed to ‘rate how important you think each value is for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders as guiding principles in their life’. The values were rated on a Likert-type scale ranging from negative one to seven. A rating of -1 indicates the value is opposed to the respondent’s values. A rating of 0 indicates the value is not at
all important as a guiding principle for the respondent. A rating of 3 indicates the value is important, and 6 indicates the value is very important to the respondent. A rating of 7 indicates the value is of supreme importance as a guiding principle in the respondent’s life.

Two versions of an ethnic contact survey (based on the Bogardus Social Distance Survey, Bogardus, 1925) were completed by the participants. One required the respondents to rate various ethnic groups from one to five for ‘how much you actually have associated with the groups below in the past’, and the other ‘how willing you would be to associate in the future with the groups’. The groups were White Australians, Indigenous Australians, Greeks, Jews, Vietnamese, and Lebanese. A rating of 1 indicates minimal contact and 5 indicates very close contact. The order of the two SVS surveys and ethnic contact measures were counterbalanced to form eight different orders of presentation. No evidence of order effects of counterbalancing was indicated, with each order being returned in approximately the same numbers.

The participants also filled in a demographic survey. The participants provided their age in years, sex, number of years of education, and ethnic group they most identified with. This last section was included to aid in the elimination from the sample of anyone who considered themselves to be an ATSI. A copy of the survey is included as Appendix B.

Procedure

Employees at the four different workplaces were approached at their workplace. The workplaces were a bank, a welfare agency, a high school, and a supermarket, all located in the northern suburbs of Perth, Western Australia. The employees were instructed to complete the questionnaire in their own time and return it to a collaborator of the researcher who worked there or to place it in a box located in the staffrooms. First year psychology students were approached at the end of a lecture. The participating students were required to complete the questionnaire in their own time and return it within a week to the Psychology building. The TAFE students completed the task as part of a class lesson. The university and TAFE campuses are both located in the northern suburbs of Perth, Western Australia.
Results

The 10 value type scores for the participants own ratings and their ratings for ATSIs were first calculated, using Schwartz’ (1994) classifications. Ten dependent t tests were computed on the 10 value type scores for the respondents’ value ratings and their ratings for ATSIs. Alpha was Bonferroni-adjusted for 10 t tests to .005, and assumptions were deemed satisfactory. The results summarised in Table I indicate significant differences between the respondents’ own value type mean scores and the perceived ATSI mean scores for all value types except Power. The participants rated themselves higher for each of the significant value types than for ATSIs, with the exception of Tradition, where the participants rated this value as more important for ATSIs than themselves. The self and ATSI ratings for each value type are all significantly positively correlated, with the exception of Achievement, which was not significant. This suggests that when the participants’ rated themselves highly, they rated ATSI values highly, and vice versa, indicating some similarity between value ratings. The means, correlations, and significant levels for each value type are shown in Table I.

[Table I here]

Eleven dependent t tests between self and perceived ATSI ratings for the individual values of the value types Power and Tradition were conducted and are shown in Table II. Alpha was Bonferroni-adjusted for 29 t tests (alpha adjusted to include subsequent t tests) to .002, and assumptions were deemed satisfactory. The analysis indicated that Social power was rated higher for ATSIs than for the participants. The other values of the Power type (Wealth, Social recognition, Authority, and Preserving my public image), were either not significantly different or were higher for self-ratings than ATSI ratings. An analysis of the individual values for the value type Tradition indicated that Devout and Respecting tradition were rated as more important for ATSIs than for the respondents. The self and ATSI other values of Tradition (Accepting my portion in life, Humble, Detachments, and Moderate) were either not significantly different or were rated higher for the participants than for ATSIs. Thus, the self and ATSI ratings for the Power type were not significant
because of the high ATSI ratings for Social power, and the Tradition type was rated higher for ATSIs because of high ATSI ratings for Respecting tradition and Devout. The means and significance levels for each individual value for Power and Tradition are shown in Table II.

