2002

The Awful Daring of a Moment's Surrender: The Male Body of Jouissance, Abjection and Embodiment in T. S. Eliot's The Waste Land

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The awful daring of a moment's surrender

The male body of jouissance, abjection and embodiment in

T. S. Eliot's The Waste Land

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13th August 2002
USE OF THESIS

The Use of Thesis statement is not included in this version of the thesis.
Abstract

T. S. Eliot's 'impersonality' and formula of the 'objective correlative' have been consistently discussed in terms of 'disembodiment'. Part I of this thesis argues that this disembodiment is the precondition of exemplary male phallic subjectivity, that fundamentally disavows what I will call the 'male body of jouissance'. Eliot's aforementioned theories are at odds with his view of the task of the poet – to work particular feeling and experience into language. This tension is, I argue, correlative to the incommensurability between the male body of jouissance and the phallic male body – as this incommensurability is established in Lacan's *The signification of the phallus*. I argue that this incommensurability is experienced as abjection, the loss of the clean and proper self explained in Kristeva's *Powers of Horror*. This results in a relation to language whereby abject contents are excluded and sublimated cathartically into 'style' – which I will argue is an embodied, rather than disembodied relation.

Part II of this thesis consists of a reading of T. S. Eliot's *The Waste Land*, insisting that the language is double – it both *means* through allusion and *repeats* the *jouissance* of the (non)subject on a different register: through style, rhythm and music. I argue this catharsis begins with a language charged with fear and loathing and through a process of catharsis becomes pleasured. This constitutes an 'embodiment', a bringing together of the clean and proper body with the abjected contents that, while impossible logically, is possible in language because of this (illogical) musical, stylistic register. I therefore argue *The Waste Land* is a fundamentally embodied text.
I certify that this thesis does not, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

(i) incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education;
(ii) contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text; or
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T. S. Eliot has become a sullied figure of modernism – which, in relation to his anti-Semitism, elitism and misogyny is entirely understandable. Most often, however, it is not for these unfortunate aspects of his ‘personality’ that he is criticized; for the most part, Eliot is criticized for his notorious doctrine of ‘impersonality’. Ellmann’s views on Eliot are exemplary here. She objects to his efforts to ‘resemble God in nature, untouched by the energies he has unleashed’, a view that for the most part is co-existent with an attempt to situate him as a common enemy of feminist discourses concerned with issues of embodiment. Quite rightly too – to examine the correlation between a disembodied male figure and certain negative and stifling significations of women is a worthy and important task. My objection is that this type of criticism tends to reinforce a view of Eliot, and phallic male subjects in general, as actually disembodied. It begins to turn the fiction of disembodiment into an unquestioned reality. It is for this reason that the majority of this thesis attempts to explain, through psychoanalytic concepts, how phallic male subjectivity depends upon a certain cultural belief in disembodiment. My argument is not in opposition to a feminist criticism as mentioned above; rather it attempts to insert itself earlier in the problem to examine how disembodiment comes about.

I will then be arguing that The Waste Land is an embodied text, since I will insist that disembodiment is an impossible fiction. I use the term embodied here in the Kristovian sense; an embodied text will be one in which the drives and jouissance of the subject are present. In order to do this, I will attempt to establish a concept – the male body of jouissance. The male body of jouissance is located in the world, sensitive to pleasure, pain – wonder and horror; it is a male body that admits its own status as a body. The
pha!lic male body is never implicated in its pleasure and signifies the burden of its
pleasure onto another body, like the body of the woman. In contrast, the male body of
jouissance would be able to locate pleasure within itself without threat to its coherence.
It could admit an irreverent pleasure, a pleasure that had no aim, or object; it is this body
that I would like to articulate theoretically.

There is at least one advantage to a theoretical articulation of the tension between
phallic male subjectivity and the male body of jouissance. I will use myself as an
example. As a white, male but homosexual subject, my body experiences certain
significations that are, to say the least, unwelcome. I expect that many women would
admit a similar experience. In terms of theory and identity politics that attempts to
articulate gender constructions, I have (at least) two options. I can attempt to examine
significations of stigmatized bodies within a phallic economy, to record and critique these
cultural tropes in the hope of developing strategies to avoid negative positioning. This
type of reading of Eliot would most probably examine his representations of the feminine
and attempt to contest the degree to which Eliot presents these bodies as 'natural'.
Another option, my preferred option, is to sidestep the ways in which my body has been
signified, and instead acknowledge that I have been signified negatively only because
someone is in the position to do it. This someone is precisely the disembodied subject,
in the case of Eliot the white male, who can make these pronouncements because he
never seems to be implicated in the world of signified bodies and pleasure. I want him to
be implicated, and my strategy for this is to examine how jouissance consistently
disrupts his attempts to get to the position of disembodied gaze, the 'properly'
impersonal and phallic artist. It is more empowering for me, and I hope that this would
apply to some extent to feminist criticism in general, to examine and critique the phallic
male subject, than it is to examine myself. In addition, it begins to articulate what the positive aspects of a male subjectivity not in opposition to feminism might be.

I will attempt to read this body into The Waste Land. Initially, I will show, through a reading of Lacan, that phallic, disembodied male subjectivity is built on the attempt to exclude the body of jouissance, an attempt that I will argue fails. I will then use the Kristevan concept of abjection to explain the relation of the phallic male subject to this body that it attempts to exclude. Most importantly though, I will argue, in opposition to Ellmann, that for the most part Eliot's poetics involve a confrontation of this body of jouissance. I therefore do not intend to rehabilitate Eliot as a writer of feminist texts, as he certainly was not. Rather, I intend to examine the extent to which Eliot's poetics, rather than being 'impersonal' and disembodied, actually begin to incorporate a male body of jouissance into a phallic subjectivity that excludes it.
Part I – The Possibility of Embodiment

Penis or phallus

Most of the current theoretical work that takes male subjectivity as its object inserts itself into the Lacanian gap between the penis and the phallus. Reading this material, there is an unmistakable feeling of consensus; the phallus is the villain holding all its subjects in thrall while the penis begins to appear as the heroic champion emerging from some distant horizon. Initially, this strategy would seem to have some merit. Since the penis has been 'cloaked' in its alter ego the phallus, reasserting its status as fleshy, unpredictable body part rather than master signifier holds the possibility of removing the phallus' empowering veil.

There are however problems with this tactic. What this strategy tends to do is establish a binary opposition, the 'good' penis and the 'bad' phallus, where there is none; it ignores that the penis and the phallus are merged and conflated in the building of a discreet male subjectivity. As I will presently argue, the phallus is utterly dependent on the penis as its material support; the phallus is a type of symbolic fiction grafted onto basic facts of biology. Within our current symbolic order, the phallus always marks the penis; symbolically, the two are inseparable. The fact that the phallus 'would be nothing without the penis' (Butler, 1993, p. 84) has led Judith Butler to attempt to consign the penis to the 'domain of the imaginary' in what she calls a 'liberating' gesture (1993, p. 61). Schehr comments on the liberatory nature of Butler's manoeuvre by asking, 'For whom? Certainly not for the poor Bobbitt-like man walking around without a penis for the sake of a liberating theory' (1997, p. 28)... 'Removing the penis is an act of castration.
at worst, an act of mutilation at best' (1997, p. 29). Schehr, quite insidiously, positions Butler as a type of 'emasculating' woman with this comment, and by implication positions feminist theory that sees the inseparability of the penis and phallus as 'emasculating'. See how easily phallocentrism creeps into Schehr's supposed anti-phallocentric discourse? The implication of his comment is that the penis is the only part of the male body capable of pleasure, and what is sacrificed is the entire male body as a zone of an excessive and disruptive pleasure; the male body of jouissance. Rather than use Butler's strategy as a starting point to explore other modes of 'being' for the male subject, Schehr falls back on the 'penis' as metonymic of male pleasure. If, as I will show, a phallic subjectivity depends on a disavowal of this male body of jouissance, Schehr's reassertion of the penis as male subject's primary access to pleasure, in that it enacts the same disavowal, falls directly into the phallocentric trap. My anti-phallocentric strategy therefore concerns itself with firstly how the penis becomes the phallus, and secondly, how this phallic construction does away with the male body of jouissance.

Obviously, there is a problem here; I am on the dangerous ground of setting up merely another opposition, this time between phallic male subjectivity and the male body of jouissance. It is for this reason that I will follow Lacan closely, and attempt to articulate male subjectivity to the point where the opposition it concerns itself with becomes an insoluble knot, a problem. I do not attempt to fully resolve the antagonism between phallic male subjectivity and the male body of jouissance. Rather, I will attempt to show that Lacan posits this antagonism as the very condition of the male subject, and from there I will merely attempt to more fully articulate the phallic male subject's experience of the problematic body. In other words, the lived experience of incommensurability is in itself a deconstruction of the binary I may appear to be setting up.
The Lacanian split-subject

Lacan's *The signification of the phallus* provides a starting point to begin to examine the 'phallic male subject'. I would like to point out that this discussion does not pretend to be exhaustive; the phallus has many functions in this essay, and the term itself undergoes an alarming amount of slippage. A full discussion of the phallus is well beyond the present concern. My task is not an elucidation of Lacanian theory. Rather, my reading of Lacan is motivated by a desire to examine exactly what a 'phallic male subjectivity' might be, how the 'phallic subject' differs from Lacan's more general 'split subject', and the subsequent consequences for the male body of *jouissance*.

For Lacan, the subject who exists within language, the symbolic order, is doubly 'split'. The first aspect of this split is introduced with a reference to Freud's discovery that the unconscious is analyzable only through dreams, and slips of the tongue; in effect it is only analyzable through language (Lacan, 1977a, p. 285). Lacan writes that this gives Saussure’s 'signifier/signified opposition the full extent of its implications' with regard to the human subject, in that 'the signifier has an active function in determining certain effects in which the signifiable appears as submitting to its mark, by becoming through that passion the signified' (1977a, p. 284). Therefore, what can be known of the subject is determined through the signifier. This has profound implications for the signified, the hidden content of the dream, or the 'real' subject; its meaning can only be accessed through the signifier and as such has its meaning determined by it. What may then appear to be the subject emerging through analysis of dreams is not the subject in some essential, true sense, but merely an effect of the signifier. For example, if I dream of knives and stabbing, what will emerge during analysis is not anything 'true' about me,
whatever it is 'in' me that correlates to knives and stabbing will remain unknown. Rather, particular cultural effects associated with knives will determine 'me' as signifiable, 'I' will be understood only in terms my association with someone who stabs, or is stabbed. My subjectivity will emerge as an effect of the signifier. This allows Lacan to state:

This passion of the signifier now becomes a new dimension of the human condition in that it is not only man who speaks, but in man and through man it [the signifier] speaks, that his nature is woven by effects in which are to be found the structure of language, of which he becomes the material (1977a, p. 284).

In these terms, the subject becomes split between an inaccessible void and a symbolic identity at the level of the signifier; the signifier speaks 'through' man; man is the signifier's material. My use of the term 'void' is qualified by Zizek's discussion of Lacan's 'subject of the enunciation' and 'subject of the enunciated' (Lacan, 1977b, p. 300). Consider the statement 'I don't exist'. This can be a meaningful statement; it is possible to lack any identificatory point within the symbolic network to which I could say with certainty 'That is I'. For example, if I identify primarily as a masculine subject whose sexual object choice is other men, I find myself lacking a signifier, in Australia at least, with which I can identify. I can be a masculine subject, or a homosexual subject, but there is no established signifier that encompasses both these terms. Yet, I can say 'that is I' just the same, however that signifier is meaningless for others (this example works much better if it is applied a few decades earlier than the present). So, in this example, the subject of the enunciation is more or less present, I do have the wherewithal to make this statement, however there is no established subject of the enunciated, no signifier that would make the statement 'that is I' meaningful for others. This is why Zizek can state that there is an insurmountable gap between the subject of the enunciation, which he calls the 'void' and the subject of the enunciated (1999a, p. 135). There is more to the subject than the signifier that determines the subject's meaning, yet this 'more' is
meaningless within the symbolic order and others that exist within it; it is not 'present' in the signifier. The 'void' and the 'signifier' therefore provide the terms of the first split described by Lacan.

The second split in *The signification of the phallus* is between needs and demand, which gives rise to desire. Lacan writes that there is a deviation in man's needs 'from the fact that he speaks, in the sense that insofar as his needs are subject to demand, they return to him alienated' (1977a, p. 286). This is because, in every demand, there is always an accompanying call for love; for the subject to be recognized and loved for what he 'really is' (1977a, p. 286). However, as Bowie notes, if the demand for love entails the Other paying the subject the 'compliment of an unconditional yes' (1991, p. 137), then the Other is never in a position to give this compliment since my full presence is never even known to me. As Bowie notes, 'his yes, however loudly it is proclaimed, can only ever be a maybe, or a to some extent, in disguise' (1991, p. 137). For Lacan then, the subject is constituted by a lack of being within language, and desire is the continued movement through the signifying chain in an attempt to fill this lack.

