Industrial development in Indonesia, development for whom?: A case study of women who work in factories in rural West Java

Peter J. Hancock
Edith Cowan University

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Industrial Development in Indonesia,
Development For Whom? : A Case
Study Of Women Who Work In Factories
In Rural West Java

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Industrial Development in Indonesia: Development for Whom?

A Case Study of Women Who Work in Factories in Rural West Java

Thesis submitted by Peter James Hancock BA (Honours) for the requirements of Doctor of Philosophy (Development Studies) in the Faculty of Community Services, Education and Social Sciences, Edith Cowan University.

1998
I certify that this thesis does not, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

1) incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education.

2) contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text; or

3) contain any defamatory material.

Signed: Peter James Hancock
September 1998 ....
USE OF THESIS

The Use of Thesis statement is not included in this version of the thesis.
Acknowledgments

I know of only a handful of Indonesia’s 200 million people who have attempted to objectively enter into debate or question the very issues I have discussed in this research. Those who have tried to improve the appalling social problems in Indonesia by questioning the nation’s endemic corruption, human rights abuses and autocratic political system have been silenced. To complete this research I collected sensitive data from over 500 Indonesian citizens. In a sense they were entrusting me to do what they and millions of others cannot: Criticise, question or even debate issues related to inequality in Indonesia. The way most people reacted to my research convinced me that they were desperate to get certain messages out of Indonesia. These messages are contained in this research. Despite the fact that many government officers warned me not to take “bad stories about Indonesia to Australia”, I have done just that. Indonesia’s massive and growing social inequalities coupled with exploitation of its workers, which I viewed and recorded, are far from the supposed ‘positives’ associated with development and industrialisation and these are the messages which need to be conveyed to the international community. I am extremely grateful to all the Indonesian people who shared their knowledge with me, in spite of their obvious fear. I must acknowledge them now because they remain anonymous throughout this thesis. Without their assistance this research would not have been possible.

My two Doctoral supervisors were crucial to the completion of this thesis. Dr Nancy Hudson-Rodd and Dr Jim Wicks provided years of supervisory support throughout the entire period the thesis was written. Without their academic and emotional support the final outcome of this research would have been jeopardised. I am deeply indebted to both.

Financial support was made available from the Faculty of Health and Human Sciences, Edith Cowan University and from the Australian National University in Canberra. This support enabled me to carry out extensive research in West Java and archival research in Canberra and I am grateful to these organisations for their support.
Abstract

This research was conducted in order to address two major research questions:

1) To what extent and in what ways are a cohort of female factory workers in Sundanese West Java influential in the cultural, social and economic development of the geographic area in which they live and more specifically within their own households?
2) To what extent does the Indonesian state support or inhibit such development?

In order to answer these and other secondary research questions I conducted qualitative and quantitative research. I used a theoretical framework which directed the methodology, questionnaires and both qualitative and quantitative data was collected whilst in the field in rural West Java.

In this thesis I studied a cohort of female factory workers from rural West Java. The research provides more accurate data on the household status and position of young women involved in the industrialisation process in West Java and provides a better understanding of the outcomes and problems of this same process on a regional and national level. 323 women were included in the study, as were their families, during eight months fieldwork carried out in 1996/97 in Banjaran, West Java. This region is undergoing rapid industrial development and as a result is absorbing tens of thousands of young women from traditional lifestyles into factory employment. This transition has significant implications for the status of women in the region, and in Indonesia in general. The measurement of the impacts of industrial capitalism (positive and negative) upon the household, village, regional and national status of such women is the most important way in which this research analyses the implications of factory employment upon women’s lives. I argue that Sundanese factory women are extremely important to their household and nation and without their loyalty to both, industrial development would not be successful in contemporary Indonesia. However, Indonesian factory women are heavily inhibited by a repressive and corrupt state.

I have argued in this thesis that, more than any other factor (globalisation, modernisation, capitalism), the state in Indonesia is the most inhibitive phenomenon interfering with factory women’s ability to share in the benefits of development and at the same time forge a new and improved status for themselves and others. More specifically, the state in Indonesia is structurally organised within strict and traditionally-oriented patriarchal parameters. The failure of this patriarchy to protect its own female factory workers, while at the same time making huge profits from their hard work, is at the centre of discussion within this thesis. It is ironic that this same state (patriarchy)
demands the loyalty, discipline and respect of Indonesian women and places the responsibility for the successful development of Indonesian society and economy fairly on their shoulders. However, at the same time, state elites benefit enormously from factory women and women in general, yet provide them no protection and allow only a few to honestly share in the benefits of development. The position of Sundanese factory women vis-a-vis the state and industrial capitalism is discussed with the aid of major development theories, original research and data from similar studies to cement clearly in the minds of the readers the notion that, more than any other factor, the Indonesian state is failing most Indonesian people and specifically failing Indonesian factory women. In this thesis, the status and position of factory women act as delicate indicators of the levels of social justice and injustice in Indonesia and the extent to which major groups in Indonesian society are excluded from sharing fully in the benefits of development.
## Contents

*Copyright and Access*  
*Acknowledgments*  
*Abstract*  
*Appendices*  
*Tables*  
*Figures*  
*Maps*  
*Abbreviations and Glossary*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter One: Introduction and Background</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Indonesian Economy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Industrialisation</em></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Employment</em></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Situation</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Factors</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Position and the State</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banjaran: Local Background</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale for the Research</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Study</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Cultural Significance</em></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Questions</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis Outline</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Two: Literature Review</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Indonesian State</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women: Sensitive Indicators</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar Studies</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Literature</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Literature</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Labour</em></td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminising Industry</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Issues</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Summary</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Summary</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six: The Factories</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview and Discussion</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where the Women Are</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleven Factories</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Shoes</em></td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Textiles</em></td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Garments</em></td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside a Factory</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ideology of the Female Wage</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Perceptions</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Lurahs</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What the Working Women in Factories Think</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Women</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Factory Work</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Case Study: Nike</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Village Man</em></td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Two Nike Factories: (Feng Tay and Kukje)</em></td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Summary</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Seven: Desa Yang Tertinggal</th>
<th>321</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Overview</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Desa in Banjaran</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Highland Desa</em></td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Lowland Desa</em></td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Discussion</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Summary</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Chapter Eight: Discussion and Macro-Economic Review | 363 |

| References | 395 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendices</th>
<th>406</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appendix One: General Questionnaire</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix Two: Questionnaire for Lurahs</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Sampling Frame</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Age, Education and Marriage Data</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Financial Contributions: Key Data by Age Groups</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Household Contributions and Key Data by Highland Region</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Household Contributions and Key Data by Lowland Region</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Reimbursement Index</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Details of 24 Factories Surveyed</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Factory Ranking</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Data by Type of Factory: Shoes, Garments and Textiles</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Education Levels of Feng Tay Workers Compared to 'All other Workers'</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Age Levels of Feng Tay Workers Compared to 'All other Workers'</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Daily Working Hours, Days a Week and Overtime at Feng Tay</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Desa Yang Tertinggal</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>GRDP in West Java</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>GDP in Indonesia (by Region) 1994</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Investment to Java's Provinces</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Exports from Indonesia 1982-1995</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Agricultural Employment in Decline</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Agricultural Employment in Indonesia 1987 &amp; 1994</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Safe Drinking Water</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Education Indicators</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Literacy Levels</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Minimum Daily Wages in Selected Provinces 1996 in Rupiah</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Average Monthly Wages for Major Sectors in West Java by Sex 1994</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Ratio of Respondents by Manufacturing Sector</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Number of Factories Sampled by Sector</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Monthly Wage of Tuti: May 1996-December 1996</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Maps

- Map One: Indonesia Political and Administrative Divisions  
- Map Two: The Province of West Java  
- Map Three: Banjaran Kecamatan  
- Map Four: Banjaran Kecamatan in Detail (See Rear Page Lift-out Map)
Abbreviations and Glossary

AAFM  Average Age at First Marriage
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Adat  Local cultural beliefs, customs and traditions
ASTEK  Insurance fund for workers
Bahasa Indonesia  Indonesian Language
Bahasa Sunda  Sundanese Ethnic Language
BKPM  Investment Coordinating Board
Desa  Public Office of Village Affairs/ Cluster of villages, politically, demographically and geographically delineated (see Village below)

FLPR  Female Labour Force Participation Rate
GAD  Gender and Development
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GOLKAR  Golongan Karya or Group of Functionaries
GNP  Gross National Product
GRDP  Gross Regional Domestic Product
ILO  International Labour Organisation
IMF  International Monetary Fund
JAMOSTEK  A state-owned workers insurance firm (See ASTEK)
Jilbab  Islamic veil for women
Kabupaten  Regency, or sub-provincial administrative unit
Kampung  Village
Kecamatan  Subdistrict of the Kabupaten
Kepala Desa  Another name for Lurah (Head of Desa)

Rent-Seeking  A paradigm discussed and re-developed by Mehmet which views rent-seeking “as a principal source of institutional inefficiency…causing directly unproductive activities which generate transaction costs and welfare losses, causing cost-push inflation and mislocation of talent at the expense of growth and development” (Mehmet, 1994B:56).

RT  Rukun Tetangga, Public Office
Two Administrative Levels Below the Desa
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rumah Tangga</td>
<td>Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rupiah</td>
<td>Indonesian currency. In 1996 US$1.00 = 2,400 Rupiah. However, in January 1998 US$1.00 = 8,500 Rupiah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RW</td>
<td>Rukun Warga, Public Office One Administrative Level Below the Desa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawah</td>
<td>Wet Rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAD</td>
<td>Women and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WID</td>
<td>Women in Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>A term in Indonesia which has confusing meaning. A ‘village’ is actually a Desa (see above). However, in this thesis a village can also mean the many small villages (hamlets) which constitute a Desa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter One: Introduction and Background

Introduction

This thesis explores the impacts of industrialisation upon the traditional lives of Sundanese women, their families and the power structures within the household in a region of West Java, Indonesia. The research is predominantly about individuals (or a sample of individuals representative of wider society) and also incorporates a generational study with an emphasis on the opinions, attitudes and beliefs of the female respondents themselves, which are compared and contrasted with those of their mothers. In essence the research explores the impacts of industrialisation on the culturally-grounded status of women in West Java and around Banjaran. The status of women is analysed in terms of decision making power in the household, control of income, control of the young women’s human resource (factory labour) and within the realm of gender relations in Banjaran, both in the household and the village. The social and economic impacts and outcomes of industrial development upon cultural values, attitudes and traditional employment of women are also important aspects discussed in the thesis.

This research focuses upon the Sundanese who are viewed by me as a forgotten culture in Indonesia. Despite the fact that the Sundanese experienced perhaps the worst, and undoubtedly the longest standing exploitation by the Dutch and their Javanese counterparts during over 300 years of colonial rule in West Java (a view supported by Dick, 1993; Firman, 1987 & Kartodirdjo
they are virtually ignored by social scientists. West Java was the first area to be colonised by the Dutch and the last to feel the relief of more liberal Dutch policy in the 1920s. The Sundanese were one of the few ethnic groups in Indonesia to be driven from traditional lands. Since independence and the re-emergence of the Javanese, usually into power vacuums left by the Dutch, the Sundanese have fared little better as indicated by their problematic economic and demographic position during the 1980s and 1990s. This research addresses an ethnic group that will not go away, which dramatically increases in size every year and which out-numbers the population of Australia by a ratio of more than 2:1. West Java, and more specifically the Bandung region in which this research was located (Map Two), has for thousands of years been the heartland of the Sundanese people. This same area has also been the centre of industrial development, both for the Dutch and the Indonesian state and today is the nation’s most important industrial enclave in terms of GDP and GRDP (Figure 1.1 Column 2), and is also one of the nation’s most fertile agricultural areas.

Many aspects of geography, from traditional studies to geography and gender, are focused upon in this thesis. The major focus is, however, upon gender and geography in the place of Banjaran in 1996. The research approaches the issue of gender and development (fully conceptualised) in a set place on the earth’s surface, at a set period in time, with historical relevance. Therefore, ‘gender and development’ is assumed to be closely connected to ‘gender and geography’ in this research.
The Indonesian Economy

In 1996, the Indonesian economy, on the surface at least, exhibited all the signs of a successfully developing country reliant on foreign investment and industrial development. Economic growth had averaged over 7% per annum in the 1990s, the manufacturing sector had typically overtaken agriculture in terms of value to GDP and per capita GNP has steadily increased over the last decade. Education and health indicators showed signs of improvement and illiteracy and poverty rates have dramatically fallen since the mid-1980s. Despite this, Indonesia is still a poor nation with an average GNP per capita income of $US 1,000.00 in 1996 (BPS:1996). However, in late 1997, Indonesia’s economy was in crisis: Massive declines in the value of the
Rupiah and investment occurred, which resulted in widespread retrenchment of labour. This crisis caused GNP per capita incomes to halve in nominal terms in six months, highlighting the fact that measurements based on 'per capita income' are not an ideal way to measure development outcomes per se.

The impacts of this crisis will be far reaching and Indonesia’s previous high economic growth rates will suffer as a result, as will employment growth and investment levels (See Chapter Eight).

A research study of West Java provides a good example of how macroeconomic policy, centrally imposed from above, impacts on people and more specifically women at the ground level. Because West Java has a predominantly rural population, modern economic development will have serious social outcomes there. Development in rural West Java necessarily brings other cultural groups (Javanese, Taiwanese and Koreans) which had already led to cultural conflict. Further, the state’s economic policy has impacted more severely upon Sundanese women at the local level, because they have been drawn out of more traditional lifestyles into manufacturing as a direct result of economic policy. Despite the fact that Java is by far the largest contributor to national GDP, and West Java is the largest province within Java in these terms (Figure 1.2), most of the province’s population remains
extremely poor and between 1990 and 1995 the official unemployment rate in the province of West Java more than doubled (BPS:1996).

In 1995, foreign investment in export oriented manufacturing industries in Indonesia reached unprecedented levels. In the first six months of that year foreign investment approvals increased by almost 200% from the previous year. This was mainly due to over 200 existing laws on investment and financial regulation being either loosened or completely changed to attract foreign investors (TJP, July25, 1995). These factors, combined with Indonesia’s very cheap labour, weak unions and abundant population attracted foreign investors, mainly from Korea, Taiwan and Japan. However, the volatile nature of foreign investment was highlighted in late 1996 when the
value of investment for the last quarter of that year fell by over 20% (TJP, Aug 21, 1996), as a result of political instability, conjecture over Suharto's leadership and a decline in international investment per se.

These dazzling figures are not representative of the vast majority of people as generally assumed. They are misleading and are only really reflective of a very small minority in Indonesia, usually ethnic Chinese or Javanese businessmen and military officials. Average GNP per capita incomes, whose steady growth since 1975 have been claimed to represent decreasing poverty, are in fact more representative of the massive accumulation of wealth at the elite level in Indonesia and the manipulation by the state of social data. Education provides little opportunity for improved living standards to the majority of Indonesians and is too expensive to be practical. Health is also the domain of the rich.

Measurements such as GNP or GDP are gross estimates, worked out using economic formulae, ignoring reality and, according to Acciaoli (1996:2), focus only upon monetary transactions and sections of the economy which economists deem important, such as the monetary market, which is far removed from other important sections of the economy such as the informal sector, the rural household and subsistence agriculture.

Inflation in Indonesia is very high and was officially estimated at around 10% per annum in the mid-1990s. However, these figures are officially released by
a central government agency and conjecture is strong that they are deflated. Further, essential industries in Indonesia, such as textiles, cement and plywood are heavily protected by tariffs and controlled by monopolies and oligopolies. Major food staples are also monopolised by the state. There is an extremely rich elite running the Indonesian economy, while at the other level, the vast majority of Indonesian people have little or no control. For example, a recent independent economic survey (LAIDS, 1996) found that 82% of all Indonesians survive on Rp 58,000 per month (US$24.00 see Footnote 1), well below the minimum needs indexes set by the state and severely contradicting state data which proudly claims that those living below the poverty line in Indonesia have fallen from 70% in 1971 to 14% in 1996 (TJP, Aug19, 1996). Corruption is rife in government and friends and family of President Suharto control a significant portion of the economy, while well connected Chinese-Indonesians control the bulk of the rest. There is no exact way in which to measure corruption and the extent to which a small elite dominate an economy. However, without doubt this elite has effectively stopped benefits of recent economic growth filtering down to the people, most of whom continue to live and work in an informal economy.

1. Exchange rates in this thesis are based upon the currency value of the Indonesian Rupiah in 1996. In 1996 2,400 Rupiah = US$1.00. However, by early 1998 due to the economic crisis in Indonesia US$1.00 = 8,500 Rupiah, severely effecting the value of Indonesian currency and its purchasing power.
Population

In 1996, approximately 200 million people lived in Indonesia. Of these, over 84 million people lived on Java, a small island which makes up only 6% of the total Indonesian land mass. Indonesia has a workforce of over 90 million people and every year 2 million new people enter the job market. West Java is Indonesia’s most populated province and if the special territory of Jakarta is combined with West Java, a population of over 50 million people is achieved.

The province of West Java is only 46,000 square kilometres and heavily over­populated. The majority of West Java’s population remains rural. However, recently there have been disturbing trends of urbanisation as rural migrants move to urban locales seeking employment once provided by the agricultural sector.

Demographically, West Java stands apart from the entire nation. Between 1971 and 1995, West Java’s population more than doubled. In 1995 the province’s fertility rate was more than twice that of Java’s two other major provinces. Here, infant mortality and maternal mortality rates were far higher than the rest of Java and amongst the highest in the nation and women tend to marry at very young ages and continue to have extremely low education levels (BPS, 1996). Therefore, West Java provides a contradiction to the usual assumptions of the benefits of the process of development whereby industrialisation eventually leads to smaller families and healthy babies. This contradiction arises despite West Java being the nation’s most industrialised
province, contributing more to the national GDP than any other province in Indonesia and attracting the bulk of national investment (Figure 1.3 Column 2). However, it remains relatively backward economically, demographically and socially, supporting the findings of this study which allude to significant exploitation of the workforce there.

**Industrialisation**

Indonesia has experienced two distinct periods of industrialisation. During the early decades of the 1900s the Dutch invested heavily in developing a modern industrial sector to boost its profits and prepare Indonesia for a new era of industrial-led colonial exploitation. Industrialisation in this era focused on plantation enterprises and other essential industries such as cement and textiles. Women played an active role as labour, especially in textiles and food industries, which were confined to Java and Sumatra. With the advent of the Great Depression, followed by the Second World War, Japanese occupation, Indonesia’s struggle for independence and the economic crisis of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, industrial development continued under extreme conditions in Indonesia between 1940 and the early 1970s. However, after 1970 Indonesia had the political stability to accelerate industrial expansion to unprecedented levels.
Figure 1.3 Investment to Java’s Provinces

Total Investment by Province in Java, 1967-1995 in Billion Rupiah


Figure 1.4 Exports 1982-1995

Value of Oil and Non-Oil Exports From Indonesia 1982-1995. $US Millions

Between 1970 and the mid-1980s, Indonesia relied heavily on developing the oil and gas sector, essentially ignoring the manufacturing sector. After the oil crisis of the 1980s Indonesia again pursued a policy of non-oil industrial development, similar to that of the Dutch period (Figure 1.4). Initially, the government promoted import substitution and later export-oriented manufacturing, with textiles and cement leading the way (Booth, 1992:3). Again female labour played a vital role in this more recent development mainly working in the textile, food, garment and shoe sectors.

Between 1966 and 1996, agriculture’s share of the Indonesian GDP declined from 51% to 16%. By contrast, manufacturing’s share increased from 8% to 26%. In this period over 50 million new jobs have been created, mainly in the services, transport and manufacturing sectors (TJP, Aug 19, 1996). However, the corresponding number of jobs destroyed in agriculture has not been properly documented and would be substantial. The decline of the importance of agriculture, combined with extreme population growth has displaced many rural agricultural workers, mainly women, in Indonesia and, of these, only younger women have been partially absorbed into the manufacturing sector. West Java’s rural workforce was affected most by these agrarian declines. As a result, rural-based, export-oriented labour intensive manufacturing is the most crucial sector in Indonesia’s economic development, not only in terms of foreign exchange but in the ‘new’ employment it creates, especially for young women.
In 1990, rural industrial employment dominated the manufacturing sector in Java by a ratio of 70/30. However, in West Java less than 50% of non-agricultural employment was located in rural areas (Jones, 1993:82). This highlights the importance of the industrialisation process in rural West Java, including the Banjaran region, and also alludes to the more competitive position women face in West Java in the formal employment market. Less opportunity for employment in West Java is a major contributing factor influencing the increased exploitation of young female workers in the province. Further, less opportunity to become employed in the formal sector among rural Sundanese women continues to reinforce traditional patriarchal values and slows the pace of 'typical' social change associated with industrialisation, as highlighted in Wolf's (1990) research in nearby Central Java. In other words, the Sundanese are less used to sending their women off to work than are other groups, such as the Javanese, and therefore have a greater potential for, not only conflict, but significant changes in household organisation when this does occur.

In Banjaran the growth of industry was obvious as it spread from the urban industrial centre of Bandung outwards in three channels towards the Priangan Mountains (Banjaran). The reality of this industrial development took on more meaning when viewed from the mountainous villages in Banjaran looking toward the city of Bandung. Three immense strips of industry were evident as they spread outward from Bandung. One of these strips headed directly towards Banjaran, the other two, to regions to the west of Banjaran. Industrial
expansion followed the only major roads, which were in extremely poor condition, and as they spread accessed new and predominantly unexploited female labour.

Employment

In 1993, Indonesia had an official labour force of 76 million of which 37.8% was female. Despite the importance in financial terms of the manufacturing sector to GDP, industry employs only 13% of the national workforce, while agriculture, despite a significant decline, continues to employ over 50% of the workforce and in most provinces this figure climbs to over 65%. However, in Java agricultural employment has significantly declined since 1987, with West Java experiencing the most negative trend (Figure 1.5 & 1.6). This data ignores millions of unpaid family labourers, domestic labourers and the massive informal sector (World Bank, 1995). Female Labour Force Participation Rates (FLPRs) in Indonesia in 1993 were 31% or only 1% higher than the 1970 figure. This point highlights a certain amount of stagnation in the growth of female employment and a decline in the agricultural sector. However, FLPRs in Java are very different from the national averages. In 1990, FLPRs in East and Central Java were very high at almost 40% while West Java had a lower figure of 29% in the same year (Jones & Manning, 1992:369). This point highlights a possible future trend as West Java offers a very large unexploited human resource, which is inexperienced in formal employment contexts. It also highlights continuing Sundanese tradition which tends to limit women's employment.
According to Indonesian Labour Law (Indonesian (the) Government Collections on Labour 1994) the Indonesian government provides most workers with the right to strike, form unions and bargain collectively. In reality in the last five years, the state has pursued a harsh line against worker unrest and union activity. Only one union is recognised by the state, and is in fact state controlled. Known as the All Indonesian Workers Union or SPSI, this union is ineffective, rife with corruption and only represents 1.5% of the entire national workforce. Other unions have attempted to operate but their leaders usually end up in prison. In 1996 the army was still being used in Banjaran to mediate in labour disputes despite Indonesian presidential statements in 1995 which pressured the military to stay out of labour disputes. Indonesian law establishes a seven hour working day of 40 hours per week with one 30 minute rest period for every four hours worked. There is no national minimum wage. Instead, a regional minimum wage is set by regional councils each year. However, yearly regional wage increases do not match the officially released inflation rate in Indonesia.

For example, Indraswari and Thamrin (1993) found that wage increases in Indonesia are always set below inflation levels and therefore keep labour struggling for survival, and at the same time ensure labour is not empowered. Over the past 20 years increases in the minimum wage have, ironically, led to
Figure 1.5 Agricultural Employment in Decline

Share of Agricultural Employment 1987-1993 in Percentages and in Three Year Moving Averages


Figure 1.6 Agricultural Employment in Indonesia 1987 & 1994


decreases in labour's purchasing power. The authors above found that in 1978 the minimum wage was Rp 225 per day in East Java, which could buy 5 kg of low quality rice. By 1993 the daily wage had increased to Rp 2,250 per day, but due to inflation could only buy 4 kg of low quality rice. Obviously wage increases in Indonesia need to be greater than the inflation rate. However, to date they are not.

Female labour in the formal sector in West Java, according to data from Censuses and labour force surveys (the state), is one of the most disadvantaged provincial groups in Indonesia. Paradoxically, more than any other province in the Indonesian archipelago, West Java provides more opportunities for the employment of women (especially in the services and manufacturing sectors) through higher provincial wages, record intercensal increase in FLPRs between 1980-1990 and the fact that, between 1977 and 1990, Jakarta-West Java increased its share of the national workforce from 19% to 22%. In the rest of Java, significant decreases in the statistics above resulted. Further, between 1980-1990 growth in West Java's labour force outstripped that of Jakarta and the rest of Java for the first time (ILO, 1992). Despite the above, and not forgetting that West Java is Indonesia's most industrialised province, macro-economic indicators of women's employment rates in West Java (FLPRs) have not in general improved as have the same indicators for Javanese women in nearby East and Central Java.
The following figures highlight cultural, demographic and political factors which have inhibited, and continue to inhibit, the informal and formal employment of women in West Java. As has already been mentioned, despite the positive trends, FLPRs in West Java in 1990 were less than two thirds those of the rest of Java. Further, the official unemployment rate of females in West Java in 1990 was more than double the level of the rest of Java's provinces (ILO, 1992). Finally, female participation rates in the agricultural sector in West Java are far below, not only the rest of Java, but the entire nation. This long standing problematic position of female labour in West Java is ultimately the outcome of a culture which favours the economic position of men over women, despite the obvious importance of female labour to the provincial and national economy. This position has been exacerbated over the last 50 years as the provincial population has increased incrementally, quickly making West Java Indonesia's most populated province. A very large population, densely settled with a scarcity of new arable land has meant women have been further disadvantaged regarding traditional employment. Increasingly, Sundanese men have found themselves unemployed and underemployed, forcing many women out of competition for employment in a patriarchal system developed to support the employment of men as breadwinner.

Political Situation

There is no doubt that politics dramatically influence all aspects of Indonesian society. The ruling Golkar Party (Golongan Karya or Group of Functionaries),
which has ruled since the late 1960s, has a philosophy similar to the Dutch colonisers: Tight control over Indonesian society with frequent use of co-option, repression, violence, torture and murder to quell unrest. Indonesian politics, decision making and economic power are dominated by Golkar, the Indonesian Bureaucracy and the army who are particularly interested in tight control of labour and monopolising the benefits of development. Political opposition has been crushed by Golkar and its’ allies and Suharto rules the nation with a dictatorial style. All gatherings in Indonesia of more than five people must have a permit and publications which overly criticise Golkar are banned and their leaders put on trial. Nobody may criticise any aspect of President Suharto’s political or social life. Those who do (and there are many) face subversion charges, which are implemented at the whim of Suharto. At the time of my research the army and government were orchestrating their most repressive response to political opposition in decades which culminated in the unrest which became known as the July 27 Riots of 1996. These riots were blamed on labour organisations and labour leaders by the state.

The riots were the outcome of army and bureaucratic interference with the only viable opposition party in the country on the eve of national elections in May 1997, PDI or the Indonesian Democratic Party. The PDI leader, Megawati, was ousted in 1996 and a puppet placed in the leader’s seat. This led to protests against Golkar and eventually to the riots in Jakarta. The aftermath reveals Golkar’s attitude towards labour. The riots were blamed on labour leaders, or those who had fought for the rights of workers: ‘Communist
insurgents’ Suharto labelled them. Many labour leaders were arrested and at this time are facing lengthy trials and some the death penalty. Control of labour with a heavy hand has long been the mainstay of economic development in Indonesia. The Dutch used this method and Suharto’s New Order Regime has learnt its lessons well from its colonial predecessors.

Indonesia’s political elite has an all pervasive control of its population, right down to the village level. Nevertheless, in all other aspects, this same elite has very little understanding of rural society in Indonesia. However, whilst in the ‘field’ any unusual occurrence, even in the remotest areas of my research region, was reported or became the focus of gossip. For example, upon my arrival in one isolated village, a rumour spread that I was a journalist asking about the factories. A local official told me of the situation and wanted proof I wasn’t a journalist, which I provided. However, the damage had already been done because my reception in many houses in that village was one of suspicion, which was unusual because I usually found the household level of research quite open and honest and people were willing to share their knowledge and complaints about factories. Nevertheless, many people in that village were concerned about possible repercussions from the military if trouble was created through my presence. After that day, I went to great lengths to tell everyone I was not a journalist and was not in Banjaran to cause trouble. Nevertheless, researching in Indonesia meant that every day political aspects had to be considered and acted upon. I had to continually monitor the
explosive political situation in Indonesia and gauge my research strategy accordingly.

Despite the fact that Indonesia claims to be a secular state, Islam is a powerful political force in Java. In West Java, where Islam is relatively strong, many leaders have in the past taken a non-cooperative stance toward government policy. Family planning schemes were resisted by the Sundanese as were policies to control marriage age and fertility levels. However, in 1997, changes were evident in West Java, with most people publicly supporting family planning and economic development as solutions to poverty and overpopulation. However, resistance to the state is still evident in West Java and dissatisfaction with the lack of promised benefits of industrialisation was a daily concern in Banjaran.

**Wage Factors**

Wages for Indonesian women employed in the export oriented manufacturing sector are the lowest in all of Southeast Asia and in some sectors lower than those in China and India. According to the indices of manufacturing labour costs per hour, Indonesia had the lowest wages in the world at US$0.28 per hour in 1993 (Stewart, 1994). The women I sampled were only earning US$2.50 per day. Considering the fact that women are commonly employed at wages well below the stated levels, wages for women in Indonesia are disturbingly low. Having arguably the lowest manufacturing wages in the world, combined with a government desperate to promote industrial
development with very little interest in human rights, obviously more investors will wish to locate factories in Indonesia. Further, as West Java provides the most tempting bait for investors, with its large population, strong local patriarchies and a reasonably subdued culture all overseen by the military, the interplay between culture, industrial development and women will need extensive investigation. Findings from this research could help to protect the women themselves and to make others aware of the regional situation. Further, from a theoretical perspective questions must be asked about the nature of patriarchy. At the local and state level, the tenets of patriarchy in Indonesia are purported to protect women, yet globalisation of manufacturing is based upon patriarchal assumptions similar to colonisation and, therefore, conflict exists between the 'perceptions of patriarchy' and the realities of women's lives studied and needs further investigation.

Manning (1993,1994) claims Indonesian wages are on the increase. However, he ignores problems with the declining purchasing power of the Rupiah, high inflation, increasing levels of official corruption and the relationship between total manufacturing earnings as a percentage of value added. In this regard, between 1970 and 1992 total wages indexed against value added in manufacturing declined from 26% to 19%, highlighting the long term decline of minimum wages in real terms in Indonesia (World Bank, 1995). Further, the index used to fix the minimum wage in Indonesia is based on wholesale prices and on a formula created by the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower which is over 40 years old and well out of date. Wages are purposely fixed at
30% below this index, keeping labour dis-empowered (KITLV, 9 May, 1995).

Manning’s data could easily be used by the Indonesian state to support its industrial policy and to appease critics. New data needs to be presented to offset what can only be termed as potential propaganda for the Indonesian elite to maintain power and their existing development strategies.

According to the ILO (1993) and The Indonesian Government Collections on Labour (1994), women are provided special protection when employed in the formal labour market. Major ‘protections’ include the legal requirement that women only work a 40 hour week and are paid the minimum wage, which in 1996 was indexed to Rp 5,200, or US$2.50 per day, in the major economic regions of West Java. However, in July 1995, 13,000 textile workers went on strike in West Java over the failure of a state owned textile company to meet these requirements. Further, data collected in Banjaran shows undoubtedly that the stated ‘protections’ are not enforced or adhered to. A realistic appraisal of working conditions will be provided in this research as there is a strong and positive link between poor working conditions, exploitation and the position of women in the household. Further, historical analyses of the position of labour in Indonesia needs to be considered because the exploitation of labour has long standing historical roots in Indonesia, and especially in West Java with its unusual history.

The ILO (1993) has documented 36 Indonesian laws which specifically protect female workers. They range from menstruation, pregnancy and
lactation leave to equal rights in employment, promotion and pay and many other supportive policies. However, the ILO (1993) has found that these 'protections' are commonly ignored and in fact lead to further discrimination against women. For example, a case study from West Java found that women work an average of 47 hours per week in factories, not including daily overtime which is compulsory depending upon orders. Moreover, those who claim maternity leave are commonly laid off work. The majority of female workers work as daily casuals or piecemeal workers with no real rights. When a factory does open or expand, the essential criterion for employment is that new female workers have no previous factory experience (Braadbaart, 1992).

Similar and more disturbing findings are revealed by this research. However, not all its findings are negative. Positive outcomes are not ignored.

In 1993 there were an estimated 76 million official Indonesian workers. For these, there were only 1,133 Labour Inspectors, 121 of whom were women. Of these inspectors, only 750 were active, meaning there was one inspector for 4,000 enterprises (TJP, August 14, 1995). These inspectors are poorly paid and many are easily distracted by the lure of bribery. According to ILO research findings, despite the fact that Average Nominal Wages for women in Indonesia in 1993 were half that of male wages, in spite of national laws which stipulated equal wages for women, the law was not enforced and prosecutions were rare. If labour inspectors do catch a company breaching the law they are merely fined a token of Rp 100,000 or US $49.00 (ILO, 1993). However, data from factories in my research area found no evidence to
support the ILO claims and equal pay between men and women doing the same work in factories was evident. The ILO bases its claims of unequal pay on aggregated data collected from Censuses which can be extrapolated to over-represent a specific region. It is more likely that the ‘gendered’ distortions in wages documented by the ILO and others is the result of the almost complete male dominance of the higher paid echelons of manufacturing, and also due to the male dominance of high paying heavy industrial work, such as steel and chemical manufacture, which in Indonesia are extremely well paid sectors, where women are not accepted as workers.

Women’s Position and the State
The state reinforces the problematic economic position of women in West Java. Women are officially portrayed as secondary to men at the general level and by patriarchal society at the particular level in most of Indonesia. Women’s status as workers is not adequately acknowledged by the state. They are simply portrayed as mothers and child bearers, responsible for the ‘moral health’ of Indonesian society, the proper education of children and as obedient servants to men. Sundanese culture is guided by patriarchy and an Islamic religion traditionally stronger than in most regions of Indonesia. For example, extremely low marriage ages, high infant mortality and maternal mortality rates and extremely high fertility levels have set Sundanese women apart from most others in Indonesia, and led to the province being labelled an extreme trouble spot in respect to over-population since the 1960s. This caused demographers from all over the world to focus unprecedented attention on
West Java, especially in the 1970-1990 period when the population of West Java grew twice as fast as those of East and Central Java (Hugo et al, 1987:44).

All female factory workers in Banjaran, as well as in Indonesia, are forced to submit a letter signed by fathers or husbands giving them permission to work. This practice is identical to Dutch colonial law implemented in 1927. Many factories require a certificate proving that married female workers practise family planning. Again the role of the state is pervasive in this situation as factories conspire with the state in controlling women’s lives through family planning incentives and patriarchal permission. Why is it that women must provide letters of approval to work while men do not? The combination of state policy, international economics, cultural traditions, religion and place (Sundanese-West Java) has in some respects combined into a pervasive power structure causing, in some circumstances, the greater subordination of women in the modern manufacturing sector in Banjaran as in many areas in the developing world. I found many parents who justified their complete control of their daughters’ factory wages through this letter. On the other hand, in other circumstances, such as in stable wage earning capacity and in the newly found freedom to travel away from the village, women have been provided with positive changes. Both aspects of industrial employment will be highlighted in this research, as recently too much emphasis has been given to only the negative outcomes of industrialisation upon women in the developing world.
Banjaran: Local Background

Banjaran is a small densely populated administrative area (Kecamatan) in central West Java. In 1996, it was inhabited by 114,000 people, most of whom were Sundanese. Banjaran is bordered to the north, east and west by a large mountain system and to the south by a sparsely populated and extremely under-developed area. Many areas of Banjaran have been relatively isolated and Sundanese culture had little outside influences to contend with, until recently. Since the 1980s industrialisation and modernisation have encroached dramatically upon Banjaran. Factories are now commonplace and partially accepted, though perceived as an 'alien' part of the cultural landscape. Television and constant state propaganda has tended to expose most people to outside influences. Nevertheless, the region in 1996 was still predominantly rural with rice production the major economic activity. Sundanese culture, with its language, rituals and customs remained strong.

Over 90% of the population of Banjaran live in Kampungs (villages) as they have for thousands of years. The villages located in central Banjaran are, however, significantly different from those in the highland areas. Immediately, a distinction must be made between the two areas, despite the fact that they are only separated by 5-8 kilometres. Central Banjaran is a small lowland basin located at the southern base of the Priangan Highlands. To the north is a large flat and fertile crater which houses over 6 million people, including the city of Bandung, the provincial capital. Banjaran is the last major settlement in this densely populated basin and is also the last area to where the ribbon like
expansion of industrialisation has spread outward from the highly industrialised city of Bandung (See Map Two). Banjaran is as far as factories can spread, due to the large mountain system blocking the path. Therefore, Banjaran is a demarcation point between the Bandung basin and the Priangan Highlands. Central Banjaran is a point where industrialisation meets a traditional Sundanese economy and lifestyle. The impacts are significant.

Central Banjaran is a market area, with over 150 densely settled villages. In fact in most areas one cannot tell where one village ends and another begins. Despite being classified as rural, this region is discernibly urban. Central Banjaran has eight doctors' surgeries, one supermarket, a police station and government office. Traditional transport dominates the landscape, but must share the roads with cars and trucks and over 1000 minibuses. Horse drawn carts (delmans) and rickshaws ferry Banjaran's population from the villages to the market centre, from where they travel by minibus to farther destinations, especially factories. Banjaran is sandwiched between the old and the new. It is an ideal location to study the impacts of industrial development upon rural areas. Twenty years ago women, especially unmarried women, rarely left their village area, and were forbidden to leave the Banjaran area alone. They were forced to leave school at 11 years of age, the age of womanhood in Sundanese culture, and were married soon after. Today, thousands of young women travel daily to factories, some long distances (18kms) from their homes, journeys their mothers rarely took. This change is due to economic development, but has not necessarily meant the emancipation of Sundanese women.
Sawah (wet rice cultivation) dominates the highland landscape. Sawah is carved into the steep slopes as are most of the villages. Men dominate this economy and only a handful of older women are active in this most important agricultural sector. Higher in the mountains the air is so cold that rice is not viable and tomatoes, corn and potatoes are grown, predominantly for sale. At even higher altitudes, government controlled tea plantations dominate as the air is very cold, relatively speaking.

In central Banjaran 76,000 people live in over 150 villages. In the 65 highland villages, 38,000 people reside. The population density of central Banjaran is extremely high. The villages are cramped, filthy and hygiene standards are a major problem and source of illness. Sewerage is pumped into the rivers, which are already clogged with refuse, as there is no other way for the people to dispose of rubbish. These same rivers are used for washing, cooking and fishing. The air is heavily polluted from the nearby factories and congested roads. Most of the houses are made of bamboo sheets and are of temporary construction. In the highland regions the population is sparse, the environment cleaner and the atmosphere relatively more healthy. The colder air in the highlands provides an incredible distinction from the lowlands, despite the fact that both are remarkably close, geographically. However, poverty is more endemic in the highlands due to the full exploitation of arable lands decades ago, and a serious lack of employment opportunities.
Sundanese culture, combined with demographic factors, has traditionally restricted women from outside or public work, at least since the 1950s when massive population increases occurred. If women did work in the past it was in the shadow of their husbands or fathers. Payment for their labour was made to their male relatives and women were relegated the lowest status jobs in agriculture, such as weeding. Further, agricultural work was reserved for older women leaving younger unmarried women free to marry and serve the household.

In Banjaran there are very few options for the economic advancement of women. The large majority of mothers surveyed or interviewed stated they were predominantly housewives (Ibu Rumah Tangga) and had rarely earned an income or been able to provide money or goods in kind for their family. Of the few mothers who had worked outside agriculture in the past, most stated that it caused too much conflict within the home. Eventually most were forced to leave due to pressure from the household head, who was usually the father or grandfather. This practice usually occurred no matter how desperate the economic situation of the family. It was not uncommon to find young married women living in abject poverty, because they had married men who forbade them to work at all because Sundanese husbands were supposed to be able to provide for their family. These husbands claimed it was humiliating to have a wife working and earning more than they. Economic security was not as important as male status in these situations, contradicting claims of economic
rationalist strategies of Third World households. Culture, in these instances, had over-ridden economic common sense.

Sundanese culture does not, however, allow women to sink to the depths of low status obvious in fundamentalist Islamic societies. Nevertheless, women in the Banjaran area adhere to the principles of obedience to males of an equal or greater age than themselves and practise this belief in many aspects of daily life. In return, the women are ideally supported and protected by men. Due to land shortages and over-population these traditions are being questioned and many younger people realise the need for women to earn a steady income. At the household level mothers have only a basic and superficial control of the family budget and decision making process. The husband must always approve of most household decisions. Unusual spending patterns and decisions made by mothers are done so with the fact in mind that later their husband may disapprove. Many women claimed to live in fear of making their husbands angry by deciding in the wrong manner. On the surface women seem to control the household. Underneath, they have been trained since birth not to behave in a manner which would anger men. Once married, this training is lived out every day, and is second nature to both men and women. On the other hand, research of Javanese women (Alisjahbana, 1962; Koentjaraningrat, 1985; Meyer, 1981; Geertz, 1961) found the complete opposite. These authors portrayed Javanese women as having high levels of independence, economic autonomy and were potentially empowered to become superior to their husbands.
Religious significance is also tied up with the household strategy, patriarchy and culture. Among the Sundanese women I studied, wearing the Jilbab (Female Islamic Veil) was not a universal right. It had to be earned by the young women by being devout Muslims, obedient to family and publicly immaculate. The Jilbab is not used in the traditional sense among the Sundanese and most Southeast Asian women who are Muslim, that is to hide the women from the eyes of men. The Southeast Asian Jilbab is less restrictive than most in the Islamic world, and in fact is commonly an enhancement to a woman’s beauty. Many young women were envious of their friends who wore a Jilbab and occasionally conflict arose because certain women wore a Jilbab but some village people claimed they were fakes. Wearing the Jilbab is a personal choice. It is decided by the female and her family, friends and significant others. However, ridicule and gossip are very powerful weapons if an ‘unworthy’ woman decides to use a Jilbab. Among the factory women I surveyed, 15% used Jilbabs, while in the wider community the proportion was higher at around 30%. This is probably due to the fact that Jilbab’s are usually not allowed into the factories for safety reasons.

The above background is important because of the fact that there is a new generation of factory women earning an income and possibly having the ability to make independent decisions in Banjaran. Many women were making independent decisions. However, the majority were still financially bound to the household tradition. They needed explicit permission from their parents to
spend any part of their wages, excluding food and transport. If this permission came from the mother, it would be done so with the status of the father in mind at all times. By the same token, many parents totally controlled their daughters’ factory wages, while a very small minority of parents had no control over their daughters’ wage at all.

Rationale for the Research

There is a growing and urgent interest (by developmental economists, feminist researchers, social scientists and international agencies such as the IMF, the World Bank and WHO) in the outcomes of rural industrialisation upon agrarian economies and women in the developing world. This interest has national and international origins and is concerned with measuring the outcomes of economic policy and international investment at the ground level. The findings of this research, which focuses upon rural industrialisation, women, the household and the culture from which both (women and household) have developed, calls into question some of the findings of all of those above. To further enhance interest this research focused upon women’s changing status, decision making power and relationships with men as a result of new rural industrialisation. Overall, the research focuses upon the complex outcomes (positive and negative) of factory employment upon the lives of women and their households.

West Java is rapidly industrialising. It is the most industrialised region in Indonesia and industry has yet to spread into rural locales in West Java to the
extent it has in other provinces in Java. The experience of other countries shows that rapid industrialisation has a profound effect when women are absorbed from more traditional lifestyles into modern factory employment. Drastic alterations commonly occur at the household level in such circumstances. However, this evidence has only come from other areas and very little information is available from rural West Java. As rural West Java is a prime location for future industrial development, in fact it is the only viable location for many new enterprises in the over-crowded province, urgent research is needed in this area. Further, in the research site, a significant trend was obvious. Large numbers of women were being attracted to work in factories from more traditional lifestyles. This situation needs to be monitored carefully because the Indonesian state has little concern for human rights. Investors are predominantly interested in profit and the women themselves come from a culture and background not conducive to resistance and solidarity and are therefore likely to accept harsh treatment and exploitation. Research is needed which seeks understanding and measures the impacts upon their status and wellbeing.

Exploitation of female workers was obvious in Banjaran, and women there worked much longer hours in factories than did men. The rationale of the factory management for wanting to employ mainly women was not solely due to wage concerns as most claim. Wages for men and women in all factories investigated were identical if they worked in the same department doing the same work. More realistically, factory management wants female workers
because they are less likely to strike, will endure longer hours of repetitive work than will men and provide a better quality product. They are more compliant certainly, while Sundanese men have a reputation for hot headedness and social unrest. Strikes and riots are common in West Java, and are usually the exclusive domain of men. Further, I would hasten to add that all foreign factory managers are men, from Asia’s more developed nations living in isolation. It was common to hear of approaches, sexual harassment or even close relations between management and staff. I would therefore argue sexual/gender factors also play a vital role in the gender make-up of the manufacturing workforce in the developing world.

**Significance of the Study**

Sundanese women who work in export-oriented and highly ‘feminised’ factories in West Java (textiles, garments and shoes) are at the forefront of Indonesia’s recent and massive push to industrialise its economy. Foreign investment, imported production practices and massive deregulation of the financial sector are impacting at the local level with significant speed. This research was conducted at a time when the impacts mentioned above were showing both positive and negative outcomes in rural areas.

The introduction of factories and the use of tens of thousands of young women as workers was placing new stresses on the social, economic and cultural fabric in Banjaran, and surrounding regions. Thousands of Sundanese women in Banjaran were suddenly freed from the home and were now able to travel
longer distances from their villages (alone) and earned consistent and relatively high incomes, compared to agricultural work. This has the potential to act as perhaps the most significant catalyst in changing traditional household power relations, which have been, for many centuries, strongly patriarchal. Brother-sister relations were strained in some instances and father-daughter power relations were being increasingly questioned by young women workers. More prevalent, however, was conflict between husband and wife or from boyfriends who viewed factory employment as a threat to their entitled control over their partners. By the same token, many households showed no signs of stress and factory work made very little influence to the relations within the household, as many daughters continued to practise strict obedience to their parents, wives to husbands and younger women to boyfriends which is a strong Sundanese philosophy, reinforced by tenets of Islam.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of this research relates to the financial contributions from the factory women to their families. The findings of this research show that factory wages are predominantly used by women to support their families, the improvement of the prospects for younger siblings and for the benefit of the worker themselves. Despite extremely low wages, many women manage to be important financial contributors to their household. This is a testament to women’s strength and determination, as they face adversity every day for very little remuneration, with the only stated reward being pride in their ability to support the needs of their respective families. This is an important point because the wages the women were receiving were among the
lowest in the world, yet most Sundanese women surveyed managed to budget their incomes and expenditures to assure financial support was forthcoming to their families. Specific data to support this statement is provided, and remains a strong indication of the autonomy of Sundanese culture.

When a young woman enters a large factory she must adapt quickly to a new culture, new rules and customs associated with factory life. The freedom the factories provided away from the sometimes stifling tradition of village life was a benefit and a relief in many circumstances. Commonly, women stated they were happy to go to work in the factory because it relieved the boredom of village life and allowed them to interact with men freely without creating gossip or ruing their reputation. This new environment provided relief for women. While there are many negative aspects associated with the induction of female factory workers, this research was designed to uncover the life of women in the home and work environment, recognising the complexity of this reality and to look for both positive and negative outcomes. Industrialisation has provided this generation of Sundanese women an opportunity to work and to contribute, an opportunity their mothers rarely had. From the women's perspective, working in factories has allowed them a chance to feel a sense of importance and pride in that their wages were helping their families to survive and improve their situation. However, many stated they felt exploited by the factory and this inhibited their financial contributions, diluting their household status.
The study, therefore, provides an excellent opportunity to analyse the influences of industrialisation upon a new generation of female workers and their families. These women have opportunities their mothers and grandmothers did not have. The potential for their status to change and improve due to their financial contributions to the household (taking a burden off their parents) is significant. However, the extent to which the state, factory exploitation and patriarchal culture may inhibit improvement in the general status of factory women needs further study. In Banjaran many young women are drawn into factory work and the associated competition among women for employment is intense, leading to new social tensions as women compete for factory work. Paradoxically, it is the young men who are feeling isolated and abandoned by the development process as they are not required by most factories in the region. Many stated they thought it was unfair that women were so easily employed. This gender bias of factory employment is another potential source of conflict in the community and provides an interesting background to the analysis of household power dynamics in the upcoming chapters.

Another major significance of the research lay in the fact that it was designed within the context of a particular cultural group in a region of West Java. Similar studies in nearby areas of Java (Mather, 1988; Wolf, 1990, 1992, 1994) provided very different results to those found in this research. Anomalies in Mather's study can be attributed to the fact that her research was carried out close to Jakarta, had very little cultural focus and tended to distort
the extent to which an Islamic patriarchy dominated the gender relations in the modern industrial landscape. Wolf’s studies, by contrast, were concentrated on a group of Javanese factory women in a rural area similar to that of Banjaran. Her findings were very different, which can be attributed to the very low regional wages in her research site and to the differences in Javanese culture at the household level, whereby Islam and patriarchy are not as strong as they are within the Sundanese culture. Wolf’s findings are in some respects completely opposite to my own, reinforcing the need for labour research in the developing world to focus first on the culture of gender and geography and not portray factory women in developing areas as an homogenous group.

This research is significant for a variety of further reasons. It focuses on a cultural group usually ignored. It focuses on an unexplored region in terms of industrial development and women’s status. It was conducted at a period of rapid change in Indonesia and West Java, a time of political instability, labour unrest and escalating violence. Finally, it highlights the importance of Sundanese women and their abilities to provide financial support to their families. This ability to support families takes place within a context of exploitation, low wages and poor working conditions in factories. The associated rapid change in household dynamics potentially empowers women as major household members and has serious ramifications for the existing patriarchal society and economy.
Cultural Significance

Traditionally, the Sundanese occupied northern and central West Java. However, Dutch expansionism and Javanese in-migration forced them out of most of northern West Java and now the Sundanese predominantly occupy central West Java, a region known as the Priangan (see Map Two). Sundanese people continue to exhibit a unique cultural lifestyle in spite of outside influences. In the research area chosen, many of the villages exhibited staunch Sundanese attitudes and common anti-Javanese sentiments surfaced. Many people I spoke with were annoyed at the state’s forced use of Bahasa Indonesia in schools, as they claimed this language was too simple for the expression of their thoughts and ideas. Many Sundanese men complained of the greed and corruption of Suharto and his government and family and at the same time stated that, because they were Sundanese, they were isolated from the benefits given to many Javanese. These views are simplistic, and ignore the fact that many Sundanese elites also adhere to corrupt methods. However, they highlight the cultural attitude of some of the Sundanese toward the Javanese regime operating in contemporary Indonesia.

Despite being Indonesia’s most important province in terms of measuring the success of the industrialisation process in Indonesia per se, very little attention has been paid to the Sundanese by researchers. As one of the largest ethnic groups in the world, second only to the Javanese at the national level, this seems surprising. In 1996, the Sundanese population was in the vacinity of 31 million people, while the Javanese, who occupy northern West Java and East
and Central Java numbered approximately 80 million people. There are extensive and very important studies available on the Javanese and Balinese (Geertz, 1961; Warren, 1993; Wolf, 1992 & Hart, 1986; for example), while the Sundanese are little known outside Indonesia and rarely mentioned outside academic circles.

The Sundanese demonstrate certain socio-economic and cultural features in a clearly defined geographic location which would lead one to assume that they do represent a relatively homogenous group. According to the 1990 Indonesian Census, 23 million people used Sundanese as the preferred language spoken at home in West Java (BPS, 1992). Other unique aspects include demographic and geographic factors such as less fertile soils, higher rural unemployment and the tendency for the exclusion of women from employment. Very low comparative female labour force participation rates, historical development, a stronger Islamic patriarchy, the existence of unique dress standards are also important. Such factors support the recognition of the existence of the Sundanese as a relatively homogenous ethnic group, despite class issues, and also have a direct bearing on the socioeconomic status of women in West Java.

Even very good literature about the household and economic status of women in Java ignores the Sundanese. Hildred Geertz, for example, studied the socio-economics of family organisation in Java and concluded that: “the household and the family are the most important organisational unit in Java, where
women tend to monopolise a significant amount of decision making relating to
finance and household management” (Geertz, 1961:4). These findings were
later confirmed by Papanek and Shwede (1988). The key word in Geertz’s
statement is ‘Java’. An uninformed reader would assume from these readings
that all women in Java were the same, controlling the household both
financially and socially. However, Geertz’s findings were taken from Central
Java which is inhabited by the Javanese and are not accurate when applied to
Sundanese women in West Java. There are 31 million Sundanese, and many
other cultural groups such as the Madurese, Betawi and Bantenese who have
occupied their own regions of Java for as long as the Javanese have (Hugo et
al, 1987:20). Too much emphasis has been placed on Javanese culture because
its’ elite dominate the military, the government and the public service, as it
does the nation’s largest universities. While I am aware that the Javanese are
not one homogenous group, the focus of this thesis is upon Sundanese culture,
industry and women and general comparisons are made to Javanese culture,
therefore, Javanese women and culture are homogenised somewhat.
Nevertheless, a focus upon Sundanese women is long overdue.

This research stresses the important influence of culture and geography upon
women’s status and household dynamics. Sundanese culture, history and
geography is markedly different from that of the Javanese. Sundanese
traditions and Islamic religion enforce a different role and status for women in
the home in many areas of West Java, especially in the highland regions.
Future studies need to address these issues and avoid generalisations which
assume that all women from the developing world feel the impacts of
development in the same manner.

Ethics

Ethical considerations were paramount in all aspects of this research from the
formulation of the research problem, to the implementation of the research
design, to the fieldwork period and finally to the writing of the thesis.
Protection of the identities of the respondents and the data they provided was
crucial. The issue of the protection of respondent identity was exacerbated
when the Indonesian government insisted on a report of my research, including
all tapes, photos, names and addresses of respondents and copies of all
questionnaires before I would be allowed to leave Indonesia. Further, the
Indonesian Ministry of Manpower requested a separate report which was
conditional upon their support of my research project. I was confronted with
an ethical problem in this case, but had no hesitation in protecting those from
whom I had collected data. I wrote a report for the Indonesian government
claiming my research was purely observational and therefore I had no
cassettes, photos, surveys or names and addresses to provide. The cassettes
were destroyed once transcribed to computer disk. The computer disks were
sent out of the country prior to my leaving Indonesia and contained no names
or addresses or any information which could be traced. Further, they were all
password protected. The questionnaires were secretly coded by Desa and by
village to avoid possible repercussions for the individuals concerned. These
questionnaires were later burnt at the field site once transcribed to computer
and again the disks were sent out of the country from a post office very distant from Banjaran. No data was left on the computer in Indonesia. The government accepted the final report after initially claiming it had been lost and allowed me to leave the country.