[Table II here]

Next, a comparison was performed between the Aboriginal stereotypes reported by Augoustinos et al. (1994) and the differences between the participants’ self and ATSI value ratings. Fifteen of the stereotype components are considered to coincide with Schwartz's (1994) values. The seven negative stereotype components are dirty/unhygienic, unemployable/uneducated, seeking special treatment, unhygienic/alcohol use, lazy/bludgers, disrespectful, and incompetent. The eight positive stereotype components are egalitarian, independent, loyal, respecting the land, spiritual, wise, just, and artistic. Four of the stereotype components correspond to two of Schwartz’s (1994) values, resulting in 19 t tests. Alpha was Bonferroni-adjusted for 29 t tests (including the previous t tests) to .002, and assumptions were met. The results are shown in Table III. Of the seven negative stereotypes, six were supported. For example, Aborigines are stereotyped as dirty and unhygienic, and this was supported because the participants rated the value Clean significantly higher for themselves than for ATSIs. The stereotype disrespectful was partially supported, as the value Honouring parents and elders was rated higher for ATSIs than for the participants, yet the value Obedient was rated higher for the participants than ATSIs. In contrast, two of the eight positive stereotypes were supported. For example, Aborigines are stereotyped as respecting the land, and both Protecting the environment and Unity with nature were rated more highly for ATSIs than for the participants. The value differences for the egalitarian and artistic stereotypes (Equality and Creativity) were not significant and hence were not deemed consistent with the stereotype. Thus, the results indicate more support for the negative than for the positive stereotypes of ATSIs.

[Table III here]

A standard multiple regression was performed between willingness to associate with ATSIs as the criterion variable and the 10 self rated value type scores (Power, Conformity, Hedonism,
Stimulation, Achievement, Universalism, Tradition, Security, Benevolence, Self-direction) and a value difference score as predictor variables. The total value difference score was computed for each respondent by summing the absolute differences between the self-value ratings and their perception of the ratings of ATSIs for each of the 56 values, and was a measure of belief incongruence. Analysis was performed using SPSS REGRESSION and SPSS FREQUENCIES for evaluations of assumptions.

Univariate outliers were brought closer to the mean by substituting their value for the next highest or lowest value that was not an outlier. With the use of a p < .001 criterion for Mahalanobis distance, no multivariate outliers among the cases were included in the final analysis. The criterion variable was negatively skewed, but neither a square root nor log10 transformation served to normalise the distribution. Thus, it was not transformed. The 11 predictor variables were all approximately normally distributed. Table IV displays the correlations between the variables, the unstandardised regression coefficients (B) and intercept, the standardised regression coefficients (β), the semi-partial correlations (sr²), R², and adjusted R². R for regression was significantly different from zero, F(11,122) = 5.566, p < .001.

Three of the predictor variables contributed significantly to the prediction of the willingness to associate with ATSIs. They were self-ratings for the value types of Security (sr² = .06) and Universalism (sr² = .12), and the difference score (sr² = .09). The three predictor variables in combination predicted 25.2% (23.5% adjusted) of the variability in predicting willingness to associate with ATSIs.

Sequential regression was employed to determine if additional information regarding the age and years of education of the participants improved prediction of willingness to associate with ATSIs. Consistent with the third hypothesis, age and years of education were entered as the first step and the value types and difference score as the second step of a sequential regression. R was not significantly different from zero after this step, F(2,129) = .189, p = .828. Thus, the addition of
age and years of education to the equation did not further enhance the prediction of willingness to associate with ATSIs.

Three further multiple regression analyses were calculated on actual association with ATSIs, willingness to associate with a composite of four outgroups (Greeks, Jews, Lebanese, Vietnamese) and actual association with the four outgroups as criterion variables and the self-ratings for the 10 value types and the value difference score as predictor variables. The R for each was not significantly different from zero. Thus, multiple regression did not yield significant predictors for these three criterion variables. For predicting actual association with Indigenous Australians, R was not significant, F(11,121) = 1.325, p = .219. R for willingness to associate with the four outgroups was not significant, F(11,122) = 1.503, p = .139, and neither was the prediction for actual association with the four outgroups, F(11,122) = 1.121, p = .351. Thus, the 10 value types and the value difference score did not predict a significant amount of the variability in determining actual association with ATSIs, nor willingness to associate, and actual association with other ethnic minority groups.