*Jouissance*

What is lacking so far in our description of the split subject is an explanation of the drive that propels the subject to attempt to have its needs met. Jacqueline Rose states that for Lacan, this drive is more than instinct, which is apparent in a need and could be fulfilled; that 'in his account, the drive is something in the nature of an appeal, or searching out, which always goes beyond the actual relationships on which it turns' (1982, p. 34). The drive then, exceeds the subject and its mere needs; it is excessive. Rose writes that Lacan discusses this drive by a re-reading of Freud's interpretation of
the drive in his discussion of the child's game with the cotton reel; the fort da. What Freud identified was a process of pure repetition that revolved around a lost object, a process he termed the death drive (Rose, p. 34). The point to be made here is that the insistence of this game places the drive 'beyond the register of need, and beyond an economy of pleasure. The drive touches on an area of excess (it is 'too much')' (Rose, p. 34). There is always something of the subject that exceeds it, something more that can be harnessed to a subjectivity at the level of signifier.

It is this area of excess that Lacan calls jouissance, which in French is literally 'orgasm', but is used by Lacan to refer to an excess of pleasure; of a drive that exceeds any object, and as Rose notes can easily tip into the opposite of pleasure (Rose, p. 34). What Lacan calls a 'jouissance of the body' (1982, p. 142) is therefore whatever it is in the body that propels a subject to keep going, it is the drive where what matters is not what the drive achieves, but its process (Rose, p. 34). What is important to note here is that this jouissance of the body belongs properly to the aspect of the subject that we described above as the 'void'. Lacan writes, 'jouissance is forbidden to him that speaks as such, although it can only be said between the lines for whoever is subject of the Law, since the Law is grounded by this very prohibition' (1977b, p. 319). Jouissance is forbidden since speech, and the stability of the signifier is grounded in the prohibition of jouissance. In other words, the shared knowledge of the signifier, the meaningfulness of the subject of the enunciated, is possible only through a prohibition of the void of jouissance, belonging at the level of the subject of the enunciation. I argue however, that properly speaking jouissance is not successfully 'prohibited'. It is not 'done away with'. Lacan states that it is spoken 'between the lines' and proceeds to state that human subjects are 'played by jouissance' (1982, p. 142), which would seem to admit that a subjectivity at the level of signifier does not really 'do away with' this area of
excess. This apparent contradiction is resolved by recognizing that the subject cannot 'know' his jouissance since, as Zizek states, 'you cannot have both meaning and enjoyment [jouissance]', that jouissance is 'nonmeaning as such' (1992, p. 134). For the split subject, jouissance properly belongs to the 'void', the area of the 'subject of the enunciation', which is non-meaning - unlike the 'signifier' which is meaning. Jouissance continues to disrupt, and affect the subject, the body can in theory irrupt into speech, however its disruptions are somewhat chaotic, disturbing, since they proceed from the void of non-meaning; knowledge cannot make these disruptions meaningful for the subject or for others.

The split subject and jouissance in Eliot's poetics

Lacan's first split, between the 'void' and the 'signifier', is apparent in Eliot's poetics, especially the theories relating to his 'dissociation of sensibility'. This theory makes its first appearance in The Metaphysical Poets. Eliot writes that in 'the seventeenth century a dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we have never recovered (1932, p. 287, 288). The dissociation of sensibility refers to Eliot's view of language and thought as general from the seventeenth century onwards as opposed to feeling which becomes particular to the individual subject (1952, p. 19). This is stated most clearly in The Family Reunion: 'I talk in general terms/ Because the particular has no language' (Eliot, 1939, p. 28). Weinblatt writes:

In consequence, it poses the fundamental question that draws together every facet of Eliot's work. In a universe where general language, the sharable language of the community, is irreparably cleaved from the particular, unique language of feeling, how can any statement go to the heart? (1984, p. 4).
Language then is shared knowledge, it is general, and cannot properly articulate private feeling, personal experience for others. For Eliot then, the task of the poet is to work particular feeling into language, in an attempt to overcome this disastrous dissociation (Eliot, 1952, p. 97).

For Lacan, as has already been argued, the subject is split between a void of inarticulable jouissance and the signifier. I argue that Eliot sees the subject in much the same way; that is, Eliot's use of the term 'feeling' corresponds to the notion of jouissance. Eliot differentiates the term 'feeling' from his conception of 'emotion' in On Poetry and Poets:

> It seems to me that beyond the nameable, classifiable emotions and motives of our conscious life when directed towards action...there is a fringe of indefinite extent, of feeling which we can only detect, so to speak, out of the corner of the eye and can never completely focus; of feeling of which we are only aware in a kind of temporary detachment from action (1952, p. 86).

Emotion then is 'nameable' and 'classifiable' and as such exists at the level of the signifier where all in the symbolic order can understand it. Feelings, on the other hand, belong to a realm other than 'our conscious life'; they constitute 'a demon, a demon against which he [the poet] feels powerless, because in its first manifestation it has no face, no name, nothing' (1952, p. 98). Feelings are what cannot be named within language; they fall short of the symbolic order, and as such belong properly to the realm of jouissance as I have described it. Standing in the way of the articulation of 'feeling', Eliot posits 'personality' which like emotion, is located at the level of the signifier. Weinblatt writes that 'most often, Eliot thinks of personality in negative terms: an encrustation of habits, postures, attitudes, and social roles which provide us with an effective means of staving off confrontation with the incessant flux of experience' (1984,
p. 37), with those 'deeper, unnamed feelings which form the substratum of our being, to which we rarely penetrate; for our lives are mostly a constant evasion of ourselves' (Eliot, 1933, p. 155). This is most apparent in his criticism of Byron. Eliot thinks true feeling is absent in Byron; his most 'ambitious attempts to be poetic...turn out, on examination, to be fake: nothing but sonorous affirmations of the commonplace with no depth of significance' (1952, p. 195). This means Byron writes in 'a dead or dying language' (1952, p. 201) because of his commitment to a 'false personality' (1952, p. 194). Personality then, is a social role, an 'act', false like emotion, which belongs properly at the level of Lacan's signifier which is split form the void where the poets jouissance lies. Thus, Eliot's explanation of the problems of the poet, split between 'false' personality and emotion and 'real' feeling are analogous to Lacan's split between the 'signifier' and the inarticulable jouissance in the realm of the 'void'.

The second split described by Lacan also seems to be pre-empted by Eliot. Weinblatt writes that Eliot's theory of poetry 'can never be grounded in a theory of language as communication' (1984, p. 68). For Lacan, as has already been argued, in every demand for a need to be met there is an accompanying demand for love which cannot be properly articulated in language. For Eliot, the poet's feelings are not articulated in the poem. Eliot writes that by the time the poet's feelings have been worked into the poem they will be 'hardly recognizable' (1933, p. 138). The correlation between Lacan and Eliot here is the inability of language to communicate what the subject 'really is'. Clearly then, Lacanian theory is useful for examining Eliot's view of the poet's problem in communicating feeling and isolated experience, in that it corresponds noticeably to Lacan's identification of the split subject.
The phallus

To return to Lacan's split subject, it appears that Lacan has described a symbolic deadlock. If both the subject and the Other are split between void and signifier, then neither can be loved for themselves, and even if this were possible, language could never mediate such an exchange. This will change with reference to the agent that steps forward to resolve the deadlock: the phallus. Lacan follows Freud quite closely in his discussion of the manner in which the phallus becomes a signifier of the lost jouissance the adult split-subject must endure (1977a, p. 281). Because the mother is originally considered by children of both sexes to be deprived of the penis, the penis becomes associated with the idea of its removal and lack. The phallus is a signifier that encompasses both the material attributes of the penis and the idea of its absence. The signifier of the phallus then, always refers to both the material penis and the idea of its removal, its absence. Once the unmediated jouissance of the mother-child dyad is renounced through the Oedipal drama and castration, the phallus comes to be a signifier of jouissance for which there is no problem of articulation and satisfaction. The phallus can perform this role of signifier of lost jouissance for two main reasons. Firstly, Lacan insists that the child, upon realizing the mother does not have the phallus, will assume she desires it, and will attempt to be the phallus for the mother. Paternal prohibition of the mother-child dyad will demand the child renounce these attempts, and the phallus from this point on will represent the lost jouissance of the mother. Secondly, the phallus, since it encompasses both the penis and the idea of its absence, corresponds to the idea of jouissance and the absence (within language) of its unproblematic articulation. It is a signifier that has already played this double role for the child. Therefore, the phallus, as both the penis and the idea of its lack, can become a
signifier of both *jouissance* and its expulsion from meaning at the level of the signifier. However, since the phallus is still dependent on the idea of the penis, it will signify the lost articulation of *jouissance* differently for male and female subjects. Lacan writes the difference is that the male subject will attempt to appear to ‘have’ the phallus, while the female subject will attempt to appear to ‘be’ it. For the male subject, separation from the mother is rewarded with a sense that his penis may one day be a phallus, that he will ‘have’ the phallus as his father does, albeit in fantasy, which will allow him to again possess the lost satisfaction of the mother, the unmediated articulation of *jouissance* (Lacan, 1977a, p. 289). For the girl, it is more difficult to see how the separation benefits her; Lacan states that as the girl realizes she will never have the phallus, she consoles herself with attempts to ‘be’ it. Lacan writes, ‘As one realizes in observing that it is not by being foreclosed to the penis, but by being the phallus that the patient is doomed to become a woman’ (1977c, p. 207). For Lacan then, the symbolic deadlock of the lack of any possible satisfaction is resolved through reference to the signifier of the phallus; the male subject will attempt to ‘have’ his satisfaction while the female subject will attempt to ‘be’ the male subject’s satisfaction. Lacan makes clear that this resolution occurs at the level of fantasy only; this is not a resolution determined by biology, but rather a symbolic fiction grafted onto certain facts of biology. I would like now to examine in more detail the way in which this ‘fiction’ is played out.

### The phallus in practice

Lacan writes of the function of the phallus:

It can be said that this signifier is chosen because it is the most tangible element in the real of sexual copulation, and also the most symbolic in the literal
In the 'real' of sexual copulation the penis plays the role of 'copula'; it literally says 'to be'. This relates literally to the penis fertilizing the egg; 'by virtue of its turgidity, it is the image of the vital flow as it is transmitted in generation' (Lacan, 1977a, p. 287). The phallus then, since it is the penis and the idea of 'lack' of satisfaction, performs the role of 'copula' in the structuring of satisfaction in the sexual relation. Understanding this depends upon recognizing that this sentence of Lacan's literally sets up the phallus as a symbol that takes on the properties of the penis, the ability to ejaculate and fertilize an ovum is transformed into the form of the verb 'to be'; the phallus is a signifier that signifies satisfaction in a positive sense in the place of the split subject where no satisfaction is possible. For the male subject, who is on the side of 'having' the phallus, it becomes clear that he is on the side of signifying his desire externally; of signifying some external object as in possession of the jouissance he has renounced through the process of castration, or moving into the symbolic order. He is in possession of a very handy 'tool' that will allow him to designate 'as a whole the effects of the signified', and he signifies his desire by designating his jouissance as external to himself (Lacan, 1982, p. 143). The female subject, on the other hand, is on the side of being signified; not having anything that corresponds to this signifying 'tool' she must be content to 'be it'; she must be content to be signified as man's jouissance (Lacan, 1982, p. 143). Therefore, the female subject is structured to provide the locus of the male subject's jouissance.
The veiled body

The necessity of 'seeming to have' the phallus demands that the male subject exclude the body of jouissance from a phallic subjectivity at the level of disembodied gaze. Lacan writes; 'All these propositions merely conceal the fact that [the phallus] can play its role only when veiled, that is to say, as itself a sign of the latency with which any signifiable is struck when it is raised to the function of signifier' (1977a, p. 288). Of course, the phallus is veiled on the one hand because it symbolizes lack, and absence. But this does not explain why the phallus can function as copula only when veiled. Perhaps it is useful to remember here that the phallus is a signifier that signifies only signification (1977a, p. 288). As such, the phallus is a signifier with no actual signified; there can be no sliding of different signifieds under the phallus as it signifies only signification, the act of saying 'to be'. Within the structuring of sexual identity, the phallus signifies the locus of jouissance externally. Therefore, a veiling is necessary, in order for the male subject to maintain 'seeming' to have the phallus; he must not be signifiable as a locus of jouissance. If the male body were signifiable as a locus of jouissance, it would undermine the phallus' attempts to signify jouissance externally. It is for this reason that the male body of jouissance is excluded from male subjectivity. We can establish this further with reference to Zizek's discussion of Hegelian theory of the 'universal'; that any 'universal truth' is always grounded in an exception to that truth (1999a, p. 144). The positing of any universal truth implies a position from outside, a position excluded from this truth from which the universal could be located and named. Zizek uses courtly love as an example, whereby the figure of the sublime inaccessible Lady 'reaches existence' and is 'transformed into an object that, precisely insofar as it gives body to sexuality as such, renders the masculine subject impotent' (1999a, p. 143). Evident here is the universal 'bodies signify pleasure', evident in the construction
of the sublime Lady. However, for Zizek this universal renders the masculine subject ‘impotent’, with no access to pleasure other than through the sublime, yet inaccessible Lady. The male body, that does not signify pleasure, is the exception that grounds the rule. This is the reason for the 'veiling' of the male subject, for the phallus to signify *jouissance* externally onto a signifier, it must act as an exception to all signifiers that signify *jouissance*; it must not be signifiable itself.