Due to the political situation in Indonesia at the time of my research, I had no hesitation in ‘playing down’ my presence and research purpose to the authorities. Due to upcoming national elections many were nervous about labour issues and their potential to lead to massive social unrest in Indonesia. The protection of respondents was more important than the collection of sensitive data. However, I was able to do both (with compromise) without, to my knowledge, jeopardising anyone’s safety, position at work or reputation within the community.

Initially, I had wanted entry into many of the large factories in the Banjaran region to gain more insights into the influences of industrialisation on the lives of women. However, due to the political situation, and after taking advice from local factory supervisors, I only entered one factory and that was by invitation from the Korean management team whom I initially met at a social gathering. Later, this same management refused my request to take photos of women leaving their factory. I decided that my presence at the factories or attempts to carry out research inside the factories could potentially compromise the position of any workers who were seen to associate with me. This was reinforced by the dismissal of factory women during the
implementation of the LAIDS Survey (Legal Aid for Industrial Disputes Settlement) in Java in 1993/94. Workers associated with the collection of LAIDS data were dismissed (LAIDS, 1996). Further, my presence at factories may have caused management to contact the local military who are suspicious of Western researchers, or any researcher. For ethical reasons the research design was changed to focus mainly upon households. Information about the factories themselves was obtained through interviews and Focus Groups from the women who participated, from key informants and from mid-level factory managers, who were more than willing to enlighten my research. No pressure was placed on the women to provide sensitive information. They were only asked a very general question about working conditions and left to talk as they wished.

Research Questions

The rationale behind the research questions hinge around the following question: In contemporary Indonesia, to what extent have development and the state achieved equitable and sustainable outcomes for the Indonesian people? To answer this major question I use the following research questions and rely upon a case study of female Sundanese factory women as an indicator of the success of the state and development in the above context.

Major Questions

1) To what extent and in what ways are a cohort of female factory workers in Sundanese West Java influential in the cultural, social and economic development of the geographic area in which they live and more specifically within their own households?
2) To what extent does the Indonesian state support or inhibit such development?

Secondary Questions

1) What are the influences and outcomes (positive or negative) of working conditions, capitalist production procedures and non-culturally specific labour relations upon the women sampled?
2) How, if at all, do these factors inhibit the ability of individual factory workers from improving their status and decision making powers at the household level?
3) How has the process of rapid industrialisation and the associated absorption of very large numbers of female workers into the formal economy (from a more traditional background) in the region of Banjaran, West Java, affected the cultural values of the Sundanese in regard to the overall status of women?

Thesis Outline

Chapter One provides an introduction and background to this research. It is designed to enlighten the reader about the following thesis by providing a general background of Indonesia coupled with the major research questions and rationale for the research focus. This chapter gives a brief introduction to the research, from the initial phases of investigation, to the fieldwork and finally to the presentation. Further, the geography of the research area has also been introduced and the relevance and significance of the study discussed.

Chapter Two (literature review) and Three (theory and methodology) will further justify the significance and relevance of this particular research topic and highlight how local level research will be made relevant at the national and international levels. The literature review highlights relevant literature related to the research topic, as well as highlighting the lack of relevant
literature regarding rural women in West Java vis-a-vis development studies.

Chapter Two discusses literature which: 1) Is pertinent to the Indonesian state and its attitude toward labour and women; 2) discusses similar studies carried out in Indonesia and other nations where women are studied in an industrialising economy; 3) analyses theoretical literature relevant to development, women and feminism; 4) analyses historical sources; 5) discusses cultural issues in Indonesia. In Chapter Two I discuss literature relevant to women in development, women as labour, women in theory and in history. This chapter provides an account of the current situation of women and their position vis-a-vis factory work according to exhaustive literature searches and outlines how this thesis addresses gaps in the literature and at the same time provides new insights into the complex realities of women’s lives in the industrialising world.

Chapter Three outlines the methodology used in this research, as well as discussing political and local issues. An approach was outlined in this chapter highlighting the way in which local studies, such as this thesis, are rendered more pertinent through the analysis of general theories such as Gender and Development, Trickle Down and Rent Seeking. This was seen as a logical progression from the more general discussions in the first two chapters as it is necessary to take the reader from the ‘general to the particular’ as quickly as possible as this thesis is based on local studies and stresses the importance of place and geography.
Chapter Four is a discussion of the position of women in the household, both theoretically in Third World research, and culturally among Sundanese. Because this thesis explores the role and status of women at work and viewed these as intimately related to their household position, this chapter was devoted to the household which is the point from which all factory women emanate. The household and women were focused upon from a theoretical perspective, a cultural perspective and from a local position, and again in this chapter, the reader is taken from the general to the particular. The findings discussed in the chapter delineate the position of women in the households studied, with reference to status, decision making, employment, history, education and marriage, all of which were rationalised as important factors to any future research focusing upon female factory workers in the Third World.

Chapter Five is a discussion of data regarding the contributions Sundanese factory workers make to their families and society. The chapter analysed in detail data from the women sampled and how they used their factory wages to empower themselves and their families. This was done by empirically measuring the levels of contributions made by factory women and comparing these to data from similar studies of factory women discussed in Chapter Two. The chapter asserted the important contributions factory women are making in Banjaran, and to what extent women were able to increase their societal and household status as a result of employment. The chapter focused on cohorts of women within the entire sampling frame to distinguish between the importance of women’s wages by highland or lowland regions, or between
married and unmarried cohorts, or between different sectors of manufacturing. The chapter provided a sense of Sundanese culture, women and tradition and the impacts industrialisation has had upon these.

Chapter Six is a logical progression from the previous chapter's focus upon the household as it concentrates on the factory systems. In this chapter I address the strong relationship between women and factory employment and their position in society and their household. In-depth data was presented from 11 factories in Banjaran to highlight the overall conditions of the factories and how these impact upon women's lives. Further, the most exploitative factories were highlighted in this chapter to show how women who work in these specific factories are less able to provide financial support to their families as a result of illegal and inhuman working conditions. Most importantly, the chapter analysed the perceptions of women, their families and local officials toward issues such as exploitation, women's status and the benefits of industrialisation to women. The result was a presentation of the complexities revealed by these perceptions regarding women, development and status: Complexities which partially defy most theory and other similar studies.

Chapter Seven is a very specific focus upon two geographic areas within Banjaran. These two areas provided local insights into the problems associated with industrial development, the state and the position of women in rural Indonesia. The discussion was designed to relate back to theoretical issues raised in earlier chapters. Data from these two 'case study' areas showed
clearly that development *per se* is not providing positive outcomes to all the community as the state and investors claim. In fact, problems associated with state corruption are seen as the major obstacle to such positive outcomes filtering down to people at the local level. This chapter provides an empirical analysis of the situation at 'ground level' and then focuses upon theoretical concerns and the role of the state in the debate concerning women and development in the Third World.

Chapter Eight is a discussion chapter which ties the major findings of all the previous chapters together. This chapter acts to integrate the major findings of the previous chapters into a summarised and integrative format. However, this chapter is also used to enhance and reinforce the major findings of the research and to discuss recent economic developments in Indonesia and the potential impacts of these upon Sundanese women. Finally, in Chapter Eight I provide a summary to answer, in brief, the research questions posed above.
Chapter Two: Literature Review

Economic growth is good for workers. Low and Middle Income countries cannot sustain the growth they need without making the best use of their working age populations. Sustained growth with rising labour demand has been achieved by countries that have relied on markets (World Bank, 1995:16).

Economic growth generally benefits the majority of a country's population as the economy becomes more efficient, creates more jobs, and raises incomes (World Bank, 1995:41).

Introduction

This literature review is designed to reinforce the following chapters and act as a guide to the structure, argument and content of this thesis. The review is divided into sections which correspond with the major theoretical, conceptual and analytical aspects of this research. The review has two other major functions: They are to highlight the obvious lack of previous studies in the area of rural development, women and West Java and at the same time analyse findings from similar studies, in and outside Indonesia. The other function is to discuss data released by the Indonesian state, usually rhetoric designed to attract foreign investment, silence critics or appease unrest in the nation. State data is analysed, presented and discussed to place the general position and status of women in the context of official perceptions in Indonesia and as perceived by many in the West.
The Indonesian State

According to the five principles upon which Indonesia is founded, the Pancasila, Indonesian law is designed to protect Indonesian citizenry and promote equality. The five principles are as follows: 1) The belief in one God; 2) Just and civilised humanity; 3) The unity of Indonesia; 4) Democracy; 5) Social justice for all. The Indonesian state publicises the Pancasila in a vast array of literature and calls on it in times of social unrest. It is also used to silence or convict political dissidents, despite the fact that Indonesia claims to be a democracy. The principles of Pancasila are twisted and distorted to suit the needs of the state, which usually equate with building monopolies, oligopolies and the massive accumulation of wealth, all of which lead to the alienation of the majority of Indonesia’s population. Pancasila also has a clause which is designed to protect the Indonesian workforce.

Pancasila Industrial Relations is a fair and honest document in the context of Indonesia. It is designed to provide support and enhance the welfare of all workers. However, like its parent document, it is merely rhetoric, called upon by the state in times of worker unrest, which is becoming increasingly prevalent in Indonesia each year. The state uses this rhetoric to silence critics and find scapegoats for its failure to protect the rights of workers. The ILO (1996:V) claims the Indonesian state takes the issue of labour protection seriously: Seriously enough to include these issues as central to the nation’s present development plan (Repelita VI 1994-99). However, in the same
document, the ILO (p81) claims that the state has been negligent in modernising labour laws, empowering and protecting workers and in providing worker support services. The ILO, on the one hand, applauds the state for its rhetoric and criticises it for its inability to implement basic labour laws. The Indonesian state is not concerned with the rights of workers and less concerned with the rights of female workers, who are officially viewed as temporary. The ILO needs to take a firmer stance on this issue and see through rhetoric such as Pancasila.

The World Bank (quoted above) believes that, as Indonesia progresses on the road to modern industrial development, increased democracy and decreased inequality will result. This organisation uses positivistic data to support such assertions. Increased GNP per capita, annual economic growth rates, and increasing daily wages are commonly used by this agency to support its claims. The release of these statistics is potentially manipulated through the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (BPS). They collect the data, analyse and release it. The state in Indonesia has shown that it will manipulate data to suit its own ends and the World Bank need to be better informed before taking a position which supports the current regime in Indonesia, as in many other poor nations, which are dominated by oppressive and incredibly wealthy political elites backed by military force.
World Bank (1995) research claims that economic development in Indonesia has caused greater equality in society. I basically argue the opposite position using West Java as a case study where state-driven development has, in many instances, led to greater social inequality and has been claimed to cause greater subordination of women. Previous case studies by Mather (1988) and Wolf (1992) have shown that women’s wages in Java do not even cover basic living expenses. Further, Mather found that when Islam and industrialisation combined the result was increased sexual, societal, economic and state control over young women factory workers in West Java. I argue that development has led to greater inequality due mainly to the extremely poor conditions faced by Indonesia’s labour force and their control by a powerful and numerically very small elite. Nevertheless, the women I surveyed were, of their own volition, improving inequity in their own small way. They achieved this without the aid of the state, and under extreme conditions. I argue that development only leads to greater equality when workers themselves make it so. It is they who exert most energy into this issue.

Data published by the Indonesian state only scratches the surface regarding inequality in Indonesia. According to 1994 data, 42% of the national income was controlled by 20% of the population. On the other hand, only 19% of the nation’s income was controlled by 40% of the poorer classes (BPS, 1994). Remember, these are data revealed by the state and are highly prone to manipulation in an attempt to portray Indonesia as a democratic nation with
goals of improving equality. Further, the data is purely quantitative and is based upon gross income. Disposable income is not considered. Further, income data in Indonesia is taken from taxation documents. The taxation system in Indonesia is not adequate to deal with 200 million people and corruption levels are so high that the rich easily avoid paying taxes, while poor factory workers are taxed without mercy. In fact, the taxation system in Indonesia has been changed to inspire investment, incentives have been provided to the elite and these continue to favour growing inequality in Indonesia. The taxation system is not designed to aid in the equal distribution of wealth. Therefore, data on income is biased, the incomes of the rich can be easily distorted through state propaganda and tax avoidance, while the incomes of the poor are simply highlighted as gross estimates, ignoring reality.

To attract foreign investment the state publishes guidelines for international investors. These pay scant attention to labour issues. The Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) is the major producer of this literature and its 1994 manuscript (BKPM, 1994:22-23) provided two pages of information about labour. In these two pages great effort went into describing the vast size of the national workforce and how many millions join it each year. It calls the workers a ‘large pool’ and Indonesia’s high population growth rate is used to attract investors. Yet in most other literature, Indonesia’s population growth is considered a major obstacle to development. This same document claimed
Indonesian wages to be average for Asia and working conditions were barely mentioned. Yet Stewart (1994) showed that Indonesian wages in the manufacturing sector were the lowest in Asia, and in some sectors, the world, and Hugo (1992) claims that wages are purposely kept at 30% below minimum needs in Indonesia to allow for state corruption costs and to keep labour unempowered. Mehmet (1994) claims that corruption is factored in at 30% of production costs in an average factory unit in Indonesia, while labour costs only 10%.

Since 1983 the Indonesian government has created many new policies to attract foreign investors. Nineteen legislative packages were introduced, the most important of which were: 1) Trade deregulation; 2) Tariff reform; 3) Export promotion; 4) Banking and investment deregulation; 5) Foreign investment; 6) Privatisation of manufacturing. All these changes were made to promote industrial development which, according to the state, would improve social conditions for all Indonesians. Since 1985 new labour policies were instigated to aid the legislative changes mentioned above. In 1985 all 21 trade unions in Indonesia were funnelled into only one federal union, SPSI. The SPSI is the only recognised union and all other unions are prohibited. In 1986 the army was given the right to intervene in labour disputes. Social security was made compulsory for all workers for loss of income due to ill health or accident. In reality, the workers I sampled in Banjaran had to pay a significant portion of their income for social security fees (ASTEK). However, it was not
uncommon during my research to find injured workers not being compensated by this same system, despite having paid compulsory fees to their factory. LAIDS (1996:59) found 40.4% of all Indonesian industrial workers contribute to ASTEK and that it was common for the ASTEK contribution to be taken from wages and not deposited with the authorities responsible. LAIDS also found that ASTEK funds were not being used to support workers who legally were entitled to its support due to injury or ill health.

Other official Indonesian policy also has little to say about labour. The 1993 Guidelines of State Policy in Indonesia (DI, 1993) (Ch IV, Manpower) stated that labour unions and cooperatives have long been the instruments by which workers would be incorporated into development without creating social disparity. Further, this policy used terms like dignity for workers, zeal and prestige to describe the current attitude of its workers (DI, 1993:64). Despite these official guidelines, there are no legal labour cooperatives in Indonesia and all labour NGOs work under constant fear of government reprisal and are forced to function outside the law. In 1996, 32 human rights NGOs in Indonesia were declared illegal and classified 'problematic' because they did not use the Pancasila as their guiding principle. All are under investigation by the attorney general. Further, many labour NGOs claim to be constantly harassed by the police, monitored by plain clothes security forces and many claimed to have had their communications systems tapped. If anything, in the
last 10 years, the Indonesian state has increased its oppression of workers' organisations in line with increased development.

In September 1996, the state was going through the motions of introducing a new Manpower Bill to supersede the 1969 Law (no14). The new Bill is designed to give the government increased control of labour. This law will be passed as there is no viable political opposition in Indonesia (all important opposition leaders are in prison or have been ousted from their positions). The new Bill will give the state new and sweeping rights in labour disputes. The chairman of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation said this law ignores rights of assembly for workers and forces them to join the only union in Indonesia, the state controlled SPSI. He also stated the new Bill was designed to provide a cheap, politically obedient and non-demanding workforce. To add to this, the foundation said the new Bill was only designed to serve the state's greed and to get Indonesia ready for the free trade era (TJP, Dec27, 1996). Instead of moving toward democracy and the improvement of labour rights, the Indonesian state is showing that it has no intention of releasing its strong grip on labour. The Dutch adhered to this policy as does the New Order. Both regimes used economic, political and military power to achieve subordination of labour.

In mid 1997 the Bill discussed above was passed. Various reports have shown that the new labour law, which increases state control of labour, was passed
using ASTEK funds to bribe the ministers responsible for debating the Bill. ASTEK is a social security system to which all formal workers theoretically contribute, and was designed to protect workers. In July 1997 the Minister of Manpower allocated US $2.15 million to ‘grease the wheels of the House of Representatives to pass the new law quickly’ (TJP, Nov 28, 1997). This money was illegally transferred from ASTEK funds. 44 ministers were illegally paid money to pass the above Bill, ironically from funds designed to protect workers (ASTEK). The Bill had previously faced serious opposition from labour groups who claimed it further restricted workers’ rights (AAP, 1997). The Indonesian Public Prosecutors Office has launched an investigation into the bribery claims. However, this type of corruption is so endemic in Indonesia that it is unlikely any investigation will be objective, honest or bring about positive change (TJP, Nov 27, 1997). In the meantime workers continue to pay compulsory ASTEK fees to Indonesian authorities, most of whom have little concern for workers rights (See Page 115 and Chapter Five).

The relationship between the state and labour in Indonesia is analysed by Mehmet (1994B; 1995). Mehmet discusses Rent-Seeking behaviour (see Glossary) to explain the culturally-rooted machinations of development in Indonesia, especially regarding subordination of labour. Rent-Seeking is itself a form of New Institutionalism which contradicted modernisation notions that the politics of the ‘democratic’ West could similarly be successfully grafted to the developing world along with industrial capitalism. Mehmet’s discussion
of Rent-Seeking behaviour (Footnote 2), which from this point on will be termed Rent-Seeking, will form a very important approach to the analytical process of this research. Further, such theory will help to evaluate the contemporary macro-economic policies of the Indonesian state and the position of the Indonesian labour force in relation to the state. According to Mehmet (1994B;1995), Hugo (1992) and KITLV (9 May, 1995) systematic, colonially-rooted Rent-Seeking is endemic in, and crucial to, the process of industrialisation in contemporary Indonesia. Business projects cannot proceed in Indonesia without rents, both legal and illegal, being extracted by high level government officers and public servants. Moreover, according to Mehmet, in 1994, of Indonesia’s 3.8 million public servants only 530 had executive powers, powers to seek rent to allow business and industry to develop. Mehmet argues that these traditionally oriented Rent-Seeking practices are only able to continue because they are offset by extreme exploitation of the formal labour market. Investors are not inhibited by high Rent-Seeking costs as would be expected because of the extremely cheap labour costs in Indonesia. In fact in 1995, wages in Indonesia were fixed by the ministry responsible at only 10% of total production costs (KITLV; 9 May, 1995).

2. Mehmet (1994B) views Rent-Seeking “as a form of institutional inefficiency...causing directly unproductive activities which generate transaction costs and welfare losses, causing cost-push inflation and mislocation of talent at the expense of growth and development”. According to this research, Rent-Seeking also leads to the exploitation of labour, abuse of workers rights and human rights per se.
In 1997 it was conservatively estimated that the value of wages were between 7% and 9% of total production costs, while Rent-Seeking was estimated to cost between 14% and 19% of total production costs (TJP, Nov 15, 1997). Wage fixing thus is closely related to Rent-Seeking in its subjugation of labour in Indonesia. Rent-Seeking in Indonesia is dominated by the Javanese elite (priyayi). However, the contemporary nature of the state in Indonesia, and its close links with other ethnic groups, is so complex that the simplifications provided above should be viewed with caution, especially by researchers whose focus is more politically oriented than is this research.

Corruption by the state and state-linked organisations is related in this thesis to the exploitation of labour and the status of female factory workers. White and White (1996) claim that corruption is on the increase in Southeast Asia, despite deregulation and economic liberalisation. These same authors criticise 'development' authors for only providing haphazard research into the phenomenon, and for not providing remedies for corruption and Rent-Seeking behaviour. However, the data provided by Mehmet (and others) above is crucial as it provides empirical and cultural understandings of the nature of corruption in Indonesia. White and White (1996) also argue that our understanding and study of corruption needs to go beyond the state and general political analysis in the Third World. With this point I agree. Using local research in Banjaran, I noted and recorded the extensive nature of corruption throughout Indonesia, far beyond the central locales of the state.
long standing culture of corruption exists in Indonesia, not only within the state or the partially deregulated market place, but among foreign investors, local officialdom and significant individuals at the local level. Analysis of Rent-Seeking, corruption, collusion and state protocol in the context of this thesis are therefore crucial factors in answering the major research question: To what extent does the Indonesian state support or inhibit Sundanese factory women from positively influencing the development of their geographic area? Such analysis is paramount throughout this thesis.

While Rent-Seeking at the macro level is controlled by the Javanese *priyayi* according to Mehmet (1994B:58), I found that it pervades all aspects of Indonesian society and also impacts upon labour, wages and disposable income at the local level. Rent-Seeking at the lower levels of society is not culturally specific. In Banjaran I recorded local government officers blocking busy roads to collect road tolls, school officials who charged new and obscure fees, local transport operators who increased costs in line with factory wage increases, food vendors who must pay levies to factory security guards and many other examples of local Rent-Seeking: All of which are increased costs which are passed onto factory workers, further eroding their already low incomes. One (public official) admitted to making deals with factory management and another actually worked for a large factory. Most of these local, Rent-Seeking costs impact daily upon factory workers, more directly than do the costs Mehmet describes. Rent-Seeking opportunities have
increased dramatically since tens of thousands of factory women began earning incomes and became reliant on monopolised transport, food and housing markets. Their income is seriously eroded by these local Rent-Seeking activities.

Indonesia’s economy typifies, more than any other paradigm, a Lewis Type Economy. In this type of economy, high levels of state intervention, combine with unlimited labour supplies and an extreme dual economy to influence the labour market. Such influences lead to low wages, poor conditions for workers and cause the state to concentrate upon state driven export-oriented manufacturing as its leading economic policy. Success is virtually assured in the short term due to abundant and cheap labour. However, considering the economic crisis which gripped Indonesia in November 1997, this assumption is highly dubious, especially in the long term when political inefficiencies associated with Rent-Seeking and endemic corruption accumulate to create an unstable economy. In a Lewis Economy, a huge number of workers are unemployed or under-employed. In a Lewis Economy, capital and imposed capitalism are subsidised by cheap labour costs and as a result there is excessive concentration of power in the form of monopolies and oligopolies. For example, in 1993 four business groups controlled 54% of Indonesia’s manufacturing industry (Mehmet, 1995). The above highlights again the weak position of the Indonesian labour force, where abundant cheap labour, combined with high unemployment, a shortage of good jobs and the
subsidising of capital and the state by low wages places the average Indonesian worker in an extremely weak position. The relevance of female labour to this position is very important as female workers are viewed as a secondary labour force and are highly vulnerable in Indonesia.

Considering the literature and combining analysis of this with my own observations of the state in Indonesia, it is necessary for the purposes of this thesis to provide a theoretical definition of the state. The state is headed by Suharto, who in 1997 was among the world’s richest men, with his family and close friends not far behind on this scale. Suharto is the nation’s ultimate Rent-Seeker. Below Suharto are a small group of ‘hand picked’ ministers, public servants and army generals who form a very powerful elite. This small group have almost complete control of Indonesia’s financial areas of high profit, but are ignorant of many other aspects of the society they claim to have created and sustained from their urban positions of power. They control society through the use of the army, television (propaganda), suppression of freedom of speech and through education. Below these rent-seekers, are the rich Chinese, the priyayi, regional governors and lower level public officers, all of whom reinforce Suharto’s rule, again with the use of the military. This extremely small group of men and women make up almost the entire nation’s power elite. The smaller this group remains the more resources it can monopolise. They are divided physically, linguistically, mentally and in all ways, apart from biologically, from the Indonesian people.
This small elite headed by Suharto has ownership of the means of production and, more importantly, the means of oppression (the military). This dominance of specific resources allows a small group of men to rule the nation from large distances at very low cost. For example, only 530 high echelon public servants control the nations' massive public service, and in turn the structures which seek to control the nation's people. Most of these high echelon officers are the priyayi (Mehmet, 1994B), and as long as they support Suharto and those close to him they will continue to hold their positions. The Indonesian state, therefore, rules from large distances, separated from its own people by the enormous wealth and power it monopolises in urban Indonesia.

It is almost like a feudal system where Suharto reigns supreme using barons, or overlords to run the nation and control the people and tap their productive capacities without empowering them to the extent that they would constitute a threat.

The above conceptual analysis of the Indonesian state is simplistic, but nevertheless useful to understand the way the state functions in Indonesia. It is simplistic because it ignores human agency, the growing middle classes and the fact that many other cultural groups are prevalent in Indonesian politics. However, the middle classes in Indonesia are basically complacent and not yet politically active. Human agency is a factor which needs to be considered among the lower classes. The poor in Indonesia (180,000,000 people) have
access to limited resources, or none at all, and cannot compete with the political elite in Indonesia: Human agency is excluded or crushed in Indonesia if it becomes threatening to the ruling elite. People constantly attempt to organise to challenge the inhumane political system prevalent in Indonesia. However, whenever this occurs they are instantly attacked by the military, acting on behalf of the elite. Many organisations and individuals have attempted to organise resistance to Suharto and his allies, but all have been destroyed through violence, arrest and other illegal state actions. Suharto has quickly dealt with any opposition he encounters, including the Sukarno family. Consider the position of Sundanese female factory workers in comparison with the state and one begins to understand the problematic position such women face. They are almost completely powerless, except in their own local sphere, where they may silently empower themselves or their families, but to achieve this requires great strength and sacrifice.

**Women: Sensitive Indicators**

Data released by the Indonesian Ministry of Statistics (BPS) and other agencies such as the World Bank and the United Nations highlights a very general picture of the socio-economic position of Indonesian women. This picture is based on quantitative data and useful in a general sense only.

Despite Indonesia’s recent economic success, the nation’s women still lag behind women from other ASEAN nations. In education, literacy and access
to sanitation, health and safe drinking water, Indonesian women are in a far inferior position to other women from Thailand and the Philippines, for example, despite these nations having problematic and less impressive economic growth than Indonesia, especially the Philippines (Figures: 2.1-2.4). The figures show clearly, that at the macro level, development is not positively impacting upon key social indicators in Indonesia as they are in other nations, according to official data.

The statistics in Figures 2.1-2.4 below show that Indonesian women continue to exhibit indicators inferior to women in neighbouring nations. The fact that Indonesia has experienced the most consistent economic growth of any nation in the ASEAN region, yet its women continue to miss out on the benefits of growth, especially in rural areas, is testament to massive social problems in the nation, problems which in theory should be solved by successful economic growth.

From a dependency theoretical perspective it would be assumed that women are likely to become emancipated through development. However, the basic assumptions of this theory are not appropriate given my proposed theoretical framework, and considering the growing disparities of wealth in Indonesia, are not realistic. Further, in Suharto’s 1996 speech to the nation, the ageing president claimed that due to economic development, Indonesia was no longer
Figure 2.1 Health and Sanitation


Figure 2.2 Safe Drinking Water

Figure 2.3 Education Indicators

Average Number of Years in School of ASEAN Population 25 years and Older by Sex and Country, 1990


Figure 2.4 Literacy Levels

Percentage of Population Illiterate Between 15-24 Years In Indonesia and Thailand by Rural-Urban and Sex. 1990

a poor nation. Suharto’s comments were based purely on economic measurements of GNP per capita. Despite these obvious shortcomings, Dependency Theory would only permit a broader level of analysis which would deny specific cultural, historical and gendered detail sought in this thesis.

The relationship between the state and female workers is analysed in this thesis in light of Kemp’s findings (1994). She completed extensive research on this topic in Indonesia. According to Kemp, the position of labour in relation to the state acts as a most sensitive indicator in the measurement of the relationship between economic growth and social justice (human rights), especially in capitalist based sectors of industry. The position of female labour in Banjaran in this regard will be viewed as a representative indicator in the relationship between the state, development and social justice. Young female Sundanese factory workers will act as a particular sample in relation to the above in this research. Kemp adds that tensions created through new factory employment for women in Southeast Asia are based upon the inappropriate intersection of the home, the factory and the state. These issues are addressed accordingly in this thesis.

Research into the relationship between women and work in developing countries has tended to focus on either the positive outcomes of development through measurements based upon macro-economic data such as GNP per
capita, or the negative outcomes *vis-a-vis* human rights. Both outcomes hinge on activities of the state. State ideologies in most developing countries assume that women, in general, do not contribute substantially to total family income. State ideologies such as this are reinforced at the highest level causing grave concern for female workers. For instance, in 1996 Suharto in a nationally publicised speech stated, ‘it is understood that female wages in Indonesia are secondary to male wages’. This places extreme pressure on women in factory employment. It implies that the female wage is not meant to supplement their families’ wellbeing and as a result, their wages are not important. The reality I found in Banjaran could not be farther from Suharto’s statement.

White (1993), in an economic survey based on the family unit in Jakarta-West Java, reinforces the importance of female factory wages, as she does the findings of this research. White found that, despite the fact that women workers in the manufacturing sector were paid substantially less than their male counterparts for the same work, individual women on average contributed 40% to their total family income. According to White, what is most disturbing is the fact that women, to reach such a high contribution level, worked on average 20 hours of overtime per week, while men in the same industry worked significantly less overtime. In regard to the household importance of female wages, my findings were very similar to White’s and are discussed in detail below. Both sources reveal that women bear the brunt of exploitation in this context. They must work overtime to contribute to their
family, they must work overtime or they face dismissal and they must work overtime because their labour is so much cheaper. They face increased exploitation as a result and, despite their financial importance, are still portrayed and perceived as temporary workers by the state and investors.

Development Agencies such as the World Bank (1995) have claimed that development will lead to the improved position of women in poorer nations. If women are drawn into the modern industrial sector they must be provided with positive outcomes because economic development creates greater equality in society (World Bank, 1995). However, the assertions of the World Bank need serious investigation. Case studies by Wolf (1992) in Central Java have shown that, when industry locates in rural regions to take advantage of cheaper female labour, only women from the middle poor families can afford to work in factories. Poorer women are isolated by the process. Moreover, Mies et al (1988) claim that the integration of developing economies into a world capitalistic system has in fact lessened the status of women and denied them the chance to continue to participate in traditional economic sectors and, at the same time, exploited and limited the employment of women who do work in the modernising industrial sectors to very specific areas.

Afshar (1985), in her analysis of industrialisation in Iran in the 1980s, found that young women were further enslaved once employed in factory work. She found that despite improved living standards and reliable incomes, women
were not able to improve their traditional status because of cultural and psychological factors which revolved around Islam and economic subjugation of women. Further, and more pertinent to my research, Afshar found that in rural areas where industrialisation was encroaching on traditional social and economic structures (as it is in Banjaran), Islam allowed men to engage in a sort of legal slavery, as women’s productive and reproductive capacities came under the stricter scrutiny of male household heads, factory owners and the state. Mather’s (1988) findings in West Java were very similar to Afshar’s. These findings enhance my data which showed, that in West Java, women who are drawn into the formal sector, especially manufacturing, potentially face increased subordination in some regards, or attempts at increased subordination leading to new conflicts. These ‘potentials’ were incorporated into my research design. However, overall I did find similar structurally-driven exploitation and subordination in Banjaran but this was traced to the state and local traditions as well as to Islam.

All authors mentioned provide data in direct contradiction to the World Bank. Further, case studies by Buang (1993) and Jamilah (1994) highlight negative outcomes when women are integrated into modern economies from more traditional ones. None of these authors noted any significant improvement in equality indicators. My research highlights the negative outcomes of new industrial employment in Banjaran. By the same token, these are viewed in relation to positive outcomes, such as the increased individual pride that
factory women felt because they were able to support their families basic needs, a task traditionally reserved for Sundanese men.

**Similar Studies**

There are very few similar studies relating to rural industrialisation *vis-a-vis* women in Java *per se*. There are even fewer located in Sundanese West Java and even fewer again which focus on village households, women and industrial development. Of those available, none provide significant cultural or historical background. Of the handful of studies available in this area none are adequately representative of the findings in this thesis. All were completed by female writers, many with a feminist perspective. The most similar study to this research was carried out in rural Central Java by Diane Wolf and published in 1992. It was called *Factory Daughters*.

In *Factory Daughters*, Wolf focused on the impacts of rural industrialisation on young women drawn from village areas into nearby factories. Wolf’s study was very similar to my research. Wolf focused on household strategies, patriarchy, proletarianisation, gender relations, life cycles and the impacts of factory work upon agrarian society. Because her research studied women, in a geographic area with a population remarkably similar to Banjaran and gave at least some representation to the fact that her respondents were Javanese, it is vitally relevant to this thesis. However, Wolf’s findings are dissimilar to my
own, and this can be traced to historical, geographic and cultural factors mentioned throughout this research.

Wolf’s findings were extremely useful as they commonly contrasted with my own. For example, most of the women in her research chose to work in a factory on their own volition. Sundanese women in Banjaran do not have that freedom. Further, Wolf claimed that her ‘factory daughters’ had a lot of social autonomy and tended to be a financial burden to their parents, even when working. This was definitely not apparent with Sundanese Women. In fact, Wolf (1992:5) noted that Javanese women tended to withdraw from parental control at every opportunity and were capable of dominating a marriage alliance, the complete opposite of Sundanese women. Finally, the financial support offered by factory women’s wages in Wolf’s research was not significant. For example, Wolf’s data (p179) found that families had to financially support their daughter’s work, in the form of food and transport costs as their daily wages were too low. As a result, Wolf claims that these families are actually supporting industrial capitalism through their support of factory daughters. By contrast, my research found that the factory women in Banjaran were not in general a burden upon their parents. In fact, the majority were an asset and provided crucial financial support to their families. Wolf’s research will be commonly referred to throughout this thesis to highlight the enormous differences culture and history cause to the status of women factory
workers from two almost identical situations, one group from Central Java and Javanese, the other from West Java and Sundanese.

Mather (1988) carried out research on a group of villages recently incorporated into industrial development in an area of West Java adjacent to Jakarta. Her findings are summarised as follows. Islamic leaders and Village Heads responded to industrial expansion by recruiting primarily uneducated women and enforcing harsh conditions insisted upon by investors. These same leaders solved work disputes through their mere presence at the factories and, through their traditional ability to subordinate women, were able to provide a cheap, docile and compliant workforce for the new factories. At the same time, these leaders gained increased social and economic status through their ability to organise labour. Village Heads and Islamic leaders in Banjaran do not fit into the portrait painted by Mather. They claim on the surface to play a key role in recruiting labour for factories in Banjaran and at the same time are contributing to the development of their respective Desa. However, of all the women surveyed in this research, only 8% were recruited through Village Heads. The rest were recruited through friends or advertisements. Nevertheless, Village Heads had to approve the employment of women, and some were also involved in helping certain factories collect taxes from workers during my research period, much to the distress of the women effected. However, their overall role was small and commonly overestimated to enhance their political status.
Hardjono's (1993) study in an area close to Banjaran (Majalaya) highlights the relationship between agricultural decline and industrialisation. She found that industrial employment had increased dramatically since 1982. People seeking factory employment were predominantly from landless households, as they were in Banjaran. Further, many small landholders preferred factory employment to sharecropping due to its stable nature, again a factor common to Banjaran. The decline of agriculture and massive population growth created a situation in Majalaya whereby young people, especially women, sought factory work. The same factors were common in Banjaran and highlight the relevance of my research outside the Banjaran region, as agricultural decline occurred similarly in both areas, in conjunction with rapid population increase and the end of agricultural extension. Hardjono found that industrialisation was changing the traditional way of life in Majalaya from traditional to modern and factory employment changing traditional values of women in significant ways. For example, Hardjono claimed factory employment was providing more incentive to adopt family planning than official government services. However, I found in Banjaran that the official family planning scheme had more impact than did industrial employment upon the positive acceptance of family planning and was impacting significantly at the village level, whereas, 15 years ago, the Sundanese were renowned for their resistance to family planning because it was anti-Islamic.
The privately funded LAIDS Survey, subtitled a *Picture of Labour in Java* (1996), provides another example of a similar study. This survey was carried out in all major industrial regions of Java, including Bandung-Banjaran. The survey collected data on wages, working conditions and information about the factories themselves. Over 170,000 surveys were collected from male and female factory workers. Of these, 90,000 were not eligible due to inaccuracy.

The LAIDS survey needs to be criticised here, because significant resources were wasted due to the fact that untrained factory workers implemented the survey, and some of these were later dismissed by the factory management for their involvement. However, relevant findings from the LAIDS Survey provide an interesting contrast to my own. For example, the survey (p33) found that many of the female factory workers had to be supported by their families to afford the necessities of life, despite their wages, as did Wolf's (1992) study, in contradiction to my findings.

The LAIDS Survey claimed that most of the women surveyed were forced out of agriculture. This may apply to Javanese women, but not completely to Sundanese women in my research site or most regions around it. Women, especially younger women, do not have access to agricultural employment. Nevertheless, the survey is a useful document. For example, the survey (p52) found that factory workers in West Java worked longer hours than any other region in Java, including the highly industrial areas in Jakarta. This finding reinforces my claims that a culture of extreme labour exploitation exists in
West Java and has evolved in an industrial culture that expects more, especially of women, in factory employment. Further, the same survey (p55) found that the largest factories have the longest working hours, which supports this research decision to concentrate on larger factories in Banjaran, though small factories were not excluded.

Two Western feminist-geographers provide relevant theoretical analyses of gender and geography in relation to women’s employment. Hanson and Pratt (1995) conducted research in Worcester and Massachusetts relating to gender, geography and industrial employment and their findings are extremely useful to this research. They found (p10) that geography or distance were key elements in isolating women from employment, limiting their employment to strict regions, and in denying women political power. In short they found that distances which posed no problems to men travelling to work, were problematic for women. These same key elements of geography isolate women in rural Java and at the same time concentrate tens of thousands of women in geographic areas close to their homes. Factories deliberately locate in regions like Banjaran for just this reason. They are close to a source of rural female labour which will remain constant due to geographic and cultural factors. Domestic stereotypes confine both groups of women to the home area which in turn limits their employment choices. The fact that Sundanese factory workers are positioned in low paying jobs with little future is testament not only to the international division of labour, but to notions of
gender and geography. Not only do employers reserve better jobs for men, but the restrictions of geographic movement for women is problematic in this regard too.

The majority of authors who have completed research similar to this, (including Afshar, 1985; Buang, 1993; Jamilah, 1994) whose findings are discussed in various sections below, have one major point in common: They all found predominantly negative outcomes when women were employed in export-oriented manufacturing in the developing world. This reinforces the significance of this study and the need for more cultural and geographic specific research such as this, that is research which aims for the analysis of both positive and negative outcomes of development upon women. However, I must at least partially endorse the findings of the authors above, as this research found that the 'negatives' outweighed the 'positives' in Banjaran. The reasons for this are cited throughout the thesis.

I have incorporated positive aspects into this research primarily because I wanted to at least heed arguments by economic rationalists who criticised the claims of social researchers (especially by Wolf, Mather and LAIDS) that families of factory workers in Indonesia had to support their children's working costs and therefore were supporting industrial capitalism. According to Thamrin (1995) economists found the above claims to be 'irrational' because of the mainstream economic argument that proposes if a factory paid
workers less than subsistence wages the business would fail because labour could not support or reproduce itself. After analysing these arguments I concluded that; economic rationalists do not understand the enormous pool of excess labour in rural Indonesia and the fact that most factory women emanate from traditional backgrounds where they are commonly unemployed or under-employed and, when they are employed, it is in traditional agricultural occupations with low status. While the findings in this thesis partially conflict with Wolf or Mather in regard to wages, they certainly do not support any arguments proposed by economic rationalists. Economic theory completely ignores the complexity and reality of the lives of contemporary factory workers in Indonesia, as it does the repressive role of the state. Indonesia's population of 200 million people, who are predominantly poverty bound, ensures that capital can easily replace labour which therefore means that wages are unusually low and do not have to provide basic subsistence. The position of capital is supported by the laws and attitudes of the state. Factory conditions, wages and the actions of the state toward the workers I studied showed clearly that the role of labour in Indonesia does not fit neatly into predictions based upon economic theory.

**Theoretical Literature**

Research attempting to analyse women in a development context has limited choice regarding theoretical relevance. In history, Indonesian women have been generally portrayed as invisible, as being unattached to development and
not valuable to it. Dutch census methods and contemporary state policy reinforced this invisibility. The end result is problematic. Nevertheless, three paradigms are most useful and will be discussed here and in sections below. These are Women in Development (WID), Women and Development (WAD) and Gender and Development (GAD). WID was first postulated in the early 1970s by Boserup (1970) who examined the sexual division of labour in agriculture on a global scale. WID was commonly equated with modernisation paradigms which suggested modernisation or industrialisation would lead to the alleviation of poverty in the developing world and hence improve the position of women. However, modernisation has not delivered its promises and therefore WID became heavily criticised as positivistic (Rathgeber, 1990). Boserup’s assumptions were too generalist and assumed all women from agricultural societies contributed in the same manner to a sexual division of labour. Women, despite WID influenced development policy, continued to be denied access to new economic opportunity, technological innovations and to suffer low economic status (Kabeer, 1994:19). The greatest weakness of this approach was that it viewed women in isolation.

WAD provided a more sophisticated paradigm of women in the development process than did WID. WAD is a female oriented approach as was WID. However, WAD developed an approach which intended to address unequal class structures in society which in turn, WAD assumed, would lead to greater gender equality. Class inequality in Indonesia is a powerful and long standing
social phenomenon with which an elite has dominated the nation for centuries. It is reinforced by the state. To address class inequality would mean attacking the state in Indonesia, which is virtually impossible and extremely dangerous. This reveals a certain amount of naivety in the WAD approach. Furthermore, according to Rathgeber (1990:193) WAD did not provide any significant analyses of the causal relationships between patriarchy, differing modes of production and women's oppressed state. WAD assumes women's position will improve if equity is achieved in the structures affecting the international economy. WAD was highly criticised for ignoring women's reproductive and household roles and for Eurocentricity (Rathgeber, 1990:193). However, to its credit WAD does not view women as isolated from men in their subordination to the global development process. WAD and WID do have aspects useful in this research and are not totally discounted simply because they have flaws. For example, WAD assumes that men and women should be viewed as interconnected in their quest for equality, as I do in this thesis.

GAD is rooted in socialist feminism. However, GAD is not simply focused upon women, but rather upon gender and how it is socially, politically and economically constructed. GAD sees women as active in development and not simply as the passive recipients of development imposed from above. However, GAD is a socialist approach and tends to be a-historical and focuses upon structure rather than agency, ignoring the complexities of personal relationships. GAD analyses women's work, both inside and outside the home.
and correctly assumes that women don’t have to produce commodities to be productive. GAD also focuses on the root of women’s oppression at the household level (patriarchal organisation). As such, GAD provides a reasonably sound framework to discuss the major findings of this research. Further, as I noted that Sundanese women are subordinated to men from an early age, at the household level, and go from traditional obedience to fathers, brothers and husbands to imposed obedience to factory managers, GAD is a useful background. However, not all Sundanese women are oppressed at the household level. It depended upon countless factors. In many instances it depended very much upon the father and the age at which he married in relation to the age of his first wife and also upon the patriarchal history/tradition of each and every household and, to a lesser extent, village. For example, those fathers who married in their late twenties, to girls aged around 13 years of age tended to be very oppressive in the household situation, while those men married at a similar age to their spouses were less oppressive. Further, the household history/tradition influenced the power of patriarchy (see Chapter Four). In contradiction to GAD, I argue in this thesis that the only institution which universally adheres to the subordination of women as a result of development is the state in Indonesia.

GAD does make other generalist assumptions in need of criticism. Gender is socially defined, economically motivated and the result of biological differences between men and women. These differences, however, vary
throughout history, and are in fact delineated by history. The current
differences between men and women in any given place and at any given time
must have historical relevance. GAD assumes that differences between men
and women are a-historical and do not vary geographically. Research among
Sundanese women reveal vast differences in gender relations, especially when
compared to Javanese women, and also between households in close
proximity with similar socio-economic levels. The only way to assure these
differences are highlighted is through actor-oriented research, whereby case
studies provide data which can be used to critique and inform theory such as
GAD. Actor-oriented research therefore analyses the agency-structure
processes and theoretical aspects under-pinning these processes. Local case
studies, such as this one, assume prominence over theories such as WID,
WAD and GAD in most areas of the thesis.

Human agency is viewed in this research as very important. The agency of
female factory workers, and more importantly their financial contributions, are
viewed as a most significant influence upon the structure of the household and
in turn the structures which inform most households in rural Java, such as the
state and capitalist developments. Women factory workers are also viewed as
active social and political agents in changing many of the structures which
influence the public lives of the Sundanese. The women are moving to waged
work in very large numbers, a new phenomenon, and are now seen as active
agents. Further, over 30% of the women I surveyed had local female
supervisors. However, the women I studied were silent actors, their actions were not intended to create conflict or change. Nevertheless, their actions are important and in a two way process inform change to the structures and ultimately the superstructures which exist in a somewhat tyrannical form in contemporary Indonesia. On the other hand, Sundanese women are still constrained significantly by structures active in the household, the village and the nation, but not to the same extent as their mothers were. Most of the women I studied were unaware of their influence upon these structures, but their influence was evident.

The relationship between actor-oriented research and structure and agency from a sociological perspective is important. The women I researched were initially viewed as victims of the patriarchal structures pervasive in Indonesia, and enforced by a violent state. However, after extensive investigation I tended to view the female factory workers as silent actors, unaware, yet important agents of change; more so than any other generation in recent Sundanese history, male or female. It is acknowledged that women are still confined by structure, but through individual and group agency, both within the household and in the public economic sphere, Sundanese factory women are an excellent and much needed catalyst to change the sometimes stifling tradition of patriarchy in rural West Java. Actor-oriented research showed me clearly, sometimes against my will, that agency was not the passive victim of structure, just as women are not the passive victims of development. Complex
two way systems are a more realistic way to view agency and structure. In 1996, structure tended to be more pervasive than did agency, or more influential, but this will change in the future. I argue below that the structures of the state are the most serious obstacle women face in the development process. This is not to say that foreign investors or multi nationals are exempt. They are not. However, it is the state which allows them to operate and it is the state which defines their operating procedures and conditions under which labour must exist.

**Historical Literature**

Analysis of important historical literature is crucial to this research. Due to my belief that the Sundanese, and more importantly, Sundanese women as labour, have been mis-represented and mis-understood in history, historical research is extremely important. While history will not play a significant role in the final thesis itself, significant historical research was necessary to justify claims made in it about regional history. Many of the assumptions relating to the industrial development of Indonesia need re-evaluation. This is because the status and position of the contemporary work force in Indonesia are predominantly historically grounded. They are deeply embedded in the nation’s contemporary economic culture, a culture which was well entrenched long before the 1970s when the industrialisation process is claimed to have begun in Indonesia. Further, the position of female factory workers in contemporary Indonesia becomes distinctly clearer when viewed with
historical reference. Overall, historical data provides a basic background and setting with which to view Sundanese women’s economic status in contemporary Banjaran. A handful of authors support this position.

Nitiasastro (1970:1) claims that between 1600 and the 1970s the recording of Indonesian history has been treated from a "European-centred outlook" which has focussed almost exclusively upon Dutch colonial evaluation (Eurocentricity). The printed history of Indonesia has tended to be either pro-Dutch (see Broek, 1942) or anti-Dutch (see Raffles, 1817) and mainly written by high level foreign officials, European academics or philanthropists, most of whom were middle-class and male. Indonesian history needs to be re-evaluated, especially in connection with those groups most hidden by history, such as industrial labour and women.

Mehmet (1995) argues that modernisation, with its focus upon contemporary urban-based capitalist development, missed the very important relationships between historical and agrarian developments and successful industrial development. Demographic, agrarian and economic developments in Indonesia, and especially in Java, were the most crucial precursors to its capacity for successful export-led industrial development after the 1970s. Furthermore, the development of rural infrastructures were significant for the successful export-oriented phase of industrial development in Indonesia, as they were in Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia. Dutch attempts to
industrialise Java in the early 20th century were based upon assumptions very similar to modernisation. However, like the modernisation theorists of the 20th Century, who viewed nations with large rural economies as incapable of modern development by themselves, the Dutch too misjudged the ability of Indonesia to successfully develop without its aid.

Eurocentricity is evaluated by Mehmet (1995:8-10) in which he describes it as a quasi-racist world view resulting from the domination by the West of the non-European developing world. Eurocentricity is transmitted into history through Western education and media and, while the term is itself a European-based value judgement, it is important because many Eurocentric biases are evident in standard Indonesian histories. Eurocentricity led to the development of simplistic theory such as Social Dualism (Broek, 1942) and the Nobel Prize winning Lewis Economy, both of which were formulated after economic research in Indonesia. Mehmet argues that post-colonial and Western-driven development plans failed due to a deeply distorted lack of historical understanding of the nations involved. This, combined with labour invisibility in history, resulted in research and policy lacking social and historical fit in Indonesia and most non-Western nations. Until now, this labour invisibility has sustained the continued and systematic exploitation of factory workers. Bias in history has denied an objective understanding of the roles of women in development over time. This same bias has given amnesty to the indigenous Javanese elite and the role they played in Indonesia's colonial history.
Historical bias allowed them to escape unfairly many of the negative perceptions now held against the Dutch and the Chinese in Indonesia.

Alexander (1991:56) provides evidence as to how Eurocentric history distorted understanding of contemporary Indonesia. He stated that:

Both historical and contemporary studies of rural Java have usually treated the economy and society as if these involved exclusively agricultural activities and agrarian production relations. Although this inclination to agrarianise the countryside characterises studies of many Third World countries, the tendency is particularly marked in conventional accounts of Java which represent it as epitomising a subsistence oriented rice-farming economy. Colonial administrators and subsequent scholars have consistently undervalued the significance of market relationships, trade and industry in the rural economy and this has distorted our understanding of Java's economic history, reinforcing views that it is a relatively homogeneous society essentially little affected by its long period of colonial rule. In contemporary Java at least half of rural incomes, in many cases a great deal more, is derived from non-agricultural work. This is not a recent development.

In the 1990s, Indonesianists were still providing Eurocentric analyses of Indonesia’s economic development. Hill (1993) claimed that the period after 1966 was the only era of really successful economic development in Indonesia’s history. Hill has fallen into the trap of assuming Western-style economic development is the only successful way to develop. Further, Hill also claims 1966 was an historic break from Indonesia’s economic stagnation of the past. Many problems are evident with such an analysis. Among these, is the fact that the Indonesian economy has gone through many periods of
economic stagnation in its very long history, obviously followed by consolidation. By only tracing Indonesia's economic history from the 1960s, Hill has given too much credence to the export-oriented period of Indonesia's development. This period has been viewed in isolation which has helped to make invisible the successful development of many other forms of economic development in Indonesia, which despite their relatively low importance in terms of GDP, continue to be extremely important socially, culturally and to women.

In 1997 Hill continued his structurally dominated analyses of Indonesian economic development. Hill (1997) provides what can only be described as an Eurocentric analysis of Indonesia's economic success over the past 30 years. Hill relies on data such as GNP per capita and statistics released by the Indonesian state and provides a portrayal of the economic and social success of Indonesia under Suharto. Hill stated that the remarkable economic record has been matched by social improvements, overcoming Indonesia's most important problem; poverty. If this is the case, why have 1996/97 been shown to be the worst years in decades as far as social unrest, violence and widespread rioting are concerned, all caused by economic factors relative to ever-increasing social disparity in Indonesia? Later Hill claims that it would be preposterous for Indonesia to resemble Latin America in its high levels of rising inequality. Hill either has no idea of the massive levels of inequality in present day Indonesia or pays too much credence to figures of economic
growth, which pay no attention to pragmatic measurements, such as disposable incomes, true inflation rates or growing inequality.

Labour

When and where market-oriented forms of labour control occurred in Indonesia's history is impossible to pinpoint. However, capitalist-like organisation of labour existed for many centuries in Java, despite claims to the contrary by conventional history. In history, before the arrival of the Dutch, this situation was even more extreme due to the fact that land, as a means of production, did not exist until the 19th century, and labour bore the brunt of exploitation, as a commodity. Whether peasants were working for feudal lords or the Dutch, or for modern multi-national companies, they were controlled in the same way, through discipline imposed centrally and structurally from above. Understanding the way in which labour was controlled in the past is crucial to our understanding the contemporary status of female labour in Indonesia.

Between 1830 and 1930 most major land and labour acts were implemented in Java by the Dutch. During the same period the value of exports from Java increased from 107 million guilders to 1,160 million guilders per annum. Control of land and labour equalled huge profits for the Dutch (Legge, 1977:90). The 1830 Cultuurstelsel and the 1870 Agrarian Law were the result of pressure from Dutch investors in the Netherlands. These laws allowed Dutch investors to lease land for long periods from a more liberal colonial
government, and secure increased control of indigenous labour, and at the same time increase exports from Java and Sumatra on an unprecedented scale. After 1870 the influx of Dutch investment in manufacturing in Indonesia (Dutch East Indies) increased 1,000% per annum due partly to the security created for investors via policy which achieved acceptable subordination of labour and control of public lands (Zainu'ddin, 1968:133). In the 1980s a similar trend occurred in Indonesia when new labour laws and economic restructuring were promulgated to attract overseas investment.

Compulsory labour (*herendiensten*) was introduced in 1854 to aid in the production of Dutch exports, for public works and for the benefit of indigenous elites. Dutch colonial policy was formulated and implemented on the basis that control of manpower was linked to political stability and increased productivity. *Cultuurstelsil, herendiensten* and scores of other labour laws supplied the Dutch with hundreds of millions of labour days between 1830 and the 1920s. Suhartos’ New Order regime seemingly has an identical attitude toward labour.

Allen and Donnithorpe (1954:79) in their analysis of the relationship among capital, industrialisation and labour, state that labour relations in Indonesia in the 1830s were based upon, not only its strict control, but also upon the factory unit as a capitalistic means of production. This sector needed large investments of capital and resources, combined with strictly organised labour
(time and productivity), to promote development, as do modern production processes. According to the above authors, the claim that Indonesia was not capable of industrialising until the 1960s is not entirely accurate. Significant indigenous industry existed before, and continued to exist in spite of the Dutch. Further, the factory unit in the plantation sector, and indeed the whole process of plantation-style industry, of which there were many thousands in Java in 1830, created a 'capitalist-link' between the factory owner and Indonesian workers. Most Javanese were forced by the Dutch to grow crops for the plantation sector (Cultuurstelsil), such as coffee and sugar in this same era, again linking most workers to market systems.