Correlations were conducted between the four criterion variables (willingness to associate with ATSIs, actual association with ATSIs, willingness to associate with other ethnic groups, and actual association with other ethnic minority groups) and the value types and difference score. Table V shows the correlations, which indicates the relationships between predictor and criterion variables. For example, Universalism, Self-direction, and Benevolence were positively correlated with all of the criterion variables, Tradition Conformity, and Security were either negatively or negligibly correlated with the criterion variables (with the exception of Conformity and actual association with ATSIs), and Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation and Power were negligibly correlated with the predictors (with the exception of Power and willingness to associate with ATSIs).

[Table V here]
Discussion

The first hypothesis was supported, as there were significant differences between self-ratings and perceived ATSI ratings for nine of the ten value types. Not only were the ratings significantly different, the self-rated value type ratings were higher than perceived ATSI ratings for eight of the nine significant value type differences. Expectancy-value theory asserts that ATSIs (the target group) are likely to be avoided as discrepancies in the perception of value systems can be interpreted as negative valuations (Feather, 1992). Belief congruence theory was supported as perceived value dissimilarity was correlated with ATSI avoidance (Rokeach et al. 1960). Struch and Schwartz (1989) found that the greater the perceived value dissimilarity between groups, the more dehumanised the outgroup is perceived to be. Therefore, because of the perceived value dissimilarity and low value ratings for ATSIs, the participants may be motivated to avoid ATSIs and may dehumanise ATSIs.

There was no significant discrepancy between self-ratings and perceived ATSI ratings for the Power type score. However, an analysis of the self and perceived ATSI ratings for the item Social power indicated that this was the only value in this type that was rated higher for ATSIs than for respondents, and hence produced the similarity in overall scores for this value type. This may be a result of the wider community’s perception that ATSIs want more land rights and money and seek special treatment (see Table III).

The value type Tradition was rated significantly higher for ATSIs than for the participants. An analysis of the self and perceived ATSI ratings for each of these individual values indicated that this finding can be attributed to the higher ATSI ratings for the values of Respecting tradition and Devout. Perhaps these values are two areas in which ATSIs are perceived positively. The Aboriginal stereotype published by Augoustinos et al. (1994) did not include specific aspects relating to tradition or religion. Perhaps the wider community sees these two values as positive attributes of ATSIs, or the participants did not see themselves as particularly traditional and religious, and thus rated ATSIs higher on these values due to the perception of value dissimilarity.
The second hypothesis was partly supported, as the individual value discrepancies were largely congruent with the negative Aboriginal stereotype reported by Augoustinos et al. (1994). Six of the seven negative stereotype components and two of the eight positive stereotype components were supported by the respondents’ ratings, evidencing strong support for negative but not positive stereotype components concerning ATSIs. Taking the analysis of stereotypes into account, it can be concluded that the participants are likely to be prejudiced against ATSIs, as their value ratings were consistent with the negative stereotypes and less consistent with the positive stereotypes concerning ATSIs, indicating overall support for negative perceptions concerning this group.