I would like to point out here the dependence of the phallus on ideology. As Silverman notes, the phallus cannot be thought outside of ideology; therefore the theories on how it comes to be such an important signifier should be regarded with skepticism as to their status as 'truth' (1992, p. 15). As shown above, much of the function of the phallus is played out at the level of the signifier, at the level of culture, and as such is dependent upon a patriarchal system. I will therefore restrain my use of the phallus as a concept to its *function*, how it actually *appears to operate*. This is the advantage of focus on the phallus as *copula*, in that it bypasses the truth status of the phallus as master signifier (as it is explained through the Oedipal drama) and instead highlights its relation to the dominant fiction of patriarchy and its power relations as they are evident in its practice.

*The disembodied male subject, or GOD*

I would like to examine further the male subject's position of 'disembodied gaze' by reference to Zizek's discussion of the doppelganger in film and painting (1992, p. 125). For Zizek, to explain the horror of meeting ones doppelganger, one must 'go beyond the "standard" Lacanian reduction of a motif of a double to the imaginary mirror relationship"*: At its most fundamental, the double embodies the phantom-like Thing in me...In my double, I don't simply encounter myself (my mirror image), but first of all what
is “in me more than myself” (1992, p. 125). This thing that is “in me more than myself” is precisely that which is ‘left over’ from the process of subjectivization. Zizek calls this figure a ‘sublime, ethereal body, a pure substance of enjoyment [jouissance]’ (1992, p. 125). What is ‘in the male subject more than himself’ [his subjectivity] then, is the jouissance of the mother-child dyad, which in the case of the male subject, is the male body of jouissance. Male subjectivity proper would therefore seem to exist at the level of pure, disembodied gaze whereby the body of jouissance, the disturbing leftover tied unconsciously to the mother, is resolved either in the mirror image or the body of the woman. As Silverman notes, sexual difference is ‘unthinkable apart from this externalizing displacement of male castration onto the female subject’ (1992, p. 45). By means of the phallus as copula, male jouissance is signified onto a signifier.

This last statement, ‘male jouissance is signified onto a signifier’ brings me to the fundamental reason that a male subject can be thought of as ‘disembodied’. As I have already noted, for phallic male subjectivity to actuate this externalizing movement, there is a ‘veiling’ at the level of symbolic subjectivity; the phallic male subject excludes his own body from his subjectivity. This subject is already disembodied. Importantly though, Lacan writes that the phallus is ‘intended to designate as a whole the effects of the signified, in that the signifier conditions them by its presence as a signifier’ (1977a, p. 285). This statement extends the function of the phallus from the sexual relation to language as a whole; the phallus is the privileged signifier that determines the meaning of all signifieds. This is how the phallic male subject comes to resemble God; he is the one that says what everything means and yet is not implicated in this designation of meaning. His jouissance is externalized into language, and he is left somewhat hollowed out; empty; everything else, including language stands for his pleasure but he
doesn't. One would assume that this would mean his language is charged with pleasure, his pleasure, but in effect this is not so.

Imagine the 'standard' scene of hardcore pornography directed toward heterosexual men. The male subject is nearly always impassive, he expresses nothing; his body is like a rock, hard and immobile as he penetrates the woman. The woman, on the other hand, is nearly always in the higher states of ecstasy; eyes closed, mouth open and consumed with pleasure. He is the phallus, and she is the signifier of his pleasure. However, no sooner is his jouissance externalized than lost; he may find pleasure in the signifier but it is no longer his. There is nothing left of the phallic male subject but a sort of empty space that nevertheless exercises power through the gaze, a gaze that is the organizing principle of meaning. So when I argue that the phallic male subject externalizes his jouissance onto the signifier, be it the body of the woman or language in general, this does not mean that language is 'charged' with his pleasure. Rather, he has disowned his jouissance; made other objects, that he can experience, stand for it. There is nothing left of him but a type of husk, or God; there is certainly nothing left that could respond with pleasure to real experiences like a caress, or touch. Please take note that I do not mean to categorize every male subject in such a negative light. What I am attempting to do is to describe the phallic position as evident in our current discourse. If there are male subjects who deviate from this position, and there certainly are, my point is that these male subjects have developed interesting strategies for dealing with a prevailing discourse that deserve attention. Eliot is such a male subject, as will presently be argued. However, the standard phallic male subject exists at the level of disembodied gaze, and his language actually contains nothing of his pleasure.
The phallus and the 'objective correlative'

I would now like to examine how Eliot's 'objective correlative' corresponds to Lacan's use of the phallus to resolve the symbolic deadlock. The 'objective correlative' is most clearly stated in *Hamlet and his Problems*:

> The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an "objective correlative"; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that *particular* emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked (1920a, p. 100)

The first thing to notice in this passage is Eliot's use of the term 'emotion', which is at the level of the signifier, rather than 'feeling', which corresponds to the *jouissance* of the body that falls short of the symbolic order and language. So the theory of the objective correlative refers to the expression of 'signifiable' emotions that are precisely *not* the 'deeper, unnamed feelings which form the substratum of our being'. This can be understood via a comparison of Eliot's criticism of *Hamlet* as opposed to his criticism of the poetry of Ben Jonson. Eliot writes of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* that essential to the play is the feeling of a son towards a guilty mother (1920a, p. 99), and that the main problem with this is that this feeling is in 'excess of the facts as they appear...his disgust is occasioned by his mother, but...his mother is not an adequate equivalent for it' (1920a, p. 102). The main problem with *Hamlet* then, is not so much that it lacks an adequate, or equivalent object, but that it attempts to express feelings for which there is no adequate object. In comparison, Eliot praises Jonson's poetry for its 'careful, precise filling in of a strong and simple outline, and at no time does it overflow the outline' (1920b, p. 108, 109), yet simultaneously recognizes that Jonson's work does not reach the 'deepest terrors and desires' (1920b, p. 115) like the work of Shakespeare, Donne...
and Webster. Jonson is therefore praised for his self-limitation to subject matter for which there is an objective correlative, whereas Shakespeare's *Hamlet* is criticised for this lack of discipline. This constitutes a point of ambivalence and ambiguity in Eliot's criticism, for as before, he sees the task of the poet as the expressing of 'particular feeling' in language, and yet it is for this attempt that Shakespeare is criticised; Eliot's formula of the 'objective correlative' seems to be in contradiction to his view of the task of the poet.

I will return to this shortly. For now, I would like to examine how the objective correlative corresponds to the phallic manoeuvre. They correspond in an alienating, externalizing movement; the object yields only 'emotion' which is *not* 'feeling' much like the body of the woman, and the signifier in general come to 'stand for' the male subject's *jouissance* whereby it is no longer his own. Therefore, the presence of an objective correlative means the presence of classifiable, identifiable emotions that can be communicated to the reader. Crucially though, the presence of an objective correlative means that the phallic manoeuvre has already taken place, that the poet is not entranced by the 'deeper, unnamed' feelings of his being, in short, his *jouissance*, but is concerned with his *jouissance* as it has already been resolved and become 'emotion'. Weinblatt's analysis of the pessimism inherent in Eliot's theory of language is particularly useful here; the objective correlative functions in Eliot's criticism as what can 'no longer be' in a universe of dissociated sensibility. I would therefore insist that attention be paid to Eliot's other poetics, a poetics based on the articulation of *jouissance* in the absence of the phallic function, to which I will now turn.
The lived experience of disembodiment

In order to explain Eliot's 'anti-phallic' poetics, I will examine more closely the psychoanalytic account of the male subject's experience of the body of jouissance. As has already been established, there can be no claim that a phallic male subjectivity, the disembodied gaze, actually does away with his body of excessive jouissance. As Lacan states, the male subject is still 'played by jouissance' (1982, p. 142). What we have here is a type of symbolic knot, an insoluble problem of male subjectivity between the body of jouissance and the phallic male body. It is this knot that the penis / phallus model of anti-phallocentric discourse ignores, because it ignores that the penis becomes the phallus and is incorporated into a phallic subjectivity, and that this subjectivity is always in an antagonistic relation to the body of jouissance. So rather than simply attempt to privilege the 'male body of jouissance' over the 'phallic male body', I will attempt now to articulate how this antagonism reveals itself at the level of lived experience. This, I hope, will constitute my deconstruction of any simple binary opposition between the two terms.

What effect does the insistence of jouissance have on the phallic male subject? It seems that a useful point at which this could be examined is the actual sex act, where the male subject comes into close proximity with the fictional female body that contains his jouissance. Lacan does not seem to think the phallic position can be maintained in such close proximity to the fiction. He states; 'the act of love is the polymorphous perversion of the male, in the case of the speaking being. There is nothing more emphatic, more coherent or more strict as far as Freudian discourse is concerned' (Lacan, 1982, p. 143). Lacan stops here, there is no further explication of the male's
'polymorphous perversion' during the act of love, which leaves the field open for me to tease out the consequences of this statement.

In the *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, Freud writes of polymorphous perversion that it consists of the tendency for children to be drawn into 'all possible kinds of sexual irregularities' before the construction of 'mental dams' through which to channel the sexual drive appropriately (1949, p. 69). Mitchell writes that Freud used the presence of perversion to demonstrate that for the sexual drive there is 'no fixed aim...its aim is variable, its object contingent' (1962, p. 10). Polymorphous perversion then refers to the child, as it is still dependent on the mother whereby its sexual drive will achieve satisfaction by any means possible. However, I would argue that Lacan's use of 'polymorphous perversion' is misleading. As Lacan has already stated quite explicitly, there is no male subject without castration; we are not dealing with a child, we are dealing with an adult male 'split' subject who exists through language whereby the original object is 'lost' (Lacan, 1977b, p. 319). There can be no unproblematic return to 'polymorphous perversion'. Ultimately, Lacan does not confront this issue. To examine how the male subject deals with the sexual relation, and the intrusion of his *jouissance* we need a different model, and it is here that I will turn to the work of Julia Kristeva.

**The abject**

I will be primarily concerned with Kristeva's essay *Powers of Horror* and its main concept: abjection. The abject is basically something disgusting - but more importantly something disgusting *because* it encroaches upon certain established borders. One of her first examples is the corpse. Kristeva writes that a corpse disturbs the borders between the wastes of the body, 'what I permanently thrust aside in order to live' (1982,
p. 3), and the body 'clean and proper'. She writes 'if dung signifies the other side of the border, the place where I am not and which permits me to be, the corpse, the most sickening of wastes, is a border that has encroached upon everything' (1982, p. 3). The corpse is obviously 'disgusting' and 'unclean', but this is not why it is abject. Kristeva writes 'it is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order (1982, p. 4). The corpse is abject because it is death infecting life; it represents a border that has been encroached upon. Abjection is the inability to exclude this abject thing from subjectivity - from the inside of the subject's being. Because the corpse represents the waste that the body expels in order to live; there is a real feeling when confronted by the corpse that it could 'menace us from the inside' (Guberman, 1996, p. 118). Therefore, what is abject is something that must be excluded so that subject can 'be' but nevertheless seems to threaten the subject from the inside. This 'inside' must be understood primarily in terms of the visceral body; what is abject is what the subject perceives as disgusting but could also be a part of itself.

For Kristeva, the logic of abjection begins with the maternal body. She writes 'the abject confronts us...within our personal archaeology, with our earliest attempts to release hold of the maternal entity even before ex-isting outside of her' (1982, p. 13). The child abjects the mother in its first attempts to separate from her (Kristeva, 1982, p. 13). As Oliver writes, 'The child in this abject relation to its mother is not yet separated from her but is no longer identical with her' (1993, p. 57). This is an abject relation precisely because discrete borders of identity are not respected; the child is both itself and its mother. The relation becomes a primarily 'phobic' one, as the child attempts to 'exclude' the mother (Kristeva, 1982, p. 7). The abject mother must be excluded; the mother's body becomes a phobic object (Kristeva, 1982, p. 6), and it is this first process of
abjection that begins to establish the child's subjectivity; 'making the mother abject allows the child to separate from her and become autonomous (Oliver, 1993, p. 61).

Oliver writes that this stage of abjection has grave consequences for the male subject's relation to the mother. She writes 'how can he become a man when 'he' was once a woman...how can he become a man and love a woman, that abject and threatening hole 'represented' by :is mother (1993, p. 61). Kristeva writes that this problem is resolved by splitting the mother in two, into the abject and the sublime (1982, p. 157) whereby it is the sublime woman the man will love while the abjected maternal will remain a phobic object (Kristeva, 1982, p. 157).

