Abstract
Using two multivariate regression models based on prior studies, this paper aims to examine whether the listing requirements of the GEMC are able to help the exchange to screen high quality IPO firms. It suggests that the approved IPO companies have better performances than failed ones, but listing requirements of the GEMC are unable to screen high quality issuers to go public, because the majority of listed companies performed poorly rather than better after their IPOs. This result is against previous findings that regard an IPO market as a screening device.
RAS ID
18693
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of Publication
1-1-2014
Faculty
Faculty of Business and Law
School
School of Business
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
Publisher
Canadian Center of Science and Education
Comments
Long, H. , & Zhang, Z. (2014). Listing Requirements Lose IPO-Screening Functions: Evidence from the Emerging Growth Enterprise Market of China. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 6(3), 29-36. Available here