The third hypothesis was partially supported as a multiple regression analysis did indicate that two of the self-rated value types and the value difference score were predictors of willingness to associate with ATSIs. The self-rated value types that were significant predictors of willingness to associate with ATSIs were Universalism and Security. Intuitively, this makes sense as Universalism emphasises understanding and tolerance for all people, thereby suppressing prejudice, and Security emphasises the safety and stability of society (Schwartz, 1994). This finding is partly consistent with that of Sagiv and Schwartz (1995), who reported that the Universalism, Self-direction, and Benevolence value types were significant predictors of readiness for outgroup contact, with Universalism being the strongest predictor. They also found that the Security, Tradition, and Conformity value types were significant predictors of unwillingness to associate with outgroup members, with Tradition being the best predictor. The study conducted by Sagiv and Schwartz (1995) concerned rating value perceptions of Jews, Christian Arabs, and Muslim Arabs in Israel. Perhaps Tradition was the strongest predictor of unwillingness to associate with each other as the most salient difference between the groups was religious affiliation. This may explain why Tradition was the best predictor of unwillingness to interact in their study and not in the present study, where Security was the best predictor.

The other significant predictor in the present study was the value difference score, which, as
a measure of belief incongruence, was negatively correlated with willingness to associate with ATSIs. This supports belief congruence theory (Rokeach et al. 1960) as the greater the perceived value dissimilarity, the less willing the respondents were to associate with ATSIs, and the greater the perceived value similarity, the more willing the respondents are to associate with ATSIs.

However, the self-rated value types and value difference score were not significant predictors of actual association with ATSIs, willingness to associate, and actual association with four other outgroups. Although it was predicted that the value types and the value difference score would significantly predict actual association with ATSIs, approximately half of the sample indicated little actual association with this group. This explains why two of the value types and the difference score were significant predictors of willingness to associate but could not predict actual association with ATSIs. Table V demonstrates the correlations between the criterion and predictor variables. Although the majority of the correlations are in the predicted direction, most are not high enough to be significant predictors in multiple regression. Thus, the third hypothesis was only partly supported.

The participants’ number of years of education was not a significant predictor of willingness to interact with ATSIs. However, the sample was highly educated, and it is probable that the number of years of education was not significant because of the restricted range of years of education of the sample. Augoustinos et al. (1994) report that students are more open-minded than the general population. As over half of the participants were tertiary or adult education students and the majority had some university education, the results of this study are likely to be conservative estimates of the perceived value dissimilarity and prejudice directed at ATSIs. Age was not a significant predictor of willingness to associate with ATSIs. Restricted range cannot explain this finding as the sample varied widely in age. This lack of effect may be a result of the large number of young adults in the sample, which would have restricted the variance of age and hence reduced the effect size of age. Thus, it cannot be concluded from this study that age is a significant predictor of willingness to associate with ATSIs.
A number of minor problems with the present study were identified. Firstly, not all of the stereotypes reported by Augoustinos et al. (1994) were used in the present study, as many did not correspond with values on the SVS. Perhaps using a broader range of stereotypes would elicit more support for the positive Aboriginal stereotypes and indicate less prejudice directed towards ATSIs. Secondly, fitting values of the SVS to the stereotypes reported by Augoustinos et al. (1994) was a subjective process. Other researchers may have developed different comparisons and interpretations of the values and stereotypes. Lastly, this research was not conducted on a random sample. Thus, the findings may not be readily applicable to other samples. However, it is likely that, with a random sample, stronger evidence of avoidance of and prejudice directed towards ATSIs may be found.

It could be argued that dissimilarity between self-ratings of values and the perception of the values held by ATSIs does not necessarily mean that the participants are prejudiced against ATSIs. For instance, a lack of similarity may be due to scarce social contact between members of the two groups or difficulty in rating values for other groups (Feather, 1980), rather that prejudice. However, the individual value analysis and comparison with stereotypes indicated that the respondents may be prejudiced against ATSIs as they endorsed the negative stereotypes associated with ATSIs.

Future research could examine self-rated ATI values and their perception of the values held by non-ATSI Australians. This would indicate the degree to which ATSIs may be motivated to approach or avoid non-ATSI Australians. Future research should not ignore the fact that many behaviours occur without cognition, affect, or the reliance on values (e.g., habits, the use of heuristics) (Feather, 1992). That is, the motivation for intergroup behaviours is not always inside the realm of expectancy-value theory or belief congruence theory. The value-motivating-behaviour relationship is not the only approach that would explain why two groups do not interact with each other. For example, this approach explained only 23.5 percent of the variance in predicting willingness to associate with ATSIs. Social psychological approaches such as interpersonal
attraction (Feldman, 1995) and social and environmental dynamics (Feather, 1992) may also explain intergroup prejudice.