I would like to point to the difficulty in using concepts such as these. In the context of this thesis, there is no way I can verify the truth of Kristeva's location of the logic of abjection being set up with the child's relation to the maternal body. However, it is possible to note a certain cultural imperative that prohibits a male subject from a 'too close' relation to the mother; masculine identity does seem to be built on an exclusion of the maternal. The negative cultural trope of the 'mummy's boy', present strongly in the area of folk wisdom, is something that can be asserted with relatively little fear of contradiction. This folk wisdom would seem to be supported by the fact that the male subject who does not separate from the maternal is a figure not only of derision but horror, as evident in the enduring appeal of the 'Norman Bates' figure in contemporary horror filmsxxv. I would therefore argue that even if the particulars of Kristeva's argument prove to be incorrect, the idea that the male subject has an exclusionary relation to the maternal is evident enough in culture to be accepted.
The abjected male body of jouissance

For the male subject, the jouissance that continues to affect his body, excessive to that which is externalized and located in the signifier, is inextricably tied to the abjected mother. This is because the prohibition of jouissance corresponds temporally with the attempts to 'abject' the mother — after castration, both will be 'left out' of symbolic subjectivity. Furthermore, for the male subject, the abjected maternal and jouissance both exist at the level of the 'void', which is non-meaning. If the void is non-meaning, unbound by the symbolic laws of distinction and separation, there is little possibility for a logical separation of the male subject's jouissance and the abjected maternal. A subject position of the disembodied gaze results in jouissance and the maternal being excluded, abjected to the void of the subject where symbolic laws that could maintain distinctions are absent. And because the abjected male body of jouissance continues, by its existence, to threaten male phallic subjectivity, 'from its place of banishment, the abject does not cease challenging its master' (Kristeva, 1982, p. 2), his experience of his body will be an experience of abjection. For the male subject confronted with the male body of jouissance, there is an inevitable confrontation with the place of the abjected maternal. In the void of non-meaning and absence of logic, the place of the maternal and the body of jouissance simply become 'what must be excluded'. For this maternal jouissance to re-emerge, in a visceral, bodily way is an intolerable situation, calling into question the very foundation of phallic identity and the 'clean and proper self'. It is for this reason I would argue that abjection is a preferable concept to 'polymorphous perversion' in explaining the male phallic subject's experience of jouissance. Abjection takes into account the processes, castration, and the Oedipal crisis, that have formed him as a subject.
An abject language

If the relation of the phallic male subject to language is one that is fundamentally disembodied, what is the relation to language of the abject male subject? Kristeva offers an alternative to the disembodied speech of the phallic male subject. She writes that 'there are lives not sustained by desire, for desire is for objects. Rather, the abject subject excludes' (1982, p. 6). So then, there is a relation to language whereby it is not based on castration, does not require the externalization of jouissance to the signifier where it can then be experienced. Whereas phallic language acts as an imperfect substitute for repressed contents, during abjection, where repressed contents are confronted, language becomes a way of excluding them by speaking them. Kristeva writes:

The unconscious contents are normally repressed... During abjection, the unconscious contents [the body of jouissance and the mother] are excluded; not radically enough for a secure differentiation between subject and object but enough for a defensive position - one that implies a refusal but also a sublimating elaboration... The abject subject makes the conscious/unconscious distinction irrelevant, therefore the speech is good ground for a sublimating discourse (aesthetic, mystical) rather than scientific or rationalist (1982, p. 7).

The normally repressed contents are excluded through sublimation. How does this manoeuvre differ from the phallic manoeuvre of externalizing jouissance onto a signifier? Kristeva refers to Aristotelian catharsis to explain the particulars of the abject subject's relation to language. She writes that Aristotelian catharsis repeats the passions of the body in a "language with pleasurable accessories," the most important of which being rhythm and song (1982, p. 28). She writes that rhythm and song arouse the impure, the abject, and repeat it, a repetition by which the abject is brought into being a second time (1982, p. 28). An abject cathartic language is for Kristeva fundamentally double, in the
sense that it is speech it 'means', but on another level it repeats what the speech does not say – the horror and pleasure - the jouissance of abjection (1982, p. 28). Poetic catharsis for Aristotle has an active function in that it repeats and purifies the process of abjection by immersing itself in it. The horror of the abject, of the impossibility of identity is sublimated through a repetition of that horror, of jouissance, into language. Furthermore, jouissance repeated in an abject language is heard through music, 'through rhythm and song', in short through style. Kristeva writes that the writer of an abject text 'topples' into 'the effervescence of passion and language we call style' where meaning becomes 'drowned' (1982, p. 206). To analyze an abject text then is to analyze the style and the music of that text.

The phallic relation to language involves a taking on of a subject position that is necessarily disembodied, as jouissance is imperfectly externalized onto a signifier so the subject desires endlessly through the signifying chain. He wants to experience it 'out there' in the signifier. The abject relation to language however, since during abjection there is no subject properly speaking, is more direct; language becomes a sublimation of the subject's jouissance, language is charged directly with the horror surrounding an impossibility of identity rather than being the vehicle for establishing a subject position. This is how an abject language is more embodied than a phallic language; it literally springs from the body. I would therefore argue that reading for the abject male subject, and his relation to the male body of jouissance and the maternal, is one strategy whereby the phallic, disembodied position can be contested, and replaced with, if not a strictly another subjectivity, at least an embodiment (the nature of which will be explained more fully in my analysis of The Waste Land). This involves a reading of supposedly 'disembodied' texts that concentrates on style, and music, as evidence of the jouissance of the subject.
Eliot's anti-phallic poetics

An abject relation to language, whereby language acts as cathartic, is a useful model for examining Eliot's poetics that can be seen to incorporate the body of jouissance. In this model, posed in order to come to terms with the dissociation of sensibility, Eliot proposes a poetics based on surrender and working into form. First, the poet must surrender the false 'personality', which is an obstruction to the poet's real feelings. This surrender is evident in *Murder in the Cathedral*, where Thomas is tempted with a vision of himself as a Saint, which is actually merely a vision of his 'prideful personality on Earth' (Weinblatt, 1984, p. 53). Weinblatt writes that for Thomas the turning point back to spiritual health is the 'play's denouement, as Thomas begins the painful ingathering of faith and spiritual energies that will finally allow him to overcome self-division by a surrender of personality' (1984, p. 53). Evident here is a poetics that focuses itself more fully on the body of jouissance without 'self-division' - the basic point of an 'ingathering', rather than focusing on the 'false' personality or signifier. The second phase for the poet is to attempt to work this particular experience into an adequate form. Weinblatt (1984, p. 67) writes that for Eliot, the true or authentic artist focuses on the task of transmuting the innermost feelings into adequate form, 'which is a task in the same sense as the making of an efficient engine or the turning of a jug or a tableleg' (Eliot, 1932, p. 114). Equally important though, is the recognition of the failure of language to ever transmute these feelings into form. As already noted, the generality of language will, for Eliot, mean that the feeling or experience that prompted the writing of the poem will be replaced by it; the poem will properly be impersonal like language (Eliot, 1952, p. 98). Therefore, the reader could expect the poem's object to replace the 'feeling' of the poet with 'emotion'; the object, within the generality of language cannot transmute the 'feeling'. There will,
therefore, be an objective correlative, but it will fail to evoke the poet’s *jouissance* for the reader. I will argue that, in fact, the language is not impersonal; while there are such ‘objects’ in *The Waste Land*, there is also a language of *jouissance*. Why did Eliot fail to recognize he was working in way that somewhat resolved his problem of dissociated sensibility? His language in fact works on two registers, one of the object and another whereby the presentation of the object is also a repetition of *jouissance*. As Kristeva writes, a language of *jouissance* is ‘audible, and through the speech that it mimics it repeats on another register what the latter does not say’ (1982, p. 28).

I am therefore arguing that Eliot’s ‘anti-phallic’ poetics consist of two movements, the acknowledgement of the body of *jouissance* and a movement toward language. In my reading of *The Waste Land*, I will attempt to show that this ‘poetics’ is a cathartic one; the language reflects the *jouissance* of the abject subject, the (non) subject, in its collapse into the place of the maternal. This abject language, I will argue, is an embodied language because it cathartically repeats the *jouissance* of the subject, rather than acting as the subject’s *jouissance* externalized. Therefore, in consideration of Kristeva when she writes of the abject subject’s ‘straying on excluded ground... The abject from which he does not cease separating is for him, in short, a land of oblivion that is constantly remembered’ (1982, p. 8), I will consider *The Waste Land* as a type of textual ‘land of oblivion’; as a repetition of the painful, and pleasurable *jouissance* of abjection.
Part II — Embodiment in *The Waste Land*

*The Waste Land*

T. S. Eliot’s *The Waste Land* has been the site of an extraordinary number of disparate critical readings, which Harriet Davidson articulates succinctly (Davidson, 1994, p. 57). Is the poem conservative and repressive or radical and new? Is there a single voice, or does the poem challenge the coherence of any one voice? Is the poem religious or nihilistic, or both? Lastly, does the poem function as the relief of the poet’s personal feelings or does it function more in terms of re-instating a lost tradition through allusions to high culture? I will take this last question as my reading of *The Waste Land*’s point of departure; by arguing that while allusions to high culture are certainly present (Eliot’s notes to the poem alone contain a myriad of references to other texts), the language of the poem works on another register — that of personal ‘feeling’ as it is revealed in ‘style’. That is to say, the language of *The Waste Land* is double; the poem *means* through its allusions yet reveals, through the style of the language, the ‘feeling’ of the poet. The language often bristles with the *jouissance* of its speaking subject. I will argue that the language of the poem moves from a ‘painful *jouissance*’, where the language is charged with the speaker’s fright and horror, to a pleasured language — a language that simultaneously suggests a process of catharsis and an embodiment and is evident in the poem’s final incantation of a ‘peace that passeth understanding’ (Eliot, 1954, p. 74).

**Meaning and Horror**

Firstly, I will show that a style charged with the speaker’s *jouissance* is in fact present in *The Waste Land*. Gish writes:
The Waste Land is Eliot's Hamlet. It is endlessly puzzling and endlessly fascinating; and by Eliot's own criterion it lacks an objective correlative. It is filled with a sense of horror and loathing which seems, on the face of it, out of proportion to the situation presented (1981, p. 47)

This is not of course to deny the objects of the poem, but to question a reading of 'meaning' qua allusion as the dominant mode of the poem's expression. Gish cites Moody in saying that 'it is a poem about a crisis or breakdown of European culture, and that it seriously evokes primitive fertility myths—such accounts, for so long found persuasive, now seem out of touch with the actual experience' (1981, p. 47). Gish adds that Moody predicts the next phase of criticism will concentrate more on the element of deep personal feeling (1981, p. 47). Gish admits that 'one cannot deny that at least one section is overtly concerned with what Eliot calls 'the present decay of eastern Europe' (1981, p. 47). She also admits that Jessie Weston's book on the Grail Legend From Ritual to Romance provides exactly what Eliot states it provides in his notes, 'the plan and a good deal of the incidental symbolism' (1954, p. 68). She writes that the plan gave a 'shape and a basis for cutting and selecting from the mass of original material' but that it is 'just that; it provides a motif, not the primary theme or mood of the poem (1981, p. 48, 49). What Gish is arguing then, is that although The Waste Land is structured through allusions to myth, the mythic content of the poem does not in and of itself account for 'the sense of horror and dread' (1981, p. 47). She therefore suggests a duality of the language of The Waste Land - that it functions on at least two levels - allusion and feeling. The first section of the poem, The Burial of the Dead, corresponds to this argument.

A central allusion of The Burial of the Dead is the hyacinth episode. This episode reads:
'You gave me hyacinths first a year ago;
They called me the hyacinth girl.'
--Yet when we came back, late, from the hyacinth garden,
Your arms full and your hair wet, I could not
Speak, and my eyes failed, I was neither
Living nor dead, and I knew nothing,
Looking into the heart of light, the silence.
Oed'und leer das Meer (I, lines 35-43)

The hyacinth episode possibly refers to The Ghost Sonata, a 1907 play by Johan August Strindberg, where the in the final scene the Student and Daughter meet in a room full of hyacinths. Jain quotes the student's words:

'Above all other flowers... I have loved hyacinths ever since I was a child. I have worshipped them, because they embody everything I lack. And yet...'. The student continues: 'Their perfume, strong and clean with the first zephyrs of spring, which have passed over melting, confuses my senses, deafens me, blinds me, drives me from my room, shoots me with poisoned arrows' (Jain, 1991, p. 156)

Hyacinths therefore allude to both an idealizing love, 'strong and clean' and a love that destroys and annihilates with 'poisoned arrows'. The allusion concludes at line 43 with a reference to Wagner's Tristan and Isolde, 'Oed' und leer das Meer'. Translating as 'Desolate and empty the sea', it directly refers to the last act where Tristan is dying and waiting for Isolde who cannot be seen across the water (Jain, 1991, p. 157). The allusion should properly refer to the transcendence of love after death, however this is in contrast with the other allusions of meaninglessness and the failure of love. A reading qua allusions would therefore seem to suggest a love that should promise transcendence - but instead only annihilates.

