Author Identifier (ORCID)
Abstract
This study documents that managers of firms with greater labor mobility (LM) face higher personal evaluation risk (i.e., higher likelihood of performance-driven forced turnover), especially among firms with more transparent performance disclosures. Moreover, managers of high-LM firms tend to adopt lower-quality performance disclosures (i.e., lower financial statement readability, earnings quality, and accounting conservatism) to mitigate their personal evaluation risk. The effect of LM on performance disclosure quality is stronger for firms whose managers are more concerned about personal evaluation risk, but is weaker for firms headquartered in states that restrain mobility. Finally, low-quality disclosures by high-LM firms attract a valuation discount.
Keywords
labor mobility, managerial evaluation risk, performance disclosure quality
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of Publication
12-1-2026
Article Number
e70103
E-ISSN
14682443
ISSN
1369412X
Volume
26
Issue
4
Publication Title
International Review of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
School
School of Business and Law
RAS ID
102294
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Nguyen, J. H., Qiu, B., & Truong, C. (2026). Labor mobility, managerial evaluation risk, and corporate performance disclosures. International Review of Finance, 26(4), e70103. https://doi.org/10.1111/irfi.70103