The present study has applications in reducing prejudice directed towards ATSI and reducing the intergroup conflict experienced between ATSI and non-ATSI groups in Australia. It demonstrates that the greater the perceived dissimilarity of values between groups, the less motivation the groups will have to initiate contact with each other. Both belief congruence theory and expectancy-value theory were supported, as both theories assert that value similarity motivates approach behaviours and value dissimilarity motivates avoidance behaviours. The research contributes to a better understanding of prejudice and discrimination in the Australian context.
References


Table I

Mean Value Type Scores for the Respondents and their Perceptions Concerning ATSIs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Type</th>
<th>M Self</th>
<th>M ATS</th>
<th>t value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p value</th>
<th>correlation</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>15.59</td>
<td>14.49</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>24.99</td>
<td>15.81</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>10.11</td>
<td>8.64</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>.381</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>12.51</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>6.51</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>.351</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>32.36</td>
<td>25.46</td>
<td>10.57</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>.303</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>45.98</td>
<td>39.79</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>.439</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>48.49</td>
<td>37.81</td>
<td>10.79</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>.378</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>20.06</td>
<td>22.75</td>
<td>-3.59</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>.397</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>19.35</td>
<td>14.94</td>
<td>7.94</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>34.77</td>
<td>26.93</td>
<td>9.83</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>.333</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * denotes significance with a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha of 0.005 for 10 t-tests.
Table II

**Mean Value Scores for the Respondents and their Perceptions Concerning ATSIs for Power and Tradition.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value type</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>M Self</th>
<th>M ATS</th>
<th>t value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Social power</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>-4.41</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social recognition</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>-1.85</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preserving my public image</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Accepting my portion in life</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>.883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Devout</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>-7.01</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humble</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respecting tradition</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>5.97</td>
<td>-9.42</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Detachment</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>-2.35</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* * denotes significance with a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha of 0.002 for 29 t-tests.
### Table III

**Significance of Value Differences and Consistency with the Aboriginal Stereotype**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stereotype</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>M Self</th>
<th>M ATSI</th>
<th>t value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p value</th>
<th>Consistent with stereotype</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negative Stereotypes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirty/ Unhygienic</td>
<td>Clean</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>10.93</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployable/ Uneducated</td>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>11.01</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligent</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek special treatment</td>
<td>Social power</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>-4.14</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unhygienic/ Alcohol use</td>
<td>Healthy</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>10.27</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy/ Bludgers</td>
<td>Responsible</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>11.14</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrespectful</td>
<td>Honouring parents and elders</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>-3.34</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obedient</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incompetent</td>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>12.14</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capable</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive Stereotypes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Egalitarian</td>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>7.73</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyal</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respecting the land</td>
<td>Unity with nature</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>-6.40</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protecting the environment</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>-4.28</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual</td>
<td>A spiritual life</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>-7.79</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wise</td>
<td>Wisdom</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>7.04</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just</td>
<td>Social justice</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>&lt;.001*</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artistic</td>
<td>Creativity</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * denotes significance with a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha of 0.002 for 29 t-tests.
### Table IV

**Standard Multiple Regression of Self-Ratings for Security and Universalism Value Types and Difference Score on Willingness to Associate with ATSIs.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Willingness to Associate ATSIs</th>
<th>Universalism</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Difference Score</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>sr²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>46.00</td>
<td>34.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>9.19</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intercept = 4.105

\[ R^2 = .25 \]

Adjusted \[ R^2 = .24 \]

\[ R = .50^{**} \]