This reading of the central allusion of the first section, relying as it does on knowledge of these myths, is perhaps not immediately apparent. I argue there is a very similar reading, of a fear of annihilation, which restrains itself to the style of the first section.
The tone of lines 1-7 beginning 'April is the cruellest month' is somber, didactic. The first seven lines are comprised of two sentences, and each line break within a sentence occurs after the verb, highlighting the objects 'Lilacs', 'Memory', 'Winter' and 'Earth'. The effect is one of clarity, a somber didacticism; each new predicate of the subject 'April' is listed with an almost clinical precision. This is suddenly lifted, agitated, with 'Summer surprised us', whereby the speaker moves to Marie. By Lines 8-18, the language becomes more colloquial, 'My cousin's, he took me out on a sled, I and I was frightened' (I, lines 14, 15) and yet the style is that of an experience recalled with some anxiety, agitation - evident in the repetition of 'and', 'And when on in sunlight' (I, line 10), 'And drank coffee, / And talked for an hour' (I, line 11), an agitation only heightened by the repetition 'Marie, Marie' (I, lines 15-16). Line 19 marks the return of the unidentified speaker, and the tone is again somber, and this time accusatory; 'What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow / Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man, / You cannot say' (I, lines 19-21). An angry, interrogative tension builds, as the narrator seems to begin to answer his question, until line 30 where the line 'I will show you fear in a handful of dust', dashes hopes of revelation and provides only a sense of anti-climax, a pause in the text; it is as if the voice had been rising only to whisper this revelation that there is only fear. These changes of tone create an atmosphere of foreboding, the reader has moved from didacticism to anxiety to interrogation. This is only heightened by the German quotation of the section from Tristan and Isolde (Eliot, 1954, p. 68). For the reader that does not speak German these lines act as an expression of the fear of line 30; since the meaning is obscured the affective dimension of the language is increased whereby the italicized German becomes associated with the last previous phrase, 'fear in a handful of dust'. The italicized German then begins to function in the realm of the 'musical', as if a minor key has been introduced which captures the fall into fear. The speaker here changes again, to the hyacinth girl. The style changes from the somber
rhythm of lines 19-30 to a halting, fragmented style; 'Your arms full, and your hair wet, I could not / Speak, and my eyes failed, I was neither / Living nor dead, and I knew nothing' (1, lines 38-40). The line breaks literally break the rhythm of the speech so that it appears halting, always threatening to stop, to choke off and fade into silence. The silence, conveyed by line breaks and punctuation, does not merely mark a pause in the text. Any pause for breath after a choked out 'I was neither / Living nor dead' is likely to be pregnant with some sort of horror, the moment of pure feeling and absorption of the confession. The final line of this passage, 'Oed' und leer das Meer' (1, line 42), reiterates the affect previously associated with the italicized German; the hyacinth episode ends with a phrase charged with fear and foreboding.

I argue that the change of style in this section works initially to build a sense of tension through the somber, didactic speaker that then falls into either an anxiety-ridden chatter, builds again through interrogation and falls finally into a quiet, broken fear. Allusively, the section refers to annihilation through love, and an analysis of style reveals similar themes present in the language, however it is the language and changes in style that are responsible for the sense of fear present in the passage. The language here is therefore double; it both means allusively and affects through its music. This is given more weight with reference to Moody's suggestion that the hyacinth episode is a moment of pure experience from which the rest radiates; 'the mere experience at the beginning'; intense, immediate, purely subjective (1979, p. 81). There is however, nothing 'intense' or 'immediate' about a vague allusion to The Ghost Sonata, if this section is purely subjective, then this is more immediately evident in terms of the style and music of the language. While this section may allusively refer to annihilation through love, fear of that annihilation is conveyed through language's other register – that of sound, music – style.
Style also works to convey feeling over and above objectal allusions in *The Fire Sermon*, which Jain writes was preached by Buddha against the 'fires of passion, hatred and infatuation' (1991, p. 169). Eliot writes in his notes that the songs of the raped Thames daughters begin at line 266 and they speak in turn from lines 293 to 306 (Eliot, 1954, p. 71) and he refers the reader to the last act of Wagner's opera *Die Götterdammerung*, which features the Rhine-maidens who guard the magical gold which gets stolen to forge a ring of power. The Rhine-maidens warn the hero, Siegred, to return the ring to the river as it is cursed. He does not, so they call upon each other to 'leave him to his doom' (Jain, 1991, p. 178). This section ends with lines from St. Augustine's *Confessions*: 'O Lord Thou pluckest me out / burning' (Ill, lines 310, 311). Eliot states in his note that this effects a 'collocation of these two representatives of eastern and western asceticism, [which] as the culmination of this part of the poem, is not an accident (Eliot, 1954, p. 72). Jain writes that 'both Buddha and St. Augustine describe sensual temptation as a burning fire' (1991, p. 181) which must be transcended. So the major allusions of this section are concerned with the denial of the body and the sensual, evident in Eliot's transmutation of the Rhine-maidens into the raped and broken Thames daughters, and a hope for transcendence of that body.

However, I argue the style annihilates any hope of transcendence. By the songs of the Thames daughters (Ill, lines 266-307), syntax has collapsed; the voice is broken, fragmented; 'A gilded shell / Red and gold / The brisk swell' (III, lines 282, 283), and is punctuated with cries, 'Weialala, leia / Wallala leialala' (III, lines 290, 291). Language here is barely functioning in terms of meaning, much more in the realm of the stylistic effects of sound, of music. The fragmentation continues to 292 where London is compared to a raped woman, this time represented in direct speech; 'On Margate Sands. / I can connect / Nothing with nothing. / The broken fingernails of dirty hands. /
My people humble people who expect / Nothing." (III, lines 300-305). The brokenness of the lyric suggests rape, fragmentation and a bodily degradation. The cries function as pure sound, allusiveness has vanished and language is left attempting to mimic the body. So whereas allusively this section is concerned with a denial of the body and a wish for transcendence; the language that has been hacked to pieces in attempts to mimic the body, reveals a deeper horror of the body and its degradations. Style in this passage brings us directly to the 'feeling' of the speakers; there is no hope of transcendence of the sensual, the bodily, rather the language seems to be charged with a very bodily 'fear and loathing' of inescapable degradation.

So a certain fear and horror, as it is repeated through the stylistic register of language, is quite important in the first half of The Waste Land. Moody supports this when he writes:

To read the poem only as a critique of culture... it is to make out the mind of Europe perhaps, but to miss the poet's mind... We have the agony of the poet given us in the poem, at the heart of its matter and in all the process of its transmutation (1979, p. 79)

I agree - The Waste Land certainly seems to be an exceptionally personal poem. Eliot himself concurred that The Waste Land was a much more personal poem than its mass of allusions would seem to suggest. Miller cites various statements made by Eliot to support this reading:

Various critics have done me the honour to interpret the poem in terms of criticism of the contemporary world, have considered it, indeed, as an important bit of social criticism. To me it was only the relief of a personal and wholly insignificant grouse against life; it is just a piece of rhythmical grumbling (1977, p. 9)

Eliot's own view of The Waste Land would therefore seem to privilege a reading of the poem that focuses 'feeling' as it is present in the style and rhythm of the language. Also
evident in this quote is the cathartic function of language for Eliot; *The Waste Land* was a 'relief' of a 'personal grouse against life'. The cathartic aspect of his language will be taken up later. For now I would argue that since, in Eliot's own words, he 'wasn't even bothering whether he understood what he was saying' (Miller, 1977, p. 9) but 'getting something off his chest' (Miller, 1977, p. 9), that to examine the poem in terms of the style of the language rather than the sense, or meaning of the allusions would seem to be justified. Furthermore, as I have argued, the dominant 'feeling' in the first half of *The Waste Land* would seem to be fear, and a certain loathing. This constitutes a deviation from Eliot's 'objective correlative' whereby the poem would transmute the personal feeling of the poet into 'emotions' at the level of the signifier – which in this case would constitute the extensive use of allusion. This has been shown to not be the case, the meaning of the allusions is not in fact dominant, rather the 'feeling' of the poet is present in the style of the language. In lieu of an objective correlative, what is present here is Eliot's 'other' poetics, which I have argued comes to confront the male body of *jouissance*, with a resulting loss of a 'phallic subjectivity'. I'll now turn to examine the status of subjectivity in *The Waste Land*.

The (non)subject of *The Waste Land*

The most readily available method by which to examine the subject of *The Waste Land* is through the poem's speaker, Tiresias, who appears with the lines 'I Tiresias, though blind, throbbing between two lives, / Old man with wrinkled female breasts' (III, lines 218, 219). Eliot writes:

Tiresias, although a mere spectator and not indeed a 'character', is yet the most important personage of the poem, uniting all the rest. Just as the one-eyed merchant, seller of currants, melts into the Phoenician sailor, and the latter is not
Who then, is Tiresias? Kenner writes that all three stories about Tiresias are relevant (1959, p. 167). Tiresias, in *Oedipus Rex* knew why pestilence had fallen on the unreal city but declined to tell. In the *Odyssey* he 'walked among the lowest of the dead' and in the *Metamorphoses* he underwent a change of sex. These myths are all present with respect to Tiresias in *The Waste Land* (Kenner, 1959, p. 167). But I would hesitate to argue that knowledge of these myths is absolutely necessary to reading Tiresias's function within the poem. Eliot's note then refers the reader to a section from Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, which Jain writes 'emphasizes Tiresias's bisexuality' (1991, p. 174). She proceeds to explain Ovid's version of the legend of Tiresias, where he lived as both a man and a woman. Because of this he was called upon to settle a quarrel between Jove and his wife Juno as to whether a man or woman derives more pleasure from love-making. When Tiresias supported Jove's position that the woman enjoys the greater pleasure, Juno struck him blind. In compensation, Jove gave him long life and the gift of prophecy. In the myth, Tiresias was successively male and female. In *The Waste Land* he is specifically hermaphroditic (1991, p. 174). Eliot's Tiresias is then quite specific; he is not any one of the three principle myths in its entirety. He is hermaphroditic, 'I Tiresias, though blind, throbbing between two lives, / Old man with wrinkled female breasts' (III, lines 218, 219), which is different to any particular Tiresias myth; he is more of an amalgamation of all three Tiresias myths. This Tiresias is not simply an allusion; he is quite specifically Eliot's own.
I argue that it is possible, in support of Eliot's statements regarding Tiresias' function, to identify the representation of Tiresias with the subjectivity from which the poem springs. This is in direct opposition to Ellmann's reading of Tiresias. Ellmann writes:

Moreover, the speaker cannot be identified with his creator, not because he has a different personality, like Prufrock, but because he has no stable identity at all. The disembodied 'I' glides in and out of stolen texts, as if the speaking subject were merely the quotation of its antecedents. Indeed, this subject is the victim of a general collapse of boundaries (1987, p. 92).

It seems that Ellmann is arguing that Tiresias cannot be identified with Eliot because Tiresias has 'no stable identity', which seems to hinge around the fact the Tiresias is both hermaphroditic and, as the poem states, is 'throbbing between two lives' (III, line 218). For now, I will accept that Tiresias' subjectivity is in question, but I can see no justification from this fact to prevent identifying Tiresias with Eliot. Instead, I would suggest that a lack of subjectivity of the 'uniting personage' of the poem would suggest a lack of subjectivity inherent in the position from which Eliot writes. Moody agrees with this position. He writes:

At this late date it should not be necessary to labor the distinction between the poet in his extra-poetic life and personality, and the persona (or the several personae) created within his poetry. My concern is with the latter only, the poet-within-the-poem. There is no question that The Waste Land had its source in Eliot's own experiences and emotions. But what it presents us is what he has made out of them (1996, p. 116, 117)

The 'poet-within-the-poem' is useful for Eliot. It allows me to examine the author, and similarly examine the subjectivity of the speaking body, without attempting to pathologize Eliot, or insist that he is present in the text as some transcendental subject. I am not concerned with Eliot the man as much as I am concerned with what sort of subject, or the type of Eliot, that the language of The Waste Land suggests. And the most practical way of examining this is to take Eliot at his word when he positions Tiresias as a type of
narrator. If, as we shall examine later, Tiresias has suffered a general collapse of boundaries, there seems a good argument that *The Waste Land* is written from the position of the abject subject.

Ellmann has analyzed the presence of the abject and abjection in *The Waste Land*. Obviously there is a dissonance here, as it is Ellmann's comments on Eliot's 'disembodiment' that have been argued against so far. In support of this move, I would simply state that Ellmann's positioning of Eliot as 'disembodied' and a candidate of abjection forms a dissonance in her own text that is not fully resolved; it is this gap in Ellmann's argument and others like it that I attempt to more fully explicate.

Ellmann writes that we should first assume that *The Waste Land* is indeed about 'waste', in terms of culture's decadence and bodily decrepitude (1987, p. 92). The co-existence of these two types of 'waste', for Ellmann means that 'the filth without insinuates the defilement within' (1987, p. 92). There has then, been a collapse between the inside and outside of the body. In then, *The Waste Land* 'is one of the most abject texts in English literature' (Ellmann, 1987, p. 93), this is not only because it is concerned with abject things, with waste, but because it is also a text concerned with the process of abjection, the inability of the subject to maintain the borders between the clean and proper self and the excluded abject.

This problem of a loss of bodily integrity is particularly evident in the poem’s narrator, Tiresias. Ellmann writes; 'Tiresias could be seen as the very prophet of abjection, personifying all the poem's porous membranes' (1987, p. 97). Kenner concurs; 'Tiresias
is he who has lost the sense of other people as inviolably other, and who is capable neither of pity nor terror but only of a fascination' (1959, p. 168). So Tiresias is a figure for whom the Other has lost its sense of otherness, which therefore makes him a good candidate for abjection. He is an 'abject subject' in the proper sense of the term; he has lost his subjectivity, his clean and proper self, which is evident by his 'fascination' of the abject contents of the poem and his inability to exclude them.

The Maternal

If Tiresias is an abject subject, I argue he should properly be thought of as a male subject infused and entwined with aspects of the maternal. If Tiresias is the 'subject' of the poem, the closest thing we have to Eliot's speaking voice, it becomes evident that Eliot's project of attempting to work particular feeling into language, with the inevitable confrontation with the void of abjected *jouissance*, also confronts the place of the maternal. Tiresias acts as the very figure of the abjected male body of *jouissance* that has taken on aspects of the maternal; his appearance, an 'old man with wrinkled female breasts' certainly invokes the male subject with attributes of the mother. The representation of Tiresias' very appearance makes him a candidate of abjection.