Hoadley (1994) attacks Eurocentric histories of Java, and uses the idea of the village to provide an example. According to Hoadley (1994:161), prior to the introduction of coffee cultivation via Cultuurstelsil in the early 19th Century, there is no evidence to support the existence of villages in Java in any significant sense. Furthermore, according to his research, in the 1700s, village labour was organised in units of 1000s by the centralised labour controllers or Mantri, for their regal masters. Land was not owned in the private and systematic sense, nor was there a class-based peasantry in Java, as there was in most of Southeast Asia in this period. Most histories of Indonesia portray the traditional village as self contained economic units devoid of outside political and economic influences.
The treatment of actual village heads also contradicts the ideal that the village in Indonesia is a mystical institution which has held society together for thousands of years and also demonstrates the cruelty of the Dutch. In 1851 a Dutch official named Vitalis was charged with enforcing Cultuurstelsel in rural West Java. On arrival at a factory in central West Java (Priangan), he found ten Village Heads, who had had their thumbs tied with ropes which were then tied to trees, suspending them in mid-air. They were being punished by Chinese factory owners for not supplying enough labour from their respective villages. However, when Vitalis investigated he found that the Village Heads had actually supplied the required manpower to the factories, and most had supplied more than they were supposed to. In a another district of Priangan, Vitalis found other Village Heads lying naked in the sun with arms bound, again accused of not supplying enough labour (Vitalis, 1851). Further, in the Indonesian language a Village Head does not mean a man who is head of only one village as it logically implies. A Village Head (Lurah or Kepala Desa) is actually a head of many villages. Ignorance of the meanings attached to the Indonesian language has added to the creation of the village myth in Indonesia.

According to Vitalis, Cultuurstelsel was also very harsh in the Banjaran region in central West Java. He claimed, in this region, especially in factories, that it was common “not to meet people, but walking skeletons”, to see many dead bodies by the roadside and the labourers in the plantation sector dropping dead
as soon as they had eaten. The regent of the area did not even bury the dead, they were food for his tigers (Vitalis, 1851). Today the village continues to supply Indonesia with the bulk of its labour for factories. In the 1990s factory workers were still dropping dead in Indonesia, albeit with less frequency than in the late 19th Century. However, this positive trend is more attributable to improved factory technology and access to Western medicines, than it is to Golkar’s pragmatism or concern for worker welfare. The above evidence suggests that, the notion of the village as an isolated unit was a creation for census purposes by the British and Dutch, essentially to enhance their exploitation of human labour and village lands. The state in contemporary Indonesia has more control over its villages than did the Dutch or any other elite group in the past. Therefore, the contemporary state is in some ways the most oppressive ruling elite in the nation’s long history.

Many labour laws were also implemented in the Dutch era specifically to protect women. The Civil Code of 1927 (article 16f) stated that women entering formal employment were considered to have had their husbands’ permission and her wages were to be used for the benefit of her family only. The Labour Ordinance Act of 1925 prohibited women from working between the hours of 10 PM and 5 AM, to protect them from factory work at night, ideally when they should be tending to family matters. This was upgraded in 1941 to allow women to work at night in certain factories depending upon demand. These laws have been re-written in almost identical format by
Indonesia and adopted their 1948, 1951 and 1989 Labour Laws and constitutions (see GRC, 1994/95:334-335 and Vlekke, 1957:77). However, they have achieved very little.

**Feminising Industry**

Recent export-oriented labour intensive manufacturing development in Indonesia has been claimed to have created a new *feminised* work force. At the macro-level and using gross statistical data, this is an accurate claim. However, if historical background and contemporary local studies are used in West Java, contradictory evidence is revealed. Analyses of Dutch and British census data reveal that West Java in the 1990s is, in many ways, a carbon copy of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. In both periods the industrial sector was similarly reliant upon cheaper, gender specific labour. Confusion exists as to what exactly feminisation of manufacturing means. Lim (1993) sees it as the channelling of large numbers of Third World women into export-oriented manufacturing. However, CAW (1995:267) claims feminisation in the developing world occurs when large numbers of women are found as factory operators and rarely as supervisors. I found both views not to be completely accurate of the situation in Banjaran. Thirty seven percent of the 323 women surveyed stated they worked directly under a female supervisor, and 97% of these female supervisors were local Sundanese women. Obviously, confusion exists over claims of recent feminisation of labour, claims which need to be addressed in this thesis.
Lim (1993:195) claims the feminisation of labour in the developing world was relative to three economic phases: 1) The boom years of the 1960s and 1970s; 2) The world recession of the 1980s; 3) Structural adjustments in accordance with point 2, whereupon economic recession forced manufactures to cut costs by replacing male labour with less expensive female labour. However, to claim feminisation of manufacturing is a recent and globally relevant phenomenon is naive. Historical analysis contradicts this claim and reveals the extent to which the Dutch and the British used their own notions of gender specific employment practices upon Indonesian women long before the boom years of the 1960s.

In Indonesia, women working in the contemporary manufacturing sector are found in a few very specific sectors. In reality, only three major sectors of Indonesia's very diverse manufacturing industry are feminised. In 1994 the manufacturing sector accounted for 13% of total employment in Indonesia, of this 13%, 32% were women. According to Indonesian state data, women only dominate three major sectors in terms of employment. These are Food and Tobacco (52% feminised), Textiles and Garments (70%) and Chemicals (50%). To highlight this point more specifically, of the 31 sub-sectors of manufacturing which make up most of Indonesia’s industrial sector, women only dominate three. These are Textiles (74%), Tobacco (76%) and Shoes (79%) (Bappenas, 1993). Further, men dominate certain sectors such as
cement and steel manufacture, to a greater extent than do women in shoes and garments, for example. Claims of feminisation need to be presented more realistically and specific data provided.

Archival data also reveals that feminisation of manufacturing in West Java is not a new phenomena. According to the 1905 population Census, there were 77,000 industrial workers in West Java. Most were in Bandung and Batavia and 33% were women. By 1930 the number of industrial workers in West Java alone had risen to 347,000, 51% of whom were women (Sayogyo & Wabyuni, 1994:42). Further, Grijns (et al,1992) in their analysis of female labour in West Java’s manufacturing sector stated the following:

If a comparison is made between the situation in 1930 and 1985... it can be said that for the whole of West Java (rural and urban) the ratio of women employed in the industrial sector fell from 116 in 1930 to 52 in 1985, which means that, while there were originally more women than men in the manufacturing sector of West Java, the position is now the reverse.

Further evidence to dispute recent feminisation is not hard to document. For example, according to the 1930 Dutch Census, there were 20,279,642 Native Workers in Indonesia of which 44% were female. Of these, 14.5 million were located in Java, of which 48% were female. 11% of total workers were in the manufacturing sector. Of this 11%, 66% were female (SJVN, 1941). While there is a lack of methodological fit between the two sets of figures from two very different eras, they cast doubt on Lim’s claims above. However, in the
region of Banjaran I encountered only a handful of mothers or grandmothers of factory women who had experience with capitalist economic organisation. Further, most of this tiny minority started industrial employment in the past but were quickly forbidden by their patriarch. Sundanese culture in this small area had resisted factory employment for women until recently. By contrast, the nearby regions of Majalaya and Pangalengan have long industrial histories of global importance. Women there have long histories of industrial employment. The most likely explanation for the differences in attitudes toward women in both areas is due to the benefits working women bought to their families and local economies, benefits which slowly eroded patriarchal structures designed to inhibit female employment. In Banjaran this transformation was in its infancy.

When the Dutch and British recorded their interpretations of Indonesian history they did so with bias. Ideas about the economic role of women were transported from Holland and England into the census data. As a result, women as labour were commonly ignored or designated to very gender specific work. The idea that the export-oriented phase of Indonesia's development, since the 1970s, has created a new feminised labour force is a simplistic assumption. It ignores women as active in the economic development of Indonesia prior to the 1970s. It belittles their historical roles,
which have always been important, despite the fact that they were not always recorded in classic European economic terms.

**Cultural Issues**

Over 300 years of Indonesian literature pays scant attention to Sundanese culture, economy, religion or their role in national development. In general, the Dutch played such a heavy handed role in West Java that the Sundanese issue was glossed over and avoided for ethical reasons in the Netherlands parliament. After Indonesian independence, official policy attempted to delete the importance of Indonesia's 300 cultural groups. In official documents today the state gives little credence to ethnicity in Indonesia, a method designed to unite cultural groups spread over a vast and disparate territory. To replace local cultural identity Indonesia has unsuccessfully used Pancasila to promote Indonesian unity. In 1996/97 this precarious unity was challenged by rioting, unrest and continual violence in dozens of regions across the archipelago.

One of the earliest ethnographic accounts of the Sundanese was a mere paragraph in *Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya* (Fowler, 1923). In this book (p.15) the Sundanese were described as having a distinct language and culture, usual for highland tribes. They were portrayed as taller and stronger than the Javanese and more honest and reliable. Their clothing and customs were also contrasted with the Javanese and Sundanese women were described as being prettier than most in Indonesia. However, their civilisation
was described as 'distinctly inferior', especially when compared to the Javanese. This brief description of Sundanese culture, among many other cultures, is typical of the scant anthropological literature available on them. The Sundanese are commonly compared and contrasted with the Javanese and are therefore always viewed in their shadow.

Due to massive population growth in West Java after the 1940s, Sundanese culture has been predominantly viewed in demographic terms. That is, Sundanese culture has been analysed, but only by demographers and within a demographic framework, biased with positivism. The problematic nature of population growth in West Java was basically blamed upon the unique Sundanese culture and religion and its resistance to Javanese policies. No demographer would comment about West Java’s incredible population growth without reference to Sundanese culture. These references always hinged upon the very low marriage age of Sundanese women, their lack of status in the economy and the home, Islamic religion and a strong patriarchy (see Darroch et al, 1981; Hugo et al, 1987; Igarashi, 1988; Warwick, 1986; Widayatun, 1991; Zuidberg & Haysir, 1978). All of the authors, however, point to the very different status of Sundanese women, culturally predicated and economically motivated.
Contemporary ethnographic studies of the Sundanese are not widely available. Demographers have scratched the surface, but have ultimately relied upon quantitative data and merely provided very brief ethnographic data to support census data. This research is therefore partly ethnographic. Relations between men and women in rural villages are analysed and discussed in an ethnographic sense. For example, in Sundanese culture women are defined as being weaker than men, especially sexually, and in need of the constant protection and surveillance of their stronger male counterparts. Divorce and polygamy are very strong threats to Sundanese women and are commonly practised, though not usually by younger men. These two customs have long threatened Sundanese women. Nevertheless, many Sundanese women instigate divorce proceedings themselves and have their parents to fall back on. Complex geographic, historical and cultural factors are prominent in the development of regional gender relations in Banjaran. However, general attributes prevail, such as a strong economic patriarchy, emanating at the household level and upheld in all facets of Sundanese culture.

Customary norms regarding female-male conduct have not been studied in any great depth amongst the Sundanese. I view these norms as the contemporary outcomes of the historical categorisation of gender roles. Women in the household usually take a passive position in a conflict situation and in public
will not assume a position equal or superior to her husband. Sundanese patriarchy is publicly strong in the economy, the village and in the household. When entering a village house the household head is a male of high status. He always sat with me in a prominent position and the women of the house served tea or hot water and did not interrupt our conversations, usually seating themselves on the floor, or away from our discussions. This type of patriarchy is publicly portrayed and even in the private realm males have ascendancy. Despite these observations, women in Southeast Asia are portrayed as having very high status, especially when compared to women in India or China. Errington (1990:4) claims this is because women in Southeast Asia are not a burden on their parents, because women are the ones who control the household budget and financial decisions and because women are economically active. Sundanese women in Banjaran are perceived as a burden on their parents if they don’t work. Sundanese women do not control household budgets to the extent that other women in the region do and are not considered household heads. Therefore, Sundanese women have lived with a culturally-defined status which is inferior to most Southeast Asian women.
Chapter Summary

This chapter has concerned itself with highlighting other similar studies which have been completed on the subject of industrialisation and women in regions similar to West Java. Most have come from Java itself and a few from other Islamic nations such as Malaysia and Iran. These studies have been compared and contrasted to my own findings and in general, my research contrasts with their findings. The importance of these differences is reinforced with local relevance and cultural background. This chapter also provided historical background to the research and at the same time discussed theoretical aspects most relevant to the subject of the thesis.

The chapter has analysed the role of the state to support the thesis that investment and industrial development have been manipulated to support a repressive regime in Indonesia which at the same time ignores the reality of the lives of factory women. The complexities of the realities of these lives have been imbued with relevant historical, cultural and geographic relevance. Historical and cultural analysis was crucial in providing a holistic picture of the contemporary position of labour in rural Java, as well as highlighting the remarkable similarities between labour relations in history and those under the contemporary and repressive New Order.
The next chapter is a standard methodology chapter. However, it incorporates further literature reviews and theoretical discussions which enhance the reliability of the methodology chosen in this thesis.
Chapter Three: Methodology, Theory and Local Studies

Introduction

In recognition of the complexities and intensity of the state, cultural and biological constraints on Sundanese women, and in addressing the major research questions, an ethnographic study incorporating social surveys and questionnaires was used in this research. The objectives of the research are addressed using qualitative and quantitative data, combined with secondary data and historical analyses. This study will provide crucial micro-data needed to offset seemingly inaccurate census data and labour force surveys which, in Indonesia, are renowned for bias, manipulation and exaggeration (Bulmer, 1993). Overall, this research provides more accurate data on the household status and position of young women involved in the industrialisation process in West Java and hence provides a better understanding of the outcomes and problems of this same process on a national and regional level. The methodology used is one which, if replicated, would address those terms of reference suggested by the ILO (below) in a variety of developing nations experiencing rapid change. However, the data was not collected with the age old adage of going from the general to the particular. This method isolates local studies, hides local actors and places too much emphasis on the general. In development studies more emphasis should be placed on going from the
particular to the general, from the micro to the macro so as not to ignore human agency at the expense of grand theory or economic rationalism. This research is definitively poised to relate, compare and contrast the particular to the general, the specific local outcomes (informed through agency) to the national and international.

Women eligible to become respondents in this research project were identified in a number of stages. The women had to be Sundanese, live with their immediate family, or in an equivalent situation, and have worked in a textile, garment or shoe factory for at least six months and remain employed in this position at the time they were surveyed. Women were identified by Desa. Eleven of the 17 Desa in the Kecamatan of Banjaran were surveyed. The women were then identified by village (kampung), from lists supplied by local government officers (RWs or RTs) (See Glossary and Sampling section below). Finally, participants in the interviews, focus groups and observations were selected from the questionnaire lists themselves. The women could be of any age, marital status or educational level to highlight these factors among typical factory women in Banjaran, which were later cross-referenced with segmented factory data to reveal patterns of factory production methods and differing levels of harsh treatment. For example, Taiwanese managed factories were the most exploitative of all foreign factories sampled, typically employing very young and uneducated women.
Three hundred and twenty three women were surveyed of a total of 5,708 women in the Kecamatan of Banjaran who worked in factories and fitted the selection criteria. However, these figures are slightly skewed because, of the 5,708 women listed as factory workers in the local census, it was estimated that approximately one-quarter of these women were ineligible because they had not worked in factories for at least six months. This is due to the short term nature of factory employment and the extremely high turnover rates in some factories (Nike for example). Therefore, there were only 4,200 eligible women for study, of which 323 were surveyed. The census figures were only estimates, provided by local census data, supposedly updated every three months, but I found some to be more accurate than others.

Women were chosen to be representative of the region’s female factory workers in general. One-third of the women surveyed came from highland areas, two-thirds from the lowland villages. This decision was designed to be representative of the geographic distribution of the population. Distinct differences were evident from both areas. Information was sought on education levels, marriage and fertility, household status, the relative status of the respondents’ mothers, household income and the influences and outcomes upon all of the above as a result of new industrial development. For example, the average age for highland factory women leaving school was 12 years, compared to 15.2 years for lowland women. This point highlights the great
influence geography has upon women’s status in Banjaran and is discussed at length below.

**Methodological Rationale**

The International Labour Organisation (ILO, 1993) recommended the following strategy when studying female labour in Indonesia. It highlighted the need for future research to be historically and socio-culturally grounded due to the fact that women’s contemporary, disadvantaged labour position is rooted in societal values of the past and present. The research should be gender desegregated as women are invisible in Indonesian Censuses, as in most of the developing world. It should place ethnographic data of women’s employment patterns and positions in a macroeconomic framework in contemporary Indonesia. The role of women as child bearers, and their perceived role as simply mothers by the state, must be acknowledged as a major influence on the role of women as workers. Ethnic diversity is also a major component to be recognised in future research due to the enormous diversity in Indonesia’s cultural groups which, according to the ILO, is the biggest single influencing factor in both FLPRs and the status of women workers on a regional level in Indonesia. In this sense, I have conducted research which is recommended by the ILO (1993). The ILO recommended research which is gender based, culturally and historically oriented and sensitive to women, as is this research. This research also assumes that women
exist in a society and within complex, powerful and dynamic relations with men and indeed with their physical environment.

Regarding the cultural constraints placed on Indonesian women in the labour market, the ILO (1993) recognises the Sundanese in West Java as a prime example of a study which would need such an interdisciplinary approach. In fact, this specific reference to the Sundanese by the ILO report is unique in the literature. However, while the ILO alludes to the relationship between Sundanese ethnicity and the comparatively poorer economic status of women in West Java, it provides no direct references or evidence to support its assertion. This research was framed with these terms of reference provided by the ILO (above) strictly in mind and addresses such factors in every facet of data collection, analysis and presentation.

Research Site: Why Banjaran?

The Kecamatan of Banjaran (See Map Two) was chosen as the primary research site after two months extensive investigation in West Java in mid-1995 for the following reasons:

- The area has a Sundanese dominated population and is isolated by a large mountain system which restricts migration by the highly expansive and opportunistic Javanese to new industrial areas and signifies the extent of the geographic area to which the results of my study will be most pertinent.
- The area is inhabited by a relatively homogenous social, cultural, economic and linguistic group.
• There is no army battalion in the area yet, as there is in most large industrial sites in West Java. The army is commonly strategically located to quell potential labour unrest in heavily industrialised areas in Indonesia.
• The region is rapidly industrialising where Sawah (wet rice land) is being converted to new factory buildings, housing complexes and other developments.
• Young women are likely to have recently been incorporated into factory employment from a more traditional lifestyle.
• The region is strongly Islamic.
• Bandung, the administrative region in which Banjaran is located, (See Map Two), has very high rates of urbanisation. However, the region is unique because this urbanisation is predominantly the result of natural increase and the consequent changing of rural categories to urban ones, highlighting high population growth rates amongst the Sundanese. Such natural increase makes the research site attractive to investors as female labour can be easily replaced through natural increase as new and abundant generations of young women create cheap replacements without the need for in-migration.

Political Situation

I arrived in Jakarta for the second phase of research in late June 1996. In July 1996, massive political unrest followed by weeks of rioting occurred in Jakarta. Golkar, the ruling party of which President Suharto has been the undisputed head for over 30 years, had allegedly conspired to unseat the leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) in mid 1996, who also happened to be the previous president’s (Sukarno) daughter. Sukarno had been previously ousted in 1966 by Suharto. Riots resulted in Jakarta, in which five protesters were killed and from which over 30 people are still unaccounted for. President Suharto blamed the riots on ‘communist insurgents’, while more credible reports from the international press stated that plain clothed police started the riot and were the main aggressors. A major result of the aftermath
of the riot revealed the state’s attitude toward labour, the press and workers’
rights, which are tightly bound with this research.

I was a Western male conducting research on female labour in West Java. I
arrived in Jakarta to apply for research visas, permission and clearance from
the Indonesian police, immigration, social and political offices and from
various other agencies, right in the middle of the July 27 Riots. Labour issues
were becoming increasingly sensitive, and as a result I was faced with a
dilemma. I decided for the safety of myself, my research assistants and those
women who would participate in the research to remove any elements from
the questionnaire which could be considered sensitive, such as questions
relating to labour inspectors, trade unions and collusion between local
government officers and factory management. Upon leaving Jakarta with a
myriad of official letters, some of which carried unofficial levies, I then had to
go through the same process at the provincial government level (Kabupaten)
and then at the local level (Kecamatan, Desa, RWs and RTs). In fact, during
my entire research period, I was confronted with a seemingly infinite number
of government personal who had to be informed of my research. Many times I
was greeted with suspicion and occasionally with hostility, especially from
army officers. Further, every day of conducting research I was faced with the
potential threat of arousing suspicion as in every village there was always a
public official or ex-army officer in residence.
The city of Bandung is located within the Kabupaten (regency) of Banjaran. Within this regency is the Kecamatan of Banjaran.

KEY
- Cities
- Priangan Highlands
- Banjaran Kecamatan
- Bandung Kabupaten
- Central Java
- Bogor
- Sukabumi
- Jakarta
- Serang
- Kerawang
After blaming communists for the riots of July 1996, Golkar then arrested leading labour rights activists and journalists for supposedly masterminding the riots. Further, since this time many political opponents to Suharto have been arrested, and charged with subversion due to their involvement with labour solidarity. The most prominent of those arrested was Muchtar Pakpahan, the chairman of a leading unofficial labour union who was already fighting a four year prison sentence for his alleged involvement in labour riots in the city of Medan (Sumatra) three years previously. In 1995 Pakpahan was acquitted of the Medan charges, but then controversially rearrested for the same crime after the July Riots in 1996. He faces subversion charges, for which the penalty can be death. The ILO has protested the arrest of Pakpahan, claiming his re-arrest was politically motivated. The Indonesian state recognises the strong relationship between labour unrest and political instability. However, the state continues to solve these disputes in a heavy handed manner, with a view to keeping wages and strikes down to a minimum to continually attract foreign investment.

At the time of writing this thesis (September 1997) President Suharto had approved new labour laws which stipulated that labour unions will be “independent, democratic, free and responsible”. This legislation was in part a response to international criticisms of Indonesia’s labour standards and the growing incidence of labour unrest, violence and destruction within the nation. Considering the fact that the state only recognises one union, the aims
of the law seem absurd. However, Cohen, in her analysis (1997:21) of the new laws, stated that the details of the legislation are disturbing. She claimed that workers have been granted the right to strike, but only in their own compound and sympathy strikes were outlawed. Further, the law stated that workers must give one week's written notice of the intended strike or face a 50 million Rp fine ($US 20,000) or six months in prison. This fine is heavy handed and, when compared to the fine highly profitable and exploitative factories face for breaching labour laws ($US 49.00), is obviously designed to further inhibit worker unrest. According to Cohen, the new laws give less freedom to workers and have further alienated the state-run workers' union in Indonesia (SPSI).

My research focused on labour at a time when labour issues were being tied to attempts to overthrow Golkar's monopoly on political power in Indonesia. Further, political instability, rioting and ethnic tension led to continued burning, looting and killing in various areas of Indonesia throughout my fieldwork period, reminding me constantly to be cautious. As each step of research, from the high level government offices in Jakarta down to the household level in isolated villages, required the permission of government officers, the political situation and the way I was perceived by officials was crucial to the success of my research.
At the local level, contact was made with every possible public officer. This was very time consuming, but necessary. Especially important were the RW’s and RT’s who are the lowest level public officers in Indonesia. They report to the Village Head (Lurah) and live in local villages. They keep lists of every person under their jurisdiction and data on births, deaths and marriages, which are updated every three months. They also have data on employment at the household level, including women who work in factories. Before entering a village the RW or RT, or both, were contacted and asked to write a letter of permission before we entered the households within their jurisdiction and usually the RW or RT accompanied us to the houses for survey. In this way trust was gained and people suspicious of Westerners were put at ease. Cigarettes were given to lower level public officers and more expensive gifts such as cigarette lighters or books were only given to higher level officers with whom I had to liaise on a regular basis. Gift giving is culturally acceptable and expected, especially at the local level and was always greeted with friendliness and seemingly improved relations between myself and those public officers with whom I worked to complete my research.

Decisions to avoid certain geographic areas within Banjaran were infrequent. Of the hundreds of households entered, only three provided a hostile or uncooperative response and in these situations, after consultation with the local RW or RT, questionnaires were continued in alternative households. However, if the entire Desa was considered hostile it was totally avoided. At
the Desa level, the 17 small political units which made up the entire Kecamatan of Banjaran, only two responded with an uncooperative reaction to my research. Before any village in the Desa was entered, I reported to the Village Head or Lurah to provide information of my arrival, intended research and which villages within the Desa I would survey.

Fifteen of the Lurah were cooperative and showed great interest in the project. The two uncooperative Lurah were initially avoided. However, one of these Desa was highly industrialised with a large number of large factories located within its boundaries, yet it was classified "Tertinggal", which means it is among the poorest of all villages in Indonesia and requires special assistance from the government. Before leaving the area it was considered crucial to study this Desa because it provided an excellent example of industrial development failing to benefit the local people (See Chapter Seven), contradicting claims by the government that economic development was filtering down to the poorer people in the nation. After consultation with Pak Budi, my male research assistant, and after hearing his willingness to conduct research in this Desa, it was decided that it was to be the last Desa surveyed and the results were enlightening. Pak Budi knew the risks to his position, but decided after consultation with his father (a high ranking government officer) that such an action would not compromise himself or the respondents. Nevertheless, precautions were taken in the form of creating close personal contact with all RTs and RWs (village officers below the Lurah) and asking for
their support and advice, which they were pleased to give. Many stated that because I had followed the local custom, which means to give respect to elected officers, and by being humble in asking for their advice, that I was not considered a threat because ‘I had respected their way of doing things’. Further, the consensus from the RTs and RWs from this particular Desa was that the Village Head (Lurah), who had originally been hostile, was connected with the ‘local’ Chinese who controlled most of the factories in the Desa. They claimed he actually worked for them.

Theory and Local Studies

A major problem attempting a local study, such as this, which has a definitive focus on the respondents as actors, is presenting the thesis in such a manner that its implications are open to a wider audience. In this case theoretical concerns became paramount. Theory was crucial in putting the micro data in a framework relevant at the macro level. The data presents information in such a manner that development planners can view the outcomes of macro-development strategies, the national and international political economy and economic rationalism at the ground level. The study therefore incorporates macro-data of the recent Indonesian economic and political situation with local data.

A major theoretical aspect of this thesis is the relationship between development research, local studies and macro outcomes. This thesis assumes
that despite being a local study, its major findings are important to allow a contrast with similar studies. For instance, industrialisation, as pursued recently by many developing governments, has resulted in the same forced structures imposed on the people from above. These structures have tended to affect women and their households in similar ways. For example, a common outcome when women are drawn from more traditional lifestyles into factory work is conflict within the traditional patriarchy (Jamilah, 1994; Mather, 1988; Buang, 1993; Hardjono, 1993). I recorded similar conflict in Banjaran, though it was less public.

My goal is to provide constructive research which can be used to further the theoretical argument concerning women and development. Local studies provide crucial data of the development process from a wide variety of nations which can be later 'stitched together' to create one or two paradigms ensuring that local outcomes of development are not ignored in the future by development planners, national governments and economists, especially those contracted to the United Nations, The World Bank and other transnational development agencies. In summary, the research challenges the assumption of a shared global experience of women drawn into manufacturing from different regions of the globe, highlighted dramatically by the different findings of research about Javanese and Sundanese women drawn from rural areas into large manufacturing industries.
There still remains the problem of integrating what is essentially a micro, or local, study within broader structures in Indonesian society and with relevant theory. The major problem is not only the difficult task of integration between the micro and the macro but also the fact that no grand theory has yet been put forward which can explain exactly the outcomes of development upon women in the developing world. If world experts in the field of gender and development continue to argue over theoretical concerns and the position of gender in relation to development theory then my role can merely be to add to the solution by providing new insights which will enlighten certain aspects of the theoretical debate.

**Sampling**

A number of sampling methods were used to guide the data collection phase of this research. However, a word of warning to researchers attempting to translate sampling methods from a leading text or research design to the field in the developing world is necessary. It doesn’t work. Flexibility is the key as well as using a number of sampling methods to collect different ranges of data. For example, a random sample was attempted in the research location. However, heavy rainfall, extremely poor roads, a lack of respondents in some villages and political problems caused me to abandon a purely random sampling frame of factory women in Banjaran. Instead, a more pragmatic sampling system, which used different sampling methods in different situations, was followed and is discussed below. Sampling methods were
geared toward the geographic-political organisation in rural Indonesia, especially at the local level. The political organisation is outlined below.

- *Kabupaten* of Bandung = regency within the province of West Java. The *Kabupaten* (regency) of Bandung houses about 7 million people. There are 20 *Kabupaten* in the province of West Java (See Map Two above).
- *Kecamatan* of Banjaran = there are 41 *Kecamatan* within the regency (*Kabupaten*) of Bandung. Each *Kecamatan* houses approximately 100,000 people (Map Two).
- *Desa* = 17 Desa make up the *Kecamatan* of Banjaran and each Desa is headed by a Lurah or Village Head. Clusters of villages or hamlets constitute a Desa in Banjaran. Each Desa houses approximately 5,000 people (Map Three & Four below).
- *RW or Rukun Warga* = is the second lowest level of public administration and the *RW* is directly responsible to the Lurah.
- *RT or Rukun Tetangga* = is the lowest level public officer in Indonesia and is responsible for clusters of families.

To arrange the sampling design for the questionnaire, population statistics were sourced from all Lurah in Banjaran. They were asked for the approximate number of female factory workers living in their Desa. From this information a list was made of all 17 Desa. Two were immediately ineligible due to political factors already discussed above. From the 15 Desa remaining eligible, 11 were targeted, representative of both highland and lowland villages. The number of women surveyed in each Desa and village was directly related to the total female working population in factories from that particular area. For example, in Desa 7 (Table 3.1), there were 654 women working in factories. Of these, 38 were chosen for the questionnaire, five families for the in-depth interviews and eight women for the focus groups. Every Desa was sampled in this way. However, due to the relatively
homogenous nature of the population, random sampling was not considered crucial.

The best way to describe the sampling frame used in this research is an area sample. Lists were used from either the Lurah, RW or RT, (Desa censuses) which contained census data of all villages in the Desa chosen, including the number of female factory workers in residence as a proportion to total population. However, because women were selected from lists, which were attached to villages, which in turn were attached to the Desa, the sample had characteristics similar to cluster sampling. The first cluster being the 17 Desa, the second being all the villages in the Desa selected and the third cluster being the village women themselves. The 323 women who completed the questionnaire, the 64 women from the focus groups and the 20 in-depth interviews are considered to be representative of the Banjaran population. Therefore, the sample is also based on principles of probability theory, as it is representative of a larger population.

The size of the sample was formulated as the research proceeded. Originally 500 women were to be surveyed. However, due to the homogeneity of the female clusters sought, the homogeneity of the population, the exhaustion of research funds and the heavy rainfall, 323 women were surveyed. 323 women were deemed enough to be accurately representative of female factory workers.
due to the large number of interviews and focus groups completed and the exceptional richness and depth of this data. Finally, because I was also studying households where female factory women resided, I decided that choosing a few households from each and every selected village, depending upon the village population and factory workers in residence, was an accurate research method. The fact that I chose to travel to every village, no matter how isolated or costly, was a better option than studying large numbers of households from a few conveniently located villages.

During early periods of data collection in the highland villages it became obvious that the sampling frame successfully used in lowland areas needed revising. One of the first villages we entered was about ten kilometres from central Banjaran. The terrain was so steep and the roads so poor we had to enter on foot. My assistant fell many times on the mountain road leading to the village and it took us over two hours to get there. When we arrived the three factory women who reputedly lived in the village had recently moved closer to the factories due to transport difficulties. There was no-one to survey and much time and effort had been wasted. Further, in other highland villages only a few possible respondents were available and many had none at all. To avoid this sampling problem required day to day flexibility. If we had data which stated there were four factory workers living in an isolated village we would first clarify if they still lived in these villages. If they did we went there for survey. If we arrived in a village and found only three or four factory
women, we surveyed all of them as it seemed a complete waste of time to travel large distances and only survey two out of a possible four women. However, overall, a representative balance was achieved between women from the highlands sampled and those from the lowlands (Table 3.1). A ratio of 3:1 between lowland and highland areas was achieved in all facets of data collection (individual women sampled, interviews, focus groups and total number of villages sampled) which corresponded directly with the overall number of factory women listed in Desa censuses mentioned above.

Data Collection

To answer the major research questions a combination of both quantitative and qualitative data was collected. Quantitative data was collected via the questionnaire (Appendix 1). Two thirds of the questions in the questionnaire required purely quantitative answers, while the remaining questions were open to qualitative answers. The questionnaire was initially tested upon 15 women and obvious flaws were rectified. The final questionnaire was significantly different from the original drafted in 1995 in Perth. Further, a questionnaire was implemented upon all 17 Village Heads (Lurah) in Banjaran (Appendix 2). This questionnaire sought census data as well as incorporating open ended questions relating to the relationship between factory management and public officers in the organisation of female labour. Data from the Lurahs also sought information about the positive and negative outcomes of industrial
employment for women from their respective Desa, and the results were enlightening and valuable.

Table 3.1 Sampling Frame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desa</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>No. Factory Women</th>
<th>No. Surveyed</th>
<th>H/Land or L/Land</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,450</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5,055</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>H/Land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4,594</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>H/Land</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,393</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>L/Land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,071</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>H/Land</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>13,573</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>5,628</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>L/Land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>4,897</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>L/Land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>6,863</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>L/Land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>H/Land</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>9,377</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>L/Land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>6,885</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>L/Land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>9,282</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>5,997</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>L/Land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>6,170</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>H/Land</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>5,528</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>L/Land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>6,259</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>L/Land</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>114,622</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,708</strong></td>
<td><strong>323</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>109</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quantitative data was also analysed from other sources, sources which provided raw data only and very little objective analyses. For example, the Indonesian Statistics Department (Biro Pusat Statistik) had collected very recent data of a similar nature to my own. However, this data was collected over vast areas, by mail or by poorly trained researchers, without cultural
Map Three: Banjaran Kecamatan

Names of The 17 Desa: (See Table 3.1)
1. Sindangpanon  Both
2. Jahsari  Highland
3. Nagra  Highland
4. Ciluncat  Lowland
5. Bandasari  Highland
6. Banjaran  Both
7. Margahurip  Lowland
8. Neglasari  Lowland
9. Kiangroko  Lowland
10. Pananjung  Highland
11. Banjaran  Lowland
12. Cangkuang  Lowland
13. Ciapus  Both
14. Tarajusari  Lowland
15. Meharjaya  Highland
16. Tanjungseri  Lowland
17. Kornasan  Lowland

See Map Four (Rear Page) for more detail of this map, including the Highland/Lowland distinction which could not be accurately represented here.
relevance and was open to manipulation by Golkar. Further, in 1996 the government was in the process of passing a Bill which would force researchers using Indonesian statistics to gain official approval of their analyses of state produced data before release of their research was allowed (TJP, Sept 16, 1996). When passed, the Bill will place serious constraints on the analyses of state data. It is an attempt to quell the growing criticisms of Suharto's regime and the state's manipulation of its own social and economic data. Therefore, the data from BPS was used sparingly and to provide comparisons between the inaccuracies of quantitative data collected *en masse* and quantitative data collected in a more careful manner and to place Indonesian women in a macro framework to allow for a more general understanding of their socio-economic status.

Each day usually 5 to 8 questionnaires were completed. They were written onto hard copies and the next day transferred to computer whereupon the quantitative data was separated from the qualitative. The names of the respondents were not recorded on the questionnaires. Questionnaires were completed in the households at a time convenient to the female factory worker. Women were selected to participate in the survey in a random fashion. Their age, marital status or location of their employment was not considered in the selection process. Upon entering a village and meeting the RW or RT, a list of respondents was drawn up and from this list women were selected for survey. From each list written, and depending on the overall number of
women working in factories from the Desa as a whole, a number of women were chosen for survey. They were not always home, were ill, were working overtime or were socialising and in such a situation an alternative respondent was sought after consulting the list. The only criteria for selection was that the women had worked in a factory for more than six months, lived with their family or as part of a family unit and travelled daily to work in a textile, garment or shoe factory of any size.

Every village in every nominated Desa was considered for sample. Not all villages had female factory workers present. In exceptional villages women were sometimes impossible to survey due to long working hours and difficult terrain. During the survey stage, possible respondents for family interviews and focus groups were identified and asked if they would like to participate at a later date. Usually those women who were most confident with the initial questionnaire and comfortable with myself (as I had to be with their answers) were chosen. Twenty family interviews were conducted and 7 focus groups completed. The focus groups involved over 60 women (including mothers of workers), all of whom were identified during the questionnaire stage and represented most Desa nominated.

Due to transportation problems, two focus groups were held in villages close to the participants, the remainder were conducted in my home. Transport costs, one day's factory wage (5,200 Rp) and small gifts were given to all
participants in the focus groups, which usually lasted for two hours. This qualitative data was recorded on cassette tape, transcribed to English by myself and my assistant and entered onto computer. The focus groups were used as a forum to deepen my knowledge of the women’s own perception and understanding of their status in the household, villages and factories and this solved problems presented by the limitations associated with the analysis and presentation of purely quantitative data. The methodology chosen gives validity to the research as it expands the sources of data collection.

Data Analysis

Quantitative data was analysed using the computer software package Lotus 123. Qualitative data from the questionnaire was also analysed with this same package. All questionnaire data was entered onto two main spreadsheets in Lotus 123, one for each form of data. Each column in the spreadsheet correlated with a question from the questionnaire and ‘open’ answers were numerically coded to create a more compact spreadsheet. Using Lotus 123, data could be analysed in any number of ways and it was decided to analyse the data in conjunction with the major research questions and the major chapters in this thesis. For example, in the section which relates to changing female status in the household as a result of factory employment, questions in the original spreadsheet which related to this topic were isolated, copied, separated and pasted into a new spreadsheet labelled ‘changing female status’. This data was analysed and used in conjunction with the various relevant
forms of qualitative data to create an analysis, argument and conclusion which
drew on every aspect of the data collected and, at the same time, avoided all
possible shortcomings associated with the exclusive use of either qualitative
or quantitative data.

Qualitative data obtained from interviews, focus groups, observation and data
from journals, diaries and conversations with key informants were initially
transcribed into English onto separate documents. Later these documents were
sorted according to subject and incorporated into key documents. For
example, for the topic of household incomes and expenditure, any data which
related to this topic was copied from the original document and pasted into a
new document which only contained data on that topic. The new document
was then reviewed and edited and the resulting analysis was used in this thesis
in conjunction with the results of quantitative data analysis.

Quantitative data is used merely as an analytical tool, to provide an alternative
form of data to support or critique other studies of a similar nature. However,
in particular sections of this research, quantitative data will be more heavily
relied upon. For example, quantitative data has some very important strengths,
such as in measuring the importance of a relatively large number of female
wages over a wide geographic area in relation to wage levels of other
significant members in their households. Data was collected on the incomes of
all family members to provide an insight into the importance of female factory
employment. This data was then reinforced with qualitative data, particularly observations, on the way in which women's factory wages were spent on a daily, weekly and monthly basis and especially in times of crisis, which were common in most poor households where the female factory worker was a significant income earner.

Quantitative data was more relied upon in certain sections of this thesis. In other sections qualitative data was the mainstay of the research, and in other sections a balanced combination of both forms of data was used. This method was decided upon despite the claim by many researchers that an even balance should be found between the two forms of data at all times. Such an approach is too inflexible for this particular research topic and did not at all times provide a means to answer the research questions.

Validity of the Data

Data validity refers to the proposed intentions of the research, and ability of the resulting collected data to match the lifestyles and behaviours of the respondents. Further, data validity refers to the collection of two forms of data, qualitative and quantitative. Validity of quantitative data refers to the ability of the data collected to measure and distinguish between individuals who differ with respect to objective measures. The qualitative predictive aspect of validity refers to the ability, knowledge and skills of the researcher to identify and differentiate data into social categories for analyses. Validity in
Qualitative research implies gaining knowledge and understanding of the true nature, meanings and characteristics of a phenomenon (women's status). Measurement is not the ultimate goal; rather, knowing and understanding the phenomenon is.

I visited the research site (Banjaran) in 1995 before I formulated a research design. Visiting the area, before returning to Australia and writing a research proposal and research design, proved an invaluable method of validating the data collected via the process of developing culturally and geographically informed research design methods. Questions posed in the questionnaire were designed not to be leading. They were based on the recent history of the respondent's employment and household status (the last 6 months) and were designed to be culturally relevant to the respondents. The follow up interviews and focus groups were designed in the same manner. Respondents selected for further interviewing and focus groups were selected on the basis of their ability to understand the survey questions, their quickness of response and the level to which I trusted their responses. Further, as mentioned above, the questionnaire was tested before implementation on 15 respondents, some from nearby my house in lowland Banjaran and others were drawn from more remote areas. All were paid the equivalent of one day's factory wage. All were asked to read the questionnaire and point out any questions they found offensive or did not comprehend and appropriate amendments were made. Further, I sat with three respondents and we read the questionnaire together to
double check the initial testing procedure and they reacted positively to the survey questions.

There was one considerable problem which became evident in the testing stage of the questionnaire. A significant number of the 15 respondents tested, or their parents who answered a few questions on the questionnaire, supplied questionable answers. For example, the question which sought data relating to the mothers age at first marriage was answered generally with the same age-17 years. However, 17 years of age was recently the legal minimum age of marriage for women in Indonesia and I suspected that responses of this age were politically motivated. By calculating the current mother's age and that of her first born it was obvious the stock answer of 17 years was inaccurate. In fact it was calculated that most mothers were married at very young ages. Once their real marriage age had been established, they were asked to comment and all agreed with the new age.

Other questions posed during the testing stage which related to the income of the fathers, received the same questionable answers as did those relating to marriage age. The fathers' incomes tended to be boosted somewhat. After polite questioning, however, it was found that the father would commonly overestimate his monthly income, especially if his daughter was earning more than him. Therefore, when these questions were asked in the final survey stage, they were earmarked for further investigation and the research assistants
were trained to look for stock, standard or inaccurate answers to those questions which surfaced during the testing phase as problematic. Finally, extreme patience was needed when implementing the questionnaire to ensure that the respondents were not rushed, that they felt relaxed and understood the questions they were being asked and that words were not 'put into their mouths' for the sake of research convenience. Every possible measure was taken to ensure the data collected was not contaminated by invalid design methods or through researcher bias. Research assistants, who lived locally, were well trained by myself in this regard.

Reliability of the Research

Reliability of the data collected in this research is a reflection of the research design itself. Reliability can also refer to the ways in which the data was analysed or in the real potential the research design has to be used in other settings, in other countries and remain effective. Reliability also relates to the extent to which a research design was formulated with consideration of literature relevant to the topic. Literature searches played a very important role, and extensive searches were carried out throughout the entire research period to ensure claims made in the thesis were reliable. For example, literature searches uncovered scant material on Sundanese women vis-a-vis industrialisation in rural areas. Further, the literature search revealed that very little research had been done incorporating the household, factory employment, female status and local culture as key and highly interdependent
variables, as this research has done. For this research design to be reliable the author must be confident that the literature searches were exhaustive and pragmatic. To this end, this research was designed to address the lack of literature with respect to the major research questions and to highlight the need for such an approach to be developed as a model for others to work with, especially those who wish to focus on women, culture and rural development, which is an increasingly prevalent phenomenon in the developing world.

Sundanese culture and its relationship with industry is a major component of this research, especially of the ways in which culture allows or inhibits the power and status of factory women to adapt to an introduced industrial culture. For this reason the research has the ability to be used as a model in other areas. The methodology was designed to allow an objective focus upon women, culture and industrialisation and at the same time did not view the respondents as an homogenous, seemingly robotic group without individual personality as demographic research on Sundanese women has tended to do (see Hardjono & Hill, 1989; Hugo et al, 1987; Igarashi, 1988; Widayatun, 1991). Further, the research did not view women as isolated from men. Women must be viewed within their relations with men and not separated from these. The research design could be transported to other rural areas where a strong cultural group faces similar, drastic changes due to industrialisation which absorbs many women as 'new' workers. More importantly, the research design would be ideal for future research in rural
areas, occupied by a homogenous cultural group which has tended to be ignored by researchers in the past and hidden by the state in its pursuit of stability and development.

Because rural industrialisation will become an increasingly prevalent phenomenon, as the major cities of the developing world reach a point where expansion is not practical and where urban resources are stretched to breaking point (Jakarta, Bandung, Calcutta, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, for example), this type of research model will become increasingly necessary. Industry has increasingly been forced to re-position itself in rural areas where the labour force is as yet untapped, less likely to resist exploitation and considerably cheaper. Further, many governments are now promoting rural enclaves for industrialisation to alleviate overpopulation and slow the massive urbanisation trends in the developing world. This research design provides a new blueprint for the study of industry as it encroaches on rural and semi-rural areas as a relatively recent phenomenon. As no doubt industry will continue to locate in rural areas, especially in nations with very high rural populations such as Indonesia, Malaysia and India, it will encounter situations similar to that in Banjaran: A declining agricultural economy, increasing unemployment and under-employment and conflict driven by modernisation. Although the cultures will differ from region to region the design can be easily adapted to be culturally specific.
By focusing on the Sundanese this research was designed to test its reliability against other similar studies (Mather, 1988; Wolf, 1990, 1992, 1994). This was done to explore if industrialisation has had a similar impact upon women's lives in similar areas. In short, this research found that women in Banjaran were influenced by industrialisation in very different ways to those outlined by Wolf and Mather, partly due to very different histories and cultures in Mather and Wolf's research area, despite the fact that they were within close geographic proximity to Banjaran. In this case suitable explanations must be provided as to why different outcomes resulted from very similar studies and hence the question of reliability is again addressed.

Language

The dominant language in the research site is Bahasa Sunda, or the traditional Sundanese language. This language is extremely complex, difficult to master and was used with great pride by the Sundanese people as it provides a strong link with their past. Bahasa Sunda is unrelated to any other language used today in the Indonesian archipelago. However, in Banjaran, a hybrid combination of Bahasa Sunda and Bahasa Indonesia is spoken in public for the ease of communication, as central Banjaran has recently become a very busy market town with more and more outsiders arriving to do business. The further one goes from central Banjaran into the highland villages the stronger the use of Bahasa Sunda becomes.
Before my arrival I had studied Bahasa Indonesia to the upper intermediate level and had no communication problems in that language. After a few months in Banjaran I was able to communicate effectively, but was still required to use research assistants and translators for pragmatic, ethical and economic reasons.

The most pressing question associated with the validity of data collected in a developing non-English speaking country is the potential for the translation process to contaminate the data or distort the words of the respondents themselves. Back Translation was used to translate qualitative data into English and is an approved method of translation (Bulmer & Warwick, 1993). Back Translation literally meant that when data was originally translated from Indonesian to English, or vice versa, the resulting translation was then isolated and 'back translated' to the original language to ensure the accuracy of the translation process.

Many survey questions used in the developing world, despite being well translated and the concept adequately presented, are often mis-understood or commonly evoke a different response from different language groups (Bulmer and Warwick, 1993:155). I would add to the above that people from the same language group, but with different socio-economic status, education levels or employment patterns would also tend to provide differing responses to the same questions. However, because this research was only aimed at one
linguistic group of women and men, with similar educational, vocational and economic backgrounds, the potential for the eliciting of two types of response to the same question, through mis-understanding, was avoided. I listened carefully to every answer given by the respondents and made sure these answers were accurately conveyed to the questionnaire sheet by the assistant.

In the formulation of research questions, conceptual equivalence was a major priority and words were chosen to avoid ambiguity. For example, words like household can be easily translated to Indonesian (Rumah Tangga) without changing their conceptual meaning, as could words like decision making, wages and status. Simplistic words were used in all aspects of research to ensure conceptual fit and to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding on the part of the respondents and to a lesser extent the research assistants. This method was considered most appropriate considering the relatively low education levels of all the respondents, the lower education levels of their parents and the very poor quality of education in Indonesia in general. Furthermore, due to the educational gap between the research assistants and the average respondent in the field, conceptual equivalence was deemed important and, in the training of assistants, this point was given priority to ensure the assistants understood the potential for mis-understanding due to the educational gap.
I employed local research assistants with fluency in English, Bahasa Indonesia and Bahasa Sunda. Initially, Yuyun, a female assistant was employed who spoke all three languages very well and the survey stage of my research began. A female assistant was considered crucial as I was investigating Sundanese women. However, as an unmarried Western male travelling to isolated villages alone with a single Sundanese female, sometimes on foot, by horse and cart or motor cycle, gossip and allegations began to surface. In one instance my assistant was chastised verbally and later said she was too ashamed to go into those villages again. Further, in the household situation, a female assistant sometimes had problems controlling male members who immediately tried to dominate proceedings in a questionnaire or interview situation. Yuyun, who was relatively well educated and unusually fair skinned, attracted much attention in the highland villages and was commonly viewed as an ‘outsider’ by the dark skinned, highland Sundanese. As a result, I decided to try a male assistant in these locations instead.

A male assistant, who was also fluent in all three relevant languages, was employed and used in the highland areas with great success. Pak Budi was from central Banjaran as was Yuyun. However, as a male of 27 years of age he had travelled widely throughout the Kecamatan of Banjaran. By contrast, Yuyun had rarely left her home Desa. He was able to have more control in the survey situation if men tried to dominate proceedings and generally in the highland villages, we were more welcomed with less suspicion than I had.
been previously with a female assistant. From that time Pak Budi was used in all isolated villages and for meetings with government officers, while Yuyun worked successfully in central Banjaran. Both attended interviews and focus groups with me. Pak Budi (being dark skinned) was perceived as more local by the villages and the way in which he conducted himself at the household and government office level proved very successful, due mainly to his exceptional public relations skills.

Pak Budi assisted in the translation of all interview and Focus Group data. They were recorded on cassette, written into hard copy and later translated into English (Back Translation) and transferred to computer. At all times Pak Budi worked under my supervision. However, as a university graduate who had recently completed postgraduate research on factory waste systems in an area adjacent to Banjaran, and who was very familiar with the complex processes associated with conducting such research, and considering his personality, which was straightforward and honest, I have the utmost faith in his translation and the advice he gave during the research process. At times Pak Budi suggested alternative research methods and procedures which were highly successful and his local contacts and experience with factories and government officers proved invaluable. Moreover, Pak Budi’s father and grandfather were powerful members of the local Golkar party. However, in spite of this they supported my research once they understood its aims and provided crucial political insulation for my research.
All questionnaires, interviews, focus groups or other forms of data collection (such as visiting young women at the local school) were personally supervised by me. I attended every interview/questionnaire in every house and followed the questions closely looking for mistakes, mis-interpretation or oversights, which can occur easily with such a survey. I entered every house which was surveyed, firstly as a form of quality control of data collection and secondly to search for prospective respondents for interviews and focus groups and third, out of respect for the Sundanese themselves. Coming to the house no matter how isolated, or the vagaries of the weather and poor transport systems, was a source of surprise and greatly appreciated by the local people. Many commented that usually researchers send local people in to fill in the forms and don’t bother to go themselves, especially government sponsored research. Entering every house no matter how poor or isolated gave the people a sense of pride because a Western researcher showed interest in their lives and many of the female factory workers claimed my presence made them feel that they were important. These comments were common and usually directed to my assistant privately who later conveyed the messages to myself reinforcing my perception that I had taken the right steps towards becoming accepted in Banjaran.
Limitations

All research has limitations. The key to good research is to identify these limitations before going into the field, especially upon arrival at the research location, and then to take steps to nullify their impact. In social science research, the potential for researcher bias or methodological weakness to negatively affect research projects, including this particular project, are obvious. This research had obvious limitations. I am a relatively well educated Western male who was researching female factory workers in a Muslim country with strong traditional patriarchal values. Talking with women commonly meant obtaining permission from the male household head. However, free standing Sundanese culture does not prohibit women from expressing their opinions. It does not overly stifle the independence of younger women and, because I was encountering a new generation of women factory workers, well used to dealing with male supervisors, managers and international buyers, I found no problem created by gender. In fact my status as a male allowed me access and privileges a female researcher would not have been granted. Nevertheless, all of those males mentioned above have positions of considerable power over women, and I had to be continually aware that the women may provide answers designed to please me.

Women in the interview and focus group situation occasionally showed signs of nervousness and worry. However, a set of simple game like questions were devised in this situation to make the women relax and they worked extremely
well. On all occasions the focus groups and interviews proceeded successfully. Nevertheless, I do recognise that this research, with an affiliation based on gender stereotypes, has the potential to bias my final analysis.

Living in a predominantly rural Muslim society, and attempting to access privileged information from female subjects also posed a problem of limiting my research due to problems of researcher alienation. In Banjaran I lived with, and paid rent to, two factory workers, a mother and daughter, and in the evenings socialised with male and female factory workers nearby as there were many in the local area. From the first day I arrived in Banjaran I made every possible attempt to become accepted into the community. I followed all beverage rules, I ate their foods and respected their beliefs. If I was unsure how to act in a certain situation I simply asked for guidance so as not to be offensive. This was usually greeted with enthusiasm and amusement by the host. I refrained from speaking English and immediately learnt the basics of the local dialect. I made myself available to local people who asked a never ending set of questions about me and Australia, which I answered honestly. The Sundanese people I encountered were extremely interested in my lifestyle in the West.

I lived in a house which was an average sized house for the area. I used all forms of transport which local people and factory workers used and refrained from spending large amounts of money. I believe I was accepted into the
community and evidence of this came when I was officially invited to Sundanese rituals such as circumcision, Islamic prayer meetings and marriages. The invitations were delivered personally and I attended all those meetings and rites of passage to which I was invited. Further, I travelled widely throughout the region on the weekends with a troupe of traditional Sundanese dancers. Later, when I arrived in these same areas, most people already knew of my presence in the area and knew where and with whom I lived. Gaining acceptance into the community was crucial in reducing a most important potential limitation to my research, that is, I was a non-Muslim male researching Muslim women. My public respect for their religion and culture and open support for their Sundanese ethnicity was the mainstay of becoming accepted into the society.

Many Western researchers had told me to lie about certain issues whilst in the field. For example, it is customary for Sundanese to ask if you are married and because I was extremely old by their standards and still unmarried many non-Sundanese believed I should simply lie. I refused to do this and answered their questions honestly. Many were surprised that I was an ‘old’ man and not yet married but I explained I was still a student and in Australia men do not have to marry at any set age. The majority accepted this explanation. Some, however, did not but I expected a certain degree of resistance toward me. Such resistance, in fact, reinforced my belief in the significance of this study. To sum up, while I have no doubt I was not the “chameleon fieldworker, perfectly
self-tuned to his exotic environment, a walking miracle of empathy, tact, patience, and cosmopolitanism” described ‘tongue in cheek’ by Geertz (1983:56), I believe I had gained acceptance from the local community, the key being respect and honesty.

Geography, History and Place

It is my belief that issues of gender (socio-biological) and environment have tended to dilute the very important influences of geography, history and culture in recent gender and development studies. These traditional influences must be continually viewed as major social filters at the local and regional levels, through which the imposed structures of development and industrialisation must pass. As filters they are non-passive in that industrial development, to become viable in any given region on the earth’s surface, is influenced to a certain extent by geography, history and culture. Nevertheless, such filters tend to have similar outcomes in different regions and in different cultures, especially in relation to women. This thesis assumes that history, culture and geography have more influence in these outcomes than has been recently asserted, especially in relation to women and the development debate.