**Note.** **p. <.001.
Table V

The Correlations Between the Predictor and Criterion Variables of Multiple Regression for Predicting Willingness and Actual Association with ATSIs and Other Outgroups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Willingness to associate ATSIs</th>
<th>Actual association ATSIs</th>
<th>Willingness to associate with other ethnic groups</th>
<th>Actual association with other ethnic groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>-.171*</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>-.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.178*</td>
<td>.174*</td>
<td>.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>.301**</td>
<td>.193*</td>
<td>.180*</td>
<td>.189*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>.213*</td>
<td>.171*</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>-.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.207*</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>-.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>-.047</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>-.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference Score</td>
<td>-.383**</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>-.167*</td>
<td>-.066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *p. <.05, **p. <.01 (two-tailed).
### Table I

The 56 Individual Values and the Corresponding 10 Value Types Measured by the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1994).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Type</th>
<th>Individual Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Social power, Wealth, Social Recognition, Authority, Preserving my public image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Successful, Capable, Ambitious, Influential, Intelligent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>Pleasure, Enjoying life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>An exciting life, A varied life, Daring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>Curious, Creativity, Freedom, Self-respect, Independent, Choosing own goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Protecting the environment, Unity with nature, A world of beauty, Broad-minded,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social justice, Wisdom, A world at peace, Equality, Inner harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Helpful, Honest, Forgiving, Loyal, Responsible, A spiritual life, True friendship,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mature love, Meaning in life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Accepting my portion in life, Devout, Humble, Respect for tradition, Detachment,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>Obedient, Honouring parents and elders, Politeness, Self-discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Clean, National security, Reciprocation of favours, Social order, Family security,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Healthy, A sense of belonging</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B

Instructions

In this section you are to ask yourself: "What values are important to ME as guiding principles in MY life, and what values are less important to me?" There are two lists of values on the following pages. In the parentheses following each value is an explanation that may help you to understand its meaning.

Your task is to rate how important each value is for you as a guiding principle in YOUR life. Use the rating scale below:

-1 is for rating any values opposed to the principles that guide you.
0 means the value is not at all important, it is not relevant as a guiding principle for you.
3 means the value is important.
6 means the value is very important.
7 is for rating a value of supreme importance as a guiding principle in your life; ordinarily there are no more than two such values.

The higher the number (-1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) the more important the value is as a guiding principle in YOUR life.

In the space before each value, write the number (-1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) that indicates the importance of that value for you, personally. Try to distinguish as much as possible between the values by using all the numbers. You will of course, need to use numbers more than once.

Before you begin, read values 1 to 30, and choose the one that is most important to you and rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your values and rate it -1. If there is no such value, choose the value least important to you and rate it 0 or 1, according to its importance. Then rate the rest of the values on the list.

List 1

opposed to my values -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 most important values

1. _____ EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
2. _____ INNER HARMONY (at peace with myself)
3. _____ SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)
4. _____ PLEASURE (gratification of desires)
5. _____ FREEDOM (freedom of action and thought)
6. _____ A SPIRITUAL LIFE (emphasis on spiritual not material matters)
7. _____ SENSE OF BELONGING (feeling that others care about me)
8. _____ SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society)
opposed to my values  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  most important values

9. ___ AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences)
10. ___ MEANING IN LIFE (a purpose of life)
11. ___ POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners)
12. ___ WEALTH (material possessions, money)
13. ___ NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my nation from enemies)
14. ___ SELF-RESPECT (belief in one's own worth)
15. ___ RECIPROCATION OF FAVOURS (avoidance of indebtedness)
16. ___ CREATIVITY (uniqueness, imagination)
17. ___ A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)
18. ___ RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of time-honoured customs)
19. ___ MATURE LOVE (deep emotional and spiritual intimacy)
20. ___ SELF-DISCIPLINE (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)
21. ___ DETACHMENT (from worldly concerns)
22. ___ FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones)
23. ___ SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, approval by others)
24. ___ UNITY WITH NATURE (fitting into nature)
25. ___ A VARIED LIFE (filled with challenge, novelty, and change)
26. ___ WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
27. ___ AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command)
28. ___ TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close, supportive friends)
29. ___ A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
30. ___ SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak)

Please make sure these pages are completed before continuing.
List 2

Now rate how important each of the following values is for you as a guiding principle in YOUR life. These values are phrased as ways of acting that may be more or less important to you. Once again, try to distinguish as much as possible between the values by using all the numbers.