Jay proposes a psychoanalytic interpretation of *The Waste Land*’s concern with the maternal. Jay identifies a feared maternal ‘reunion’ in the figures of drowned man; 'it is Belladonna...who guides *The Waste Land*’s seamen. She leads them, like Whitman's "Dark Mother," the ocean, to a death both feared and desired' (1983, p. 176). It constitutes 'a return home to identity with the Eternal Feminine' (1983, p. 178). But as Phlebas demonstrates, this also means death. There is a profound concern in *The Waste Land* of the figure of the mother and death; it is also evident in the representation
of Lil’s abortion, ‘It’s them pills I took, to bring it off, she said. / (She’s had five already, and nearly died of young George)’ (II, lines 159, 160). The maternal body here is associated strongly with death, a horrible corporeality, and as Phlebas demonstrates, there is an accompanying fear of union with that body. Jay also posts a split between the abject and the sublime mother, ‘her division into fair and dark ladies’ (1983, p. 186). He writes; ‘Woman is divided between Aphrodite, Venus, the Muse of creation, and the hyacinth girl, on the one hand, and on the other, Persephone, Belladonna, and the lady of mortal situations’ (1983, p. 186). Apparent here is the obligation of negotiation with the maternal body; it is something that must be dealt with and is partially resolved through this ‘splitting’. The important point is that the fear of the maternal body is a recurrent theme at the level of allusion; it is the maternal body that constitutes the poem’s ‘dark lady’.

Fear of the maternal body is also carried within the language itself. Moody characterizes the fear expressed throughout Eliot’s poetry thus: ‘it is primarily and principally a fear of women’ (1996, p. 184). Much of his poetry enacts an attempt at detachment from feminine suffering:

He sets himself apart from his partner whose nerves are bad by saying nothing while thinking (with a troubling relish), ‘I think we are in rats alley / Where the dead men lost their bones’. He can declare the typist’s City ‘Unreal’; and he can gloss the Thames-daughters’ song (1996, p. 185)

Evident in this quote is the extent to which the language of the poem itself demonstrates a fear of women and semantically enacts a separation. The nervous partner’s incessant questioning, ‘What are you thinking of? What thinking? What? / I never know what you are thinking. Think’ (II, lines 113, 114) ends abruptly with the morbid ‘I think we are in rats’ alley / Where the dead men lost their bones’ (II, lines 115, 116). The change of
style here, from ‘hysterical’ to morbid enacts a semantic separation, which in itself suggests a fear of collapse. The ‘gloss’ on the Thames-daughter’s song also suggests a sublimation of fear of the feminine into language, ‘I can connect / Nothing with nothing. / The broken fingernails of dirty hands’ (III, lines 301-303) switches abruptly to the section containing the speaker’s plea ‘O Lord Thou pluckest me out’ (III, line 309). The Thames-daughter’s song is ‘glossed’ with a horror of bodily degradation, which involves the speaker taking on that voice of feminine suffering. Then, through a textual separation, the voice moves back to the unidentified speaker with a prayer for release. Again there is a separation at the level of semantics, a separation that begins to charge that language with a fear of collapse into the feminine. Lines 359-367, which in his notes Eliot states refer to a phenomena during an Antarctic expedition where the explorers shared a delusion of ‘one more member’ of their party than could actually be counted (Eliot, 1954, p. 73), are especially evocative of this disturbance of identity, and bring it into association with the maternal. Eliot writes:

Who is the third who always walks beside you?
When I count, there are only you and I together
But when I look ahead up the white road
There is always another one walking beside you
Gilding wrapt in a brown mantle, hooded
I do not know whether a man or a woman
--But who is that on the other side of you?

What is that sound high in the air
Murmur of maternal lamentation (V, lines 359-365)

In these lines, the disturbance and question of identity, the sense of their being a leftover of identity, unidentifiable, veiled and genderless, is followed by ‘murmur’ of the maternal, ‘high in the air’ as if belonging to this mysterious ‘extra’. The text seems to semantically connect a leftover of identity with aspects of the maternal. Crucially though, is again the sense of fear that accompanies it. The insistent questioning, ‘Who is that
third', 'But who is that' and 'What is that sound' convey a fearful hesitation, if not a paranoia. Once again a certain fearful jouissance is released into language, this time emerging along with the place of the maternal.

It seems then that for Eliot, the decision to acknowledge a male body of jouissance, which has been the thrust of poetics thus far, results in a confrontation with the place of the maternal that undoes the possibility of a discreet and singular subjectivity. Tiresias exemplifies this, as does the poem's 'dark mothers' and fear of women. The stylistic effects of the language surrounding the feminine and the maternal are those of fear, horror and a longing for separation. If male subjectivity proper rests upon a disavowal of the body of jouissance, and instead finds its jouissance in objects, recognition of that troublesome body, and the subsequent recognition of its inhabitation of the place of the maternal, prevents male subjectivity's successful establishment. This situates the body of jouissance as an abject thing that must be excluded – again along with the maternal – an exclusion that I will argue takes place within a cathartic language of abjection.

**Excluding the abject - catharsis**

Eliot himself seems to favour a view of language as cathartic when he writes in *On Poetry and Poets*:

[the poet] is not concerned whether anyone else will listen to [his words] or not, or whether anybody else will ever understand them if he does [find the right words]. He is oppressed by a burden which he must bring to birth in order to obtain relief. Or, to change the figure of speech, he is haunted by a demon, a demon against which he feels powerless...he is going to all that trouble, not in order to communicate with anyone, but to gain relief from acute discomfort...then he can say to the poem: 'Go away! Find a place for yourself in a book - and don't expect me to take any further interest in you.' (1952, p. 98).
The content of feeling for Eliot is a burden, a demon that oppresses, against which he feels powerless and must obtain relief. Like abjected contents, this demon frightens and haunts - subjectivity becomes powerless, undone. Like the abjected contents that must be cathartically sublimated, this demon is a burden from which the subject must be relieved, preferably in writing, in a book. Why writing? Because as The Waste Land demonstrates, language has a register that can become charged with the subject's jouissance, can carry it, relieve it. For Eliot then, language and writing become a way of cathartically sublimating abjected contents into a stylistic register of language.

I would like here to look at some specific examples where a process of catharsis can be located, firstly from A Game of Chess. In terms of allusion, the first part of the section emphasizes the artificiality of human relations. This is more pronounced with the many allusions to the 'false' signifiers of love. Jain writes that the first twenty lines of this passage invoke the literary tradition of fatal romantic passion. 'Burnished throne' refers to Shakespeare's Anthony and Cleopatra; 'a golden Cupidon' refers to a gold sculpture of Cupid; 'a sylvan scene' refers to Milton's Paradise Lost where Satan first arrives at the borders of the Garden of Eden (Jain, 1991, p. 165). The following part, lines 111-138, consist of what Weinblatt has called a hysterical woman (1984, p. 120) and Ellmann has called neurotic (1987, p. 98); exhorting her companion to speak and to think, while he can only think to himself 'I think \( \ldots \) are in rats' alley / Where the dead men lost their bones.' and 'I remember / Those are pearls that were his eyes' (II, lines 115-16, 125-27). The meaning then that we could glean from the allusions of this passage would consist of again, a sort of sterility and falseness of human relations.

The style reveals a more complex reading. Jain writes of lines such as 'reflecting light upon the table as / The glitter of her jewels rose to meet it, / from satin cases poured in
rich profusion’ (II, lines 83-85), ‘the artificial, stilted, cloying style and diction satirize the sensibility and mode of expression of this tradition’ (1991, p. 164, 165). The style does more than this however; filled with detail of artificial love, densely written and monotonous; the reader quite literally drowns in the excessive detail until no clear image of the room is possible. Line 87, ‘Unstoppered, lurked her strange synthetic perfumes, / Unguent, powdered, or liquid—troubled, confused / and drowned the sense in odours’ (II, lines 87-89), states this fear of being ‘drowned’ in the signifiers of love and simultaneously associates these figures with the feminine. The speaker drowns in the feminine – escape is impossible. The final line of this first part, where the woman’s hair ‘Glowed into words, then would be savagely still’ (II, line 110), shows the extent of this drowning. The final words ‘savagely still’, taken for their own effects, imply both a malignancy and an inability to escape. It is here that the ‘hysterical’ woman’s voice appears. The colloquial ‘My nerves are bad to-night. Yes, bad. Stay with me’ provides a point of relief for the speaker and the reader both; both are lifted from the crowded, pungent room into the clarity of direct speech. It is as if the speaker ‘come to the surface’ after nearly drowning. Moody writes of this ‘hysterical’ voice after the denseness of A Game of Chess, ‘the only relieving feeling is the woman’s hysteria (1996, p. 121). I concur. The tension that has been built up through the dense passage preceding it, along with the fear of dissolution and nothingness it invokes, is relieved here with ‘My nerves are bad to-night. Yes, bad. Stay with me. / Speak to me. Why do you never speak. Speak’ (II, lines 111, 112). Eliot, as speaker, after drowning in the odours and falseness of the woman, gains relief through a semantic repetition of her. This sudden change of voice, its clarity and single-mindedness – ‘What are you thinking of? What thinking? What? / I never know what you are thinking’ (II, lines 113, 114), provides the vehicle that provides this relief. For Kristeva, this episode would reflect the abjection of self, the drowning within the feminine, and the subsequent cathartic act of
repeating this over-powering feminine. I argue here that the relief that the 'hysterical' female voice provides in the text for the reader is also evidence that the repetition of her voice has a cathartic function. Moody writes of music in The Waste Land: 'The poetry has developed to a state beyond conscious control, and is a direct expression of the poet's being shaping itself in the music of words' (1979, p. 101). If the poet's 'being' is shaping itself in the text, there is now a sense of a being for whom the text is providing some relief after 'drowning' in the feminine. There is, in these lines, a sense of a cathartic separation.

Tiresias also has a cathartic function. Eliot says in the notes that Tiresias sees the substance of the poem (1954, p. 70), and likewise in the poem he sees the sexual encounter between the typist and the 'young man carbuncular'. This section certainly takes a dim, patronizing view of women, the 'young man carbuncular' makes 'a welcome of [her] indifferenceto his caresses, and the final lines of this passage sum up her actions with 'When lovely woman stoops to folly' (III, line 253). Also interesting however is the near perfect rhyme of the passage, a style that makes it difficult to invest much emotion in either characters on first reading; neither character is particularly 'real'. What exactly does Tiresias see? I would insist on his blindness; Tiresias sees nothing at all, he can only foretell, and I maintain that this prophecy of Tiresias' is unremarkable to say the least. Line 228-29 read; 'I Tiresias, old man with wrinkled dugs / Perceived the scene, and foretold the rest' (III, lines 228-229). If Tiresias has seen this scene, it was long ago, before the blindness. This scene, as should be obvious, is not seen by Tiresias, what we hear is a repetition of previous seduction scenes that Tiresias assumes to be the same as the one present. This scene, as told by Tiresias, is entirely unreliable, and is meant to be. With this established, the typist passage becomes a repetition of lovemaking that renders it sterile, degrading and unremarkable through the
contrived rhyme. What can be trusted from this passage is that Tiresias is an indeterminate character that repeats for us a story of bland seduction. As Brooker and Bentley comment, 'What Tiresias sees...is not reported in detail, but what he feels about his own body is substituted for the bodies before him' (1990, p. 142). What this means is that while Tiresias presents us with images of degradation, blind as he is, these stories are of his own body. The images become a repetition of the horror surrounding Tiresias' own impossible, hermaphroditic body – blind as he is he can know nothing else in certainty. We can therefore classify the subject of The Waste Land as in horror of his own bodiliness and connection to the maternal, in horror of his lack of subjectivity, whereby his language becomes a repetition of this horror and painful jouissance – a repetition from the place of the maternal in an attempt to cathartically sublimate and exclude those things that frighten.

The beginning of embodiment

The relation to language in The Waste Land, then, is an abject relation, where language functions as the vehicle of a cathartic sublimation of the (non)subject's fright and jouissance. I have established that this relation can be thought of as more embodied than a phallic relation whereby the signifier, from the body of the woman to the network of signifiers, is made to signify the subject's jouissance - whereby it is experienced as fundamentally not his own. An abject, cathartic relation causes language, as a vehicle of sublimation, not disavowal, becomes 'charged' with the jouissance of the (non)subject. There is however, a development of this embodiment in the poem that I would like to examine via a metaphor shared by Eliot and Kristeva: thunder.
What the Thunder Said represents the section of the poem that functions most nearly in terms of music and the stylistic register of language. It begins with an allusion to the crucifixion; ‘After the torchlight red on sweaty faces / After the frosty silence in the gardens / After the agony in stony places / The shouting and the crying’ (V, lines 322–325). The easy, relaxed rhyme, the quaintness of ‘torchlight red’ marks the beginning of a style that is even more in contrast with the meaning of the allusion; the horror of the crucifixion forms a disjunction with a style that seems to take pleasure in its own effects.