Geography plays an important role in all aspects of social research. From having to observe the vagaries of geo-political boundaries to transport difficulties, to the geography of industrial place, and to the gender of geography, aspects of geography were pervasive in this thesis. For example, in
June 1996, after 15 months waiting, I obtained research permission to work in the Kecamatan of Banjaran. Working outside the designated area led to conflict. Being confined to only one Kecamatan was not limiting to the data collection once I had gained a sound knowledge of the geographic area in which I was confined. However, I was definitively, geographically contained by the Indonesian state.

All respondents were coded according to their geographic distance from central Banjaran. Significant differences in education levels, marriage age and in household decision making processes, and hence the status of women was noticeable as distance increased from central Banjaran. Geography assumed a vitally important role in the final methodology chosen and was later to provide a significant comparative analysis, as the culture and status of women in densely settled and low lying central Banjaran was markedly different from that of the highland areas. The highland villages represent a more traditional agricultural society, from which the history of the economic activity of women, marriage ages, education and the general status of women could be compared to the regions in central Banjaran, which were less agricultural, extremely densely populated and showed obvious signs of modernisation and industrialisation.

Another important aspect of geography is that of gender and geography. This research applied notions of gender as landscape, that is, how has the
feminisation of industrial areas changed the landscape and, in turn, influenced cultural change? Tens of thousands of women now enter central Banjaran each day on their way to the factories, and many at unusual hours. This is a new phenomenon. The extent of the geographic area and distance covered by women has greatly increased as a result of factory employment, among other things. Further, the industrial areas are significantly feminised and in one small area in central Banjaran, 50,000 women (approximately) enter each day. The impact of such an influx was found to be significant, mainly due to the economic importance of female wages, which significantly supported transport, food and retail enterprises in industrial areas and also because this army of women had significant power due to their income. Further, the fact that they were concentrated in a small place is unprecedented in any other event in local Sundanese history. Factory women were seen as public entities and viewed simply as more than just potential mothers. They were seen as economic assets with a new form of mass power. Further, as industrial areas have been developed, usually in traditional rice growing areas which were the domain of men, which women have now come to dominate, not only in terms of power or prestige, but by their sheer weight of numbers, geography and gender must be included as a real catalyst to change within Sundanese culture.

The idea of an object (the factory) which has been imposed, influenced by foreign investment and government policy and indeed the international economy, into Banjaran is interesting from a humanistic geographical
perspective in this thesis. This place is alien and controlled from afar, has closed borders and transformed the local economy dramatically. Women are drawn in their tens of thousands into industrial complexes in Banjaran, complexes which function like politically immune embassies. They are fenced off, extremely private and have high security, in stark contrast to the very traditional public social and economic life in the area. Factories are unique in the region as they have high security while the villages and local industries are open domains and entry is rarely prohibited. Women who enter the factory are entering a place very different from local places and are, for the first time in their lives, hidden from public view and scrutiny. They go from the scrutiny of men they know to the scrutiny of non-related men. As a result they become vulnerable but at the same time may be empowered due to their lived experiences with new and sophisticated industrial cultures.

A sense of place, therefore, plays an important role in this research. Banjaran is a place of the Sundanese, and it has been for a long time. The place is open, very public and there is very little evidence of modernisation or outcomes of massive economic restructuring imposed from the macro-level by Golkar, except for the factory areas. These industrial places are highly potent in their ability to influence the women who work in them because, as they leave the public realm of Banjaran and enter the private domain of the factory, they become invisible to the outside world. Once inside, they are only visible to their supervisors and managers and must learn a new culture in a new place.
They must become acculturated quickly to the factory. How the women adjust and adapt to the factory as an alien place is important to this research, as it is pivotal in changes in attitude toward female status in the home. Many women found this transition difficult and many fathers, husbands or boyfriends continue to be extremely threatened by the factory place because, when women enter the compound, the men have no control over them. They cannot control with whom the women speak or eat and it was common to witness this conflict in the home, which was occasionally extremely violent. The factory place was a threat to the patriarchy in Banjaran as it was, to a certain extent, a place of relief for the women. Geography is a cultural, financial, and natural barrier to Sundanese women. Transport is expensive and time consuming in rural West Java. The rugged terrain, poor transport systems, over-population and cultural constraints all combine to limit women’s employment patterns.

Geography also plays an important role in providing comparative analysis in this research. Many comparisons are made between women in highland Banjaran and the lowland areas. Geography (climate) is used to explain some of the noticeable differences in the status of women from both areas. The highland regions of Banjaran have a markedly colder climate than do the lowland villages. During the wet season the air was colder and more cloudy in highland areas. The local economy was markedly slower in the highland areas as a result. Sawah was not as quick to mature and less productive. Women were, therefore, less economically active in the highland regions, which in
turn effected their household status. In some immeasurable way, I felt female status in the household was predicated by geography, which was evident in the very different position of highland women in Banjaran. I also believe this notion of geography partially explains the overall difference between Sundanese and Javanese women. The Priangan Highlands are much colder than the land of Javanese women, which is extremely hot year round, receives significantly more rainfall and is more fertile. Javanese women are more active as a result, which impacts positively upon household status through high levels of local economic activity. Physical geography has partially informed the development of two very different cultures, especially regarding women’s household status. Therefore, patriarchy is in some way influenced by geography. The slower economy and poorer soils amongst the Sundanese led to the development of local economies favouring men and excluding women, evidenced by very low FLPRs amongst Sundanese women, compared to Javanese women.

In a more theoretical sense geography was also important in understanding the gendered nature of society and economy in Banjaran. What employment is available to women in their geographic area is a very gender specific question among the rural Sundanese. For employment to be viable to rural Sundanese women it must be in close geographic proximity to Banjaran, while employment opportunities for Sundanese men are far more flexible geographically. Geography lies at the centre of understanding the labour
market in Banjaran. Sundanese women, apart from being perceived as ideal factory workers for foreign factories themselves, are significantly constrained culturally from travelling long distances to work. 18-22 kilometres was the largest distance parents would allow their daughters to travel from home. Geography is also crucial in understanding the nature of women’s employment, as Sundanese female factory workers were travelling to work within the confines of their culture in close geographic proximity. This notion of geography and employment is embedded in the public role of men and the private role of women and is reflected in employment patterns of women vis-a-vis men.

Hanson and Pratt (1995) conducted research in Worcester and Massachusetts relating to gender, geography and industrial employment and their findings are extremely useful to this research. They found (p10) that geography or distance were key elements in isolating women from employment, limiting their employment to strict regions, and in denying women political power. In short they found that distances which posed no problems to men travelling to work, were problematic for women. These same key elements of geography isolate women in rural Java and at the same time concentrate tens of thousands of women in geographic areas close to their homes. Factories deliberately locate in regions like Banjaran for just this reason. They are close to a source of rural female labour which will remain constant due to geographic and cultural factors. Domestic stereotypes confine both groups of women to the home area.
which in turn limits their choices. The fact that Sundanese factory workers are positioned in low paying jobs with little chance for future promotion is testament, not only to the international division of labour, but also to notions of gender and geography. Not only do employers reserve better jobs for men, but the restrictions of geographic movement for women is problematic in this regard too.

Historical analysis was important in a variety of ways to this thesis. Past contexts are crucial to an understanding of the present. Oral histories were obtained from focus groups and interviews with mothers and older members of the community. The oral histories focused on recent history and were designed to contrast the economic position of mothers to daughters who were working in modern factories. Oral histories from mothers and other community members were crucial in one conclusion of this research which relates to Sundanese culture and demography. Women in the recent past have had very little role to play in the economy outside the home. They rarely earned an income and if they did work in agriculture it was casually and in the shadow of their fathers or husbands. Further, the informal economy, which is exposed in the literature as a domain where women in traditional societies usually become involved in economic trading or producing, has no real relevance to Banjaran. Women were significantly limited from working in either the formal or informal economy. They were idealised as housewives (Ibu Rumah Tangga) and young unmarried women would be confined to the
household area until married and would immediately become mothers and houseworkers, possibly occasionally working outside the home. This does not apply to all women. However, it does to over 80% of those surveyed or interviewed. Younger factory workers are therefore a part of a new history in Banjaran and comparisons between their lifestyle and that of their mothers is striking and poignant.

The unique history of the Sundanese and the region, which was for most of its history controlled by Javanese kings and later the Dutch colonial forces, adds to the people's cultural homogeneity and the development of the very different role and status of women there compared to Javanese women. The Sundanese had embraced Islam more strongly than the Javanese, perhaps as a defensive mechanism against dominance by the Javanese and the Dutch, and this has been reflected in the economic and social status of their women. History continues to play an important role in contemporary Banjaran and many people related stories about the Dutch and the Javanese which highlighted this point vividly.

In many of the villages I entered, Dutch plantation (factory) ruins were evident. Overgrown by the jungle they appear now to have had very little influence upon the local culture. The remains were in some cases substantial, yet in all situations were completely ignored by the local people. The stillness and decay of these factories hides the dramatic impact colonialism has had
upon the Indonesian labour force, especially those drawn into manufacturing. These ruins are all that visibly remain of the Dutch influence and one must wonder if the modern factories I viewed will one day suffer the same fate. Like the Dutch factories, the modern factories I studied may decay and become a part of the natural landscape. However, the legacy they leave behind will also have long lasting impacts.

Chapter Summary

This chapter was fundamentally a methodology chapter. It outlined the research focus, the way in which data was collected to address this focus and discussed sampling frames, reliability, validity and theory. The use of language and translation procedures were also discussed and validated. However, the chapter was not simply a standard methodology account in many respects. Political, historic, geographic and cultural issues were incorporated into this chapter, and into the method of research itself, because that is how the research realistically functioned ‘on the ground’ in Banjaran. All the issues mentioned immediately above influenced the methodology, data collection and analysis in this research. These issues or factors had to be considered in the research design, data collection and even the way I lived from day to day during the fieldwork period. Most leading methodological texts did not prepare me for the significant influences these factors would have upon my methodology and ability to do research in the Third World. Without addressing such issues this research would not have succeeded. Issues such as
those mentioned above and discussed in this chapter need to be incorporated into any research focusing upon Indonesia and most developing nations.

The next chapter logically follows the methodology and the issues discussed in relation to it. The chapter focuses upon Sundanese women and the household. It studies the traditional and contemporary position of women in the rural household vis-a-vis the agrarian economy and factory employment. It focuses on factory women and their household status and the way in which it differs from their mothers and other women. Factors such as education, marriage, income and decision making were the basis of this focus. These factors differentiated factory women’s status from traditional Sundanese women’s status in the home and wider society.
Chapter Four: Sundanese Women and the Rural Household

Although resource constraints at the macro level have served to highlight and sharpen the agrarian problems that the state is now confronting... These problems (agrarian poverty and powerlessness) are a reflection of deep seated contradictions, which derive from the particular history of Javanese rural society and economy and which have been set in motion by the state’s efforts both to exercise tight control over rural society and to transform its agrarian production base. In acting to consolidate its power vis-a-vis the ‘floating mass’ of Javanese villages, the New Order state has generated in a different guise the very threats that it sought to suppress (Hart, 1986:211-212).

This chapter focuses upon both the traditional and contemporary position of Sundanese women in rural households. It also outlines the significant impacts of agrarian decline, industrial development and state policy upon the social and economic status of factory women, and women in general, in the region studied. Hart’s comments above apply to Javanese rural society, but are also pertinent to Sundanese rural society. The threats which Hart refers to are associated with increasing poverty, inspired by corruption, elitism and the exclusion of the majority of Indonesian people from power and basic livelihood. While at the other extreme a small group of elites control land, labour and capital (exclusion) to an extent that rural households in Java commonly face a daily struggle to survive. People in the households in my research area were in some respects fortunate to have the possibility of factory employment which provided an opportunity of formulating survival strategies based predominantly around women’s factory wages. This is a new phenomenon in the region.
Young female workers, in the households studied, were providing a new strategy for survival for members of their households in increasingly difficult times. They were normally not working just for themselves but for two, three, four or occasionally more family members, who, to varying degrees, relied on the women's meagre factory wages for health, food, education, housing and many other costs. Women who worked in factories knew the importance of their wages to their families and there was evidence of pre-conceived household strategies associated with new factory employment. Because women receiving a stable income is a relatively recent phenomenon in Banjaran, their families had no real previous experience as to where to place their daughters within a new household economic situation. This led to conflict and change as households struggled to realign traditional roles and expectations with new realities.

Introduction

The issue of gender inequality, status and family organisation is central to understanding the new household position of women who work in factories in rural Indonesia. It is important to understand the position of Sundanese women at the local level to create a realistic picture of their industrial participation patterns, the importance of their incomes and how these, in turn, impact at the household level. However, it must be remembered that household level research among rural societies is also a village level analysis, given the very close relationship between the two and the open public nature of the
households, which were always closely interconnected with the broader village life. In this chapter I place the analysis of Sundanese women's household status in a wider context by comparing and contrasting it with Javanese women. The comparison is concerned with examining the nature of the household, local economy and marriage among the Sundanese and Javanese by analysing the workforce participation of the women sampled, their household situation before, during and after factory employment and by providing a culturally specific understanding of the women concerned. This focus is important because it is from the household that factory women emanate. It is the household system which provides most support to factory women and which in turn has the most to gain from the long term employment of women (apart from investors and Rent Seekers). There is a direct relationship between traditional household systems and the status of factory women. This relationship usually surfaces in the form of labour exploitation supported by the state, which I argue places great tensions upon traditional household organisation in their ability to realign tradition.

Rural Household Status and Theory

After exhaustive literature searches I have found no one theory which provides a realistic background for this study, especially regarding household status, gender and industrial development. However, I have drawn from a few key studies already discussed in the Literature Review. While it would be easier as a researcher to create generalisations which would fit neatly into theory such as GAD, and remain convincing, the complex realities I observed deny this
luxury. I have been left with the more complex task of describing local reality and its position in relation to theory and notions of status of Southeast Asian women. I searched for women's own perspectives of female status and how people involved in rapid dynamic change perceive their own position in society, a society which is being formed by them.

The nuclear family is a Western notion driven by capitalist and industrial expansion. As industrial development eventually dominated Western society the nuclear family became the norm. Western feminists later identified the structures of the nuclear household as the basis of gender inequality. Feminist scholars based their assumption upon the new industrial gendered division of labour and the responsibility placed upon the wife in the household. Barrett (1988) claims that the logic of capitalism enforces a gendered division of labour. This logic is reinforced through the state in education and other policy. However, Barrett also claims that such divisions of labour are evident in pre-capitalist societies and are based upon gender ideologies and their relations to material possessions. Both serve to structure women's workforce activities, what they do, how they are paid and when they are active. According to Barrett, women are at the mercy of men regarding their economic status in any society. To a certain extent this is evident among Sundanese household systems, where women are ascribed gender specific roles and are aggressively perceived as inherently more suited to certain types of employment. This translates in the formal economy to women dominating repetitive low status
types of factory employment (shoes, textiles, garments) and hence to lower status in the workplace.

Barrett's (1988) household ideology claims that the gender division of labour outside the home is in fact linked to the gender division of labour in the home. Barrett claims that gender inequality in the household emanates into wider society. These notions are useful in this research because, in Banjaran, there was a strong link between gender ideologies in the household and the factory, but gender inequality is a two way process. Gender inequality can move the other way, from wider society into the household, from the factory to the household or from the local economy into the household. I found very strong evidence to support this. For example, local rice culture excluded landless families and specifically women from employment, ensuring that the majority of Sundanese women were tied to the home and were viewed as a burden, at least until factory work provided some with alternatives. Further, the most exploitative factories or sectors (sports shoes) identified in this study were intimately linked to lower status for women in the home and were eminently more patriarchal than the majority of households. They were organised in a military fashion and women who worked longer hours in the poor conditions for lower pay than the average woman sampled exhibited lower status in the home. This was due to the longer hours they were away from home, their lower contribution levels and the detrimental way local people associated such women with 'bad factories' (see Chapter Six).
Barrett (1988) assumes that all households, both in the West and the Third World, are the basis of gender inequality. This ignores the significant impact of history and culture; education and development upon gender inequality. For example, Javanese women are ascribed a very different household status as a consequence of their economic status, which is different to Sundanese women and acquired through outside economic activity. Barrett's assumptions of gender inequality emanating from both capitalist and pre-capitalist notions of material wealth are too static and ignore local cultures. Her notions don't allow for change, they do not account for the fluid nature of household organisation and the need for this organisation to change and evolve due to a myriad of social, geographic and economic factors. For example, new factory employment among Sundanese women, and the significance of their wages, is challenging both local and state norms in Indonesia. Households must adapt to women who earn more than most men in the house, to young women who are rarely home and no longer under the constant scrutiny of their male relatives and local village officers. The ways in which household dynamics change (positive or negative) in the face of new conflicts must become the focus of household studies in cultures theoretically conceptualised as patriarchal. For example, household dynamics tended to create a negative status for women overtly exploited in factories and positive status for women who worked in 'better factories'. Further, gender norms among the households sampled were not being aggressively challenged by the women. However, the structure of the households and their kinship systems had to adapt to new economic influences, which also have political, cultural and sexual under-tones.
Elmhirst (1990) provides a more realistic way to view the relations of gender inequality in the household in Indonesia. She views (p163) these relations as fluid associations based on ‘subjectives’ and material accumulation but not always in the capitalist sense of labour relations. Gender inequality in Indonesia can be partially traced to family systems. Where it can be traced, it needs specific research to highlight this and must be analysed as a particular moment in time and development, and not as a static symbol of male patriarchy on a world wide scale. Elmhirst (1990:163) recommends a focus upon the sites of gender inequality, both in the home, the workplace and beyond the family, especially at the village level in rural Indonesia. The place where gender inequalities are produced and reproduced, enforced and reinforced (house, village, factory, state) are the areas in need of focus. I found in some respects, especially when conflict arose, village society was more dominant in assigning and enforcing roles and status for women than were the households. It was evident the public village life of the Sundanese expected more in the way of gendered segregation than was evident in the households. Life in many of the households, when observed in private, tended to be more relaxed (fluid) in this regard.

Classic household status theory centred almost exclusively upon the household head, the man, usually portraying him as the only person within the household controlling its organisation, allocating status and formulating economic strategies. These theories assume the male household head is directing family
labour and resources as if he possessed all relevant knowledge. While this may be true in the simplest sense it does not accurately portray households, especially those in rural areas, where differing levels of status are evident and new status can be achieved, as many of the factory women in my research revealed. Further, household status and organisation have very strong traditional links and must be observed with historical relevance. Feminist theories of household status, on the other hand, addressed the obvious problems with classic studies of the household vis-à-vis status and proposed a new paradigm whereby many women were portrayed as household heads simply because they controlled the household budget. Feminist scholars do not analyse, however, the low status associated with controlling poor household budgets (daily bartering at the market for basic commodities with very meagre finances is a low status role assigned to women). Further, feminist scholars missed the unspoken link between husband and wife or father and daughter. While the man may hand over his income to a woman, he knows that she will spend the money wisely, and in accordance with the long standing patriarchal tradition of the household and the village. Neoclassical theory, on the other hand, assumes that all household members have the same opportunity to work, improve their status and/or achieve their ability to fulfil different functions (Hart, 1986:10). Neoclassical theory assumes perfect competition in the rural labour market, which does not exist. In relation to geography, neoclassic employment models assume people search for work in a rational manner, without regard for physical boundaries. This may be true for Sundanese men, but for the women it is not. Constraints of geography predicated on Sundanese
patriarchy deny the ability of women to seek employment wherever they wish and in this research long distances of travel for factory women was usually negatively perceived and caused conflict at home (see Table 6.3).

Household organisation in Banjaran was nowhere near as cut and dried as any of the above theories suggest. Young women had potentially more opportunity than their brothers to find stable employment, despite education levels skewed with male bias. Further, the household head, though involved in the decision initially for the young women to work in a factory, was often culturally constrained from publicly recognising the positive outcomes of factory work and often attempted to interfere with her employment to the ultimate financial detriment of the family. This does not translate to the actions of an all knowing and rational household leader. Nevertheless, households in Banjaran, despite the enormous contradictions provided by reality and the complexities associated with this reality, remained patriarchal. While I had no alternative but to conclude that the households and society I studied were basically patriarchal, many other shadow plays were occurring daily behind the scenes. All forms of household organisation in my research area were an extension of survival strategies, designed to combat increasing exclusion from access to basic resources. Commonly patriarchal strategies, or structuralism, took second place to survival. However, just as often patriarchal traditions interfered with survival.
Household strategies usually imply that a household has one commonly agreed-upon plan for survival. This is far from the reality I recorded. The idea of a common strategy was contradicted by individuals wishing to break away from their household poverty, through marriage or employment. Conflict and change were common in the houses I researched, revealing that strategies had to be changed. Strategies did exist but they were not universally agreed upon and one household member may have had a different interpretation of strategy to the next, depending largely upon gender and age. The following example highlights what I mean. Budi and Sunni were newly married at the time of my study and lived with Sunni’s parents in a very small house in a highland village. The common household strategy was daily survival based upon Sunni’s stable income and her husband’s spasmodic wage. However, soon after Sunni married, her husband insisted she leave her factory job because according to Islam, Sundanese culture and the Indonesian state, the husband must support his wife and her family. Sunni did not agree and argued against quitting her job, but her husband insisted that her place was in the home. Sunni, seemingly constrained by the husband’s argument, had no choice but to agree. So she quit and consequently her family became even poorer. Sunni decided to work as a piecemeal worker at home stitching garments for a local Chinese factory. She received less income, but her husband approved as he could monitor her every move. His constant unemployment and insistence that Sunni quit factory work was not rational, nor was it strategic from Sunni’s perspective. Both husband and wife had different interpretations of household strategies of survival.
It is obvious from the above discussion and case study that patriarchy, whilst being a difficult term to define, does function in Banjaran. Walby (1992:33) criticises the term patriarchy because it implies ... “women’s oppression is universal, and ... cannot handle historical change. Analyses which use the concept of patriarchy are criticised for being unable to deal with differences between women, especially those based on class and ethnicity”. Walby’s comments are vitally important to this research. She suggests that patriarchy should be analysed in terms of structure and she outlines six major structures through which patriarchy should be conceptualised: Paid work, housework, sexuality, culture, violence and the state (Walby, 1992:36). Further, Walby claims these structures should be viewed in terms of private (household) and public (village) patriarchy. This research has basically incorporated Walby’s suggestions into all discussions regarding patriarchy. Nevertheless, Walby’s conceptual analysis of patriarchy tends to ignore human agency and the ability of individual women to negotiate their own position vis-a-vis patriarchy. Furthermore, in Banjaran there was often no distinction between private and public patriarchy. To address these flaws in Walby’s conceptual analysis, human agency was studied more closely in this thesis and discussed in terms of its ability to change or support patriarchy.

The Nuclear Family in Reality and Theory
The nuclear family has grown to be the dominant family unit among the Sundanese, while the extended family is relatively less common. The nuclear
family is defined in this thesis as simply parents (or parent) and their
dependent children, including families consisting of parents only, living in a
separate household. The extended family is defined as a group of people
related by marriage or birth living in a household and who constitute two or
more generations of that family. The growth of the nuclear family among the
Sundanese is not simply the result of capitalist development. Massive
population increase, rural land shortages, lack of wealth and increasingly
expensive housing and living costs has meant that family units have tended to
become smaller and more splintered among the Sundanese. Large extended
households, once reliant upon agriculture, have tended to break up into smaller
more manageable units. Further, many young married couples wish to live
alone away from the scrutiny of family and to do this means living in a very
small house or sectioning off the main household. Limited access to land,
employment and resources are crucial factors in household organisation.
Nucleated families have tended to become the norm across rural Java and in a
similar rural survey to this, 73% of all households were classified as nuclear

The fact that over 85% of the households I surveyed were classified as nuclear
is not a completely true indication of the Banjaran region in general. This is
because I focused only upon young factory women and their families, the
majority of whom came from landless families. The landowning classes rarely
allow their daughters to work in factories and tend to have large extended
families. The wealthy have land and are less likely to develop cooperative
strategies. The poor create household strategies to survive or improve their situation. The level of strategic coordination was high among the households I researched and decisions to work in factories involved both parents, husbands and occasionally other siblings. On the surface at least, poor households worked as unified units in their quest for survival. The poorest households in any village had very little access to local employment and had to seek work farther from home. As a result, the women I studied were predominantly part of a nuclear household strategy, but were also individuals struggling to adapt to factory work and to their new position and role in the household and in society at large. For example, while 61% of the single women sampled handed their monthly wage over to the family (usually the mother), many lobbied to keep some of their wages for their own benefit. This was pre-arranged through discussion, but was rarely negotiable, and where this money was spent needed parental approval.

The dominant family unit of all the 323 households I surveyed was nuclear due to the fact that the large majority of young factory women were not married and they were living with parents in small ‘poor’ households. Of the smaller cohort of factory women I sampled who were married (39%) it was relatively rare to find those with children living alone, due to the expense of buying land and building a house (see page 195 for more detail). Many married couples without children lived in a nuclear situation due to the fact that they planned not to have children until they were financially able.
Overall, 15% of the cohort sampled lived in extended families, and the large majority of these were young couples with children. Generally, young married couples lived with the parents of the bride which helps young women in that they do not have to adjust to a new family or village and can live with their family until their financial position improves. This is also related to cultural restrictions of Sundanese women travelling far from home, which is quite strong. When a new husband takes up residence with his in-laws he is subordinate to the father of the house, but not to the mother, but will usually show her deep respect. When the young couple move into a new ‘nuclear’ residence the young husband assumes the role of Bapak (father). However, he is still subject to the higher status of his bride’s father no matter where the young couple reside. But the further they live from the bride’s village the less this is relevant. Sundanese brides need the protection of their parents and if a conflict results, they especially need the public support of their fathers. On the other hand, the young husbands seem to have less family support. The ideal is that young brides are extremely vulnerable when first married and are often blamed for marriage breakdowns. Therefore, the supposed patriarchal sanctuary of marriage is a contradiction. Patriarchy in Indonesia is supposed to provide protection to a woman’s reputation but the reality that her reputation can be just as easily tarnished by a bad marriage. Even after marriage, women need the continual protection of their husband or father. This has enormous implications for household status and employment because married and unmarried women have been traditionally constrained by the protective and contradictory notions of local and state patriarchy. These assumptions are
facing a pragmatic and irrepressible confrontation now that young women are entering the work force and gaining valuable experience which will allow them at least to challenge the contradictions of patriarchy, or more realistically, identify where patriarchy is failing them. The deconstructed assumptions of patriarchy, its contradictions of power, control and gender were obvious in Banjaran.

**Javanese Women**

Comparisons are made between the roles of Sundanese and Javanese women to explain the very different household functions, decision making processes and forms of patriarchy which operate among both groups of women. Ethnographic studies of Javanese women are common, while Sundanese ethnography is virtually non-existent. Therefore, this chapter provides a new perspective of women’s status in West Java, essentially contrasting Sundanese women with their Javanese cousins. I argue that Javanese women enjoy higher status for economic reasons (in reality they probably don’t enjoy this status at all as it represents hard work). Landless, rural Javanese females are significantly involved in wage labour from an early age. On the other hand, Sundanese women have traditionally been denied this role. For example, a similar local study found that landless Javanese women spent 80% of their productive capacities in hard labour, usually far from their homes (Hart, 1986:128). Sundanese women do not participate to the same extent in paid labour activities.
Javanese women have, according to Wolf (1992:57), inherited higher status than most of their Asian counterparts in terms of kinship and inheritance. According to Javanese law (adat) sons and daughters inherit equally and women have the ability to own land. Sundanese women also have the ability to own land and do inherit equally with their brothers. However, Sundanese women have inherently different status from Javanese women which contradicts any connection made between inheritance systems and female status, as Javanese and Sundanese women exhibit very different household status. Javanese women have the greater comparative ability to assert some independence before they are married, especially when they earn an income outside the home (Vreede de Stuers, 1960:44; Koentjaraningrat, 1985:139). These authors see a strong relationship between Javanese women’s high status in the household and their high levels of participation in the economy, high levels not traditionally enjoyed by Sundanese women.

The higher status of Javanese women is based upon long standing observations that they are freer to move outside their village area, outside the local market economy, to decide where they wish to work and, most importantly, in the control of their wages (Atkinson & Errington, 1990:vii). Javanese women have been portrayed as the main authority in the household, the religious organiser and the discipliner of the children, as well as having their own income and autonomy (Koentjaraningrat, 1985:139). The reported autonomy of Javanese women is economically grounded. Centuries of poverty and feudal land control in Java has led to the ability of women there to move away from their
family in search of employment. Extreme population growth in East and Central Java, combined with the Transmigration Program, which focuses almost exclusively upon the Javanese, have helped to create the image of the autonomous Javanese women. Sundanese women in West Java are less autonomous, are not as free to leave their village area and do not control their incomes to the same extent as Javanese women.

Historically, Javanese women came from a very different rice culture than did the Sundanese and this has had a major influence upon their household status. Intensive wet rice cultivation (Sawah) has dominated Javanese culture for centuries and as a result has been supportive of very high population densities. At the same time, Javanese women were necessary as workers in Sawah due to its intensive nature, with three or four crops harvested per annum. The Sundanese, on the other hand, only fully adopted Sawah this century and before that, slash and burn agriculture was the norm. Sundanese women were not as necessary to the same extent as were Javanese women. As population densities increased after the 1930s on Java, women from both groups found themselves increasingly ostracised from agrarian employment. For example, the 1930 Dutch economic surveys conducted among the Javanese found that on average, 50% to 80% of the labour expended on Sawah was by women, who traditionally occupied the most labour intensive and time consuming positions. By contrast, similar surveys conducted among the Sundanese found that in the same era in many regions of West Java men dominated agrarian employment due to an economic crisis. Furthermore, according to the
economic census of 1930 women in West Java were not involved in paid work to the same extent as were Javanese women. In that census, 44% of Javanese women were active in the workforce, compared to only 23% of women in West Java (Locher-Scholten and Niehof, 1987:85). Javanese women with a long history of agrarian economic activity merely shifted their focus to services or trading or migrated to cities if need be. In the 1930s and beyond rural Sundanese women did not work, at least not to the same extent as did Javanese women, and continued to exhibit very low FLPRs (Jones and Manning, 1992:369). Different household status resulted, which in turn impacts upon household organisation, patriarchy and women’s contemporary position regarding factory employment.

Most studies in Southeast Asia allude to ever-increasing land shortages, but continue to portray peasants as predominantly agriculturalists. This may be true in other areas, but in West Java land shortages have precluded most from agricultural work for many decades. Even before World War II, land shortages were extreme, and in a survey area very close to Banjaran, 44% of all families were landless, another 25% had only a compound to live in and 23% owned plots of dry and low yielding land of less than one Ha. (Dam, 1956:91). By the 1990s land shortages were more extreme, to the point that rural areas in West Java do not provide significant agricultural employment at all. The words of two mothers of factory daughters in Banjaran support this observation.

In my mother’s and grandmother’s era it was more common for women to work in Sawah and earn a little wage which was usually paid to their father or husband. In my era, with so
many people and new settlements, many fields have changed into villages and there is not much work, especially for women. In my mother’s era not many children survived, but in my era all the children survive forcing mothers to stay at home. My grandmother owned Sawah herself but was forced to sell it to a developer for housing, all I have now is some ducks and they are just a hobby (Data from a Focus Group in October 1996).

In my mother’s life and even in my life, women only worked a few weeks a year with their husbands then they would be pregnant again. Then they would have too many pressures. In my daughters era women have only two choices, they can marry or work in a factory. Today’s women cannot help by working in Sawah anymore because most of the land is gone to developers, and the army officers own most of the fertile land around here (Data from an In-depth Interview in August 1996).

The new settlements referred to above, like the factories, are alien intrusions onto the rural landscape, rapidly encroaching upon Banjaran. Large housing settlements are springing up all around Banjaran to cope with extreme population pressure. However, they are being built in the most unlikely areas. Most of the settlements, which are all the same design, and built by government sub contractors, are units of thousands of urban styled inner city houses, all adjoined to each other and are extremely small. They were built in rural locales, in the highland regions, where the land was cheaper, and where local owners of Sawah had no choice but to sell to developers, who were well connected with government. There were 13 of these large settlements in Banjaran alone, and scores of others in nearby regions. They are reminiscent of the high density housing used in 19th century London, built to cope with England’s industrial expansion. These same settlements are eating up very fertile land and are designed to relieve the over-population, pollution, endemic
crime and impoverishment of regions like central Banjaran and to alleviate the population explosion which has occurred in nearby Bandung, now Indonesia’s second largest city. At the time of my research these complexes were in the final stages of completion and one must wonder what impact high density housing will have upon rural villages, their economy and society.

**Control of Land and Exclusion**

Rural West Java in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries was changed from a region of seemingly unlimited access to rural lands to a province based on exclusion. Coffee cultivation and the widespread development of *Sawah* by the Dutch alienated most Sundanese from their traditional lands. Indigenous elites benefited with increased access to land, labour and wealth and as population densities increased over the centuries, exclusion became more prevalent (Hoadley, 1994; Fernando, 1988:21-28). Dutch policies were designed to create cheap and manageable labour and private access to land, all of which were achieved remarkably well. The modern outcomes are even more extreme as population densities became among the highest in the world in rural West Java. In three hundred years the Sundanese went from having public access to unlimited lands for subsistence production to being predominantly excluded from their own lands. Today the theory of exclusion is an apt one, but not only are the majority excluded from land, wealth and traditional agricultural labour, they are also excluded from industrial employment, and those that have it are considered a new elite by their landless peers. However, factory women are viewed with scorn by many land owning families in Banjaran. The factory
women themselves were aware of this negative perception and the land owning families I spoke with confirmed this. The reason negative perceptions are attached to factory women is due to the new public scrutiny they are exposed to, the fact that they are potentially challenging existing class systems and because of the significant impact factory work has upon their traditional lifestyle.

A small group of traditional and government elites own most of the land in rural Java. The exact extent to which this occurs is hard to estimate but other studies have shown a significant increase in unequal access to land in rural Java as population has increased in the latter half of this century. Hart (1986:14) found in her rural study that 10% of village households controlled 60% of the land and controlled the majority of resources. Hart also stated that 45% of all the households were landless or virtually landless. Further, landholders had almost complete control of labour arrangements and tended to employ a few favoured workers to the exclusion of the masses of under-employed landless labour (Hart, 1986:15). Control of land and labour by a rural elite keeps the cost of labour down and also easier to control. Hart’s major thesis is that exclusionary land and labour practices at the local level are linked with macro-political and economic forces working against the poor rural population of Indonesia. For example, in this research only 34% of the fathers surveyed (307) gained their livelihood from agriculture, of these 9% were actual landowners, all with extremely unstable income. 17% of mothers surveyed were agricultural workers and of these 4% were landowners. Among
the younger generations, 13% of the husbands of married factory women surveyed worked in agriculture and only 5% of all factory women's siblings who lived at home worked in agriculture. The agricultural sector in rural West Java shows significant signs of decay; a reflection of population increase, elitism, endemic corruption and exclusion.

Exclusionary land and labour practices are widely used throughout the world albeit on different scales and within different evolutions through time. Exclusion has been a major method of labour control in Indonesia and has long been used to enhance subordination of labour in factories. Millions of workers in Indonesia today are excluded from industrial employment and this was evident in Banjaran. Many men and women claimed they were denied factory work, not eligible or rejected, but these same workers are ready to take any jobs the factories may offer at a later date. The same formula was applied by the Dutch and more recently by the New Order regime.

Sundanese Kinship Systems

Sundanese kinship ties, in the economic sense, were not strong. Due to over-population, land shortages and extreme poverty, kinship ties are not what they used to be and most families are on their own economically. However, family members will help in times of need and adversity. Neighbourhood connections are more important than extended kinship ties. Most employment comes from local or village connections and is usually organised by men irrespective of whether women legally own the land. Sundanese kinship systems are not
based upon inheritance or gendered relations within extended family units as they are in most of Southeast Asia. Inheritance is not a viable option anymore as there is little to inherit. Marriage is the major activity creating kinship links and in providing women and men with social security and adult status.

Kinship systems differ on the basis of class among the Sundanese, as they do with the Javanese and most groups in Indonesia. ‘Marrying off’ a daughter among the landless Sundanese is the only viable option for most. While many young unmarried Javanese women travel away from their villages in search of employment in Indonesia’s industrial areas, this option is not appealing to the Sundanese who continue to view female migration as immoral. Therefore, to marry and especially to marry into a family ‘better off’ than your family is the only hope for most landless women. By traditionally marrying their daughters at an early age the Sundanese attempt to relieve themselves of a financial burden, that is a woman who has very little access to employment and, by marrying, she must be supported by her husband. This is the ideal. However, it was obvious in Banjaran that, among many young married couples, the husband was, in fact, a burden upon his new wife if she worked. The majority of young husbands sampled, especially those in extended households, had little or no income and the majority had very unstable incomes. They were dependent upon their wives' factory wages.

Studies relating to Sundanese kinship systems are rare. There are however, similar studies regarding nearby Javanese culture which are available in their
hundreds (Koentjaraningrat, 1985:vii). The most prominent of these is _Javanese Culture_ written by Koentjaraningrat in 1985. This book is actually an extended annotation of hundreds of volumes which relate to Javanese culture, including in-depth comments from the author himself. Despite the fact that the book provides interesting insights into Javanese culture, kinship and economy it tends to do so from a male perspective, especially regarding economy. For example, Koentjaraningrat (p454) outlines the relationship between Javanese rural peasants and traditional work ethics. "When questioned as to what ultimate goal they toil for every day, and as to what human labour actually seeks to achieve, they look puzzled, and finally reply that man works hard simply to earn his daily food". Later the author states that Javanese peasants have a common saying _aja ngaya_, which means "don't work too hard". Both statements above are male centred outlooks upon work.

The Sundanese women I spoke with had fixed views toward work. They saw it as a way to improve the education and life's chances of their children or younger siblings. They were prepared to work hard if it meant that improved living standards from that of their mothers' era resulted, and displayed more aptitude in formulating and instigating long term plans in this regard. Factory employment has acted as a catalyst and most women see the opportunity it provides them compared to very limited opportunity in the agricultural or trading sectors. Women have been provided with relatively long term and stable employment which has impacted upon their work ethic. Male employment, which is predominantly unstable, has created a long term work
ethic whereby men tend not to make long term economic plans and live on a daily basis. The younger factory women studied also revealed an interesting insight into their own perceptions toward work.

All the young women in Focus Groups and interviews were asked about their attitude to agrarian employment. The majority stated that agricultural work, apart from being unavailable, was too dirty, too hot and it made their skin black, which is socially unacceptable in this culture. Having black skin is considered most unattractive due to the low status nature of agricultural work and a female with very black skin was not only perceived as a lowly agrarian labourer, but also as 'black sweet' which had sexual connotations of impropriety. To add to these, women stated factory work was their hobby (hobi) and that working in Sawah could never be a hobby. The use of the word hobby to describe work reveals an interesting female attitude towards factory employment. It is seen in this context as 'game like' and reflects the fact that Sundanese women working in the formal sector is a new phenomenon. The women, in some regards, saw factory work as fun, a relief from their tedious life in the villages and a far better alternative to outside work. Viewing factory work as a hobby, which many did, could be construed as meaning that factory work is not taken seriously by the women. However, this is not a finding of this research. Factory women interviewed take their new roles very seriously, and cope with significant exploitation in their quest to remain employed and remove their burden from their parents. The fact that they commonly and continually referred to factory work as their hobby reveals certain social
perceptions still prevalent among the Sundanese that women’s work is just for fun due to ideologies which promote the man as breadwinner and the women probably used the term hobby for this reason. The very important financial contributions these same women make to their families and the harsh work conditions they face contradict these ideologies. Chapter Five will address this contradiction in detail.

**Household Heads and Gendered Status**

There is no formula to decide who has the primal status in the households studied. In general, the households were headed by men, with their wives, or a replacement female controlling daily budgets, but all under the watchful eye of the mechanisms of patriarchy. By patriarchy I don’t just mean the immediate husband or father. Patriarchy in the household is more than just this. It refers to history and tradition as families have predominantly developed from their past and patriarchal relations are passed down from generation to generation and, therefore, patriarchy is an inheritance. Most family members are aware of their history and traditions and their expected role in the home. Patriarchy is also a social entity. It is a social term used to describe a certain relationship of power and gender. It is supported outside the home in the villages by significant community members and upheld in local government, by village leaders and their wives. Patriarchy, or the actions and beliefs of individuals, has guided and to a certain extent controlled the life of Sundanese households for centuries and perhaps its biggest challenge is to adapt to the new impact of female factory employment in a constructive and sustainable manner.
To explain how patriarchy is passed down through generations is both an individual household and general social issue. For example, approximately 25% of the mothers surveyed claimed to always have equal power to make decisions in unison with their husband regarding household issues. In these households, all of the young factory women stated they felt they had more power to make decisions than did their friends or relatives, whether working in factories or not. When asked why their fathers or husbands were unusually understanding, the most common answer was that they came from a family where their fathers were understanding and hence this has been passed down through the generations. On the other hand, in a large proportion of households studied, the father had ultimate control in decision making and would not allow any women, whether earning an income or not, to participate in family decisions. These fathers were acknowledged as being very strict when the mothers and daughters were interviewed in private. They claimed they were strict because their fathers had been the same. This is how they had been taught. There was no reference made to the mothers’ parents and their attitudes. The husbands had the power to be understanding or strict. It depended very much on their past. This, in itself, implies a strong patriarchy because even the most understanding husbands and fathers still had the power to act in any way and the past was only relevant to their own fathers’ attitude and not their mothers’. Patriarchy, therefore, regenerates itself over time and is more dependent upon the attitude of men both past and present, as fathers or husbands, than it is upon women.
I view patriarchy as a trade-off. Women trade-in lower status for protection (financial, moral and sexual) of their reputation (marriageability and re-marriageability). But as population densities have escalated and modern influences encroach upon Banjaran, patriarchal notions are finding it impossible to fulfil traditional protective roles and conflict results. The promises of patriarchy are no longer affordable or pragmatic to many women I studied, especially to those financially protecting men in their family. While Sundanese notions of patriarchy have not failed women per se, they have had their power eroded.

It is problematic attempting to generalise about gender status at the household level. It is even more difficult claiming to measure improvements in gender relations in a region over a short period of time. However, quantitative and qualitative data provides a general insight into the impacts of industrial employment upon household status. Exact facts and figures are not going to provide any useful insights into this phenomena. To measure and analyse household status I have relied on only basic analysis of quantitative data and preferred to rely upon the words of those interviewed and present in discussion groups, especially the mothers of factory women. I attempted to understand the women's perception of their status and whether they perceived an increase or decrease in status as a result of factory work. How the women defined status is important because it raises the point of gender relationships and also
provides new ways in which to measure women's status, apart from the quantitative data relied upon by the state in Indonesia.

In gross terms, 40% of the women questioned said they felt their status had increased as a result of factory work (status being defined by the women themselves; see page 186). The remaining 60% believed their household status had not changed. Of the women (40%) who claimed to see a positive improvement in their status, roughly 45% stated that this was predominantly due to their new wage contributions to their family. The remaining 55% claimed it was due to the fact that they were not in the home all the time and, therefore, not confined to household duties and constant patriarchal control. There was a common theme present among those who claimed their status had increased due to their wages (45%). These women were usually from the poorest of families and in most cases their wages were the mainstay of the family. The most common social factor evident among the cohort who claimed increased status as a result of dislocation from their home (55%) was that these women tended to come from areas where traditional confinement to the house and the village was more strictly adhered to.

At this point it is easy to see why the status of young Sundanese factory women has significantly more ability to improve than did the status of their mothers. I collected data of the employment patterns of all the mothers of factory women. The small minority of mothers who did work were predominantly confined to two sectors: Agriculture or household servitude.
The average monthly income for house servants in Banjaran was Rp 40,000 (US$16.00) per month and agricultural wages for women averaged Rp 50,000 per month. The average income of factory women was Rp 142,000 per month. Rp 142,000 per month is, in itself, a small amount for hard work. However, when this is compared to the vastly inferior average incomes of their mothers, factory women have significantly more potential to improve status through financial means.

Factory employment places a new generation of women in a new situation regarding patriarchy and status. I was surprised that only 40% of the respondents surveyed used their new incomes as an explanation as to why their status was different to that of their mothers. On the other hand, more than 50% were adamant that, because they had the ability to travel far from their village to factories and spent more time away from home than actually in their home, their status had changed for the better. Because they were commonly away from home, the factory women missed the constant reinforcement of patriarchy, at the household, village and national levels. They were to a certain extent immune from state policies in contrast to other women who remained in the village. They were relieved of the boredom of having to stay at home and were not constantly being watched by members of their communities.

Apart from wages and dislocation, women usually measured their status by the degree to which they were included in family decision making processes, their ability to make independent social and economic decisions and their ability to
solve family problems. That is, by being away from their homes and their village and experiencing new and complex happenings in the factories, including Western notions of production, foreign managers, buyers and investors, they gained valuable and high status experience which allowed them the ability to solve problems in their households. Many parents in Focus Groups and interviews claimed they were surprised by their daughters’ maturity and intelligence when they were asked to participate in problem solving after they had experienced factory work. Moreover, factory wages had a complementary impact upon these worldly experiences and both were unavailable to their mothers or grandmothers. Experience and wages, the result of geographic dislocation from their homes, were the key to improving the status of Sundanese women in the home.

A sub-sample of the women who claimed their status had not increased at all as a result of new factory work (60%) were later re-questioned. Their views remained that factory work had not positively effected their status. These young women either came from a stricter patriarchal background or were less likely to seek improved household status associated with the rapid changes common when women begin factory work. Many did not want to be different from their mothers. They did not want the freedom Western women have nor did they want the responsibility (or expense) of increased status and the decision making this involved. A common factor evident was that many of these women who claimed their status had not increased also worked in the
sports shoe sector, the most exploitative and degrading sector in manufacturing (see Chapter Six).

Household status of Sundanese women has developed over generations. It is grounded at the household and village level. Because women in the region rarely left the household or worked outside the home and were confined to the village, household status for Sundanese women has been literally just that. They have been bound to a tradition which forbade women from travelling alone, from leaving their village, unless on important business and a tradition which saw almost all young women become just like their mothers, married, not working and poor.

The words of the women themselves taken from Focus Groups and interviews highlight this condition.

Traditionally, the father was like a king in the home and the women had to follow his orders. However, because we work away from home and earn a wage we have greater status from our mothers and grandmothers. We know this when we are asked to help make decisions or are asked for our advice. Our mothers were not in this position. They were never in this position, they were a burden.

If a young woman can show that she is responsible by working for a long period of time in the factory she will usually be asked to help solve problems and her wage gives her the ability to do this. If our sisters stay at home and never work they will have status just like their mothers, it is their traditional position in the family. If we married now, and our husbands wanted to be like men from the past there is nothing we can do we must accept this, but it would not be good.

If any man wants to act like a raja we cannot argue with him, but it doesn’t mean we have to like him.
Automatic trust and freedom was not forthcoming to many young women studied. Many of the parents I spoke with studied their daughters’ monthly pay slips to check they were not lying. Many claimed their daughters had to be watched more closely now they were factory workers and their reputation needed to be safeguarded more than ever because of the dangers they faced. Dangers meant damage to their reputation through sexually oriented gossip. Further, many of the mothers in the Focus Groups stated they sometimes placed pressure on their daughters to earn more through overtime. Despite this, the majority of parents claimed that respect for parents and religion were more important than wages or experience. The daughters agreed with their parents in these situations but really had no choice. However, the reality of a stable income each month was beginning to erode these traditional beliefs. By highlighting the case studies and quotes below an insight into the conflict which commonly occurs when a young woman starts to work in a large factory is provided. However, it must be remembered many were from a lifestyle where they had rarely left the household area, except to attend school, which in itself is an extension of the village arena and not a real threat to the young women’s reputation.

We don’t want to be free like Western women, having sex every day and having no respect. We do want to be free from gossip as Western women are, that would be good. We are happy to obey our parents or husbands because that is our culture and our responsibility. Our family and our culture is surrounding us, we are educated by our families to be obedient and at school the same thing happens. We cannot escape from this, it is too powerful and if we did not have it we would be lost (Data from a Focus Group in November 1996).
Gossip is only used against women and is usually created by men. Men are not the victims of gossip like us so they can say what they like to their parents. But we must obey or gossip will ruin our chance to marry or even walk outside our home (Data from a Focus Group in November 1996).

I met Kukum when she was 17 years of age. She had recently finished her secondary education and had never worked. Kukum’s older brother and sister worked in local factories. A factory position was offered to Kukum when her sister went to Malaysia to work in a sports shoe factory. Kukum started work in the factory and I observed her for the first three months. In the first weeks she was exhausted and unhappy when she returned from work. She was also angry at the way she was treated at the factory by the men, who made sexual gestures to her because she was new and susceptible. After a few months of settling in and learning to live in the factory culture Kukum began to enjoy the working life and liked to be busy all the time. However, her father, older brother and boyfriend were far from happy. Kukum’s boyfriend became excessively jealous and attempted to coerce Kukum into leaving her job. She refused to do so and as her boyfriend was unemployed Kukum claimed he had become ashamed that his girlfriend was working. Further, he was worried about her reputation now that she was free to talk with any man she pleased. The relationship ended and, at the time of finalising my fieldwork, Kukum claimed to be in love with her Korean supervisor.

Kukum’s father presented a greater problem, however. As soon as Kukum began working and earning an income, problems began in the home. I spent
many uncomfortable evenings in Kukum’s household observing the conflict between father and daughter. The major problem hinged around transport and night work. Because Kukum was working shift work she could not get from her village to the factory in the evenings unless she walked long distances, over difficult terrain, alone and at night. According to Indonesian law, the factory must provide free and safe transport to all factory workers and especially for women who work night shifts, but her factory, and many others in Banjaran, did not. Kukum wanted to stay with a friend during night shifts. Her friend lived closer to the factory and she could easily walk to work from there. She had the money to pay for her lodging but her father refused completely stating she would bring shame to him. Kukum argued the point but he continued to refuse and her older brother provided support for his father, while her mother remained silent. Kukum discussed the problem in private with her mother the next day and decided to stay with her friend on night shifts and her mother agreed to calm her father. Her father would not be appeased, however, and according to Kukum he and her brother became very aggressive and forced her to walk the long journey on night shifts. Kukum had not consciously attempted to change her status by deciding to stay with a friend but failed and the conflict over factory work placed more pressure on her than she would have otherwise had to face. Her father was a very strict man and attempted to involve me in the dispute which eventually became public in the village.
During the process of the argument Kukum continually tried to explain to her father the problem she had with night transport. At one stage he began to argue very loudly which prompted the RW (low level village official) to come to the house and he joined the discussions, and supported the father completely. Observing this type of support provided me with an insight as to how patriarchy is reinforced through conflict. Factory work may provide a significant portion of women with increased status, but just as many face increased patriarchal control or protection which is supported by other significant men and usually by the silence of the mothers. Kukum’s father won out on this issue, an indication that increased control was commonly associated with factory employment.

On the other hand, many young women managed to increase their status in the home because of factory work, despite experiencing similar household conflict. Nenden was 18 years of age when I met her and she had been working in a large textile factory for two years. Years of factory work had given Nenden the ability to challenge her father’s decisions. Nenden stated that in her mother’s era, women could not decide anything because they were a burden. Nenden was bitter at the fact that her father had two wives and had married her mother when she was only 12 years old and began a sexual relationship immediately despite the fact that her mother was very tiny and had not yet reached menarche. Factory women now had the ability to question these traditions. Nenden continued to live with her parents, and provided them with half her monthly wage. Nevertheless, her father had been placing constant
pressure on her to quit work and stay at home, despite the importance of her wage. His mother remained silent but stated in a focus group that she thought Nenden was unfairly treated in this matter. Further, Nenden’s father did not like her fiance (whom she met at the factory) and insisted she marry his choice of spouse who already had one other wife. In both cases, she refused and claimed that due to her factory wage she had the ability to do this. She would not leave the factory and would marry her fiance. A focus group carried out in Nenden’s village revealed that parents there are very strict with their daughters because a few years ago two young girls left the village and became prostitutes in Bandung. Since that time the parents were advised by the Village Head to become very strict with their daughters. From my observations in this village, I came to the conclusion that the way in which the behaviour of a village’s young women was perceived as correct and traditional (from outside) was a reflection upon the character of the village itself. In some way, the fact that two young women rejected their cultural values by becoming prostitutes was viewed as a poor reflection upon the entire village patriarchy for failing to correctly train and protect their daughters.

Marriage

Classic household studies treat young unmarried rural women in Java as people without an aim or identity. As soon as they are married these women suddenly become identifiable. This view holds over into the local economy, culture and tradition but is far from reality. For example, Koentjaraningrat (1985:183) states that when a young Javanese woman marries she prefers to
stay initially with her parents so as to learn the intricacies of household management of which she had no prior knowledge. This assumption implies that prior to marriage women have no knowledge, which is culturally prescribed, but untrue. Sundanese women who were unmarried were well aware of their position in the household and their role in its management. Marriage and the expected duties in wedlock were also well understood, as were their sexual and social responsibilities, all predicated since birth. Traditionally, it was assumed that rural women do not have an identity until they have a separate household instigated out of wedlock. This may apply to women centuries ago, but the contemporary reality is that many will not have a household and increasing marriage ages means most women must assume an identity without either a husband or a household.

Marriage is the only significant rite of passage for Sundanese women. Menarche is not celebrated among the Sundanese as it is among Javanese women (Koentjaraningrat, 1985) leaving marriage and childbirth as the only real celebration of female culture. On the other hand, great ceremony is attached to both Sundanese and Javanese circumcision rites. At the age of about 10 years all Sundanese boys must be circumcised. It is a rite of passage into the nation of Islam. No matter how poor the family, considerable resources are accessed to provide a celebration for circumcised boys. Families go into debt to provide this. I attended three circumcision celebrations, and all were among very poor families in highland villages. The families hired large troupes of musicians, dancers and comedians who performed from early in the
morning until evening. The circumcised boy sat at an altar like chair and his genitals were able to be viewed by any who desired proof of his operation. The expense of the entertainment was very high by local standards. The expense is partly compensated by gifts of money from guests. The importance placed on male rites of passage into manhood is testament to the culture of the Sundanese and the somewhat skewed position of Sundanese women in society. Traditionally, marriage is the only chance to move out of their protected girlhood and into womanhood, the problem being that marriage is also a protected realm for Sundanese women despite the increasing importance of wives’ wages.