Before you begin, read values 31 to 56, and choose the value that is most important to you and rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your values and rate it −1 or, if there is no such value, choose the value least important to you, and rate it 0 or 1, according to its importance. Then rate the rest of the values.

opposed to my values  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  most important values

31. ____ INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
32. ____ MODERATE (avoiding extremes of feeling and action)
33. ____ LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group)
34. ____ AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)
35. ____ BROAD-MINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
36. ____ HUMBLE (modest, self-effacing)
37. ____ DARING (seeking adventure, risk)
38. ____ PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)
39. ____ INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events)
40. ____ HONOURING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect)
41. ____ CHOOSING OWN GOALS (selecting own purposes)
42. ____ HEALTHY (not being sick physically or mentally)
43. ____ CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)
44. ____ ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE (submitting to life’s circumstances)
45. ____ HONEST (genuine, sincere)
46. ____ PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE (protecting my ‘face’)  
47. ____ OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations)
48. ____ INTELLIGENT (logical, thinking)
opposed to my values  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  most important values

49. _____ HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)
50. _____ ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.)
51. _____ DEVOUT (holding to religious faith and belief)
52. _____ RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)
53. _____ CURIOS (interested in everything, exploring)
54. _____ FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)
55. _____ SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)
56. _____ CLEAN (neat, tidy)

Please make sure these pages are completed before continuing.

Alternate Instructions

In this section you are to ask yourself: “What values are important to ABORIGINES AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDERS as guiding principles in THEIR life, and what values are less important to them?” There are two lists of values on the following pages. In the parentheses following each value is an explanation that may help you to understand its meaning. Your task is to rate how important you think each value is for ABORIGINES AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDERS as guiding principles in THEIR life. Use the rating scale below:

-1 is for rating any values opposed to the principles that guide Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders.
0 means the value is not at all important, it is not relevant as a guiding principle for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders.
3 means the value is important.
6 means the value is very important.
7 is for rating a value of supreme importance as a guiding principle for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, ordinarily there are no more than two such values.

The higher the number (-1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) the more important the value is as a guiding principle for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders.

In the space before each value, write the number (-1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) that indicates the importance of that value for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. Try to distinguish as much as possible between the values by using all the numbers. You will of course, need to use numbers more than once.

Before you begin, read values 1 to 30, and choose the one that you think is most important to Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to the values of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and rate it -1. If there is no such value, choose the value you think is least important to Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and rate it 0 or 1, according to its importance. Then rate the rest of the values on the list.
By using the following rating scales, evaluate how much you actually have associated with the groups below in the past by circling the corresponding number:

1 = Minimally or not at all - I do not associate with this group at all.
2 = Slightly - I live in the same street as a member of this ethnic group.
3 = Moderately Closely - I work with or do business with someone who is a member of this ethnic group.
4 = Closely - I have a friend who is a member of this ethnic group.
5 = Very Closely - I am married to or a member of my family is married to a member of this ethnic group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>Degree of Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Australians</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Australians</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alternate Instructions

By using the following rating scales, evaluate how willing you would be to associate in the future with the groups below by circling the corresponding number:

1 = Minimally or not at all - I would prefer not to associate with this group at all.
2 = Slightly - I would be happy living in the same street as a member of this ethnic group.
3 = Moderately Closely - I would be happy to work with or do business with someone who is a member of this ethnic group.
4 = Closely - I would be happy to have a friend who is a member of this ethnic group.
5 = Very Closely - I would be happy marrying or having a member of my family marry a