Document Type

Conference Proceeding

Publisher

IEEE

Faculty

Computing, Health and Science

School

Computer and Security Science

RAS ID

9051

Comments

This article was originally published as: Hingston, P. F. (2009). Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma for Species. Proceedings of 2009 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Games. (pp. 17-24). Milano, Italy. IEEE. Original article available here

© 2009 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.

Abstract

The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is widely used to study the evolution of cooperation between self-interested agents. Existing work asks how genes that code for cooperation arise and spread through a single-species population of IPD playing agents. In this paper, we focus on competition between different species of agents. Making this distinction allows us to separate and examine macroevolutionary phenomena. We illustrate with some species-level simulation experiments with agents that use well-known strategies, and with species of agents that use team strategies.

DOI

10.1109/CIG.2009.5286498

Access Rights

free_to_read

 
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Link to publisher version (DOI)

10.1109/CIG.2009.5286498