Moody writes of the section directly after the crucifixion:

the culmination of the poem’s struggle for releasing expression in the ‘water-dripping song’ (lines 331–58). The most remarkable feature of this passage is its direct lyric voice – the voice of immediate experience. This is quite new in the poem (1996, p. 126)

The ‘voice of immediate experience’ implies that ‘particular feeling’ is beginning to be worked into language, while the beginning of a tangibly pleased language suggests that the fear and loathing of the first half of the poem has been ‘released’. It seems a catharsis is indeed taking place. The sound of this passage, the quiet, incantatory repetitions connote a peace, or at least an absence of fear that has been absent thus far. The passage reads:

Here is no water but only rock  
Rock and no water and the sandy road  
The road winding above among the mountains  
Which are mountains of rock without water  
If there were water we should stop and drink  
Amongst the rock one cannot stop or think (V, lines 331–336)

The complete absence of punctuation, the repetitions ‘If there were water / And no rock / If there were rock / And also water / And water / A spring / A pool among the rock’ (V, lines 345–351) that do not create tension as does ‘Marie, Marie’ but soothe as an incantation would, work to create a music that suggests, if not a stable self, a self
more at peace than previously in the poem. As Moody writes, 'its coolly detached tone and resolved music, confirms the conquest of the earlier negative states of fear, terror and revulsion' (1996, p. 125). This ‘resolution’ can be heard in part in the deliberateness of rhymes such as 'If there were water we should stop and drink / Amongst the rock one cannot stop or think' (V, lines 335,336) and 'Dead mountain mouth of carious teeth that cannot spit / Here one can neither stand nor lie nor sit' (V, lines, 339, 340). The resolution is heard through the style, the sound - as Jay writes, ‘there is certainly a liquidity in the verse that belies this statement of sterility' (1983, p. 183), to which I would add there is a pleasure in the sound of the easy, sporadic rhyme that belies the statement of horror, 'carious teeth that cannot spit', that these lines contain. It is as if the sublimation of the abjected jouissance of the subject into language is becoming more charged with pleasure. While the terrain is still barren, still a wasteland of sorts, the desolation does not seem to quite pierce the subject in these lines. There is then, the beginning of a sense of resolution.

Directly after this section is the Antarctic expedition reference that begins ‘Who is the third who walks always beside you?’ (V, line 359). As has already been argued, the extra figure in this section can be read as evocative of the male body of jouissance with its connotations of the maternal. I would note that recognition of this body occurs after the ‘water-dripping’ song, where a sense of resolution, stability and pleasure has been present for the first time. The clarity with which the problem of identity is addressed in these lines emerges for the first time after the water-dripping song; the abjected male body of jouissance has been sublimated into language through style. The tone in this section changes to a more coherent questioning, quite different to the ‘hysterical’ woman’s questioning from A Game of Chess, and the effect is, from this change of style, a certain recognition that this ‘extra’ figure is crucial to the sense of horror and loathing.
previously expressed – a pleased sublimation of the abjected maternal and male body of *jouissance* into language. There is a sense of resolution with the place of the maternal, which with reference to Kristeva could be explained by the cathartic aspects of the *water-dripping song* - as if enough fear and horror had been excluded to language to allow some differentiation. And there is some resolution, for the figure of the 'dark mother' has haunted the *edges* of the poem so far is soon to make her first *direct* appearance. Line 368, after the section of 'maternal lamentation' reads:

A woman drew her long black hair out tight  
And fiddled whisper music on those strings  
And bats with baby faces in the violet light  
Whistled, and beat their wings  
And crawled head downward down a blackened wall (V, lines 368-372)

Line 390 then reads 'Dry bones can harm no one'. The direct appearance of this 'dark mother' in itself implies a cathartic process; her representation depends on some differentiation and exclusion of abject contents. Moody writes; 'for the space of the song he has found his own voice and inward self' (1996, p. 128). He expands on this by stating that the rest of the *water-dripping song* is a type of return, of wholeness culminating in the line 'Dry bones can hurt no one' (1996, p. 128). I would agree with Moody here. The 'murmur of maternal lamentation high in the air' has been replaced with a directly represented woman who draws 'her long black hair out tight' who 'whisper music on those strings' and is accompanied by 'bats with baby faces' crawling down walls and falling towers: all the trimmings of a Boschian nightmare; this woman is certainly in the realm of the 'dark mother'. However, the tone of the lines where the dark mother is introduced is calm; there is a gentle rhyme in these four lines that forms a counterpart to the nightmarish images; while the image is hellish, the poetry is structured and controlled. There is also a 'softening' of the syntax. The assonance of the long *i* in
the words 'violet light', and the breath that comes with their speaking both slows the reader and makes it difficult to read them as particularly nightmarish. So while the imagery suggests that the maternal is still a problem to be dealt with, it seems that in terms of the language the mother has been excluded, and sublimated to an extent into a language of gentle rhythm and evocative, pleasured syntax. What is evident here is that the problem of abjection, the impossibility of a coherent identity when the void of jouissance and the abjected maternal is confronted, is resolved through the cathartic aspects of language's 'other' register of style, music. While stability is impossible between a male body of jouissance and the maternal in terms of meaning, language's other register of style where meaning is forgotten can cohere these two terms into a stability that I would call an 'abject embodiment'.

An abject embodiment

To say then that the male body of jouissance is excluded and sublimated into the language of The Waste Land allows a location of a type of positive embodiment possible for the male subject, an embodiment that involves a confrontation with the realm of the maternal. Kristeva writes in a section of Powers of Horror entitled Time: Forgetfulness and Thunder. During the process of abjection:

The clean and proper...becomes filthy, the sought-after turns into the banished, fascination into shame. Then, forgotten time crops up suddenly and condenses into a flash of lightning an operation that, if it were thought out, would involve bringing together the two opposite terms but, on account of that flash, is discharged like thunder. The time of abjection is double: a time of oblivion and thunder, of veiled infinity and the moment when revelation bursts forth (1982, p. 8, 9)
The loss of subjectivity in abjection therefore also suggests a radical loss of temporality. During abjection, time is forgotten, since the subject has dissolved, temporality is lost. When forgotten time 'crops up', like lightning, there would be, if the abject contents could be 'thought' logically, a bringing together of the clean and the filthy, the self and the abject that would constitute a type of 'wholeness'. The metaphor 'lightning' works to highlight the extent to which temporality hits the abject subject; it is a flash because the abject subject cannot really think these things through, they 'blind' him mentally, so to speak. So the embodiment that temporality affords is like 'thunder', a type of bodily rumbling, an embodiment that is not 'thought out' and logical, but more of a bodily 'revelation'. If the phallic domain requires a tangible signifier to take the burden of its *jouissance*, 'blindness', in that it suggests a lack of access to visible signifiers, seems to negate the possibility of a phallic subjectivity. For the abject subject, the cropping up of time, lightning, is resolved through thunder, a bodily rumbling, which would take place at the very heart of abjection – between the male body of *jouissance* and the place of the maternal that constitutes the very deadlock of abjection. What sort of subject are you when listening to thunder? You are not thinking, merely experiencing. The metaphors of lightning and thunder help to explain the impossibility of this embodiment, a moment of stability without a proper subjectivity – the impossible becomes possible because it is not 'thought out'.

*What the Thunder Said* begins with an abject subject suffering a loss of temporality. The description of the water-dripping song is entirely spatial with almost no temporal verbs or adjectives to mark time. Weinblatt writes of a 'missing present' in *The Waste Land*, which signals a 'shattered identity' (1984, p. 107). He proceeds to state; 'throughout Eliot’s oeuvre, the adverb *here* almost always signals this dilemma of a missing present' (1984, p. 107). This is evident in these lines:
Here is no water but only rock
Rock and no water and the sandy road
The road winding above among the mountains
Which are mountains of rock without water (V, lines 331-334).

The beginning of *What the Thunder Said* therefore still refers to a (non) subject, an abject subject suffering the loss of temporality. I would argue that the last section of *The Waste Land* seems to offer the reader a change in subjectivity, a type of abject embodiment described by Kristeva above — as forgotten time crops up with the thunder’s voice.

Allusively, the section refers to the Fable of the Thunder in the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* v, 2. Jain writes:

> The threefold offspring of the creator Prajapati, gods, men and demons, approach Prajapati for instruction after completing their formal education. To each group he utters the syllable 'da'. Each group interprets this reply differently. The gods interpret it as 'damyata' ('control yourselves'). The men interpret it as 'datta' ('give'). The demons interpret it as 'dayadhvam' ('be compassionate'). When the groups, in turn, give their interpretations, Prajapati responds with 'Om' signifying that they have fully understood. The parable concludes: 'This very thing the heavenly voice of Thunder repeats, da, da, da, that is, control yourselves, give, be compassionate' (1991, p. 189)

Eliot’s first repetition of this myth reads, ‘Then spoke the thunder / DA / Datta: what have we given / My friend, blood shaking my heart / The awful daring of a moment’s surrender’ (V, lines 399-402). Remembering that the men interpret ‘Da’ as ‘datta’, which means ‘to give’, I would like to note that to ‘surrender’ to the subject’s own blood-shaken heart is not to ‘give’, strictly speaking. Again, reading at the level of allusion is problematic, as there is a collocation of giving and surrendering which stems from a pure sound in English, the syllable ‘DA*. What are foregrounded here are both the purely stylistic effects of language and of a surrendering to the ‘blood shaking my heart’, which can be seen in association to surrender to the male body of jouissance. The language
change from the 'missing present' of 'here' to the language of datta, seems to give rise to a more embodied position than has been present previously. Whether or not 'my friend' is meant to interpolate the reader, most readers would respond at least in part as if it were. Such a direct address seems to suggest a more stable position for the (non)subject, and a direct intrusion of a shared time that has been absent in the poem thus far. Eliot writes quite clearly that the moment of surrender 'Which an age of prudence can never retract / By this, and this only, we have existed' (V, lines 404, 405). Surrender, and the embodiment through language it can afford, is therefore necessary -- only through this surrender have we 'existed'. There is a type of embodiment, one that is not strictly known, or spelled out, but is nevertheless present in the language which suggests more clarity of self than previously. The following section reads:

DA
Dayadhvam: I have heard the key
Turn in the door once and turn once only
We think of the key, each in his prison
Thinking of the key, each confirms a prison
Only at nightfall, aethereal rumours
Revive for a moment a broken Coriolanus (V, lines 410-416)

Dayadhvam, 'be compassionate', is negated here somewhat, there is little opportunity for compassion with each 'in his prison'. Again the voice of the thunder seems to allow a realization of the problem of compassion when the self is isolated in a fixed subjectivity. There is a sense that compassion is not possible without the surrender of the previous passage, the surrender of the 'prison' of subjectivity, which constitutes a self-reflexivity in the text that has been rare, if not absent thus far. The thunder speaks again:

DA
Damyata: The boat responded
Gaily, to the hand expert with sail and oar
The sea was calm, your heart would have responded
Gaily, when invited, beating obedient
To controlling hands (V, lines 417-422)

_Damyata_, which means 'control yourselves' is, I think, negated. There is a sense of irony, or pessimism, in the lines 'your heart would have responded / Gaily, when invited, beating obedient / To controlling hands' (V, lines 420-422) when read against the surrender of the first thunderous syllable. The speaker here has actually lost control by inviting the other, has surrendered, and the controlling hands I think take on a more bodily, sexual connotation which is quite opposite to the idea of self-control evident in the allusions. Again, the thunder has allowed this realization. All of these realizations, these revelations, which suggest a much greater security of the speaker, seem to also imply something more stable than the abject subject, the (non)subject. They seem to represent a type of embodiment; a self-realization that is bodily, felt like one would feel thunder. They also suggest a re-emergence of time into the (non)time of abjection. So the voice of the thunder seems to correspond to a more self-aware, embodied position, a development in embodiment. The maternal and the male body of _jouissance_, as I have argued, have been sublimated into language's register of style, whereby there is both a differentiation in that they are represented discreetly, and a bringing together, in that are both existing within the stylistic register of language that through its increasing self-awareness and evident pleasure suggests a more secure speaker.

The last lines of the poem exemplify the type of embodiment that has been achieved through the cathartic use of fragments of other texts. Eliot writes:

_I sat upon the shore_
_Fishing, with arid plain behind me_
_Shall I at least set my lands in order?_
_London Bridge is falling down falling down falling down_
_Poi s'ascose nel foco che gli affina_
_Qualdo flam uti chelidon—O swallow swallow_
Here we have the final instance of an abject embodiment, given to us through mere repetitions present through a highly concentrated mass of disparate allusion. Rather than reiterate the exact particular references\textsuperscript{xxx}, I would note that the rapidity with which they come prevents any clear reading at the level of meaning. In addition, I would point to the inclusion of the nursery rhyme, 'London Bridge is falling down falling down falling down' and the mindless, singsong enjoyment it creates. The inclusion of this line affects the reading of the others; they become repetitions of texts that are repeated for the pleasure of their saying – words that are charged with the jouissance of the speaker. If the language of the first half of the poem contained the sublimated fright and horror of the subject, these lines contain the sublimated pleasure. The subject is not then in horror at his own lack of being, however nor is there a phallic subjectivity present, where these signifiers would constitute stable objects. The state of subjectivity here is an abject embodiment, a security of self afforded through the act of sublimating abject contents to language.