Thirty nine percent of the women sampled were married. Their ages ranged from 14 years to 39 years. The average age of married women surveyed was 25.5 years (Table 4.1). Of the married women sampled, 49% lived alone with their husbands in nuclear households. Their income earning capacity was very high. This was due to the fact that factory work, despite being exploitative, was a year round job, with minimal seasonal breaks or low periods, while most men in the region worked only spasmodically. Of the married women surveyed, 57% earned equal to or more than their husbands or fathers. Of the 49% of the married cohort living in a purely nuclear household, 73% earned equal to or more than their husbands on a monthly basis. Further, of this 49%, 2% had very unusual arrangements where the women worked and the husband stayed at home caring for children. These husbands were questioned and felt ashamed of their position, but stated it was the best way to organise their small
households without the interference of their parents who wanted the wife to stop working and stay at home. This would have led to abject poverty, an option the young couples refused to entertain. In lieu of this data, if the household head was to be the major income earner in a household, as many claim (especially the Indonesian state), then young married Sundanese women who work year round should automatically become household heads. But they don't.

According to the women themselves, apart from employment and dislocation, increasing average age at first marriage (AAFM) and choice of husband are potentially the most significant catalysts to social change and increased status among the young Sundanese women studied. More than 90% of the women surveyed stated they had the right to marry the man they loved as long as their parents agreed, a considerable change from commonly arranged and very young marriages of their mothers. All stated that marrying under the age of 20 years was bad for women and having more than two children detrimental to their health and economic wellbeing. Contemporary women have access to information their mothers never had. The young women were well informed about government family planning programs and adhered to their ideologies in private and in practice. However, the quantitative reality of marriage ages among the young women surveyed revealed a slightly different, though improving, demographic situation of young factory workers regarding marriage ages.
The AAFM of the married factory women was 17.2 years. Their overall average age at the time of the survey 25.5 years, compared to an average age of 19.4 years for the cohort of unmarried factory women. The combined average age of married and unmarried factory women was 22 years. Therefore, the cohort of married factory workers represented an older generation (with an average age of 25.5 years compared to 19.4 years for the unmarried workers Table 4.1). The AAFM of the married factory women (17.2 years) is still quite low and contradicts the claims of focus group and interview respondents that 20 years of age was the best age to get married. However, considering the fact that the average age of the unmarried cohort of factory women was 19.4 years, marriage ages are dramatically increasing among the Sundanese, especially amongst women who work in factories. A highland/lowland comparison reveals very different average marriage ages amongst the cohort of married factory women. In the highland areas the AAFM of factory women was 15.8 years compared to 18.2 years for lowland areas (Table 4.1). Despite the fact that these areas are very close geographically, very different marriage ages are evidence of continuing traditional and geographic influences in the highlands.

The comparatively low AAFM of the mothers of the factory women provides a brief insight into the recent history of Sundanese women. The AAFM of surveyed mothers was 14.3 years compared to 17.2 years for their daughters. However, when these figures are broken into a highland/lowland distinction, significant patterns emerge. For example, the AAFM of the mothers in lowland areas was 15.6 years compared to 13.3 years in highland areas (Table
4.1). This distinction between married and unmarried factory women, combined with the highland/lowland distinction provides an interesting insight into the differences operating between the more traditional highland areas and lowland Banjaran. The highland areas are less affected by industrial development and modernisation and more importantly lack proper access to education after primary school.

An interesting challenge to traditional marriage age and practices is provided by factory employment. A sideline to this challenge is in-factory marriages. Many of the women who work in factories meet their husbands at the workplace. The factories are providing some women with a wider choice of spouse, from a larger geographic area and providing husbands who have the relative financial security of factory employment. Their mothers had very limited choices in these regards, and tended to marry men who worked in agriculture, lived nearby and were known to their family for many years. Factory husbands were becoming an increasingly prevalent phenomenon and young factory couples were obviously better off than most and were usually in a position to buy or build their own home. The factories themselves provided an alternative to tradition and many couples chose to be married on the factory grounds and not in their Kampungs. This is an unprecedented phenomenon and the factory management supported factory marriage alliances by allowing young couples the use of factory facilities to hold their marriage ceremonies. In these situations factories have taken away the traditional role of local village alliances in organising marriages. In 1996 this was only occurring on a
scale, but is a significant occurrence. In one weekend, for example, three couples married at a local shoe factory and marriage ceremonies carried out with traditional dress and festivities were held in the unlikely place of a large foreign-run factory.

Education and Marriage

Collecting and presenting data on levels of education was considered crucial among the Sundanese women sampled when attempting to analyse household status and the related impacts of industrial development. However, education in Indonesia is highly gender biased, and most young women who graduate from rural senior high (SMA) do so with secretarial or home economic skills, including a very strong influence of state propaganda. Further, Focus Groups among female students at a local high school revealed that factory work is not an inviting option, despite the fact that over 70% of the young women had immediate family members working in factories. The students found the idea of factory work highly distasteful. The problem is, however, that factory work will be the only real option for these young women when they graduate, unless they can afford a university education, which all stated they could not.

Most of the large factories in Banjaran employed women only if they had completed SMP or high school education. Other factories provided incentives, such as higher wages and more elite production work to workers who had completed SMA or senior high school. Other less scrupulous factories such as Feng Tay (Nike) employ women with no education at all. This tends to
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Married Cohort</th>
<th>2 Unmarried Cohort</th>
<th>3 Combined Cohort</th>
<th>4 Mothers Cohort</th>
<th>5 Highland Mothers</th>
<th>6 Lowland Mothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Average Age (Years)</td>
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<td>19.4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAFM (Years)</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Highland AAFM</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowland AAFM</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Completed Education</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD Education or lower</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Completed SMP or SMA</td>
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<td>71%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
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concentrate uneducated women into the most exploitative factories, causing many to leave factory work soon after starting (Table 6.3). This in turn tended to create problems in the home, whereby these women were seen as failures. In general poorly educated workers had a very short working life due to the overt exploitation they faced and tended not to attempt formal employment again as they were ashamed (malu), because they could not support their families as they knew other female workers did.

Each social survey sought data about the factory workers' education level compared to their mothers. The findings are presented above and correlate strongly with the marriage ages above, especially when the married cohort of factory women (and their mothers) were compared to the unmarried cohort. It must be remembered, however, that the average age of both cohorts of factory women, married and unmarried, was different by six years. Between the two cohorts, significant differences in education levels resulted. Of the married cohort, education levels were significantly lower when compared to their unmarried counterparts. At the same time there was very little difference in the education levels of the mothers from either cohort. For example, 53% of the married cohort (average age of 25.5 years) had no education or only completed SD or primary school, while only 29% of the unmarried cohort fitted this low education category. Further, 71% of the unmarried cohort had completed high school or senior high school compared to only 47% of the
married cohort (Table 4.1). Low AAFMs correlate strongly with low education.

In view of the educational differences highlighted it is evident that significant changes are occurring rapidly among Sundanese women. Many more women are completing their education, even over a period of six years. However, completing education, even to the primary school level, is expensive in rural Java and many parents complained of the high school fees and associated costs, as well as unofficial and illegal levies placed upon them by many of the school principals, such as illegal building taxes and administration fees, which I view as Rent Seeking.

The highland/lowland distinction reveals a stark contrast in education levels of the women studied and highlights the influence of geography and cost upon educational attainment. In the highland areas education levels were disturbingly low. Of the highland mothers studied, almost all (97%) had no education or only completed primary school. The lowland mothers had slightly better education levels, with only 69% stating that they had no education or completed primary school. More specifically, of the entire cohort of lowland and highland mothers surveyed, 34% stated they had no education. Forty nine per cent of the mothers surveyed in the highland areas fitted this lowest of education categories. Of the factory daughters studied in the highland areas, 74% had no education or only completed primary education,
compared to only 30% among the lowland cohort. At the high school and senior high school level, 70% of the lowland cohort had achieved these higher levels compared to only 26% among factory daughters in the highland villages (Table 4.1). The lower education levels of highland mothers tended to be reflected in their daughters' education standards and in turn in their comparatively lower AAFMs.

The major reasons highland women do not attend school after primary level is distance and cost, combined with the influence of a more traditional patriarchy. Primary schools are available in the highlands. However, when young women graduate they face the problem of getting to distant high schools (8kms). Costs of transport, food, books, clothing and fees preclude most from continuing their education and the road systems are so poor that many who do attempt to continue soon give up after travelling daily up and down treacherous roads sometimes for two hours a day. The investment is not worth the expense and time, according to those interviewed, because there are really no jobs for anyone with a good education unless they have good connections or a lot of money to pay the large bribes needed to get a government job. For example, it was commonly stated that any senior high school graduate who wished to work in the local government office had to pay 5 million rupiahs to a senior official (Rent Seeker). This cost precluded all the families I surveyed as 5 million rupiahs is the equivalent of approximately four years full time employment at the minimum provincial wage level.
There was evidence of disillusionment with the education system and, in some cases, decreased female status in the home resulted from supposed improvements in female education levels. Many of the parents of young women, who had afforded the expense of a high school or senior high school education, were annoyed that their daughters were unable to find stable and well paid employment, despite promises by the state that increased education was the key to alleviating poverty. Many female high school graduates were no better off than if they had left school at the primary school level. If they could not find work, or had to work in a low status factory job, parents questioned the reasoning behind the expense of education and swore they would not do the same with younger daughters. The great expense associated with improving female education levels among the Sundanese led to conflict. The parents expected the expense of educating their daughters to be recuperated later when they found meaningful employment. However, this has not occurred to any significant degree and high school graduates have only low paid, low status employment, or more probably unemployment to look forward to. Improved education needs to be supported by appropriate employment to have any chance of increasing female status.

Marriage and Money

Sundanese women's status traditionally revolved around life stages. Unmarried younger women were seen as weak and vulnerable and were kept
under strict scrutiny to avoid ruining their chances of marriage. They needed the protection of older brothers and fathers. They were viewed as a financial, social and religious burden. Traditionally, unmarried women are viewed in the household as dependents and their status changes very little until they have their own children and start an independent household. Older married women tend to have higher household status, especially if they have proved a successful wife and economic organiser.

Comparisons between the financial contributions of married women surveyed with their unmarried counterparts revealed very different trends. They highlight significant changes in modern financial obligations and arrangements which occur when a women marries, as they do changes in female status based upon life stages. Of the married women surveyed (39%), 32% kept all their wages for themselves, compared to only 10% of the unmarried cohort. The married women stated they kept the money after making agreements with their husband or parents (or both) to be used for basic daily needs and a very small percentage banked some of their monthly wages. However, supporting daily costs or daily needs benefited the entire household, directly or indirectly. Direct benefits were associated with providing food for the family and indirect benefits allude to the taking away of the traditional female burden from husbands and parents.
Married women, whether living with husbands in a nuclear situation or with their parents, husbands and siblings in an extended family, tended to give significantly less money to their family than did unmarried women. This is ideally because they are saving to move into their own residence, or because they have less money to share because they often had the burden of a husband to support. Husbands were notorious for spasmodic work and income amongst those surveyed, thereby partially demeaning education theory which, in the past in Indonesia, has focused on educating men over women. Further, the figures above were taken from static survey questions and tend to underestimate the significance of female financial contributions because the questions were only based on the day they received their monthly wage and to whom they allocated monies. By observation and interviewing it was revealed that, on a daily basis, factory women were providing small amounts of money to their families for food, transport, cigarettes, medicine or gambling (male domain). The allocation of these casual monies most found hard to remember and will be discussed in Chapter Five in detail.

**Marriage, Sex and Status**

Sundanese and Javanese women are portrayed, and commonly portray themselves, as ‘weaker’ than men, especially sexually. This helps to explain very low marriage ages among both groups as they prescribe that women need to be married early before their wild desires surface and cause gossip. However, the Sundanese have lower marriage ages than Javanese women,
reflecting the perception that Sundanese women are so weak sexually that they must be constantly watched and quickly married. Elmhirst (1990:187) claims the protection of women’s sexuality and gender idealising in the household leads to the strict allocation of women to gender specific and very limited tasks, which in turn reinforces the image of Indonesian women as gentle, caring and weak. Elmhirst claims the roles accorded women in the home translate to their status in the workplace, especially in factory work and the associated feminisation of certain industries. Factory work is considered appropriate for Javanese women, but was originally resisted by the Sundanese and now it is only considered appropriate for poor families without access to land. Ideally, fathers and husbands should have access to the means of controlling their daughters activities outside the home. In Banjaran they had this access, until factory work took their daughters well out of their reach, which is perhaps the most significant catalyst for change in recent history.

The social ordering of sexual relations is crucial among the Sundanese. Women were traditionally married at very early ages to protect them from sex, or according to myth, to control their insatiable sexual appetites. Sex was not a taboo topic among the Sundanese. The women were generally not shy to discuss it in a group situation. They claimed men are sexually strong and able to control their desires, while women must be married quickly because they will become pregnant out of wedlock and therefore become unmarriageable.
Many fathers continue to push their daughters into early marriages to avoid shame.

After a few months of interviewing female respondents, and to a lesser extent their husbands, parents and family, I noticed a distinct difference in the attitude of younger married husbands in nuclear households compared to their older and more experienced counterparts. The younger (nuclear) husbands were, in general, more authoritarian than older husbands. In one way it is the first opportunity these young men have to exert their traditional right to be literally king of the household. The women I spoke with in the Focus Groups found this observation to be extremely amusing, but nevertheless accurate. They stated that young husbands are asserting their authority over the marriage and the household, if they have that ability. It is a method of training the wife not to make the husband angry, and more importantly, jealous. Jealousy refers not only to sexual jealousy, but to jealousy over prestige, economy and traditional patriarchy; basically jealousy over culture, which most Sundanese men claimed ownership of, while women were neutral when they spoke about culture. A recent conference in Jakarta dealt with just this issue. One of its key speakers, Sartono Mukadis, revealed that his family-based research of the impacts of globalisation and the related increased employment of women in Indonesia had made many husbands jealous. Mukadis stated that this new economic trend placed men and women from the same family in conflict. Men were threatened because their traditional role as
breadwinner was being eroded and their God-given authority over women was being challenged (TJP, Nov12, 1996). This form of conflict and challenge was evident in nuclear households in Banjaran, especially considering the nature of this research, which supports Mukadis’ findings. Nevertheless, Sundanese fathers and husbands remain for the time-being the gateway through which other people must pass to gain access to their households (women and culture). However, jealousy over culture, and the new challenges factory employment places upon the traditional male ownership of culture, were evident in many households.

Upon entering households to survey women, we had to gain access through the household head. In these situations, I formulated a distraction for husbands intent on answering all questions posed to their wives. This took the form of my assistant interviewing the wife, while I made other more ‘prestigious’ conversation with the husband. This method worked well but was usually only needed when a young couple lived alone in an independent or semi-independent household. Many other husbands were shocked that we wanted information from their wives, and not from them, but usually accepted our reasons for this. However, a few continued to exercise their ‘God given’ right to answer for their wives and then our distraction method had to be employed. It was quite surprising the general response we received when first entering a household and telling the Bapak that we wanted to interview his daughter or wife. Many asked; “Why don’t you just ask the man of the house?” Or “Why
are our women important?” and “Why do you want her information?”
Sometimes there was a hint of hostility, but comments were usually made in
an inquisitive manner.

The patriarchal and sexual control of young wives or daughters at the
household level relates directly to a workforce for factories which is extremely
obedient, more so than older married women who have etched out some sort
of compromise with their husbands after many years of marriage. Age
certainly impacts upon levels of status among the Sundanese. Older married
women earned their respect by not shaming their husbands, by following his
rules in the household and in public and by regenerating and reinforcing
patriarchy. Further, such women were relatively free of sexual danger. The
successful rearing of God fearing children into adulthood free of scandal,
gossip or humiliation is testament to a good wives’ lifetime work. Younger
women, with their perceived or real lower status are ideal factory workers.
They can transcend more easily from a local patriarchy, to the military-style
patriarchy of the factory. However, this transition is not always an easy one
and this is discussed further in Chapter Six.

Chapter Summary

New factory work has provided young Sundanese women an opportunity their
mothers rarely had. They are significant wage earners, and their incomes and
new lifestyles cause changes in household organisation, placing a focus upon
young women and causing much discussion about their position. Factory wages have bought tens of thousands of women into a more prominent position in the household and more attention is focused upon them as a result. However, I have not argued this attention is always positive or constructive.

The basic notion of measuring changing status was centred around three things. The first was the relationship of the factory women to their mothers. The large majority of households surveyed had mothers who were not earning an income and in the past had not done so either, at least to any significant extent. Sundanese women in the 1960s and 1970s continued to marry at very young ages (10-15 years) and were still culturally defined as a burden to their husbands. They were married as children. The factory women, however, were not a burden and were economic assets to their families, a fact which many in Banjaran had not yet realised. Having the ability to travel away from their immediate village has also been a big move for the young women, a leap their mothers could not achieve. Finally, the women have the ability to solve problems. Many of the factory women I spoke with were very proud if their father came to them with a financial problem, which they often did, and asked their advice. The young women were usually able to solve the problem with their wages, or offer advice based upon their capital potential. This is a most significant issue, young women having the ability to solve household and even community problems quickly and consistently places them in a very different position to their mothers. However, due to the short length of time factory
work has been available, the exploitative nature of the work, the endemic corruption and the strong cultural influences in the region, this position is yet to be consolidated.

The new and highly valued experiences which factory work provides young women are major catalysts to social change. While I predicted the impact that wages would bring about the most significant changes at the household level regarding women’s status, other factors were also important. The ability to move away from their villages and into a new world (the factory) and gain invaluable experience has prompted significant changes among the members of the households studied.

However, traditional resistance to change was strong in Banjaran. For example, many parents, husbands and village leaders acknowledge the financial importance of factory women at the household, village, regional and national levels. On the other hand, just as many claimed women’s factory work, wages and experience were insignificant and played no role in the future of their society. The most plausible explanation for this relates not to levels of poverty, landownership or demographics, but to differing levels of traditional cultural influence (patriarchy) between households and indeed between villages. Traditional Sundanese culture in this region has typically resisted unusual social change of the type that factory women are associated with.
The next chapter deals with the overall contributions and importance of female factory wages and associated experience at the household, village and regional levels. This chapter, in addressing and measuring the importance of female factory work to the local, regional and national economy, contradicts many of the patriarchal assumptions, highlighted in this chapter, which restrict women among the rural Sundanese; restrictions which I argue are not rational. The data revealed in this chapter completely contradicts traditional Sundanese notions that women are predisposed to be a burden and therefore must be protected by patriarchal structures.
Chapter Five: Contributions by Factory Women

My first daughter has dedicated herself to work in the factory. Her wage is used to support our second daughter so that she can finish senior high school and get a good job as an air hostess. Our first daughter will not marry or stop factory work until our second daughter has completed her education. Then she will marry. Having an oldest child who is female has proved a blessing to us because her wages are also used for medicine and food when my wage cannot suffice our daily needs. I don’t understand the modern economy in Indonesia because I also work in a factory as a security guard with 20 years experience but my daughter earns more than I do. I don’t know if this is good for my culture (Words of a highland father, September 1996).

The above statement reveals a great deal about household strategies, patriarchy and the importance of female factory wages among rural Sundanese households. More specifically, it reveals the man’s perception of his daughter’s role in supporting his family to make a better life. The father spoke of his daughter as if he had control of her destiny, her income and even her thoughts. Phrases like ‘she will work’ or ‘then she will marry’ imply a complete control by the father over his daughter. Further, he and many other fathers commonly used the term ‘my culture’ which implies local culture is owned by men and provided an interesting way to view culture during fieldwork. In public the father assumes this position. However, in private, when his wife was interviewed, a more complex situation was revealed. Interviews unveiled that the strategies the father referred to were worked out in consultation with his wife and older children. Further, the terms chosen by the father certainly show a consciously planned and acted out household strategy. The eldest daughter would work until her younger sister had completed her
education to a senior level. This was important because a senior high school education had never before been achieved by any female in this family. Her older brother had graduated from senior high school but has been unable to find a stable job. The fact that the family had decided, through joint discussion, that the second daughter would become an air hostess implies a certain amount of naivety because such a position would need high level contacts and probably the use of corrupt methods. However, it highlights the existence of a long term family strategy, instigated by the opportunity provided by the employment of their eldest daughter. Finally, the words of the father reveal conflict in that the modern economy has betrayed him due to the rapid transformation in male/female roles, power and ability to earn.

The words of the father revealed another important cultural aspect, though extremely ironic, of the collaborative unified household strategy to defy the restrictions of a patriarchal system. By not allowing one daughter to marry until the second daughter had graduated revealed a strategy which was designed to avoid the very real possibility of a husband insisting his new wife leave factory employment and stay at home, as many had already done to the ultimate financial detriment of the households concerned. For all of these reasons, this family’s story was chosen because it is representative of most families studied in this research. It reveals trends in the relevant quantitative data and is an excellent prelude to the issues discussed in the following chapter.
Introduction

The introduction of factory employment provides a new challenge to household organisation and traditional female status in Banjaran. In the recent past most young women had no alternative but to marry, theoretically to take their burden away from their parents. The opportunity to earn a wage was not widely available and women tended to marry at very young ages. They had no real avenues of improving their position in society, except through the efforts of their husbands. Women’s status was dependent on that of their husband’s. New factory wages, and more precisely the extraordinary way in which Sundanese women budget extremely small wages and cope with very harsh working conditions to provide financial support for other family members, are providing the ultimate catalyst to change the female role of dependency on the male in Sundanese society. Women’s contributions to their households, and their local geographic area, are slowly destroying notions that women are a traditional burden. These contributions provide a new challenge to traditional household status, structure and function, especially in regard to gendered roles and responsibilities. The focus of this chapter is the complex ways in which factory women contribute financially to their families, who in turn help to ensure that meagre factory wages are strictly budgeted so that their daughters do not continue to be a financial burden when fully employed.

Before going to West Java I assumed that the financial contributions of female factory workers to their families would be relatively insignificant. This
expectation was based on the literature concerning previous studies conducted in Indonesia and elsewhere and due to the extremely low wages in Indonesia per se (Wolf, 1992, for example). After having surveyed only a few Sundanese women, I realised that their financial contributions to their families were very important. Female factory wages were extremely beneficial to the social, physical and spiritual wellbeing of the families I studied. Young factory workers showed remarkable loyalty to their family through the sharing of their wages. However, to achieve this contribution required great sacrifice on behalf of the women, usually in the face of unnecessary exploitation. Many hours of overtime were worked in an attempt to achieve relative financial security for their families. At the same time, the majority of these women were expected to fulfil traditional household responsibilities, consequently doubling their workload. However, the young women were not acting alone and were part of an organised family strategy. Most women handed over their wages to their mothers, who in turn distributed the monies according to both individual family strategies and to wider cultural norms. Usually, small factory incomes were budgeted to allow for the factory workers’ transport and food costs, which were comparatively high, and occasionally a few luxury items. The remainder was spent on food, clothing, education or medicine. In these ways, as well as in countless others, not only were factory women contributing directly to their household, village, regional and national economy but were significantly contributing in less visible ways, such as in terms of providing a positive example to other women and in bringing about a challenge to
traditional household organisation, local culture and the overall political regime in Indonesia.

**Methodology**

Analysis of quantitative and qualitative data in this chapter will be used to highlight, reinforce and assert the complex household strategies, and the importance of women to these strategies, initially revealed above. Quantitative data was used to highlight the complex system of contribution and reimbursements made by (and to) factory women, thereby making possible the potential to improve female status in the home. Data was analysed directly in relation to three of the research questions outlined previously in Chapter One and which are reiterated below:

1) To what extent and in what ways are a cohort of female factory workers in Sundanese West Java influential in the social, cultural and economic development of the geographic area in which they live and more specifically within their own households?

2) To what extent does the Indonesian state support or inhibit such development?

3) How has the process of rapid industrialisation and the associated absorption of very large numbers of female workers into the formal economy (from a more traditional background) in the region of Banjaran, West Java, effected the cultural values of the Sundanese in regard to the overall status of women?

The methodology and presentation of this chapter and the next two chapters is slightly different from the overall methodology outlined in Chapter Three. In these chapters quantitative data analysis was used to create a framework to which qualitative analyses was attached in a supportive role. Quantitative data
provides a platform with which to view the relationship between financial contributions and female status. Findings derived from quantitative data prompted the use of specific qualitative substantiation. In this way appropriate qualitative data was matched with quantitative analysis. Significant patterns were revealed using this method. For example, quantitative data revealed women who worked longer hours for less wages and benefits than the average workers surveyed, found it extremely difficult to either take away their burden, or that of their siblings, or to improve their household or local status. However, if only qualitative data was analysed the extent to which women relieved their burden and the extent of their contributions would not be revealed.

Theoretical Approaches

Women, especially rural women, have been systematically denied access to the development process and direction in Indonesia. They are specifically excluded from the policy-making levels of government, from trade unions and from management positions. The rhetoric propagated by the state, confining women to the household and to an inferior economic role, impacts most dramatically at the household level. Women’s status has for centuries been tied to domestic duties in Indonesia and, in the contemporary situation in Banjaran, this traditional status continues to impact upon factory women. By the same token, many men fear the competition women exert for cheap factory employment and resent the fact that women, who in their eyes should be confined to household servitude, are competing in ‘their economy’. Sundanese
women’s household position is therefore crucially important to their ability (or inability) to achieve a new status as a result of factory employment.

Development approaches in the past, such as WAD, WID and modernisation which assumed women would be liberated simply because they have been incorporated into the modern economy, fell short because they ignored household and local constraints upon women. These approaches ignored the important contributions being made by all women in the developing world and provided no realistic solution to the significant national (state) and local constraints faced by rural women. Ahmad (1984:73) found that rural women incorporated into development plans are constrained by three factors: 1) Lack of access to land and resources; 2) Lack of control over the fruits of their labour; and 3) Reduced mobility due to household and cultural restrictions. These constraints are applicable to all Sundanese women. This chapter highlights significantly the last two points.

Later, GAD focused upon gender relations, the household and their links to the global economy. GAD has been criticised for the way in which it “homogenises women, seeing them as a single unitary category ignoring difference…or assuming that women are passive recipients of development and not agents of change… and for the top down approach taken” (Waylen, 1996:43). Lim (1990 cited in Waylen, 1996) argues that what is necessary to inform approaches like GAD is a complex analysis of the wide variety of women augmented by development in the Third World and a focus upon
complexities rather than upon generalisations. This research supports Lim's argument. However, Lim also claimed that the 'complexities' which needed a specific focus included indicators of education levels, wages, conditions at work and household status. According to this research, these 'complexities' were commonly not complex at all. The women I sampled had very similar education levels, wage rates, conditions and status. The complexities Lim is highlighting are therefore dubious when applied to this research. Complexities were more apparent in the way in which individual women perceived work, the way they allocated meagre incomes and in their household status as a result of work. However, this research found that household status was also culturally, historically and geographically influenced.

Studies of the impacts and outcomes of macro-development approaches commonly lack a necessary focus upon households. Further, such approaches assume that all households react in a similar way to the same external forces associated with development. Brohman (1996:288) argues in his critique of gender and development approaches, that to a certain extent, development policies and individual household behaviour are inter-connected. Brohman states that the economic and strategic behaviour of households, as a result of development, are "fluid and dynamic; and must be analysed carefully rather than assumed". Brohman (p289) also provides an appropriate model from which to understand household decision making processes among families sampled. The model is called the 'cooperative conflict' model. This model views household decision making as a bargaining system among household
members with different individual 'statuses' and therefore differentiated bargaining power. Bargaining power also depends upon status in the household and within wider society. Women in Banjaran fit well within the model as their bargaining power and position vis-à-vis wages and housework significantly depends upon their household and societal position. However, the model ignores the impacts of their position in employment and the importance of their incomes in relation to total family income as bargaining tools. Further, to be effective, the model needs to address how women who work contribute in seemingly immeasurable ways and how this in turn impacts at the household level. Immeasurable contributions include taking away a traditional perception that women are a burden upon men, or the example and incentive successful working women provide to others.

Sundanese women, in their households, within wider society and within the walls of their factory empires, all of which are overseen by a repressive state, are seriously constrained from bargaining on equal terms with those who hold power. However, their incomes have given them some leverage, which will improve over time, but only if factory employment remains stable in the region. Not all households had the same system of bargaining or power vis-à-vis gender relations. They varied considerably, depending very much on the individual nature of the household head and his relationship to his spouse and children. On the other hand, household strategies contained a common thread. They were worked out in a similar fashion to the 'cooperation conflict' model. However, factory women had more power in this regard because it was their
wage which the household strategy commonly revolved around. Or at least the strategy had to be adjusted when women started working in a factory. Strategies were always worked out with women coming from a position of historical tradition. However, the increasing important influence factory women had in their ability to cause strategies to change within their household was a significant and new step forward for most women sampled, despite their poor traditional status.

**Women’s Contributions to Their Families**

To achieve any level of useful contribution to their families, factory women face an enormous array of geographic, climatic, social, cultural and economic constraints at the local and regional levels. Added to these are the wider problems of a corrupt state, greedy investors, over-population, endemic poverty and associated ill-health. Industrial development has helped to make Suharto one of the world’s richest men and at the same time reinforced his dictatorial grip on power. Industrial development has also benefited the families I surveyed. This development has very little to do with the often professed benefits of “trickle down”, the protection of workers rights, the enforcement of even the most basic labour laws, or with concern and attention from Suharto or members of his government. It has come from the individual daily struggle of factory women and the influence their families have in supporting them. In other regions of Indonesia, factory women were reliant upon the financial support of their husbands and family merely to survive as their wages were not adequate to suffice daily costs (Wolf, 1992; Mather,
In Banjaran, this could have easily occurred but for the unusual culture prevailing in the region, as well as the fact that Banjaran is located in an area of regionally high wages, affording a little more financial leeway to the women. However, they could have not survived financially without the involvement of their parents or husbands in controlling their spending through the creation of new household strategies. They publicly accepted the control of their incomes. The state and local culture prescribes this. However, conflict surfaced in all focus groups when this issue was raised. Many women complained about their lack of financial control and the fact that their families continued to treat them as children. Nevertheless, the pride the women felt in being able to help their families outweighed these conflicts, for now at least. This same conflict was handled in such a delicate manner by the women that it is leading to subtle positive changes in the local culture, especially in relation to women and development.

In Wolf's (1992) research of factory women in Central Java, she found that young women contributed, on average, 28% of their wages to their family. Wolf also found that these same families had to reimburse the women individually the equivalent of 36% of their monthly wages from family monies, simply to support the factory workers' daily costs. Wolf appropriately concluded that the poor rural families in her research site were supporting industrial capitalism as a result of having to financially support their daughters' employment costs. Among Sundanese women in Banjaran the same pattern of family financial support for industrial capitalism was not evident.
Sundanese women sampled contributed on average 38% of their incomes to their family every month. Their average monthly incomes being 142,000 Rp. Only the equivalent of 17% of the women’s average monthly income was reimbursed to them to support their working costs. Working costs greater than the 17% reimbursement average were usually paid for by the women themselves with the remainder of their wages. The discrepancy between the two studies can be attributed to the following factors: Higher regional wages (see Figure 5.1, Columns 3&4); the relatively longer working hours of Sundanese women sampled as they were working in highly exploitative industries; and to cultural factors, whereby Sundanese women strive, and at the same time are heavily acculturated into taking their burden off their families. To contribute to the extent that they do to their households and community, women in Banjaran must make great sacrifices.

Figure 5.1

Minimum Daily Wages in Selected Provinces 1996 in Rupiah

![Bar chart showing minimum daily wages in selected provinces in 1996 in Rupiah](chart)

Source of Data: Indoline: Indonesian Labour Information Network, Vol III 26 January 1996. Note: Minimum Daily Wages are fixed on a provincial level in all of Indonesia’s 27 provinces, except for West Java and East Timor. West Java is divided into three districts, and the industrial areas of this province were the only areas to receive the higher minimum wage of 5,200 Rupiah per day in 1996.
The 38% referred to earlier is merely an average contribution figure taken from 323 women surveyed. Many gave significantly more than this amount and received significantly less back in daily reimbursements than the averages indicate. Nevertheless, the young Sundanese women who participated in my research contributed, on average, 38% of their monthly wages to their families, usually to their mothers. However, 20% of the cohort sampled contributed nothing due to personal reasons (saving for marriage, to buy a house, or their families did not need their income). Of the 80% of the women sampled who did financially contribute to their family regularly, 37% received no reimbursements. Yet this 37% contributed an average of 24% of their monthly income directly to their family. On the other hand, 33% of the cohort contributed at least 50% of their wages to their families and 16% of the cohort contributed 80% or more of their income every month to their family. These figures highlight the fact that, as far as money is concerned, factory workers were contributing substantially more than they received. They also answer the research questions. Nevertheless, they are very general data and need more specific analyses to be useful.

This research also concentrated on how much money was reimbursed to the young women to support their daily working costs, which according to Indonesian state rhetoric, are to be borne by the factory, but are commonly withheld forcing families to provide this support. The results showed a low level of support in Banjaran to the extent to which it would be impossible to
claim that families of female factory workers in rural West Java financially support industrial capitalism. In fact, of the 323 women surveyed, only two were costing their families more than they were contributing. However, Sundanese families are supporting industrialism in other ways. Allowing their daughters to work in a patriarchal culture unused to such a phenomena and in the strict control they have over their wages to ensure the women remain employed are the most noteworthy. Families must support their daughters to cope with the harsh transition to factory work and the constant pressure they face. These are crucial aspects of family support without which industrialisation could not function successfully in Banjaran. By the same token working women give a sense of security, a wide array of new experiences and bring about social change as a result of successfully nullifying notions that women are a burden, incapable of contributing substantially to society unless it is in the form of childbearing and rearing or housework.

The figures above were taken from static survey questions. They tend to under-estimate the significance of female financial contributions because the questions focused on the day the women received their wages and to whom they allocated monies. By observation and through interviewing, it was revealed that on a regular basis factory women were providing small amounts of extra money to their families for food, transport, cigarettes, medicine or gambling (male domain). This money was supplied on demand over and above their usual monthly contribution. The allocation of these casual monies most found hard to remember, but was widespread among factory women. Further,
they were contributing in ways which could not be measured. For example, the worldly experience they gained from formal employment and the example and incentive they provide to younger women in the region are very important. It is sad that the state and investors cannot set similar positive examples through their attitude toward female factory workers, or to the majority of Indonesian people.

One further aspect needs to be considered regarding the contributions of factory women vis-a-vis improved status. Wage slips collected from various women revealed an alarming number of deductions from their gross monthly income. Most factory pay slips studied contained two sections: 1) T-Kotor, which means the amount of their salary before deductions are made. Kotor means ‘dirty or filthy’ which is an unfortunate term to be used in this case. 2) T-Bersih, which is what the women actually receive after deductions are made; bersih means ‘clean’. On average 25% of the women’s income was ‘cleaned’ by the factory and the government through deductions. The more women earned, the greater the proportion such deductions became. Deductions for tax, health insurance (ASTEK), transport, food, cooperatives, trade unions and many other unidentifiable deductions, despite the fact that the women were generally not union members, did not receive the benefits of worker insurance if required and their taxes did not ensure benefits to society or the protection of workers’ rights. Other research has found that these deductions were commonly illegally kept by the factories (LAIDS, 1996:59) or were used by rent seekers to further exploit labour (TJP, Nov19&28, 1997). These
deductions are further indicative of the many constraints factory women face when they attempt to contribute financially to their families.

Household Functions and Housework

The ways in which households adjust to suit working factory women are now modest, but nevertheless significant, when viewed in light of the traditional way in which Sundanese women have been allocated household status. The industrialisation process and the way it impacts upon the household status of women is highlighted through such adjustments. Due to long working hours, the importance of women's wages, and common shift work, household functions change to suit the new lifestyles of the factory workers, and many were treated as quasi-'breadwinners' with meals waiting for them when they returned, and their washing done. Many were provided with their own bedroom, which was a real privilege in the small houses I surveyed. For example, the family discussed earlier is a nuclear family with five children and had only one bedroom in their very small bamboo house. This bedroom was given to the oldest daughter when she started factory work. Her parents now sleep on the floor in the kitchen. The other siblings, including the older brother, sleep in the lounge room area, also on the floor. The wages of the young woman were so important that privileges were provided as incentives to for her to stay employed. However, more realistically, providing women privileges such as their own bedroom, consciously reinforced the household strategy and tied factory women to this strategy. In spite of these privileges, conflict was apparent. Private conversations with the daughter revealed that
she was unhappy with factory work and if it were not for the family bond, strengthened by a pre-conceived strategy, she would have quit long ago. Boredom, long working hours, conflict, stress and gossip within the factory were the major reasons she wished to leave, but she was essentially tied to the factory until her sister had completed her education. She was still required to do daily housework, while her unemployed older brother was not. This is not a rational household strategy. It highlights gender bias and, as a result, conflict within the household commonly occurred. This conflict was not openly resolved, but absorbed quietly by the women as their culture prescribes. Conflict inevitably leads to change and the delicate way in which most Sundanese women dealt with conflict so as to bring about an advantage to either themselves or their siblings and to a lesser extent parents, is viewed as an extremely positive contribution, despite the seemingly invisible nature of such change.

Specific Columns in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 highlight the number of hours factory women worked in their houses during a normal working day, not including their day-off, if they received any. The number of hours spent on housework by factory women was a crucial way of investigating the impacts of factory work upon household organisation and status. Further, housework is itself another contribution made by factory women. It must be remembered that housework is viewed as a female task among the Sundanese. Men very rarely work in the home. Women are trained from a very young age to help their mothers around the house. The boys are expected to help their fathers
outside the home. In Banjaran most of the houses have become smaller and more crowded over time and housework has become more demanding and critically important.

Housework is the pre-ordained realm of Indonesian women under the Islamic term *Kodrat*. *Kodrat* is discussed in detail in Chapter Seven, but is a highly influential term which officially defines women’s responsibilities to the household, whether working or not. Housework is a contribution which the majority of factory women continued to make despite the enormous demands full time employment made of them. Housework is a traditional way in which Sundanese women cement their household position, a status all claimed they did not want to forfeit to factory work because factory work would not be important in their future, but housework would. Considering the poor nature of the people (socio-economic), the commonly extreme hygiene and nutritional problems and over-crowding, which predominantly impinge at the household level, housework is the only major way, apart from employment, that families may combat declining standards of living. Cooking, child care, cleaning and washing clothes in most houses I studied were crucial contributions and required long hours of hard labour by Sundanese women. Households could not function without these contributions.

Twenty one per cent of women sampled did not do any housework. This was left to older women and younger girls in their households. 73% of this 21% lived in highland regions. Housework is a gender specific role allocated to
women by Sundanese culture and the state. Unfortunately, women who work long hours in factories are not exempted by the rhetoric of either institution (Kodrat). Therefore, the 21% who did no housework, most of whom lived in the more traditional highlands, were negatively affected by this inability. Again highland factory women face geographic impediments to improve status through contributing to their households. Their excessive hours away from home was a major point of discontent among their families and village officials, partially due to their lack of contributions through housework, which was paramount to defying god's will (Takdir).

Table 5.1 (Column 9) shows that on average, all women sampled spent 1.4 hours each working day on house duties. On their days off, considerably more hours were spent on housework. However, due to the fact that many women received no regular weekly holiday, housework completed during weekly holidays was not analysed. Table 5.1 also highlights the different time spent on housework between age groups. For example, the 14-16 year old cohort only worked 1.1 hours daily on housework while the 'over 26 year' cohort worked 1.9 hours each day. These differences are related to culture and economics. Culturally, younger Sundanese women are not expected to do as much around the home as are older women, especially when unmarried. As age increases, housework duties increase. The 14-16 year cohort worked longer factory hours, did more overtime and had to travel larger distances than most older women sampled, which provides another reason for their comparatively lower contributions in the home. This did not impact greatly
upon their status due to their age, but many parents were worried that their
daughters may not make good wives if they missed the important social
training associated with learning housework.

General trends revealed in housework highlighted in Table 5.1 are slightly
contradicted in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 (Column 5) when highland and lowland
women are compared. Lowland women did significantly less housework than
highland women, at all ages. This is indicative of the more crowded nature of
lowland houses, and the tendency for their households to be significantly more
well endowed with unemployed women who naturally did most housework. In
the highland regions housework was a great burden to factory women. Long
hours of daily travel, on top of excessive hours in factories had to be
combined with relatively longer hours of housework by highland women.
However, as highlighted above many highland women were incapable of
doing any housework due to long working hours. Many parents and village
officials interviewed discussed the problems associated with long hours of
work undertaken by highland women. None alluded to the exhaustion and
frustration felt by these women. They were merely concerned with the fact
that if women worked long hours they would miss out on learning to run and
organise a household according to adat (local tradition). However, missing out
### Table 5.1: Financial Contributions: Key Data by Age Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohort (age)</th>
<th>Left school (Rupiah)</th>
<th>Average Daily Wage (Factory)</th>
<th>% of Cohort no Overtime</th>
<th>Average Weekly Overtime</th>
<th>Average % Contribution to Household</th>
<th>No. of Hours in Household Daily</th>
<th>% of Her Wage to Total Household Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All <em>(100%)</em></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5,220</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.5hrs</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-16 <strong>(7.7%)</strong></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>15hrs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-19 (32.5%)</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.5hrs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-22 (24.1%)</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9hrs</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-25 (17.3%)</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8hrs</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26+ (17.6%)</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>5,750</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6.9hrs</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (100%) = 323 women surveyed
** (7.7%) Represents the proportion of age group cohort to the entire cohort (*)
Table 5.2: Household Contribution and Key Data by Highland Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age cohort</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Left School (age)</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>% of Cohort no C/bution to H/hold</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Average % Contribution to H/hold</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>No. of Hours in H/work Daily</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>% of Her Wage to Total H/hold Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-16</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*(40%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>17-19</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*(35%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>20-22</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*(23%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>23-25</td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*(29%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>26+</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(%) Represents the proportion of age group cohort to entire cohort both highland and lowland. * IE 40% of the 14-16 year cohort sampled lived in highland regions.
Table 5.3: Household Contribution and Key Data by Lowland Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age Cohort</td>
<td>Left School (age)</td>
<td>% of Cohort no Contribution to H/hold</td>
<td>Average % Contribution to H/hold</td>
<td>No. of Hours in H/work Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>14-16</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>(60%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-19</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(65%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-22</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(77%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(71%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26+</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(56%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* 60% of the 14-16 year cohort sampled lived in lowland regions
on learning local household traditions may also be positive, because most of
the households I studied did not function efficiently due mainly to the lack of
gender equality and the traditional denial to women of necessary economic
opportunities. In fact, I viewed ‘learning housework’ to be intimately tied to
learning obedience to the structures and dictates of patriarchy.

Contributions to the Local Economy

The fact that young Sundanese women rarely travel far from their home or
village is very good for the local economy. Tens of thousands of young
factory women are spending their wages in the local area. Food sellers,
transport providers, supermarkets and local markets are crowded with young
female factory workers every day in Banjaran. Local transport is dominated by
factory women during peak hours, when many of the mini buses (angkots)
would only accept factory workers, ignoring all others. There is no way to
measure the importance of factory women’s wages to the local community but
they are substantial, due mainly to the fact that the women rarely leave their
local area. Further away from central Banjaran, village economies also benefit
from factory workers, who require specialised transport, food and other
services which are provided by local village men. It is ironic that those who
benefit most from female factory workers in the local area, in government and
in the international arena, are men. It therefore seems irrational that Sundanese
women are constrained by a culture and state which excludes them from most
employment and also confines them geographically and at the same time does
not recognise their important economic role. The extent to which this gender bias impacts upon women in Banjaran is immeasurable, but extremely prevalent, especially in light of continuing traditions and new emerging local traditions attempting to adapt to women who work.

Food sellers and owners of Warungs (small shops) located around the factories depended significantly upon women’s wages. This is evidenced by the fact that on Sundays or national holidays such enterprises closer to the industrial areas are closed. Inside the factories, local caterers supply food for the majority of factory workers, providing significant local employment (The women commonly have the cost of ‘in factory food’ illegally deducted from their wages). Transport services are also significantly buoyed by local factory women. Many women collectively hire a private minibus (abonemen) which ferries them from their highland homes to the factory. Drivers of delmans (horse drawn carts), ojeks (private motorcycles), large buses, minibuses (angkots) and rickshaws all depend to a large extent on the new mobility and power of factory women. These businesses are the exclusive domain of men. The mothers stated in focus groups that it was common, if a lot of women from their Kampung worked in a factory, that local businesses would take advantage by increasing their costs, such as ojeks who knew the women had money and wanted to get home quickly because they were tired and hungry. Ojeks provide quick and easy transport in Banjaran which is usually plagued by traffic congestion. Exhausted women commonly opted for ojeks and had to
bargain for the cost of the fare. This immediately places younger Sundanese women at an economic disadvantage because they are unused to bargaining with men.

There is a strong relationship between the local economy and women’s factory wages. Women need transport at all hours of the day and night as there are many factories in the area operating with different shifts. All transport providers can therefore work at hours they would not normally work and earn crucial extra income as a result. At the level of the Desa (the 17 administrative units which make up the region of Banjaran), women who work in factories have a direct bearing on local development. In most Desa, families with women working in factories are asked/expected to give more money than other families normally would to support local development and social activities. There is strong social pressure in this regard.

Those Lurah who presided over Desa with high numbers of factory workers claimed that the new factory wages of young women increased the income of their respective Desa. Five of the 17 Lurah interviewed stated that factory work was more important than agriculture in regard to the local cash economy. The remaining Lurah (except two) stated that women’s wages positively contributed to local development. Incomes from factory wages help to elevate the status of the Desa by helping to improve its yearly budget. One Lurah explained how this occurred. Each year every person in his Desa,
whether working or not, must pay a set levy called the *luran* to the office of the Lurah. In one Desa in 1996 the *luran* was increased to 750 Rp per person. This amount was increased from the previous year by the LMD committee or the *Lembaga Musyawarah Desa* after considering the large numbers of factory workers in their Desa compared to the previous year. In theory therefore, every person in this particular Desa should pay Rp 750 to the Desa fund (*luran*). However, many could not afford to pay and were exempted, but the Lurah stated that if he knew a woman was working in a factory they would be expected to pay the *luran*. In fact, the Lurah expected these women to pay for any family members who could not afford the *luran*. The *luran* increases in line with wage increases and the number of workers working in the formal sector. Increased women’s wages were very important, for example, when the LMD committee decided to increase the *luran* to Rp 750 in 1996 in the Desa studied above. The *luran* is to be used for the improvement of child health, cultural development, sports and social activities. Therefore, without doubt, factory women contribute in many ways to the development of their local geographic area.

Women in the focus groups had different views on the way in which the *luran* was controlled and affected by their employment. In one focus group, four of the women stated that their donation to the Desa (*luran*) was increased when the Lurah knew they were working in a factory. In other focus groups, women stated that in the past their families were so poor that the Lurah accepted less
money when the *luran* was collected each year. But since they were now working their entire family was obliged to pay. The *luran* may seem an insignificant amount when only paid annually by each person in the Desa. However, definite relations between the functioning of the *luran*, the development of the Desa and female factory wages is revealed by the above examples.

At the household level, all Lurahs acknowledged that the income from women in factories has been most helpful to their husbands and fathers. However, in the long term, most Lurahs acknowledged that women’s wages will benefit the entire Desa. One Lurah stated, “that because their wages can be used for the education of children and at the same time the example provided by factory women inspires other women to increase their education, employment prospects and status of the Desa, factory women are good for our development”. Another Lurah stated that “as women find it very easy to get factory work, their contribution to the development of human resources in the Desa is increasing each year and becoming more important”. And yet again, another Lurah stated “factory wages increase the families’ incomes and allow many poor families to participate for the first time in the economic and social development of the Desa”.
The following quote is provided by another Lurah and demonstrates the way in which local and national governments officially view factory women and justify their employment status:

The employment of women is positive because it increases the gross income of the region which filters down to improve the development of the entire Desa. Women’s work also adds to the GDP of Indonesia and to the strength of Golkar. However, there are negative impacts too, especially because the workers have no time to participate in Desa activities and miss out on government statements. Also, if a woman works and her husband does not, or if a daughter works and earns more than her father this is a serious negative impact, bringing about a breakdown in traditions, especially if men must stay home and care for the children (Lurah No 9, August 1996).

Other comments by the Lurahs are recorded to highlight the way in which the importance of women’s wages are viewed by local government:

Factory wages are good because they improve health and education and at the same time give new experience to our young women. Factory work creates good views on our women in the world and working makes the families realise the importance of a good education. Factory work also increases marriage age. Working in the factories reduces unemployment and supports the development of the Desa. It also takes a burden off their parents and they are able to suffice their own needs. Their wages can be used to buy secondary items such as clothes and televisions. Women can now support their Kampung’s activities and spend more at ceremonies. The women working in the factories gain knowledge and new life skills which helps the Kampung (Anonymous).

Two Lurah had more negative comments to report and did not support the idea that women should work in factories. Ironically, one of these Lurah was a woman recently elected to the office. She was the third wife of a local businessman. She stated that factory work had no direct link to the
development of the Desa. Both Lurah were negative towards women working in factories because the Desa cannot transmit the central government programs to them because they are always at work. They also stated that because such women have less time to participate in the Desa’s social activities it is bad because they become different from the rest of society. Further, the women’s parents have less time to supervise them and this is bad because it is women’s responsibility to bring up the children (Kodrat). Both stated they support the factories which sack pregnant women, or those who will not employ married women at all. They stated that this should be government policy because there are many younger single women available to replace them and the government doesn’t want mothers in factories: Their children will suffer morally. These statements are in direct contradiction to Indonesian labour laws which state no discrimination should be practised against married or pregnant women (GRC, 1994/95). In reality, factories may practise any form of discrimination they wish against women. Emotional, physical and verbal abuse occur, which has had serious impacts upon many women already working in factories, and which also impacts negatively at the household level. Such discrimination has led to the death of at least one worker I knew of in Banjaran during the time of my fieldwork (1996) and caused an unknown number of predominantly young women to leave factory work soon after starting, usually seriously scarred by negative status as a result.
Financial Contributions by Age Group

Contributions of factory women to their families differed not only between highland/lowland regions but between age cohorts. For example, the youngest cohort (14-16 years) contributed substantially more to their families than did the 23-25 year cohort. The younger the women, in general, the higher their contribution. In Table 5.1 (Column 7) it is evident that the 14-16 year cohort contributed 48% of their wage to the family and continued to receive significantly less than half this amount in reimbursements for working costs. Younger women, with relatively less education and experience and therefore fewer and less potent bargaining skills in their family, were more tightly controlled by parents and therefore more inclined to contribute substantially to their families' income. Further, their relative inexperience left them more vulnerable when household strategies were initially worked out in regard to how much money would be contributed each month. As the age of the young women increases after 16 years it is evident (Table 5.1) that their contributions to the family decline relative to the average financial contribution of 38% given regularly by the entire cohort. As age and experience increased, women developed specialised bargaining skills which they used to their advantage within their households.

Table 5.1 illustrates the inferior position of the youngest cohort of women, both in the factories, in education and in the home. The 14-16 year cohort have the lowest education levels, receive the lowest daily wages, work the
longest hours in factories and yet contribute more than any other cohort sampled to their families. Furthermore, their individual wage is relatively more important to the household than all other cohorts (Table 5.1, Column 11), implying that to leave factory work, as most claimed they wanted to, would place their family’s wellbeing in jeopardy. All of the women in the 14-16 year cohort were working in contradiction to national and international child labour laws. In fact, 21% of the 323 women sampled had started working in factories illegally as child labourers. However, their incomes were crucial to their families and the reality is that these women have such low education levels, that to leave factory work would place them in a problematic position. However, as child workers with poor education, they are channelled into the worst positions in the most exploitative factories and they should be provided special consideration by the state and investors, which they are not.

Tjandraningsih (1993:232) in her study of child labour in West Java claimed that children of illegally young ages working in factories had received a forged statement from the Lurah stating that they were 16 years of age or older. Tjandraningsih stated that the children paid an illegal levy to get this statement. However, according to the village officials I interviewed, bribes were not accepted for forging these statements. They did indeed occasionally forge them, but did so in consultation with the children’s parents and because they wanted to help the families concerned. The child workers were generally from the poorest households and their families desperately needed the income.
Here lies a great irony. The child workers were illegally working, were the most exploited but had no other real alternatives in employment. They could marry in an attempt to relieve their burden but, as young men were commonly unemployed in Banjaran, this was a risky decision. Factory work for the children sampled (as young as 11 years of age) was obviously more exploitative, but necessary for extremely impoverished families. Most could not afford the expense of educating their daughters, and factory employment was the only option. The fact that younger women contribute more financially is crucially important. In Banjaran it is usually the younger women who are most apt to be viewed as burdens, especially if they have little education to rely upon. However, if younger women continue to be successful in employment and set an example to other young women the idea that women are in fact assets will be significantly reinforced through their actions. Nevertheless, the more extreme exploitation younger women face makes long term factory employment difficult to achieve.

**Contributions of Married Women**

Comparisons between the average financial contributions of married women surveyed and their unmarried counterparts revealed very different trends. They highlight significant changes in modern financial obligations and arrangements which occur when a woman marries, as they do changes in female status based upon life stages. Of the married women surveyed (39% of 323 women), 32% kept all their wages for themselves, compared to only 10%
of the unmarried cohort. The married women stated that they kept the money after making family budgetary agreements with their husband or parents (or both) which were to be used for basic daily needs. However, providing their own daily costs or daily needs benefited the entire household, directly or indirectly. Direct benefits were associated with providing food for the family and indirect benefits allude to the taking away of the perceived traditional female burden.

Married women, whether living with husbands in a nuclear situation or with their parents, husbands and siblings in an extended family, tended to give significantly less money to their family than did unmarried women. This is ideally because they are saving to move into their own residence or because they have less money to share because they often had the burden of a husband and children to support. However, simply because married women give less each month than do unmarried women does not indicate that married women have lesser status by comparison. Married women are expected to have more financial responsibility than unmarried women and therefore have less to contribute. Husbands tended to have only spasmodic work and income, thereby partially demeaning long standing educational practice and policy, which in Indonesia has traditionally focused on educating men over women. The fact that married women contribute less signifies that they have more control over larger amounts of income than their younger, unmarried
counterparts and, at the same time, continue to take their burden off husbands and parents.

If a Sundanese husband is working he usually hands his wage to his wife. Control of her income, combined with her husband's, and the fact that contemporary married women who work in factories have more control over where monies are to be spent, in comparison with their mothers, have significantly improved their status simply through the relatively large amount of income they have to allocate for household expenses. Younger husbands and wives, with few exceptions, stated that they consulted more with each other about money than in their parents era because now the women were important income earners. The other major reason stated was that younger couples had more complex economic situations to deal with compared with those of their parents' era. Younger couples face higher and more diverse costs of living, have more modern consumer needs and must ensure their children are educated and provided for in a vastly different fashion to previous generations.

The fact that married women have more income to dispose of gives them unprecedented opportunities in their household and family networks to solve problems. Spare monies are commonly used to support parents and other family members in times of need. Married women's wages are seen as more crucial to the family than are unmarried women's wages, especially if a
woman has married the oldest son. Culturally, eldest sons are obliged to support all family members, including parents if need be. This support usually takes the form of education costs for younger siblings and unexpected financial needs, such as ceremonies and health costs. Many eldest sons could not have fulfilled this traditional role in the current situation if it were not for the fact that their wives commonly earned more than they did, in the short term at least.

