Democracy and corruption: A complex relationship
Abstract
We argue that an 'electoral democracy' is not sufficient to reduce corruption. Our contention is that the institutions associated with mature democracy are crucial to successfully deterring corrupt behaviour. At the core of our argument is the idea that with well-functioning institutions, the probability of detection and punishment is sufficiently high to deter most decision makers from choosing to act corruptly. The empirical evidence we present supports this idea. The nonlinearity of democracy variables is tested to confirm that an advanced stage of democracy is crucial for combating corruption.
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of Publication
1-1-2014
Faculty
Faculty of Business and Law
Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
School
School of Business
RAS ID
19181
Copyright
subscription content
Comments
Saha S., Gounder R., Campbell N., Su J.J. (2014). Democracy and corruption: A complex relationship. Crime, Law and Social Change, 61(3), 287-308. Available here