Line 431 - 'Why then lle fit you. Hieronymo's mad againe' - in particular suggests an embodiment. It refers to Kyd's \textit{The Spanish Tragedy}, where Hieronymo, grieving for his murdered son, is asked to provide court entertainment. He responds, 'Why then lle fit you'; which means he will write something suitable and punish the murderers (Jain, 1991, p. 194). Hieronymo's language therefore is double; it is both a meaningful answer for others and a sublimation of his grief. This constitutes an awareness of the duality of \textit{The Waste Land}'s language, that it both means and repeats the jouissance of the non-
subject. Line 430; 'These fragments I have shored against my ruins' also comments on the poem's own use of language. As far as my research has been able to discover, this line does not allude to any particular text. Instead, I would argue that it refers to Eliot's use of allusion throughout the poem. The implication is that the allusions have, throughout the poem, been subservient to a personal function. They have been employed to shore up the ruins of identity that constitutes abjection, a cathartic repetition whereby abjected jouissance and the maternal can be excluded and sublimated. It is the self-awareness of this statement that leads me to argue that an embodiment of sorts has indeed been achieved; this is much less a mindless repetition of fright than previously and much more a reflection on the process of catharsis that the poem has enacted.

This embodiment is recognized most coherently in the final lines of the poem, 'shantih shantih shantih' which translates loosely as 'Peace which Passeth understanding' (Eliot, 1954, p. 74). I would disagree with writers (Moody, 1996, p. 129; Jain 1991, p. 195) who have argued that the final lines should not be read as if this peace has been achieved. It is precisely a peace beyond understanding that has been achieved, an embodiment which involves a resolution of the male body of jouissance and the place of the abjected maternal. It is an identity that is impossible logically; there is no type of subjectivity that could encompass both a male subject and the maternal. If there were, the problem of abjection would not have arisen. I hesitate to call the resolution of the poem a subjectivity at all; an embodiment is a preferable term in that it refers to a particular moment that has occurred after a period of catharsis. It is the movement toward this embodiment that The Waste Land enacts; as has been shown, the sublimated jouissance, evident in style, moves from a horror and loathing to a more acknowledged, pleasured repetition of an embodied moment. This abject embodiment, achieved
through an abject, cathartic language is best described in Eliot's own terms, as a peace that passeth understanding. It is an embodiment that cannot be thought out, it is beyond the realms of logic and the symbolic, but is possible in the act of writing since the words both mean and repeat *jouissance* in their music; the style of language is always an accompaniment to its logic through which modes of being are possible that logic will not admit.
This thesis originated in a desire to articulate a concept of a male body of jouissance, of which Eliot was to provide the antithesis; his 'doctrine of impersonality' was to function as an example of the way in which the phallic male subject excludes jouissance from his subjectivity. The most surprising result of my research into the relation of the phallic male subject to the body of jouissance was the extent to which Eliot's theories corresponded to it – with the result that much of the section on the 'objective correlative' had to be rethought and reworked. Particularly with respect to Eliot's focus on deep, personal feeling and experience, I believe that the model of a male body of jouissance allows the theoretical articulation of important aspects of Eliot's poetry. Also, the extent to which this model has articulated these aspects, I think, establishes the usefulness of an articulation of the male body of jouissance in contrast to the penis / phallus model of male subjectivity.

I can best articulate another unexpected result via a quote from Jane Gallop. She writes in The Body Politic that 'heterosexual feminists may experience their sexuality as a disturbing contradiction to their political stance' and proceeds to cite an example of a talk given by feminist critic Elaine Marks, who admitted that she did not know how to reconcile her love for reading Proust with her position as a feminist (1988, p. 108). I find that my position as gay white male writer led me to a similar problem with Eliot. There seemed a hypocritical gap between my love of reading him and my resentment at his misogyny and homophobia. The model of the male body of jouissance allowed me to articulate my love for a particular aspect of his writing, the extent to which he developed strategies with which to overcome the phallic position, and his use of writing in quite non-phallic ways. It seems useful, and more accurate, to be able to articulate the attributes
of an anti-phallic writer without necessarily having to claim them as a writer of feminist texts. In this way, the purity of both strategies is retained while their difference is foregrounded.

Not that Eliot would have characterized himself as an 'anti-phallic' writer. The nostalgia present in his criticism for the stability of the copula, the phallic function, whereby language is always already invested with his jouissance where he can unproblematically experience it, is palpable. Eliot most definitely yearns for the stability of language before the dissociation of sensibility. But, in its absence, and with it the absence of the function to protect him from the void of jouissance, his horror of the maternal, he devises a poetics of abjection and catharsis as a substitute. A poetics whereby language's 'pleasurable accessories' become the ground where jouissance can be experienced and then excluded through style, and music; a language of painful jouissance, of horror, loathing and fear – that can also afford a pleasure, security. Perhaps, just perhaps, we find the beginning of a model of an ethical relation of a male subject to the maternal – in that within the stylistic register of language an embodiment of the male subject and the maternal is possible. There is then, the opportunity to recognize that which has been abjected from the symbolic. In any case, Eliot's poetics provides a model of the male subject's relation to language in which jouissance is mode of meaning, where the reader is invited to share in the world of the pain and delight of the phallic male body, after it has been sublimated into the music, rhythm and style of abjective catharsis. It is this realm of language that allows an embodiment for the male subject, impossible to refer to within the register of language that means, but possible through the act of writing to exclude; an embodiment within an abject writing that situates itself beyond the realm of the possible.
See Maud Ellmann's *The Poetics of Impersonality*, p. 7 for a discussion of Eliot's 'disembodiment'.

For a fuller discussion of Kristeva's work in bringing the body to language, see Kelly Oliver, *Reading Kristeva*, p. 5.

This argument is most clearly explicated in Lawrence Schehr's *Parts of an Andrology*, p. 4-11; Susan Bordo, *The Male Body: A New Look at Men in Public and Private*, p. 84-94; Arthur Brittan, *Masculinity and Power*, p. 46-57; and Jane Gallop, *Thinking Through the Body*, p. 124-132. All four writers simultaneously recognize the difference and conflation of the penis and the phallus, and yet continue to attempt to rehabilitate the penis.


One of the great advantages of the terms 'void' and 'signifier' is that they meaningfully describe the subject's relation to language, yet they can be employed without reference to the more regressive movements of psychoanalytic discourse; they are meaningful without reference to more suspect and arguable psychoanalytic concepts such as castration and the Oedipal drama.

For further discussion of desire moving the subject through the signifying chain see Lacan *The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud*, p. 154-155.

For Freud's discussion of the fort-idea, see *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works*, XVIII, p. 16.

For the sake of clarity, I have excluded the problematic of translation with regard to the word *jouissance*. For a good discussion of this problem, see Jane Gallop, *Thinking Through the Body*, p. 119-124.


See also Lacan's *The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis*, p. 106. Lacan references Eliot's allusion to the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* v. 2 and the three lessons, *Damyata, Datta and Dayadhvam*, in his explanation of the power of the signifier.


The term 'doomed' here should be taken as Lacan's idea of what it means to be female, not as a view authorized by this text.

See Lacan, and his explanation of the sexual relation as a 'comedy' in *The signification of the phallus*, p. 289, 290.

I would like to note at this point that this leaves the entire question of the female subject's *jouissance* open; as she is in the position of 'embodying' *jouissance*, does she also embody her own? Feminine *jouissance* is Lacan's entire concern throughout *God and the Jouissance of The Woman*. Here he states that she has a 'supplementary jouissance', 'a *jouissance* beyond the phallus' (p. 145). I refer the reader to this argument for a more detailed, albeit arguable, explication of feminine *jouissance* 'beyond the phallus'.

For a further discussion of the incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier see Lacan, *The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis*, p. 154.

Lacan explicates his theory of the 'mirror stage' in *The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience*, p. 1-7.


Eliot's comparison of Andrewes and Donne is another example. Eliot writes that whereas Donne is 'constantly finding an object which shall be adequate to his feelings' (1932, p. 351), Andrewes is wholly absorbed in the object and therefore responds with the adequate emotion' (1932, p. 351). Therefore, Andrewes' prose demonstrates the phallic manoeuvre by assuming that the object contains the emotion; whereby the phallic manoeuvre has already happened. Donne, on the other hand, writes prior to this movement. His 'feelings' are the main focus, the *jouissance* is primary and recognized, and what the reader witnesses is the attempt to find an adequate object. Hence the 'baffling' (Eliot, 1932, p. 351) aspect of Donne's sermons and poetry, the sense that he is 'a little of the religious spellbinder...the flesh-creeper, the sorcerer of emotional orgy' (Eliot, 1932, p. 345). Eliot goes so far as to compare the lack of an objective correlative in the work of Donne to a 'lack of spiritual discipline' (1932, p. 345).


Of course, it is only Eliot's opinion that the phallic function is 'absent'.

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xvii For a further discussion of the incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier see Lacan, *The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis*, p. 154.

xviii For a fuller discussion of male subjectivity in heterosexual pornography.

xix Eliot's comparison of Andrewes and Donne is another example. Eliot writes that whereas Donne is 'constantly finding an object which shall be adequate to his feelings' (1932, p. 351), Andrewes is wholly absorbed in the object and therefore responds with the adequate emotion' (1932, p. 351). Therefore, Andrewes' prose demonstrates the phallic manoeuvre by assuming that the object contains the emotion; whereby the phallic manoeuvre has already happened. Donne, on the other hand, writes prior to this movement. His 'feelings' are the main focus, the *jouissance* is primary and recognized, and what the reader witnesses is the attempt to find an adequate object. Hence the 'baffling' (Eliot, 1932, p. 351) aspect of Donne's sermons and poetry, the sense that he is 'a little of the religious spellbinder...the flesh-creeper, the sorcerer of emotional orgy' (Eliot, 1932, p. 345). Eliot goes so far as to compare the lack of an objective correlative in the work of Donne to a 'lack of spiritual discipline' (1932, p. 345).

Hitchcock's model of the male subject tied to the maternal as a figure of horror in Psycho is recycled in contemporary horror films such as Friday the 13th and Scream 2.

For Eliot, the term 'surrender' also refers to the poet's surrender to tradition. The poet surrender his 'personality' to a consciousness of his literary past, which is more 'valuable'. For further discussion, see Eliot, Tradition and the Individual Talent, p. 52.

Similarly, Weinblatt writes of the character Colby in The Confidential Clerk where Eliot 'paints a portrait of two selves, both known as...the confidential clerk: a former, truly authentic self as an aspiring musician battles to displace a newly invented self as a confidential clerk in the world of business' (p. 56).

See Eliot's Selected Essays p. 203, where he argues the reader can in fact gain some sense of the authentic artist with knowledge of the artist's entire oeuvre.


A good exploration of a polyphony of voices in The Waste Land can be found in Marjorie Perloff's The Poetics of Indeterminacy, p. 64.


See Jain, A Critical Reading of the Selected Poems of T. S. Eliot, p. 157, for a discussion of the influence of Tristan and Isolde.

Similarly concerned with a lack of transcendence of the flesh in this section are the presence of Tiresias and his witnessing of the 'sordid scene' between the typist and the young man carbuncular. For further discussion of this, see Ellmann, The Poetics of Impersonality, p. 98.

For a discussion of the 'maternal intertext' in The Waste Land, see Lamos, Deviant Modernism, p. 78-82.

The title A Game of Chess refers to A Game at Chess by Thomas Middleton, 'a political allegory directed against Spain. The characters are the chessmen; the white pieces being the English and the black the Spaniards'. Eliot's notes also refer the reader to Middleton's Women Beware Women, where the moves of a chessboard correspond to the seduction of a young woman. There is therefore emphasis on the degree to which relationships between men and women are a series of moves and countermoves; the artificiality of human relationships is heightened. For further discussion, see Jain, A Critical Reading of the Selected Poems of T. S. Eliot, p. 164.

Eliot's misogyny is also discussed in Ellmann's The Poetics of Impersonality, p. 98.

For further discussion of the incantatory aspects of Eliot's poetry see Weinblatt, T. S. Eliot and the myth of Adequation, p. 124-129.

See also Lacan's The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis, p. 106, for his reading of the pure signifier 'DA'. 
See Jain, *A Critical Reading of the Selected Poems of T. S. Eliot*, p. 192, 193, where she states the presence of the following allusions. Lines 423-424 are a reference again to Weston's Fisher King, line 425 is another biblical reference and line 426 is a children's nursery rhyme. Eliot refers the reader at line 427 to Dante's *Purgatorio* xxvi, 145-48 which speaks of poet Arnaut Daniel's suffering in the refining fires of Purgatory; 'And so I pray you, by that Virtue which leads you to the topmost of the stair—by mindful in due time of my pain'. Line 428 is a reference to an anonymous Latin poem *Pervigilium Veneris*, an invocation of love at springtime. The line translates as 'When shall I become as the swallow'. Line 429 is from Gerard de Nerval's sonnet *El Desdichado* and translates as 'The Prince of Aquitane, of the ruined tower'.

Although it seems to me, and this will form the basis of further work on my behalf, that the articulation of the prohibition of the male subject acting as a signifier of *jouissance* does permit a feminist argument. This would consist of establishing the adoption of a signifiable body as the basic condition of living within culture, and since it is the female subject that does this, then the female subject is the only subject that can be said to be 'fully within' culture. Lacan's argument that woman is 'elsewhere', and outside the symbolic order becomes a trope that conceals the fact that it is the male subject that is elsewhere, outside of culture. The feminine position therefore becomes the only one capable of bringing any pleasure to the signifier, and therefore any enjoyment to culture.
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