Quantitatively, the best way to highlight the importance of married women's income is to focus on their husbands' incomes. Forty four per cent of the husbands surveyed earned 100,000 Rp or significantly less every month. This figure was well below the average income of all factory women surveyed (142,000) and highlights the small contribution many married men make to their households. 100,000 Rp or less is not enough to cover basic needs of one person every month, let alone a wife and family. Ironically, the state claims that male wages in Indonesia are set at higher levels to provide support for an entire family, a claim which is simply untrue. It is curious how the Indonesia state continues to publish such propaganda, implying male wages are higher so as to enable them to support a household (see Figure 5.2). Despite the gender bias revealed in the Figure, especially in Column 2, male wages, in the lower levels of the formal sector were not significantly higher than female wages, neither of which alone could support a family adequately. Men in nearly all the households I surveyed, were only able to provide adequate
support if another member of the household had full time employment. In the case of this research, this other member was usually a woman. The major reason for the significantly higher incomes of men in Figure 5.2 is the almost complete dominance of men in the higher echelons of all economic sectors in Indonesia. Men in higher positions earn vastly higher wages.

![Figure 5.2](image)

**Figure 5.2**

Average Monthly Wages for Major Sectors in West Java by Sex, 1994. Series 1=Female. Series 2=Male


Highland/Lowland Contributions

Geographic differences in the level of financial contributions reflect the most interesting and enlightening aspect of how geography and culture impact upon the level to which factory women contribute to their households. Geographic differences are themselves reflective of continuing cultural traditions as well
as of transport difficulties. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 (above) address these
differences. Overall, highland women contribute less to their households than
do lowland women by a significant ratio (column 4). Highland women (in
general) have far higher transportation costs and as such, their financial
contributions are significantly less. This highlights the importance of
geography as the rugged terrain and expensive transportation services, which
operate in the highland areas, restrict women's ability to contribute financially
and consequently to take away their burden and improve their household
status. This point highlights the problem associated with exploitation
of labour in Indonesia. It also highlights the vast divide between what is
officially stated and what happens in reality. All factory workers are supposed
to be paid a transportation levy by their employer. Many do not receive this
levy (See Chapter Six). Of those women in the highlands who do receive the
payment, it is not enough to cover the high transport costs associated with
travelling to a factory from the highlands. For example, the average daily
transport costs of highland women surveyed was 1400 rupiahs, far higher
than the transport costs of lowland women, and a cost which constituted
over one-third of their daily wage. Of the factories which provided free daily
transport using very large buses, none could traverse the shocking roads
leading to the highland areas. Highland women are left to fend for themselves,
while lowland women are virtually dropped at their doorstep free of charge.
Highland women must walk long distances or pay expensive transportation
costs simply to get home. Moreover, highland women spend more on daily
food costs due to their isolation. Most have to buy relatively expensive food ‘on the run’ because of the long hours they travel to and from work.

Younger factory women from both highland and lowland regions contributed substantially more than did older cohorts surveyed. For example, the 14-16 year cohort from the lowland regions contributed an average of 52% of their monthly income to their families (Table 5.3 Column 4). In the highlands, due to higher daily expenses, the same cohort could only contribute 44% of their monthly income to their families (Table 5.2 Column 4). However, 44% was far higher than the overall average contribution of all cohorts of 38%. Interestingly, in the highlands, as age increased, women contributed substantially less to their families income. On the other hand, as age increased among the lowland cohort, financial contributions slightly increased. This difference is the result of the more desperate position highland women face in the local economy and again as a result of transport costs. As they get older, highland women tend to use very expensive transport systems. Older highland women, who were working full time in a factory, also had more household responsibilities than did younger women and less time to use cheaper and less reliable transport, such as small mini buses which were very slow and unreliable and almost non-existent in the wet season. The older women tended to hire private and more expensive buses or motorbikes which impinged heavily upon their ability to contribute to the same extent as did older lowland women.
Highland women are constrained from contributing to the same extent as are lowland women due to simple geographic location. This point is exacerbated due to the very poor status of most of the households in the highlands when compared to lowland areas. In Column 6 of Tables 5.2 & 5.3, it is evident that women's factory wages are very high in relation to total family income in the highlands, where factory women are usually the major income earners. In the lowland areas, where employment is more widely available and better paid, the factory women's wages are relatively less important. This adds to the desperate nature of highland families. I have no doubt that unnecessary exploitation at work and the failure of many factories to provide free and safe transport, as Indonesian law prescribes (GRC, 1994/95, see Table 6.2), impinges upon women's household contributions and their ability to cement a new and necessary household status appropriate to continuing employment in the formal sector. The ability of the women to improve their standing within the household, as a result of hard toil in factory work, is weakened or even negated through unnecessary exploitation. The geographic location of highland women, the associated continuing tradition and greater poverty also inhibit the contributions of such women due to the relationship between low education levels, low AAFMs and the tendency for women who exhibit the above characteristics to be channelled into the most exploitative factories.
Reimbursements

The level to which parents controlled their daughters spending habits in Banjaran is remarkable. It is perhaps even more remarkable than the extent to which factory women in rural West Java were supporting their families with meagre incomes. In general, factory women handed over a lump sum to their mothers every month. In turn, the mothers budgeted this lump sum, so that the factory women had enough money to cover their daily expenses (working costs) for the next month. The remainder was used to cover daily household needs. The wages kept by the individual factory women were also tightly controlled by their parents. It was also common for the factory women to give out the bulk of the rest of their wages in small amounts to family members. Factory women had no real alternative in this regard. If they were asked by a younger sibling for 1,000 rupiahs they usually gave it. If they were asked for 10,000 rupiahs for medicine, they gave it. Most of the factory women faced this dilemma on a daily basis, and constantly complained about it. However, they really had no alternative as they were tied to a preconceived household strategy, a patriarchal system of local and national significance and a new household role which they stated made them proud to be working. They would, therefore, not cause trouble by complaining publicly, but freely discussed the issue in interviews and Focus Groups.
Tuti was a factory worker and she became a key informant in my research study. Over a three month period I observed the extent to which her family members relied on small financial handouts, over and above the 50% of her monthly wage which she gave to her mother every month. Tuti received nothing back through reimbursements and budgeted her own working costs with her remaining income. Tuti was the major income earner in the family, earning significantly more than her father who was also fully employed but worked less hours than his daughter. In one month, after giving half her wage to her mother, she told me that she was looking forward to going to the market and buying soap and shampoo, items she rarely afforded. However, during that month her father became ill and needed medicine, her older brother needed money for a religious pilgrimage, and her younger sister needed new text books. Tuti did not get to buy herself any luxury items. She wanted to make herself attractive as she had already reached the age of marriage (17 years) and was beginning to worry that she would be left ‘behind’, as most of her friends were already married. I bought her the soap and shampoo.

Quantitative analysis of the reimbursements made to factory women by their families is extremely important in this research. I have stated that factory women in Banjaran are making significant contributions to their families through their wages. However, the extent to which these contributions are reimbursed to the factory women needs detailed analyses, especially in regard to Wolf’s (1992) findings. More detailed analysis is necessary, not only to
highlight geographic distinctions in reimbursement trends, but also to highlight the fact that two very different groups of women emerged from within the cohort, who usually contributed significant portions of their wages to their families (38% or more each month). One group received financial reimbursements on a regular basis throughout each month to cover their costs for the next month’s employment, while the other group did not. This second group, to which Tuti (above) belonged, had to pay their own working costs after already giving substantial contributions to their family and in that way were doubly contributing to their families’ welfare. Those who contributed, yet received no reimbursements for costs, were analysed to highlight the dual nature of any trend or paradigm many researchers claim is singular in nature. Household organisations among the Sundanese were too complex for singularity. The theoretical significance is therefore in the dual nature of household organisation vis-a-vis financial contributions and reimbursement patterns.

In Banjaran, 28.5 per cent of the women sampled received no reimbursements at all. This is, however, a very general statistic and biased by including the cohort of women who contributed nothing to their families (19%). To achieve an objective study of the level of reimbursements vis-a-vis contributions I segmented quantitative data as follows. Firstly, women who contributed the average amount of 38% of their monthly income or more were segmented by age cohorts and by highland/lowland distinction. The result is Table 5.4. This
was done to highlight the level of contributions made by women and to assert my thesis that women's factory wages are extremely important to their families and women do not generally need the financial support to work as Wolf (1992) found. More realistically, a significant cohort of women sampled, unused to budgeting a monthly wage, usually had their incomes controlled by their mothers who were well disciplined in such regards.

Overall, 30% of the women sampled contributed substantially (38% or more) to their family income yet received no reimbursement. These figures differed by age group in significant ways. For example, only a small proportion (18%) of the 14-16 aged cohort received no reimbursement due to the fact that the younger women needed higher levels of financial support from their parents and because initially they contributed more than did the older groups. Further, the 17-22 age group received average levels of reimbursement showing that they had reached a life stage where they could more readily budget their income for an entire month. The older cohorts, 23 years and over, in general received higher than average reimbursements than the 17-22 aged cohorts. This anomaly was due to the fact that older cohorts tended to come from lowland regions and contributed more than the average of 38% of their income to the family (Table 5.1, Column 8; Table 5.2, Column 4) and needed more financial support over the period of a month.
Table 5.4 focuses on a section of those surveyed: Those who contributed 38% or more of monthly their wage to their families. This focus substantiates my claim that, in general, women who work in factories in Banjaran do not need the financial support of their families. They merely need the ability to budget a very small wage over a period of a month. This is not easy considering the harsh conditions factory women face every day. This would also be impossible if the young women did not live with their families.

**Table 5.4 Reimbursement Index**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohort</th>
<th>% who Contributed 38% or more of income but received no reimbursement</th>
<th>Highland</th>
<th>Lowland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-22</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26&gt;</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The differences in the highland/lowland reimbursement indexes are also due to cultural and geographic reasons. Table 5.4 shows that in general highland women receive more reimbursements than do lowland women. This is due to higher transportation costs and the longer hours women are away from their
homes, whereby they must attempt to take their meals ‘on the run’. Further, as age increases among highland women, so does the comparative level of reimbursements. Highland women contribute less on average to their family incomes as was evident from Tables 5.2 and 5.3, yet receive more reimbursements than do lowland women. Hence, highland women continually need the financial support of family members and perhaps this very specific geographic analysis supports Wolf’s findings that families, in fact, support industrial capitalism through the financial and emotional support of their daughters. However, emotional support applies to the entire cohort and financial support is more appropriate to highland regions. The need for highland families to support their daughters, especially as they become older, is problematic for the women, whose potential to improve their domestic status is strongly diluted by these factors. Nevertheless, while highland women face unusual impediments to contribute, they continue to do so in a variety of ways. Simply by enduring the harsh terrain, difficult transport problems, factory work and local restraints highland factory women provide a positive experience to others.

Chapter Summary

With regard to the research question which focused upon the process of rapid industrialisation and its influence upon local cultural values toward women, no one simple answer is evident. Factory wages, to a certain extent, supported existing patriarchal structures operating in Banjaran. These same structures
were resistive of 'changed' or improved women's status. On the other hand, these same wages were commonly used to educate younger female siblings to higher levels, which will eventually create a culture more attuned to accommodating young women as economic and cultural assets, rather than as liabilities. Nevertheless, fathers at present seemingly had more control over the destiny of their family due to the increased income of his daughter, whether directly or indirectly. The process of industrialisation had impacted significantly upon the status of the Sundanese women studied. Overall, I argue that while traditional patriarchy resisted change, positive change is inevitable and was evidenced among the women sampled. Factory women's wages and worldly experience which resulted from factory work are positive inputs to their culture irrespective of how much this is resisted by traditionalists.

The way in which households adjust to suit the new working lives of women, despite the fact that their working lives lack any secure future, is a significant way in which rural families support and are seduced by industrial capitalism. It also highlights important aspects of household strategies set in place as a result of new female factory wages. Such strategies are evidence of cultural change. Coping with exploitation at the household level is another way in which families support capitalism. Factory women face extreme hardships, long hours and incredible transport problems. Yet they have the supportive institution of a Sundanese family to return home to, unlike the majority of female factory workers in Indonesia.
It is clear that social and cultural transformation is occurring at household, community and national levels. Women are exerting more influence with the power (financial and social) resulting from their new roles as factory workers. As a result of their high financial contribution levels and positive experience they provide to other women, the women I studied are making significant contributions to their geographic area and households. They do this in spite of almost a complete lack of concern or support from their own government. In fact the state is a major obstacle to such women providing positive developments to their geographic region. The state is ignorant of the importance of women to development, especially working women such as those highlighted in this thesis. However, not all women fitted into this positive category, and those who didn’t and the reasons for this were outlined above.

The next chapter focuses on the relationship between conditions in factories and women’s status. It is a logical continuation of this chapter and addresses more fully reasons why many women do not benefit from factory employment. However, in the next chapter I analyse the relationship between two extremes; foreign operated ‘super-factories’ and traditional Sundanese households.
Chapter Six. The Factories

This chapter focuses upon complex relations between the prevailing industrial system in Indonesia and women's status in the home. In essence, the chapter is designed to address the following three research questions:

1) What are the influences and outcomes (positive or negative) of working conditions, capitalist production procedures and non-culturally specific labour relations upon the women sampled?

2) How, if at all, do these factors inhibit the ability of individual factory workers from improving their status and decision making powers at the household level?

3) How has the process of rapid industrialisation and the associated absorption of very large numbers of female workers into the formal economy (from a more traditional background) in the region of Banjaran, West Java, affected the cultural values of the Sundanese in regard to the overall status of women?

This chapter uses two case studies from the shoe sector which represent the type of factory that has been expanding most rapidly in recent years and employs the majority of female factory workers in the Banjaran region. A focus upon this sector was deemed an appropriate way in which to answer the above questions. A small number of women in the sample did work in the garment and textile sectors. Many of the factors identified in the case study of the shoe industry apply also to these other industries, although some differences will be noted in the course of this chapter. While I studied different types of factories and four different management nationalities, the

262
linkages between women's status at home and work conditions was not measured so as to differentiate between micro-variables such as factory type. They were designed to measure, in the most general sense, the way in which industrial employment impacts upon women's status in the home. General assumptions were made in this thesis due to the over-riding role and influence of the Indonesian state upon factory working conditions per se. While case studies focus upon Nike shoe factories the intent of this thesis is not to measure the impacts of global capitalism or globalisation and MNCs. The focus is upon the Indonesian state as I argue too much attention has been diverted away from states like Indonesia and aimed at MNCs. While MNCs are exploitative and much has been written about them, I want to bring the focus back upon the Third World state in development studies.

Apart from state, local and cultural constraints to improve economic status through manufacturing employment (discussed in Chapter Five), factory women also face more serious and less mutable impediments from the industrial system itself. Improper conditions at work seriously inhibit the ability of any woman to cement a new and lasting economic role in society: One which would lead to improvements in gender equality and, at the same time, address Indonesia's exclusionary economy which functions at all levels with remarkable efficiency. Factory women cannot improve their working status to the same extent as they can at home. To improve their bargaining power within the industrial system is almost impossible given the
contemporary political and economic climate in Indonesia, regardless of which manufacturing sector they work in. Therefore, factory women have few avenues to bring about positive changes to the industrial system. The state in Indonesia is yet to allow ‘group’ rights to workers, let alone individual ones. Any individual who does stand up and challenge the system in Indonesia is either Blacklisted, imprisoned for treason or, in extreme cases, tortured and murdered. In essence, challenging the industrial system in Indonesia is the same as challenging the state in a treasonable manner. Oppression of workers’ rights allows Rent-Seeking to continue and facilitates the accumulation of massive profits, which result when an industrialising economy is exclusively controlled by a small elite. At the other extreme, the industrial system has the innate ability to inhibit women’s development through the direct impact it has upon their household status and organisation.

Indonesia’s exclusionary economy is a serious problem and has been thus for centuries. As Indonesia attempts to develop a successful industrial economy, exclusion is becoming more extreme. A growing rich elite have the means to deny most others access to power and resources, ensuring the benefits of development are enjoyed only by their children, or extended family members and friends, denying the masses, as did the pre-colonial Javanese empires and the Dutch colonisers. At the local and national levels, short employment spans, low wages and unnecessarily harsh conditions in the entire industrial
system are symptomatic of exclusion. These factors impact on people at the local level. For example, households and villagers tended to accumulate negative perceptions toward women working in the ‘worst’ factories surveyed in Banjaran (see Nike below). Quantitative data was used to highlight the relationships between exploitation in the factory and a lack of ability among some women to improve status in the home. Women who worked longer hours without a noticeable increase in wages and benefits, compared to women who worked regular shifts but were paid fairly, found it extremely difficult to reduce their economic burden, or that of their siblings and consequently to improve their status. Quantitative data provides a baseline platform from which to view the relationship between factory conditions and female status. Qualitative analysis provided important ethnographic insights into the intricate functioning and social implications of this relationship.

Overview and Discussion

Despite the overall state-driven exploitation of female workers in Indonesia, some differences were revealed when analysed data reflected patterns and trends about the individual factories, or more broadly by manufacturing sector (textiles, garments or shoes). These differences caused women working in certain sectors undue hardship and created serious impediments to their potential to improve status. However, due to unnecessary and endemic exploitation, state-driven corruption and military coercion it is
difficult to find causal relationships between sectors of industry or foreign management teams, except to state that all work in unison, some more effectively than others, to exploit and exclude women workers. I do not argue that this exploitation or coercion is completely capitalist-derived or based. It is clearly not. It is also an extension of Javanese tradition and elitism. It is predominantly a domestic phenomenon.

While individual factories in Banjaran were studied in this research, it is hypothesised that all manufacturing sectors which are highly feminised in Banjaran are overtly exploitative of their workers. This is based on the existence of an industrial system which makes it extremely difficult for women to improve employment status or working conditions. While the relationship between conditions in the factories and life at home in the villages may seem tenuous, it is indeed exactly the opposite. The way female factory workers were perceived by their family members, boyfriends and society depended to a great extent upon their conditions at work, and their financial contributions relative to time spent there. Many of these perceptions were negative. For example, female Nike workers were commonly negatively perceived because this factory had a very bad local reputation and was extremely exploitative. Claims that feminisation of manufacturing in nations like Indonesia is a passing phenomenon, with little long term impacts, is was not evident to the families I studied. Factory employment has an extraordinary influence upon the status of individual
women and household organisation. These are both negative and positive influences, both of which were discussed in Chapter Five. However, because Sundanese factory women are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and associated negative value judgements at the local level, such as losing touch with tradition and not learning housework, the way in which they are treated at work, or perceived to be treated at work, is crucially important. Sundanese women who attempt factory work face incredible odds and, at the same time, remarkable potential to improve their lives and the lives of those around them. What stands in their way is unwarranted humiliation and minute financial returns which bear no reflection to the hard work conducted and an almost complete lack of concern from their own ‘democratically elected’ government at all levels.

The relationship between women’s status and factory employment must be analysed in terms of patriarchy, Rent-Seeking and gender dynamics of the household. Rent-Seeking is a patriarchal institution practiced by elite Sino-Indonesian, Javanese, Sundanese and most foreign investors. Such institutions immediately place young Sundanese women in an inferior bargaining position, providing them with a status only relative to their productive capacity (as with machines) measured in terms of cost benefit analysis. To set up any factory in Indonesia requires countless documents and letters of permission, from scores of government departments at five administrative levels, which can potentially take many years to finalise.
Paying rent seekers cuts this time to a few months. Mehmet (1994) estimates that, in a foreign factory, Rent-Seeking costs 30% of production costs in Indonesia. Labour costs are factored in at a very low 10% of production costs, due mainly to alarmingly high Rent-Seeking costs which only directly benefit a handful of Indonesians. At the most general level, women face a powerful international patriarchy which has immense power and works unseen and often unrecorded. These global attitudes filter down and impact at the village and household level, a reflection of what Giddens (1996) terms ‘action at a distance’. A clear link runs right from the seat of power in Jakarta to the factories and villages in Banjaran. In this context Trickle Down does occur with great efficiency in Indonesia. The Trickle Down costs of Rent-Seeking are only balanced if labour is extremely cheap and labour costs are kept permanently low. By employing women, factories are able to keep wages low, because two-thirds of Indonesia’s manufacturing industry is located in rural areas, where women are generally constrained from protest for cultural reasons and because labour protest in Indonesia is predominantly confined to urban centres.

If a young woman, married or unmarried, works in a factory under the following conditions:

- Works long hours every day, 6-7 days a week;
- Has expensive transport and food costs;
• Receives state sanctioned low wages and is not properly compensated for overtime;
• Is not paid all her benefits and entitlements;
• Has relatively low education levels;
• Has low household activity;
• Suffers from exhaustion and humiliating working conditions;

then she faces enormous odds, and the likelihood that she will be able to work for a reasonable length of time, provide herself with an improved lifestyle, therefore leading to improved status, is extremely small. Further, it is usual for women who work under some or all of the above conditions to find themselves dislocated from society and culture, which is in itself a negative outcome, but is exacerbated by the fact that commonly such individuals are negatively perceived in their local area. The problem of dislocation from her family and village is damaging, especially if the woman is away from early morning to late at night and misses important social and religious events. When this occurs the woman’s status is somehow mutated. She becomes, according to some highland beliefs, like a ghost. Further, if the factory does not compensate properly for the woman’s work, her family will potentially acquire negative perceptions toward her, both socially and financially.

**Where the Women Are**

Within the Kabupaten (regency) of Bandung, there are 41 Kecamatan (sub-regions), of which Banjaran is one. Factories are located in certain areas and
not in others, revealing a noticeable demographic influence. The two most populated Kecamatan in Bandung are also the most highly industrialised. The Kecamatan of Banjaran and Majalaya have the largest populations, by far the greatest population densities and the highest proportion of young women (BPS, 1994A:10). They are therefore attractive to investors seeking to locate factories in areas with abundant labour reserves, for the following reasons: 1) Large populations make the employment market more competitive and therefore labour more exploitable and controllable. 2) Due to the continuously high turnover rate in the factories, abundant reserves of cheap labour are available in these two Kecamatan. 3) A further advantage for investors is the rural-population factor, which implies that in extremely densely settled rural regions such as Banjaran, negative perceptions about factory employment are likely to have less impact upon potential new female recruits. However, for those women working in the worst factories in Banjaran, negative stories, myths or perceptions are commonly and unfairly tied to them simply because they work for a particular factory.

The feminisation of multi-national factories in the developing world is viewed by most as an economic outcome of globalisation. However, in this research, feminisation, which was driven by South Korean, Taiwanese, Japanese and Chinese (Sino-Indonesian) management, also has physical significance. Most researchers claim that feminisation of manufacturing in certain sectors in the developing world is the result of women's dexterity,
their ability to endure tedious work and their acceptance of lower wages and poor conditions, in comparison to men. This is more or less true. However, as a male researcher I heard many private comments made by male managers and community leaders suggesting other reasons as to why factories in the region are staffed by young women. These comments would not normally be made to a female researcher in such an area. The foreign management who operate the factories are all men. It is aesthetically pleasing for them to be in charge of thousands of poor, young and mostly unmarried women. The language used by the management and the workers about each other showed clear physical significance. Many of the managers I spoke with tolerated their jobs because they were surrounded by women who looked up to them, apart from their relatively enormous salaries. On the other hand, many of the young women had romantic notions toward their wealthier Asian managers. Economic factors certainly create a labour force of predominantly young and inexperienced women in specific manufacturing industries in the developing world. However, physical factors must also be considered. For example, a Taiwanese general manager told me that if he had to live in this ‘backward’ country, with the heat and the dirt, that he would do so only if surrounded by attractive young women. This same manager had recently promoted a very attractive woman from her position on the factory floor to work in his office. I interviewed her privately and she claimed the manager constantly attempted to take her out for dinner or to a disco, but she refused and had
managed to retain her office position. The incident was common knowledge around the factory.

**Eleven Factories**

The women sampled came from 24 factories, all of which were located in the immediate geographic area of Banjaran. However, adequate data was collected from only 11 of these factories and therefore the rest were ignored in relation to the very specific analyses drawn from the data in Table 6.1. Further, given the fact that most factories, no matter from which sector or foreign nation, created very similar conditions for women it is argued that all overly exploit women with state approval. However, some do this more than others (Nike for example). Nevertheless, it is important to understand the implications of the ratios of respondents surveyed by sector (Figure 6.1) and the number of factories from which these respondents came, again by sector (Figure 6.2 and Table 6.1). For example, 45% of all respondents worked in the shoe sector (Figure 6.1). However, according to Figure 6.2, this high ratio only came from five factories. This highlights the large numbers of women absorbed from newly exploited rural areas in Banjaran into the shoe sector (compared to garments and textiles, which have been in existence for a longer period in the region) as it does the very large size of shoe factories in general. The ratios will be discussed later in the chapter. Hence, the utilisation of female labour in Banjaran is a new phenomena in the shoe sector. This point also highlights that Banjaran is a new industrial area, due
to the fact that many new shoe factories have located there, while textile and
garment factories were generally located farther away in more established
industrial areas. This caused women from Banjaran to travel comparatively
longer distances if employed in these sectors (Table 6.1 and 6.3).

Of the factories sampled most were large (1,000 workers or more) textile or
shoe factories, while the garment factories tended to be an even mix of large
and medium-sized enterprises (between 101 and 500 workers). This is
reflected in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, whereby only 16% of respondents sampled
came from the garment sector, but hailed from a relatively large number (8)
of individual factories. Only one of all the factories studied paid the women
all their wage, benefits and leave requirements (Table 6.2). Most factories
granted some allowances and ignored others. Ironically, more than 40% of
the women interviewed, as well as their parents or husbands, were generally
happy with their employment conditions. This same cohort stated that their
expected daily production targets were reasonable and therefore not stressful.
If they did encounter difficulties in meeting their targets, their supervisors
were supportive and rarely abusive. They tended to hail from ‘better’
factories (textiles) but there was no conclusive sectoral correlation in the
data, except to greater poverty. Considering the extreme poverty in the
region, the fact that working women were a new phenomena, the low (or
non-existent) agricultural wages for women and the massive unemployment,
it is little wonder many families were uncomplaining about factory conditions.

Figure 6.1 Ratio of Respondents by Manufacturing Sector

Figure 6.2 Number of Factories Sampled by Sector
Table 6.1 Details of 24 Factories Surveyed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Factory</th>
<th>Country Venture</th>
<th>Factory Type</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>* Distance</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PT Gistex</td>
<td>Korea Garment</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>18km</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Kukje</td>
<td>Korea Shoes</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>7km</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Delta</td>
<td>Korea Garment</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>18km</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Alanatex</td>
<td>Korea Textile</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>19km</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Tawekal</td>
<td>Korea Shoes</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>4km</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Asiasport</td>
<td>Korea Textile</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>10km</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Apatex</td>
<td>Korea Textile</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>3km</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Panasia</td>
<td>Korea Textile</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>12km</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Panafil</td>
<td>Korea Textile</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>23km</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Saimoda</td>
<td>Japan Garment</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>12km</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Adatex</td>
<td>Japan Textile</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>6km</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Metro</td>
<td>Japan Garment</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>11km</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT KTSM</td>
<td>Japan Textile</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>12km</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Feng Tai</td>
<td>Taiwan Shoes</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>7km</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Hadtex</td>
<td>Taiwan Textile</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>22km</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Supertex</td>
<td>Hong Kong Textile</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>9km</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Lumerindo</td>
<td>Indonesia Shoes</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>8km</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Cardinal</td>
<td>Indonesia Garment</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>11km</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Adira</td>
<td>Indonesia Garment</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>19km</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Sinar</td>
<td>Indonesia Shoes</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>11km</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Daliatex</td>
<td>Indonesia Textile</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>14km</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Wing/tex</td>
<td>Indonesia Textile</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>12km</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Leading</td>
<td>Indonesia Garment</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>9km</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT Limpung</td>
<td>Indonesia Garment</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>13km</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Distance from central Banjaran to factory
* All Korean Factories are South Korean

Sub-Total 147
Sub-Total 53
Sub-Total 72
Sub-Total 7
Sub-Total 44
Total Respondents = 323
Table 6.2: Factory Ranking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factory Name</th>
<th>Sick/L</th>
<th>Maternity/L</th>
<th>Mens/L</th>
<th>Holiday</th>
<th>Bonus</th>
<th>O/Time</th>
<th>Trans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*PT. Feng Tay</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT. Asiasport</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT. Tawekai</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT. KTS M</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT. Delta</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT. Hadtex</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*PT. Kukje</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT. Alanatex</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT. Metro</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT. Adatex</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT. Supertex</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Payment of Nationally Stipulated Working Benefits. Note: The percentage values in the Bonus and Overtime columns are based on the responses of the women surveyed. For example, only 40% of the Feng Tay workers surveyed stated that they were paid the legal hourly rate when they worked overtime and only 30% stated that they had ever been paid a bonus. Finally, in the transport column a Yes answer was given if the factory either provided free transport or paid each worker an adequate allowance for transport costs.

*These two factories are the focus of a case study later in the chapter.

The 11 factories studied in depth are ranked from the worst to the best according to the guidelines of this research (Table 6.2). The ranking was established using scales based upon wages, conditions and payment of benefits and allowances. Further, community perceptions were also taken into account. For example, Feng Tay and Asiasport were ranked in the worst position in terms of the measurable scales above. However, Feng Tay was
perceived significantly more negatively than Asiasport, especially regarding its treatment of women, so was ranked at the top of the scale, signifying its lowest ranking. Community attitudes toward individual factories was a crucial way in which to measure the ranking of factories. Feng Tay (Nike), from this point on, is viewed as the worst of all factories surveyed. At the other extreme, Supertex (textile factory) paid its workers in accordance with all national laws and was indicative of other factories in the textile sector in the region in general. However, this is not to say that national laws in Indonesia are fair minded, especially toward women. They are clearly not so.

Table 6.2 shows clearly the notable differences which exist in working conditions between individual factories sampled in Banjaran. However, working conditions tended to be similar within sectors. Of the three sectors focused upon in this research (textiles, shoes and garments) the textile sector was the best in terms of working conditions, treatment of workers and payment of entitlements. The shoe sector occupied the worst position in these terms, as evident by Table 6.2, where shoe factories tended to be clustered at the top of the table (indicating the lowest ranking). On the other hand, textile factories tended to be grouped at the bottom of the table (indicating a relatively good position). The garment industry, which was predominantly locally owned (Table 6.3 column 10), was the worst sector in terms of wages, but not in terms of conditions and working hours. The garment industry had the potential to be extremely exploitative because the women generally
worked on a piecemeal basis. In spite of this, the shoe sector is the most destructive of women’s status among those sampled. This is due to the vast numbers of women it employs, the fact that it is a new sector in Indonesia, its hurried production nature and the way in which sports shoes have been aggressively marketed in the West. As a result, workers in shoe factories face enormous work loads to fill production orders and at the same time have their rights quashed in the quest for faster production and increased profit.

Table 6.3 distinguishes between working conditions by sector. Various differences emerged between sectors regarding conditions at work and status in the home. However, these differences were not mandatory. The shoe, textile and garment sectors will now be discussed separately.

Shoes: According to data analysed (Table 6.3) shoe factories exhibit the following characteristics: They are predominantly large, foreign owned and managed; employ the youngest women sampled, who must work the longest hours compared to other sectors (Columns 1-3 & 11-13). Further, according to the graphic representation of the cohort surveyed, 45% of all women sampled worked in the shoe sector, but only came from 5 separate factories close to central Banjaran. This highlights the large nature of the factories and the fact that shoe factories have only recently moved into rural areas like Banjaran (Figures 6.1 & 6.2). Women who work in shoe factories were not receiving
Table 6.3: Data by Type of Factory: Shoes, Garments and Textiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 % of Factories Large</th>
<th>2 % Foreign Owned</th>
<th>3 Workers' Ave Age (Years)</th>
<th>4 Distance to Factory (kms)</th>
<th>5 Left School Age (years)</th>
<th>6 Average Years Working</th>
<th>7 Daily Transport Costs (Rupiahs)</th>
<th>8 Daily Food Costs (Rupiahs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shoes</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garments</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>10 Average Daily Wage (Rupiahs)</th>
<th>11 Hours of Work Each Day (Ave)</th>
<th>12 Working Days A Week (Ave)</th>
<th>13 Overtime Each Week (Ave Hrs)</th>
<th>14 Average % C/bution to H/hold</th>
<th>15 % Who did % of Her Wage Not C/bute to Total Family Income</th>
<th>16 % of Her Wage to Total Family Income</th>
<th>17 % Not Married</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shoes</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garments</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the legal daily wage of Rp 5,200. However, ironically the wages of women who worked in shoe factories were more important to their families than the wages of women from the textile sector who were better paid (Table 6.3, Column 16). This point highlights the fact that shoe workers come from the poorest families in the region and are more desperate for employment. Shoe factories also tend not to pay their workers adequate transport allowances, seriously inhibiting their ability to contribute to home life. Further, despite the fact that women from the shoe sector have significantly less distance to travel to work, they pay unusually high transport costs (Columns 4&7). Long hours of overtime associated specifically with the shoe sector, which should mean high contribution rates to the household (Column 14), in fact lead to exactly the opposite in Banjaran.

Textiles: According to Figures 6.1 and 6.2, 39% of the women sampled worked in textile factories, coming from 11 different factories. This is consistent with the wider geographic spread of the textile industry compared to the shoe industry. Textile factories, being well established in the region, draw workers from far afield. Like shoes, textiles are manufactured in large factories. In contrast to shoe factories, textile factories are not predominantly foreign owned (Table 6.3 Column 2). Sino-Indonesian are the major owners and are viewed by the Sundanese as foreigners, despite having lived for three centuries in Indonesia. Historically, many Chinese were recruited to Indonesia to act as middle-men between the Dutch and the indigenous elite and peasants.
(Hoadley, 1994:191-192). They were adept at organising labour and trading. They were also used as scape-goats in times of unrest, and they still are today.

Textile factories, when compared to shoe and garment factories, attract the female workers with the highest education levels. These factories also offer the most congenial and longest working life span, the highest average wages, and the most manageable working hours (Columns 5-13). This is the result of the highly mechanised nature of textile factories where the employment of more competent employees is crucial. As a result they have the highest financial contribution rate (Column 14) and the lowest rate of 'no contribution' (Column 15). Furthermore, the Sino-Indonesian owners are more wary of over-exploiting workers given their problematic ethnic position in Indonesia. This significantly reinforces my argument that favourable conditions at work cause improved status in the home and society, especially in rural areas.

Garments: Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show that 16% of the respondents sampled worked in the garment sector and were drawn from 8 individual factories. This reflects the small nature of the labour force in this sector, as many garment factories were small operators. Roughly half the factories were foreign owned but were managed almost exclusively by Sino-Indonesians. Garment workers had to travel significantly larger distances to work than the workers from the other two sectors because garment factories are located in more traditional industrial areas far from Banjaran (Table 6.3 Column 4). As a result the
women's transport costs were higher by comparison (Column 7) as were their food costs (Column 8). As a result the financial contributions of garment workers were lower than women from the other sectors (Column 14) and the proportion who 'did not contribute' was significantly higher (Column 15). This point reinforces the notion that problematic factory conditions, wages and benefits impact directly (and negatively) upon women's status outside the factory. However, only 16% of the respondents surveyed worked in the garment sector in Banjaran and, therefore, its influence upon status is not as assessable or predictable at this time as with the shoe and textile sectors.

**Inside a Factory**

According to the respondents, the majority of factories surveyed were reasonably clean, but most were poorly ventilated and extremely noisy. The factory discussed below is a joint venture South Korean enterprise and is a typical factory in the region. The local partner is Sino-Indonesian who relies heavily upon foreign management techniques. In this factory 2,500 local people are employed and 80% are women. The shoes are assembled in Banjaran and all the materials are imported from Japan or South Korea. The cost of production, including labour costs, of the highest quality shoes in this factory was $US7.00 per pair in Banjaran in 1996. The shoes are sold in Jakarta, for example, for $US60.00 and much more by the time they reach America or Japan. The women normally work eight hour shifts, but are also required to do excessive overtime with large daily quotas when production
orders are high. The shoes are assembled by women who work in lines of 60. Each line is expected to produce 4,000 pairs of shoes per day. Workers here claimed that South Korean management was the worst in Banjaran. Local male workers commonly had verbal arguments with management which in some instances led to low level violence. There were strong feelings of resentment among workers toward such managers. They believed that the management viewed them as lower class humans or servants (Pembantu). Inside the factory, management feels much safer enforcing harsh conditions or insisting on illegal conditions of employment if they are doing so to large groups of women. If they attempted to impose such conditions upon a workforce dominated by Sundanese men the result would be violent.

Both male and female workers were asked about general factory operations and how these conditions effected them. The results were disturbing. Breakdowns of machinery were common and when they occurred the daily quota could not be achieved. The workers, mainly women, suffered as a result. Management either made them go home without pay or they were forced to make up their quota in unpaid overtime at a later date when the machines were fixed. In some instances, the women were docked in their pay at the end of the month. Essentially, breakdowns in machinery were blamed upon women by management. By the same token, if the factory was behind in an order, the workers were forced to work long hours of overtime, sometimes for days on end without adequate rest or sleep. They would not be compensated with a
bonus after this exhaustive work as they believed they should be. Factory management avoid any form of machinery sabotage or ‘go slow’ policy by workers by blaming them for any problems in production and making them the first to suffer if the factory is behind in production due to plant problems. This is a clear example of the way in which management exploits labour. By ensuring problems with production are blamed upon workers, who are in turn made to suffer unfair hardships as a result, management avoids problems with passive resistance, a common phenomena in developing economic systems in poor nations as highlighted by Jamilah (1994) and Scott (1985). In corresponding Malaysian factories women resisted potential exploitation through the destruction of microchips, work slow methods and ‘spirit possession’ (cited in Escobar, 1993:142). In Banjaran such resistance is successfully avoided through harsher treatment of female workers in the manner described above.

The Ideology of The Female Factory Wage

In theory, female wages are identical to male wages if they do exactly the same work. In reality very few men do exactly the same work as women, but those who do were paid equally in Banjaran. All women in the Focus Groups said that women’s work in the factory was naturally slower than men’s but was more accurate. Statements like the following were common:
The men can work very fast and do hard jobs with machines but they are not as caring as we are. If women try to work as hard and fast as men there are many mistakes and the quality is not good.

Women would never dare to protest for a higher wage in Banjaran, but the men do. The company knows that women are too weak to insist on a higher wage or better conditions, but when men strike or protest the company will listen because the men can cause much trouble.

The higher wages for men who work as supervisors or machine operators are fair because they work faster and harder than women. Men are also responsible for their families welfare and must get a higher wage.

It was rare to find a male production worker earning more than a female production worker if they worked the same hours in the same position. In the higher echelons of production, which were dominated by men, wages were vastly higher. This explains massive discrepancies highlighted by quantitative data in female/male wage ratios in the manufacturing sector in Indonesia.

All of the women who participated in this research provided reasons for the factory management’s preference for female factory workers in the production line. They were also aware that foreign managers were wary of upsetting local men who had previously asserted their local power over management on issues which related to the unfair dismissal of local Sundanese men. However, the management were seemingly unconcerned about upsetting women. One woman appropriately summed up the issue by stating that:

In our factory women and men get the same basic wage, however, men receive an additional income called 'Post Money' because men have to do different work at certain times of the year. In reality, I
think this is to stop the men causing trouble because we usually work longer hours than they do and don’t get any extra money.

Local Perceptions

Questions asked in Focus Groups were designed to discover women’s attitudes to work. The responses echo important attitudes of Sundanese women toward work. Many viewed factory work as a game and used the word hobby (hobi) to describe their attitude to this type of work in general. Nevertheless, women who worked in highly exploitative factories (Nike) or sectors of manufacture (shoes) rarely described work as a hobby.

There is no evidence to support the notion that all women who work in factories are unhappy or feel personally exploited. Approximately half the women claimed they felt they were being exploited while the other women did not express this view. However, the majority of those who felt exploited came from the most problematic factories or factories which exhibited poorer working conditions. Nevertheless, this data is based on perceptions and many sports shoe workers, for example, claimed not to feel exploited. However, it must be remembered the majority of shoe workers were relatively poorly educated and from the lowest social strata. Those women who were unhappy with factory work, or felt exploited, expressed their views in the following manner:
I often want to leave the job especially when I have problems at work, but then I think what will I do at home, I will be bored and open to gossip and who will support my little sister to finish school.

I want to leave the factory because the shift work makes me feel unhealthy, so I am looking for a better factory job somewhere else.

We both want to leave next year because we feel tired and have nothing to show from our work. All our money is gone before the next month and we are still as poor as when we started working.

I will leave when I am married because my boyfriend hates the factories.

My wage is always cut for transport payments, food and tax and this makes me so angry I want to leave. I asked my father to complain about it but he is too scared.

On the other hand, many women provided positive comments such as:

I have many new friends in the factory that I would not have if I worked in my Kampung. I enjoy mixing with men and women freely without the chance of gossip being spread about me.

Without my factory wage my father would have died long ago. My money can buy him medicine and make his life better because I can afford to buy batteries for his hearing aid. When I did not work my father could never hear anything because we could not afford batteries.

The Lurahs

The Lurah (Kepala Desa) is a quasi-democratically elected head of about 7,000 people and is essentially the last link between the national and regional governments and the village. There are 17 Desa (small administrative regions) which make up the Kecamatan (district) of Banjaran. Therefore, there are 17 Lurah. The Lurah report directly to the Bupati (District Head) who in turn reports to the Governor of the province of West Java.
Seventeen Lurah were interviewed about their perceptions of conditions in local factories. The Lurahs are key political, social and cultural figures within the community, so their opinions are important to gain a broad understanding of the context of the changes that factory work will have upon women. All were well versed in Pancasila industrial relations as reflected in their common responses to questions regarding the role of factories in Indonesia's development plans. However, those who did admit to having doubts tended to have more individualistic views toward local problems associated with factory employment, if they, in fact, admitted there were any problems. The Lurah provides most requirements needed to get a factory job according to Indonesian law and to local culture (adat). The Lurah's office must advise the factory by letter that the nominated worker will work well and diligently. Further letters are required from local doctors and the police station. The Lurah's office is instrumental in submitting completed application forms to the factories. However, a recruitment officer at one of the largest factories in the area said that these applications were rarely used and the people who were employed were recommended by friends or gained employment through other connections. This assumption was tested by myself and proved to portray a more accurate view of reality than did the claims of the Lurah. While all the Lurah portrayed a sense that their office was primarily instrumental in creating employment in their Desa by recruiting factory women, the reality was completely different. In fact, the Lurah were merely paying lip service to
factories except for a few who had strong relations with individual factories. Of all the women sampled, only 19% claimed to have been employed as a result of the efforts or influence of their respective Lurah.

To be influential in providing employment, individual Lurahs had to have close personal connections with a particular factory. For example, one Lurah crafted a special deal with a large local factory whereby this factory would employ people from the Lurah’s Desa in preference to those from other areas. In return, the Lurah would ensure that things went smoothly. The Lurah saw advantage in this relationship as it increases the gross income of the Desa and therefore the income of the region. The Lurah claimed he usually puts forward candidates who are most in need of work, as long as they are ‘good people’ (orang baik). He also claimed to have put pressure on the factories to pay women all their legal benefits. This Desa and the factory support each other. The Desa provides workers and the factory paid for a new road bridge which was built to allow the factory buses in and out of the Desa. According to the Lurah, the factory’s general manager made the deal because he said the women workers from this Desa were very good and did not cause trouble. This Desa was one of a minority which was politically active in recruiting female factory workers.

Eight of the 17 Lurah interviewed stated that exploitation of women in factories was a serious concern. However, they also stated unanimously that
there is nothing they can do about this exploitation. They are constrained by
tradition and a dictatorial central government. The government makes it clear
that labour unrest is a form of treason and severely punishes any who follow
that path. None of the Lurah admitted to ever accepting any formal complaint
from a factory worker. However, many knew of serious problems but were
unable to act upon them.

On the other hand, nine Lurah stated that they did not accept the notion that
exploitation existed in the factories and stated that they had never heard of any
complaints from the women. However, these Lurah either came from Desa
with very little influence from factory employment, due to extreme isolation,
or had the attitude that exploitation was a minor problem and one not worth
worrying about. Those Lurah had similar attitudes to the state and investors: If
the workers feel exploited they should leave the factory and stop complaining.
Many of the Lurah refused to entertain the idea of factory exploitation and
simply highlighted positive outcomes when asked about this issue responding
in these words: “Working in a factory is very good for widows and young
women who have not yet married, therefore, how can exploitation exist”.

The female Lurah discussed previously in Chapter Five stated there are never
any complaints from factory women. Therefore, there can be no exploitation
of these workers by management. This denial of exploitation has been
reported to the Bupati (District Head) who in turn sends it up the line to the
state. The state then uses this mis-information to quell criticism both from within Indonesia and internationally. The female Lurah also stated that exploitation of workers does not exist simply because no women had ever complained to her office. She made this statement with a senior military officer present because she refused to be interviewed without his presence. The female Lurah did not agree that exploitation existed because the women have to work properly and cannot be lazy. Therefore, according to her, if exploitation occurred it was the woman's fault. This attitude is typical of the enormous political obstructions that factory women face, which are exacerbated by the fact that the attitude came from another Sundanese woman with considerable political power at the local level. The simplistic premise that, if women become more politically active or representative in the Third World, positive benefits will 'trickle down' to all women are significantly contradicted by the above discussion. Many researchers point to the fact that women are not represented in politics in nations such as Indonesia, and assume that if this imbalance was to be addressed, that gender equality would magically result (Waylen, 1996:10-14). These assumptions should be reconsidered in light of the attitudes revealed by the female Lurah above.

What the Working Women in Factories Think

The following data came from numerous Focus Groups and household interviews designed to offset the views of local government in relation to the subject of exploitation. The women interviewed were aware that the foreign
companies have come to Banjaran to utilise their cheap labour but also stated that Banjaran was a better area than cities like Jakarta or Bandung for factories, because Sundanese women are very passive and rarely complain. The women were generally aware that factories make vast profits from their work and most of the women believed they don’t get enough money for the amount of work they have to do.

The cohort who believed women were exploited in general attributed this to the low level of education of female workers. Further, they commonly stated that the ‘situation or emergency’ (keadaan) of their daily lives makes it very hard to complain or do anything. One woman worked out of desperation and before accepting work at a Taiwanese factory, had to sign an illegal ‘agreement’ stating she would not ask for a transportation allowance. She was desperate for employment and had been waiting for two years without success. Her ‘emergency’, lack of education and experience (poverty), forced her to accept illegal enterprise bargaining arrangements. In reality, she would have accepted any conditions in order to obtain employment. Many women had similar stories to tell from a variety of different factories with different management.

The cohort who were unhappy about their low wages stated that the factory should pay them more because they spend the whole day at work and give up their family life and ‘playing with their friends’. None of the women
participating in a Focus Group conducted in a highland village received a transportation allowance. They were usually gone for 13 hours a day because of the isolation of their Kampung. These women are paid Rp 27,000 per week but have to spend Rp 13,000 on transport and food each week, leaving very little money at the end of the day. This point highlights the great importance of geography upon financial contributions and status (Table 6.3 Column 4). However, this situation was put in perspective by a local village leader who said that women working in the factory are better off than women in the field where they are paid very low wages, or none at all, and become ‘very black’ from the sun. If they become black, it is a sign of low status associated with agricultural work, an obstacle to becoming beautiful and, in extreme cases, a sign of sexual impropriety, according to local beliefs. However, these agricultural workers did not have to pay for transport or expensive food, but were nevertheless perceived more negatively than factory women due to the traditional low status female agricultural workers have in the region.

The women provided their own interpretations of what exploitation meant to them:

The supervisors are very rude and abusive and if the factory has no work for the women we are sent home, but must make up the lost hours in unpaid overtime later. If we fail to meet daily targets our wages are cut and it is common to be paid without an official pay slip. Many do not eat the factory food because it makes them sick but they are is still charged for the food (Women from Asiasport).
Women are exploited because they are denied job satisfaction and the sharing in the company’s success. Women who are retrained and reskilled in the factory and promoted to a new position are not paid an increased wage. This is exploitation.

Usually once in every week I have to work almost 24 hour shifts to make up for the stupid managers. They blame us if orders are behind. When this happens, I will work from 8 AM to 4 PM and go home until 7 PM and then return to work until 7 AM the next day. This happens all the time but the management say it is only when orders are behind.

When I started working in the factory my training wage was paid for 7 months and not three as our government says. I was paid at half rates for 7 months as were most of my friends who started work with me. We were too scared to complain but knew we were being cheated.

One woman I interviewed had worked on the factory floor for two years but had recently been retrained and reskilled to work in the laboratory. She was not paid a higher daily wage however, and due to lack of overtime and shift work in the laboratory she actually took home significantly less pay each month as a result of promotion. As a result of being retrained and promoted it seems absurd that any worker should receive less pay.

The cohort who stated that no exploitation existed held this belief because men and women were treated on an equal basis in the factory, unlike agricultural work of their mothers’ era where women were rarely paid at all. This perceived equality of the sexes was in contrast to the privileged position of men in traditional Sundanese culture. Many women stated they do not believe that they are exploited by the factory system because they get the same
treatment as men. They have choices now and power to make decisions, to come and go from the house without the peering eyes of the Kampung. However, perceptions of women could not be tied to any individual manufacturing sector, they were relative to poverty and individual belief and no real correlation could be made to manufacturing sectors per se.

Many of the poorest women studied did not believe they were being exploited because without their jobs their families would be very poor. They believed they were working within the rules stipulated by the national government. Realistically, if there were no factories in Banjaran they would have few alternatives. The poorest women had the lowest education levels and the lowest social status. This low status was reinforced when such women were recruited into the worst factories accepting, in their ignorance or desperation, illegal working conditions.

Two Women

The monthly wage slips were collected from over twenty women, for up to a two year period. It was evident that vast fluctuations occurred on a monthly basis in the amount women earned, making it difficult to generalise about the income of female factory workers. Due to shift work and other significant differences between factory wage systems monthly wages differed dramatically.
The wage of Imas (Figure 6.3) in 1995 was in-line with the lower national minimum wage in that year. More importantly, during the months of November and December (Column 1&2) she was being trained for the job. Her monthly income was significantly lower in 1995 as a result. Imas could not explain why her income fluctuated so dramatically except to say that it must be due to night work and the shift allowance she is paid. However, during the months of November, December, February and March her wage was so small that it caused extreme hardship within her household and this tended to make her family angry toward her. Families have no avenue to vent frustration toward the factories or their government, which they well know is corrupt. Due to fear of reprisal from government officials they tend to take out their frustration on their daughters.

Figure 6.3

![Bar chart showing monthly wage of Imas from November 1995 to August 1996.](chart.png)
Imas is a permanent worker, and has worked in the same large shoe factory for one year. 80% of the workers are female in this factory. Her mid-level managers are Sundanese, and the factory provides food and transportation deducting Rp 200 from her salary daily for food. Despite the fact that this goes against national laws, most factories in Indonesia do it. Not including overtime, she works eight hours a day, six days a week. Imas works on a permanent roster system, as do all workers in her factory. The roster system works on day (6AM to 2PM), evening (2PM to 10PM) and night (10PM to 6AM) shifts. The roster system rotates over a three weekly period, so in any one month Imas may work two weeks night work or only one. However, she prefers night work because she makes more money due to the shift allowance (See April and August). When Imas finishes six days night work, she returns home at 6AM and must report to work again the same day by 2PM. She stated this takes many days to recover from but that the extra income made her mother happy.

Tuti’s wage (Figure 6.4) increased dramatically between September and December 1996 and may seem impressive. However it must be viewed in the following light:

- Daily Regional wage increases were beginning to impact from 1995, but were not paid to her until 10 months later. Backpayments were not forthcoming;
- Tuti’s factory was experiencing a changeover to Nike production, and as a result;
Figure 6.4

Monthly Wage of Tuti: May 1996-Dec 1996 in Rupiahs

- She was working seven days a week;
- Her holidays were cancelled;
- Daily overtime was compulsory;
- Tuti was required to do extra overtime as she was a favourite with management;
- Constant exhaustion ensued;
- Daily targets increased above and beyond normal requirements;
- Transport costs increased when her driver heard of wage increases.

Tuti is 19 years old, and has worked in the large shoe factory where she now works for two years. Before that she was often unemployed since leaving school at 14 years of age. 2,500 workers are employed in her factory, 75% are female. All her supervisors are male and Sundanese. Her mother had previously started employment in a factory in Banjaran but was later forbidden by her husband (according to local tradition). She lives in an
extremely poor house made of thatching and her father died many years ago. Her mother is bed-ridden and constantly ill. Her adopted mother also lives in the house, but does not work. Her mothers have very low education levels and no marketable skills. She is the only wage earner in the house and travels to work daily by horse and cart, which costs Rp 800 per day. Her food at work costs Rp 600 per day. However, transport allowances are made in her wage which covers the cost of transport (only because she lived in a lowland area). Without this meagre allowance the welfare of her family would be seriously jeopardised. Without her income, Tuti’s family would be destitute. Fluctuations in her income led to uncertainty and concern in the home.

**Education and Factory Work**

All factories have different classifications of workers, usually as daily (casual) or monthly (permanent) workers. However, during surveying it was evident that over one third of the women were not entirely sure whether they were daily or monthly workers and in these situations more in-depth investigation was necessary. This confusion over status highlights the attitude of management toward workers. In theory women are constantly told of the need to improve their education which will improve their economic and social status. In reality it suits industry to keep most of its workers confused as to their working status. Daily workers are called “pekerja harian lepas” and are paid every two weeks. Women who have only SD (primary) education levels are usually daily workers with lower job security and status. Women with
SMP (junior high school) or SMA (senior high school) are usually classified as monthly workers but it depends on the factory. Women with SMA have a better chance of becoming a monthly or permanent worker.

Monthly workers have a more secure status, higher wages, better jobs and are perceived more favourably by their community members. In some factories daily workers can be promoted to monthly if they have worked for two years and this means better pay and security. But they must have outstanding performance and attendance records in that two years, meaning very few women are actually promoted from casual to permanent workers.

Workers with SMP or SMA (junior high school or senior high school) stated they were accepted into the best factories. Those workers who had completed their education to the SMP level (senior high school) stated that this was crucial because they could not work in their factory and would have to work in a bad factory like Feng Tay or Asiasport if they only had SD levels (primary). This was confirmed by public officials and miscellaneous factory management and by the Nike case study below. Further, they stated that schools taught discipline, basic English and Indonesian, all of which are crucial to allow them to communicate with their supervisors and overseas buyers who they claimed often ask the workers questions about any problems when they visit the factory. They also said that it improves their personality and teaches them
basic economics which they have to use in their job, especially in regard to quotas, their wages and balancing their spending.

All women stated that when their children grow up they will need a better education than they had. They must reach a better future than their parents so they do not have to work in factories. Education and factory employment are two crucial factors in relation to female status among Sundanese. Factory employment encourages women to improve their education and better educated women are less prone to work in the most exploitative factories and hence have more opportunity to improve their status. Most of the women in the Focus Groups stated that they would ensure that their daughters received a good education because they knew if they did not they would have to work in factories like Feng Tay (Nike). This factory was commonly used as a yardstick to measure against other factories by the local community. Women who worked for Feng Tay were known to be extremely poorly educated, and were commonly viewed negatively by the wider community. Poorly educated women are generally found working in the worst factories, with the worst conditions and have very poor prospects and status as a result.

A Case Study: Nike

Nike or Feng Tay, as it is locally called, was chosen as a case study because it ranked lowest in Table 6.2. This case study should therefore be viewed in this light. All other factories studied are labeled 'exploitative' in this research.
However, case studies focusing on the worst of these can be used to understand the overall position of all factory women keeping in mind that Nike is one of the worst surveyed. Nike is ranked in the worst position on the ladder overall when it comes to wages, benefits, conditions and community perceptions. Many other factories were also rated poorly in these terms and ranked closely to Nike. As noted earlier in this chapter, the majority of new employment opportunities for women is in the shoe sector. It is instructive, therefore, to focus on one shoe factory as a case to provide detailed insights into the harsh conditions factory women face *per se* in terms of increasing their household, local and national status. Factory employment makes it extremely difficult for women to provide a positive example to other young women or to ensure their families benefit from their work. This case study simply highlights this point.

At the time of the research, Kukje (a South Korean shoe factory), which was originally ranked in a reasonably good position (Table 6.2) was changing over to a Nike contract and then conditions seriously deteriorated at the factory. Before Nike, Kukje was commonly perceived as one of the best factories in the region in which women could work. This view was supported by ex-Kukje workers as well. However, at the time I left Banjaran it was evident things were not good at Kukje (see below for more detail). Further investigation is needed at this factory to provide analysis of the serious negative impacts global policies can have upon local women.
Women who work for Feng Tay share many characteristics which impede their ability to bring about positive change in the household and the local region. Feng Tay workers, in comparison to workers in other factories, tended to:

- Have very short working lives;
- Be younger than all other factory cohorts sampled (one was only 11 years of age);
- Have the lowest education levels;
- Be less likely to be paid correct wages, benefits and allowances;
- Suffer illegal deductions from their already low wages;
- Be significantly more likely to spend the majority of their day away from home and less likely to contribute through housework (For example, 81% of Nike women worked more than 70hrs per week Table 6.6);
- Not provide a positive incentive to other women;
- Be a burden on their family (emotionally and financially) as a result of harsh working conditions;
- Not be provided any transportation assistance.

**The Village Man**

Early in my research period I arrived in a highland village at about 8 PM on a week night to meet and talk with factory workers. I entered on foot as the roads were so bad that no form of transport is available during the night time (in the rainy season). I asked an old man where I could find women who worked for Nike. He replied that they had not returned since leaving at 5AM the previous morning. I was puzzled and he explained that all the factory workers worked for Feng Tay (Nike) and I had very little chance of seeing them, as their families rarely saw them. He said the women from Nike were called "Walking ghosts who worked in Satan’s Factory" (Mereka pergi dan
pulang seperti hantu dari pabrik Setan) by the local community and if I wanted to speak with them I would have to become a ghost myself.

Nike promotes itself as a saviour to developing economies like Indonesia. In 1994 Nike released this statement:

As a player in Indonesia's economy, Nike is part of a plan that has succeeded in increasing per capita income ten-fold since 1970 while decreasing those living in poverty from 60% to 15% in the same period...by supporting light manufacturing Nike contributes to the increase of workers skills, wages and capabilities (Nike, 1994).

Nike has attempted to claim credit in the improvement of the economic situation of Indonesia since the 1970s. However, Nike did not fully enter Indonesia until 1988. Nike has attempted to use Indonesian state statistics (which are themselves highly questionable) as a form of propaganda to silence its many critics. Further, Nike's worker turnover rates in the factories researched are so short that few benefits, such as those mentioned above, are forthcoming. The average working life of Nike workers surveyed in Banjaran was less than half that of all workers from other factories surveyed, yet Nike claimed in 1993 that:

The overwhelming share of workers in our factories have had a positive experience, as evidenced by the fact that the turnover rate in those factories is the lowest in the business.... The workers if you will vote on their feet (Kidd, 1993).

Nike workers in Banjaran do vote on their feet. They leave the factory more rapidly than any other group of women from all other multi-nationals
surveyed in Banjaran. They are extremely unhappy with conditions and resentful toward management. Ultimately, this phenomena impacts at the household level negatively reinforcing traditional views that women are childlike, incapable of working or are destined to be a burden upon men.

Of all the multi-national factories in Banjaran, which employ predominantly women (textiles, garments and shoes), the Nike factory rates the lowest in terms of treatment of workers vis-a-vis overtime wages, working conditions, the non-payment of legal working benefits (Sick Leave, Menstruation Leave, Bonuses) and staff turnover (Table 6.2). Evidence to support the 'lowest rating' is provided by the analyses of quantitative and qualitative data from interviews and Focus Groups; data which can be best described as 'community perceptions'. Further supporting evidence comes from information received from key informants about another large shoe factory in the region. At the time of my research, the factory next door to Nike, Kukje, a South Korean shoe factory had just been granted a Nike contract and the impact of Nike production processes upon the lives of the women workers was sudden and negative, as will be highlighted below.

The Nike factory in Banjaran is a Taiwanese joint venture company, and is usually called by its Taiwanese name of Feng Tay by the local people. According to my research, 7000 workers were employed at Feng Tay in 1996, 75% of whom were women. Feng Tay has one other shoe factory (Nike) in
Jakarta and seven others worldwide, predominantly in China and South America.

Analyses of the data I collected (Table 6.4) revealed some important trends regarding Nike’s employment practices. First, 60% of Nike workers surveyed had very low education levels, only SD (Primary School). By comparison, 48% of the women surveyed from ‘all other factories’ had completed SMP (Secondary Education) and another 18% had completed SMA (Senior High School). By contrast, only 33% and 7% of Nike workers, respectively, had completed SMP and SMA. Therefore, 60% of the Nike women surveyed had only 6 years education (SD), while 66% of all other women surveyed had between 9 and 12 years education (SMP or SMA). Second, the youngest cohort of women sampled came from Nike. The average age of Nike workers was 16 years of age, (the youngest was 11 years old when she entered the factory) and 41% of those surveyed were only 15 years of age or younger when they first entered the Nike factory. On the other hand, the average age of women surveyed from ‘all other factories’ was 18 years of age and only 15% of these entered the factory at the age of 15 years or less (Table 6.6).

Third, the average employment span of the female Nike workers surveyed was only 1.7 years compared to an average of 3.6 years for the entire cohort of women sampled. However, because I only sampled women who had worked for 6 months or more in any factory, these figures should be viewed (overall)
with caution, because the average employment spans of all workers would have been much lower than the figures above. Nevertheless, these figures accurately portray problems at Feng Tay.

Highland women, who are usually more desperate for employment, tend to accept work at the most exploitative factories, factories which accept low education levels and ignore national employment ages. Due to the mountainous terrain and poor subsidiary roads, factory buses usually only operate on major roads, forcing many women to walk long distances at night when other local forms of transport have ceased to operate. Nike provides no transportation allowance. Nor is the factory compassionate toward the transportation difficulties faced by many of its workers due to the combination of the factory's long shifts and the difficult terrain they must traverse, usually in the dark.

I interviewed a young man who had worked as a supervisor at Feng Tay for five months in 1995. He left the job because he said he could no longer live with his conscience. He stated that he was shocked during his training as a Nike supervisor due to the new skills he was expected to learn; skills to control women, which usually translated to verbal abuse, such as 'fuck you' and 'move you stupid bitch' to be used indiscriminately on the workers. He stated that he left the factory because it insulted his culture and his religion, mainly because he was taught to respect women, a fact the Taiwanese
supervisors did not seem to understand. Finally, he stated that at Feng Tay it is usual for 100 women to enter as new workers and soon after (usually when the three month training period ends) for 50 to leave. During the three month training period daily wages are extremely low.

Table 6.4: Education Levels of Feng Tay Workers Compared to ‘All Other Factories’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SD (Primary)</th>
<th>SMP(Secondary)</th>
<th>SMA(Senior)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feng Tay</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Factories</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5: Age Levels of Feng Tay Workers Compared to ‘All Other Factories’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>% 15 Years or Less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feng Tay</td>
<td>16yrs</td>
<td>16yrs</td>
<td>15yrs</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Factories</td>
<td>18yrs</td>
<td>17yrs</td>
<td>16yrs</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quotes from the Nike supervisor’s journal reveal the distress he felt whilst working for Nike:

I can’t stop wishing to leave from this hell, I think they (the Taiwanese management) do not understand modern managerial skills at all. They know their position is very
Many other factories in Banjaran pay low, three month training wages. However, the women in these factories are more likely to continue working for many years after. At Feng Tay, costs are cut by harsh practices which force many women to leave before or soon after their three month training period is completed. Despite the existence of an Indonesian national law on Minimum Wages, I found one woman who had worked for six months at Nike and was only receiving Rp 3,700 per day, which is well below the legal regional wage of Rp 5,200 (US$2.50) per day. She could not explain why, except to say that because she, unlike most of her friends, didn’t work seven days a week, she was not entitled to the legal daily wage. Another worker interviewed had previously worked at Feng Tay for 2 years when a serious knee injury sustained at work forced the worker to leave. No health insurance (ASTEK) or sick pay was renumerated. Further, no compensation for a permanent disability was forthcoming from Feng Tay.

At Feng Tay, as in most large factories in Banjaran and in the region, young female workers are channelled into the most demanding sections of production. In the case of shoe factories this is the stitching section, where high pressure, long working hours, forced overtime and very few holidays are common. Staff turnover rates in these sections are very high. At Feng Tay,
1000 people work in the stitching section, 90% are young unmarried women under 25 years of age. They receive no religious holiday leave (Lebaran) as do women from other factories in Banjaran and they are lucky if they get two days holiday per month. It is in sections such as stitching that young women are most vulnerable to exploitation, usually because they are young, relatively uneducated, usually unmarried and have very little experience in dealing with male authority outside the family and almost no knowledge of their rights. From a cultural perspective young unmarried women must refrain from protest and anger and are forbidden to 'stand up' to male authority. Most of the women I spoke with took this tradition very seriously. Women in Banjaran are therefore inclined to accept the harsh conditions at Feng Tay, without public complaint.

In September 1996, I interviewed a Lurah or Kepala Desa (Village Head) from one of the 17 Desa (or small administrative regions) which make up the district of Banjaran. I asked the Lurah what he thought about Feng Tay and the resulting reply confirmed my findings. He stated that Feng Tay was different from all other foreign factories in Banjaran, explaining it was more like a 'prison' and the Lurah knew personally of many women who had left the factory soon after starting work there. He also stated that it was common for community leaders to try and discourage women from entering work at this factory. However, because there is little alternative work for women in
some areas of Banjaran, and the need for work more desperate in some households, women were forced to accept employment at Feng Tay.

I asked for an example of why Feng Tay was exploitative. The Lurah told me of a recent death of a young woman at the factory. The woman collapsed at 12.00 midday in the factory from heat exhaustion. She was not taken to the factory medical-clinic, but to the Mosque where she lay unconscious for many hours. Later when she had not regained consciousness she was taken to hospital where she died soon after. No one knows why she died, and there was no investigation or compensation from Feng Tay. However, in the opinion of the Banjaran community, the woman died of exhaustion and lack of medical treatment (neglect). The death of this woman can be viewed as resulting from criminal neglect associated with the sick leave arrangements developed by Feng Tay. One must wonder about the rationale of taking an unconscious women to a Mosque, and not to the medical-clinic, simply to deter others from taking sick leave. If the young woman had been taken to the medical-clinic her chances of survival would have been increased.

At Feng Tay if women are sick they must report to work, no matter how serious their illness. If they stay at home and rest, even with the permission of a doctor’s certificate (in accordance with national laws), they are instantly dismissed upon returning to work. I know personally of three women who suffered this fate. They all stated they were too sick to walk the long distance
Table 6.6: Daily Working Hours, Days a Week and Overtime at Feng Tay.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factory</th>
<th>Hours per Day</th>
<th>% Who 'Normally' Work 7 Days</th>
<th>Overtime per Week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feng Tay</td>
<td>11.5 hrs</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>20hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Factories</td>
<td>8.5hrs</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>6hrs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All figures above are averages. The data was drawn from questions which sought information about the 'usual' number of working days and working hours based upon the respondents 'last months' employment' and their Pay Slips if available.

to central Banjaran, and all had certificates from doctors. The sick leave arrangements at Feng Tay are unusually cruel. If women become ill at work they must stay in the Mosque until their shift is finished and then they may return home. If they are still sick the next day they must report to work as usual and stay all day in the Mosque. If women become ill at home the same rule applies, they must report to work and stay in the Mosque, not in the medical-clinic (the cost of which is deducted monthly from all employees' wages). Women who live in the more isolated villages (some up to two hours walk away) must show up for work or they will be dismissed. Further, the constant rain during one half of the year means that sick women are forced to walk in the rain and in dangerous terrain merely to sit in the Mosque. This practice has been developed by Feng Tay to deter women from taking sick leave and is indicative, not only of the managements' negative attitude...
towards the welfare of its employees, but also of Nike’s complete disregard for workers who come under its sphere of influence.

**Two Nike Factories (Feng Tay and Kukje)**

In October 1996, the large shoe factory next door to Feng Tay, a South Korean-owned factory called Kukje, employing 5000 workers, (80% women), started to produce Nike shoes. For a small city located nine hours by extremely congested and difficult roads from the port at Jakarta, one must wonder why Nike has granted two contracts to operate factories in the area. One reason is that Kukje initially filled Nike orders directly from Feng Tay due to the factory's inability to meet all of its export orders. Nike expects a record year in 1997 with annual revenue projected to go well over the US$4 billion mark (CAA, 1996). In Banjaran, Nike can avoid the industrial unrest common in Jakarta and also avoid the media ‘spotlight’ as the company has come under a lot of international pressure recently. Despite promises from Nike to improve the conditions of its workers, recent evidence from Kukje indicates that Nike has no interest whatsoever in the welfare of workers who are unfortunate enough to work in Nike factories producing shoes.

I visited the Kukje factory before it came under Nike supervision and talked with members of management, team supervisors and female workers. The factory had a very congenial atmosphere. The women said the existing daily target system was reasonable. The South Korean management said it was
crucial to keep the women happy and the supervisors seemed to have very
good relations with the women (I watched them for a long time without their
knowledge). Five weeks after Nike was introduced at Kukje, I interviewed
two workers in their homes. Later these interviews were supplemented by
interviews with four other workers from Kukje. The impact of the change to
Nike-style production had been drastic (according to the women). The women
were noticeably exhausted and stated that they were not coping with the new
pressures. Their Sunday holiday had been temporarily cancelled and
compulsory overtime was becoming increasingly common. Further, the annual
three day holiday during the Christmas period was cancelled at Kukje for the
first time since the factory began production.

The women’s normal daily production quota of 200 pairs of shoes a day had
been increased to 300 for Nike. The women also claimed they were no longer
free to go to the toilet when they wanted, but must sign a leave slip to gain
permission before they go. One worker said she tried to ‘hold on’ all day
because she did not want her name in the book as she would be ashamed
(malu). Finally, the women claimed their praying time had been cut short and
now when they prayed a supervisor watched them and made them hurry. The
women also stated their supervisors were becoming increasingly angry toward
them, and were abusive because the women were not working fast enough,
making most women scared and nervous. In December, one young worker
came to my house with her parents because she thought she was going to lose
her job. She stated that her South Korean supervisor had screamed at her because she was not working fast enough. Previously, before the introduction of Nike at Kukje, this same girl had told me she loved her supervisor because he was very understanding. The young woman was extremely worried about facing the supervisor the next day as she blamed herself for the trouble. After a few months, the production of Nike shoes had a serious impact on thousands of workers at Kukje. The women I interviewed were obviously distressed by the change and confused by the sudden transformation in the attitude of their supervisors.

If Kukje continues to follow Feng Tay’s lead in a quest to keep Nike profitable then the impact will inevitably become harsher in the future and will negatively effect the workers and their families. As one Lurah said to me people need two things from their job, and both are as important as each other. He said that they needed enough money to survive and also needed a compassionate workplace (as do all workers). I would argue that Nike is not only denying both, but also corrupting existing standards of working relations in other large factories in the Banjaran region. Nike is a threat to the community in Banjaran.

Feng Tay, and to a lesser extent Kukje, are the negative result of the combination of international and Indonesian capital (Taiwan, South Korean and Sino/Indonesian) a Western corporation (Nike) and a developing
country's desire to industrialise quickly (Indonesia). Local leaders in Banjaran are powerless to resist this potent tri-partite combination and higher level government officials are either not willing or not able to act against firms like Feng Tay and Nike. While these two factories are the worst in the area, all factories studied operated, to varying degrees, in a similar manner and should be viewed in such a light. For example, despite the fact that one factory paid the women all their legal entitlements, it is still considered exploitative due to the corrupt and oppressive nature of the Indonesian state. The economic situation at the local and regional level in West Java is such that international capital is now heavily relied upon to create employment. The more jobs international corporations generate in areas like Banjaran, the more power they have to dictate terms and create their own culture of labour relations. The way in which Kukje quickly and quietly changed over to more oppressive and profitable Nike-style production procedures, without interference from the government, is testament to this.

Chapter Summary

Economic development via industrialisation has been pursued at all costs in Indonesia. The resulting human suffering is irrelevant to most of the powers that be. Companies such as Nike would still profit enormously if women were paid a better wage and treated well. Trickle down is not a reality to the Indonesian people. Greed, corruption, oppression and exploitation are a reality. Claims that poverty has declined rapidly in Indonesia since the 1970s
as a result of industrial development are questionable. Overall, general statistics show improvement in poverty indicators. But now greater disparities are evident in inequality of wealth as a result of industrial development. Since independence, many new labour laws have been passed in Indonesia. They are designed to protect workers, and a few have provided such protection. However, most are not adequately enforced and therefore do very little to ensure humane, just and equitable working conditions. Most laws are easily avoided by international companies such as Nike. In reality, countries like Taiwan and South Korea are allowed to import the worst aspects of their labour relations into poorer nations, such as Indonesia, unimpeded. Feng Tay’s sick leave arrangements are a prime example of this. In the developing world international factories like Feng Tay and corporations like Nike function independently and are more like self contained *Industrial Embassies*, immune from both local and national labour standards and are a ‘law unto themselves’. Finally, the Kukje case study, which highlighted a dramatic change to Nike-styled production practices, showed clearly that ‘action at a distance’ is an apt term and that global policy certainly does impact at the household level in the developing world.

In this chapter I described and analysed data from a variety of levels (personal, household, state and global). The chapter focused upon the prevailing industrial system in rural West Java, foreign management principles and factory systems. To achieve a realistic analysis of the relationship between
factory conditions, community perceptions and women’s status, the factories themselves were examined just as family organisation was investigated in Chapter Five. However, unlike the previous chapter, attempts to use quantitative data to highlight and analyse the relationship between working conditions and status proved less fruitful. Qualitative analysis proved more potent in this chapter. It was crucial for me as a social researcher to interpret this relationship first hand, and in abstract ways, from information gained from the families concerned. However, the quantitative data showed clearly a relationship between women’s household status and low education levels, long working hours, young working age, low pay and less benefits among the factories investigated. By focusing on a few of these factories (Feng Tay, Asiasport and Kukje) the quantitative data was supported by qualitative data, and therefore the relationship between factory conditions and female status were enhanced, described and analysed. Data showed clearly that women who worked in exploitative factories (Feng Tay or Asiasport), or cohorts of women by sector (Shoes), were less able to contribute financially and physically at home. They were also potentially more liable to be considered as a burden by their families and less likely to provide a positive example to other women or to their community. As a result, the relationship between factory conditions and female status in the home is reinforced by the use of many forms of data in this chapter.
This chapter revealed the great variety of 'local' attitudes toward issues such as the benefits of factory work, development and exploitation. These attitudes revealed what life is like under the influences of global capitalism: Attitudes which were not universal, but were nevertheless enlightening. Many perceived development as a negative, invasive and highly exploitative phenomenon in Banjaran and provided their own reasons for holding such views. The reasons should be heeded seriously. On the other hand, many public officers and factory women, and their families, viewed development in a positive light, again providing their own reason for holding such views, which were also enlightening and significant. However, the views of all those outlined in the chapter were 'local views' and were not informed by the 'wider picture' of international industrialisation. In some ways I was in a privileged position having access to both local and international perceptions of Third World development. This leaves me with the task of evaluating the outcomes, the 'pros and cons' of development. My position is clearly this: There is no need for any form of exploitation of factory workers, especially women, in Banjaran. The state and international developers have conspired to initiate inhumane wages and working conditions for workers and at the same time do very little to ensure that development equals a positive experience for those involved. Therefore, and considering all of the above, in answer to the three research questions outlined above, I argue that:
1). The majority of the influences of industrial capitalism are negative to the women sampled. However, the extent to which these influences inhibit improved status is not so simple. The outcomes of factory employment *per se* are exploitative. Nevertheless, given the traditional roles women played in the area, factory employment provided some positive outcomes for at least 40% of the women sampled.

2). Overt exploitation, as revealed by the discussion of Feng Tay and the shoe sector in general in this chapter, clearly showed that there is a direct and negative relationship between industrial capitalism and household status when individual sectors of manufacturing, or indeed, individual factories overly exploit their female workers.

3). The rapid absorption of large numbers of women into factory employment is slowly providing a positive impact to Sundanese culture and the way in which it perceives women. 40% of the women sampled indicated positive outcomes in this regard, which is significant considering the status of their mothers.

In general, I have argued that the influences above, while predisposed to being negative toward women's household status, were not able to completely inhibit 'self perceived' improved female status among at least 40% of the women sampled.
Chapter Seven: Desa Yang Tertinggal

Development policy in Indonesia since the 1970s has relied heavily upon rhetoric. According to the nation’s most recent development plan (Repelita VI) development in contemporary Indonesia is designed to provide:

The growth of a self-reliant attitude of the Indonesian man and the Indonesian people through their increased participation, efficiency and productivity in the context of improving the standard of living, intelligence and the material and spiritual welfare (DI, 1994/95:77).

To salvage at least some reality from the ‘development rhetoric’, Suharto, the President, initiated a series of Presidential Decrees (Inpres) in the late 1980s and 1990s, which were designed to alleviate rural poverty through improved education, infrastructure development and employment creation. Presidential decrees are common in Indonesia and are not always designed to benefit the poor or disadvantaged. They are often used to advance the position of Suharto’s family or to expand the political patronage of Suharto (Pabottingi, 1995). For instance, in August 1997 President Suharto instructed that all government departments must buy the new Indonesian car, the Timor, predominantly owned by Suharto’s son, which had been extremely unsuccessful in the national car market up until that time. Further, in 1994 Suharto, under pressure from the USA, instructed that the Indonesian military would no longer intervene in labour disputes, but the practice has continued. Presidential instructions (Inpres), therefore, are not only intended as positive
interventions on behalf of the people, but are ways in which Suharto asserts power and control and at the same time appeases his critics.

*Inpres Desa Tertinggal* (IDT) is one of the most controversial Inpres Programs. IDT literally means that by Presidential decree the poorest villages (*Desa*) in Indonesia will receive funding to improve ‘their situation’ where poverty is believed to have been caused by economic ‘backwardness’. In 1993/94, there were 28,000 villages (*Desa*) identified as being the poorest in the nation and in need of support through the IDT Program: 77% of these villages were located in Java-Bali. On average, 60 million Rp (US$24,000) is given to each Desa classified under the IDT Program over a three year period (MacDougall, 1996:1). The system works on the premise that the Lurah applies to be classified as *Tertinggal* to the state and, if successful, the Desa (politically defined cluster of villages) will receive financial support for a three year period. However, many of the Lurah I interviewed stated that any Desa classified as *Tertinggal* was a source of great shame and, as a result, many did not apply for assistance. Nevertheless, there were two Desa classified in such a manner in Banjaran in 1996 and the major aims of the IDT Program for these, and other Desa, was to:

Promote the poor people's abilities to overcome their problems. The implementation is in the form of generating their economic activities, developing the basic economic potentials, meeting the basic needs, providing basic services, followed by creating an environment which supports the eradication of poverty (DI, 1994/95:78).
The IDT Program provides funds to the relevant villages to stimulate their economy, provide infrastructure and therefore, theoretically alleviate poverty. Critics of the program usually cite state corruption as the major weakness in the IDT plan. One critic in particular provides a realistic analysis of the bureaucratic problems faced by those who are desperately in need of IDT funds. MacDougall (1996) highlights the problems with IDT using simple analogies. For example, he states (p3) that Development Programs, to be successful, must simply ask common development questions such as... "is it better to give a poor man a fish or a fishing rod to provide him with the ability to support his family in the future"? The obvious answer is to give him a fishing rod, but the problem with this approach in Indonesia is that he could not catch any fish with a rod because all the waters are controlled by rich contractors granted exclusive and extensive fishing licenses by the government (MacDougall, 1996:3). The same problem applies to agriculture, small business and to a lesser extent, trading in rural Indonesia. People who are poverty bound, excluded from power and decision making at all levels are not going to benefit from extremely small financial handouts which are commonly absorbed by rent seekers higher up on the 'food chain'.

The one major problem with IDT is the way the program is implemented. Originating from the central government, the funds are transferred through six different levels of government before they reach those most in need.
Channelling money through six levels of government is a process which rent-seekers have taken advantage of at all levels, especially considering that the program is ‘based on trust’ (MacDougall, 1996:1). By the time the funds reach the Lurah they have been through many hands. The money is then distributed from the Lurah to the ‘Head Families’ who occupy a prominent position in all villages in Banjaran. These families distribute the money to the poorest families in their sphere, or at least that is how it was supposed to operate in Banjaran. After investigation it was evident that very little money had been used for infrastructure development in the two Desa classified as Tertinggal in Banjaran. I observed no evidence which would suggest that the IDT funds reached their target. For example, many of the poorest people I interviewed in the two Desa concerned had no idea their village was receiving IDT funding, and in the lowland Desa none were aware that their Desa was classified as Tertinggal. Further, there was evidence to suggest that the Head Families commonly, either misused, or used the IDT funds in a foolish manner such as those outlined below.

By focusing on the two Desa classified as Tertinggal in Banjaran, this chapter addresses theoretical approaches highlighted in previous chapters. Furthermore, this focus, when viewed through corresponding impacts of development upon women in Banjaran, addresses many important issues and raises the following questions, which are succinctly related to the research focus of this study:
1. Why are two Desa, which have relatively large numbers of factory women, still trapped in extreme poverty?

2. Why is the lowland Desa, which had the second highest ratio of factory women to total population of all Desa studied, and many ‘very large’ factories located within its boundaries, among the poorest in Indonesia?

3. What is the impact of this micro-focus upon more general theory such as Trickle Down and Rent Seeking?

4. What are the major differences between lowland and highland factory women from these Desa in terms of the major research question relating to the contributions factory women make to their local region?

5. What problems do the highland women face due to their geographic and political position?

6. How do the findings of this chapter support and enhance the findings of previous chapters?

7. What are the theoretical underpinning’s of this case study approach to GAD, and two important traditional Islamic concepts (Takdir and Kodrat)?

National Overview:
In the mid-to-late 1980s, Inpres Programs were designed to positively impact in rural areas which were correctly perceived as being left behind by the development process. However, during the 1980s, the overall development budget in Indonesia gave low priority to such programs. Fortunately, when development expenditure per se was cut back in the early 1990s, the IDT Program did not negatively suffer (Thorbecke & van der Pluuijm, 1993:52). The authors claim (p248) that the Inpres Programs positively impacted by providing basic services and extra income to the poorest people in the villages
concerned. The reality I observed and recorded was far from this. In fact, considering the comparatively small amounts of money allocated to the Desa, it is hard to imagine any positive impact resulting from the funds, except to a handful of families, which is in itself a microcosm of Indonesia's exclusionary economy. The more Indonesia's economy develops and its population increases, the more exclusionary (economically and socially divisive) it becomes.

As with industrial development itself, the IDT Program I studied was more beneficial to the international reputation of the Indonesian state, and to a few traditional (elitist) families and public officers, than it was to the general population. Despite the many critics of IDT, and the negative data contained in this chapter, in 1997 Suharto received a 'Poverty Alleviation' award from the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) which recognised the IDT program as a major component of successful poverty alleviation in Indonesia. However, the reality I observed places serious doubt over the ability of the IDT Program to successfully operate in Indonesian society. The fact that the village people concerned did not have a say in where and how the IDT funds were to be allocated is testament to the way ordinary people are completely 'excluded' in Indonesia. Ironically, the IDT Program was cancelled in late 1997. No reasons were provided for this decision and no new poverty alleviation scheme has been implemented to replace IDT. Indonesian authorities claimed that there were, however, many other successful poverty
alleviation schemes already functioning in Indonesia, therefore the cancellation of the IDT Program was not significant (Kompas, 1997). However, I observed no other state-run poverty alleviation programs operating in Banjaran during my research period.

Two Desa In Banjaran

The two Desa, coded as Numbers 15 and 16 (see Table 3.1 & Map Three and Four), one highland and one lowland, are extremely poor despite industrial development. In the most specific sense, the findings of this chapter support wholeheartedly the findings of the previous chapter: That is, factory women who tended to have very low education levels and who also came from the poorest families and whose incomes were extremely important to their families, worked in the most exploitative factories and they and their families suffered as a result. For example, the proportion of the women from the highland Desa (Number 15) classified as *Tertinggal* who worked at Feng Tay was far higher than the ratio of the entire cohort studied and, as a result, appropriate levels of financial contributions were not forthcoming to these workers or their families (Table 7.1 Column, 22).

Without doubt the two Desa, classified as *Tertinggal* in Banjaran, were deserving of the classification as they were arguably the poorest in all of Banjaran in terms of social and economic infrastructure, the health and well being of the people and levels of development. Empirically, these two Desa
were also the ‘worse off’ in economic terms which is highlighted below in Table 7.1. It is ironic that both Lurah in charge of these Desa were either rude or hostile toward me. However, this did not inhibit my research because lower level officials, such as RWs and RTs, were willing to share their attitudes and opinions with me. In fact, they perceived these particular Lurah as being more aligned with higher level public officers than with their own people.

It is useful to compare the positions between the factory women from both Desa for a number of reasons. Firstly, research in these ‘poorest’ of Desa showed the incredible importance of female factory wages to their families, and the increased exploitation women from these Desa face as a result of poverty. This was especially prevalent in the highland Desa because of the longer distances women must travel and the highly exploitative factories they work in. Second, by focusing on smaller geographic areas I was able to obtain a clearer picture of the impact of industrial development at the local level. Third, focusing on the poorest regions in Banjaran enabled me to provide a balanced analysis of the overall position of factory women in Indonesia. Fourth, because the lowland Desa was occupied by very large factories which employed a large number of local women (650) and remained classified as one of the poorest in Indonesia, the overall problems associated with industrial development in the Third World are clearly highlighted and discussed. Data obtained from these Desa provides evidence which cannot be ignored. The evidence clearly shows that industrial development (alone) does not benefit
local people as the state and investors claim. The reasons for this, outlined in
detail below, are significantly due to local and national rent seekers operating
within ‘culturally acceptable’ boundaries.

The Highland Desa
According to the Lurah, there were 364 families who needed the financial
support of the IDT Program in the Desa. Each year IDT pays approximately
20 million Rp to the Desa for a three year period. Even if this money was
divided equally and honestly between 364 families every year they would
receive very little: 53,000 Rp (US$20.00) per family per year without the
costs of Rent Seeking deducted. It is unlikely that US$20.00 per annum could
alleviate any form of poverty, especially in the long term. After surveying
dozens of families it was evident few benefited from IDT.

At the time of my research (1996-1997) this Desa was populated by 6,170
people. 150 women worked in factories. The Desa was extremely isolated due
to poor roads and mountainous terrain. Of all the Desa studied, this particular
one functioned in the most traditional manner: Like their mothers and
grandmothers, young women tended to leave school at very young ages, marry
soon after and live with their extended family until they could afford a home
of their own. The average education level of the Desa’s population was SD
(primary) or below and there was no medical clinic or reasonable access to
secondary schools as there was in other Desa (Table 7.1 Column, 1&3). The
only noticeable difference between generations of Sundanese women was in their attitudes toward the desired number of children and factory work. The younger women rarely had more than two children (in line with government policy), while their mothers and grandmothers had many more children. Further, younger women were less inhibited by social norms (Kodrat see below) which traditionally prohibited Sundanese women from 'public work'.

In this Desa there were very few young women who continued their secondary schooling due to a combination of the influence of continuing tradition and geographic/economic factors. There were no easily accessible secondary schools in or near the Desa. This meant any young women who wished to continue their education past the primary school level would face extreme transportation problems. This in turn exacerbated economic problems as schooling was already relatively expensive for the average Indonesian family. The families could not afford to send their young daughters to distant schools (8 kms) due to costs of education and transportation. The only young women I did encounter making the extraordinary commitment to continue their education were either from 'well off' families or were from poorer families which had older siblings (usually sisters) willing to support their education costs with factory wages. The infrastructure in this Desa was extremely poor. Primary Schools here were the worst I had seen. The parents stated that often the teachers only stay a few weeks and then leave to go to a better school.
Agriculture was very important to the local economy. This is evidenced by the fact that 53% of the ‘factory’ fathers surveyed worked in agrarian pursuits compared to only 33% of the entire cohort sampled (Table 7.1 Column, 17). Further, agricultural wages were significantly lower in this Desa compared to all others (Column, 18). Almost half the young factory women were already married which was a ratio vastly higher than the figures obtained from the entire cohort sampled or when compared to data from the lowland Desa classified as Tertinggal (Column, 11). This highland Desa was continuing to rely on traditional agricultural practices and marriage customs which also inhibited the educational and economic advancement of its young women. The Desa was in a very poor position and its Lurah, after being initially cooperative, became hostile after completing a series of interviews with me. According to Pak Budi and other village officials, after divulging information to me, especially regarding the buying of prize goats with IDT funds, he became worried of reprisals and refused to cooperate with me further. However, by that time I had finished research in the Desa and already moved on to more hospitable villages.

The Lurah initially reported that the IDT funds went to Head Families (land owning families) who were to distribute it to ‘poor’ households in their area. The Lurah stated that most Head Families (traditional land owners) simply bought expensive fighting goats with the funds. The goats are used for fighting on the weekends, which draw huge crowds of men for gambling.
purposes. These goats are not a sustainable economic enterprise and do not benefit women or children in any noticeable manner. Many women complained of their husbands or sons losing money in the goat fighting arena, which is unique to the Sundanese highlands. It could be justifiably argued that, by promoting gambling through IDT, the government was acting in a detrimental way toward poor villages, especially toward women in these villages because the funds, which were used to promote gambling, commonly left poorer families in a worse financial position.

The factory women from this Desa face enormous obstacles to improve their economic position. The distances they had to travel to work led to very high transport costs (Columns, 2&4) which in turn caused the women to contribute significantly less to their families income than any other group of women sampled (Column, 8). Further, they worked longer hours, more overtime and longer working weeks than any other cohort, yet were unable to provide similar levels of financial contributions to their families (Columns, 5-8). It is ironic that women who work more hours than the average women sampled contributed less to their families, because they took home less income each month due to their relatively higher working costs. This can be traced to high transport costs and the low income status of the rest of their families. For example, in the highland Desa, factory women's wages were extremely high compared to the income of their entire household (Column, 10). Further, the average incomes of their parents and spouses were significantly lower than
those of the entire cohort sampled. However, as a ratio they contributed less to their families each month compared to the entire cohort (Columns 13, 16, 18). While the factory women in this Desa earned incomes far greater than those of their family, they were unable to alleviate their poverty to the same extent as lowland women. This is further evidenced by Column 20 which shows that 50% of the cohort received no reimbursements from their family to help with their working costs, which was unusual when compared to the entire cohort studied.

Arguably the most striking data in Table 7.1 is revealed in Columns 21 and 22. These columns show that a large proportion of the women sampled from the highland Desa worked in the highly exploitative shoe sector. For example, 38% of the highland women sampled worked for Feng Tay (Nike). In short, the argument presented previously in Chapter Six, that women with the lowest education levels, and the most desperate employment situation worked in the most exploitative factories, is reinforced by this data. Women from the poorest families, who themselves exhibit extremely low education and economic levels, are channelled into the shoe sector, or in this case into Feng Tay. It is women from this Desa who have no alternative but to traverse the shocking road systems twice a day simply to work. I observed them returning from work at night in the rain and they really were like the ‘walking ghosts’ described in the previous chapter. Further, it is these same women who were most disadvantaged by Feng Tay’s sick leave policies discussed in Chapter
Six. Feng Tay force these women, if ill, to walk for hours each day simply to report to work and wait in the mosque without treatment.

If IDT funds were spent on improving transportation infrastructure and therefore decreasing local transportation dilemmas in terms of time and cost, significant benefits would accrue to the whole community. If the Indonesian army were to fulfil its proposed 'dual function' and provide assistance to improve the roads in Desa such as this, the positive results would be immediate. However, I did not ever witness the local army providing any such service, nor did I hear from local people anything but disgust for the army, or incredible fear of its power. I did see soldiers destroying small stalls set up by traders, which therefore destroyed the people's livelihood, but never witnessed any positive social input by the military. If the IDT funds were combined with military power, the roads to this Desa would be improved dramatically at low cost. However, this is unlikely to occur as the army personnel I observed everyday were busy playing table tennis and other games, while their officers were rarely seen.

The Lowland Desa

Apart from being classified as Tertinggal and having significant transportation problems, the lowland Desa (Number 16) had very few physical similarities to the highland Desa. This Desa was very low lying, commonly flooded during the wet season and extremely dry during the hot season (musim panas).
Despite being close to central Banjaran (4 kms), the Desa was isolated due to the fact that its roads were not on the main arterial system which linked Banjaran to other major urban and industrial centres in the region. The Desa was further separated by very fertile and extensive wet-rice lands (Sawah). However, these did very little to promote or sustain local development because they were predominantly owned by ‘outsiders’ who used their own labour. Secondary schooling was widely available to young women who generally took advantage of this as indicated in Table 7.1 (Column, 1). Nevertheless, the isolation of the Desa did not hamper the recent development of four very large factories and numerous smaller factories within its boundaries.

The Desa’s economy is weak and not many people make an income from the land as it is controlled by a few ‘outside’ owners. This point reinforces Hart’s (1985) ‘exclusionary economy’ discussed previously. Transportation here is difficult due to the constant flooding and relative isolation. As a result, costs are disproportionately high as transport providers take advantage of the isolation as one of their only bargaining positions. For example, Table 7.1 (Columns, 2&4) shows that despite women in this Desa having the shortest average distance to travel to work of all women sampled, they continue to pay relatively high transport costs. These costs are incurred because either the factory they work for does not pay the women adequate transportation...
allowances, or because local transport operators (male domain) are charging very high prices to women who are isolated geographically.

Women in this Desa exhibited above average education indicators. The young factory women sampled had the highest levels of education compared to the entire cohort (Table 7.1 Column, 1). Their mothers were likewise better educated (Column, 3) and as a result women in this Desa tended to delay marriage age, especially if working in a factory. This point is especially prevalent when the education levels of the women from the lowland Desa were compared to those of the women from the highland Desa above (Column 1). Again it seems ironic that on the surface this Desa exhibits all the positive traits the government would expect, especially regarding marriage age and education levels among women, yet it remains classified as Tertinggal. It is also ironic that education levels and FLPRs in this Desa are well above regional and national averages, yet the population remains trapped in poverty. One must wonder if the large factories located within the Desa provide any positive outcomes except to a few well positioned local, national and international elites. One must also wonder about the credibility of Indonesia’s educational programs. However, after studying the lives and perceptions of the factory women in depth, one stops wondering and starts marvelling at the great sacrifice they make, simply to provide their families some shelter from endemic poverty and powerlessness.
Over a three year period this Desa was to receive 65,000 million Rp in IDT funds. However, there was no evidence of new infrastructure or social services as a result of the funds. The Lurah stated that the luran (described in Chapter 5) was more beneficial than the IDT funds in developing the Desa. The luran is a local tax significantly buoyed by factory women's income. The fact that the majority of respondents interviewed from the lowland Desa did not know that their Desa was classified as Tertinggal, or that it had been classified as such for at least three years, is testament to the lack of cooperation between the Lurah and the people. The overt hostility of the Lurah towards me simply reinforced this perception. On first arriving in the Desa I reported, as protocol demanded, to the Lurah's house. I spent a very long period there. He was aggressive, impolite by Sundanese standards and glared at me for long periods. When we left his house my assistant, Pak Budi, said he was acting in a defensive manner and that this Lurah was very unpopular. Later it became obvious that the Lurah was involved in a consultative/supervisory position at one of the very large factories within the Desa, but his exact status was unknown even to the lower level public officers we talked with.
### Table 7.1 Desa Yang Tertinggal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Left School (Age)</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>Distance to Factory KM</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>% Mothers no Education</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Daily Transport Costs (Rupiah)</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Hours of Work Each Day (Ave)</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>Working Days A Week (Ave)</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>O/Time Each Week Ave Hrs</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>Average % C/Bution to H/hold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Desa</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highland</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowland</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9</th>
<th>% Who did Not C/bute to H/hold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>% of Her Wage to Total Family Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>% Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>% C/Bution of Married Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Husbands Wage Ave per Month (Rupiah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>% of Married Women’s Wage to Total H/hold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>% Mothers Working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mothers Wage Ave per Month (Rupiah)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| All Desa | 19 | 49 | 39 | 36 | 143,000 | 53 | 29 | 69,000 |
| Highland | 29 | 80 | 49 | 19 | 120,000 | 60 | 25 | 35,000 |
| Lowland | 10 | 57 | 32 | 41 | 128,000 | 43 | 14 | 12,250 |

Note: All the figures above are averages taken from the specific cohorts (lowland, highland or the entire cohort).
Table 7.1 (Continued) Desa Yang *Tertinggal*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>17 % of Fathers Working in Agriculture</th>
<th>18 Fathers Ave Wage (Month) (Rupiah)</th>
<th>19 % Husbands Working in Agriculture</th>
<th>20 % of Cohort No Remittance Returned</th>
<th>21 % of Cohort in Shoe Factory</th>
<th>22 % of Cohort Who Work at Feng Tay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Desa</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>108,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highland</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowland</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Column 22: Feng Tay is a Taiwanese run Nike sub-contractor and is the most exploitative of all factories surveyed. Note the high proportion of relatively poor, illiterate and under-age workers at this factory (See columns 1, 4 and 22).
The analysis of working conditions of factory women in this Desa (Table 7.1) highlight again the complex relations between family organisation and young factory women in relation to their status and work. Women in this Desa enjoyed more favourable working conditions than most others studied. They worked less overtime, fewer days per week and hours per day than the averages revealed for the entire cohort sampled. They tended not to work in the most exploitative factories. As a result, their contributions to their households were higher than average (Columns, 5-8). This high ‘contribution’ level in a Desa fraught with poverty and corruption significantly justifies the claim that factory women among the Sundanese are crucial to the development (survival) of their local area. This is further reinforced by the fact that women from this Desa exhibited extremely high contribution levels (Columns, 8&9) and received fewer financial reimbursements from their families compared to all other women sampled (Column, 20).

When viewed in relation to total family income, lowland women’s wages were also crucial (Column, 10), but were not as important as the wages of women from the highland Desa. Despite this, and due to relatively lower transportation costs (Column, 4), lowland women contributed more to their families and expected less in return than their highland counterparts (Columns, 8-10). Finally, women from this Desa were not forced, to the same extent, into the shoe sector or into factories with extremely harsh working
conditions like Feng Tay, as were their highland counterparts. This is due to their higher education levels and the fact that other factories had already located within their Desa’s boundaries (Columns, 21-22). Despite all the positive aspects of this Desa, especially in comparison to other Desa, the questions must be asked again: Why is this Desa classified as Tertinggal? And why are the majority of people unaware of this status and ignorant of any financial aid reaching any families they knew? The simplest way to answer these questions are with terms such as corruption and greed. Corrupt officials have kept the majority of the Desa’s population ignorant of the IDT scheme for reasons which cannot be documented and the local (foreign controlled) factories are not directly benefiting the local economy. The only way the existence of factories benefits the local people is through the loyalty of the factory women to their families.

At first glance, to claim that this Desa has not benefited as it should from industrial development, partially demeans my argument that factory women are major contributors to their local area. However, the fact that this Desa has many large factories which mainly employ women, yet was classified as Tertinggal, does not trivialise women’s contributions. It in fact highlights structural problems of development, political organisation, control and corruption and the fact that international manufacturers provide very little benefit to local communities, whilst at the same time make huge profits from the efforts of Sundanese women. As such, this Desa is a perfect region to
analyse the outcomes of industrial development upon local communities. It is an ideal geographic location to attack assumptions that industrial development, in tandem with the IDT Program and educational improvements, help all forms of social and economic development and improves poverty.

Theoretical Discussion

After pragmatic and empirical discussion and analyses of the situation regarding the two Desa above, discussion of theoretical aspects is an appropriate way in which to enhance the ‘case study’ or micro approach taken previously. Three major theoretical approaches will be discussed. 1) Trickle Down; 2) Gender and Development (GAD); and 3) Takdir and Kodrat (indigenous philosophies relevant to the debate).

The assumptions of Trickle Down theory (that the most poor in the populations concerned will benefit from industrial development), despite being called into question by many in the West, are still heavily relied upon by the Indonesian state and investors to justify their development policies, approaches and realities. The Indonesian state continually promises the working classes, the landless, the poor, and women (the ‘excluded’) that the benefits of industrial development will ‘one day’ Trickle Down to them. They are still waiting, while politicians, army and indigenous elites and industrial barons continue to accumulate massive wealth in Indonesia and abroad, effectively blocking Trickle Down. Criticisms that Trickle Down has failed
due to its reliance on Western assumptions are not entirely accurate. Those who block Trickle Down in Indonesia (rent seekers) are more obstructive of it than is Western capitalism and foreign corporate entities, and they need to be criticised again, and again if necessary, until they ensure that the benefits of development accrue more positively at the ground level.

1) Trickle Down is a development approach which postulated that development at the macro-level would eventually Trickle Down and impact positively at the micro or local level. Most analysts (Mehmet, 1995 for example) assert that Trickle Down has not worked. However, criticisms that Trickle Down did not work, due to the basic premise that it was based upon Western assumptions of capitalism and technology which could not be applied to Third World nations is not completely accurate to the reality I observed in Indonesia. The fact that Trickle Down was not occurring in the lowland Desa classified as Tertinggal (above) had very little to do with Western capitalism or Eurocentric bias. The factories were owned and run by Asians. The Indonesian state, local investors and public officers were working within culturally specific economic boundaries, which have a long tradition in Indonesia, when they ostensibly blocked Trickle Down. For many centuries, a Javanese elite (priyayi) has functioned in such an ‘exclusionary’ manner and continues to do so today. While Western notions of capitalism certainly do little to help the local development of the Desa I studied, traditional Javanese customs of elitism (Suhartoism) are more inhibitive of Trickle Down than are
distant debates, theories and notions of Western economic organisation. In reality, Western notions of industrial development fitted quite nicely with existing Javanese elitist tradition.

For centuries the Javanese *priyayi* have functioned economically, socially and politically as an elitist culture, dominating their own peasants and other cultures (the Sundanese). Indonesian nationalism was instigated, promoted and controlled by Java's elite who re-asserted their pre-colonial control of Indonesia after the 1950s (SarDesai, 1996:154-158). When Suharto came to power, he adopted many of the principles of the *priyayi* into politics, the military and the economy. Moreover, Western notions of capitalism suited 'Suhartoism' perfectly. The blame for the failure of Trickle Down in Indonesia should no longer be laid completely at the feet of Western economists or economic theory and should be equally shared by the Javanese elite. Before, during and after Dutch and other significant European influence in Indonesia, compatible Western systems of political rule and associated stability, which were tied to control of manpower and increased productivity, were prevalent in Java and were systems developed by the *priyayi* whose birthright assured them political position and power (Hoadley, 1994:65-89). These principles are still prevalent in contemporary Indonesia and although they may have changed over the centuries, they continue to persist in an all pervasive manner. It is time the world started to look more closely at the enormous wealth accumulated by Javanese elites and their allies, instead of
placing the blame of development failure completely upon intangible Western theory, or upon philosophies which criticise capitalism. If, for example, the positive outcomes of development were not blocked by Indonesian rent seekers (‘actors at a distance’), the likelihood that Trickle Down would at least salvage some vestige of credibility, by providing more positive ‘development’ outcomes to those at the local level, would be greatly increased. As the development process now stands in Indonesia, rent seekers are the major beneficiaries of development. Their children will prosper in Indonesia’s exclusionary system, but the masses will not. This was blatantly obvious when viewed through the case studies above.

2) Within the same Western-derived theoretical realm of Trickle Down is the Gender and Development approach (GAD). This is another theoretical approach which also needs to be viewed in light of the IDT case studies presented above. There are five basic principles of the GAD approach which are outlined in The CEDPA Training Manual (1996) and are relevant to this analysis. These will be discussed in relation to the reality of the position of women in development which I observed in Banjaran, particularly in the two Desa studied above. The five principles will be discussed separately.

GAD, to be practical in the field, according to CEPDA (1996:50) should be based upon the following:
A. An approach which seeks to empower women and transform unequal relations between women and men.

Looking at the position of the factory women in Banjaran, this approach seems realistic enough on a theoretical level. However, how can women be empowered in a basically patriarchal society when men in the factory workers’ households I observed have very little power themselves? Power cannot be instilled upon women while their fathers, husbands or brothers are ostracised from political and economic power and commonly suffer lower wages and less employment opportunities than do many young women. Factory work does not bestow equal relations between men and women. It simply tends to be a re-statement of past industrial developments under the Dutch, whereby poor men also act as pawns in the development process. Simply empowering women would not transform unequal relations between men and women, nor would it mean the alleviation of poverty in general. This assumption dictates that women survive in a vacuum and can be empowered as such. Empowering people would be a better method, but this too would be problematic in Indonesia because it carries treasonable connotations.

B. Relations between men and women need to be focused upon.

This statement is realistic and relations between Sundanese women and men were focused upon in this research. The resulting conclusion was that while the women exist culturally, economically and socially within a ‘patriarchal’ society, the subordination they face at the factories from male management
and from the state is far more destructive of their development potential. Further, simply focusing upon gender relations in the Third World does not necessarily mean positive outcomes will result. If we, as Western readers, simply understand gender relations, this will have little influence upon the reality I observed. In essence, ‘gender relations’ function at many levels in Banjaran and Indonesia and are also different between households. Moreover, it is problematic attempting to focus on a phenomena like gender relations when it cannot be easily defined or even described. While understanding or focusing upon gender relations is important, this alone is too narrow a focus and would lead to a highly subjective and non-representative outcome. To be more objective and even pragmatic class relations and the existence of a power-elite in Indonesia is in more desperate need of focus.

C. Unequal relations of power (rich and poor/women and men) that prevent equitable development and women’s full participation.

This is perhaps the most pertinent aspect of the GAD approach. It highlights the need to focus upon class relations and unequal access to power which I found were the most significant inhibitors to development in the Desa studied. Equitable development is blocked by an elite in Indonesia, usually a patriarchal-based and culturally reinforced political and economic clique. What is naive about the above statement is the fact that it assumes if these inequities are addressed women’s full participation in development will result. Look at it this way. Men in the two Desa studied above were predominantly
denied access to industrial employment and the higher wages associated with factory work, yet a male patriarchy controls Indonesia’s political economy. This contradicts claims that unequal and patriarchally driven power relations at Indonesia’s highest levels are at the forefront of gender inequality at the ground level. This is a simplistic assumption which pays too much attention to an invisible gender division in a given population. It proposes an ‘us and them’ mentality between men and women, which is supposed to function at all levels of society, dividing men and women, no matter what class or culture they belong, into two opposing teams competing against each other.

D. Equitable, sustainable development. Women and men sharing decision-making and power.

This is a naive approach which has no historical, cultural or political reality when applied to Banjaran, Indonesia or most developing nations. For centuries, a small group of men have dominated all aspects of Indonesian society, especially the public realm and that will not change in the near future. Further, decision making is controlled by an elite in Indonesia, who are careful to exclude most others. If this elite happened to be female I am certain the same problems would continue as exclusion and the power of class and ethnicity are so ingrained in the political and cultural economy of Indonesia that it would be extremely difficult to remedy. For example, Suharto’s wife (recently deceased) and daughters are considered the driving force behind
Suharto's long term success and economic policy and have benefited enormously from exclusion and associated Rent-Seeking.

E. **Address the short and long term needs of women and men to improve their condition.**

These needs were theoretically addressed by the IDT Program. Suharto and his wife were highly public about their support for the program. Yet it has done very little except to enhance the corruption and collusion endemic in Indonesia. The Lurah and the Head Families who have potentially benefited from the IDT Program at the expense of poorer families are merely acting in accordance with tradition in Indonesia. They are not acting any differently to the Javanese elite. Basic needs cannot be met if those attempting to meet the needs of the people are themselves highly pre-disposed to emulate the actions of higher levels of government or elitist Javanese tradition.

In theory GAD assumes that women are oppressed by gender relations and by class structures. GAD argues that women, ostracised from decision making and the benefits of development, have more in common with men of their class than with women from higher classes (CEPDA, 1996:vi). Theoretically, this fitted well with the reality I observed in Banjaran. However, *The CEPDA Training Manual* provides no solutions to this problem. If the major problem in rural Indonesia stems from greed and corruption by an indigenous elite, surely this is the place where GAD should focus its attention, which it doesn't.
Instead it provides many naive and unrealistic approaches designed to improve the position of women *vis-a-vis* development at the micro-level. Such approaches would have little impact upon Indonesia's 'top heavy' exclusionary economy. The Indonesian elite do not want to empower people. That would mean having to share the spoils of development with too many. They want to control them.

On the positive side it is evident from my research that women were 'accidentally' empowered through factory work. They have stable and reasonably well paid employment when compared to most men in their villages. Sundanese factory workers were generally providing positive outcomes to those around them. But this was due to cultural and geographic factors and the nature of the family in Sundanese West Java. It had very little to do with outside prompted 'empowerment'. They empowered themselves under extremely difficult circumstances without any government concern or assistance.

By focusing upon decision making, GAD has missed an important aspect of most social and economic organisation. Decision making is first and foremost politically based in Indonesia. Next it is culturally based with the Javanese dominating the political arena in Indonesia. At another level, it is economically based, with wealthy Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, who form an extremely small minority, controlling development. Because
Indonesia is a highly centralised state, the decision making processes originate 'at the top' and are passed down to the local level. 'Bottom up' approaches to empowerment and development are seriously hampered as a result. Gender bias, or the fact that women are denied access to political decision making processes, which according to GAD negatively effects women in the development process, is harnessed at the top level in Indonesia. I believe it would not matter if this political elite were female, the outcome would be the same. The majority of Indonesia's poor and relatively illiterate population would continue to be excluded from decision making and any share in the massive wealth industrial development has bought to Indonesia. To empower poor women, from poor families who have been excluded for centuries from power would be perceived as a threat by the state and, ideologically, by Islam, which will be discussed below.

Both discussions (above) reveal a certain amount of naivety in Western approaches to development, especially in their neglect of the all-pervasive role of the state in nations such as Indonesia. They have no room to allow the state to act as a major player in the outcomes of development. Both skim over the role of the state, when in fact the relationship between women and the state should be a central focus and a starting point of any discussion of the impact of development upon women. The best method to justify this claim is by highlighting the views of Third World writers themselves. Shirin Rai (1996) provides an excellent discussion of the issue in her paper Women and the
State in the Third World. She states (p25) that the state must be brought back into the focus of any research about women’s lives in the Third World. Rai argues that, overall, the current debate on the state is Eurocentric and does not account for the extraordinary dominance the state has over most women in post colonial regimes.

According to Rai, Western feminist theory and research have mis-understood the Third World state. Rai (1996:25) states “They tend to overlook the processes of the state and class formations in the Third World, and therefore the relations of exploitation operating in the economic and socio-political terrain”. Rai stresses her belief that Third World women’s lives are severely affected by national and international forces in the era of globalisation. What is overlooked is that Third World women are not protected by the state to the same extent as are most First World women. As a result, many of the writings of Third World women have correctly focused upon the state and its impact upon the lives of women. These women view the state and civil society as “complex terrains: fractured, oppressive, threatening...both the state and civil societies form the boundaries which women act and are acted upon. To ignore these boundaries would be foolhardy for women due to the enormous capacity of the state for violence” (Rai, 1996:32). Approaches and discussion about Trickle Down and GAD should therefore focus their attentions upon the state before attempting a more local focus.
On a more specific level, and from a very rare Sundanese cultural perspective, Skinner (1966) studied the relationship between the Sundanese and the state. Skinner reiterated the fact that economic, political and social development revolves in West Java around the Desa and its strict control by the state. Skinner (p266) argues that this system places the Sundanese at an extreme disadvantage because the Desa system itself is an 'imposition' derived from traditional Javanese political and agrarian organisation. Today, the Desa system functions at the local level and the Lurah at the head of that system is the only real elected representative of the people. However, the reality is, in much of Indonesia, and especially in Banjaran, that the Lurah is also an elite who is one of only a few who has the power to become elected. All the Lurah in Banjaran were obviously among the wealthiest in their Desa. Skinner argues that in the 1960s the Sundanese had very little empathy toward the state or the Desa system, a view supported more recently by Niehof and Sastramihardja (1978), Warwick (1986) and Ancok (1991). These authors claim that the Sundanese adopted a resistive stance toward the state which they perceived as being Javanised and destructive to their development and homogeneity.

Using the Desa system, centralised political control was strengthened after Indonesia's independence. The new state gave priority to organising its large rural population under the Desa (village) system (Skinner, 1966:267). The Desa system works to allow the state to oversee its large and problematic rural
population from urban centres through centralised and highly autocratic control and spasmodic violence. Originally, the Desa system was originated by the Dutch after they had viewed its success among traditional Javanese regencies. The contemporary Indonesian state has continued this practice and all public officers are appointed by the state and not the people. In theory, the Lurah is the only officer elected by local people, but this is only a partial reality. Further, even if the Lurahs were completely dedicated to the cause of local people, they would face opposition by all levels of government above them, all of which represent Golkar and not the electorate. Skinner (1966:269) argues from a Sundanese perspective that:

In moving from the local up into the regional levels of the socio-political structure, the villager almost immediately and universally encounters leaders and officials, groups and causes, which are... elite oriented. Above the local level the villager is hard put to find leaders who genuinely identify themselves with the values of the rural population.

These words were written in the 1960s, when Sukarno was in power. Sukarno is viewed fondly by the Sundanese and is perceived by them as a democratic leader. After Suharto came to power the Sundanese have been increasingly ostracised by the political elite as Suharto is not viewed by the Sundanese with fondness, trust or admiration. Under Suharto’s leadership the state has become more elitist, autocratic and less representative of the people. This adds to the exclusion most people in Banjaran must live with. All future development research needs to address issues such as these and at least have a basic
understanding of the political, economic and social history of the region they are focusing upon.

3) *Kodrat* and *Takdir* are two highly symbolic terms which have theoretical relevance when applied to the debate about women and their role in development in Indonesia. They also shed light upon the nature of power and destiny in Indonesia. *Kodrat* and *Takdir* are terms taken from the Quaran and adopted by the state in its control of Indonesian people and, more particularly, Indonesian women. The terms will be discussed separately to highlight how they relate to the above debate regarding IDT, development and women.

*Takdir*: In its purest sense *Takdir* means that God determines everything. All that people can do is try hard and accept their fate, but God is still in control (*kita harus terus berusaha, tetapi Tuhan yang menentukan*). *Takdir* asserts a person’s fate is defined before birth. One’s life, position and status are defined by God. *Takdir* is commonly used to organise society on a philosophical level through the rhetoric of the Indonesian state. Therefore, if you are born poor, powerless and without hope that is your destiny. It is your *Takdir*. In this sense, endemic poverty can be blamed on the people themselves as it could be argued, using the powerful ideology of *Takdir*, that those destitute are that way because of God’s will, not the will of the state. In one sense, the Indonesian state uses *Takdir* as a scapegoat, offering to help people break away from their destiny through development, education and modernisation.
But these promises have proved empty for most. According to the state’s version of *Takdir*, if you are poor then you will stay poor, if you are rich and powerful it is God’s will. *Takdir* also defines who and when people marry and when and where people die. *Takdir* has many similarities with the caste system in India and was a well known term which was taken seriously by those who spoke about it, regardless of their class. Obviously, in private many people disagreed with the assumptions of *Takdir*, especially extremely poor people, but these same people have endured centuries of exclusion and can be excused for at least partially accepting their *Takdir*.

*Kodrat*: Is closely related to *Takdir* and is also an Islamic term, but one which is usually relevant only to women. *Kodrat* is outlined in various forms in Indonesian state policy, labour laws and philosophy. The term itself means God’s will or the power of nature, which in terms of Indonesian women translates to assumptions that women are tied to the home and husband and are responsible for the moral development of society. These are more than assumptions according to *Kodrat*, they are forces of nature which are immutable. To Sundanese women interviewed from all social classes *Kodrat* had the following meanings:

1) It meant that they had to be obedient daughters and respectful of men;
2) It meant that they must give the biggest part of their life to being wives and mothers;
3) It meant they must serve their husbands and that they;  
a) must give mothers milk to their children.
b) cannot reject God's will.
c) must believe in their destiny and the power of nature.
   d) must accept the choice of husband God has made for them.

These same women, when asked what application *Kodrat* had toward men, both officially and according to *adat*, replied in the following manner:

1) *Kodrat* can relate to men but it simply means that men should want women and want sex (all the time).

The burden of social responsibility according to *Kodrat* is, like the state's attitude toward female labour, unjust when viewed through the eyes of women and especially so when compared to the roles expected of Indonesian men.

*Kodrat* does not decree that women cannot work, and according to all women questioned this was true. However, the large majority stated that *Kodrat*, while allowing them to work, also assured that they had to fulfil their traditional obligations to the household, husband and family. In essence, they could work in factories but their duties under *Kodrat* could not be shunned. If work interfered with these duties then *Kodrat* and Sundanese *adat* (local cultural beliefs) prescribed that they quit work. *Kodrat* also applies to factory discipline. Many women stated that because of the teachings of Islam and *Kodrat*, which also fitted well with Sundanese *adat*, they were very good factory workers. Women stated they could not help but apply the notions of *Kodrat*, originally designed for the household, to the factory itself. In this
sense, women tended to replace their ‘God given’ duty to the household to the factory itself.

*Kodrat* is a theoretical perspective. It is a most relevant way in which to view the women in development processes in Banjaran. It has religious, cultural, geographic, economic and national significance. While *Kodrat* may have little realistic use in the everyday life of Sundanese women struggling for survival, it has significantly shaped their attitudes toward their own destiny and position in society. By significantly upholding *Kodrat* as official policy toward women, the Indonesian state has attached religious significance to the status and role of women, something which is at odds with a state which claims to be secular.

In many ways women who work in factories are challenging *Kodrat* and *Takdir*. Women asserted in interviews that *Kodrat* allowed them to work as long as their duties to family and household (society) are not sacrificed. However, simply by working they are silently challenging both notions of *Takdir* and *Kodrat*. By earning an income, which is commonly used to provide education and other positive outcomes to their family, combined with the positive example many provide to their siblings and wider society, factory women are potentially upsetting notions which assume poor families are simply fulfilling their destiny: To be born poor, remain poor and die poor. If factory women are able to consolidate their status in society, and continue to
make crucial financial contributions to their families and potentially create an economic situation where one day they could buy land, a house or small agricultural holdings or even start a small business, they would be upsetting traditional economic organisation according to God’s will. They are acting in a threatening manner. Pre-existing class systems, which have developed from pre-colonial feudal systems, colonial domination and Suhartos’ New Order, are also being challenged by such women. The continual struggle and loyalty of factory women, in the face of inhumane wages and conditions, will aid in the advancement of the poor in Indonesia. If these factory women continue, or are allowed to continue, in stable factory employment, these challenges to Indonesia’s exclusionary economy, propped up by convenient notions of Takdir and Kodrat, will become significant. It is ironic that, today, Indonesia’s most prominent citizen, born into extreme rural poverty, uneducated and constrained by Dutch policy, ostensibly challenged Takdir to become the richest man in the nation with ultimate political power. That person is Suharto himself. He escaped his Takdir, but is one of only a few. Suharto has set up a regime that ensures he decides who may or may not escape God’s will.

Chapter Summary

This chapter has been, in many ways, a review of the previous chapters. However, by focusing upon the ‘extremes’ of two Desa, one highland and one lowland, the chapter provided a somewhat dramatic review of previous issues
discussed in this study. The description of two Desa, which were in themselves ‘world’s apart’ but shared one thing, extreme poverty, underdevelopment and being classified as Tertinggal, was the central focus of the chapter. This focus revealed many important findings. These findings were discussed in light of theoretical approaches (Trickle Down, GAD, Takdir and Kodrat). The chapter again highlighted the enormous constraints factory women face simply to ensure a positive outcome is achieved for themselves or their families as a result of their participation in development. These constraints include a corrupt and inefficient state, Islamic beliefs and specific notions related to ‘Westernised development’.

Empirical analyses of the IDT Program and its relationship to general industrial development was used to discuss the impacts of development upon two groups of factory women, from two different Desa. Further, four theoretical approaches were highlighted to show the ways in which theory supports, distorts or alienates women who are at the forefront of contemporary industrial development in Indonesia. Two of these approaches were Western-centred, and two were drawn from Islamic tradition. The approach showed clearly that ‘micro’ or ‘ground level’ development programs should be pursued with extreme caution in Indonesia. Any development, to work successfully at the ground level, must first address problems at the macro-level. Such problems hinge around centralised political power, Rent-Seeking, Suhartoism and significant religious/theoretical constraints upon the
Indonesian people themselves, such as *Takdir* and *Kodrat*. To be successful, development in Indonesia must also address ‘exclusion’ and my belief that any project which became successful at the local level in rural Indonesia, thereby empowering people, would be perceived as either a great threat by the state, or a wonderful opportunity for rent seekers to ‘ply their trade’.

The fact that the IDT Program was cancelled soon after my research period was concluded supports my focus upon it in this chapter. The Program was rife with corruption and in reality achieved very little. Further, the small amounts of capital invested through IDT to each Desa were not sufficient to have any positive impact. It is therefore extremely disappointing that the UNDP awarded Suharto a much publicised international award in 1997 based partly on the IDT Program. In the future I would hope the UNDP were more careful before they awarded ‘prizes’ to state leaders, prizes which are commonly based on false assumptions and state propaganda and not upon reality. The failure and consequent cancellation of IDT is itself a good example of the problems factory women face in Banjaran: An almost complete lack of concern from their own state. The general welfare of factory women and the reality that they play an enormous role in alleviating ‘local pockets of poverty’, through hard work, are facts which the state has no interest in whatsoever. Ironically, the state continues to significantly inhibit women from providing such positive input. Even when the state acts to assist
the poor, it actually achieves the opposite, as the IDT case study above showed clearly.

It was deemed crucial to discuss the two approaches 1) Trickle Down and 2) GAD in conjunction with the two Desa for reasons of reliability. Theoretical approaches such as these provided issues like IDT, industrialisation and women and development in rural West Java with far wider significance than they would have otherwise had if they were only discussed with local relevance. By the same token, the discussion of Takdir and Kodrat reinforced approaches such as Hart’s exclusionary economy, making them more relevant and reliable when viewed in this light.

The next chapter is a summary and analysis of the major findings of this research in relation to its research focus. However, given the volatile nature of the Indonesian economy and its obvious impacts upon factory women, such as those studied in this research, this chapter incorporates economic discussion and analysis within its overall framework. A severe economic crisis gripped Indonesia and most of Southeast Asia in late 1997. This crisis has serious implications for the factory women I studied. Further, the position and status of these same women, explained in this thesis, are crucial indicators of the significant problems associated with Indonesia’s macro-economic structure (corruption, exclusion and repression).
Chapter Eight: Discussion and Macro-Economic Review

During the latter half of 1997 the Indonesian economy was gripped by panic over the recent and massive decline of most ASEAN currencies. Between July 2, 1997 and October 10, 1997 the value of the Indonesian Rupiah declined by over one-third (Alford, 1997). Between October 1997 and January 1998 the Rupiah declined by one-third again meaning that the Rupiah had lost 65% of its value in only 7 months. Investment interest, especially from outside Indonesia, declined dramatically and, in early October, President Suharto took the unprecedented step of asking for IMF help. The IMF responded by offering a financial package designed to reassert confidence in the Indonesian economy through the injection of massive funds. However, the IMF insisted that the Indonesian government and the nation’s banking system become more transparent, state monopolies on food be disbanded and many mega-projects, dominated by Suharto’s children, be scrapped (Leahy, 1997). At the time of this research Indonesia had partially submitted to such demands but Suharto continued to ensure his children were protected. Nevertheless, simply by making these very specific demands the IMF has inadvertently, but not openly, highlighted the biggest problem facing Indonesia today: Corruption, Rent-Seeking and the nepotism of Suharto. These are perfectly highlighted by the Timor car project, and countless other mega-projects which are dominated by Suharto’s children and closest allies and cause resentment, inefficiency,
lack of confidence and significant economic imbalances within the nation's economy.

The IMF has recognised the macro-impacts of Rent-Seeking and rapid ‘exclusionary’ industrial development in Indonesia, both of which have significantly contributed to the largest economic crisis in the nation for decades. However, the IMF has little concern for the micro-outcomes of this crisis and incorrectly assumes, that if the nation’s macro-economy is stabilised, these benefits will positively filter down to the workers. This research has shown the chances of this happening are more than remote. A lack of investment and tight constraints upon development in Indonesia will have the most serious impacts upon the working classes. The proposed US$23 billion dollar ‘bail-out’ by the IMF will do very little for the poor in Indonesia, but will provide crucial support to Suharto’s regime and enhance his ability to continue to exclude the majority of his people from the benefits of development. The negative impacts of this crisis will be most felt at the ground level, among the nation’s poorest families who have come to rely on industrial employment. The Sundanese women I studied in Banjaran will negatively feel the impacts of this monetary crisis, as will their families. For example, the initial outcome of the currency crisis in Indonesia caused the prices of basic commodities, such as rice and cooking oil, to increase as much as 40% (Mcbeth and Lioe, 1997). A forty per cent increase in these two
commodities will cause severe hardship to most of the households I studied in Banjaran.

While Indonesia is in the throes of possible long term recession, the plight of the workers will be even farther from the minds of government and investors (if that is possible) given the existing status of the Indonesian labour force. Discussions to 'save' Indonesia's once booming economy will have little positive impact on the workers in the nation. They will not be concerned with human rights, only with economic rationalism. However, I argue that the initial causes of the crisis, which were undoubtedly linked to corruption in government and banking, combined with cronyism and elitism and the consequent building of economic monopolies and oligopolies, if initially avoided, would have partially insulated Indonesia from the currency crisis in the first place. Many of the negative impacts of the currency crisis could have been avoided in Indonesia if the nation was not industrially dependent upon a few elite families who gained their extraordinary positions through cronyism and not merit. Considering the importance of the female workers I studied to their families and local and regional economies, it would have been far more prudent for Indonesia to diversify its development 'resources' away from the elite and allow them to filter down to lower levels of society, therefore giving the nation a more diversified and insulated economy which, at the same time, would ensure that the benefits of development would be more equally distributed. The increased financial status among the factory women in my
study occurred despite enormous obstacles (state, tradition, geography and patriarchy) and was based upon very small wages. If these wages were increased in line with improved working conditions and recognition of the important role factory women play in society, the consequent diversification and consolidation of ‘local economies’ would insulate Indonesia’s macro-economy considerably and at the same time ensure that ‘all’ benefited from development.

Leading economic analysts have predicted that Indonesia’s economy will take 18 months from October 1997 to recover to pre-existing levels of high growth. However, based upon the findings of this research, and given the extraordinary high levels of economic inefficiency and corruption in Indonesia, I predict economic recovery will take significantly longer than 18 months to occur. To facilitate recovery, the manufacturing sector will seek to rationalise labour costs. Rationalising labour costs in a nation with already inhumanly low wages (US$2.50 per day) and very poor working conditions means widespread loss of jobs and increased exploitation of the remaining labour force.

For example, in a recent interview, Bomer Pasaribu, the chairman of the All-Indonesia Worker’s Federation of Trade Unions claimed the crisis would cause unemployment to jump from 7.7% in 1996 to 13% in 1998 in Indonesia. Bomer stated that the only way for this impact to be countered by
the government was if it slashed illegal levies (Rent-Seeking) which caused invisible costs which amounted to 14% - 19% of total production costs, twice the nation’s labour costs (Footnote 3). Bomer also criticised the IMF package for its lack of concern for workers rights (TJP, Nov15, 1997). Such a rapid increase in unemployment, as predicted by Bomer, will lead to increased labour unrest, increased political instability and the heightened possibility of widespread violence again erupting in the industrial regions of Indonesia. I can provide no remedy for the corruption which has long standing roots in Indonesia except to strongly urge those with functional power (IMF, World Bank, UNDP) to bring pressure to bear in this regard and take this opportunity to instigate the restructuring of Indonesia’s political economy to ensure exclusion is no longer its mainstay. However, to date such agencies have supported Suharto and his allies (See Page 386). Nevertheless, as suggested by White and White (1996), I have provided more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in both the local and national contexts in this thesis. Further, by highlighting the importance of female factory workers to the lives of those around them I have provided one solution to the current crisis. If factory women were treated with respect and granted the financial rewards they deserve, a realistic ‘bottom up’ approach to development would be achieved in many regions of Indonesia. Such an approach would also seriously inhibit potential social unrest.

3. Bomer Pasaribu revised these estimates in January 1998 due to the worsening of the economic crisis, stating that unemployment would rise well above the 13% he previously predicted for 1998 (The Australian, January 17-18, 1998: P11)
In Chapter Two I resisted endorsing the World Bank’s (1995) view that ‘economic growth is good for workers’, using the study of Sundanese factory workers as a benchmark. However, I have not completely argued that economic growth was bad for the women and their families I studied. I simply argue that growth in the context of a nation such as Indonesia provided no pragmatic or humane safeguards to ensure that growth was ‘good for workers’. The women themselves, along with considerable family support, ensured that growth was ‘good for workers’, but not all were able to achieve this and many endured negative experiences, status and memories as a result of factory work. The World Bank (1995) also added that developing nations needed to make efficient use of their labour force to be more successful. Again the World Bank cannot be said to be providing an accurate portrayal of the Indonesian situation. Through extreme and long term exploitation of labour, the Indonesian state has made extremely efficient use of its labour force to the point of criminal neglect. The problem in Indonesia is that efficient exploitation of labour is equal to abuses of human rights flavoured with endemic corruption at all levels of government, thereby negating any efficiency associated with its exploitation. It could be argued that if rent seekers in Indonesia were concerned with community and social development, instead of their own personal well-being, the efficiency factor the World Bank spoke about could be achieved. In fact, the only area in which the Indonesian state-driven economy is efficient is in its control and exploitation of labour. In
all other areas of industrial development, financial organisation and state apparatus, inefficiency and a lack of transparency are major obstacles to creating a sound industrial economic base from which to guide Indonesia’s future growth.

Mehmet’s (1994B;1995) analysis of the relationship between the state and labour and Hart’s (1985) proposal of an ‘exclusionary’ economy provide crucial support to my position above. Both authors provide unequivocal support for my claim that state corruption and the exclusion of the majority of Indonesia’s people from the benefits of development are the most serious problems facing the nation today. The fact that these constraints are also historically-grounded supports the use of historical analyses in this thesis. I have argued that the state in Indonesia is the main obstacle to development filtering down to positively impact at the ground level. These obstacles are based upon Javanese notions of elitism, with Suharto at the head, functioning to allow only a few below him to monopolise the benefits of development. No longer should the state in Indonesia be allowed or encouraged to blame its own failures on Dutch colonial legacies or global inequalities, especially considering the remarkable success a few fortunate individuals have had in accumulating massive wealth in contemporary Indonesia. Suharto and the *priyayi* system of Javanese elitism are at the centre of these failures, just as the Dutch colonisers were in the past.
Mehmet's (1995) discussion of Rent-Seeking behaviour in the Indonesian context is done within a macro-framework and has been extremely important in this research to allow understanding of why female factory workers are exploited and not protected by the state. However, at the regional and local level, Rent-Seeking is also highly pertinent. I have shown throughout this thesis that regional and local rent seekers also inhibit Trickle Down and exacerbate the national and international exploitation of Sundanese factory women. These same rent seekers are only able to successfully seek rents at lower levels because Suharto and his supporters have re-created an economic and political culture in Indonesia which is based on Rent-Seeking. At the local and regional levels, rent seekers (factory management, transport providers, government officers, the military, food sellers and many more individuals) are also significantly inhibiting the improved status of Sundanese factory women. McBeth's (1997) analysis of Rent-Seeking in Indonesia supported this hypothesis. He found that, due to low government wages, poor education and the centralised nature of the state in Indonesia, as distance increased from Jakarta, rent seekers created their own revenues, illegally using their positions in government or the military, for example. At the local level the same situation was apparent in Banjaran. If the central government is aware of this situation, it obviously condones it. The result is that factory women face different levels of exploitation, due to Rent-Seeking, at all levels of society. To eradicate Rent-Seeking would mean cutting out the historic and cultural heart of the Javanese elite. However, corruption is so embedded in Indonesian
culture that such eradication would be a monumental task, probably only achievable through large scale class conflict or serious pressure from Western nations, which has to date been inadequate to say the least.

Nowhere are the failures of the Indonesian state more apparent than in their disregard for Indonesian women. I discussed the way in which the state advances the role and status of women as homemakers and wives who need to be loyal and obedient (to Allah, the state and family) to ensure the successful development of Indonesian society. Indonesian women have generally been loyal and obedient. They have kept their ‘side of the bargain’ by working in factories for low pay and poor conditions, by raising families and supporting their husbands and by working in many other important economic sectors. The state, on the other hand, has been negligent of its responsibility and betrayed its own people. Very few benefits of development filter down to Indonesia’s women. Education and literacy levels, wages, health and sanitation indicators highlighted previously by ESCAP (1991) and the World Bank (1993) show clearly that Indonesian women are in a far inferior position to other ASEAN women, despite the fact that Indonesia has been for the last decade the fastest growing economy in the region and is considered by many to be ‘the world’s second most important developing nation’ (Alford, 1997). Kemp’s (1994) statement that the position of women in Indonesia, especially as labour, is the most sensitive indicator of the extent to which the state has provided positive outcomes of development to its people is now in need of further analysis.
According to this research and that cited by Kemp (1994), Wolf (1990,1992,1994), Mather (1988), White (1993), Hardjono (1993) and LAIDS (1996) the state in Indonesia has been negligent, more so than in most ASEAN nations, in its regard and concern for social justice as an integral part of the development process. The position of women as revealed in this research is a perfect way to measure the success of the state. According to the findings of my research and most other research findings cited in this thesis, the Indonesian state is a miserable failure in this regard. The notion that patriarchal structures, which have a long history in Indonesia, are fundamentally designed to protect women are severely contradicted by these findings.

The way in which the state portrays women as houseworkers who are responsible for the development of society, impacts upon Sundanese factory women. State notions mesh well with other constraints upon women’s status among local Sundanese culture, such as Islamic religion and the way in which modern factories operate. Analysis of the data collected from factory women showed clearly that these constraints were commonly inhibitive of women improving their status as a result of their participation in development. The women I studied were obviously affected by all of the above. However, the way in which they were affected by state and other constraints was not experienced in the same ways by all women. Highland women, for example, were more inhibited by local traditions and culture, and especially by
geography than were lowland women. This was evidenced by their lower education levels, lower AAFMs and their inferior ‘contribution’ rates compared to lowland women. Further, highland women were more likely to be negatively perceived by their communities as a result of working in a factory, due to the longer hours they had to work and the associated dislocation they endured from traditional society.

In light of the authors mentioned above, one major question needs to be raised. Why is there such a clear division of findings between researchers who focus upon women and industrialisation in the developing world? Wolf, Jamilah (1994), Afshar (1985), White, Hardjono and Mather reported negative outcomes of industrial development upon women. On the other hand, Nike (1994), Hill (1997), BKPM (1994) and Manning (1993,1994) tended to have the opposite view, finding only positive outcomes. This research assumed that all the above studies were somehow biased and conducted research which was heavily laden with pre-conceived notions of the impacts that factory employment would have upon women. In my research I avoided taking on board ‘pre-conceptions’ which would lead to bias and also included the opinions and attitudes of the research subjects (factory women and their families) into the research design and analyses. If I observed and recorded positive outcomes of development they were not ignored. However, in general this research found that the positive outcomes of development only existed when women, family and culture ensured this. For me to take a position, one
way or the other, to take a side either with the 'positives or the negatives' is problematic due to the complexities I observed. Nevertheless, based on the data I collected I assert that the negatives, which were significant, were in no way outweighed by the positives. Surface to say that all of the positive data I recorded resulted from culture and household organisation and women's immutable concern for the welfare of those close to them.

Several of the theoretical approaches discussed in this research, such as GAD or dependency theory, share the basic assumption that all women from the industrialising world would feel the impacts of development in a similar manner. In line with the theoretical under-pinning of such theory, and because this research focused on a group of women with very similar socio-economic characteristics, one would assume that the impacts and outcomes of factory employment upon their status would be the same. This assumption was incorrect. The women I sampled were remarkably different in their attitudes and perceptions about their status and societal position which resulted from factory work. The impacts of industrial development had different outcomes in each and every household, depending upon age, marital status, geographic location and various other factors. However, due to the analysis of detailed quantitative data and corresponding qualitative research this thesis was able to make the following useful generalisations about women and development:
1) Women's status neither completely improved or was completely weakened by factory work. The Sundanese women I sampled tended to be divided in their views, with roughly half claiming increased status as a result of factory work, and the other half not. To improve their individual status required defeating a myriad of constraints, which interacted and impacted differently within each household and as a result of geographic factors.

2) Highland women are seriously inhibited by geography (continuing tradition and transport). As I observed the tendency for uneducated women to be channelled into the most exploitative factories, highland women, who were significantly less well educated than lowland women, are geographically disadvantaged by the development process despite the fact that they reside only 9 Kms from lowland Banjaran.

3) Women's wages were extremely important to their family's welfare and future. In general, women's wages were positively used by the Sundanese families surveyed. However, this was only due to the massive sacrifices made by the factory women in coping with unnecessary exploitation.

4) The higher the level of exploitation in individual factories, or by manufacturing sector (textiles, shoes, garments), the less likely it was that increased female status would result. Households which contained women who worked for Feng Tay, for example, were seriously disadvantaged because
of the unfair, inhumane and the unusually exploitative treatment their daughters received. This in turn tended to dilute any possibility of improved status through factory employment.

5) The major inhibitive factor Sundanese women faced emanated from the state. Violence, corruption, and the way the state allows its workers to be so easily exploited by other state departments and international actors are the most serious impediments factory women face. The women are fighting against these by working long hours for very little reward but understandably have very little leverage or power in such a ‘one-sided’ conflict.

6) History continues to be a major influence upon contemporary Indonesian society. Both Dutch, Javanese and Sundanese traditions continue to influence the lives of female factory workers in Banjaran. For example, the strict and inhuman control of Indonesian labour has been for centuries the stalwart of creating political stability and economic profit in Indonesia. The way in which the Javanese dominate the government and military also has historical significance.

7) Patriarchy is failing the women I sampled. Due to their increased education, wages and status (as a result of factory employment), compared to their mothers’ era, many Sundanese women are starting to question the notion that they should submit to patriarchy simply because it mythically protects
them and their reputation. International, state and local patriarchies are being legitimately questioned by many of the women studied because the women logically traced most of their problems to contradictions in patriarchal structures.

8) Sundanese factory women are not passively accepting all that befalls them. They are certainly constrained by a repressive state and local tradition. However, the fact that they sacrifice so much to improve their family’s position defies any notion of passive women. Women who work longer hours than most men, who endure harsher working conditions and receive very little in return should not be labelled passive simply because they don’t complain publicly or resort to violent protest. They are, in fact, active agents in social change no matter how passive they may seem on the surface.

9) Sundanese factory women contribute significantly to their households, their village and the local, regional and national economy. These contributions are financial. Further, the women I sampled also contribute in other ways, such as challenging notions that women are burdens or by providing positive examples to other women.

These findings discredit theory which promote a-historical notions of development. Theory needs to be able to encompass the complexities I observed. However, theoretical approaches and paradigms used in this
research were useful due to their ability to allow me to ground local or actor-oriented research and make it more assessable within a wider context. While many of the theories (approaches) discussed in relation to this research did not exactly fit the realities I observed in Banjaran, my findings and discussion have provided the ability for these to be better informed as a result.

A key issue or measurement in this thesis was the extent to which female factory workers contributed financially to their families. Hence this measurement tended to act as a barometer of improved female status in the region. This was crucial in answering the research questions relating to: 1) The extent to which the women sampled are influential in the overall development of the geographic area in which they live and; 2) the outcomes of industrial development upon the general or societal status of women. The financial contributions of the women sampled were significant. However, as discussed in chapters 4-6, there are serious impediments to the claim that the financial contributions of women (alone) improve their societal status. These impediments include the influence of Islam, Sundanese tradition (adat), the state, capitalist exploitation, marriage, patriarchal structures, education and geography. Further, in spite of over-arching Western theory, a significant cohort of those women sampled did not want, nor seek, improved status as a result of factory work. Such women did not want to be ‘different’ from their mothers. However, simply by working and earning an income they were in fact significantly different from the roles their mothers traditionally fulfilled.
This statement is a major essence of this thesis. While a significant cohort of women did not seek to improve status, they were in fact acting to bring about change through ‘conflict and cash’ by working and providing financial support to their family. Nevertheless, as a measurement, the contributions of the women sampled, which were identified as significant, were the most likely catalyst to improvements in female status among the Sundanese women I studied. In Chapter Five, I analysed the issue of financial contributions by factory women in detail.

I concluded that, despite the fact that a significant cohort of women did not want to improve their status as a result of factory employment, the households in which they lived were dramatically altered to suit the new working women. Therefore, whether women sought improved status or not, the simple fact that household strategies and organisation changed to accommodate the lives of factory women, implies conflict and change and inevitably improved status, or at least a more pragmatic status for women which would allow them to work unimpeded by local patriarchal beliefs and traditions which in the past forbade women from permanent or public employment. Overall this chapter concluded that the biggest positive impact upon women’s status is that they were no longer being viewed as a burden, as were their mothers and grandmothers. These impacts are related to wage earning capacity. Nevertheless, they were still in their infancy. I argued that, despite enormous constraints, Sundanese factory women are important contributors to their household, village, local
area, region and nation. Despite this obvious conclusion, the state in Indonesia continues to under-estimate their importance by continuing to propagate their exploitation and profit from it to the exclusion of most others.

The factory systems were also a major bane to women. The impacts of capitalist production styles, transplanted into the world of the Sundanese, were immense and usually negative. By focusing Chapter Six upon the factories I addressed the major research questions which dealt with measuring the influences of factory employment upon women’s status. Again this analysis found no one simple conclusion, as many women reported positive outcomes and refused the notion that they were exploited, while just as many took the opposite viewpoint. The attitudes of the Lurahs were also divided on this issue. However, I appropriately intervened claiming that factories, in general, were exploiting workers, even the few who complied with all relevant national laws. This strongly implies that the state in Indonesia supports the exploitation of its workers and does very little to protect them. By highlighting the worst of these factories, Nike or Feng Tay, I was able to show how exploitation within the factory system almost always provides negative influences upon women’s household and societal status. However, these influences differed in their intensity between individual factories or sectors of manufacturing and were also dependent upon the nature of the household from which the women emanated. Local perceptions, individual attitudes and the data I collected revealed a remarkable array of answers to the same questions which sought to
measure the impacts and outcomes (positive or negative) of factory employment upon women. Nevertheless, certain important generalisations were possible. Overall, I concluded that, despite the fact that roughly half of the data above did not reveal negative outcomes, factory production systems unfairly inhibited Sundanese women from contributing to their families and society to the extent that even the nation's laws theoretically allow. Despite this, women were still major contributors, but if the factory systems and the state were more considerate and aware of the importance of these women, and acted to promote fair working conditions, the status of women would improve dramatically and not in the slow, haphazard and 'unprotected' manner it was improving at the time of this research.

In relation to the influences of capitalist production processes upon women and the level to which these inhibit women from improving status, this research has found that such influences are almost always negative. The industrial system in Indonesia is highly exploitative of workers. This is necessary to allow rent-seekers and investors to profit in terms of the accumulation of wealth, prestige and power. However, from the point of view of the majority of Indonesians such exploitation is unnecessary for two reasons. 1) Exploitation means long hours of work for low pay and improper working conditions. Fairer wages for the women I studied would have enormous positive impacts upon their status, the wellbeing of their families and eventually upon their society in general. If only the state would realise
this, more positive impacts of development would be passed onto society by
the relatively safe, loyal and honest hands of Sundanese women, who would
be more able (than the state) to ensure that the benefits of development filtered
down to society. 2) Islam, the state and patriarchal structures should protect
women working in factories. They have a moral obligation and a potential
economic, social and political objective for doing so. The state could solve
many of its social problems if the wages of women were increased and their
human rights protected. The state officially portrays women as being
responsible for the development of society, so why not pay them, empower
them and trust them with this task? It is a task which they would achieve with
far more equitable results than Suharto’s regime.

The research question which addressed the impacts of rapid industrial
development upon the cultural values of the Sundanese towards women also
needs to be considered. Local Sundanese culture is comparable to state and
Islamic notions of women. Traditionally, and due to the economy, geography,
population and Islam, Sundanese women were confined to the home, or to
strict employment opportunities sanctioned by men. The state does little to
dilute such notions of women as houseworkers and obedient servants to men
and the nation. Therefore, to erode such traditional views of women, which in
the simplest sense have portrayed them as child like and burdens, will take a
long time. However, among the cohort of factory women I surveyed,
especially the cohort who claimed positive status resulted from their
employment in factories, changes were evident. Many women were perceived
differently by their families due to the financial support they provided, and
were beginning to destroy notions that women were a burden. Factory women
were generally providing positive influences to their status. The fact that this
improved status is not safeguarded due to state neglect and corporate greed is
the most serious obstacle to ensuring that this new status becomes embedded
in Sundanese culture. However, the women and the families I studied were
attempting to provide their own safeguards in spite of the enormous
impediments discussed above.

Rapid industrialisation *per se* cannot provide positive influences to the status
of women. Case studies and general data highlighted instances where many
women achieved no improved status as a result of factory work, or indeed
experienced decreased status. Such women either did not desire improved
status or were living in a household strongly constrained by tradition. Further,
many women claimed to have experienced decreased status as a result of
factory work, especially those who failed to adapt quickly to capitalist
production processes, or those who were dislocated from society due to long
working hours or those who worked in highly exploitative factories. Again
this dichotomy in the data which sought to measure the impacts of
industrialisation upon women’s status is typical of the overall findings of this
research. The complexities were enormous and I was left with the sometimes
unenviable task of providing generalisations. In answer to the question above,
rapid industrialisation has in general positively impacted upon women’s status due to their ability to transgress exploitation, capitalism and corruption and begin to destroy traditional notions that women are a burden, child-like and incapable of supporting a family. However, it must be reiterated, if left to the state and industrial system itself, women’s status would suffer a serious blow in Banjaran.

All of the research questions asked in this thesis implied conflict and change as a result of development. Conflict was not evident in the public realm, nor was it obvious among the women studied. I am tempted to state that the women I studied were polite, respectful and loyal, and that is the way I perceived most of them. However, this implies that I support state and local notions of women, which I do not. It also implies that it would be impossible for such women to bring about change through conflict, which is also untrue. Many of the women I studied were active, able to negotiate conflict and bring about slow social changes. Being away from home and their village for long periods each day and bringing home their small wages to help support their families were major catalysts to such change. On the surface, this conflict and change was not apparent. After 10 months in the field collecting data, interviewing women and their families and observing key households, I was convinced of the positive changes factory women were bringing about for themselves and their families and society in general.
I must make it explicitly clear at this point, that while I do not condone Indonesian state attempts to blame their own human rights failures (while at the same time accumulating massive wealth) on their colonial history, I do realise the enormous influences history has upon contemporary Indonesia, and upon its labour policies, especially those aimed at women. However, a key issue in this thesis was the relationship between the accumulation of wealth and power by an elite as a result of industrial development, a corrupt relationship which negates any blame being apportioned to colonial history. Nevertheless, Indonesia's colonial legacies, such as a corrupt state, exclusion and strict control of labour and resources are pertinent to the position of contemporary Indonesian female factory workers. I am not being a-historical by arguing that the Indonesian state should not be allowed to blame their shortcomings (above) on Dutch imperialism or contemporary global capitalism. I have argued that the contemporary elite in Indonesia have knowingly and cunningly filled power vacuums left by the Dutch and as a result the position of women has unduly suffered.

In regard to contemporary industrialisation, Indonesia is playing with a double edged sword. On one edge, Indonesia has opened its economy to global influences by deregulating sections of its economy. Indonesia has done this to attract foreign investors. On the other edge, Indonesia has left-in tact its closed and repressive treatment of labour. This is a contradictory stance which spells great danger for Indonesia. History has shown time and time again that to
repress labour to the extent that the Indonesian state does, as measured by its apathy toward the plight of female factory workers, is a recipe for massive social unrest. On the other hand, by opening up its financial sector to the global market Indonesia is placing its contradictory economy at the mercy of the uncertain influences of global capitalism, evidenced by the currency crisis discussed above. While Indonesia is praised for opening up or deregulating its economy by investors and economic rationalists, it still has significant work to do on its treatment of labour, especially female labour in factories. According to this research, these indicators are far from impressive. By keeping labour policies and practices in-tact, which subdue and encourage exploitation of labour to achieve profit and political stability, Indonesian elites are in fact hanging onto colonial practices which needed to be eradicated decades ago.

Western economic theory (Trickle Down, Modernisation) has played a major role in determining the status of labour in Indonesia because the state adheres to such theory to guide its development plans and has been supported in this for thirty years by the World Bank (Footnote 4). Economic rationalists

4. In February 1998 the president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, admitted that the World Bank 'had got it wrong' regarding its long term support of Indonesia's economic development path. Wolfensohn claimed he was not alone in his enthusiastic support for Indonesia, which he assumed was on a very good path until the crisis hit in 1997. At the same time, Emmy Hafeld, chairman of the Indonesian Forum for Environment, attacked the World Bank for supporting a corrupt Indonesian regime for 30 years. Other NGO's and economists supported Hafeld's criticisms of the World Bank. Despite this, Wolfensohn refused to address the political situation in Indonesia, and hence the World Bank remained dormant in its stance on Indonesia (Leahy & Greenlees (1998). "Indonesia call was wrong: Wolfensohn", in The Australian, February 5, 1998, P1).
have long assumed that sound macro-economic policy would eventually lead to democracy, social justice for all and improved living conditions in Indonesia and the developing world. This assumption is strongly linked to notions that the benefits of industrial development would eventually 'trickle down' to the masses due to state policy, laws of human nature and economic organisation. However, this thesis has shown clearly that, while most economists claim Indonesia has sound macro-economic policy, the reality is quite the opposite: Indonesia does not have sound macro-economic policies. The position of the women I studied and the economic crisis which began in late 1997 are testament to this. I have argued that the only sustainable sound economic policy in nations such as Indonesia is policy which seeks to include people and ensure that the benefits of development are more evenly shared. I showed clearly that, at the micro-level, Sundanese factory women were attempting to spread the benefits of development to those around them but they are seriously impeded by a repressive and corrupt state. Sundanese factory women were significantly more pre-disposed to ensuring that development was 'good for workers and their families' than were their own state. Sound micro-economic policies with primary concern for workers, combined with significant changes to the state apparatus are the only way in which sustainable development will occur in Indonesia. Top down approaches will never be successful in Indonesia when the 'top' (the state) is rotten to the core and when the 'bottom' has been ignored, oppressed and excluded for centuries.
The economic crisis of 1997/98 and the unprecedented and continual decline of the Indonesian Rupiah were finally traced by most observers to ‘social’ factors negatively effecting the reputation of Indonesia’s political-economy. A lack of confidence in Suharto’s regime caused the crisis to continue despite the initial economic theory that massive aid from the West (US$23 billion) would restore confidence in the economy. Indonesia’s presumed sound macro-economics were over-powered by the cultural landscape and by human agency. This point reinforces the need for social factors to be considered more important than economic theory or the position of a political-elite when the economic situation of developing economies is evaluated or measured. Any nation which exhibits extraordinary levels of corruption-led inequality, such as Indonesia, should never be considered to have sound macro-economic infrastructure. Any nation whose levels of social justice are extremely poor, as measured by the position of young female factory workers in this thesis, should not be labelled an economic success story.

I have used the position of female factory workers in Banjaran to measure the success of development in Indonesia and to highlight the state’s role in this ‘measured success’. Development (regional or local) cannot occur in Indonesia without significant and unnecessary state involvement. The state will not allow development to proceed unless its elite stand to profit personally and, as a result, the state vehemently controls development to
essentially ensure that the majority are not empowered by it as they should. Indonesian authorities are particularly cruel and dishonest in the way they encourage women to participate in manufacturing but at the same time ensure that only themselves benefit from this participation. In spite of this, the position of the factory women I studied showed clearly, that despite state and international obstacles to improving women’s status, such as corruption and repression, development cannot be said to be failing women workers per se. However, this is only due to the determination of individual women (and their families) to fight poverty themselves after experiencing the continual failure of their own government to provide them shelter and a more secure future.

In conclusion, and based upon the findings of this thesis, I will briefly address the Major and Minor Research Questions as outlined in Chapter One.

1) To what extent and in what ways are a cohort of female factory workers in Sundanese West Java influential in the cultural, social and economic development of the geographic area in which they live and more specifically within their own households?

The female factory workers I studied were significantly influential in the development of their households and geographic area. Indeed, I found that they are also extremely important to Indonesia’s development as they work in crucial manufacturing sectors and provide an immense boost to the national accounts. However, the most important way in which the women I studied were influential in development was in the realm of gender development.
Compared to the role and status of their mothers, Sundanese factory women were challenging traditions which had long viewed women as burdens, childlike and incapable of contributing to society except to bear children and remain obedient to men. Sundanese factory women, despite resistance from tradition (patriarchy) and other enormous obstacles (geography, the state and over-population), were important contributors to the cultural, social and economic development of their households, region and nation.

2) To what extent does the Indonesian state support or inhibit such development?

I found very little evidence to support claims that the Indonesian state supports, or even recognises, the important contributions factory women are making to Indonesia. The state ensures development proceeds at a fast pace in Indonesia without concern for workers’ rights. If left to the state, the women I studied would make very few positive contributions to those around them, and receive very little in return, as a result of industrial employment. Corruption, repression and rhetoric are the mainstay of the Indonesian state and its current attitude to labour, development and most significant sections of the Indonesian community. It is the women themselves, and their families, who ensure factory work leads to positive developmental outcomes for those around them without the aid of the state.
Secondary Questions

1) What are the influences and outcomes (positive or negative) of working conditions, capitalist production procedures and non-culturally specific labour relations upon the women sampled?

There were both positive and negative impacts of industrial employment upon the women sampled. Therefore, it is impossible to generalise about the impacts of factory employment upon women. Many women found the characteristics of factory employment (wages, dislocation and work experience) to positively enhance their status. On the other hand, women from highly exploitative factories found these characteristics to have a negative impact. All women surveyed, measured the influences and outcomes of factory employment by the way in which their household and social status was affected by factory employment. As discussed in Chapter Six, women who worked in 'better' factories or sectors of industry (textiles) were more prone to experience positive outcomes as a result of factory work. However, factors such as geography, education and tradition continue to contaminate these outcomes.

2) How, if at all, do these factors inhibit the ability of individual factory workers from improving their status and decision making powers at the household level?

Forty per cent of the women surveyed stated that they had improved their household status and decision making powers as a result of factory work. This claim was supported by quantitative and qualitative data. Further, more than
50% of the women sampled found their societal status had improved due to their wages and dislocation from tradition, as a result of long hours away from home. Nevertheless, patriarchy and industrial capitalism are fighting a ‘rearguard action’ and reputedly denying 60% of the women sampled improved status within their household. However, this is a simplistic statement because many women did not seek, nor want, improved status (as compared to their mothers). Further, other obstacles such as the state, geography, education and the factories themselves also significantly inhibited improved status as a result of factory employment.

3) How has the process of rapid industrialisation and the associated absorption of very large numbers of female workers into the formal economy (from a more traditional background) in the region of Banjaran, West Java, affected the cultural values of the Sundanese in regard to the overall status of women?

Rapid industrialisation (as a social process) is providing a significant catalyst to the improvement of the status of Sundanese women. Traditionally, Sundanese women married at very young ages, without adequate education and were confined to the home. If they did work it was in traditionally accepted, and poorly paid, positions in agriculture or basic service sectors (housework). Factory employment, combined with modernisation, family planning policy and improved education has meant that traditional attitudes to the status of women have changed. Such attitudes have been forced to change as more women become economically important. However, change is not
welcome by all, especially in highland regions where education levels are low and where tradition is strong. Nevertheless, overall I have argued that the status of the 323 women studied, from the perspective of culture and tradition, is improving as society slowly realises it is not rational to view women as burdens or liabilities, especially when they are major income earners. These improvements were not only confined to factory women, but were also evident among the female siblings of those women studied and among younger women in general as tradition slowly realigned itself with the fact that low status for women translates to the poorer socio-economic status of society in general.

The wages of the factory women I studied are arguably the ‘hardest earned’ Rupiahs in Indonesia, at least among women. While the wages their mothers obtained for low status agricultural or household (pembantu) work were far lower, factory work is a year round, highly stressful and dangerous job in which young women were prone to the overt exploitative nature of industrial capitalism and state intervention. Obviously Sundanese factory women have a greater potential to improve status, relative to their mothers’ era, due to wage factors alone. However, a major focus of this thesis was upon the way in which the state, local culture, religion, global influences, geography and over-population inhibited women from achieving this potential. These obstacles are monumental considering the tradition from which the young women I studied came. Nevertheless, with state support many of these obstacles would
disappear or be severely weakened. Unfortunately, based upon the state's past record, and considering its long term economic plans and the position the state has taken in light of the economic crisis of late 1997, it seems that only widespread conflict will prompt the state to act in a more humane manner toward labour, especially female labour. While widespread conflict is unwelcome, it is hard to see any other event having the ability to dilute the stranglehold that Indonesia's contemporary elite have over the nation's resources: A stranglehold which has developed from the nation's distant and recent past.
References


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Appendices
Note: Appendices 1 and 2 are formatted in a condensed fashion below.

Appendix 1

Questionnaire for Factory Women

This page to be completed at the end of each survey.

Respondent Number __________________________________________ _
Date _______________________________________________________
Time _______________________________________________________
Interviewer Signature _________________________________________

Confidentiality Clause:
I the author and implementer of this social survey declare that results and data collected will be kept under the strictest confidence and the names of respondents will remain anonymous. Research assistants will help to implement the survey which lasts approximately 30 minutes. Your answers will be kept confidential. To ensure confidentiality the interview is identified by number and not name. You can withdraw from the interview at any time, you do not have to answer any questions you do not want to and you may terminate the questionnaire at any time.

Signed: Peter Hancock.


Is this respondent a candidate for the Focus Groups or In-depth Interviews?
Yes / No / Possibly
Factory Classification:
(Circle appropriate answer)

Large / Besar
Medium / Tengah-tengah
Small / kecil

Textiles / Textil
Garments / Pakaian
Shoes / Sepatu

Factory Management:
Korean
Japan
Taiwan
Chinese
Chinese/Indonesian
Sundanese

Questions:

1. Who do you live with?
   Anda tinggal sama siapa?

2. Are you already married?
   Apakah anda belum menikah atau sudah menikah?

3. What is your age?
   Berapa umur anda?

4. How far from the factory do you live in KM?
   Berapa lama kamu tinggal dari pabrik anda do KM?

5. What does your mother normally do for a job?
   Apa pekerjaan ibu anda?

6. What does your father normally do for a job?
   Apa pekerjaan ayah anda?

7. What is your education level? How many years completed?
   Sampai dimana tingkat pendidikan anda? Berapa tahun sudah selesai?

8. Why did you leave school?
   Mengapa anda meninggalkan / putus sekolah?
9. Are you a permanent / piecemeal / casual, daily or monthly worker?
   Apakah anda pekerja tetap / dibayar menurut produksi / pekerja harian
   atau bulanan?

10. How long have you been working in factories?
    Sudah berapa lama anda bekerja di pabrik-pabrik?

11. Is your immediate supervisor Male or female?
    Apakah atasan langsung anda wanita atau pria?

12. How do you get to work?
    Bagaimana anda pergi ke pabrik tempat anda bekerja?

13. What is the daily cost of your transport?
    Berapa ongkos sehari untuk kendaraan?

14. Does the factory provide your food and how much does it cost each day?
    Apakah perusahaan menyediakan makanan? Jika Ya, berapa ongkos sehari?

15. How many hours a day do you work based on last weeks employment?
    Berapa jam anda bekerja (rata-rata) sehari berdasarkan pekerjaan anda
    minggu lalu?

16. How many days a week do you work based on last months employment?
    Berapa hari dalam seminggu anda bekerja (rata-rata) berdasarkan
    pekerjaan bulan lalu?

17. Based on last months employment, how many hours overtime a week did
    you work? Is this usual?
    Berapa Jam anda bekerja lembur seminggu berdasarkan pekerjaan anda
    bulan lalu? Apakah ini biasa?

18. Were you trained for the job? If yes for how long?
    Apakah anda mendapat latihan kerja? Jika Ya untuk berapa lama?

19. Have you been retrained or reskilled since this time? If yes, for what?
    Apakah anda mendapat latihan lagi saat itu? Jika Ya, untuk apa?

20. Based on your last six months employment what is your average monthly
    income?
    Setelah anda bekerja selama enam bulan berapakah pendepatan anda rata-
    rata setiap bulan?

21. Do you contribute regularly to your family in the form of all or part of
    your wages? If yes what proportion is your normal monthly contribution?
    Apakah anda secara teratur memberi kepada keluarga anda seluruh atau
    sebagian gaji anda? Jika Ya berapa perbandingan sumbangan anda terhadap
    pendapatan atau penghasilan total keluarga?

22. Who do you give this money to?
    Siapa yang biasa menerima uang anda?
23. Did or do your family support you financially to work? If yes, How much do they give you each month and for what?
Apakah keluarga anda ada atau pernah memberikan tunjangan berapa uang untuk bekerja? Jika ya dari uang anda berikan berapa yang anda peroleh kembali dan untuk apa saja?

24. What is your mothers education level?
Apakah tingkat pendidikan ibu anda?

25. At what age did your mother first get married?
Pada usia berapakan ibu anda pertama menikah?

26. If Married, at what age did you first marry?
Kalau anda sudah menikah, pada usia berapakan anda pertama menikah?

27. Do you have to do other work at home before or after finishing factory work? If yes how many hours based on last weeks experiences?
Sebelum anda pergi ke pekerjaan atau kapan anda selesai pekerjaan anda harus melakukan pekerjaan di rumah anda? Jika ya berapa lama jam sehari berdasarkan pekerjaan anda minggu lalu?

28. If you are married, where does your husband work?
Kalau anda sudah menikah, Suami anda bekerja di mana?

29. Do you do shift work. If yes does this often include work after 11 PM.?
Apakah anda bekerja bergiliran? Jika ya, apakah itu sering termasuk bekerja di atas pukul sebelas malam?

30. What proportion of your total monthly income is relative to total family income, for example, based upon last month was your wage 25% of the total household income regardless of how the money was spent?
Berapa perbandingan total penghasilan anda tiap bulan dibandingkan total keluarga anda tiap bulan? Berdasarkan upah anda bulan lalu dibandingkan total penghasilan keluarga anda berapa persenkah upah anda?

31. What is your fathers usual monthly salary?
Berapa penghasilan ayah anda dalam sebulan?

32. What is your mothers usual monthly salary?
Berapa penghasilan ayah anda dalam sebulan?

33. If married, what is your husbands usual monthly salary?
Kalau sudah menikah, Berapa penghasilan suami anda dalam sebulan?
34. What is the combined income of all your brothers and sisters per month who live in this house with you and are not married?

Berapa penghasilan semua saudara-saudara anda dalam sebulan tetapi mereka harus tinggal di rumah ini dan belum menikah?

35. How long have you lived in Banjaran?

Berapa lama anda sudah tinggal di Banjaran?

36. Do you have brothers or sisters who live at home and who usually work in agriculture?

Apakah kamu punya kakak laki-laki atau perempuan di rumah dan biasa bekerja di pertanian?

37. If divorced, have you remarried?

Jikalau kamu sudah cerai, apakah kamu sudah menikah kembali?

Appendix Two

Guidelines for Interview with all Lurah (Village Heads). In English only.

Name of Desa?

Number of Kampungs (villages)?

Number of Population?

Number of RWs?

Number of RTs?

Cost of luran in 1996?

Cost of luran five years ago?

Number of women from this Desa who work in factories?

1. Could you describe your job?

2. Does your office help to recruit female factory labour? If yes how?

3. How important do you think female factory workers are to the development of this Desa?
4. How important do you think female factory workers are to their households, kampungs and society in general? ____________________________

5. Many Western researchers claim that women in Indonesia who work in factories are being exploited. Some researchers have also stated that local leaders help to exploit women. Do you agree with these statements? ____________________________

6. What practical benefits in relation to development have you seen in this Desa as a result of women working in factories (education, children, marriage age, health, culture and society)? ____________________________
### Keamatan Bangaran

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**Map Four**

Fieldmap

North Utara

Lowlands

Highlands

Approximate Highland/Lowland Area

(highland villages not listed)